Acquired - The Lean Startup and the Long-Term Stock Exchange (with Eric Ries)

Episode Date: December 30, 2019

Season 5, Episode 10: The Lean Startup and the Long-Term Stock Exchange (with Eric Ries) Acquired closes out Season 5 and 2019 with a radical look into both the past and future decades of startup company building, investing and - yes, exiting - in conversation with legendary Lean Startup author Eric Ries. Nine years on from pioneering the now-canonical concepts of product-market fit, minimum viable products, and pivots during the aftermath of the financial crisis, Eric’s new venture at the Long-Term Stock Exchange represents an equally ambitious attempt to rewrite the orthodoxy of how companies and their investors manage liquidity, governance and alignment around longterm value creation. Like Lean Startup a decade before it, can LTSE help address some of the endemic problems in this generation’s startup ecosystem — excessive capital raising, stay-private-longer, dual-class founder hegemony, extreme illiquidity and quarterly earnings myopia? Tune in to find out!Sponsors:ServiceNow: https://bit.ly/acqsnaiagentsHuntress: https://bit.ly/acqhuntressVanta: https://bit.ly/acquiredvantaMore Acquired!:Get email updates with hints on next episode and follow-ups from recent episodesJoin the SlackSubscribe to ACQ2Merch Store!

um before we start eric i did have to say did you intentionally pick a building with gigantic stone pillars in a marble lobby to start your stock exchange in obviously i was like what building is he talking about do we have i i'm completely blind to that stuff no i have not uh i did not weigh in on the uh on the decor of the place. Welcome to Season 5, Episode 10 of Acquired, the podcast about great technology companies and the stories behind them. I'm Ben Gilbert, and I'm the co-founder of Pioneer Square Labs, a startup studio and early-stage venture fund in Seattle. And I'm David Rosenthal, and I'm a general partner at Wave Capital, an early-stage venture firm focused on marketplaces based in San Francisco. And we are your hosts. Today, we tell the story of an incredibly ambitious undertaking,

creating a new stock exchange. A long-term stock exchange, that is. Earlier this year, the LTSE was approved by the SEC as only the fifth body with such a license. And we have with us today, none other than the founder and CEO, Eric Ries, to talk about it. Welcome, Eric. Thanks, guys. Thanks for having me on. Yeah. Yeah, yeah. Listeners, you may know Eric's name from his popular 2011 book, The Lean Startup. The LTSE was actually started from an idea that Eric had while writing the book, and there are a couple paragraphs at the end that explore it. And eight years later, here we are with the LTSE as an approved national securities exchange

and having raised $68 million from venture funds, including Andreessen Horowitz, Founders Fund, Floodgate, and many other top investors. It was super fun. I was on the plane on the way back from visiting my family for Thanksgiving, pulled out my digital copy of The Lean Startup, went through, and there it was, about a page and a half right at the end.

Right at the end, the very last idea in the book, practically. Yeah. Yeah, and I knew it was going to be polarizing from the start. When I was writing the book, so this is now go back to 2010, before the book even came out. This is when the idea hatched for me. And part of writing The Lean Startup, you can imagine I felt a lot of pressure to eat my own dog food and use the techniques of Lean Startup in writing the book. So it was a very iterative process, and I did a ton of testing and experimentation my own dog food and use the techniques of lean startup in writing the book. So it was a very iterative process. And I did a ton of testing and experimentation and AB testing.

And one of the final stages was I sent the full manuscript out to a lot of test readers from different audience archetypes of people I wanted to influence. And I'll never forget one of the test readers wrote me back. He said, the book is fine, except that there's one thing you have to take out. There's this idea at the end of the book about this stock exchange thing. And listen, you basically piss away the credibility you've carefully built up over 299 preceding pages. You just, you flush it all away in one, in one page. It's that bad. You must take it out of the manuscript. So that was, it's auspicious. It's auspicious first reaction from a test reader. So that's when I knew I was onto something.

Yeah. That reminds me of the Google story where Larry and Sergey were working out of the Rudikis garage and an investor came by, like a friend of the Rudikis to meet them. And they said, like, hey, we got this company working out of the garage. Do you want to meet? He's like, no, sneak me out the back. I don't want to talk to them. Oh, man.

Yeah. Yeah. Every once in a while, you know, the conventional wisdom really serves you very very poorly and and it's funny now because it's always been very polarizing but what people don't remember is that lean startup was very polarizing in the early years now everyone's like oh obvious of course we're gonna we'll at least pay lip service to it whether people actually do it or not as it a different conversation. Yeah. Eric, did your book coin the phrase minimum viable product? You know, I had never heard that phrase before, but in the years since, people every once in a while will dig up like an academic paper from 1984 or whatever, or somebody used it. So apparently it has been used, has been used before. But I think I'm primarily the one to

blame for the overuse of the phrase MVP. So I apologize. Anyone who's sick and tired about hearing about pivots or whatever, that's also my fault. Mostly wave portfolio companies. Yeah, so to all your portfolio companies, I apologize. Well, listeners, it's worth knowing before we dive in, the LTSE has an ambitious vision to fix many of the problems that they see in the public markets today, from short-termism, abrupt changes in governance from so-called tourist investors, and visibility into who a public company's shareholders really are.

So we're excited to explore some of the company's disruptive and, as Eric, as you pointed out, controversial ideas today and discuss sort of will it be a decade from now as widely accepted as the lean startup has. So listeners, we had an awesome LP episode with Vlad Magdalene, the founder and CEO of Webflow this past week. As with many of our LP shows, we went deep with him on the nitty gritty of company building and what he's learned on his journey from building the no code website builder that has taken the industry by storm. You can become an Acquired Limited Partner to get access by clicking the link in the show notes or going to glow.fm slash acquired.

And if you stick around after this episode, you can hear an excerpt from that show. Okay, listeners, now is a great time to tell you about longtime friend of the show, ServiceNow. Yes, as you know, ServiceNow is the AI platform for business transformation, and they have some new news to share. ServiceNow is introducing AI agents. So only the ServiceNow platform puts AI agents to work across every corner of your business. Yep. And as you know, from listening to us all year, ServiceNow is pretty remarkable about embracing the latest AI developments and building them into products for their customers. AI agents are the next phase of this. So what are AI agents? AI agents can think, learn, solve problems, and make decisions

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by clicking the link in the show notes or going to servicenow.com slash AI dash agents. And now onto the long-term stock exchange. But before that, before the lean startup, you worked at a couple pretty fat startups. Oh, yeah. Much has been written and said, of course, about your history and how the lean startup movement got started. But when you studied CS at Yale, right. And then you graduated and you joined a startup, uh, at the time called there.com, which was an early virtual world. Oh yeah. And I believe I'm good if I'm getting my history right, operated for three or four years without launching a product, just hiring tons of people,

raising tons of cash, and then burst out into the world? Like, how did you, you know, you're a senior at Yale. How did you decide, oh, I'm going to go join this crazy thing? So, first of all, you got to go back in your time machine. I was originally in the class of 2000. So the dot-com bubble swept through the world while I was an undergrad. But New Haven, Connecticut was like basically the last stop on the train before the whole thing imploded. So I did it. I dropped out of school and I did a startup

from my dorm room, which, you know, could have, would have, should have been Facebook, but we didn't exactly know what we were doing. So we had kind of like the first half of the movie, the social network experience. Was it actually a social network? Was that? I'll tell you our idea. I'll tell you you think this is a good idea. We thought that college students from top universities, Ivy League universities, should create online profiles for the purpose of sharing. Sounds like a terrible idea. That wasn't so bad. What was so funny about it, I mean, now I can joke about it. Of course, at the time, this was horrible.

