a16z Podcast - Marc Andreessen on the Mindset of Great Founders — with David Senra

Episode Date: March 15, 2026

Marc Andreessen joins David Senra for a conversation about entrepreneurship, history, and what drives some of the world’s most ambitious builders. In this conversation with David, Marc reflects on patterns he’s seen across great founders, why many of them focus relentlessly on building rather than introspection, and how technology and entrepreneurship continue to shape the future.   Resources: David Senra Website: https://www.davidsenra.com X: https://x.com/davidsenra Show notes: https://www.davidsenra.com/episode/ma... Marc Andreessen X: https://x.com/pmarca a16z: https://a16z.com/author/marc-andreessen Substack: https://pmarca.substack.com   Stay Updated:Find a16z on YouTube: YouTubeFind a16z on XFind a16z on LinkedInListen to the a16z Show on SpotifyListen to the a16z Show on Apple PodcastsFollow our host: https://twitter.com/eriktorenberg Please note that the content here is for informational purposes only; should NOT be taken as legal, business, tax, or investment advice or be used to evaluate any investment or security; and is not directed at any investors or potential investors in any a16z fund. a16z and its affiliates may maintain investments in the companies discussed. For more details please see a16z.com/disclosures. Hosted by Simplecast, an AdsWizz company. See pcm.adswizz.com for information about our collection and use of personal data for advertising.

We just have this fundamental view. The technology is like on balance an enormously powerful force in the world. And the big problem with the world is that there's not enough technology, there's not enough information, there's not enough intelligence. And we have this opportunity.

We have these special sets of technologies that let us fundamentally improve things. Anybody can build a product, start a company, even trying to be a VC. These are all completely open fields. And it's just shocking to me how few people actually give it a shot. And the fate of the world over the next 1500 years

is riding on the people who actually want to give it a show. You're much more likely to build something important in the 21st century. if you start with the founder and train them on management, then you are to start with the manager and try to train them on being a founder, creating new things. Take whatever amazing new thing you have and just put it in a room with like normal people and let them try to use it.

And you just like learn so much about how much of a bubble that you're in. Mark Andresen recently joined David Senra on the founder's podcast for a conversation about entrepreneurship, history, and what drives the world's most ambitious builders. In this conversation with David, he reflects on patterns he's seen. seen across great founders, why many of them focus relentlessly on building rather than introspection, and how technology and entrepreneurship continue to shape the future.

Here's Mark Andresen on founders. I wasn't expecting to start here. I want to talk about why you were consuming so much caffeine that you notice that your heart was skipping a beat. I love caffeine. So for a very long time, I always said, that's the ultimate day. Like the perfect day was 12 hours of caffeine, followed by four hours of alcohol. Like that's just like the ultimate. I did cut out, or at least for now, I've cut out the four hours of alcohol. But caffeine is just like one of nature.

It's most marvelous things. But it turns out you can't overdo it. And so, yeah, a while ago I was drinking so much coffee at work that I was sitting in a meeting a couple of years ago. And I started to feel just a little bit, something felt off. And I just took my pulse. And I realized I was skipping about every 10th heartbeat. So I had like an existential crisis because I'm like, all right, you know, I need to call 911. It's just like, I might have a heart attack, I'm about to die.

So I go under the table and I Google and I'm like, it's just a problem. And before Dr. Google said, no, it's okay. It's fine. You just might want to cut back a little bit on the caffeine. We were talking right before we recorded. Like I've read your entire blog archive, Fulge on Twitter forever,

listen to every single one of your, you know, podcasts that I can, for going back like a decade. You said something that I love and I never hear other entrepreneurs talk about, but I think it's super important that you don't have any levels of introspection. Yes, zero, as little as possible. Why? move forward, go. Yeah, I don't know.

I've just, I found people who dwell on the past, get stuck in the past. It's just, it's a real problem. And it's a problem at work and it's a problem at home. So I've read, obviously, 400 and I think now 10 buyer-referrous of his case entrepreneurs. And that was one of the most surprising things. Like, what's the most surprising thing

that you've learned from this? It's like, oh, they have little or zero introspection. Like Sam Walton didn't wake up thinking about his internal self. He just woke up. He's like, I like building Walmart. I'm going to keep building Walmart. I'm going to make more Walmart and just kept doing it over and over again. And you probably know, if you go back,

Like, 400 years ago, it never would have occurred anybody to be introspective. Like, it's the whole idea. I mean, just all of the modern conceptions around introspection and therapy and all the things that kind of result from that are, you know, kind of a manufacturer of the 19-10s, 1920s. Say more about that. Great men of history didn't sit around doing this stuff at any prior point, right? It's all, it's all a new construct. It was, you know, well, first Western civilization had to kind of invent the concept of the individual, right?

Which was like a new concept, you know, several hundred years ago. And then, you know, for a long time, it was already the individual runs, right? and does all these things and builds things and builds empires and builds companies and builds technology does all these things. And then, you know, kind of this kind of guilt-based whammy kind of showed up from Europe, a lot of it from Vienna.

You know, 19, 10th, 1920s, Freud and all that entire movement and kind of turned all that inward and basically said, okay, now we need to like, you know, basically second guess the individual. We need to criticize the individual. The individual needs to self-criticize, right? The individual needs to feel guilt, and needs to look backwards,

needs to, you know, dwell on the past. It never resonated with me. Do you find a lot of the greatest founders that you've spent time with and backed and partnered with or have low introspection? Generally, although in fairness, the introspection is probably linked to the personality trait of neuroticism, right? So, you know, a lot of the best founders are, you know, I think that like zero percent neuroticism. Like they just don't get emotionally phased by things that happen, which is a superpower when you're an entrepreneur. But having said that, some of the great entrepreneurs are, in fact, very neurotic. Like, you know, that's also the case.

it's not a, you know, it's not, it's, it's, uh, maybe it's a nice to happen to be low neuroticism, but not necessary. And so, you know, there are some that kind of get wrapped around the axle on kind of personal issues. You know, as you know, these days, sometimes that then, you know, kind of turns into, you know, use of, you know, psychedelics, you know, different kinds and those us synergienic drugs. And, you know, that's like one very interesting kind of trajectory for, you know, kind of the culture of the country, culture of the world. And, you know, we'll see where that goes. So we've recorded under like a dozen of these so far, most of them with some of the greatest, you know, founders living for the show. I can't

believe how many, how many times on almost every episode, psychedelics pops up. And they're like, you should try them. Like, I'm not doing any drugs. This would be clear, I'm not. I've never have, never have any to. Like, I have, you know, the problem is I already have, like, tons of horror stories from people I know or know of that, you know, kind of came out the other side. Like, well, I actually, I had a, my deepest conversation is what I actually,

was actually with Huberman. And, you know, and I was describing this phenomenon where we see at Silicon Valley where, you know, kind of, these guys get under pressure and, you know, they kind of feel anxious or whatever. And they decided to, you know, somebody tells him. psychedelics and they try it. And they kind of come out the other end as a changed person. And they kind of come out like much more at peace, but then they also tend to like quit their companies. They like moved into Asia and become a surface structure. Like they're just like, there's just like

peace out, right? They're just done. There's a whole bunch of examples of this. And I, and I was complaining to Huberman about this. And in true Huberman kind of wise Yoda style, he's like, well, you know, how do you know they're not happier? Like maybe that was the positive outcome. Like maybe the thing that was driving them to be a great entrepreneur was a fundamental level of insecurity, right? And kind of this, you know, this kind of unsatisfied, you know, kind of neurotic impulse. And now they're just, now they're just, you know, whatever the serotonal levels or whatever been recalibrated, that they're just kind of satisfied sitting on the beach and being a surface director. And, you know, maybe they're better off. And I'm like, yeah, but their company

is failing. And so anyway, yeah, so there's a possibility that there's a better version of you or me on the other side of, you know, ayahuasca, but I'm not willing to find out. I'm not neither. That brings up something that, like, I think about a lot. Daniel Ack has the greatest way to put this, like, he thinks the best entrepreneurs are not optimizing for happiness or optimizing for impact. I think that's true. I think it's certainly true for Daniel, yeah, who's, you know, kind of a great case study of that. You know, having said that, you know, I always kind of wonder is that, well, intrinsic versus extrinsic motivations. Impact strikes me a little bit as an extrinsic motivation. You know, it's like, yeah, impact, money, fame, you know, and by the way,

I think extrinsic motivations are fantastic, and I think, you know, they can be very motivating. The people who kind of get the great rewards for building great things, you know, deserve them. But at least what I found is it's the intrinsic motivations. that actually get people up in the morning. And there's where you're dangerously closed to straying into introspection. But, you know, it's like, okay, like what is the thing that causes somebody who's now, you know, extremely materially wealthy, extremely successful, you know, to get up in the morning and continue to, you know, kind of punch away at the world.

I think those tend to be interior. What's that for you? Oh, I mean, that that would require introspection. I'll let other people speculate. No, you have to. It's a lot more fun to speculate about other people's other people's... But I am curious about you because, like, you have a, you have a, series of quotes that I absolutely love. I save on my phone, I reread from time to time.

One of them, I'll butcher, but it's just like, you know, the world is way more malleable than you think. And if you just pursue something with a lot of maximum effort, drive, and energy, the world will recalibrate around you easier than you think. And I actually reread that this morning before I came over here. And I was like, what is that for Mark? Like today, like, what are you waking up trying to change in the world? Yeah, there's a lot that we're actually trying to do. I'm suspicious that that's my actual underlying motivation. Why?

Why? Just because, like I said, I don't think external impact is enough to keep people going. Or at least, I've seen way too many people who had a high level of external impact, and then at some point they just stop. Okay. Well, here's the problem with external impact. It's like, okay, it's four in the morning. You're staring at the ceiling.

Like, is that's enough. Like, external impact is stuff that's happening to other people, right? But it's like, all right, what is it about you? The story I like to tell myself is that I'm competing with myself, right? The story I like to tell myself is I'm getting up in the morning because I'm trying to become a better version of myself. I'm trying to become, you know, smarter and better informed. and, you know, reach better conclusions

and, you know, be better at what I do and continue to expand my skills. But, you know, again, to actually analyze that properly require a level of therapy that I'm not willing to engage in. So anyway, so, yes, much more comfortable conversation is that, yeah, what are you trying to do in the world? Which I would love to talk about.

I have almost no introspection either, so like I understand that. All right, so tell me what you're trying to do in the world now. Yeah, I mean, look, we just, we have had this. It's actually fairly amazing. that it's become a controversial kind of thing, but we just have this fundamental view of the technology is on balance and enormously powerful force in the world.

And basically that's a big problem with the world is that there's not enough technology, there's not enough information, there's not enough intelligence. And we have this opportunity, we have these special sets of technologies that let us fundamentally improve things. And then there's this very special

kind of personality type of the entrepreneur who's able to build a product and then able to build a company and build a phenomenon and really make an impact on things. And so when I look at the world, I'm just like, okay, this is just a very, the world we live in, it's just a very primitive and crude place

as compared to what it should be and what it could be. And so the whole thing that we've been trying to do, you know, for 17 years at our firm is, you know, build kind of the ideal partner to the founders that are, you know, trying to do that based on our own experiences of having been founders that we're trying to do that. Overall, the world, especially the Western world, is just, it's just stagnant.

Like, you know, the overall kind of theme of things, that just everything is stagnated. And we could, you know, we could talk a lot about that. But, you know, every once in a while, you have somebody who comes along, It's just like, all right, no, I actually have an idea on how to make things like fundamentally better and I have a way to build a business around that

and build a company, build an empire around that. And that, you know, and those people, you know, include ourselves in this, but, you know, those of us that are trying to do that, you know, we're like a rough movement basically against stagnation. But like, you know, without us, there's nothing but stagnation. But it's actually really funny. There's always this kind of criticism that you get from, you know,

whatever the, you know, kind of the corporate press or kind of outside critics, which is like, you know, you VCs are funny the wrong things. or you entrepreneurs are building the wrong things. It's like, well, nobody, like, licensed us to do any of this. Like, we didn't, like, apply for a permit, right? Like, get, like, judged by somebody ahead of time and told, yes, you get to do this, you don't get to this.

Like, many people could be trying to do this. Anybody can do this. Anybody can, you know, start, build a product, start a company, you know, start, you try to be a VC. Like, these are all completely open fields. And it's just, it's shocking to me how few people actually give it a shot. And, you know, and, you know, the fate of the world over the next 1,500 years is riding on the people.

actually want to give it a shot. So when you started the firm 17 years ago, was your thesis exactly the same as it is today? I'd say the core thesis is the same. The specifics have changed enormously. We can talk about both parts of that. But yeah, no, the core thesis was kind of the startup, the entrepreneur, you know, the founder is going to be

the core engine of progress in the world. And I think that, you know, I think that's more treatment over. In fact, when we started, it was still controversial, the idea that the founder would run their company. Even in 2008, 2009? Yeah, it was still very controversial. Well, it was very controversial. In fact, in fact, they were high-profile companies at the time that were getting heavily criticized for, you know, basically having these little kids running around, running these companies.

Okay, so you have this, like, encyclopedic knowledge of the history of Silicon Valley in your head. I've probably read, I don't know, 30 to 40 books on it, so I have some level, but not that you do. I remember reading a book on Nolan Bushnell front of Atari. He was like 27 at the time, and it was excessively rare. It talks about that in his story. It's just like, excessively rare for him not to be replaced once Atari started growing with, you know, CEO, like an older CEO. Yeah. Like, were there other examples that before him?

Well, so. Christopher Columbus. Alexander the Great. Right. So throughout history, most of the, you know, Thomas Jefferson, throughout history, most of the great things that have been built have been built by this kind of super charismatic founder type, you know, Will the Power founder type who, you know, basically built and run something to do that.

