3 Takeaways - Former CIA Director David Petraeus Provides His Expert, Riveting Take on the Russia Ukraine War (#128)

Episode Date: January 17, 2023

Former CIA Director and General David Petraeus (Ret.), one of the most brilliant military leaders of our generation, talks as only he can about the Ukraine war — how it will end, the likelihood of Putin going nuclear, the risk of a wider war, the weapons Ukraine needs to prevail, and more. Be sure to listen to Part 2 of this engrossing talk next week.

Welcome to the Three Takeaways podcast, which features short, memorable conversations with the world's best thinkers, business leaders, writers, politicians, scientists, and other newsmakers. Each episode ends with the three key takeaways that person has learned over their lives and their careers. And now your host and board member of schools at Harvard, Princeton, and Columbia, Lynn Thoman. Hi, everyone. It's Lynn Thoman. Welcome to another Three Takeaways episode. Today, I'm excited to be with former director of the CIA and retired four-star general David Petraeus. I'm looking forward to finding out how he thinks the Russia-Ukraine war will end, under what circumstances he believes that Vladimir Putin will use nuclear weapons, and if he

thinks the war risks becoming a wider Russia, US, and or NATO war. I'm also excited to find out how he sees China, as well as other risks, such as cyber. This is the first of a two-part series with General Petraeus. Welcome, Dave, and thanks so much for our conversation today. Great to be with you, Lana. Thank you. It's a pleasure to be with you, Lana. Thank you. It's a pleasure to be with you, too.

Let's start with the Russia-Ukraine war. What has surprised you about Russia's military performance? Well, actually, I was one of the various you who, before the invasion, said that Russia would not take Kyiv, much less ever control it. So that was not a surprise. And we've always known that the Russian military has a number of shortcomings. It doesn't have a professional non-commissioned officer corps. Its logistics, once it leaves rail lines, which they use very effectively, are much less robust than ours are. It's a top-down command and control system and so forth. That said, the ineptitude that they demonstrated with

campaign design was a bit of a surprise. The fact that they didn't use all that time that they had in maneuvers in Belarus and in Russia on Ukraine's borders. You know, if I'd been a commander with all that time in the field, I would like to think that I could help the unit achieve the ability to combine arms in a way that they have not. In other words, to have tanks supported by infantry that keep the shoulder launch anti-tank guided missiles at bay, supported by wars and artillery, indirect fire, very close to you. Engineers to reduce obstacles, EOD to reduce explosives, air defense to keep that off you, EW, electronic warfare to jam the enemy's networks, and close air support coming right over top with attack helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft.

They just have not done that, not remotely. And then the much-vaunted modernization turns out not to have been all that substantial. They were using really archaic command and control systems. Comparison to us, we use FM, which is not that broad in terms of transmission. You don't want everybody to be able to hear what you're saying. But ours is frequency hopping anyway and secure. It's encrypted. Theirs is HF, which broadcasts very widely.

You said it picked up in a police scanner. It's in the clear and it's single channel, which means that very widely, easy to pick up in a police scanner. It's in the clear, and it's single channel, which means that any citizen with a police jammer or any military with one can just jam their communications, which is one of the reasons that so many generals have been killed. They have to come up front to find out what's going on. Why are we stopped? They get out of their armored vehicle and very well-trained snipers trained by Western forces have been taking them out. And then again, a host of other shortcomings that they've demonstrated. But most significantly, of course, the fact that they completely underestimated the capabilities of the Ukrainians.

They underestimated the senior leadership of Ukraine, particularly that of President Zelensky, who has been brilliant in performing the tasks, the four tasks of a strategic leader. As we discussed, we built a website at the belfercenter.org at Harvard when I was a fellow there that lays out that there are four tasks of a strategic leader. You have to get the big ideas right, the strategy, you have to convey that, communicate it effectively throughout the breadth and depth of the organization, or in this case, the country and the world. You have to oversee the implementation of the big ideas. You have to drive the campaign plan, provide example, energy, inspiration, presence, and so forth. And then you have to determine, usually formally, sit down and determine how you need to refine the big ideas to do it again and again and again. President

Zelensky and his team, his senior military leadership as well, have done this brilliantly. But also then the entire country is mobilized. That's the biggest of the big ideas. He says, I don't want to ride. I want ammunition. I'm staying right here in Kiev with my family. We are going to fight for our independence. And the entire country has responded magnificently.