But we thought that they should use those profiles for something serious, a real business. So we thought they should create profiles for getting a job. And we should create a resume database and share the profiles with employers who wanted to hire them. So we were very focused on- Sort of like an evergreenmonster.com type work. Well, it wasn't job postings, but resume database.

It was weird, like in some ways it was not, like it's really not a crazy idea. Like we could then do analytics to match the right people to the right jobs. And, you know, like there was certain like sensibleness to it but first of all if we had actually understood the concept of a pivot and if someone had even suggested to us the idea that we could pivot into being facebook we would have been totally dismissive because we were like no no we're trying to build a real business yeah we didn't really understand what a real business was so we

had no concept like the idea that there's like the idea of a digital marketplace or that you know then attention-based product would be valuable. We had none of that, none of that insight. And, you know, it was very, very much of a moment when people were building digital technology without a clear purpose as to why. We just saw that everyone was doing it and it's just, that's what we wanted to do. And so we did it. This is a total aside, but it fits right into that. Were you at Yale at the same time as Matt Kohler?

I was, yeah. I remember when he was a McKinsey consultant. We had coffee one day. He's like, do you think I should join the technology industry? And he was thinking about some things he could work on. So yeah, it's a small club of people from that world who went on to do good things. And Matt would, of course, be one of the first employees at LinkedInin and then first employees at facebook yeah one of the most important facebook early employees on the business side really uh and it's a great vc now yeah um but anyway that's that's

so funny you were building a social network for college students focused on recruitment and he would go to linkedin yeah yeah exactly right we could if we'd had any sense at all we would have called yeah what should we, what should we do? What should we do? But yeah, I remember when he went to work, when he first went to work at LinkedIn too and I was like,

what's, and I was like, well, I already know about social networks and it's never going to be anything, right? Like the biggest problem

in entrepreneurship is you learn what's not going to work. That's not something that can ever be learned. Because just because it didn't work before doesn't necessarily mean

it won't work the next time and that's what drives us all. It's the hardest thing in venture investing too. That drives us all crazy. You overfit on the data that you have access to. Anyway, long story short, I went back and the startup failed. So unlike the Facebook founders, I went back to school and finished my degree. If you've ever watched one of those movies about entrepreneurship where like the plucky protagonist goes back to the people who said it would never

work and they were like, you were wrong. I was right. You know, rah, rah, rah. In real life, you get to be the one to go back and be like, remember when you said I should not drop out of school because something will ever come of it? You were right. I'm back. Thanks for that advice. It's my homework. Yeah, it's a totally brutal and awful experience. But I love the process of being able to translate ideas into products like so quickly in the

rapid pace and duration of a startup. So when I graduated, I was thinking about what to do next. And I was just applying to jobs. I didn't know if I would do a startup or I would go to a big company. I looked at a lot of stuff. And my resume came across the desk of this crazy virtual reality startup in Menlo Park. And they flew me out. And we'd all read Snow Crash and the same sci-fi books.

It's coming. It's coming next year for sure. It's been coming for a long time. And they sold me on this incredible vision. It was a pretty small company at the time that I joined. They had really high quality venture capital backers. And I wanted to apprentice myself to the best entrepreneurs I could find. So I was like, this is an incredible management team. These people really know what they're talking about. You're going to learn exactly what to do. I'm going to learn exactly what to do. All the So I was like, this is an incredible management team. These people really know what they're talking about. You're going to learn exactly what to do. I'm going to learn exactly what to do. All the things I did wrong,

I'm going to learn how to do it right. And what's quaint about the story now is that by modern standards, it wasn't even that big of a disaster. We raised so much more money now

for startups. The company actually chugged along for like 15 years, right? Yeah, it didn't die right away, but I remember I used to tell people when I first talked about a lean startup, I'd be like, the joke of there.com is that it raised $50 million with no customers. And people would be like, ooh.

And now it's like, what was that, the seed round? Right? Like, oh, is that a lot? I talk to students now, and they're like, they don't get the joke. They're just like, right. Then what happened? I'm like, no, that's the lot of money that we set on and they're like what so you know it's a very different era but unlike today we did not have any of the vocabulary or lean startup so we had no concept of minimum about

product pivots you know continuous deployment none of that stuff so it was self-consciously waterfall style development by the time the product launched i remember we had almost 200 employees we had a whole warehouse full of customer service reps to handle the anticipated demand. Zero customers. This is a consumer virtual world startup. Big nationwide launch, TV and everything. The only problem was that the customers never read the business plan, so they didn't know what to do. Other than that, it was a brilliant thing.

It was an incredible team. That team has gone on to found an incredible array of startups and they've created, generated so much value in the world. So it was really a very talented group of people. What companies came out of it? Arista, the network equipment company, the CTO there and founder was the CTO of there. Well, I shouldn't be name dropping.

A lot of cool people. And I'm like, everyone I don't mention will be met. But a bunch of the very early Asana people were there, folks. Actually, and then a lot of their people were early Google employees. Because as they did rounds of layoffs, the earlier you got laid off from there, the earlier you wound up at Google. So the first people to get laid off made the most money by far. So it's just funny

how this world works. And no one should ever take investment advice from me because I had many friends that who went to go work at pre-IPO Google. They're like, hey, you should come check this thing out. It's can't tell you exactly why, but you should come. And I'm like, ah, Google, what's it? Yeah. And I met with Matt Kohler who told us like, I do this LinkedIn thing. What is that? Facebook. Is that really going to be a thing? So I have turned down all the big opportunities in this era. And now you can pitch them to come list with you.

Yeah, but it turned out to be for the best because I wound up on a path that I wouldn't trade for anything. But it's certainly, I mean, you know, if you're going to work in this business, and especially if you're going to be in Silicon Valley, you will have to confront the financial costs of the road not taken like every day every year all the time and if you're motive you if you get ego attached and you're motivated by the financial return like

it is a really horrible way a way to live so it kind of forces you to um only look forward well you can do that although i think that can be pretty stressful too or or try to develop actual equanimity about the outcomes here. You don't really have control over what's going to happen, and the uncertainty is so high. You can't predict, and you have to come to accept that. If you're going to make entrepreneurship and the entrepreneurial ecosystem a career, which is really like that's a new thing that's possible in history. It's even really new in the last 10 years. The time you're talking about, you were the crazy one to come out here.

No parent is proud until 10 years ago that their kid is leaving a great education, turning down the job at the big company, and making no money and starting a company. That's a new phenomenon. Yeah, it can be hard for the family and others to understand. But I think now we're starting to build up this idea that it can be a valid career and therefore can have a certain kind of job security attached to it, even though the individual companies may fail. So I do think that's a very exciting, very exciting development. So you leave there as it's all imploding around you and you start another company, IMVU, and one of your investors is Steve Blank. How did you meet Steve? He was their investor. So I was very lucky.

