a16z Podcast - The Missing Power Layer of Modern Warfare
Episode Date: March 24, 2026Erin Price-Wright speaks with Adam Warmoth, founder and CEO of Chariot Defense, and Alex Miller, CTO of the U.S. Army, about the power crisis at the heart of modern military operations. As the battlef...ield becomes more distributed and electronics-heavy, the Army's legacy power infrastructure, built around diesel generators and lead-acid batteries, is struggling to keep up. They examine how commercial breakthroughs in EV and aviation technology are being adapted for the front line, why fuel convoys are a military liability, and how procurement reform is letting startups get hardware into soldiers' hands faster than ever. Resources: Follow Adam Warmoth on X: https://x.com/AdamWarmoth Follow Alex Miller on LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/alex-m-0983a5201/ Follow Erin Price-Wright on X: https://x.com/espricewright Stay Updated:Find a16z on YouTube: YouTubeFind a16z on XFind a16z on LinkedInListen to the a16z Show on SpotifyListen to the a16z Show on Apple PodcastsFollow our host: https://twitter.com/eriktorenberg Please note that the content here is for informational purposes only; should NOT be taken as legal, business, tax, or investment advice or be used to evaluate any investment or security; and is not directed at any investors or potential investors in any a16z fund. a16z and its affiliates may maintain investments in the companies discussed. For more details please see a16z.com/disclosures. Hosted by Simplecast, an AdsWizz company. See pcm.adswizz.com for information about our collection and use of personal data for advertising.
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All the things we want to do is really about the soldier.
In the mud, cold, wet, tired, hungry, what makes their lives easier or better?
Your average soldier today, they're drawing just by themselves 30 to 60 watts of power continuously during their operation.
So that's basically a mid-tier laptop running all the time.
We're moving towards an increasingly electronic battlefield.
There's really this missing power layer that is required to actually field all those systems.
Cheriot is building the tactical power layer for robotic warfare.
So we had a lot of passive capabilities that were able to hide, kind of sense without kind of giving away position,
but needed the ability to go active when we needed to make an interception.
So that meant that we had to bring the 15 kilowatt generator that was 99% of the time running at 500 watts,
creating a detectable signature both from the thermal acoustic signature and then the resupply because it's using fuel so inefficiently.
So there are all these things that create a signature in environments where there shouldn't be signatures,
and that means that we can be targeted.
So someone will go plug in a copy pot, and it'll take down the air defense radar.
Modern warfare runs on electrons.
Drones, sensors, electronic warfare systems, edge AI.
Every capability the Army wants to field draws power.
But the infrastructure delivering that power hasn't kept pace.
For decades of counterinsurgency, diesel generators and fixed forward operating bases were enough.
Today, the battlefield is distributed, decentralized, and contested.
every generator running at 1% capacity is a targetable thermal signature.
Every fuel convoy supplying it is a liability.
The question isn't how to power more things.
It's what the right things are and how to make that power invisible to the enemy.
Aaron Price Wright speaks with Adam Wormouth, founder and CEO of Chariot Defense.
And Alex Miller, C.O. of the U.S. Army.
We're here today with Adam, Wormouth, and Alex Miller.
Adam is the founder and CEO of Chariot Defense, which builds next generation power systems for the battlefield.
Before that, he led engineering at Anderil and product at Archer Aviation.
And Alex is the CTO of the U.S. Army, where he runs all things technology.
He's the driving force behind the Army's push.
Thank you to get new tech into soldiers' hands fast.
Adam, Alex, welcome to the A16C show.
Yeah, thanks for having me.
Take beer.
Maybe just getting ready.
into it. Adam for listeners in 60 seconds, what is chariot building? Who's the end user and what
is winning look like for you guys in the field? It's a great question. Chariot is building the
tactical power layer for robotic worker. The reason why chariot needs to exist in the world is we're
moving towards an increasingly electronic battlefield at the same time that is becoming more distributed
and more decentralized and we're building kind of these new systems or pushing these new systems
down to these operational mobile forces that now need to sustain equipment, have organic
capabilities around command and control, around County UAS, around Air Defense, EW, all of these
electronic systems.
And there's really this missing power layer that is required to actually field all those systems.
So when I was leading County UAS at Anderil, we were fielding all these new systems into expeditionary
environments and constantly running into problems with the existing power solutions being
insufficient for what they're being asked to do in that new environment.
So what we're doing is basically building.
integrated battery, power electronics, microcontroller systems that allow you to hybridize
your systems. So we're not going to replace diesel fuel. We're not going to replace power
generation. What we can do is be much more smart and be much more tactical about how we actually
employ and distribute the island of the ballot. Awesome. And now, Alex, for listeners,
what is the CTO of the Army actually mean in practice? What do you control versus influence
and what are you trying to change right now? No, it's a good question. It's an all-un influence operation.
So I will tell you the real driving force between all the change, really as Secretary Driscoll, General George, as the Chief of Staff of the Army.
And then I have an amazing partner in Mr. Brent Hingraham as the Army Acquisition Executive.
So right now at this point in time, influence is really easy because I have willing partners and willing leadership who say, we are going to change things for the better.
But what it means for me in practice, what I do control is getting out and actually seeing the problem set with my own eyes, digging in with my hands,
actually being there, seeing it, doing it, which you don't see a lot of.
Generally, the Pentagon becomes very insular and people just sort of hang out there
and drive things from the top.
It becomes much easier when you really understand from the bottom,
from soldiers in the mud, cold, wet, tired, hungry, what makes sterilize easier or better.