Russia completely underestimated that, didn't realize the advances that Ukraine had made since 2014 and the occupation of Crimea and that portion of the big ideas has been miserable. The mobilization, all the rest of that has been terrible. And then, frankly, they haven't adjusted all that well. There have been adjustments. There has been partial mobilization. There has been one commander put in charge. There's been a variety of adjustments, but they haven't really been sufficient to turn around a situation in which Ukraine rather than the other way around, though certainly Russia is on the offensive in certain areas, including this embattled city of Bakhmut down in the southeast, where they've impaled themselves on it very, very costly for every foot or meter that they have achieved. And it doesn't appear that they are necessarily going to be able to take it in the end. And if they do, by the time they do, they will have destroyed it because of their inept tactics, which are essentially when you hit the enemy, instead of employing combined arms operations and effects, they just basically plaster it with artillery, missiles, rockets, and so forth. How large are Russia's losses? Well, no one truly knows. The high-end estimate is that it could be as high as

100,000, which would make it, again, many, many times the 13,000 that they lost in Afghanistan in the course of nearly 10 years. And of course, that proved unsustainable for the USSR. And here you are already at six, seven, whatever times that was. And really, it actually brings to fore the central question in my mind of the war in Ukraine. And that is, when will President Putin recognize that this war is also unsustainable, not just on the battlefield, but also on the home front because of the economic, financial, and personal sanctions that have been imposed on Russia and Putin's inner circle, and also the export controls that have been imposed as well. And although the Russians really sent from central casting as a country to resist sanctions, because it's a top three gas,

oil, and coal producer. The world needs those energy sources to power the economy. And as a variety of other strategic minerals and agricultural goods, nonetheless, it is taking a toll. And the fact is there's some 1,200 or so Western companies that have either left Russia now or have drawn down their operations there. And Russia has set itself back already, probably at least a decade in terms of its economic development. And it could be more. So over time, at some point, assuming again that Western support for Ukraine continues, and I think that's a valid assumption, especially given that the U.S. passed at the end of last year a very substantial assistance package that should take us perhaps

all the way through this year for the United States. And other countries are continuing to be steadfast. The latest announcement as of yesterday, of course, is that we're now going to provide our most advanced infantry fighting vehicles, as are the Germans, the French, and the Brits, and at some point, perhaps provide tanks and provide some more long-range precision munitions, maybe even drones at some point. So assuming all of this continues and assuming, which I think is very solid, that the Ukrainians will continue to see this as their war of independence, their fight for survival, and continue to mobilize the entire country, they then will continue to do a much better job of recruiting, training, equipping, and organizing additional forces and capabilities. In other words,

force generation, which they have done so vastly better than Russia, that a country that is one third the size of Russia now has a larger army and a more capable army on Ukrainian soil than does Russia. And I think that is an irreversible reality because of the limitations that Russia has when it comes to additional soldiers and also the ability to equip and to train them, in which they have done very, very poorly as well. So these are the realities at some point. I think you'll see another offensive in a few months from now, perhaps on the part of Ukraine. We'll see how well that goes.

If it is as dramatic in its achievements as have been the past counter offenses, then you could actually start to see Russian forces crumble and maybe even collapse. So that's a very difficult development to predict. It's much more psychological, actually, than it is necessarily physical. But should that happen and you see further significant loss on the battlefield and the continued tightening of these sanctions, this being led by the deputy secretary of the Treasury in the United States, Wally Adeyemo, a brilliant individual. If that continues, then I think at some point, Putin has to recognize this cannot continue. And at that moment, then you might have meaningful negotiations, which are not possible right now. And then both countries have particular needs.