Hold on. Henry Ford. Hold on. I love that you went here because you don't remember this, but we had dinner in Miami with Jared Kushner, like, a year ago or something, and me and you would wrestle because I was so excited to talk to you. And I was trying to get out of you, like, you know, because I think about history-scrauded entrepreneurs all day. Like, this is why I'm doing seven days a week. Like, who are these entrepreneurs from history that you like? These are naming country founders.

Yeah, it's true. Exactly. There's this, like, recency bias, right? Which is like, the world that we live in today is the normal state of the world. And like, everything that happened in the past is weird and different. And those people were like, number than we are and, like, all screwed up. And it's like, well, maybe. Or maybe the world worked a certain way for thousands of years and we're in the weird time. Like maybe we're in a time that's just like really unusual from a historical standpoint. And I think this is one of those dimensions in which that's true. It just, it never would have occurred to anybody 100, 200, 300, years ago that if somebody was going to, like, you know, start something that they were going to be the person who ran, like,

obviously. It was just obviously the case. The book that I was recommend on this topic is called the Machiavellians, which is a sort of famous book from the 1940s by this guy, James Byrne, it's like one of the great geniuses of the 20th century. And he described, the way he describes it basically is he said, like, there have been, two fundamental modes of, like, business organization over the course of, like, basically the history of capitalism. There's what he calls bourgeois capitalism, which basically is, like, founder runs the company, name on the door.

The classic archetype for bourgeois capitalism was Henry Ford, you know, in the 1920s, and today it's Elon Musk, right? It's just like, that's you. And by the way, in the old days, it was Ford Motor Company. You know, it's not a Musk motor company. But, you know, everybody knows Tesla and SpaceX, like, you know, these are Elon. And again, that maps to this historical thing, which is that's also how countries ran,

and that's also how, you know, cities ran and, like, all these things. you just religions, by the way, like, you know, basically everything, you know, founders led the way. That's the historical norm. And then he said what he basically says in this book is he goes through and he says there's this new, basically, model that basically is an artifact, again, it's an artifact of kind of this weird period of time between the 1880s and 1920s where kind of the modern world, you know, as we know it today, kind of formed. And he said there's sort of a new philosophy of sort of leadership and management, which is called

managerialism, sort of the rise of the concept of a manager. And specifically a manager as contrasted to a leader. And so therefore the manager, therefore the idea of a management school, right, therefore Harvard and Stanford Business Schools, right? Therefore, the idea of the manager who replaces the founder running a company, you know, therefore the idea of management as a skill set that can be used to run many different kinds of businesses. In the 70s, this then turned into the conglomerate, which was the idea that it doesn't

matter what the company does. If you have a good manager, the company should do, you know, 30 different things. And so managerialism is this idea that you have this kind of interchangeable management skill and that that can basically run anything. And actually what Burnham says is he says, look, people are going to try to draw a value judgment on this and they're going to try to say this is better or worse than the old name on the door model. But he said the reality of the modern world is everything is big. Like, you know, for the electrical power grid to get big or the road network to get big or the car

industry to get big, large-scale systems need to be run by people who are training how to run large-scale systems. And so he said, you may or may not, same thing with the countries, large-scale countries are going to be run by people who are good at running large-scale things. And the founding personality type is not a manager personality type. Those are different. And so there's going to be a handoff when things get big and complicated. And so that's the model that Nolan Bushnell talks about, and that's the model that dominated Silicon Valley for 50 years. The problem with his argument is that assumes the managers are going to do a good job, right? And I think if there's like one dominant theme that we're seeing in the last 30 years, you know, in the West for sure, is like managers

generally, you know, writ large are not doing a great job. Or another way to put it is, the managers maybe are good at managing something that's going to be status quo for a long time. Like if it doesn't change, maybe they, you know, maybe they can run the banks for a long time, or they can run the power company for a long time or the car is the car is the car, you know, or soup, soup is the soup, it kind of doesn't matter. But the minute thing is change,

the manager personality type, because it's not the founder personality type, it doesn't know how to be able to change. Not everything is changing. A lot of things aren't changing, but for the things that are changing, they're changing, like, really, really quickly. I mean, SpaceX is like the classic example of this.

Imagine being a professionally trained manager, trained at, like, you know, a top management school working for a rocket launch company competing with space. sex. And the assumption of the entire rocket industry for the last 100 years has been the rockets are used once and then, you know, that's it. And the economics of launch are dominated by having a building new rocket every time. And then this like crazy guy in California comes up with this thing where the rockets line on their bunk. And you can't replicate it. Okay, your management

skills, like what good are your management skills at that point? And I think there's like a whole bunch of interesting areas of human activity where like that shift is happening. And so I think this is where Burnham's thesis collapses where it's just like, okay, the managers actually can't do it. Yes, there's a need to run things at scale, but no, the managers actually can't do it because they can't adapt. And the founder can just learn how to run things to scale. Well, that's the theory. And that's a big part of our theories. Yeah, the founders can actually learn how to do this. And, you know, this is still a controversial topic. This still comes up. Like, is because founders aren't necessarily, especially founders on day one are not good at doing

this. Like, okay, so in tech, let's talk about tech specifically. Like in tech, the founder tends to have been in a lab, you know, literally or metaphorically for 20 years before they start their company. Like they've been, you know, probably working by, themselves or with a small team. They've been building technology. They haven't been running things. Like they haven't been managing large organizations. They haven't been running public companies. And so there is a missing skill set. And on day one, they don't know how to do that. And so they do need to be willing to learn how to do that. And then by the way, they do need to be capable of doing that because some of them can and some of it can't. But yeah,

so this maybe is like the core thesis behind our firm, which is you're much more likely to build something important in the 21st century if you start with the founder and train them on management than you are to start with the manager and try to train them on being a founder, on creating new things. And I think this trend is intensifying. And so you're, because what's happening is all the old edifices, all the old incumbent institutions of the last hundred years that run by managers, they're all in some state of fundamental collapse. Like they're, they're all collapsing in my trust and credibility because they can't adapt. And so this issue is becoming more and more acute, which is the system that we thought was necessary and sufficient actually just like

does not work. And if anything good is going to happen, it's going to have to be somebody. It's going to have to be a Henry Ford, Elon Musk, type, who actually does it? You think it's in a vast minority of people agree with you? Look, it's becoming more common. I mean, when you get on Elon Musk, going to see a job, when you get these kind of archetypal examples of it, it's a lot easier to, you know, to sell it. You know, Mark Bark Zuckerberg, we were talking about earlier.

Like, you know, he's now a great case study of this, right? He had, you know, when Mark started Facebook, he had never had a job before. Okay. Not only had he not managed people, he had not worked for anybody. Right? So, like, he started with zero, and his learning curve, which, by the way, it happened fully in the public eye, right? His learning curve was vertical.

And by the way, it's still vertical. Like, he spends, like, an enormous amount of time learning how to become better at running these things at large scale. He's still the founder, and he's still the innovator. And he's still, like, a fountain of ideas to do. So he's that double, you know, he's like the class example of a double threat. And then what happens is other founders look at that. And they're like, oh, I could do that. Right.

Which is exactly what Steve Jobs said when he saw Nolan Bush now. He's like, I can run my company. I can do that. Yeah, exactly. And by the way, you know, it's amazing, like, how fast this stuff shifted because, like, Steve famously had this, you know, short period of time where he worked for Hewlett-Packard. And I think, I don't know if it's true. The legend is the Jobs pitched his manager. Was it Wosniak pitched him? Okay, right, okay, okay, Wosniak. There was some other story where Jobs went into some meeting with some manager trying to pitch the thing. And the line for the manager was, absolutely not. This is the dumbest study I've ever heard. Get your feet off my desk and get out of here, right? You can just imagine, Steve with his, you know. And they had to be bare feet at that time. My favorite Apple lore is that the first sale in Apple's history was made barefoot when he walked into the bite shop. He was barefoot.

What's amazing about that is, you know, yes, so it was now for sure. We're for Heel and Packard. Everything I'm describing was Hewlett Packard in the 1950s and 1960s. In 1940s, that was also Dave, Dave Packard and Bill Hewlett were that founder type. And Dave Packer and Bill Hewlett ran their company between the two of them for like 50 years. Do you think that's the most... And by the way, Silicon Valley was built in large part on HP. HP was the original Silicon Valley company.

Okay, that's the next question. And it was run by its founders for 50 years, and yet people concluded that the founders shouldn't run the companies. Right. And so it's like, it's one of those things where it's like it's kind of so obvious it was staring everybody in the face. And so people had to construct kind of elaborate, you know, basically these elaborate kind of lattices of like, you know, theories to basically get around the fundamental fact that you need somebody who knows what to do actually running the thing. Do you think HP might have been the most influential company in Silicon Valley history? It was for sure the most influential company from 1940 to 1980. and then probably after that, Intel. Well, you go to the founders of Intel

and you read biographies of them, and they talk about modeling off of HP. Yeah, that's right. That's right. Yeah, that's right. And then how many founders modeled off of Bob Noyes and Intel after the fact, including Steve Jobs, who was, we'd go to Bob Noyes's house for dinner. Yeah, that's right.

By the way, that's another great example, because Bob Noyes, at least, you know, if you look at photos of Bob Noiss, you're like, wow, this guy's like a pillar of society. Like, he's, you know, he's very well dressed, and he's kind of very adult and he's very, like, you know, he's famously the leader of the traitorous aide. You know, they're the group that left Shockley to start Fairchild.

And then left Fairchild to start Intel. And so Bob Noyes was 100% the Steve Jobs of his time, just in a short sleep, white, dress shirt and the skinny black tie. But it was, again, it's like the exact same thing. And so I, you know, I never, unfortunately never met Bob Noyes. But I could easily imagine Bob Noiss and Steve Jobs sitting down and being able to talk for three hours and completely understanding each other, despite the fact that they, the look and feel is like completely different.

He was almost like a disciplinarian to Steve because Steve was, you know, wild and reckless. Like I was also wild and reckless. need to mature. And I think Bob's wife maybe went to work at Apple early on too. So it was, he talked about this in his biography. There's a few great biographies of Bob Noisse, but he said that the reason he spent so much time after he's really successful spending time with the young entrepreneurs, he said it was restocking the stream in which he fished from. He thought it was really important. He's like, I learned from all the guys before me. I need to take that that knowledge I've built up over multiple decades and push it down the generations. That's what I'm trying

to do with this show. I'm trying to do my other show founders. It's like, hey, I mean, If you, my other show founders, the what, when you click on the podcast description, is like, learn from history as great entrepreneurs. That is what you're going to get if you listen to it. The wise actually comes from you where you're like, I was watching one of your talks at Stanford, like years ago. And you're like, hey, there's thousands of years of history. We're always smart people.

Like, invented new technology, started new companies. And somebody wrote these lessons down in a book. And he's like, for a few moments of your time or a few dollars and a few, you know, a few hours of your time, you can always learn more stuff from the accumulated knowledge of history. and like it's a good issue to time. I was like, that's the why. So I used your quote as the why to founders.

I'm going to go back to starting the firm, though. This is interesting. What was occurring in your life either at that time or before that, that you had this observation that this had to be done? Oh, so see, you know, we've got all these labor theories. The practical reality of it was, my partner, Ben and I had become very active angel investors. And I'd been an angel investor since like the mid-90s,

but then Ben and I started doing it kind of as a real thing, pretty significant time into it, probably starting in, you know, 2003. Well, I did it kind of throughout the early 2000s, but 2003, 2004. It's hard to remember now, but if you go back to like 2000, 2003, 2004, there weren't like thousands of Asian investors. There were like eight. It was like a short, you know, it was like Ron Conaway and a handful of people. And then Ben and I running around doing it.

And this was very significant in the evolution of the venture capital industry because this was the point at which the traditional VCs got disintermediated by angels and seed investors who kind of inserted in before the proceeds arrived, which was this, you know, fundamental change that changed the whole industry. But, you know, we were part of that. So, but as a consequence, like, we were investing. again, all these new companies, you know, basically at the point of formation, you know, we're basically playing amateur early stage VC.

And we're going to, and we're always like, when I go around the board, like, you know, you're going to raise money from a real venture firm later. They're going to go on your board and whatever and work with you. And what we just found over and over and over again was we ended up getting pulled into these companies, either because there were issues that just like the other people that they were, you know, working with or they're, you know, they either hadn't raised venture yet or the VCs that they'd raised from couldn't help them with. And so we just got pulled in.

And the reason was we had been running companies at that point for, you know, whatever, 20 years. And so, you know, we at least had some idea of what we were doing. And then the other is we kept getting, we kept getting brought into conflict resolution between the founders and the VCs. So that, because, you know, it's like, especially, especially, especially, especially, especially, the VC's fundamental point of view is the founders not going to run the company and we need to, like, replace you the professional manager as fast as possible. Like, the founders are not necessarily going to like that, and they might resist that. And by the way, even if they're on board with that idea, they might not like the person

who the VC wants to bring in. And so we kept ending up in these. kind of basically as arbitrators in the sort of, you know, in theory, we were kind of trusted intermediaries because we knew the founders, we knew the VCs, and we could kind of help bridge between that. But literally what happened was, after a while, we were like spending like eight hours a day just doing this. And we're like, all right, and it's like weird. It's like you're writing a $100,000 check and you're like spending all this time doing it. And then to basically arbitrate it somebody who wrote a $10 million check. And it's just like, all right, we should probably just write the $10 million check. And that was, that was that. So it was, it was, I always

think like the best the founders I always one of my theories of like the great founders is they they tend to be able to operate at kind of the strategic conceptual level and then the practical level at the same time and so so we had we had a whole theory I could take you through for the evolution of the venture business yeah but but underneath that was just this actual you know the lived experience of what was actually happening on the ground the big theory of the firm that we that we had at that time what was linked to this idea of was linked to this idea of founders running the show but it was also a structural observation of what was happening in the venture industry which was, basically what we did was we sort of in line with your philosophy.