That is my job to go understand the problem space rather than just approaching bright, shiny objects,
or chasing technology.
That's awesome.
So maybe let's set the scene.
the Army is adding drones, sensors, electronic warfare, edge AI, autonomous systems.
We've heard about this. It's happening faster than ever. And we're here because there are gaps in our power infrastructure.
So maybe Adam, let's start with you. Paint us the picture of a tactical operation center right now.
What's physically there? What's running? What's consuming power? What are the gaps?
Yeah, it's a great question. So the tactical operation center today looks a lot different than it looked five years ago.
as we transition from a very counterinsurgency focused
force structure to a very large-scale combat operations
distributed decentralized.
And so you're seeing brigade command posts
and create operational centers
that are smaller than a battalion command post was before.
And so what you're doing is you're pushing a lot of capabilities
that used to be able to live at these big fix-site fobs.
Right.
So those forward operating bases that were dug in,
we're doing construction.
Like semi-permanent.
That's right.
And so things like mobility didn't matter,
things like signature management didn't matter.
even logistics mattered, and logistics was painful,
but we kind of lived with those logistical burdens.
And the reason was we were fighting on kind of this barbell of the operational spectrum,
where there was kind of short patrols happening from where all the soldiers really needed to carry with them was a radio.
To communicate back to that brigade command post that was kind of dug in and fixed and could provide air defense,
ISR, C2 capabilities, as long as they could communicate with that forward force.
What we're seeing is that every kind of link in that chain has been disrupted.
So if you think about a platoon, forward deployed, needs to go see over that next mountain to know what's on the other side of that terrain feature.
They would call back for support to this big fixed command post.
That command post would launch a drone, you know, a fixed wing drone from a runway that would get overhead and kind of provide time on station and stream down a high bandwidth 30 FPS full motion video stream down to that platoon and they would have that intelligence picture.
Every link in that chain has been disrupted in a large-scale combat operation fight.
That transmission back to base is going to get that triangulated and detective.
and targeted. The runway that they'd be launching that from has been destroyed by the enemy's
long-range strike capabilities. If you do manage to get ISR overhead, right, that's going to be
contested, it's going to be shot down. And if it does manage to maintain time on station, that
video link down to it is being jagged. And so what that means is we're pushing a lot of those
capabilities down to the company, the platoon level. And so your command post is now much more
distributed. You're running command and control out of a single truck rather than these big kind of
semi-permanent installations.
So we're starting to see this shift already, but let's take that same talk and add everything that the Army wants to do in the next, let's say, two to three years.
Next generation come in and control, AI, more autonomous systems.
How does that power math change?
Sure.
So before we actually talk about the tactical operation center, let's actually talk about the soldier.
So all the things we want to do is really about the soldier.
Your average soldier today might have one or two radios, depending on if they're in a leadership position,
as we think through things like Soldier War Mission Command,
as we think through drone batteries,
as we think through their eUD,
their in-user device or something like a tactical Android assault kit,
they're drawing just by themselves 30 to 60 watts of power
continuously during their operation.
So that's basically a mid-tier laptop running all the time.
So if you run that over a 72-hour operation,
they might be drawing between 1.5 and 2 kilowatt hours
just by themselves before you start adding
their team, their squad, their platoon.
So before we start talking about the fixed positions
and the mobile positions, power looks different
at the soldier level.
Now for things like next gen command and control,
one of our goals is really making those platforms
much more power efficient, but also
bringing down the size of those command posts.
So we had this wonderful set of experimentation
called transforming in contact where the very first unit
that went through that, the Second Brigade 101st strike,
their brigade command post was five Humvee,
backed up to each other, whereas normally a brigade's talk by doctrine is 4,000 square feet.
So if you think through just making it smaller forces us to have less servers, less computers,
less fans, less TVs, because you walk into every jock and it looks like a Taj Mahal of TVs
and routers and everything. Just by minimizing the footprint, we've reduced how much stuff we have,
which means we've reduced our power draw. So as we then take that truth,
and look at Nixon Command and Control,
which is our full stack deployment of how do you do infrastructure for communications,
infrastructure for software platforms,
infrastructure for software services like autonomous warfare, like robotic warfare,
and then the delivery, so everything from your apps or your tech tools or the websites that you hit,
being able to deliver that as one set of platforms as a full stack
rather than the 17 disparate systems that came before it means less servers,
less radios, less routers, less cabling, less comms antenna, less noise makers.
That is what we're going for.
It's not just trying to find better ways to power everything we had.
It's actually thinking through what should we have and then how do we power that?
So, I mean, you've seen some of this in the field, Adam and Andrel.
You were at Andrel for three and a half years building counter drone systems.
what did the power problem for these actually look like in practice for you?
What was failing in your experience?
Yeah.
So that experience really shaped what chariot defense is today,
which was we were supporting expeditionary county U.S. operations,
you know, before Ukraine, before it was kind of the kind of invogue topic.
And it's because we were working with SOCOM,
who was kind of running into these problems, you know, ahead of the conventional force.
You know, when we started fueling those systems, I assumed,
cool, hey, we bring the robots, right?
And there'll be somewhere for us to plug in.
Yeah.
And quickly realize that that was not the case
in that your options today were kind of small
or like lead acid, you know, batteries,
not really designed for energy storage and power distribution
or kind of massive diesel generators.
And we certainly kind of believe in diesel being part of this solution.
We're very much a hybrid power company.
It's very energy dense compared to batteries.
