a16z Podcast - The Inside Story of Growth Investing at a16z
Episode Date: December 31, 2025This episode is a special replay of David George’s conversation with Harry Stebbings on 20VC. David is a General Partner on a16z’s growth team, and in this discussion he breaks down how he thinks ...about breakout growth investing: why great business models are now table stakes, where real edge comes from non-consensus views on TAM, and how to underwrite upside in a world of higher prices and increasing competition.They also dig into the mechanics behind the scenes: unit economics at growth, “pull vs push” products, winner-take-most market structures, and how David decides when to double or triple down on a company. Along the way, they touch on SPACs, the rise of crossover funds, single-trigger decision making, and how David manages fear, pressure, and performance over the long arc of an investing career. Resources:Learn more about 20VC: https://www.thetwentyminutevc.com/Watch on YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/@20VCFollow Harry on X: https://x.com/HarryStebbingsFollow David on X: https://x.com/DavidGeorge83 Stay Updated:If you enjoyed this episode, be sure to like, subscribe, and share with your friends!Find a16z on X: https://x.com/a16zFind a16z on LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/company/a16zListen to the a16z Podcast on Spotify: https://open.spotify.com/show/5bC65RDvs3oxnLyqqvkUYXListen to the a16z Podcast on Apple Podcasts: https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/a16z-podcast/id842818711Follow our host: https://x.com/eriktorenbergPlease note that the content here is for informational purposes only; should NOT be taken as legal, business, tax, or investment advice or be used to evaluate any investment or security; and is not directed at any investors or potential investors in any a16z fund. a16z and its affiliates may maintain investments in the companies discussed. For more details please see a16z.com/disclosures](http://a16z.com/disclosures. Stay Updated:Find a16z on XFind a16z on LinkedInListen to the a16z Show on SpotifyListen to the a16z Show on Apple PodcastsFollow our host: https://twitter.com/eriktorenberg Please note that the content here is for informational purposes only; should NOT be taken as legal, business, tax, or investment advice or be used to evaluate any investment or security; and is not directed at any investors or potential investors in any a16z fund. a16z and its affiliates may maintain investments in the companies discussed. For more details please see a16z.com/disclosures. Hosted by Simplecast, an AdsWizz company. See pcm.adswizz.com for information about our collection and use of personal data for advertising.
Transcript
Discussion (0)
You have to think long-term, so we think in five to seven-year terms,
and try not to worry if we're off by a year or two on the valuation.
Like, that's a risk that I'm willing to take.
We turned it down based on price when I was at GA.
They figured out a huge market, hiding in plain sight,
a sales model that totally worked, fast product velocity,
all the things that we look for, big markets where they're the leader,
business model that was exceptional at scale, long room to run,
so that's a very painful one.
The benefit of single trigger-puller model as opposed to committee decision-making is it's the ultimate measure of conviction.
So if that individual has conviction and gets feedback from the partnership and maybe the feedback is constructive or negative and still wants to make the investment, that's conviction.
Today we're replaying a conversation from 20VC with Harry Stebbings featuring A16Z general partner David George from our growth team.
David shares how he thinks about breakout growth investing, why Edge comes from non-consensive views on market size,
how to underwrite upside in competitive markets
and what separates poll companies from push companies.
He also dives into unit economics,
deciding when to double down,
and how single-triggered decision-making shapes investment conviction.
They round out the conversation with SPACs,
the rise of crossover investors,
and how David manages pressure and competition
over the long arc of an investing career.
Welcome back to 20VC with me, Harry Stebbings,
and what an episode we have in store for you today.
I just love doing this one.