We went back and we studied a lot of other businesses that have similarities to the venture business. So we studied private equity, venture capital, or sorry, private equity hedge funds, investment banks, law firms, management consulting firms, ad agencies, accounting firms. You know, basically anything where the product is fundamentally a relationship, you know, a knowledge work, you know, kind of relationship as compared to something that gets manufactured. And what we observed is basically in a Hollywoodality. agency is actually the one we've probably talked publicly about the most. And so that was a great case study. The old story. He was in this studio a few months ago.

Fantastic. And so, and he actually, and by the way, he gave us, you know, we make a point of credit. He gave us a lot of this theory. So a lot of this comes from him. But, well, actually, I'll tell it through through, through his experience. So when he started his agency and was an 80, whatever, no, 75, 75. In the 70s.

In the 70s, like in the mid-70s. It was actually a very similar. It was structurally, it was very similar to when we started A16 and in 2009, which was the configuration industry at that point was basically a bunch of, essentially service firms, a bunch of talent agencies, none of which were at very high scale. And then each of them was basically a tribe of basically solo operators, kind of lone wolves. And so the concept in Hollywood was you had an agent, and that was your guy. And that agent knew, whoever that agent knew and had whatever relationships an agent had.

But the other agents at your agency were not available to you. And there was no collective benefit to the fact that you were at an agent. that had not just your guy, but like 100 other guys, there was no collective payoff to that. They ran that in that way for a very specific reason, which is kind of this, eat what you kill professional services mentality, where everybody should have to go build their own book of business.

But you end up, you're just dealing with a guy as opposed to a firm. Like there's no firm, there's no collective thing. And that was basically the condition of venture capital in 2009, which is you have been, at this point, we knew all the VCs really well. And we had raised venture and we had worked with all these other companies that had raised venture. And basically all of the sort of,

legacy venture firms at that point. They were all like that. They were all just like tribes of long wolves. And then the thing that we knew that was not publicly known was, generally speaking, inside the firms, they didn't even like each other. Oh, I hear stories like this all time. Right. And so it's like, you know, whatever, there's Joe and Mary, you know, who are partners at a venture firm and you're working with Joe. And Mary has like a key connection that you need access to. And so-and-so, and what you don't know is they're having like a brutal fight. You know, they're like trying to destroy each other because they're fundamentally economics. They're, they're going for a greater slice of the profit pool.

And so they're really going out. And so we just, we saw example after example of venture firm that was basically either, two things actually. One is either melting down due to just internal strife and conflict. Or by the way, the other was generational succession. The other issue was a lot of the dominant venture firms in 2009 had been around for 30 or 40 years. And they were now on their third generational partners, going to their fourth generation of partners.

And, and again, it's the same thing. They had been founded by Dynamos. And then they were, you know, the later generation people were, we're not. like that. So we basically said, oh, this is where the oldest thing comes in. As we said, look, that's not going to last. So our theory of it was what we call death of the middle. Or we sometimes, the negative way to frame it is death of the middle. The positive way is the barbell, which is what's happened in all these other industries, which is basically the industry gets stretched apart like Taffy. And what you get is you get this barbell thing. And on one side of the

barbell, you get early stage angel seed investor who are really like first money in, like, you know, staying very light in their feet, writing a relatively small check, but like being involved in companies extremely early on, you're taking a lot of risk. And then on the other side, you get basically scaled platforms, right? So, you know, you get large-scale enterprises that have, like, a lot of throwaway, a lot of access, very big networks, and then access to a lot of money. The other comparison we always make is to retail shopping, right, which is there used to be department stores like Sears and JCPenney,

which basically where the brand promise was pretty good selection of products and pretty good prices. Right. And then now those are dead. And what you have instead of boutiques, like the Gucci store or the Apple store, and then you've got this super-scale economy. companies like Walmart and Amazon. We were to the point where it's just like there's no reason ever go to a department store

because it's got less selection than Walmart and Amazon, but it doesn't have the quality tier and the special experience of a gooshier or Apple store. But you had that thought in mind when you started 86-A-6-A-Z-100%. Yeah, exactly. Yeah. It was a conceptual leap for venture capital at the time, but the exact same thing had happened to private equity, the exact same thing had happened in hedge funds, the exact same thing had happened in investment.

And you knew that by what, just reading the industry? So like investment banks are a classic example. So if you read about the sort of the original investment banks, in the U.S. between like 1880 and 1920, they were all like boutique venture capital firms in the 1970s, 1980s in the U.S. It was just like 20 guys. These are more like merchant bankers.

Yeah, merchant bank. There's a book I just finished reading because I've been spending time with Dell's merchant bank, a lot of them. Greg Lemkow has become a good friend. And I was like, well, if I'm going to meet these guys, I need to like read something about their, to understand that.

I read this book published in 1965 called The Merchant Bakers, and it walks through exactly what you were talking about. And they were almost like family-run partnerships. That's right. Yeah. The classic stories, which I love so much, so J.P. Morgan's one of my kind of favorite historical figures.

And J.P. Morgan was an example of that. The J.P. Morgan Investment Bank was like this, basically this time. It was very important, but it was like this tiny little operation. It was, you know, fit in a single office. It was, you know, probably 20 principals and some office staff or something. You know, it's not. It was not large. And actually, the hidden secret to J.P. Morgan was he was the son.

The father was Junius Morgan. Okay. I literally, when you were talking, I was like, wait, you, you, I was, shocking that you would say pick him because I actually found his father more formidable individual than him. He was. So he was, which is almost always the case of any famous public figure. The father is almost always a more interesting story, which a lot of examples of that. But, however, yeah, so Junius Morgan. And then J.P. Morgan has filled a specific economic role that's gotten lost in history, which is basically Junius Morgan, the Junius Morgan Bank was in London. The JP Morgan Bank was in New York. And what the

Morgan family was doing was they were funneling money from the old slow growth economy of Europe into the new high growth economy of the U.S. But again, it was exactly your point. Like, it was this little boutique family operation. The other great thing about that era of history is these were, they were all bifurcated by religion. Yeah. So there were the Protestant investment banks and there were the Jewish investors banks.

And they did not mix. No, not at all. Completely different worlds. And as a consequence, J.P. Morgan was the Protestant banks, like J.P. Morgan were able to find, like, the railroads, which were considered, like, the real businesses at the time. But then, like, all the disreputable stuff, like, movie companies and, like, department stores, like, those are all the Jewish.

investment banks. By the way, with Jewish, almost entirely Jewish founders. And then Goldman's, G.P. Morgan is the big survivor of that today in the former Jacob Morgan Chase. And then, and then on the Jewish side, it's Goldman Sachs, you know, is the great survivor. But again, if you go back, there was... So that's, you consider that the barbell in investment banking. You have the J.P. Morgan kind of like family partnership, and then you have the complete scale of, like, Goldman Sachs. And so what happened was both JP, both JPM and Goldman Sachs started out a hundred years ago, they were on the one side of the... A hundred years ago, they were actually in the middle. They were kind of, again,

this sort of, you know, they were boutiques, but they were like, of their time, they were like, today you'd call them like mid-market, you know, he's sometimes called bulge bracket, you know, kind of thing, as opposed to just like a solo operator or something. Actually, the way JFK's father got started was he literally hung out a shingle in 1920s, which was Joseph P. Kennedy banker, you know, private banker, and he, like, just did deals. And he was, like, an angel investor of the time. And so, and then you had the big commercial banks, but the big commercial banks had no interest in issuing loans to these speculative, you know, entrepreneurs. And so in that time, JP Morgan and Goldman said,

and Kunlob and Drexel and all these other kind of mid-market banks, Morgan Stanley, the bank that became Morgan Stanley, were kind of these mid-things. Now, what's happened, you know, sitting here 100 years later, those are now the scaled players. The ones who didn't scale are kind of long forgotten. Having said that, there's one firm that survives in the old model, and that's Allen & Company. And there are other boutique investment bank study, but Allen & Company was found in the 1920s and has, you know, is uniquely the one that survived in the original model of boutique and deliberately being a boutique investment bank.

And it stayed that way for 100 years. And so one way to think about it is today that's the barbell in banking, which is Allen Company on the one side, and then JPMorgan and Goldman Sachs in the other side. So are you reading about this while you're funding the firm, before you're funding the firm? Ben and I spent about a year and a half planning the firm, and part of it was he was in, we call industrial servitude.

He was working for Hewlett-Packard after we sold our company to H.P. So he was running a big part of HP at the time. And so we could literally start a new full-time thing until he got free of that. So we had a year and a half to kind of study and think and work. And because you had this period from 2003 or 2002, when you're doing angel investing a lot until you start your company six, seven years later, you're observing all of the weaknesses in the model.

And that's where you have, hey, why don't we take the CIA? I think Ovitz calls it like the phalanx, where it's like if you have one agent at CIA, you have all of us. And they would like roll deep. I think he says in this book, like, oh, my agent's coming to the career. No, it's like 20 agents are coming. And I think they'd be dressed in like the same kind of suitmaker.

And like they were intentionally trying to intimidate, like their competition. Armani suits, Salka shirts, was a little shirtmaker in Beverly Hills, and sober, you know, all sober colors, white shirts.

And then I think he had a bulk purchase deal, I think, with the local Jaguar dealer. And the legend at least has it is that the license plates all said, CA1, CAA2, CAA3. And so late, you'd go to a premiere, there would be like 20 jags lined up. And then 20 guys and identical suits coming out.

And yeah, yeah, this is the exact thing. It's just like, now that's the Hollywood version, but like just imagine the psychological impact of that if you're just like an old school agent. This is sort of that, you know, Michael's a very dear friend. He became very controversial over the years. And the reason he became so controversial, I think, is just because he smoked his competition so severely. Like, he pouted them so hard.

There was no response. You're just a guy working for an old agency and you've got your clients in these 20s. What the fuck was you're showing up? And like, yeah, it's just, yeah, it's this force. And the clients, if you talk to them, by the way, a lot of his clients are, you know, still active today. You know, from the period if you talk to them, it's just like, yeah, it's just a no-brainer. It's like, do you want to work with a guy or do you want to work to the firm? It's just obvious.

He has, I don't know if he told you all these stories. Do you tell you about the his morning schedule thing? The, like getting on the bike, doing the karate and 300 grand car. For the firm, for the firm. No, no, no, no. So this is, again, something that's specific to Hollywood, but it's a great example of the... Okay, so the agency business, at the time he started CIA, the agency business was like 90 years old or something, right? It, like, started out doing vaudeville bookings and, like, music halls, and, like, it had been around for, like, decades. And so the people involved, been it had had decades to think about like the best way to do it.

And they had arrived at a set of practices. And one of the practices, I think I'm getting this right, one of the practices was at every agency, they would have their staff meeting in the morning at 9 a.m. And they would basically share, you know, whatever information was going to get shared in the agency would get shared at that point. And oh, you know, this studio had wants a script to do.

He wants to do a crime thriller and here's a script and whatever. And then, you know, this is like the point where there would be minimal, you know, whatever minimal handoff existed to the other agency. And so this is where everybody would kind of get updated. And so the staff, the staff meeting would go from like 9 a.m. to 10 a.m. And then at 10 a.m, they would start calling their clients. And they'd be like, oh, you know, we heard there's a, you know, whatever, there's going to be a casting call for, you know, this great new role for this professional fee for whatever. And you should consider you

that. And so, of course, Michael's like, all right, well, we'll have our staff meeting at 7 a.m. We'll be done at 8. Yeah. Between 8 and 9 we'll call all the clients. By the way, we won't just call our clients. We'll call their clients. Right. And so imagine you're whatever, Paul Newman and you've got some agent you've been working with for 20 years. And he calls you at, your agent calls you at 11 o'clock. And it's like, got this great role. And you say, oh, the guys at CA called me about that three hours ago. And your agent's like, they don't represent you.

And Paul's like, yeah, isn't it great? Isn't that fantastic? And so, again, you just like, you rinse and repeat that a thousand times. And it's just, to the client, it's just like completely obvious what to do. And so, yeah, so the reason I go through this, the moral of the story is, again, it's sort of this idea, incumbency, you know, incumbency status quo, like, you just end up, you end up in any business, you just end up with all these embedded assumptions. Generally, and then, you know, 90 years later,

So the founders of the agencies were 90 years ago, they weren't involved anymore. So the people who were running competitive agencies were managers, not, right? Said thing, managers, not founders. Right. And so the thing a manager never does unless they're under duress is reconsider fundamental assumptions. Like, they hate that. Like, that's not, the whole point of running something big is you don't have to do that. You get to run the big thing at scale.

You don't have to go in and like reinvent it from scratch. Like, that sounds like a nightmare. Right. But anyway, as a consequence of that, you end up with like all these embedded assumptions. that are basically just unspoken, nobody's questioning. It's not happening. And if you take the time,

you can kind of go in and go back, you know, first principles, you can kind of go in and you can say, okay, well, how do they arrive at that? And what we found in just industry. I mean, this is what our founders do every day. It's just an industry after industry after industry. There's all these embedded assumptions that made sense

and 1970 or 1930 or 1880 that just don't make sense anymore. I love that you did. I always say it's like not what you do, it's how you do it. And the idea that you could take, I'm like, I'm not running a talent agency, but there's so many of these principles that I comply to venture capital.

And your blog archive, which I absolutely love, and I told you I've read like multiple times. I did episodes on it. You would give advice to like young people. It's like, my advice is like go work in an industry that's still, the founders of that industry are still working. When I read Ovitz's book, the way I would summarize his approach because he isn't this big stodgy, slow-moving, you know, very bureaucratic organization. It's like, oh, mediocrity is always invisible until passion shows up and exposes it. Oh, interesting. Yes, right. And that's what he did.

Yeah, that's right. He's just like, there's so many things that you guys could be doing better here. I can't do it in the, and I remember correctly, he took some of these ideas to his boss. Oh, yeah, yeah, yeah. Because that guy was his mentor. I can't remember his name. You're famous the word for the CEO of William Morris. Yeah.