I mean, honestly, I don't deserve any of this. I was very, very fortunate. The refugees from there, a couple of them picked me to be a co-founder of another company, and they were the ones that had the prestige and the relationships. I was just a junior guy on the engineering team. What did I know? And so they recruited Steve and a bunch of other investors like, hi, this is a very Silicon Valley thing. It's like, I know we just lost you a ton of money, but how about you give us some more money and this time we'll actually make you some money. And most of the investors, if you're going to be a good investor and you have an

entrepreneur that you like, you can't let the fact that they lost your money deter you from making the next investment. They did did that he was one of them but he steve's idea was hey guys i don't mind setting some more money on fire here but how about you guys audit my class that i'm just starting to teach at berkeley at the time right yeah yeah yeah we were in the very first or second year he was teaching what was he called customer development at berkeley and uh and my co-founder and i would schlep down from Palo Alto to Berkeley. And that was a new phrase at the time. No one ever heard that phrase before.

It's a whole discipline. I was in the room when a room full of Berkeley MBA students, every class session, would argue with him and push back and be like, this is the stupidest thing I've ever heard. I could so imagine that happening. And what was funny is that he came from an enterprise background. People don't remember Epiphany now,

but it was a big enterprise software you know dot com phenomenon and he would be presenting stories from epiphany and the mbas like whatever you present to mbas they'll be like sure it would work for x but it'll never work for y like whatever x and y doesn't matter so they'd be like sure old man that works for enterprise but how would it ever work for consumer and of course we then did it at imview and then i would be teaching in business he would often invite me to guest lecture in his class or whatever and if i meet with mbas they're like well sure of course it's going to work for consumer but how would it ever work in the difficult world of enterprise and just like

everyone could just pick a lane pick a criticism that you want to have no that's not how it is but it was considered completely crazy steve i even among the Silicon Valley people, they thought he was nuts. And the crazy notion at that time for him was that you need to aggressively listen to your customers and that it's not about your vision, it's about what they tell you. And then you need to inform your product roadmap based on customer discovery. He was arguing for a parallel discipline to product development. He'd had his really raw thinking about what do you do if you're the head of marketing for a waterfall style engineering company that is absolutely convinced that their product is going to work after they set all the money on fire and do the big launch?

Like, what can you do about that? I remember reading it. I was being in his class. You're being very derogatory towards engineers. This is not, Steve, this is not how engineers behave. And of course, he's like, yeah, it is. I was like, no, but there's like a new generation and we're do agile and do this. And he had never heard of that stuff. He was from a different, a different time. So it was a cool, it was a very cool meeting of the minds eventually where he was coming at this from a marketing view where you should have these customer conversations in a very disciplined way. And he was trying to bring some rigor to that marketing activity so that engineers would take it seriously. I mean, that was really the whole point of it, is like, how do you sit down with a very technical team and tell them, listen, with all due respect, we're building the wrong product. It might be technically excellent, but it's the wrong product. And now we have much better terminology and theory,

and we've come a long way since those original frameworks. Was Steve, in his thinking about this, was he influenced by Crossing the Chasm? Yeah, yeah, yeah. He was very into Crossing the Chasm and The Innovator's Dilemma. Yeah. You think about Jeff Moore and of course Steve

and I didn't think about this until now. They're marketers. They're coming at it from a marketing background. And I wanted to ask you how you got inspired and I presume worked with Steve to then write the lean startup after like four steps to the epiphany was already out there. What was the insight of, Hey, this can be bigger and, you know, brought to a broader audience.

You know, I was just frustrated that I had never had a master plan to do this. I just like, I remember buying copies of four steps to the epiphany for like everyone on my team and be like, everyone read this on Friday, come into the office on Monday, and we're doing it starting Monday. That was my like theory of change. When I was at InView, it was my job to try to explain why we did things the crazy way that we did them. Because I came up from that during practice.

So I was focused on speed of deployment, right? Continuous deployment. Like what we would call now single piece flow from lean manufacturing applied to software development itself. Viewing designed but undeployed features as work in progress inventory and therefore a liability. Untested, unvalidated assumptions are inventory and are bad, not good. So you don't want to build that stuff up. You want to flush it out as soon as you can. I would try to explain and I would make up theories and I was constantly trying to come up with a language and a theory for why.

But yeah, I certainly have been advocating for kind of like somewhat dubious and unpopular ideas. I have the staying power for that. And it took me a long time to even give it a name. Lean Startup isn't even the first tribe, by the way. It took me a long time to find a way to talk about this that I could get civilians interested in like process junkies and people who are in demand like that those people are easy academics academics you know whatever but like actual work people who work for a living who are like i'm just trying to get my job done today i don't really want to hear about your 92 step process right i don't want this thing to fail, but I do have a job to do. Yeah, and so it took me a long time.

First, I ran the employee orientation at InView. Just explain to our own employees, why do we do things in such a crazy way? Why? So I'd been at InView for five-ish years. And it was very old, like classics. I brought a professional CEO. We didn't totally get along.

I was like, you know what? I'm not going to be the founder who has to be kicked out. I'm just i'll volunteer i transition out so i was thinking about what do i do next and all these vcs were calling me hey you should come be an er yeah you know i didn't like this is you know i didn't know what the career path in silicon valley was like and so i was like it's all very interesting and i was thinking about what to do next and this funny thing started happening where vCs would ask me to come meet with portfolio companies that were going too slow. Because I had this reputation because of InView's engineering prowess that I could magically make engineering teams work faster. That's totally how the mind of a circa mid-2000s era VC worked, which is just like, oh, like these guys, they got some fairy dust. I don't know what I do. I don't know how this thing works. But like, you just go sprinkle

that over there. You got it. You got it exactly right. And I would be like, no, no, no. Actually, I'm not special at all. I just have this superior theory. And they'd be like, sure, sure, sure. But could you just do the dust anyway? So I go and have these meetings and meeting go like this. The VC would tell the company, this guy can really help you. You should invite him for a meeting. A friend of the firm. Yeah, a friend of the firm, the worst. So then they have to do it. So they invite, call me, would you do us a favor and come have a meeting?

Sure. Come meet the whole management team assembled for me. And I would start telling them stories about what had worked for us at InView. And I would say, we ship software to production 40 times a day on average. And they'd be like, sure, that could work for a three three-person team but it could never work for a six-person team or whatever like whatever size and they were it could never work for size n times two and i'd be like no no no we we doubled and doubled we're doing and they would start to get angry and they would yell i would get yelled at in these meetings they'd be like that's crazy that could never work

they didn't ask you for the meeting in the first place so i'm sure i didn't know what's going on i thought i was just really bad at having these meetings. They would go so badly and the people would hate my guts and I'd basically be like ejected. You're like, you know what I need to do? I need to write a book about this because it's going so well. So I wish I had that. So at the end of the meeting, I'd be like, listen, you called me for this meeting. You asked me here as a favor and now you're mad at me. And you just like, I'm not telling you a theory. I'm not telling you a theory. I'm just telling you a story of what I witnessed with my own eyes.

You think I'm lying? So that kept happening to me. And I had this great idea. If I write some of these stories down, then the next time somebody calls me for one of these meetings, I can say, hey, why don't you read this first? And if you think I'm crazy, maybe let's not have the meeting. And then I don't get yelled at. This was my genius plan.