It's one where the chat really completely,
went off-peased and we didn't stick to the schedule at all, but always the sign of a great
conversation, so I'm thrilled to welcome David George, General Partner at Andreessen Horace, where
he leads their growth investing practice. Since joining in 2019, David has invested in the
lights of Clubhouse, Coinbase, Databricks, Figma, Instacart, Robin Hood, and Trip Actions, to name
few. David also sits on the board of Current, Greenlight and Workrise. And prior to Andreessen,
David spent seven years growth investing at General Atlantic, where he invested in the likes of
Airbnb, Crown Strike, Open Door, Slack and Uber. Again, just naming a few. I'd also want to say
huge thank you to Ariel at Trip Actions and Ali at Databricks in particular. Some amazing
questions and suggestions from them and I so appreciated that. But without further ado,
I'm now so excited to hand over to David George, General Partner at Andrew St. Horowitz.
Three, two, one, zero.
You have now arrived at your destination.
David, it's such a joy to have you on the show today, my friend. I do.
I do want to start by saying huge thank you to Angela Strange on your team and Allie at Databrace
for some brilliant questions suggestions, but thank you so much for joining me today, David.
Hey, thanks for having me, Harry. I've listened to the pot a bunch and love what you've done
with it. Well, thank you so much. I still can't believe I actually get paid to talk to people
like you, so it's a pretty crazy life, but I do want to start with some contact. So tell me,
how did you make your way into the world of venture and come to be leading Andreessen's
growth fund today? Yeah, so look, I grew up in Kentucky, very far away from the world of
finance and technology. I was very fortunate. I had an awesome upbringing. My parents, I had an
older brother. Went to college at Notre Dame, thinking I was going to be a lawyer. Thankfully,
I went into the finance industry out of school instead. Eventually, I moved to San Francisco in 2008,
where I started to, you know, first encounter the world of tech. And I joined General Atlantic
about 10 years ago. At GA, I had the chance to invest in some amazing companies, spent about
seven years there. Companies like CrowdStrike, Uber, Airbnb, Open Door, Slack, and then some
others that are a little bit lesser known, but really awesome companies like Benevity and
Seismic. I came over to A16Z to start and run our new growth fund about two and a half years
ago. Initially got to know some of the folks at the firm just from some overlapping investments
that we had. So I think I knew Alex Rampel the best because we're open door. And fast forward
to now, we're investing, had the chance to build a great team inside the firm and work with
some awesome founders and companies here as well. I mean, it's been an incredible time since joining
Amdreyssey. Do you have to touch on the GA time there? Because the GA is such a
prominent kind of figure in the industry, but it's also a very different one. So I have to ask,
you know, what were your biggest takeaways from your time with GA? And how do you think it
impacted your mentality? Yeah. Look, GA is an amazing place. I'm really grateful to the team there.
You know, one of the foundational frameworks that I developed coming out of it was what
makes a breakout or successful growth investment or sort of pattern recognition of what I look for.
In almost all cases, for me, that has come down to, you know, a great founder. And then a theory
on busting through consensus view on total addressable market or Tam. The consequence of that is
a company that grows faster, you know, faster and or longer than expected. So, you know, take my time
here, take Roblox. The prevailing view when we invested was, hey, it's just a kids game. Well,
you know, we felt that they had a shot and still do at being something much bigger, a co-experience
platform, something that's much broader than games, much bigger than kids. One counterintuitive
observation from my time at GA and my pattern recognition coming out of it is, you know,
exceptional business models are just table stakes in growth investing. They're not actually,
in my experience, what gives you edge in making great growth investments. So, you know, we don't
take risk on investing in anything but high quality business models. But in my opinion,
this is not where you generate outsized returns. You can make mistakes here, but it rarely
surprises to the upside. So despite that, I feel like it's where 90% of growth investors spend 90% of
their time. So, you know, coming back to the TAM point, total addressable market point, I'd give
you a couple more examples on, you know, forming non-consensus views and things that made successful
investments for me. One of the flavors of this is the consensus view of total addressable
market lags what's actually happening in the market. You know, when I was a GA, the consensus
defined the market wrong at Upting Mitz. There would be way more applications than historically.
And, you know, the view of the software to support that just lag. So you could see it actually by
looking at individual forward-thinking companies, but not from looking at market research reports.
You know, one of the more recent examples is Figma, which were investors in from A16Z.