Yeah, which was the biggest of the talent agencies at the time. So were you, you had essentially just designing what you wish you had when you were founders? Yeah, that's right. And again, that may be a cheat code. But, yeah, if you've been the customer, obviously, this all becomes a lot more obvious. I don't know if you want to answer this question or not, but in Warren Buffett's shareholder, he has this great line where it's, like really important to pick, to play against weak competition. Did you feel that there was going to be, like, that point in time in venture capital history

that you were going to be playing against weak or weaker competition? I would say not exactly. We didn't view them as weak. We viewed them as basically, we viewed them as running on a status quo set of ideas. And so, and to be clear, like, we, and part of why we think about this way, we had erased money from at the time, in the time, in the time, we're probably the two-bed venture firm. So Clarence in the 90s and I work in John Dorr very closely for five years in that escape. And then we, I would like, I would like, we raised money from benchmark when they were like King of the Hill.

And Andy Ratcliffe, who was one of the founders of the firm and is a, you know, legendary, brilliant VC. And so we had worked with, we just had, you know, for accident of history. We had worked with two of the whatever top five or whatever people in the field, you know, for a long time. And they were and are, by the way, brilliant at running on the model that they, that existed. John was brilliant at that. And he's brilliant at that. They're still brilliant today. It was less a competition of, oh, these people are soft or these people aren't smart.

It was none of that. It was no, they're really good at executing, I guess, this particular playbook. And by the way, that's why it's okay. Like, if we're going to do this, we need to be, we need to be playing by a different playbook. There was no such thing as, like, scaled venture capital at the time. No, it's a time, no, no. Because the firms all hit this, they all hit this limit. They all hit this limit where they just could, the idea of a, like, partnership of equals

or even a hierarchical partnership. Like, it just breaks at some point because there's just too much internal dissension. It is too hard to coordinate. and then everybody's fighting for slices of what it was viewed at the time to be a fixed-sized pie. And so none of the other firms could, they, structurally, there was just no way to get to scale. Where else did you take ideas from besides the agent business in Hollywood and like the merchant bank investment banking industry? I mean, it was just very obvious that it had happened in private equity. Like, you know, this was the, this was the time when like, it was actually really,

this was around the time when like KKR and firms like it were hitting their stride with, they're actually building like a lot of operational capabilities in-house. they were actually building their own actually investment banks in-house. One of the things we've never done, but it's always been on the ideal list, is to actually just have an in-house bank. And KKARE had actually done that,

just build a captive bank. And so they had done a bunch of things like that. And so we saw it happening, which is the mid-tier private equity firms were collapsing. And you either needed a solo, you know, very light in your feet, kind of solo operator on the one side doing small deals or you needed to have a scale platform like KKR.

It happened in hedge funds. It happened in... But, I mean, it had long... Actually, the TV show of Mad Men. Madman tells the structural story of this happening in the advertising field in the 60s and 70s. And I will ruthlessly spoil Mad Men because it's been, it's been off the air for like 20 years at this point. But, you know, a big part of the arc of Mad Men is those guys are working. Sterling Cooper is a classic mid-market ad agency.

Right. And then, and then it's whatever. The third season, they sell it to McCann, which was the scale player at the time. And they show you all the pros. And they clearly talk to people who had been through this. because they showed you all the pros and cons of working for McCann, because McCann's this giant machine. And so Don Draper's used to, like, making all the creative decisions,

and now he's just in this conference room, arguing with people, until he just, like, gets up and walks out. But then Don Draper and Roger Sterling start their own startup. They start Sterling Cooper Draper Price, that's the second one, which starts out as a true startup, as a true boutique startup. And then they have this, whatever, year and a half, just fucking hell. Like, they can't get anywhere. They can't get clients, like, because they're too small.

You know, they're subscale. And so it kind of, and then I think, I think in the end, I forget it's eventually long, but I think in the end up, I think they end up selling it. No, no, no, no, no, no, sorry, I got it wrong. They sell the first one to the British ad agency that just completely destroys it. And then they sell the second one at the can. So they actually show that process happening twice.

And so that, again, if you go back to history, that is what happened in the ad agencies, basically between the 40s and the 70s. Like, basically television catalyzed that. Like when television emerged, advertising became a much bigger deal than it had been before, and it just had to be professionalized in a different way. The other thing happened is, of course, the external environment changes, right? So everything we just talked about

just has to do with the internal mechanics of how these things run. But the other thing happens is the external environment changes, right? And so part of what, I think what Michael would say, I think you would agree with this, part of what may CA possible is at one point, basically Hollywood was just movies. And then there was like whatever, a low kind of TV division.

And by the 70s and 80s, the Hollywood was becoming much bigger than just movies, right? It was movies and TV and advertising and music and sports and politics and culture and like all kinds of things. In fairness to the kind of our competitors, You know, Silicon Valley between, call it, 1950 to 2010, was primarily just in the tools business, right? Primarily the companies, you know, starting with Hewlett-Packard, the companies that we all backed and built were basically just building tools. And you'd build a tool like an operating system or a disk drive or something, and you'd sell it to people and figure out what to do with it.

It was right around the time we started our firm that the Valley was going from being primarily tools businesses to actually building directly competitive companies in incumbent industries. Right. And so Airbnb going directly into the hospitality industry, right? So alternate universe Airbnb is just boutique booking hotel software. You're right for any Airbnb. So it's a tiny little boutique business building basically a little spreadsheet software. But no, Brian Chesky decided brilliantly. We're just going to like go into the hospitality business that compete with hotels directly.

Uber and Lyft, in the old world, we're just taxi dispatch software. In the new world, they're full transportation providers. Tesla in the old world would have just been software for self-driving cars. Tesla in the new world builds, you know, the entire car. By the way, Facebook's same thing. prior to Facebook, if you built like online ad, you know, software, you were selling it to the media companies. Mark's like, no, we're just going to beat the media company. Like, we're just going to build the entire thing.

And so this was the other thing that happened was, you know, for us, was that that was right around the pivot point when the Valley's ambitions went from just building tools to going directly into incumbent industries. And then this goes back to the scale thing. It's like, okay, why do you need to scale a venture firm? It's because the companies need to scale. Right. And then, of course, AI now makes that crystal clear, right? Because the winning AI companies are raising, you know, billions, tens of billions, in some cases, hundreds of billions of dollars.

Right. The old world of $10 million or $30 million or $50 million checks, you know, where VCs tap out, it's just not a relevant thing anymore. But did you know the scale was changing at the time you found at the firm? We had a pretty good idea. So I've been involved in Facebook, you know, basically,

you know, informally since inception and then formally on the board says 2007. And so I saw the, and that thing hit the knee in the curve. It was just very clear. It was to us. It was just like very clear that, you know how big it was going to get, but it was going to get much, much bigger than the Internet 1.0 companies had gotten.

And so there were, was that, what else? It was also around the time Apple was directly entering the cell phone market, which was another great example of this. Silicon Valley didn't used to make cell phones. The original cell phones weren't made by Silicon Valley. They were made by these giant industrial companies like Sony and Nokia and whatever, in Motorola in Illinois or whatever. And then Silicon Valley would make the chips that go into them or the software. And of course, Steve was like, yeah, no, screw that. We're just going to make the phone, right? There were these signals that it was happening. And then the other thing was just the internet itself was maturing, right? And so, you know,

at that point, the consumer internet was 15 years in, and we had seen every part of that. And so I forget what the number was. That was probably around the time the global internet penetration was crossing a billion users on its way to $5 billion. Yeah, you have a very interesting lived experience where you were there at the very beginning of the internet.

One thing that I'm fascinated by, and that's actually going to be the first question for you, because I've never heard you speak about this, at least on a podcast, but your partnership and relationship with Jim Clark, You were at 20 when you met him? How old were you? I was old-fashioned.

I actually graduated from college and got my degree. It's a very stone age concept these days. So that was in 1994. So I was probably 22, 22. So there's this great book. I don't even think you like the book written by Michael Lewis, Silicon Valley's story. I've skipped it.

I've read it twice just because I don't know if anything's in there is true, but the portrait he paints of this very eccentric character. It's just wildly entertaining to me. But what's shocking to me is when you talk to young founders. I'm like, this guy started three, I think it was the first person in history, just to found three separate billion-dollar technology companies. I think that's right. And almost no one knows who he is.

Can you just talk about how you met him, what was like working with him? I knew exactly who he was. And the reason was because his company, Silicon Graphics, his first company, they were the company in the valley between, like, call it 1988 to 94 or something. They were like, whatever Google or Open AI or whatever company you want to make. Like they were like the the company. And by that, I mean, like, they were the company where the smartest people in the industry all wanted to work there. They built the products that were like the coolest products you could possibly imagine.

They had this incredibly young and vibrant and dynamic culture. And then they hit this like cultural moment that was just incredible in I think 92, which was the turning point in the movie business when computer graphics really kicked in. And the two movies back-to-back were Jurassic Park and Terminator 2. Run on the machines they made. Build on the machines they made. It was the technology they made. Technology Jim invented was the technology that made that possible.

And those movies, you know, those are still two of the great old-time movies. But at the time, I mean, I still remember the chills that you get. get seeing dinosaurs on screen. It's just like, this is, and then there's this company that builds the machines that do this. By the way, the silicon graphics computers are actually in the movie. There's a scene in Jurassic Park where the kids are navigating through Unix. Yeah. And it was actually the, it was actually the 3D software. It was actually those were actually the silicon graphics telegraphic computers. And so like they just, that was like this moment where they were just like, they're just like the absolute it company of all time. But by the way, their legacy lives on it in

an Nvidia. Invidia is Silicon Graphics, basically, with one, it's like a trader-or-sate thing. It had to be a new company for reasons we could describe to do the GPUs instead of the workstations and servers. NVIDIA fundamentally is based on Jim's ideas. That's where

that stuff all comes from. And so, he was already legendary. And again, he was one of these, he was the full deal. He was legendary as a innovator in technology, because you know, he's a PhD in computer science, and he actually he himself invented the original figure what they call it. I think it was the reality engine. the original interactive 3D graphics on a chip thing was actually him.

I think it was like his PhD thesis. And then he started the company, and then he ran the company. And then by the way, and then the VCs brought in professional manager. By the way, and the reason we know about Nvidia today and not SGI is because of this founder manager issue, which we could talk about. No, let's talk about that real quick. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Because I don't remember this part of the story. Yeah, yeah.

So, now, by the way, there's two sides of the story. And I wasn't there. And so I just reflexively side with Jim Clark, but I'll try to at least represent both sides of the story. So, so Jim, I don't even remember what's in the Lewis, but like Jim's like a true, Jim's like a true, he's like an Elon, he's like a true Elon's chief jobs level guy. And so like incredibly creative, incredibly bright, incredibly charismatic.

But like he's volatile. Like he's, he's exciting. Like, he's exciting. It's like being around him just like an incredibly exciting. There's always something new. He always has new ideas. And again, that was. in that time where it's just like, okay, that's the personality type

that clearly can't run the company. And so the VC's brought in a guy out of Hewlett-Packard who had been trained in Hewlett-Packard because at the time what happened is you wanted to hire a professional CEO, he went and hired a general manager out of either Hewlett-Packard or I'd be out more of the two training grounds for those guys. So they brought in a really, really short guy. I don't really know. I think I met him once. I don't really know. By all accounts, he was

like a very, he was like a very good example of this kind of HP general manager type who became a CEO. He took over it. He took over the company. And by the way, like in his defense, under him, the company scaled enormously. Like, I'd forget when he took it over, but it was like 87 or 88 or something. And then, you know, by the time I got to the Valley 94, like this company become huge. And, you know, whoever's running the company gets at least some credit for that. So, but anyway, they got in this classic fight.

Like, they got in this classic fight. And the classic fight was, you know, it's the same story every time. The founders like, the founder's like, the CEO of like, we need to do things completely different. And the CEO's like, no, like what we're doing is working. Like, stop fucking with, stop fucking with the thing that's working. And the founder's like, no, it's working now, but it's not going to work in the future. And the manager, and the CEO's like, well, then we'll deal with it in the future. And the founder's like, you can't wait to deal with it in the future because by the time the future arrives, it's going to be too late.

And the manager is like, why are you in my pants? I'm like making you all this money. The company's super successful. Like, get out of my shorts. Right. And you get in this, and you see this. And that was exactly the deadlock that they got into. And Jim Clark basically made two predictions as the founder of Silicon Graphics.

So Silicon Graphics at the time was selling their computers. basically started list price at like $50,000 for a desktop workstation and then scaled up into the millions. And Jim was like, look, two things are going to happen. It's amazing that he, and you figured this out by like 1991 or something. He said two things are going to happen. He said, number one, everything that we sell today from $50,000 is going to go on a chip and that's going to go on a card and it's going to go on a PC and it's cost $300.

And either we're the company that's going to make that or we're going to get destroyed, right? Which, by the way, is what happened. That's Envidia. Like, that's what actually happened, right? So he was completely correct about that. other thing that he had was he's like, look, this idea of standalone computers is not going to be the thing. These computers are all going to get network together, and the network is going to become the important thing. At the time, there were different terms. People were using terms like information superhighway or video on demand or 500 channels. It had all these kind of concepts kind of coalescing around what became the internet. And even before the internet kind of became

a mainstream thing, it was just like, look, it's just inevitable that this is all going to become connected. And then the function of a computer is no longer going to be mainly what just the computer does. It's going to be the fact that it can talk to all the other computers. And we need to do that. And to do that, he actually, he actually went to Japan. He actually got this incredible deal. Nintendo, you know, then and now was like, you know, this giant video game company. So he actually had this deal with Nintendo, where, number one, it's he actually, in Silicon Graphics, actually built the original 3D graphics chip for a, for a consumer game player for Nintendo 64. So he did that deal. And then he went to Time Warner, which at the time was, you know,

this very important media company doing all kinds of things. And he struck a deal with them to do what was called Interactive TV, which was basically pre-Internet. Basically, it was like Netflix before Netflix in 1991, right? Like, amazing foresight, right? Just like amazing foresight. But again, he and the CEO got in this conflict, and the CEO's like, look, we just can't. We have to focus on the thing that we're doing.