But what not having a kind of hybrid system forced us to do
was size our power generation to the peak demand of that sense of that kind of U.S. kit.
So we had a lot of passive capabilities that were able to hide kind of sense without kind of
giving away a position, but needed the ability to go active when we needed to make an interception.
So that meant that we had to bring the 15 kilowatt generator that was 99% of the time running
at 500 watts, which means it's using fuel bearing efficiently.
It's causing reliability challenges.
It's taking up a lot of space on that aircraft that's air-resulting in.
It's, you know, creating a sense.
detectable signature, both from the thermal acoustic signature, and then the resupply because
it's using fuel so inefficiently. So all of that creates a targetable signature that's throwing
away a lot of those benefits of that passive chemical gas system. So that's really where we believe
in hybrid. We believe in batteries as power, power management, power distribution, kind of pairing
with the existing power generation assets in the army around the vehicles and the power generation
that exists. I would love, you know, on this topic of kind of the generators and the diesel
systems that are in use today. You know, they produce heat, noise, emissions. They can be detected and
targeted. You know, we were also just talking earlier about how much of a target these fuel convoys are.
I would love to hear kind of your perspective. How big of a problem is it for the Army?
That's a good question. So there was a long period of time where being an 88 mic, a truck driver,
was one of the most dangerous jobs because you're basically driving, you're driving a truck full of
liquid explosive. You're driving a truck full of fuel. So it didn't matter how efficient to generateers got,
they still needed fuel to run.
And all of the signature that we're thinking about for,
even in the world we're seeing today,
over the weekend and into today,
signature really matters.
So if you are creating a thermal signature
because your generator is running all the time,
you can be found.
And so maybe for the very tech illiterate,
of which there are probably not many listening to this podcast,
thermal signature is basically heat.
It's heat.
So if your phone gets hot when you're using it too much,
and that's a thermal signature,
or if you put your, the easiest way,
if you go put your hand on top of your refrigerator at home,
it's warm because it's actually generating,
it's using energy, it's generating that,
and it's putting out thermal energy.
And that means that the enemy could potentially detect.
And you can see it.
Yeah.
You can see it because it's part of the spectrum.
It's why hunters use thermal cameras.
Everything generates that.
Same with acoustic, so it makes noise
because you can hear it for a long distance,
especially when you're in flat terrain
or nothing else should be making noise.
batteries, if they are not coded correctly, if the converters aren't shielded, they actually
produce electromagnetic noise so you can find that as well. So there are all these things that
create a signature in environments where there shouldn't be signatures and that means that we can be
targeted. That's one of the areas that we are really thankful for new players that are emerging
into portfolio that say, I know that I have to generate power. We don't live in a world where we
own everything all the time. Therefore, it has to actually produce power in a way that's useful
and useful in this context is low thermal output, low acoustic output. So can't be hot, can't be
loud, and it's got to be easy to actually move. Yeah, the easy to move, I think, is also underrated
as a challenge. So maybe Adam back to you, what exactly is your first product? How does it work?
has it different from a traditional battery system.
Yeah, and we actually tend to lead our products with their concept of employment,
because that's really what makes our product interesting.
Yeah.
And so what our first product is, is the same 424 system.
It's a 4 kilowatt system, 4 kilowatt hours of energy storage.
But what it does is it can deploy at kind of the squad up to battalion level.
Maybe for just contextualize, how much is that?
Like, what does that power?
Yeah, so it depends on the use case.
And that's kind of the great thing about having this universal product is,
So we went out to our first transformation
and contact exercise back in May of last year.
That was six months from first check into the company.
So kudos to the Army Transformation Initiative
in terms of its ability to bring new companies in
to say, hey, we're going to work with this.
We're going to bring it in, right?
We're not going to make you file six months worth of paperwork.
We're not going to say, hey, we already started planning this exercise
six months ago, try again next year.
And so we brought it out there.
And a lot of it was, hey, let's discover those use cases on the ground.
We had a multifunctional reconnaissance company,
which is one of the new elements
in the Mobile Brigade Combat teams,
actually air assault in with that M4-24 system,
they're able to run 36 hours
without generating any kind of detectable thermal
acoustic signature, running their radios,
their EW equipment, their drones.
At a battalion command post,
you're looking more at like two or three hours.
And this is where we say,
hey, the battery is not really the answer
from an energy perspective.
In some cases, it can be for Militonaut's time.
But at a battalion command post,
what we saw was guys
idling trucks under camo nets,
given up carbon dioxide poisoning,
because they had no way to convert
their AC generator power to DC power. Or we saw, you know, the, the executive officer having to
choose who got to plug their laptops in so they wouldn't overload those generation assets.
And so what our system does is it kind of drops in the middle and kind of access this converter,
buffer manager, exactly, that lets you handle the big surges on the output side without passing
those 30-year loads, lets you shut your generation off to go into that low signature kind of
hiding mode, gives you, you know, failover when those power generation assets fail, gives you
high quality power to your C2 equipment.
And a lot of that NGC2 equipment.
What do you mean when you say high quality power?
Yeah.
So it is a bit of a nuance like a tech.
It's like electrons, you know?
Yeah.
When you plug into traditional generators and you have a big surge of load,
a lot of times that can pass, that can impact the generator's ability to generate
your kind of clean sine wave alternating current power.