The simplistic way to look at their market is software for designers. But the historical
definition of design and designers is actually pretty dated. Our view was that all front-end
engineers in the future will engage in design. And this is 10x plus bigger in terms of market
opportunity than just defining what they do in the design space. So, you know, in both cases,
It was a refined view of the addressable market that led to a conclusion that in the future that that will be much bigger than folks recognized today.
I have to unpack a couple of elements here before we move on.
I do just want to dive in and touch base here.
You mentioned the element on business model.
And I do want to touch on that because, you know, when you look at some companies, say a DoorDash of the world,
it takes a while for the beauty of the business model to mature into what it is.
So how do you think about having the mental plasticity to see what the best.
business model can be versus what it is today when investing in growth. Yeah, look, DoorDash is a great
example of this. You just led me right into a discussion of mistakes that I've made in the past,
which could be like a 90-minute VC episode. But, you know, DoorDash is a great example of this.
I missed a lot in DoorDash, not just the unit economics, you know, the power of the market
size, the localized network effects. But I would say the big piece on the unit economics for DoorDash is
you could see early signs of it in performance of really mature markets that they were in.
and you could see the localized network effects in action.
So specifically in the South Bay suburbs in the Bay Area,
unit economics were very good.
And they ran some experiments at the time that we were looking
that demonstrated that they could actually get the unit economics much higher.
The power of their market position allowed them to maintain strong unit economics
on the restaurant side.
And then they did some really innovative stuff,
which there were ideas around this,
but it was early to see it on building consumer stickiness,
like loyalty program. And so you put all that together. And at the growth stage, you could see this
had the potential to have really good unit economics, even though, you know, the trailing data around it
didn't show it. You mentioned union economics quite a lot there. My challenge is like, when do they
become important? I'm using this session as an advice and a learning moment for me, but at the early
stage, sure, your cacks may be super low, but you've got the most aligned customer base that
you're marketing towards. And they will generally get a lot more expensive over time as you
saturate that audience, but then also brand and word of mouth can come into play and they can
reduce. So I guess my question is like, when do unit economics become central and how central are they
to you? Yeah, look at the growth stage, they're very important. The thing that we look for in unit
economics is, you know, where are they now? And then as you scale up much larger, do you have a theory
on why they're not going to get worse? And hopefully that they get better. And so they're very
important at the growth stage. Again, though I go back to the point of like what's driven,
you know, outsized returns for me, the unit economics end up being sort of table stakes, right?
Like you can get it wrong to the downside. It's very rare that the company ends up with, you know,
unit economics that are much greater than what you expected. It's much more common that, hey,
the growth of the company just exceeded all expectations. So, you know, at growth stage, when we
invest, we look very closely at them. The challenge that I have, I'm sorry, we did have a schedule
I'm just completely, you know, going off.
Yeah, totally.
The challenge is, like, with the unit econ is, like,
when you have the proliferation of capital that we have into the markets
and suddenly founders have these budgets, which are just eye-watering,
Solona has raised a billion dollars.
I mean, a billion-dollar raise.
Like, their need to be worried about KAC optimization or unit economic efficiency.
It's just less because they've got a billion dollars in some cases.
How do you think about and advise founders on how close they should pay attention to
unit econ when they have this proliferation.
and capital support?
Yeah, look, I think it's a great question, and it's a function of market conditions,
competitive environment.
So, you know, there are instances where I'll tell founders that it would make sense to relax
their criteria and maybe spend a little bit more in the name of growth if it's a hyper-competitive
market and it ends up being a super sticky customer base over time.
But you mentioned Salonis and other company a little bit.
They're in an incredible market position.
I think their business model is fantastic.
I would view their future as very elevated,
levels of high growth. And, you know, there's not some looming intense competitive threat that
makes them think that they should aggressively go burn a bunch of cash just to grow faster.
In our universe, in each of those sectors, that makes it sort of the right size for us.
I think one for me that I always find striking is that capital concentration on a per
company basis. How do you think about bluntly how to get as much cash into the winners as
possible? And what does that reinvestment decision making look like for like, do we really
fucking double down, or do we let the capital market support it and we play a nice role?