Okay, that's how far ahead I was thinking. So the other thing you don't understand about that time is startup people didn't blog. Yeah. Blogging was... Nobody had a blog. You were one of the first. I was one of those. I can tell you all the bloggers who were writing in Silicon Valley at that time, because when I started blogging, they all reached out to me because I showed up in their HTTP referrer logs. And these blogs were so low traffic, they could tell when a new person entered the scene. Dave McClure, Sean Ellis, and Andrew Chen

all called me within a month of my starting to blog to be like, what's up, who are you? And of course they were asking who are you because I did not put my name on my blog because I was embarrassed about it. It was anonymous. What was your blog called? It was called Startup Lessons Learned.

In the passive voice, not by anybody. They had been learned. The startup had learned its own lesson somehow, mysteriously. And that's how it started. And then people wanted to know who I was and they wanted to hear what I had to say. And I was like, well, I better give this theory a name. And I started talking about it as Lean Startup. And with the concepts of MVPsps and pivots had you already

started to crystallize those at this point or did that come through yeah yeah i did but it wasn't like crystal clear it was like i had this constellation of concepts some of which have been long since you know left behind like i was every bit as excited about teaching people about engagement loops which is the retention uh flip side of viral loops which nobody wanted to hear about that viral loops were too complicated. I was like, but that's just as important. So the concept that really landed for people. It's actually still a failing of startups today

as everyone focuses on getting your CAC down. So few people focus on retention and even less people focus on revisiting pricing strategy. You have all these different levers. These things are unbelievably mispriced. I've never worked at a startup where a very simple set of experiments around pricing hasn't revealed

dramatic, differently economic stats. It's embarrassing. It was just a very special time where there was an incredible hunger for new ideas about entrepreneurship and this thing wound up taking over my life. It was a wild experience. I know we're spending a bunch of time on it. This really changed the fabric

of the ecosystem. In reflecting back on it, can you identify what were some of the wins that were in the air at that point in time that people were hungry for this different way of thinking about startups? Yeah, it's hard to remember now, but 10 years ago was a financial crisis. Remember RIP Good Times and that whole thing?

So first of all, it was very convenient to be known as the lean startup guy at a time when sequoia capital telling everyone to cut costs and i got a lot of phone calls from founders who would be like hey i heard you can help me get out of my office lease that's not the point you help me with repo on furniture like how do i get rid of these aaron chairs to lower my burn rate different lean buddy yeah and what's funny is i would tell people he he would call me for advice on burn. I said, listen, the build, measure, learn feedback loop, the reason it's important is we can analyze every dollar you spend

and we can ask ourselves, is that dollar helping us learn critical things that you need to know right now about your company or not? If it is, it's worth spending on. And if it's not, you should cut it, whether it's a crisis or not. It's pure waste. So just don't do it. And you can imagine the furniture guys would be like, uh, thanks.

Thanks for that really helpful advice, buddy. Like anyway, but my office lead, right? Like, I don't want this, like there are people not very theory oriented. So it took me a long, long time to figure out how to make this practical for folks that they could actually do it. And I know, I mean, I really never dreamed that it would have the kind of impact that it did. It's quite a moving thing, actually. All right, listeners, our next sponsor is a new friend of the show, Huntress. Huntress is one of the fastest growing and most loved cybersecurity companies today. It's purpose built for small to midsize businesses and provides enterprise grade security with the, services, and expertise needed to protect you. They offer a revolutionary approach to managed cybersecurity that isn't only about tech, it's about real people providing real defense around the clock.

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the show notes. Our huge thanks to Huntress. I want to tell this story in medias res a little bit. So the natural next question would be, you know, how did this lead to starting LTSC? But I think to set the stage for listeners, Eric, can you give us a high level order of magnitude of company from like two founders in a garage up to the biggest multinationals and governments in the world. And I've had the privilege over the last 10 years of working with all of them. Because once the lean startup hits and becomes a thing, it's not just startups that want to talk to you, right? No, I mean, it's huge, huge companies and nonprofits and NGOs. Like we can talk about, there's huge companies and nonprofits and NGOs. Like we can talk about, there's a whole community of people that study lean startup for national defense within the Five Eyes Intelligence Alliance across nations. I mean, it's crazy how many places this thing has gone.

And in particular, many of the early startups who were just two people in a garage when they first heard about lean startup, they grew and got to product market fit. So I mean, I was really a privilege to get to work with some of these companies as they scaled up, and then yet to be called into these much bigger companies. And it's like, there's some things that are different at 10 people, 100, 1000, 10,000, 100,000, 300,000, you know, a million or more. But there's some things that are very consistent. And so I had had this experience. And to me me it felt like being issued a backstage pass to capitalism. I get to see how business – I've lived in California practically my whole life and now here I am traveling the world and getting to see all these problems. And no matter where you go, no matter who you talk to, if you say like what are the problems that afflict your organization?

Like everyone's like short-termism. We're living quarter to quarter. We can't short-termism. We're living quarter to quarter. We can't make the right investments. We're not really focused on the long-term. We have bad ownership. They don't have constancy of purpose. It's just an epidemic problem. You can read Elon Musk's Twitter feed here. Or wherever. It's one of the very few things that pretty much everyone in business agrees on. And yet, if you ask people, what are we going to do about it? It's like asking, what are we going to do about gravity?

You're not going to do anything about it. It's just a fact of life. It's like, you know, it's like, who do I complain to about gravity? Nobody. You just fall down when you fall down. Like, that's just how it goes. And so like we've attributed, especially in Silicon Valley, we treat the facts of our capital markets and the infrastructure of our financial reality as facts of nature when they are in fact human creations and they're changeable. And for whatever reason, this always struck me as wrong. So LTSC is our attempt to fix that problem by aligning ourselves with the next generation of leaders of companies who have a very different value system than what's come before. And their employees are activists. They care a lot about sustainability, diversity, and equality.

They genuinely believe, deluded or not, they genuinely believe that companies can be a force to change the world for the better. And they want financial infrastructure that supports that vision. And there isn't any. Just crazy. I know that the LTSC as a regulated body is very flexible in the type of guidelines. They defer to the entrepreneur. You let the company sort of pick a lot of the mechanics that they want to bring in. But what are some example ideas that you've had of mechanics that can change these things for the better, that companies who list on the LTSE versus the NASDAQ or in conjunction with the NASDAQ or New York Stock Exchange,

what mechanics could fix this stuff? Yeah, so this is a very careful balance. And I've learned this over many years now of testing and testing and testing and refining this. Really, you? Yeah, of all people. Without which we would definitely be dead. That we need to have a principles-based approach here. So we need companies to say, I'm willing to sign up to these principles. For example, that the long-term investors are my valued partners and should be rewarded accordingly. That I'm going to treat all of my stakeholders as first class members of my

decision making process, my employees, my community, my vendors and suppliers, my customers. You know, the acid test of certain companies in recent years is when you discover that there's scientific research that shows that your product is unhealthy and addictive for your customers. Are you going to do anything about it? Are you going to bury the research the research and like think how different our world would be if certain companies had made certain choices that are different than they did make versus like think about an older generation of leaders like when you know tylenol famously had to recall all the pills off every shelf in america and how like the short-term pain of doing the right thing but they did they did it because they might have been necessary. Because they understood that

earning the public's trust over the long run is far more important than the short term. It's value creative for all shareholders. Exactly right. So you can just pledge those principles and be like, rah, rah. Put it in your values. Whatever. Put it in your S1 and be like, we're going to be so great and all this stuff.