When you're plugging into maybe host nation shore power, right?
there's brownouts blackouts
voltage spikes
all of that is kind of
kryptonite to these
these command and control systems
Yeah I mean I'm being somewhat facetious
But like if you know a lot of
It's a real thing
It's a real and a lot of people who work in tech
And who listen to this podcast sit
Where in in you know
Silicon Valley in the United States
Where maybe they have a power outage every once in a while
But really don't have to reckon with
What it means to what it means to not have kind of reliable
consistent power over their laptops
And it's one of those things where if you've traveled overseas and you plug your phone into a wall after you figured out which adapter and it doesn't charge quite right, you can tell that it's taken too long or it's getting really hot.
Or if you're me and you blow out your hair dryer.
Yeah.
So like clean power is something that we used to talk about a lot more.
And then we figured out how to put generators in the middle and separate ourselves, but those were fuel driven.
So having clean, consistent power, that's a really important topic.
Yeah.
And you brought up the wrong voltage, wrong frequency, right?
You know, stuff that's frying your hair dryer, right?
So a big part of how we're going to fight and how we're fighting now is with allies that don't always share the same power standards.
So the other thing our system can do is act as that software-defined power layer to bring all of these different sources together and power all these different outputs.
Right now there's really no smarts running on kind of there's no like kind of routing happening with power.
So someone will go plug in a coffee pot and it'll take down the air defense radar.
And so what we're doing is applying kind of that smart power layer that's able to kind of manage,
that's able to optimize, it's able to forecast and simulate, that's able to convert to the right
folders, the right frequency, kind of through hot software handshakes between systems.
And so I think, yeah, people don't realize kind of how much room there is to improve kind of the current
power situation, how much in counterinsurgency we kind of just got away with some kind of bad
habits around around this stuff and how much we're really going to have to transform to kind of
meet this new modern type of way. But it's it's, I'm glad you brought up the coffee maker. So this is
sort of tangent. It's, it's also an education on things that are very high draw versus things that
are very low draw. Because a lot of people don't understand as soon as you plug your coffee maker in
or a microwave, you are changing the nature of how much power you're drawing because it is going
to spike immediately versus a lot of our drone batteries are much, much lower draw, but they're
longer. Yeah. So you need that energy. It's just not spiked.
biking and bringing down your talk, which definitely didn't do, a coffee maker.
Yeah, it's like I have, in our pantry, we have a microwave and a toaster oven, can't run both
of them at the same time.
Yeah, exactly.
I remember that the hard way approximately once a week.
And then the software layer that we're adding is instead of expecting our, you know, our,
you know, end user level, you know, operators to really be like, you know, PhDs in power.
Instead of that, if you just add that software layer that can say, like, hey, instead of
turning on all three air conditioners at the same time, turn one on, wait three seconds,
turn the other on wait three seconds, turn the other on wait three seconds. Very simple,
zero operational impact. You've now cut your peak power demand by a factor of three,
which means you've cut the size and weight of your system by a factor of three. So some very
small improvements with software can have a major impact on mission outcomes.
And so, Adam, Terriott's core insight is that the commercial EV and EVTol
industries have largely already solved this, or solved this to some extent.
Can you explain that in more detail?
What made you connect the dots between the tech on the commercial side and the military application?
Yeah, absolutely.
So the time I spent in my kind of first career outside when I come out of college,
outside of my time in Anderl, was in the electric aircraft industry.
Electric energy is only possible because of some incredible breakthroughs happening in the technology sector
for these core kind of electro-industrial stack components around high-voltage batteries,
silicon carbide power electronics.
It's this like almost magical new technology that lets.
you do all of these things in terms of kind of software-controlled power, really high compact, high
density. And so there's some incredible breakthroughs there, same breakthroughs that are behind,
you know, Heron Power, right? Same breakthroughs that are behind companies like Impulse Stoves,
even, is these really high power density electronics. And so that was all happening really in the
commercial sector, right? Tesla kind of leading the way there. Two of our leading electric aircraft
companies, you know, are in the Bay Area about 20 miles from Tesla headquarters, right? You know,
Joe B and Archer, not in L.A. where you might expect them to be. And it's because
these incredible breakthroughs happening in the commercial sector that actually allow your hybrid
system to win on kind of size and cost and weight compared to a traditional combustion engine system.
And so that improvement's been kind of happening over the past 30 years in the industrial
sector.
And what we're doing is kind of through good forward deployed engineering and good, you know,
kind of go to market and building the product in a way that's informed by our experience
getting into the budding dirt with the warfighter, we can kind of take that, that amazing technology
advancements and bring it into the apartment.
in a way that's similar to what Andrell did
with self-driving car technology
and autonomy developed from that industry
to what Palantir did in terms of
they're working with kind of cloud
compute and big data processing.
Technology invented commercially
brought to department.
It's been kind of a flip from what we saw
in the Cold War, right?
Which was GPS, internet really invented
and kind of research labs
brought into the commercial sector.
We've seen a bit of a flip there
and we're kind of part of that time.
Coming full circle.
And I mean, you mentioned this earlier,
but you went from founding the company
to have a lot of,
having a system in the field in six months.
How did you achieve that?
How would have, and how maybe would that have looked differently under the old model
before we had people like Alex pushing things forward?
Yeah, I mean, I talked about a little bit of just like, you know, the paper drills, right?
And kind of the process following and the kind of inflexibility to say, why does this
process exist, right?
And I think we kind of lost track of that where.
the process kind of became the outcome versus, you know, the outcome is winning. Like, we want to win.
And then, like, okay, the process exists. And we have things around like fairness and we have
things around, you know, the kind of right regulations and stuff so that everyone kind of feels
like they have enough of a shot to keep new entrants participating. But there was kind of then
this overcorrection where the process became the outcome. And I think what you've seen with the
guidance from Secretary Heggseth and Secretary of fiscal in General George is really refocusing on
the outcome.