You know, we've invested multiple times in many of our companies. So Coinbase, we invested three
times, Roblox twice, Databricks three times, strike four times, trip actions, four times. Every time
we assess one of those new investments, we do it with fresh eyes. And so we got re-underwriting.
We mentioned the upside there and the multiple expectation or multiple desire. You know,
the bluntly, the challenges are so much cash. The prices are so high. It's just much harder to do those
multiples with the entry prices that we're paying. I had Layla from Capital G on the show. She said
the prices are two-x what they were a couple of years ago on average entry price for her.
I'm interested, like, how do you think about your own price sensitivity today, given where we are
today? Yeah, look, this is a fantastic question. I wrote a piece about this called When Entry
Multibles Don't Matter. Talking a little bit, it touched on this and other things. I'll just talk to you
about our process and then I can address the valuation point. So we first start, we assess the company,
assess the market, we assess, you know, founder, all independent evaluation. And so if those check
out, then we spend a lot of time on valuation and scenarios and making sure that we see our way
to target return. So the best thing that we can do is invest in great companies that are growing
very fast because those afford you more degrees of freedom on valuation. And, you know, I talked
about the upside scenarios. Like, they're the ones that are more likely to deliver upside scenarios.
So one of the frameworks that we use and talk about a lot, and it's, you know, this is relevant for
evaluation because it speaks to the flavor of companies that we tend to matchmake with is,
you know, we look for what we call Glenn Gary, Glenn Ross, market structures. So, you know,
the famous movie, this is like independent evaluation. So what that means is there's a scenario,
have you seen the movie? I haven't. So explain it for me. Okay. All right. It's sort of like
a boiler room sales old school movie. So there's a scene where Alec Baldwin is presenting to his team
their monthly sales competition. It's his famous line where he says, okay, here's the prizes. First
place gets a Cadillac. Second place gets a set of steak knives and third place gets fired. And so we actually
think most many or most tech markets play out in market cap in a similar way, where the leader
captures the vast majority of the market cap creation. You know, if you're not the leader, it's going to be
a challenge situation. So we look for those kinds of market structures. You know, this is very well known
and well covered in, you know, consumer land companies like Google and Facebook that have
clear network effects. But surprisingly, you can see it actually in a lot of industries that don't
have network effects, but play out in a similar way. So in B2B, you know, Salesforce, workday,
service now, they command almost all the market cap in their respective markets. So the way we
approach the valuation question is, you know, if we can get that point right and the company
wants to work with us, you know, more often than not we can reach an agreement on valuation.
Now, you know, the biggest point is, you know, in a market where valuations are higher than they
used to be you have to think long term. So we think in five to seven year terms and try not to worry
if we're off by a year or two on the valuation. Like that's a risk that I'm willing to take.
If we underwrite something five years and it takes a seven years, I'm okay with that. The last piece
is just tech markets are bigger than ever and there's going to be a lot of market cap creation.
And so if we're long term oriented enough, you know, we should be okay. You know, tech's about a quarter
of US market cap and that's just going to grow fast. Can I ask one. There's always a case where
everyone's turned down a company based on price. What company have you turned down based on price
that keeps you up at night? Oh my goodness. The most painful one is probably Qualtrix,
which, I mean, look, it's killer founders and yeah, I remained friends with the guys. We turned it
down based on price when I was at GA. They figured out a huge market hiding in plain sight,
a sales model that totally worked, fast product velocity, all the things that we look for,
big markets where they're the leader, business model that was exceptional at scale, long room
to run. So that's a very painful one. I do love Ryan. Just never play golf with him.
He's an absolute fiend. But I do have to ask, you know, you said there about kind of
entry price no longer mattering with that brilliant kind of provocative title. I was taught,
you know, I'm from the old school of venture. Temporal diversification mattered too.