Which every S1 in the last two years., you know, from WeWork to what have you. That's the problem. Investors take those aspirations and they just put it in the shredder. It's like, this isn't even worth the paper you printed on because how do I know that you're serious about it? So the idea of LTSC is companies

should commit to these principles by making a binding pledge to operationalize each one. And the flexibility that we have created is so that it doesn't have to be one size fits all. Every company does exactly the same thing, but every company has to do something real and we act as the certifying body to say,

yeah, that's real or it's not. So you make it by sort of registering the implementation of such a pledge with you. It then becomes like a securities violation to break it. You got it exactly right. So there's real enforcement penalties if you don't do it. And therefore, only the good companies would do it. The bad companies would be crazy to do this. So you have like the perfect self-selection. That's what you want. So for example, one of my favorites is public companies today, generally speaking, don't know who their owners

are, which you can't run a private company this way right we obsessed about getting the smart money on the cap table and the idea that when you go public and just give it up like well whoever happens to buy it i guess it's fine and i've met so many companies who like they literally pay for a service i love this this is my favorite like you have some service surveillance stock surveillance like you're hiring the cia to go suss out who owns your because like no you need to know who your investors are therefore know what they want make sure that you're hiring the CIA to go suss out who owns your, because like, no, you need to know who your investors are, therefore know what they want, make sure that you're actually aligned. So we believe that every company has the right to know who its long-term investors are, but in exchange for that transparency should reward them, should give them additional voting rights, should give them additional economics, additional superior capital raising opportunities, that kind of thing. So that's like, that's a principle that's like very high level, but we drive it down into the market microstructure and make it real. And so let's dive into those. What could superior economics mean? So if I hold the stock longer, my stock could become more valuable?

Yeah, you could have a progressive dividend that's paid out preferentially to those who have held longer. Because there's no, I mean, for, well, as far as I know, all of the history of equity securities, there's this concept of preferred equity and common equity right there could be other classes of equity that's correct and those different classes can have different economic terms it's actually a very old idea and when you talk to like old-timers in securities law and and um you know corporate structure they're like yeah sure this isn't that like. This isn't impossible to do. It's just practically speaking, we don't do it because there's so many forces that pressure people into conformity.

And yet how ironic that we as the industry of innovation are hyper conformist and conservative about how we structure companies and how we make them bring them to the public. And then now we've kind of stopped doing it. So now we're so unhappy about the public markets. We're taking our ball and going home and we're not taking companies public until very, very late in their life. And how antisocial is that?

I mean, these companies don't go public for 15 years. You know, when you were saying a minute ago about, I hadn't put two and two together either, which is funny because we bring up the financial crisis so many times on this show, you know, whether it's Uber or Airbnb. It really shapes everything that's happening in our era. Everything of this era. because we bring up the financial crisis so many times on this show, whether it's Uber or Airbnb. It really shapes everything that's happening in our era.

It shaped everything of this era. I think it's so right to say that shaped the desire for the lean startup movement. There also are a bunch of trends, similar huge trends in the financial world that have kind of led, I think, to LTSC. So I'll throw them out there. Feel free to agree.

I'd love to hear your thoughts. One, so first you had the rise of algorithmic trading in the public markets. So you went from whether you were a value investor, a growth investor, like whatever, it was like people were hitting buttons to make trades. Yeah, no longer. Not that long ago. And now most trading and most ownership in the public markets are not people hitting buttons. It's machines hitting buttons and they hit them a lot faster and they care a lot less about the long term. Two, you have the rise of index funds, right? So now you have a whole nother class, which is a huge portion of the public equity market, which isn't even anybody making the decision. It's just a passive, you

know, this fund is going to track the market. Oh, now we have the rise of passive funds. We have competing index providers who have different index formulas for what tracking the market is. So the active decision making has just been moved from the fund manager to the algorithm of the index provider. Abstraction on abstraction. It's getting wild. So now you have a situation, I think, in the public markets where what used to be a loud cacophony of voices in the marketplace voting on buying and selling shares, the number of active human voices has been reduced hugely. So a lot less information flowing into the market.

A lot less information flowing. And so you can be, if you're a loud activist shareholder dissenting voice or whatever, you can now be heard in a lot. And if you move the stock, all these passive index and algorithmic trading is going to move with you. You can have a huge impact on a stock. And importantly, right now, governance is tied one to one with ownership. And so, you know, you could have these very short term investors who just arrived who can vote and change control of the company, which makes sense. They own it. But Eric, LTSE allows for a different view on that. So can you talk a little bit about

separating economics from... Actually, one thing real quick before that. So then you have Snapchat go public, right? Or you have all these companies going public now with these dual-class, multi-class share structures. Snap was the most egregious of like, no, you guys get no votes. And I understand it. As a founder, you're like, screw this.

But yeah, okay, so what's the other path? Well, yeah, I mean, I get the view that if you can be emperor for life, why not? Pretty good gig. But I think it, first of all, I think it's really important that people should see the fact that founders are taking these extreme measures is a reflection of an extreme problem. Like these are extreme reactions to an extreme problem. And I would point to two of them. First of all, in the old days, when I first got into this business, founders were in the biggest rush to go public because their billion dollars about to become fully liquid. And it would make a ton of money. The idea that you would put off becoming a liquid billionaire for 10 extra years, that's

not an act of greed. There's something else that's going on here, right? People are putting off their own mega payday. Now, you know, of course, there are secondary transactions. People, it's like they're not starving or anything. But like generally speaking, highly capitalistic and competitive people would rather have $1 billion than like $50 million. And they're choosing not to do that. Why? And, you know, the founders are one thing, right?

But like the venture investors, right? Who would have thought? Ben and I run funds. Man, we would really like to distribute returns to RLPs so that we can raise new funds. And that would actually be better for the ecosystem as a whole. One of the problems we're having is all these early returns are frozen. They're not being recirculated like they used to be. And so there's not as much, even though we have a lot of seed stage activity right now,

we could have exponentially more if we would unfreeze all these transactions. And similarly, like very few founders can actually justify perpetual dual class control of a company, right? Even if you're like, I'm the greatest CEO that could ever happen. And I suppose like, well, even if you like develop dementia

or like even if your children aren't as good a CEO as you, they should inherit the company from you. That's called feudalism. We have a lot of political experience with these systems and we know there- It doesn't go well. It does not go well.

And most founders, if you really press them in private, they'll say, I don't think this makes that much sense. But that's how bad standard governance is. So Eric, what's an example mechanic then where, David, I like the way you painted it, that for a long time, economics and governance were really tightly coupled, except for companies like media companies

where there was a reasonable argument of why a dual class structure should exist. You needed to be independent from the subjects you were covering. Exactly. And so then the last five, eight years, we see this incredible rise in massively separated

classes where the founders own everything. There's no way to ever change that. Sometimes the common gets no votes. It's crazy. And what's a way that you could sort of have a middle ground here? I think the compromise that I personally think is best is if you're going to be dual class organized. I think that's okay.