Russia has to get out from underneath the financial, economic, and personal sanctions and export controls and stop the loss of life. Ukraine has to stop the also loss of life, not just on the front lines, but of course, to its civilian population as a result of the damage that Russia is doing deliberately, attacking and destroying elements of Ukraine's power generation, distribution, and water systems. And also, I don't think you can have a frozen conflict in the way that we did after 2014, because Russia needs to get out from underneath those sanctions and export controls. Ukraine needs the damage to stop, and Ukraine will need a Marshall-like plan to help with the reconstruction of the country and a security

guarantee. We've been reluctant in the past to give an ironclad security guarantee. I think that should be in the past. That didn't work out very well. Our sensitivity to Putin's concerns about helping Ukraine or enabling them to join NATO or something like that obviously didn't work. It backfired. It allowed him to attack Ukraine. And this time, I think there will have to either be a U.S., U.S.-U.K. and a couple of other countries or perhaps NATO, although that's a little bit challenging given the fact that Hungary and Turkey and some others might object to it. You need unanimity. Keep in mind that Finland and Sweden have still not yet been okayed by Hungary and Turkey. They will be, I believe, but it's

taking longer than it should have. In the case of Ukraine, it might make it not possible, but there has to be a security guarantee or else you're not going to get success with the reconstruction. Keeping in mind that what really enabled the success of the Marshall Plan in the wake of World War II was not just the 110 or 2020 billion equivalent in today's dollars. It was the security guarantee, the security umbrella provided by the United States for those Western European countries that enabled them to rebuild and investors to invest with a degree of confidence that they'd be able to succeed. How do you think the war is impacting Putin's leadership position inside Russia? Well, it's a difficult question because Russia is so famously opaque, if you will,

and it's very, very hard to understand what's going on in the inner circle. Those that might even entertain thoughts about a coup or displacing Putin or something along those lines need to be really careful not to stand near open windows. I think they call it window cancer or something like this because they tend to fall out of those windows. That said, obviously, it has to have weakened his position, even though, yes, the country's with him. The polling is reasonably good actually in Russia. And of course, given the control over traditional means of presentation of news, essentially the TV and newspapers and so forth, Russia controls that very substantially.

It's a little more challenging in the Internet space, although there are efforts there as well. But by and large, Russians are fairly supportive still, and they buy all of his grievances and distorted views of history and his assertion that Ukraine doesn't have a right to exist. It's not truly a sovereign country. It was part of Russia and should be, et cetera, et cetera. So I think, again, it's very, very hard to predict when someone like Putin might be truly vulnerable. But I think he is certainly in a shakier position and situation now, certainly, than he was before the invasion. Do you see any risk of any kind of a coup inside Russia? I would have to say yes. But again, if there is something like that brewing,

it's going to be the most closely held secret in the world, because if it gets to him, the plotters are not going to have much longevity. So again, these kinds of issues are very, very difficult to divine and to determine. But certainly, I think there have to be those. There reportedly are those who are questioning, my gosh, what have we done? We had a pretty good thing going here. We were able to buy, you know, the London stand, all the Russians that had real estate there and so forth. They could send their kids to school in Western Europe. They could summer down in Southern France.

They could park their yachts in Italy and so forth. I mean, none of that is possible now. So their lifestyles have been dramatically circumscribed. Obviously, their profits have been restricted very substantially as well. And they're basically in a country led by a leader who is absolute pariah in the vast majority of the world, noting that, of course, we have lots and lots of allies and partners, and Russia has very, very few. At the end of this war, however it ends, what will it take for Ukraine to recover? How extensive is the damage to Ukraine?