And what that means, if you focus on the outcome, is, hey, just because this company didn't
exist when we started planning this exercise, literally, for that JRTC exercise, we did not
exist when that planning kicked off.
And it's kind of been a complete transformation in terms of the willingness to accept risk,
the willingness to kind of bring in new entrance, right?
And just, I think that really, that outcome focus is really what I would say is the kind
of central tenant of the transformation issue.
Yeah, I agree.
And this is really the core tenet of when Secretary Hague's,
Seth and Secretary Duffy and Secretary Michael for acquisition and sustainment, research engineering,
and, of course, the department, that's really what they're talking about in terms of, it's a
cliche overused.
It's buying runs.
It's not, hey, our goal is to field a team.
No, our goal is to actually win.
And then you field a team that's going to win and you work backwards.
So the transforming in contact when we first started, it was all about how do we flood the zone for
those units, give them all of the technology to solve their problems.
And then we will find out what doesn't work.
We'll find out what worked, but needs maybe some adjustment rather than the two years of writing requirement, the five to seven years of trying to field something and then going, ooh, I don't think we bought and made the right thing.
That's the right thing after all.
So maybe to that end, like what have been some of the product lessons that you've learned deploying directly in the field?
I joke.
Like I've jokingly called you the chief four deployed engineer because when you look at Adams calendar, it's basically.
impossible to get him a person in San Francisco for, let's say, a term sheet signing dinner.
Because he spends all of his time essentially in the mud.
I feel like she's going to slide something over for this.
So we'd love to hear, like, what are some of the specific lessons that you've learned
and feedback that you might not have gotten if you hadn't had the opportunity to really
deploy with the warfighter and get some of that direct product feedback?
Yeah, yeah, yeah.
And I've had the opportunity to see Alex out in the field at,
at JRTC out in the mud out there, I'm at NTC out in the desert, you know, spending three
weeks living out of, you know, motels and, you know, just getting into the field with,
with the soldiers.
Just really enjoying Barstow.
That's right.
All that it has to hop.
Yep.
Yep, exactly.
And so, you know, that's really been a great experience as I'd spend a lot of time.
I think Alex could also probably be called chief forward to playing engineer as well.
And, you know, just embracing that model of, you know, we're going to get out and we're going
to learn.
We're shipping version 5.2 of our system today is a system that we're actually selling and
delivering two army units right now.
And so that's, you know, in just a year, right?
You know, going from version one, you know,
our first system we actually ever built is still up,
actually deployed with a unit up in Alaska because they wouldn't let us take it home
after the demo.
But they also had a lot of really good feedback for us and said,
don't take this home.
We like it as it is.
But if you were to change something, here's what you should change.
And a lot of those changes have been,
how do we actually make this as drop in as possible
to the doctrine, to the training, right, to the existing equipment, right,
really focused on that interoperability, that ease of use.
Is that like hardware interoperability, software interoperability,
that allows for interoperability?
What do you mean when you say?
Yeah, it's all the above, including just kind of the concepts of operation,
how they would transport it, how they were loaded on to different platforms.
So one of the key things that our system has is every tactical vehicle and combat vehicle
in the Army has this NATO port on it, that today they only use basically to jump a truck,
one its battery dies because someone left the radio on overnight.
That is effectively, though, something that ties you right into that vehicle's electrical system.
And so we realized, oh, hey, we can actually drop something in there.
We can plug into that port.
They actually already have that cable.
And so with something that, like, we just delivered just one box.
We make it super simple to use.
We have one switch to operate it.
You know, that was kind of the thing that we really learned and iterated on.
We dropped it in.
Okay, well, now they plug it in, and now they end up with a dead truck.
If they charge our system, it's like, okay, well, let's add that by.
bidirectional charging. So we'll charge our system, but then when the truck turns off and they're running loads up the truck, we'll push power back in. So things like that were things that we learned by actually getting out of the field. You know, doing this at a time and transformation contact because the formation structures are changing so rapidly, right? There's no textbook that you can like read on. And especially around power, people really can't describe their power needs, you know, their connectors, their voltage their frequencies. You kind of have to get out there in a field, give them something and they say, hey, this doesn't work. And and again, kind of coming back to, we don't actually.
actually really like talking about our products. We like talking about what does enable.
How can they be more lethal, more survivable, you know, more operationally independent
with this capability. And so you can really only learn that by getting into
deal with them, seeing the soldier innovation of, hey, what uses do they come up with it?
One of the multi-purpose companies threw it onto a robotic vehicle. We went and drove around,
silently beyond the flop while powering all their systems. And we're like, okay, that's a use
case we should design for. Yeah. And I know you actually just got back from the
Arctic with the 11th airborne.
Would be curious to hear some of the things you've observed,
whether specifically related to kind of on the ground,
resupply power management power supply chains.
Everything breaks at negative 40.
JP8 freezes at negative 53.
When you are about negative 20 or below,
by the time you issue you the battery for your radios from the connex,
they're dead.
So one of the lessons,
So I had an opportunity to go up to 11th Airborne's JPMRC, Alaska rotation.
So first brigade was the training unit, second brigade was the Op 4.
And they gave a masterclass on how do you make the things that you have work.
And then we also were able to provide them through devcom several experimental types of power generation management and storage techniques.
A lot of it focused on small batteries.