But then you have to have a way for the long-term investors to join you in that privileged class They have to be able to earn their way into the better class so they can join you in co-determination of the company that's really in the company's long-term interest because Except for the very few of these founders that are investing in immortality. Everyone else is planning to die So there will be another ceo of this company one day and your dual class protections will not protect them so what's the plan for the next ceo if you're really thinking about i want to create a lasting institution what's the plan why would the next ceo care at all about your ethos of multi-stakeholder development well of your ethos of long-termism like why they they right they could

easily be as good as you do a vetting them. They could just be like, you know what? My incentives are to run quarter to quarter. Screw this. So we have to rely on all of the long-term stakeholders in the company, including the long-tenured employees. And hopefully this next CEO is himself a long-tenured employee. But also the long-term investors should all have a superior voting opportunity just like you do as a founder. So you could imagine like every quarter that you hold the stock at adding some multiplier to the amount of votes you get yeah exactly like like the the

ltsc software makes it possible for companies to design programs like this because they can track the long-term ownership in real time and if you trade out you and if you know who the investors are whereas give them the appropriate reward yeah okay so like we don't mandate this specific voting system because you know it's controversial and there's some people who they think like one share two votes it's like there's a big wall street journal article about this what called one share two votes basically like how hedge funds they borrow extra money like right at the last second before a proxy contest to get extra votes like that day and then get it it's just like i think that's indefensible but i but that's currently allowed under the rules so there's kind of a big debate about like, what's the best system? And I kind of feel like, because none of these systems

is exactly right, we should just we should have more experimentation with different models till we find the right one. I happen to like this particular one. But it, you know, that would make sense for like a Google type company that really has control and, you know, is founder owned. And I could see that making sense. I could imagine different scenarios for other companies. And I could imagine a smaller cap company saying, you know, we don't want to mess around with voting. Voting control isn't even really our issue. The issue is just creating an incentive

for people to be long-term investors. And so let's do something like a progressive dividend. So I'm not ideological about it. I just think neither side can really justify what it's advocating for. And you see this a lot in ideological battles where everyone's like drawn to more extreme positions

because they don't, they feel like if you give those people an inch, they'll take the whole thing, right? And so not to make any meta commentary here. Well, that's interesting. I mean, let's just say what it is.

Like we're making sort of interesting political allegories. And I've heard you describe this before as allowing your long-term shareholders to become citizens of the republic with you and sort of let's get away from this sort of feudalism mentality and let's say look if you want to go on a 20-year journey with us where you continue

buying up your position in the company you know you help us make good decisions you own this thing for the long like of course you should be more participatory in helping us figure out where it's going next. I think it's actually very logical and really a genuine win-win. So it's even a win for the quantitative guys. This was a surprise to me. A bunch of these quantitative traders, they're not immoral. They're amoral from the point of view of companies. It's not that they're trying to do something harmful. They just don't care.

So I'll tell you a story. I was sitting with a quantitative trader once and i was like trying to explain the system to him and he was just like i don't get it who cares why he just was like i don't why is this important and i was like okay imagine a hypothetical with me imagine one day in the future you've engineered an artificial short against a company and today the stock is down 10 so you just made a lot of money and he was like yeah you just like see on his face i watch billions yeah yeah he's like this is all this can just see it in his face. I watch Billions. I'm familiar with it. He's like, this is an awesome story. Tell me more.

I'm like, okay, do you realize that the next day, like 3,000 middle managers who work at that company are running around because there's a crisis. It's time to change the company's strategy. Because the stock price. Because the stock price just tanked. We just saw this on the Disney Plus episode.

When Disney was, they had their earnings call in August 2015 and they were like, we're seeing disruption in the cable industry. Cord cutting is happening. ESPN is down. And they had plans

for Disney Plus. Stock dropped 10%. They were like, we are accelerating the plans for Disney Plus. Now in that case, it was the right decision. But like,

even a company like Disney, stock price makes a lot of impact. Absolutely. And so the guy was like, he was like, why? He couldn't understand why anyone would care. He's like, it's just a short. It doesn't have anything to do with them.

It's just, you know. Their intrinsic value is identical to what it was yesterday. It was just as valuable. And the strategy was, he's like, and I was like, so you are approving of your role in governance here and changing the company strategy? He was like, this makes no sense. When I short cattle futures, the cows don't care i was like right this this guy is not someone who cares about governance trying to wreak havoc his average holding period in a security is 10 minutes

so he was describing to me when he his firm had this policy that he hated that if they get a proxy they must vote the proxy a lot of a lot mutual funds, a lot of firms have this view that if you get a proxy, you have an obligation to vote. And to him, it was like, I held it for 10 minutes and I was so unlucky. I was fishing and I pulled up a boot, right? It's like, oh man, now I have to vote this stupid proxy. I have no clue.

So he's trying to get his book down to zero when proxies, you know, balance are set. He would love it. And so I was like, would you prefer, he's like, he's genuinely a tourist in the best sense of the word. He does not care. He's just passing through.

He just wants to get the money in. He's doing a technical thing. And so he would love for governance to be somebody else's problem. He would love to have that be completely different. It actually makes sense to him. And then we talked to a lot of long-term investors, especially the big asset owners. We have built the world's most efficient trading system in history for trading 100 share lots.

If you want to trade 100 shares of stock, it's awesome. You want to trade 3 million shares? Oh, now you've got That's why stuff, you've got to go,

yeah, you want to do that, you've got to go to a big investment bank and you've got to engineer a block trade that's happening off market when the market is closed, like all this kind of stuff.

Yeah, it's really, it's very expensive and hard and for a lot of technical reasons that i don't know that would be of interest to your listeners most long-term investors are chronically underweight the companies they really believe in because they cannot get the allocation they want they can't get into the good venture funds they can't get onto a road show they don't trade enough and then once a company is public they can't do the large block transactions they want to do. The stock price starts to go up. Now they've missed their target. So normally in the old, old days, you would buy a big position. It would go up. You would take the gains from that position to buy more. But if you miss the train, now your target is behind. And so

you can't do it. So they actually can't get the ownership they want. And so companies, even in some of these direct listings, we're seeing lots and lots of really good companies who just, they have too few long-term investors on the cap table. And it's not actually a good situation for anybody. And this is the craziest part. Not to mention those guys aren't setting the price because the price is set by the trades that are being executed. Sure. And if you're a long-term holder, then you're not making trades. So you're not helping push the information into the market

about what's actually worth. That's exactly right. So that drives way more volatility, way more confusion for employees. Your employees are generally your longest term shareholders and so they're watching the ticker every day.

I mean it's just, I ask CEOs who've taken their company public, biggest change you noticed afterwards? They're always like, everyone's on Yahoo Finance every day now. Is it still true

that employees are the longest term holders? I always felt like when I was at Microsoft that like everyone was dumping their stock all the time. Just like? I always felt like when I was at Microsoft that like everyone was dumping their stock all the time. Just like,

I mean, it says a lot about the era that you were there. I could probably guess what years it was. You should have held that stock then. But you are by necessity

because of your grant period. Like you get a grant and then you invest into that over four years. Yeah. Well, and if you think about the concept of career equity,

which is like the really, the financial term that dominates most employees of most organizations, compensation is their perception of future promotion opportunities. People that are trying to make a career out of place are very long that place's survival. And so I think it's actually like toxic for them to be on Yahoo Finance. So like if you use longer term compensation instruments, we obviously we sell software to companies to provide the information to employees in a better way. But if you know, for example, if you know in real time what the long term investors are doing as a class, then you can report to your own employees. Here's the here's the price as perceived by our long term investors with all noise removed. And you'll realize that like most days, nothing happened. The fundamental of the company.