We're not going to do these things. And so Jim did the classic founder thing, and he left. And when I met him, basically, that was the state that he was in, which was, okay, like, you know, I, Jim, am like in the crime of my life. I know I have all these ideas. I don't know exactly what to do with my next company, but I know it should be a software company,

not hardware company. I know it needs to be a company that is able to anticipate these changes that are happening in the world. And I know that, and he was very sad about this, Silicon Graphics is not the company that's going to be able to do these things. And so I have to build the new company that's going to do it. I want to hear more about what I was like working with them, but there was a very astute observation you made in your blog archive because you're trying to, you know, essentially this post was trying to educate founders, just like recruiting is the most important thing you're doing at the very beginning of company, maybe forever. And you're, you're underestimating how difficult it is. And you tell the story of Jim Clark.

in the blog archive. You're like, this guy was a legend. It was. Like, most famous person, best entrepreneur. And he's like, he tried to recruit all these other people. And like, I don't know, there was like 100 people. And you're like, you were one of two or three that actually followed through and took the chance and jumped and started working with him. Yeah.

And again, this is like, I don't know, Zuckerberg or Sergey Brann or Elon or whatever decides to start a company. Like that was his candle power wattage in the community at that time. And so, yeah, you would think that the obvious thing people would just like say, you know, Jim Clark also start a company with you. You know, just the obvious thing is, you know, just the obvious thing is, you know, you just say yes. Like, it was not happening. And so I don't know if I told the story, but the, my crystallized memory is a dinner of 12 of us at Elf, this famous Italian restaurant in Palo Alto took out Elfran Isle. That's where a lot of these companies were formed. It was Jim's favorite restaurant at the time. So Jim had like a dozen of us, us being people

who were like in existing companies who were like basically technical people who he knew. Well, this is the thing. He was constrained. He had a not solicit agreement with silicon graphics. And so he couldn't just rip people out. And you did that. want to violate that. And so he needed, he needed to basically reach out to the tackle community and find new collaborators. So there were like a dozen of us in there. And I remember that, I remember that dinner very precisely for two reasons. Number one is I was the only one of a dozen to basically to say yes. And then the other was, it's the first time of my life I drank red wine. And I didn't know what to make of it. And so I kept sipping it, trying to figure out

if I liked it or not. And I didn't realize that I was getting completely hammered. Because I had no idea how to calibrate red wine. And so the true version of the story is, you know, I leave the dinner and I'm like, wow, this is amazing. Like, you know, I'm going to say yes to this. We're going to do this. And I go to my car in the parking garage from Palo Alto across the street. And my brand new car. My first, you know, new car I've ever owned, right? My brand new car.

And I gun it and I pull it out and I ripped the entire front end of the car off. It's like this screaming metal. So like the whole friend of my car is just like hanging on the ground. And I'm like, oh, fuck me. So anyway, I parked the car, get out of the car, walk home. No Uber. this time. No Uber. I'm just like, no, three mile walk at, you know, whatever, 11 o'clock at night with, you know,

six bottles of red wine. And you're what, 22? No problem. Oh, 22, yeah, exactly. 22. I'm like, I think I probably won't mention this to Jim. I don't know, there's some wild stories in that book. He might have admired you to more. He might have. Yes, yes, yes. How many founders of the companies, just you and him? So originally, yeah, originally it was him and me. Yeah, we started the company. And it was, again, one of these things where we had a long conversations about, like, what to do.

Well, okay, so then the problem that he had was there was the idea of doing the graphics chip. But again, that's what anybody did, but invid, it was essentially a spinoff of SGI. But, like, at that time, starting a new chip company from scratch would have been tough, and he didn't want to compete with SGII doing that. And then the interactive, you would have called the Interactive, it's lost to history, but this interactive television street, like, it wasn't time for that yet. It wasn't actually time for Netflix yet. And so it, like, the, it was going to be cost prohibitive.

Time Warner had rolled out this interactive television thing in Orlando, Florida, 500 people. Yeah, and Microsoft was involved. They were doing a ton and Oracle. At the time, like, all the big companies were... It's all these Bill Gates' viruses. Yeah, exactly. He talks about that a lot.

But the CAPEX per, you know, house was like $50,000 or something because you had to have, like, a silicon graphics station in the house. It just wasn't going to work. And so you couldn't figure that out. And then we cycled through a whole bunch of ideas. We actually went...

He actually went back to Nintendo, and we almost pulled the trigger on basically building what today you'd call, like Xbox Live, or what was it called PlayStation Network or Xbox Live? like an online gaming service for the Nintendo 64 in 1994, which might have been a good idea. We thought it was too early.

We almost did that. And then what happened literally was the internet. I had worked on the internet in college. And then, you know, this is, you know, fortunately only a few months later. But the internet just kept growing. Hold on, Mark. Yes. You'd work on the internet.

That's a little bit modest. Yes. Well. I think a lot of people listening to this will know, but you should probably explain how you're working on the internet. So at the time it was not, so this is part of the story, At the time, it was not that big of a deal. It's not nearly that much of a big of a deal at the time as it's viewed now.

So the Internet, I've told this story many times, so I won't go in a huge detail. But yeah, so a group of us at Illinois did this thing called Mosaic, which was the first widely used web browser than the first one of the graphics. Explain what was different about what you made compared to what existed before. Yeah, so the previous web browsers were like text-based. So there was like this nascent concept of the web, but it was like text-based terminals, and then it didn't have graphics. It wasn't point-and-click.

You know, it didn't work in the way that you would like the spec software to work. And then, by the way, it didn't also have, like, you know, no scripting language, no security. You know, none of the actual capabilities that, like, make the browser a useful thing. And so there was this, like, nascent idea, but it needed to get built into a full thing. And so we built the original kind of full, full thing, full browser at Illinois. And then we also built the first kind of mainstream web server, like the first web server, again, that kind of had everything that people needed. You know, this had been a project at college.

And then this was a – and again, at the time the Internet was not viewed as a consumer phenomenon. Was it illegal to commercialize – Steve Case of AOL tells a story. He had to, like, lobby and get a law changed. Yeah, that's right. What was – the details there? So the Internet, as we know it today, in the 1980s, was called the NSF Net. NSF stands for National Science Foundation, which was a branch of the U.S. government that funds research. And the National Science Foundation funded the Internet.

The reason I was able to do the work I was able to do at Illinois is because the NSF – that actually dumped a ton of money into four universities around the country to build what we're called the supercomputer centers. And then those were also the main hubs for the NSFNet. And the function of the NSFNet was fundamentally to connect the supercomputers to all the people who were going to use them.

And so it was this government research, academic program. And it was very exciting in the technical field, but there was no conception that ordinary people are ever going to use any of this. Like, it was just not, nobody ever thought that this was the thing that Normies were going to use. And so NSF, it's tax fair, funding. So the government, at least, is not supposed to be funding businesses directly, although

sometimes they do. But there was, there was, you know, formal legal restrictions on, on, on, on, on, on, on, on, on, on, on things with, with, with commercial applications. And so what, what there was, is there something called the AUP, the acceptable use policy. And the acceptable use policy said that, that basically the internet, the internet, the NSF net turn internet, um, was for academic and research use and commercial activities were strictly prohibited, like literally not allowed. And, and again, And it's just like, oh, as a taxpayer, that makes total sense. Like, I'm glad my tax money is not going to fund something like that. But, like, as a user, you're just like, all right, that's nuts.

Like, that's clearly crazy, right? And if you took the conceptual leap to say, no, this is going to escape the lab and this is going to be something normal people are going to use, then it just became obvious that it would have to have commercial activities. Yeah. And then AOL was one of the early pre-internet online services that wanted to connect to the internet. I think they famously connected to the internet in 1993. Do you know about the concept of Eternal September?

No. Oh, okay. So there are two internets. There are two internets. There is the internet that existed before 1993 and the internet that existed after 1993. People who were on the internet before 1993 often describe it in utopian terms

because it literally was like you take the whatever million smartest people in the world and you put them on a network together with like no commercial activity, no advertising, no nothing, just the million smartest people in the world and you just like let them talk to each other. And it's just like amazing.

It was like amazing. Like there was this old messaging system was called Usenet. And like the discussions on Usenet were just like absolutely spectacular. It was just like this. It was like, it was amazing. It was like the most pure, clean, intellectual, like, vibrant space since, like, I don't know, Athens in, you know, 500 BC. It was just like this amazing phenomenon. And then AOL connected, AOL had, I don't know, whatever, million or two million people at that point. They connected, they connected all the

AOL users, which were just normal people to the internet, September in 1993. And so that became eternal September, which is, that's the day the internet changed. And by the way, I'm pro that. I'm glad that happened. But like, the pro and the kind of that is that took the internet from this like ivory tower, you know, kind of thing to this basically mainstream consumer ordinary people thing, which is, of course, it's just a fundamentally different thing. It's obviously, right. Concept of Eternal September literally was,

it was like when every new wave of college graduates, like graduated and got their first job and then went online. So September is when, September is when the new crop of, like, internet users showed up for a long time. So the September effect didn't just happen once. It like happened over and over and over and over and over and over again. And every cycle of Internet user would basically be like, oh my God, this is great, but like it's all going to get ruined in September.

Yeah, right. And so the Internet that we live in today is the result of. They can only see us now. 30 September. Right. But yeah, by the way, there was controversy, there was controversy of time about whether the Internet, whether they acceptable use policy should be revoked.

There was controversy over whether normal people should be on it or not. There was controversy over whether the kind of content normal people wanted to be on it should be allowed to be on it. there was controversy about whether there should be like there was controversy. We got quite a bit of flag at the time for putting images into web pages under the theory that that would like fundamentally

make everything worse because you'd have like normally content. That would be bad. And then you know, it's just said about like e-commerce. By the way, advertising. I remember when there was actually a moment there was a guy. There was a guy named Sanford Wallace

and he became known as Spamford. Spanford Wallace. And he was literally, he sent out the first spam message on the internet in like 1992. And it was like, literally, it was like the first internet ad. And it was like a spam for, I don't know, whatever, legal services or something. And he just drops it on the use net. And it was like a thermonuclear explosion because it was like, you know,

get this commercialized crap out of my, out of my news feed. And so, so like all of these things were like hotly controversial. I was generally on the other side of all these arguments because I was like, look, this thing is great. Obviously, everybody should have access to this. Obviously, we need to connect everybody to this. Obviously, to do that. We need these need to be businesses.

there needs to be commerce, there needs to be advertising, like all these things obviously need to happen. So is that the discussions you and Jim were having where you're like, okay, we're going to start an actual company on this? So, yeah, so that's how we got to the conversations Jim and I had, which was basically like, okay, because that was right at the tiffic places like in early 94. So this is like the AUP had just been revoked, and it was just a, and AOL had just done the first September, and it was, the whole thing was just about to tip.

And I knew that, I knew that because I was tech support for the browser. personally. No, explain that. Just me. Well, so, if you, Mosaic at the time was the browser everybody used. And so if you use Mosaic, there was a, you know, submit a bug report or whatever, you have a question submitted here. And that went to an email box, and that email box was me. And so I became tech support for the Internet for like, you know, I have three years.

Oh. I got all the emails. How many emails were you getting? Well, I asked you, too. That was one email box. And the other email box was Mosaic was. actually created under by it was also funded by the National Science Foundation. So it was actually not the original license that it, you couldn't be used for commercial use. It was for

academic and research and individual use. And so we had this thing, we did a deliberately ambiguous license. And we said if you want to use the browser commercially, you need to email us to arrange terms. Now, we had no concept at all of what those terms would be, but we just said we need to create the same coming flow. So I was getting bombarded with tech support requests. And by the way, tech support for the internet means your tech support for everything. So it's like, you know, the old PCs had, you know, they had CD-ROM tray. So you press the button, the CD-ROM tray comes out. You put the disc in the thing.

The problem is a lot of people thought that those were cup holders. Right? So you press the button, the cup holder comes out. You put your cup and coffee down. And then, you know, 10 seconds later, the cup holder retracts back into the PCs, fills your coffee all over the place. You're like, how the fuck do I keep the cup holder out? Right. It's like, man.

Let me email mark. Yeah, let me email Mark. You know, it's like, sir, that's the CD-Rod drive. So there was a lot of that. So one of the funnier things you can always do, in politics they call this focus groups, but user testing. You see this over and over at tech companies,

take whatever amazing new thing you have and just put it in a room with like normal people and let them try to use it. And you just like learn so much about how much of a bubble that you're in about the kind of things that you're familiar with that like normal people are just like, I don't know what the hell any of this stuff is. So there was a lot of that.

But then I had this other email box, which was all the commercial licensing requests. And so I saw the consumer takeoff on the one side, And then I basically, I think that, and then the commercial requests hit like 400 messages and people wanted to pay money for this thing. And so I basically took those to Jim and I was like, there's a business. Yeah, this is going to happen. And then we actually went to my underwrite, my old boss at NCSA actually had gone to,

we actually went to Washington in 93 to try to get NSF funding to staff a support desk so that it wasn't me answering all the emails. And the National Science Foundation people were very nice and they were. were like, yes, the National Science Foundation is not in the business of funding customer support desk for your software. And so I still have the denied NSF grant that would have kept the whole thing at an academic project. But yeah, so at that point, it was like at least to Jim and me, it was just obvious that that was going to be business. By the way, again, very controversial. The original press coverage on Netscape for the first year was that these people will never make money. Like, this is ridiculous.