And how do you keep those from cold soaking, which is the condition where it gets so cold.
for so long it actually destroys part of the chemistry of the battery and it doesn't charge
properly. How do you prevent them? And soldiers come up with the best solutions.
And like one soldier took a space blanket and just wrapped the drone on the battery and it produced
enough heat that it kept, it actually kept it thermally insulated enough to fly. So that's super, super
simple. It doesn't need a whole bunch of other things. Devcom brought some battery heaters,
which just slaps onto the cells, draws about 10% of the power from the battery,
It keeps it long enough that keeps it warm enough that it will fly.
So all of these edge cases were really, really interesting to see soldiers do, but they're edge cases.
So we saw a lot of the very similar things at JMRC in Germany last year where it wasn't negative 20.
It was about 20 degrees.
And we saw the same failure.
So now we can figure out, and I'm glad you brought up the flow between the industrial base now and the department versus the Cold War,
which it was department was the idea of fact
we were you pushed stuff out.
We are at an interesting time
where we're seeing a lot of technology
that solves the 80% solution
and then we can hyper focus on
what's that 20% edge case
because the Arctic is one
and we're seeing the exact same things
that all of us grew up with
with the super heat,
super hot environments as well
because the jungle eats batteries
just as much.
The desert eats batteries.
So now we can actually go,
okay, the commercial industry
has solved this really serious
80% problem. The consumer market is making things smaller, more efficient, less expensive.
We can now spend taxpayer dollars on those cases.
Yeah, focus the resources on the things that really don't matter in the commercial sector.
Yeah, there you go. So maybe switching gears a little bit. I guess more broadly, like how,
can you talk more about how the Army is modernizing its procurement and tech integration?
You've talked about it a little bit, but would love to just, you know, hear your big picture view for how this should work.
Yes, I can.
And I'm proud of where we've been because a year ago, Justin and Lela and I started, we're sitting here talking about what does acquisition reform look like.
What does it mean?
And now we're here, and I can actually tell you, here's what we've done.
So the Army had 13 program executive offices across everything.
and then PMs under that,
we had research and engineering centers
that were disconnected.
We had contracting officials
that didn't work for the PMs or the PEOs.
All of that was separate.
And they actually lived under different commands.
We had Army Futures Command with the labs.
All of the PMs lived under the acquisition
and logistics and technology chief in the Pentagon.
And then the contracting lived under Army Material Command.
Today, we have six portfolio acquisition executives
and our sort of plus one is the pathway
to innovation pathway to innovative technologies the pit um the contracting officials work for those portfolio
executives the labs report to those portfolio executives the requirements generators report to those
portfolio acquisitions so now you really have a portfolio manager who says here is the current
state of what soldiers need in my portfolio so command and control protection fire sustainment
very big meaty problems yeah here are the current efforts that we have underway
within the labs that solve some of these problems.
Here's what we can cut away because commercial industry
is probably gonna solve that faster than us.
I'll give you an example.
We did lots of credit to Chris Manning,
who was our deputy assistant secretary for research and technology
and is now the deputy C2 portfolio executive.
He actually put together a gauge that said,
here are sort of the big areas that we invest science
and technology dollars on.
Fires, command and control, energetic, sustainment.
And then he also assessed, here are the areas
where industry invests their money,
and if both of those are invested in,
that's probably a mismatch.
That means we are wasting dollars
that you are going to actually solve
way faster than we will.
So we can focus on things like
energetics and propulsion
and things that are super unique to us.
That is how we actually thought
about next gen command and control,
go fully commercial where you can.
That's how we're thinking
about some of our next generation
fires capabilities
because there's probably not a need
for 20 years of government development
when we can see very clearly there's companies who have built better, cheaper, faster missiles
or better, less complex rockets.
I get to watch SpaceX launches all the time.
So those are examples of things that we have done, like the acquisition reform is a thing.
It is here.
It is working within the Army.
So, and you also mentioned a little bit earlier, this transformation in contact,
which is essentially, I mean, you should describe it, actually.
Okay.
It was a very simple thought from General George
and then immediately signed on with Secretary Driscoll.
It was, what if we gave commanders flexibility
to organize their units and their equipment for their mission?
So generally, the Army, the Big Green Machine,
we have the best capability in the world
for the things that are unique to us.
Like the things that came out of the Big Five, Patriot, Abrams,
Bradley, Black Hawk, Chinook, or Apache,
best things in the world bar none.
However, that can't be the norm for everything
where commercial industry is going to go faster.
So we said, what if we saturate these units,
give them so much stuff to the point where it's probably going to break them,
they're not going to be able to try everything all the time,
and then what if we let them tell us what's working and what's not,
and then organize themselves with the formation and the technology
to be the best, most lethal organization they can be.
So we started with Second Brigade 101st,
down at Fort Campbell, Second Brigade 25th in the Pacific in Hawaii,
and then Third Brigade, Tenth Mountain, who's going to Europe.
We said, you cover the globe.
You're probably going to look and feel different rather than just trying to field everyone
the same thing everywhere all the time.
And then we spent the next 18 months iterating with them.
We expanded a little bit, so I think I've seen Adam at every tick rotation.
And then we took it to every combined training center that we have.
So that's the real crucible where we make units as a unit
actually go fight the fight against a living, breathing, thinking opt for
instead of just what we used to do, which is, hey, it worked in a lab,
let's spend the next five years building it and then filling it out.
And then hopefully it does in combat what we needed to do.
We actually made everyone use their technology.
Everyone talks about the things that work,
the things that came out of tick that were most important for, at least me,
as an advisor to the chief and the secretary, is here are the things that don't work.
stop doing them. Let's not waste more money. Or here are the companies that are really promising.