So like my dream one day is to have a big ticker somewhere where the same number just goes by, Dow Jones Industrial Average, and it's just the same number going by because most days, nothing happened. All this noise is just that. It's just noise. And when something does happen, it's news.

The private markets have gotten so perverted now that like what I'm about to say is very much idealist versus reality. But it's kind of like the private markets have gotten so perverted now that like what i'm about to say is very much idealist versus reality but it's kind of like the private markets and venture investing right like an evaluation is assigned to a company a venture firm invests at that valuation you go work for a while 12 18 months later 18 months go by before there's another step change in valuation like yeah i mean i know a lot of founders that no one in DC and a lot of people in New York can't believe this,

but I know a lot of founders who don't think there should be continuous trading. You think about how Elon Musk runs SpaceX. There's a regularly scheduled company-driven auction where people can buy in or sell. The company sets the price. It's extremely restrictive as a regime. And there's a reason he's so unhappy in the public markets.

He also has this thing in the private markets. He's in complete control. Talk about a company that will probably never go public. That's what he said. So this is the other trend I wanted to get your thoughts on. Really, I think probably since you've started LTSE, this whole massive expansion of the private markets, staying private longer.

We've talked about on the show before i remember when when dave goldberg was ceo of survey monkey and he said i'm never taking this company public we're going to be private for life uh and obviously now they're a public company so that's different but dave sadly no longer with us yeah that's very sad how have you guys learned through all of this change that's happened uh as you've been building ltsc i was talking to a v VC five years ago and he said to me, Eric, I just don't get it. If private companies can raise unlimited capital

on whatever terms they want, whenever they want, with no disclosure requirements, no accountability, no publicity, why would they go public? And I was like, great. Let us interpret your sentence as a bit field

and let's make each clause of those a bit. I agree. When all the switches are set to true, you're right. Really, there's a thermostatic equilibrium that exists at all times between the private and public markets. And if you make being private relatively more attractive

or being public relatively less attractive, you will cause more gas to stay in one side of the chamber than the other. So companies will be private long. It's like a very, very predictable consequence of policy choices that we've made as a society. I was like, do you honestly believe that all those bits will be true forever? And he was like, I'm not sure. I was like, well, why don't you call me back when the bleep hits the fan? Because this is coming. And the time to have invested in a solution to this problem is not the day that everything crumbles,

but five years ahead of time. So you should really be investing in LTSC and it didn't work. But other far-sighted investors thought that way and now here we are. And every one of those things is under threat, right? We have seen all kinds of mismanagement.

We discovered WeWork, you know? Not to name any names, but we have seen horrible mismanagement in the private markets. We've seen all kinds of mismanagement. We discovered WeWork. Not to name any names, but we have seen horrible mismanagement in the private markets. We've seen valuations that are totally out of control. And my personal pet peeve that I don't think enough attention is being spent to is we're seeing a large number of secondary transactions

with relatively high volumes at high valuations with no disclosure and information asymmetry. And my grandparents lived through the depression and they told me, like these were like spooky stories for me growing up as a kid. Did everyone else not have grandparents that lived through the depression and they'd not tell them these stories? I look around and I think, I have heard these stories before.

This isn't right. There's a reason that our grandparents worked out the system the hard way that large block transactions should come with accountability and transparency and that's how you prevent fraud and i i think as more and more these stories come out it's going to be uh i think for for ltse what's really the most interesting piece of the we work saga is the last gasp you know save that they tried was an IPO. When you're scraping the bottom of the barrel of options. It's like, wow, we can't.

Many of those bits seem to have flipped the other way. And so now we need to jam it out the door. It didn't work. Yeah, exactly. That's not the way to go. And a big part of our mission at LTSE is to get companies to adopt good governance from a very early age. So we run by far the largest

corporate governance platform for startups. But we don't call it that. Because you can't sell startups on corporate governance. Corporate governance is an extremely poorly marketed. Give me some corporate governance. But let me tell you. What is that, the largest? So we go to market under a variety of brand names

for distinct problems that founders face. So like R&A evaluations and cap table management, runway planning. I can't tell you how many startups I meet with don't know how much runway they have. It's like cardinal sin number one. Don't guess.

Don't have some finance person do for you. Especially before you're on board. You better know, but most founders don't. We do option planning and hiring planning, which again,

most founders don't. And so these are all individual SaaS products. Individual tools, yes. So you can go to captable.io, fast4na.io, hiringplan.io, startuprunway.io. Sensing a trend. Yeah, we're very straightforward naming

and very consistent. And the tools are part of a common platform. And we build them for founders to use themselves, so it's a high focus on usability and design. And you don't have to have a GC or a CFO to use them for you. We're just trying to take as much cost out of the ecosystem as we can. But then while we have you there, it's like while you're – I'll give you an example. Our hiring plan product has completely free compensation data for market data for startups.

So you can figure out for every job offer you're giving, we can tell you exactly what the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentile cash and equity grants are for your stage your geography your industry that's just open or do you require like it's completely free you just go to hiring plan.io you can just sign up for right now that's such a like zillow type thing where like all that data exists right now startups are paying a lot of money for that data like why pay the money for the data not needed so we just we get it and we we do it free And then, while you're there, wouldn't you like to know if your offer letters that you give

are at market or not? Sure you would. Well, while you're checking that, would you also like to split it up by demographics? Wouldn't you like to know

if you have bias in your offer letters? Now, most founders are like, of course I don't have bias. I run a perfect meritocracy. It's like, well then great,

the analysis will show what a great meritocracy you are and then you'll feel good about yourself. But if it doesn't, wouldn't it be a lot cheaper to solve the problem now versus when you're reading about it in the Wall Street Journal five years from now? And think how expensive these problems get when they're allowed to fester. So we really try to help people find their way to ethics and good governance because a lot of these mistakes are inadvertent. It's just ignorance. It's not malice. It's just people don't know better because a lot of times

it's the first time they're doing it. Yeah. Well, this is a really good time to talk about. So where is the company now? You've got this license with the SEC. You have, I assume, a revenue generating business with all these SaaS tools that are going to kind of help people prepare. No one has listed yet. What could it look like when people list? When could that happen? Is that allowed to happen right now? Not yet, not yet. So yeah, your listeners should think of us as having acquired the world's most expensive taxi medallion, but we are not yet driving the car around. So we got approved by the SEC in May. The bigger deal actually is we got our principles-based differentiated

listing standards approved, I think, in August. So we're just starting to work our way through the technical filings now to actually stand up the exchange. It's quite an involved process to do this in a regulated way. And this is a superset of the requirements to list on any other exchange, right? That's right. It's so much so that you can even do a list. So if you still want to go ring the bell at NYC, God bless you. We're happy to be the secondary listing venue. So people could trade, investors could choose which of the exchanges they'd like to trade.

And when people do an IPO with LTSE, whether we're the primary or the secondary venue, you get the same level of liquidity and access to liquid options for your employees. Oh, interesting. So there's no liquidity penalty. So you could buy shares that were previously on the NASDAQ if that company is listed on NASDAQ

and then own them through the long-term stock exchange? The literal words you just said to describe how that works are not 100% correct, but not in any way. I assume that I don't know. Functionally, that's exactly the right idea. The protections that LTSC embodies are enacted through the company's charter and they follow the security wherever it trades.