And that was a core part of any portfolio. Today with deployment cycles, it doesn't seem to matter
either. Do you think temporal diversification matters today? Or do you think it's about
adjusting to the game on the field and being in the moment? Look, I think it's more about adjusting
into the game on the field and being in the moment.
And then we don't invest in hundreds of companies.
And so our goal is not to be an index fund of the overall tech market.
Like, we just need to continue to outperform and do our best.
And if we can see the path and get confident about the path to achieving our target
returns, that's okay.
Reserves are one way that you achieve temporal diversification.
If you have more of your fund and reserves, you know, that stretches the deployment cycle
of your fund over, you know, five years instead of two years or whatever the number is,
that naturally provides some temporal diversification.
I have to ask, man, we mentioned the price changes and the increasing price we've seen over the last, especially a year, but last few years.
You know, we've seen P hedge funds, crossover funds, I mean, everyone and their mother investing in late stage and pre-IPO.
I've got to ask, man, when you look at it, how do you think about this massive proliferation of capital at the late stage, especially with players who seem to be playing a different game in terms of return expectations, willingness to pay two extra.
what we pay. How do you think about this new landscape and how you win in it? Yeah, look, it's a great
question. First, I think there's a little bit of a misperception in the market about some of those
firms who have been more aggressive recently. The returns are pretty good. They've done a good job.
I think a couple of things that we've done to adjust. So one, diligence processes and
fundraises, you know, they've gotten faster, to put it lightly. What that causes is, it makes investors
narrow the focus area of what they can cover in diligence. You have to have a
mind coming into things. And you have to be really smart about where you spend your time.
So, you know, we always focus on the three or four things. You know, I talked about business
model being sort of a table stakes exercise for us, you know, so that's typically, you know,
one, maybe two of those things. But, you know, the real decision-making process will come
around that view of future growth. So we have to be prepared to make those judgments
faster and assess those questions quicker. It used to, I remember when I started a GA would be like,
okay a company's raising money and you know let's take two months and you turn over every single
piece of minutia for a company like that's it's probably more efficient and better overall for
the market that that's not the way it's done anymore because it's just inefficient all around you know
on the competitive point i think of us as playing the and game like relative to some of the newer players
so we move fast we pay fair market prices you know we can write very large checks and follow on into
companies you know many times over the years that's that's all what some of the newer players are
known for, but because of the way that Mark and Ben have built the firm, we can also do a lot
to help founders as a scale. And that is relevant whether the company is at series A or the
series D in the growth phase. So, you know, we tend to matchmake with the companies who see us as
being able to deliver more than just dollars. You mentioned Mark and Ben there. In terms of
investment decision making, how does that look like for you? Yeah, it's a little more on the
informal side. We have a single trigger-puller model, though. We have discussions and deep,
robust discussions about investment decisions, but it's ultimately the call of the GP who's sponsoring
the investment. I serve as a generalized specialist. I heard Paul Inright use this term recently.
It works for us. And what that means in this case is I sit across all the industry groups.
So, you know, we can measure the relative excitement of a BWA software company versus a bio
company or a crypto opportunity or consumer. And this is really helpful in sort of measuring relative
excitement and attractiveness. So the other piece on investment decision making, and it goes back
to the matchmaking point is, you know, we try and prioritize companies where there's still some
degree of company building that takes place. So we can help companies, given what Mark and Bennett
bill. And being part of our decision making process is we have the luxury of partnering with
our early stage GPs and deal partners across the firm. So we feel like we'll have unique insights
into big trends or themes early from being a part of the early stage business. You mentioned the
single trigger element there. I'm really
interested because, you know, at the end of the day, you've just
got to have the courage to pull the trigger
and go. And it's a big
courageous moment to write that
check and put your name to it. I guess
how did you approach
that? How did you mentally get
over that with your first? And would you
have any advice? I remember with mine, I was
shitting myself, and mine was for a million
dollars, not for a hundred billion dollars.
Well, it's better to be honest, I mean.
Yeah, look, it's better to be honest, man.