They're not quite there yet. We can give them rudder guidance. Or here are the portfolios of
investment that are the most fruitful. Let's continue to send them our demand signal because that's what
they need to do their job. Yeah. So how do you know that tick is working? What does it look like?
Maybe specific wins or I guess like how do you move from success?
within tick to, you know, a longer, more sustaining larger contract.
It's not, it's unevenly distributed.
Yeah.
So I will give you one example for how I know that that tick is working.
So we started with purpose-built, a tradable UAS,
and now that is something that we were scaling to the Army.
We started with sort of a vision that not like Ukraine,
because we don't fight like Ukraine,
but some of the lessons in technology,
we definitely want and we should scale it.
So what you're going to see here in the next couple weeks is the UAS Marketplace go live.
It's live right now.
We've got it sort of sequestered off so we can actually try it, get soldier feedback on it.
But that is a way that now companies can get their kit out there and then scale those demand purchases.
We know that we used TIC to fix the network.
And really what that means is rip out a lot of the super complex networking stuff that we gave to units.
And we allowed them to reorganize and say, this is how I need to be organized for me to get the data that I need,
where I need it, and now we're institutionalizing those
training, or those architectural changes.
So I know that it's working in big, hairy areas.
I think if I were a betting man that you'll see very similar
from us on things like autonomy, things like power generation management
and storage, things like mission autonomy across air and ground and maritime.
So that's, I know that it's working with the things that were really baseline,
so I know that it will work on the things that are much more complex.
And so then, I mean, the budgets are still ultimately controlled at the congressional level.
So how do you work with Congress to make sure that the long-term budgets line up with your modernization efforts and what you see being important in the field?
Aggressively. I think last year I talked about a concept called flexible funding or agile funding.
We worked with all of the committees. And in the 26th budget, we were over.
to get some of our budget line item consolidation.
Having those portfolios executive is as an arbiter
of what their budgets look like also helps
because now you have a portfolio of things
instead of multiple different efforts
and those portfolio executives can make trades with them.
They can trade off, yeah.
They can make trades on requirements.
They can make trades on systems.
They can make opportunity cost trades where,
hey, maybe we get an 80% solution,
you know, 30 days from now,
instead of 100% solution,
years from now. And then what you'll see in the Army's budget without giving away numbers,
because that's how I get tackled on the streets, is we will continue to be aggressive about
BLI consolidation in 27 and program element consolidation, but also doing the simple things that
like nobody cares about, except us here in Washington, making sure that our JBooks are not so
specific that we lock ourselves in, making sure that our PNR forms or talk about the things,
the capabilities that we need, not the stuff that we're buying. Because then
as new companies come online, as new capabilities become real,
that gives us flexibility to try them immediately,
rather than having to wait another palm cycle,
which was what we did, you know, two or three years ago.
Yeah, yeah.
So maybe zooming out again a little bit, you know,
thinking towards the future and power and, you know,
the future of warfare.
I'd love to talk a little bit, like one of the big risks in,
power and energy in particular batteries is how much of our battery supply chain comes from China.
And China is currently beating us on battery production, production costs, and many of the
downstream industries like EVs, drones, grid storage, et cetera. So how big is the gap? Is this
something that the Army is thinking about? How do we close it? And how do we bring these supply chains
closer to the U.S.? Yeah, just simple question. Definitely no big deal.
No, so we are. So one of the under understood components of the Army is our organic industrial base. It's 23 depots and arsenals and factories across the United States that were built during World War II and have been running ever since as a strategic reserve for the nation. So the Army builds all the ammunition. We repair radars and combat vehicles. And we build, we have the additive manufacturing.
Center of Excellence. So that, like, that is a strategic reserve that the Army has. So as we think
through battery production, there's been two big, two big pushes. So NDA 26 had investments in
battery cells. So that's massive. And then the Undersecretary of War for Industrial-based
policy is also making big investments coupled with the Department of Energy. And how do we
onshore manufacturing of battery cells? Super, super exciting because you're looking at, you know,
across just IBP industry-based policy
in the Department of Energy,
you're looking at almost $300 million of investment.
And then you're also looking at, you know,
an additional couple hundred million
of investment area that the Department of War is looking at
for battery cell production,
which turns into battery manufacturing,
which turns into upstream rare earth mineral manufacturing,
productization, metalization,
and then making it available
so that companies can pull it into their supply chains.
So yes, your army is looking at how do we do that.
And we are also trying to make sure that the department and industry
and the rest of the federal government understand,
here's the demand signal because we will absolutely consume these things.
It allows Americans to get upskilled.
It allows factories to be set up for American manufacturing and production.
And it tells the American industrial base that there are opportunities
that might not have looked like they were available five years ago,
that will actually be hugely beneficial for the country moving forward.
It's not just a drone thing.
It's not just a toy problem thing.
And this actually solves America's problems,
not just the Department of War's problems.
Yeah.
I'd be curious to get your perspective as well
and how you're thinking about your supply chains,
particularly on the battery end,
but more broadly across the product.
Yeah.
So we really kind of see our position as kind of that next level down.
from the department where we're delivering an end product and end solution.
And so we can also kind of, you know, using the demand signal from the department for our products
can go pass that on to our suppliers and our supply chain as well.
And we can say, hey, you know, the department is probably the highest willingness to pay kind
of per kilowatt hour for these systems, you know, versus kind of consumer commercial type
applications.