Like, everybody knows the Internet's free. Like, everybody knows that none of this is going to work. So, you know, even even... What did you think the business model? even then it was controversial. Was just literally licensing it? It was a combination of things. So it was definitely software licensing.

And we did this thing up for the browser was free, but the server software cost money. And then we out of the gate started building all these, we called applications, server site applications. So we built like the first publishing system. We built the first publishing system for like running a newspaper or magazine online. We have content management system. We built the first e-commerce system for selling, you know,

so pre-Amazon. So we built the first e-commerce system for selling things online. So we built and sold a lot of that software. And then we, And then we own, you know, the main website that the browser had is its default homepage. And so we built the original Internet advertising business was basically, so Netscape was the largest internet advertising company until I think 97. That's incredible. I didn't know that.

And Yahoo! And so, yeah, so we invented, people at the firm invented, at the company, invented, I don't know exactly who gets credit, but like the original ad formats, you know, we're right around that time. And a lot of them rolled out on our site, you know, first. And, yeah. And so it was literally, it was advertising pre-eats. It was it was e-commerce pre-Amazon. It was, yeah, content pre, you know, we literally sold. I mean, we put the Wall Street Journal online.

It was our, you know, that was our software that did that. And a lot of other newspapers, magazines, all that stuff. And so, yeah, it was a lot of that. And then it was the web operation. And again, it was, again, it all looks obvious in retrospect. But, like, again, it was like, okay, when we started this, like, I don't know, the total number was. And so we started the company April 94.

There couldn't have been more than two million people total online, right? And then almost everybody was coming in over dial-up. This is like pre-broadband, right? So everybody's coming in at like 14.4-kilobit modems, and we're, like, hoping that people are going to upgrade to 56-kilobit modems, like, you know, that that would be, like, super helpful. Computers at that time did not come with TCPIP installed. So to get your PC actually on the Internet.

You needed to buy a TCPIP stack. Try explaining to a normal human being what a TCAPE stack is. Like, it makes no sense at all. They're going to ask if they could put it next to their cup holder. Exactly, yeah. It was just like, it was just like talking to Martians. Right. Talking to us,

was like talking to Martians. And then, you know, monitors were, you know, like three feet deep and just, like, bathing you in radiation. You know, just kind of hoping

that the radiation stays up here and, you know, everywhere else. In retrospect, it was, like, it was like super early and it was all very, and then again,

it was just like, okay, e-commerce, like, are people going to buy things online? It's like, I don't know, maybe. But, like, the press at that time,

it was just like wall to wall like, if you put your credit card number online, like hackers are going to steal it. I was to say, if you read any books or around this time, they're like, there's no way in hell

anybody's ever going to put their credit card on internet. By the way, the other thing you would never, ever, ever, ever do is put your real name online because it would be immediate identities that after your life would be ruined. So you would never, ever do that. By the way, the other thing was right in the beginning you had all the panic around, you know,

kids know, this is going to destroy children. You know, this is a huge risk of children, so you had all that panic. And then there was a media, you know, there was the beginning of the calls for censorship, you know, there's clearly all this stuff that you have to take down. Your time's going to run in stories,

talking about how the whole thing was fake anyway. They kept saying that all the numbers were made up and like there actually wasn't anybody online. It was like a tiny little user base and we were all like infliging the numbers and committing fraud. And so it was just this. In retrospect, it's all like quaint and cute and sweet,

but it was like the precursor. It was all the moral panics around technology today. You could see nascent versions of them back then. You pick up on something that, because me and you've read a bunch of the same books where it's like humans reaction to something new, it's just consistent throughout history. And so I heard a podcast with you.

I thought it was the only one that would tell the story in private about bicycle face? Right, bicycle face. Exactly. Do you want to say what bicycle face? Bicycle face, bicycle face, yes. So it basically turns out every new technology is greeted with what they call a moral panic, right? So a moral panic basically is, whatever this new technology is or this new form of media is,

it's going to ruin everything. It's going to ruin everything. It's going to ruin everything. It's going to ruin morality. And then especially, it's going to ruin the children. And then back, the bicycle was pre-feminism, so it's also going to ruin the women, very specifically. It's going to ruin the women. which clearly cannot be, because women clearly in 1880, you know, cannot be trusted to use a bicycle without getting into real trouble.

I'll explain. I'll explain why. So this is this persistent theme. And basically, you go all the way back and this is like, you know, this is like this famous thing where Plato and Socrates thought that like, you know, basically, they thought that written language was a big mistake, that all information transmission should be oral and they had this, you know, whole thing back in 500 BC. And then it was just like every, you just have to like imagine. I always like to hypothesize like, you know, the first guy brought fire. You know, it's like down for. him out. They probably killed him. Yeah, they're like, what the fuck? Right, exactly. Like, you know, this thing is horrible. This thing could burn down the village. Like, this is awful. This is going to destroy everything.

And so it's just been this consistent thing. And there's this great website called Pessimus Archive where he, there's, these guys who go back and they find all these newspaper articles that are contemporaneous to these things. But it's, it's everything. And, you know, so when I was a kid, you know, it's like heavy metal music, Dungeons and Dragons, you know, it was like all this stuff was awful. I remember the moral panic around the Walkman, the very first cassette,

portable cassette player with headphones, because it was going to write. It was going to destroy society because everybody's going to just be listening to their own, you know, their own music. I remember the moral panic around the calculator was going to destroy education because kids were not going to learn how to do math anymore. And then you go back and it's like in the 50s, it was like comic books and it was, you know, rock and roll music. Obviously, it was going to ruin everything. In the 20s, by the way, jazz music was going to ruin everything. Playing cards were going to ruin everything. What else?

Novels. You know, we're taking kids. Kids are going to sit around and just read novels all day instead of doing any real work. So it's just over and over again. And it's this constant story. So the bicycle one is the great one. So the bicycle rolls out in like 1870, 1880. And so the U.S. still at that point was like, you know,

thinly populated, you know, from today. And the West had been settled and sued all these little towns and villages scattered all over the place. But, you know, to get from one town to the next, it was like, you know, five, 10, 50 miles. And so people didn't generally walk that. And so the bicycle comes out, all of a sudden, it's easy to go five miles into the next town.

And then, you know, young people discovered the bicycle. And they discover there are young people who they didn't grow up with who were in the next town over. And they're like, you know, they head up to do it. And so the specific... To do it. To do it, yes. To do everything.

To do whatever it is, the young people do, they're going to head... Yeah, look, look, it's just the nature... If you've known the same group of people since you were two, like, you're going to... What's over that hill? What's over that hill? Yes, exactly.

Right. I grew up in a small town. I can identify with that. And so... And then specifically at that point, young men, obviously, but specifically young women started to do the bicycle. And so, and this is a big threat.

And so, like, if you're like a guy in a time, and like all the attractive young women are like heading over the hill to the next hill on this bicycle thing, like that's a big problem. And so the press at the time created this thing called bicycle face. And the idea of bicycle face was, it was part of the moral lecture that was given

to young women in the press at the time, which was basically young women should not use bicycles because if you go on a bicycle, you have to exert yourself. And if you exert yourself in the bicycle, you're gonna end up making like an exertion, you know, exertion face. But the thing was, if you did that too much,

your face would freeze into bicycle face. They literally thought it would. stay that way permanently, and then you would stay that way permanently, and then you would never find a husband. Right. And so, yeah, so that was that moral panic. Yeah. And so these things just like ripped through every, I mean, it's just, it's incredible. Music is always a great one because it's like, you know,

I don't know, it's over now, but like in the in the 90s 2000s, you know, it was all this moral panic around hip hop. Dude, Jimmy Iveen, who's your neighbor. Yeah. He was in here two weeks ago. Yeah. And he had a deal with him. They called him a, yes, like a chemical gas or mustard gas.

Like they compared him to, literally, like, what he's doing is the same as genocide. Yes, that's right. Because he's funding hip-hop music and white kids are starting to listen to hip-hop music. In the late 80s, early 90s. In front of, like, congressional hearings on this, like the media behind him, he was pushed out of a conglomerate. Like, this wasn't a joke.

Yes, that's right, that's right. And it's actually funny because, like, we, I'm not in the music business, but, like, hip-hop is, like, I'm so normalized. Today, it would just never even occur to you. It just, like, feels like, hip-hop is kind of, you know, is a cultural phenomenon. He's even kind of fading today. But, yeah, no, that was super intense at the time.

time and then rock and roll that was like super intense in the 50s and 60s and then the amazing thing is jovis presley they wouldn't shoot him that's right because he would shake his hip so they're like no no he can't it's waist up on tv from now on that's right but here's the one here's the one i look jazz they said all the same things about jazz in the 1920s and 1930s it was the jazz music corrupting that and it was the exact same thing it's because like kids are going to get together and they're going to dance to jazz and then who knows what happens and then it was like there's a jazz musician that's like smoking pot and that means all the kids are going to start it was just so it's the same it's the same story

over and over and over and over again. And I'll also say, by the way, in fairness, like it's not the society doesn't change. Like, you know, many of the technologies that we just described did cost society to change. Like, you know, things are different pre-imposed the bicycle. They're different pre-imposed the car. You know, they're different pre-imposed, you know,

the creation of modern culture, rock and roll or whatever. But like this, like, the more, again, this idea of the moral panic. This idea of just like outright panic, end of the world is just like this, repeated over and over and over again thing. And then what's, what's happened is like, this is just, this is the obvious. way to sell newspapers. Right. Like this is like the meta story of the press, which is just like

whatever it's happening. It's like horrible and awful and it's going to kill everything. You know, you know, be sure, be sure to buy our newspaper tomorrow. Well, this originates because I've done a bunch of episodes and read biographies about, you know, I'm like, I get a lot of shit because I don't pay attention to the news at all. Like I read old books, listen to podcasts, talk to smart people. That's essentially like my media diet right now obviously communicate with LMs. But, you know, like you're missing, or you're, not misinformed or you're ill-informed or you're not informed if you don't do this i'm like have you read the biography of joseph pulitzer have you read the biography of willing randolph hearse like all

these ideas that you think are new it's just like they were the they were the originators and the inventors of essentially yellow journalism go read that stuff and what it was like what media newspapers were like before and after pulitzer and hurst and tell me i should be consuming this stuff nonstop like that's a ridiculous statement yeah something comes mine i want to go back to jim clark uh real quick is there any and then i want to go to you have this you've had this you've had this very unique seat because you saw the beginning of the internet and now I want to compare like what the lessons from there for like where we're at with AI. But is there anything that you learned because Jim Clark was what like two deck probably 20 years older than you?

Yes, about that problem. So like is there anything that you learned work? What a fucking education you had to be able to work with that guy when you're early 20s. Yeah, that's right. So is there anything that you learned by working with him back then that you still used today? I mean, yeah, a lot. You know, easily said it was very formative for me. So a lot of it. But yeah, I mean, you mentioned the sort of quote earlier about the world is a malleable place. Like Jim was like the ultra-version of that. And so, yeah, he would just like, yeah, when he had an idea, and he was right, like, his ideas were correct almost all the time. And he would just like pound the world into adopting them, into believing them. Like he was,

you know, the idea of being like a complete force of nature. One thing that was malleable was himself. He has this great quote in that book where he calls himself a self-described loser at 30 years old. I mean, the guy had like two PhDs. He was a professor. But he just like, I think he'd been in a second or third divorce, and he just snapped one day, and he's just like, I had, woke up one day with the undeniable urge to achieve something. And that's when he goes from academic to founder and just rips off company after company for like a few decades. So it's like, oh, he's, he realized that he is malleable too. He just reinvented himself over and over and over again. And of course, he does that not just by like starting a company, but like inventing

interactive computer graphics. Yeah. Like completely changing the, you know, indirectly, like completely changing Hollywood. But is there anything about recruiting or managing or any other way that he ran his company. No, so look, my two mentors at that time, actually, they were in some ways polar opposite. They always got along with. They were kind of polar opposites. They were both Jim.

So Jim Clark or Jim Barstale. So the Jim Clark side of my personality is like the, like, the, like, the, like, I'm just going to bludge in the world into doing what I want. You know, and then just, and then the idea of just, like, you know, try to be a fountain of creativity. Like, just like, there are many new ideas out there. And, like, you just, you need to go find them. And then, you know, I'm going to say also, put this, like, a sense of professional

dissatisfaction. Like, okay, like, whatever. Look, this is the other part of the story. Like, a lot of founders would have had a success like selling graphics, and that would have been it, and they would have spent the next, whatever. Whether they were totally happy with how it turned out or not, like they would have spent 30 years just coasting on that, right?

And having a great time and taking credit for it and the whole thing. But Jim, you know, was always, you know, at least in that part of his life, you know, dissatisfied in the productive positive sense of like, okay, no, there's something better. There's something bigger. You know, there's something new that we should do. So, you know, there's that side of it. And then Jim Barstale was the other, was the other,

who I just literally was with yesterday. in Jackson, Mississippi. Jim Berkstead's the other side, which was, Jim Berksdale's like the manager of managers. So Clark is like the ultimate example of that bourgeois capitalist thing I mentioned, so the Henry Ford, Elon Musk type. And then Jim Barstow is like the ultimate example of like the super manager. And Jim had run, you know, big parts of IBM and AT&T and the Federal Express.

And, you know, came into running escape. And what was interesting was like that's kind of where I got a lot of this from and a lot of my skills drum is I got trained by both of those guys. and then kind of both of those guys at the same time and then was able to very clearly observe what is just the difference between those mentalities but then the other is of course how those concepts converge.

Right? Because just the fountain of creativity you can't build you can't build anything just with that. Just the management, you don't do anything. Who's a great example of that from history? Would it be like Nicola Tesla? Founder creativity. Oh, that's right. Yeah.