Look, I totally agree. And like, the first
time I did that. I still remember, I mean, it's not, it was not a single single trigger puller model
at GA, but I remember my first investment there and I was panicked. Like, am I making the whole
decision here? I don't know. I've grown to get comfortable with it over time. I think the benefit
of the single trigger, and this may be obvious, but the benefit of single trigger puller model
as opposed to committee decision making is it's the ultimate measure of conviction. So if that
individual has conviction and gets feedback from the partnership and maybe the feedback is
constructive or negative and still wants to make the investment, that's conviction.
right and if there's a committee model sometimes you know one of the negative things that happens is they're selling and so because often a committee will look to the person and try and measure or gauge conviction and so they're selling and so my experience i think it leads to less intellectually honest conversations and open conversations because you know there's some element of convincing that needs to happen as opposed to personal conviction building by challenging and you know asking questions and exposing concerns and getting feedback on
This is a tough one, but do you think there is internal politics and, I mean, there is at most
firms, but do you think there is internal politics and Andrews? And then she thinks there's
anything that you or one can do to maybe prevent or minimize them? It's going to sound like
I'm bullshitting because it's like the politics are pretty, look, if you're a single trigger
puller model, lots of the politics come from shit like that, trying to convince people,
trying to advocate your own ideas, trying to shit on other people's ideas because, you know,
maybe there's a deal that gets done instead of yours. Why would that introduce, Paul,
if it's single trigger, because it's like, I'd like this deal and I have conviction, so
see you later. Rather than like, I have to get you on side. I'll vote for your deal if you vote for
my deal. Yeah, no, that's what I'm saying. I'm saying the same thing. I'm saying the single trigger
for the model eliminates the politics, right? Right. Yeah. And then the other thing that calls
politics internally is like promotions path for people. And I think part of the benefit of the way that
just the background of most of my partners being founders of companies is they've actually run
companies. This is typically a problem with investment firms. It's like superstar investors end up
running the firm. Whereas, you know, our firm is run by people who have run companies. Yeah,
I do totally agree with you and see that. One of many reasons I work alone. Well, that and,
you know, no one likes me. But other than that, it's totally cool. Everybody loves you,
man. I was fishing. I, I just stepped right into it. Anyway, I do want to ask as well,
though, like, final couple. But it's like, you know, everyone's got a spat now. I've been tempted by
20 VC spack. I think that's so cool. But,
Anyway, everyone's got a SPAC, like, how do you think about like the rise of SPACs, the SPAC market, whether it's good, bad, and opportunity?
Look, I think SPACs are great for the company side.
They provide another form of liquidity and getting public for companies.
I counsel, I've talked to some of my company's founders about, you know, going down the SPAC route.
And the thing that I say to them always is it's a totally fine path to go down as long as it's not seen as a milestone and you're just ready to be a public company and, you know, after you're done with it.
So it's good from the company side.
I think on the issuer side, it's valuable to the market if there's some uniqueness
that comes along with it.
So, you know, if there's a value proposition that's unique, great.
It will be appealing to the right founders.
If it's just a financial vehicle, I think the proliferation of so many SPACs will make it
a little more challenging to generate really attractive returns in the market.
Final one, you mentioned some of your companies.
I spoke to some of your companies before the show.
And one, Ali, who I love, by the way, but Ali said to me, you've got to ask this guy, he's been super successful and he's achieved so much, what drives you today and how do you think about your relationship with money?
On a plane last night, and I was texting with Ali about something similar. It's not, money is not what drives me. I love learning new things every day. I get the chance to work with the best founders in the world, building awesome companies, just like you. You know, I love my job. I work all the time. I do have a deep fear personally and paranoia of failure.
And I'm extremely competitive.
And so returns and generating returns are one element of the scoreboard for me.
And I love that competition and I want to be the best.
There's a mission, you know, mission side of our business too,
which is generating great returns for our limited partners.
So these, you know, universities, nonprofits, it's the same as you.
They've entrusted us with their investments.
And I want to make sure I work as hard as I can to give them the best outcomes in the market
so that they can use those dollars to good calls.