And doing that reshoring is going to take, you know, going to take investment, right?
Those first hundred, those first thousand, right, are going to be more expensive than the equivalent
from China. But what we can do is we can say, hey, we will kind of help you get down that cost
curve because we're able to say, hey, we can go and take that and deploy it into kind of the
most demanding application, right, that has the most demanding supply chain requirements.
And we can kind of act as kind of off-take agreement kind of for those companies. And, you know,
I think a lot about, you know, reading kind of freedoms forge and thinking about how do we kind of
re-industrialize, right, and how do we kind of compete in this economic domain against China.
and it's not by trying to out China, China, right?
It's like, what do we do great here, which is capitalism, right?
Incentives.
It's the government as a customer, right?
Not the government as an investor.
And so we kind of really see opportunities to take the demand signal to sell those products
into the department and then say, hey, if you're buying, if you're building cells in the U.S.,
we will buy those cells.
We will buy those first thousand cells to help you get down that initial cost curve because
we have a customer, right, who has that highest demand for that in a way that, you know,
prevents the government to go buy lithium.
and then figure out, okay, what do I do with all this lithium, right?
Like we sell a product that goes directly to that end user,
but can help kind of provide that demand signal
to those U.S. companies trying to re-shore.
The other thing that we think about really in the supply chain space
is focusing on those end items or those kind of mid-middle of the value chain
items where there's a lot of focus, a lot of discussion,
right, at the national level, at the White House,
about critical minerals, right, about sales, refining, mining.
But where we actually see some of the biggest risks in supply chain
are actually these end items where soldiers are going to Home Depot and buying, you know,
these Chinese battery banks to fill a gap around power.
Systems that are Wi-Fi connected, right, systems that could be backdoored, right,
from a communications perspective, could even be shorted out in terms of their BMS and turned
into remotely triggerable IED.
And so we see a lot of kind of the supply chain and really trying to drive the supply chain
discussion, not just into those inputs, but into those end items.
And it all kind of has to work together cohesively.
So maybe last question then, if you could define success for tactical power modernization
24 months from now, if that's the right time frame, what would soldiers actually feel is different?
Coming back to the warfighter.
I'll tell you a story.
Hopefully it supports the answer to question.
So I went to, I had an opportunity to go to a THAAD battery, and I will not say where it is,
even though they are decisively engaged right now.
And they were rebuilding,
they, these fire soldiers,
were rebuilding three KW generators by hand
because the adapters were fouled.
The guts had basically worn out
and they needed them to make sure they had continuity of operations.
And the question that we asked was,
why are you rebuilding,
this. 3K is nothing. Let's go find some. And they went, we would love that. We would love that
flexibility to just go buy a 5K generator and just have it here. And we weren't doing that for them.
So we've solved that problem, but 24 months from now, that problem shouldn't exist. Now, it's
going to take time to get, you know, everywhere all for the entire army, but we should be able to
either have some type of dismounted solid state battery. That's a tactical microgrid.
compliant. We should have some type of solid-state generator that's tactical micro-rid compliant,
or we should have something like the Infantry Squad vehicle heavy, where it's a vehicle that
actually is able to put out power that is tactical micro-grid compliant. That allows everyone to know,
here is the way that you build your interfaces, just like we did with software APIs forever. Here is the way that
you serve your power. Here is the way that you have to hook up so you can give it to us. And that
standard should be no more cumbersome to any company than us saying, hey, your software has to
have APIs. If we can do that, I think a lot of the problems that soldiers have today go away and
they get to ask second order questions like, how light can we make this? What are the other
interesting ways that I can employ this? How can I actually power my robotic warfare company? How can
I actually power my tactical UAS platoon and their batteries so that they're not in a hide site
with two generators, you know, powering six different types of UAS batteries.
Some of them are super slow trickle charge because the cells are smart.
Some of them are very fast charged because the cells are dumb.
I think a lot of those problems become much more transparent and we can actually start solving
harder problems.
Yeah, I mean, I'll bring it full circle to kind of the outcomes focus, right?
And again, Cheriot, not really liking to talk about our products,
to talk about what we enable.
And we want to, yeah, we want to kind of blend in as this just infrastructure layer.
Kind of similar thing with Next GenC2, right, is just like everything communicates, right?
Everything is shared.
There's no silos.
You don't need that individual soldier on the ground to be an expert on networks or an expert on
radios or an expert on how to configure and dial in this particular radio.
It's, you know, I plug something into the network and immediately that sensor, right, all of its data,
right, is available to the people who need it.
We want to be that kind of same layer for power where it is transparent.
right. It's not something that you have to think about.
Significly, you can think about how do I deliver effects, right?
How do I be more lethal? How do I be more survivable? How do I hide?
How do I use this to operate longer without resupply?
And so that's really where we're focused is. And we've seen some early wins there.
We had a brigade commander, you dropped this into his vehicle.
Last year at the same exercise was driving these, you know, Home Depot, Chinese battery banks
back to the 10K generator and swapping them out the whole time.
His XO was constantly doing math on like, okay, when is the same?
going to be dead when do we need to drop it back we dropped ours in this time plugged it into the
vehicle and now power was not a thought and now right that that that that that that bandwidth right
um that operational kind of command and control bandwidth was focused on mission objectives um not you know
hey how do what where am i going to charge my battery next um so that's really kind of i think we're
if we if we succeed in 24 months right actually nobody talks about power because like because because
it just works right just works we're on to the next bottleneck exactly
Cool. Well, thank you both so much. This is really fun.
Thank you.
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