He needed like a George Westinghouse to commercialize his ideas. Well, it's a Tesla versus Edison. Yeah, so Tesla versus Edison. So Tesla versus Edison, so I'm an Edison guy. Elon's a Tesla guy, obviously. But Elon, of course, himself has now become like a really outstanding. I mean, obviously, become an outstanding manager, like in his own way. Back to the point where I think he's actually inventing an entirely new school of management,

which we could talk about. Let's go there next. He's maybe the greatest manager of our era, despite the fact that nobody thinks of him that way. So I actually think Elon's more like Edison than he is like Tesla. And there was a big war. And it was kind of this thing because it's every, everything kind of turns into these little morality plays. And so kind of the basic story of Tesla and Edison was Tesla had all these ideas,

but couldn't commercialize them, couldn't turn them in companies, ultimately, you know, couldn't figure out how to make money on them, couldn't build, like, big, big companies, you know, kind of based on them. And then Edison, you know, basically, at least the way the legend goes, is he was more of this grinder. He was less incandescently brilliant, and he was more of a grinder, and he's just like, we're just going to try a thousand things. You know, so when they invented the filament for the lightball, they just tried like a thousand different combinations of things to get to the filament and, you know, sort of this brute force approach.

But then he built General Electric. He built the like National Electric grid. You know, he built these giant companies. And then he, you know, he funded by. Funded by J.T. Morgan. There you go. As a, as a venture capitalist in his spare time. Yes, exactly.

100%. And so, and then, you know, Edison also advanced at the movie projector. And then literally spent years trying to enforce his pass, right? And the phonograph. And the photograph. And the photograph. And the photograph. You tell the story.

And I knew because I read the book, too. Yeah. We should tell people what he thought the phonograph is going to be used for. So this is a bit of a digression, but it gets to the personality type. So one of the things that people look for is it's like, oh, what are the consequences of a new technology going to be, oh, let's go ask the people who invent them, because obviously they know.

And so this is what happens when like these, for example, the AI guys get, you know, the pioneers of AI get interviewed in the press. It's like, well, tell us the future of AI. And it's like, you get the, like, the one I'll pick on is Jeffrey Hinton, who's like an actual self-declared socialist. Like he's an actual, like he's an actual capital as socialist. And people ask him, what's the future of AI? And of course, he says it's going to be rampant.

and we need to give UBI to everybody. It's like, what a coincidence. The answer from the socialist is communism. Like, what an amazing coincidence. But people think because he's one of the inventors of AI that he must be the guy who knows. And so the story I always tell is the Edison story. Thomas Edison was like a, it was like a very proper waspian,

you know, personality type of that era, extremely proper gentleman, and always like impeccably dressed, very, you know, kind of very ethical, you know, outstanding, you know, kind of citizen of that time. and very religious, very religiously devout. And so for him, it's just obvious that the application of the record player was that everybody would buy a record player, and then everybody would buy a library of discs that would be the great sermons,

religious sermons, for all the great preachers of the time. And then you get home at night after a long day of work and you turn on the record player and you would listen to a sermon, you know, with your adoring, you know, wife and kids, you know, gathered around you. And of course, the record player drops. And immediately, of course, it's just, it's music. It's just, like, obviously music. And it's like ragtime and you swim in as jazz. And Edison's just, like, completely horrified.

He didn't know that if you put the phonograph in the window and you play good music, then you have all these girls on bicycles coming over with bicycle fists. Exactly, exactly. And so this is always my thing. It's like if Edison didn't know what the phonograph was going to use for, the idea that, you know, I don't know, whatever, Joe AI entrepreneur is going to be able to forecast the economic implications. Like, no, no, like, that's not going to happen. And in fact, the people who invent the technology are often, like, the least qualified people

to understand the long-term implications because they're just, they're too, they're too buried in the specifics of the here and now. And then all these other questions, you know, these are all big cultural, social, economic questions. And by the way, I don't know if there's anybody that can predict big cultural or economic or social friends, but it's certainly not somebody who's been in the lab for 20 years, including myself. So how this started? You think you greatly benefited from the two gyms, essentially like being polar opposites.

Yeah, basically. And showing you. But also working very closely together. Did they get along? I don't know if I've told this story publicly. So I should tell the story. So they got along great, became very good friends. They both did great and they're both, you know, very responsible for certainly everything

that Netscape did and everything that I've done. But they, but you know, it's a, it's a different disciplines, different worldviews. You know, so there's an oil and a water kind of aspect of that. And so, so, you know, Clark ran the company for the first like nine months, which at the time felt like, you know, just like this was internet time. It felt like much longer, but it was like this highly compressed nine month period. And, you know, and it was like we were like doing all these new things. We were doing all these new things.

Like the company was just doing like a hundred new things. It was amazing. But like we, nothing was being systematized, right? By default, it was not going to turn into like a large company without the management part. And so Barstale comes in and he basically is like, wow, this investment is great, but we need to like actually start to have systems and like schedules and processes and actually like run this thing, run this thing like a business. And, you know, as founders do, Clark, you know, originally, you know, found that a little bit frustrating because it's like, you know, whatever is the latest idea is not the thing that we're just going to turn the entire company, you know, to pursue. And this is when Clark was still coming to Jim Barstale staff meetings. And so Clark got up, got, got, got, he had a negative reaction to Barstale saying, no, we're not going to do this new thing.

We're going to keep doing the thing that's already working, you know, one of those moments. And Barstale's like, you know, can I talk to you outside? And so, you know, they went out back and, and I heard the story from both of them later. And, you know, Clark's like, you know, look, this is the whole reason we're here is because we do these new things. And, you know, if we don't do these new things, we're going to destroy the company. And Barstale looks right at him and says, Jim, I hear you, this is as serious as dick cancer. What? The deep Mississippi draw, right?

And Clark shares him right in his face and bursts out laughing. And they got along great ever since. Like they loved each other ever since. First up basically is saying, look, we can't, we're not going to make these decisions in a state of kind of superheated passion. Like, we're not going to do that. We need to have the full version of this conversation, but we're going to have it in kind of this longer and maybe more dispassionate way.

But it was to puncture the stress of the moment. And so I will say I have used that one a few times. But I could see Clark. And Clark thought it was hysterical. Nobody had ever talked in that way before. But I could see Clark like, oh, no, here we go. This is a replay of what happened at Silicon Graphics, though. I think probably he was probably afraid of that to a certain extent.

But yeah, yeah. But I would say, yeah, I don't want to say anything negative about the SGA guy. But, yeah, I mean, like I said, Clark was just like, Barstale was just like, was the manager of managers. he was like so advanced on this. That story notwithstanding. Barstale never took the position of like, no, it's time for the new ideas to stop.

But it was always like, okay, we need to thread the new ideas into a business, which is kind of the hybrid of the two. So I just had this thought while sitting here listening to you speak. Is there something about your partnership with Ben? Yeah. Where like you, like he's more Barcliffe, you're more Clark? Yeah.

Although we do mix it up a little bit more because he does have his own edge. But yeah, there is some of that. Yeah. So, like, for example, our friend, he runs the firm. And then I, yeah, I will, I tend to come up with, you know, he comes up with lots of new ideas, but I do tend to come up with new ideas. And then we do have this kind of discussion, you know, frequently. So if I was to follow you around without you knowing with a camera, what would your day look like then?

Are you just like a found of ideas or you're like this uncontrolled energy like a Jim Clark back in the day? But I've got both. This is the thing, because they both train me, I've got both parts of it. Okay. So you're not as uncontrollable or unmanageable as. Yeah. Like, I think, I believe Ben would tell you. I mean, look, Ben's been working with me now for 30 years,

and so I think if this is a real issue, I think that our partnership would not have lasted. But I think he would say that I have a pretty strong internal edit function. I want to see unedited. Well, unedited is really fun. Unedited is very enjoyable. It is very disruptive. And so, yeah, it has to be, yeah, it has to be calibrated.

When do you show the unedited side? I don't tend to do it in the spur of the moment. Again, this is a thing. And, you know, Elon sheds this incredibly well, just incredibly well, as does Zuckerberg, is like it is this thing, and again, this goes back to like the Edison Tesla thing, when you're responsible for,

when you're responsible for an organization, when you're responsible for a team of people, it's more than five or ten, if you're going to have an organization, it's like 100 or 1,000 or 10,000 or 100,000 people, like you can't change the plan every day. Like, you just can't. You'll destroy everybody.

You'll burn everybody out. You'll destroy everybody. They'll just be mass confusion. People will quit. It's just going to be, like, you can't do that. there has to be some calibrated middle ground. There are a handful of examples of, like, great business successes where it's like one or two or three people.

Right. And so maybe it's like Bitcoin and Minecraft and WhatsApp and Instagram and then I start running out of examples. But like AI, there will probably be more. There will probably be more like single person companies from here on now. Or by the way, artists, you know, an artist and novelist. Let me say, this is a difference between like a novelist and a movie maker.

A novelist is like, you put whatever the fuck you want your novel. But like if you're a direct, you know, director of a movie, you can't, like, change the entire plot, like, on Tuesday while you're shooting the movie, or you're, like, there's 300 people who are relying on you to, like, complete a movie. Like, so, so anyway, so the point being, it's, like, intact, if you're, if you're going to have an organization, or, by the way, in anything, in any field of activity, if you're going to have an organization, you do need to have some calibration, titration process. Like, change does need to happen, but it needs to happen in a measured way. And so, and so you can't just, like, blow it up every day.

And so, yeah, so either what you need in that case, to get kind of the, holy grail of the large scale organization that's still innovating. Either you need two people involved who are able to balance each other. And by the way, you could say this is like Steve Jobs and Tim Cook, you know, would be a canonical example. Or by the way, early on Zuckerberg and Cheryl Sandberg, or early on Bill Gates and, you know, Steve Ballmer. So you can have that kind of configuration. Or every once in a while you can get that in a single person, right, which is very rare, but like Jensen Wang would be a single person example of that. So, you know, every now and then you get that. And so I would say Ben and I have like a version of the Yen and Yang kind of aspect

to it. But like I said, he's very creative on his own. And I have this, because I have the Barkstale training, I have this additional level of sort of most of the time, you know, sort of self-governance. Like I get it. Like I'm not. But it's one of my big thing. It's just like, look, if I'm going to walk in and I'm going to like, we have to change everything tomorrow. And Ben's going to be like, fuck you. Like this fucking sucks. I'm like, like, that leaves nowhere good. Right. So that can't, that can't be the thing. And so I do like, yeah, I do do a lot of self-edity. You just said something. I think you said, you believe Elon is inventing a new way to manage. I think he may have figured out the best way to reconcile the two.

The fountain of ideas with the systematic builder, I think he might have figured out a fun of... I don't know if it's a new way to do it, but I think he might have cracked the code on how to do that for the next hundred years or something. So break down what you've observed with the way that Elon's managing. Yeah, I should start by saying, look, Elon's method has been described by people before.

And I should say, like, I work with him, but from the outside. So I've not worked in one of his company, so I have one layer of indirection, but I work with them quite a bit now, and I study him very, very carefully. It's this extreme focus on substance. It's this extreme focus on getting to the truth. So one of the things you notice in any organization with multiple layers is that basically

that compounding lies. And I got this lesson early because I worked for IBM at the point of their kind of maximum size and importance in the world. Can you explain? I don't think people understand just how big and powerful and almost monopolistic IBM was. Yeah. So I worked for IBM at the very height of their power right before they fell. It was my first job when I was in college.

And they were in the mid-80s, they were 80%. of the market capitalization of the entire tech industry. Right. There's nothing even close to that. It's not even close. Right. So this is like Google Times 10 or something. It's just like or Apple Times 10. It's just like a level of scale and importance that just nobody had. And by the way, the TV show actually that does a great job of this is Halt and Catch Fire in the first season has this thing. This point where these guys are basically inventing the PC effectively. It's a point when IBM shows up. And it gives you a sense of like, it's like the CIA story you told them.

It's like the failings. It's like 20 people on like blue suits or just here to like completely crush you. like it was just this overpowering, you know, kind of thing. And, you know, they invented, like, all kinds of stuff and the industry wouldn't exist today without them. And they were an incredible company for a very long time. And the whole thing, by the way, run by their founder for 30 years, run by the founder's son for 30 years, you know, this incredible company. But then, you know, they're still, you know, they're not that anymore,

but they're still a big and important company today, you know, whatever, 1940, so eight years later. It's like how many companies survive in tech, you know, 80 years. My favorite idea of stories, Thomas Watson, Sr. had been convicted of antitrust crimes before he started IBM. Is this the cash register? The cash register? And so he had previously run a company called NCR, National Cash Register.

And he had been convicted by the federal government of monopolizing the cash register business before he even started IBM. And then at IBM, he monopolized the mainframe business. And then they convicted him again. He's a double dipper. He got very used to being an antitrust court. So he was incredible. By the way, there's a, Kevin Maney, old school tech reporter, wrote a book biography of Thomas Watson, Sr., which you feel.

Because the machine in the man or the man in the machine, right? It's one of, I'm not sure if it's that one, but it's one of those. I think it might be that one, yeah. And he actually went back, and this is like, you know, this is a real time about like 1940s, 1950s, 1960s. And he went back and he got them. At that time, they had a secretary transcribing in real time all of the executive staff meetings every Monday morning. And he went back and I actually got the archives of the transcripts of the executive staff meetings. and it's just literally Thomas Watson's just like cursing everybody out

and just like a complete tyrannical second bat just like screaming at people and it's all it's all in the records and so it's like you know it's like you know whatever I don't know whatever Elon gets accused of or whatever Steve Jobs it's like oh no that guy was whatever it is it's a pale version of what that guy was doing but anyway point being is like IBM so by the time I got involved IBM was like 60 years later you know anyway yeah 50 years later after that and so they were kind of peaking in their power. But what happened was, I remember this because I was there intern and I was trying to figure out whether I should work there after college. And they had a, their internet was a mainframe

app. And one of the functions was a, it was a was the orchard. And I calculated there were 12 layers of management between me and the CEO, which meant the following. It meant that my boss's bosses, bosses, boss's boss, boss, had a boss, boss, boss, boss before it got to the CEO. And then, and then really what happened, the story of the thing, really what happened was, And I saw this happen. I saw this happen up close. What I saw this happened was each layer of management was lying to the one above it, right?