How do you prevent that fear paralyzing you?
because I, too, I have this kind of relationship with fear.
The way I channel my fear, I channel it into working harder.
So if I have a fear at any moment that I, you know, I'm not doing the right things.
Like, the way I try and compensate for that is I dive in, I work harder.
I do something different.
I reach it.
And the beauty of our business, you know, same as yours, is there's an endless amount of work that you can do.
You can always get smarter about a company.
You can always get smarter about a trend or a theme.
You can always try and form a differentiated point of view on something.
You can reach out to people who you've learned from.
There's just an endless way.
that you can, you know, expend work time. And so when I feel like I'm not doing well or failing,
I tend to, you know, go deeper into that stuff. I do want to move into my favorite, though, David,
which is a quick fire round. So I say a short statement and then you give me your immediate thoughts.
Does that sound okay? Let's do it. Okay, so what's the favorite book and why, David?
Okay, I'm going to give me two. One is like a business book that I think is the most important one,
which is for the business that I'm in, which is increasing returns to scale by Brian Arthur.
The second one is my fun favorite book is Count of Money Cristo.
Tell me, have you read Seven Powers by Hamilton and Helmer?
I have not, but it is downloaded on my Kindle.
Honestly, for what we do, it is amazing.
Tell me, what lie do rich people tell themselves most off?
I think it's over-emphasizing their own work
and underplaying the role of luck and circumstances
and other people who contribute to their success.
It's like form of just world fallacy.
What is the single biggest challenge of your role with Andreessen's Day?
It's constantly evolving to changes in the competitive market.
So I mentioned this earlier, Mark and Ben turned the industry on its head 12 years ago,
and people are constantly trying to figure out the next thing to turn on its head.
So our strategy and how we work with companies always has to change with that.
What do you know now that you wish you'd known when you started at Andresen a couple of years ago?
I mean, Andrews is still pretty fresh for me.
I wish I had known it earlier in my career in growth to spend more time thinking about what can go right,
as opposed to modeling or trying to predict what may go wrong.
This is a tough one. What advice do you often give that you find hard to follow yourself?
It goes a little bit back to our fear point, but there are going to be ups and downs over the life of an investment in a partnership with a founder. Don't get too high from the highs. Don't get too low from the lows. It's one thing on the investing side. The same could be said for building a company, but probably times 100 in magnitude.
Final one, David. What's the most recent publicly announced investment? And why did you say yes and get so excited?
So it was loom. So the frameworks that I love is I try investing.
companies that are pull companies, not push companies. What that means is the market is
pulling their product from them as opposed to they're trying to push their product out to the
market. So they're an asynchronous video company. It's viral. It's spreading organically. It's
growing 10x year over year at scale. They're building enterprise top down sales onto bottom up
traction and run by founders who are passionate. They're domain experts. They know the product.
They're building a brand and they're building a great business. I've got to ask this one final
question. With pull and push businesses, often it's pull in the beginning. And then
it goes to push. Do you get worried when it goes to push and how do you determine how long
you have to run on the pull? Yeah, this goes into the market work that we do. I think you can
form a pretty sophisticated point of view on this. One, if it's something that's very unique and
they are the market leader, the pull will probably last much longer. Secondly, it's part of our
diligence. We talk to non-customers, probably more than we talk to customers of companies. And you can
get a pretty good sense for how they're going to behave in the future based on those conversations
to try and predict it. And then back to my table stakes, business model comment, you know, you just got
to make sure that is pushing that comes along with the pulling, that the economics of that are going to make
sense. David, listen, I absolutely love this discussion. Thank you so much for putting up with my
completely wayward questions, but it was amazing and I so appreciate it. Thanks for having me,
man. I mean, if you couldn't tell, I absolutely love that discussion. I want to say you, thank you
to David, for being so patient with my completely
off-scheduled questions. He was just fantastic there. And as I said, just loved it. Shows like
that made me really appreciate what I do. As always, I so, so appreciate your support and I
can't wait to bring you a fantastic episode this coming Thursday.
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