It is very, very extensive. It is going to require a very significant infusion of money in the form of a Marshall-like plan. In fact, the German Marshall Fund actually has been working on what that should look like. The EU, US, and others have also been doing a lot of work on that. Obviously, the requirements change with every night's missile and drone attacks by Russia. But no, the economy has been devastated. So it's not just a matter of economic assistance to get them through this period. It is a matter of an enormous amount of outside funding to help them rebuild the damaged infrastructure in their country. Again, keep in mind that the other element that will be absolutely essential and without which

the reconstruction cannot succeed. And certainly there won't be much outside investment. The other element is an ironclad security guarantee that can ensure that individuals can do work there and can invest there with an expectation that it will succeed. How do you see the aid that the U.S. and other countries are providing to Ukraine? Is it sufficient? And if not, why not? Well, it's extraordinary, actually. What the U.S. has provided already, just in terms of arms, ammunition, and other military material, is already approaching $22 billion. You add in all the other assistance and various calculations, get it close to $50 billion when you're talking economics, these other forms of humanitarian

assistance and so forth. It dwarfs what other countries have done in aggregate, just as does our spending in NATO. It's not just more than all of our currently 29 allies, soon to be 31 when Finland and Sweden finally joined. We spent more than all of them together, really at 2.3 times or four times as much as all. So it is the U.S. If the U.S. does not lead in these kinds of endeavors, the rest of the world will not be at it with it. It will lack the leadership that is necessary. And I think the administration has done a very impressive job together with Congress, keeping in mind that, for example, the minority leader of the Senate, Senator McConnell, has been one of the biggest champions and supporters of

this and helped to get through, at the end of the year, this very substantial bill that was inside the overall Sondheim omnibus bill. That said, I would like to see additional capabilities provided. I'd like to see somewhat longer range precision munitions for the high mobility artillery rocket system, the HIMARS right now, the particular munition that we provide, the guided missile launch rocket system, GIMLR is about 80 kilometers, not quite, it'll land on an area the size of a dinner table with accuracy. There is another alternative called the small diameter bomb. We have a lot of them that are actually even cheaper than the Gimler, which could double that range.

So I'm not advocating going all the way to the Army tactical missile system, which is 300 kilometers, but we could double what they have. I'd also like to see the provision. We are now seeing the advanced infantry fighting vehicles from U.S., U.K., Germany, France. That's a big advance. I'd like to really see the German Leopard 2 tank added to the mix. It's much more maintainable than is the U.S. Abrams tank. I hope that that will be agreed in the weeks that lie ahead. I'd like to see Predators, so a more capable drone provided to them. I'd like to see additional air defense and ballistic missile defense systems. We've already provided a lot and we are providing, coming soon to a theater near Ukraine, Patriot.

But there are some additional very cutting edge technologies that we could use, high power microwaves, for example, for taking down drones, which are very, very cheap. So you're not shooting ammunition that costs... If you use Iron Dome, for example, in Israel, which is an incredible capability, but it costs $60,000, $75,000 per interceptor to take down a drone that costs a fraction of that. So again, there are a number of different items that I would like to see added. In many cases, there are legitimate concerns, issues are a number of different items that I would like to see added. In many cases, there are legitimate concerns, issues about the amount of training it would take, the amount of, again, can they maintain it, sustain it, et cetera. Are there technology risks if they fall into the hands of the enemy, et cetera?

I think these are manageable. I know that these are being discussed in the highest councils in the U.S. and in the West. And again, I hope that we can accelerate decisions on those because Ukraine is going to mount an offensive sometime in spring. They've already said so. And they generally follow through on what they say publicly. I won't get into where it might be located. But when they do that, they need to have everything that we could possibly have provided them because they are capable of achieving combined arms effects, contrary to what Russians have been able to do. They actually have combined the effects of armor, infantry, artillery, mortars, air defense,

electronic warfare, engineers, explosive ordnance disposal, close air support, attack helicopters, and so forth, within limits of what they have, especially when it comes to fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft. I hope you enjoyed the first part of my conversation with General Petraeus. We'll complete this two-part series with a discussion on whether or not Putin will resort to the use of nuclear weapons, whether the war between Ukraine and Russia will lead to World War III, and we'll also give you General Petraeus' thoughts on China. Be sure to listen to part two of this conversation with General Petraeus next week.

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