Because each layer wants to look good and wants to, you know, whatever, put a little spin on the ball. And like if one layer lies to the next layer above it, it's maybe that's okay. But when that happens two or three times, the lies compound. That happened six times,

the lies really compound. If that happens 12 times, the CEO has no idea what's happening. Like, absolutely no clue what's going on in the company, which was the state of play that IBM had. They actually had a term. There was actually a term.

They had a whole vocabulary. I mean, this company was like a nation state at the time. you could, like, live your whole life, like in Austin, Texas, and never meet anybody who didn't work for IBM. Like, it was just like this incredible thing. They had this constantly called the Big Grey Cloud. And it was literally the cloud of men and great business

who followed the CEO around and prevented him from ever talking to anybody who was ever actually doing the work. And so when he would come to visit, it was like a state visit. It was like a visit from the King. And it was like the King and the Traveling Court. And so it was a completely impervious bubble

to get information through us. But I tell that story because that's the polar opposite of Elon approach. Right. And by the way, Being the CU IBM in 1989 was a great way to live, right? Because it's just like, wow, everybody's bringing me good news all the time. Like, I wake up in the morning and, like, everything is great. And I'm, like, famous and I am, like, rich and I am successful.

And, like, I've got a chauffeur and I've got a jet. And I've got these 80 guys in great suits who are, like, taking care of everything for me. And I don't have to ever talk to engineers. And like, this is great. You know, until, you know, it's like the turkey on Thanksgiving, you know, until things change and there's a problem. And then you have no idea what to do about it, which is what happened to them. The Elon approach is the polar opposite of that. polar opposite of the approach is literally, like,

I'm only going to talk engineers, right? And so when there's an issue, I am going to go straight to the source of truth, and the source of truth is the engineer who actually knows what's going on. And so what do you literally does? And I've seen him do this. So he literally does he goes to whatever, when there's an issue of one of his companies,

he goes to whatever is the engineer who's working in that problem, and he sits down the engineer and they solve that problem. And I can just tell you, like, the number of CEOs in tech, even the great ones who do that, like, I mean, almost nobody ever does that. Why does nobody ever do that? Well, first of all, it's just like a giant pain in the ass because, like, your life

consists of like having to actually solve all these problems, like the whole point of being like big and powerful and successful is you pay people to do that and now you're doing it. And you're in there at like two in the morning doing it, right? It just sucks, right? And so like most people won't do it. And then the other is you have to, that means the CEO, the company has to have the skill set to be able to do that.

So the CEO has to not just be a great CEO. They also have to be like a great technical technologist, not just that they have memories of having been a programmer at one point or whatever, a chip designer or where they can actually sit down with a chip designer right on Thursday night at 2 a.m. in Austin, and they can actually figure out, like, what's wrong at the chip. And Elon has that ability, and he's like encyclopedic on, like, every area of technology and is able to go hands-on with rocket designers and AI designers and everything in between.

And almost no CEO has that. And so, but that's literally what he does. And then the way that he thinks, the way that he thinks about it, I think, is basically, you know, he runs whatever six companies who wants or something. And it's like, basically, in any given week, he thinks about everything as a production, basically production line, you know, sort of production process. He's actually like an old school industrialist.

So everything's like the production process. And then any given week, there's, in any production process, there's always a bottleneck. So there's always a, there's always the thing that is slowing down the process the most. And that's always one thing. So what he does for each of his companies is he identifies what the, he charts, he literally maps out the production process. And he literally has these like monitors where he like has the whole thing laid out. And then he basically says, okay, this is the issue that's holding up production this week.

And then he goes and he works. And that's the thing that he goes to work with the engineer on. is he goes to fix that bottleneck. And he does it every week for every company. And so think about what that. This is why Tesla is smoking, has been so much dramatically outperforming the rest of the auto industry.

It's because Tesla, he's fixing the critical production bottleneck at Tesla 52 times a year, himself. Yeah. I can tell you what the CEO of the legacy automakers are doing. Like, they're not doing that. That is not what's happening, right? And in a contrast, like a normal company, it might take six months to all these problems.

And Elon's like fixing it right now tomorrow. Like, let's go fix it right now. And so he just runs this loop over and over again. He's just, he's absolutely indefatigable. I offered, he famously, for a while, he had sold all of his houses. And he was literally cop-surfing. You know, it's one of the most successful people on the planet. Yeah.

And so I have a vacation house. I offered him. I said, if I'd take a week and use the vacation house, whatever, take the kids, feel free. And he'd sit back five minutes later, it's like, you know, whatever, 11 o'clock at night. You know, forward response, I don't take vacations. right? Like, which again, it's like there's no CEO like this. Yeah. The whole point of being a CEO is you get to go jet around. And so anyway, so he's doing that. And then, you know, he turns this in a routine. And so, you know, when he does like, he'll, he'll, he does like a day a week at each of his companies. And he'll basically do like all day. He'll do like a 12, 14 hour stretch where he'll do design reviews with, with the way that he does it is with five minutes per engineer. Right. And so he does five to 60 divided by five. it's been way too long in this podcast.

How much is that? 12. 12. You can do 12 design reviews an hour. Yeah. And then he does 10 hours a day. So Elon will do 120 design reviews in the course of a day.

Are these 101? I have not actually said on these. I suspect there are other people around. Including people, you know, work for him and, you know, probably some of the leaders of the companies are involved in different ways. But it literally is, the thing I noticed, it's literally a rotating cat. It's the point engineer on each of the important things coming in and presenting for five minutes.

And then the course, is like, if it's going great, that's great. If it's not going, what's the problem? And then how does that problem rank, right? Is that the production bottleneck? And if it is the production bottleneck, then that's the thing that he then fixes. And then that's when he's there from whatever 8 o'clock to 2 a.m.

Working with that engineer to fix that problem. You know, one way to think about this is the velocity, like in military affairs, it's called maneuver warfare, right? So just the speed at which he operates is just, the cycle time is just so much faster than anybody running in a traditional method. It's just, it's hard to even compare the different. It's like four hours versus six months. Like it's just this incredible gap.

And then the other part of it is somebody I know once went for for SpaceX. And they asked what it was like. And he said it's like being dropped into a zone of shocking competence. Like everybody is like ultra competent. And the reason everybody's ultra confident is because, number one, if they're not, Elon sniffs it out and fires them. But he knows because he's talking to the people actually doing the work. So he, you know, at this point, in his, you know, having done this for whatever, 25 years,

he can sniff this out really quickly now. And then the other is the best engineers in the world want to work for him because he's the one CEO like this who's able to work with them as a peer on whatever the technology is. And as an engineer, you're just like, what would be better as an engineer than being able to design a rocket engine with Elon Musk is your engineering partner? Right. And so he just has this, like, incredible positive selection where, like, the smartest people

in the world want to work for him and then anybody who can't cut it gets fired. The world sees this as like raw aggression, but it's beyond that, right? It's a very systematic way of optimizing these companies to be able to take on these, like, profound challenges, and then being able to actually solve all the problems and do these things, and at a speed that it's just, like, completely unmatched. The challenge of all of this is like, okay, that all works great if you've got Elon. Right. And so one of my concepts is, I think we need a metric for founders in Silicon Valley called the Millet Elon. Right. And so are you, how many Millet Elons are you, right? Are you 10 milit Elons? That would be great. Are you 100 million Elons? You know, that's 10% of an Elon? Yeah. That'd be fantastic.

You know, 500-millimeters, like, I'm going to give you all the money, right? Most people are like one-millimeter-elon or 0.1-millimeter. The question that falls out of this, which is the question that bedevils us, is like, okay, like, you know, you can't clone him. You can't bottle of the essence. So what out of that can be transplanted to, like, normal human beings? And how much of it is predictable or knowable when he's much younger? Because the famous example of this is Michael Moritz passing, made all his money in PayPal with Elon.

Obviously, there was contention there. He got kicked out and everything else. But then Elon pitched him Tesla and he passed because there's no way that you're ever going to surpass Toyota. And then Moritz to his credit was just like I drastically underestimated the guy's determination and pain tolerance, I think, is the term he used. I wasn't there for that. So I don't know about that.

I will say the idea of having been a software entrepreneur, building a car company. Okay, building a... When Tesla started, there had been no new successful car companies in the United States. It was like 100 years. It was like 100 years.

There was like 2,000 of them at 190, founded from like 1900 to 1910 and three that survived. That's right. And the previous real attempt to start a car company in the U.S. before Tesla in the preceding decades was... Tucker or something.

Tucker automotive. Yeah, yeah, Tucker. Which was such a disaster that they made a movie called Tucker, which is about what a disaster it was. And so, like, obviously you don't do it. Obviously, this is insane. And for a software guy to do this is insane.

And oh, by the way, this is only one of the things he's doing. He also has the rocket company. Yeah. Which is also insane, right? And so, yeah, so it's like, and I wouldn't know, by the way, I didn't see it. And I did, I was, you know, I'm a software guy. And I just, I don't know, whatever he's going to go. I guess he's going to go do cars.

I don't know anything about cars. So it's not like I saw it. But I'm just saying, like, the level of incredulity that he was greeted with at the time was, I think, almost uniform. And, you know, there's that famous. The most famous Elon photo, I think, are the most powerful one is the one where he's young Elon probably 2005 or whatever. And he's in the shorts and the polo and all and he's like crouched down. And there's nothing but the explosion remains of the third rocket, the second or third rocket. The one he had been funding personally. Like, yes. Did you ever read Eric Berger's book, Lift Off? Yeah, I didn't. Oh, you got to read it. I'm surprised you haven't. It's the only focuses. I like these company histories that focus on like the first like six years. And it just stops. It's a first six years. It's a first six years. history of SpaceX. And it's just nothing good in the book. It's just reading one failure after

another after another, one catastrophe after another after another. It's a good read. When my kid was five, he loves rockets. And so his favorite rocket video was the compilation of all the SpaceX rocket explosions. Do you know? Well, Iman talks about this that before his friends, when after he sold them to, I think he had like 180, I think the story tells it said like 180 million after taxes. He's like, I'm going to do this rocket company. One of his, I think Adeo Rossier, I forgot him with the friend, sat him down. And they made him watch. all the rocket, there's a compilation, this is probably for you to,

of just rockets blowing up over and over again. Like, no, you're literally going to light your fortune on fire. It's going to explode in the sky. I mean, obviously, it's working. Right. So his method obviously is working, and it's obviously working far better than, I mean, it's certainly working far better than anybody else's method in cars.

It's certainly working better than anybody else's method in rockets. And then in a bunch of other areas also. So, like, it's clearly working. And so it's like, okay, you know. And then he just draws, because of just who he is and what he's doing and how he does it, You know, he draws so much heat. You know, there's just so much, the environment is just full of criticism and attacks, you know, just not stop.

And, you know, we all kind of get sucked into these narratives. But I think the key thing is just the, for me, it's just like, okay, like there is a method there that he has been working on and refining for, you know, coming out 30 years that has worked better than any of the method. Like, I don't know, like I said, I don't know how many people can do it. Maybe there's just like a fundamental limitation, which is you can do it if you're Elon and you can't do it if you're somebody else. Or maybe you need to be above 30 miliolans, but not. below or something like that, right? Maybe there's some threshold where you break through on this. But it is clearly the best method.

Like it clearly is generating the best results. And then again, conceptually I like it because it, again, it's this bridging of the founder mentality with the manager mentality because he's not just doing these are not just one-offs. He's scaling everything is scaling. What is it? Starlink just hit? What was the number? Starlink just hit 10, was it 10 million subscribers?

I'm one of them. Yeah, exactly right. You probably have read about iridium and telodesic. No. Oh, okay, okay. So, ELA's not the first guy who said we're going to do satellite-based, like, internet access. There was Bill Gates, Craig McCaw. So when Microsoft's on top of the world, and Craig McCaw basically built cellular telephony in the U.S.,

built what's now AT&T mobile. Those guys teamed up in the early 90s and did this thing called Telodesic, where they put up, you know, satellite-based voice, and then it was going to be Internet Internet access. Complete catastrophe, total bankruptcy, complete disaster. And then Motorola, which used to make all the cell phones in the U.S., had another one system, but actually still up called a radium. And again, it's just classic business school case study of just complete disaster, capital destruction. And so Elon's like, I know, I'm going to do number three of those.

We're starting as a side project at the rocket ship company. Right? Because he's like, I, in retrospect, it's total genius. Because he's like, we're going to be putting up, if the rockets are reusable, we're going to be launched them all the time. And then the question becomes, what's going to go in the rockets? And he's like, I could wait for the customers to come to me with more stuff to put in the rockets, or I could just put up my own satellites.

What would be the satellite to put up? oh, it would be consumer-grade, you know, consumer-priced Internet access. And it's just like, okay, anybody who knew anything about the history of, like, satellites knew that that was like the great, you know, that's the new craziest idea in the world. And, of course, it's like this, like, you know, giant success. It's like the site, it's like the side project. There's clearly method. It clearly incorporates invention. It clearly incorporates a brilliant job, both of those.

It's clearly, in part, the Henry Ford, whatever, Alexander the Great method, clearly. But there's also, like, real scale and have to it. Space Six and I was building, you know, they got their own city. like down in Texas, right? And so it's a formula that captures most sides of it. And it may be like the least studied and understood thing I know of in the world right now. It's incredible. Mark, we're running out of time.

When I started this show, you were out to top my list for one of the guests I want to talk to you. Thank you so much for doing this. I hope you come back in a few months because there's a million other things we need to talk about. Good. Awesome. Fantastic. Thank you. Thanks for listening to this episode of the A16T podcast.

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