Cool. So it's a pretty, I think the hardest thing, the reason this company took me more than five years to figure out how to start is just the technical and legal challenge of combining full liquidity with those protections was quite the intellectual challenge, but we got there.

So anyway, to make a long story short, we should begin operations in 2020. And then this is, we put long-term right in the name of the company. So our employees and investors are like, we warned everybody. But once we start operations- It's a good thing you chose lean startup instead of fast startup. Yes, that's right. That's exactly right.

We've been trying to make this point for a long time, that lean doesn't mean fast in an absolute sense, but just fast compared to the industry that you're in. So we are actually, even though it took us almost three years to get this exchange approved, we're actually the fastest Form 1 approval in history. So we're faster than it has ever been done before. It's just really freaking slow. Yeah, and senators used to travel to Washington by horse and buggy like it. Yeah, that's exactly right.

So, you know, we're trying to move the industry in a good direction. But the thing I wanted to say was, so we will go live in 2020 and then we will be legally authorized to begin the process of soliciting companies to list on LTSC. I see, which is why cap table.io is so important. Fundraising for funds, like you can't, oh.

Yeah, so it'll be a little while before, you know, lots of companies are listed. So people are like series A, series B, that's when they should be thinking about, hey, like four years, two, three years from now. But existing public companies could also adopt you guys, right? That's right. And listen, if someone in the class of 2020 IPOs wanted to list an LTSC, we would be delighted and thrilled, and that would be wonderful if that should happen. We'll work very hard to support them. But just as an expectation-setting exercise, we don't really know how long

this is going to take. And that's okay. That's why we raise a lot of money. And even by modern standards. So this is a show where we sort of analyze and grade businesses. So I want to make sure we understand the business model here. Traditionally, a stock exchange would be, they make money every time a trade happens. So they're incentivized to have lots and lots of transactions, which in part is why we see the lots and lots of transactions that we have today. Your business model is different. Tell us about that. We believe that one of the most powerful things you can say when you're selling to a customer, like when we sit down with a CEO, we want to be able to say

to them, look, we are the only stock exchange you will ever meet where you're the customer. We make our money by selling you products and services that you believe are value add and we sell some products and services to your long-term investors. We have trading on our platform but our goal is not to serve traders primarily. We're not anti traders. I don't think traders are bad but we have enough financial institutions who primarily serve traders. We'd like there to be at least one whose main job is to serve its actual customers.

So you're a marketplace without a take rate business model. Yeah, that's right. Yeah, I mean, what's like a marketplace? You're subsidizing either supply or demand, right? And if you're an investment bank or you're an exchange, the supply is companies and equity securities. The demand are the investors investors so who do you think they're serving you know you guys are flipping that on yeah that's exactly right in fact they

don't call them companies they call them issuers yeah right which is one of my favorite euphemisms of financial services like the atm machines that print out the certificate like the real customers trade the issuers just issue that's what their job is to do the issuing so so that's that's the big part of what we do now we do have a stock trading platform and we is to do the issuing. So that's the big part of what we do. Now, we do have a stock trading platform, and we want to be the premier stock trading venue for infrequent traders, for long-term investors. So we've built up... And to what you said earlier,

a very valuable service you could offer is like, you want to buy $500 million worth of stock? We can facilitate you buying $500 million worth of stock. So yes, we have a number of things that we offer to companies where they can do those kinds of capital raises and still consummate the transaction after market close, their investors can't be front run, but where the company can have a say in the kinds of investors that can acquire the stock. So they can basically place the stock with their existing long term investors. And is that the sort of service that you would charge for?

Yeah, exactly. Got it. We try to build services that are valuable for companies at every stage of their life to and through the IPO. So we're very strong in the seed series ABC stage with these kind of early stage tools we've been talking about. We have a separate product suite which is not yet publicly announced but where we have customers that are in the late stage, pre-IPO stage.

And then we'll eventually take those companies public, we hope, and maintain a software relationship with them as well as a listings relationship. That's our long-term goal. Got it. Cool. We want to thank our longtime friend of the show, Vanta, the leading trust management platform. Vanta, of course, automates your security reviews and compliance efforts. So frameworks like SOC 2, ISO 27001, GDPR, and HIPAA compliance and monitoring, Vanta takes care of these otherwise incredibly time and resource draining efforts for your organization and makes them fast and simple. Yep. Vanta is the perfect example of the quote that we talk about all the time here on Acquired,

Jeff Bezos, his idea that a company should only focus on what actually makes your beer taste better, i.e. spend your time and resources only on what's actually going to move the needle for your product and your customers and outsource everything else that doesn't. Every company needs compliance and trust with their vendors and customers. It plays a major role in enabling revenue because customers and partners demand it, but yet it adds zero flavor to your actual product. Vanta takes care of all of it for you. No more spreadsheets, no fragmented tools, no manual reviews to cobble together your security and compliance requirements. It is one single software pane of glass that connects to all of your services via APIs and

eliminates countless hours of work for your organization. There are now AI capabilities to make this even more powerful, and they even integrate with over 300 external tools. Plus, they let customers build private integrations with their internal systems. And perhaps most importantly, your security reviews are now real-time instead of static, so you can monitor and share with your customers and partners to give them added confidence. So whether you're a startup or a large enterprise and your company is ready to automate compliance and streamline security reviews like Vanta's 7,000 customers around the globe, and go back to making your beer taste better, head on over to vanta.com slash acquired and just tell them that Ben and David

sent you. And thanks to friend of the show, Christina, Vanta's CEO, all acquired listeners get $1,000 of free credit. Vanta.com slash acquired. So we're going to move to grading now. And obviously, this is so speculative that it's difficult to grade. We have a mechanism for doing this because lots of times we talk about things that just happened. So let's talk about the A-plus case. So what would it look like a decade from now if this has gone phenomenally well? And then let's talk about the F-case where, you know, hey, this was a great experiment. I'm glad we tried it. But why did it fail? Or why could it have failed? And I'll start with that A-plus case by throwing out the idea that this might enable a whole bunch

of goodness in the world and new innovation, but actually be a way worse business than any of the other stock exchanges ever have been. It's interesting that that could be an A-plus for the world, but apples to apples, if you bought shares of LTSC today, or if you had bought shares of NASDAQ in 1973, buying NASDAQ in 1973 may have been a much better bet. I mean, that's totally possible. I've learned a lot about what it means to build a long-term oriented mission-oriented company. I had paid lip service to that stuff before, but I worked in consumer internet. It's not the same. It's just not the same. The look on Eric's face is priceless. So every person who comes to work here and every

investor we allow to invest in the company, we have to have a serious conversation with them about risks and downsides. And in particular, we say we are trying to fix a trillion dollar problem in capitalism itself. Tim O'Reilly has that famous adage about create more value than you capture. We're going to create that order of magnitude of value or die trying. That's what we know for sure. Whether we capture any of it for ourselves, I don't know. Probably is going to be fine.

I'm pretty sure if you create a trillion dollars of value, like you don't have to create. You have to capture a very high percentage to make an awful lot of money. But we don't know. And frankly, we don't have to create you have to capture a very high percentage to make an awful lot of money but we don't know and frankly we don't care now our investors care because they want returns but like but we have a fair candidate like look if you have an irr target in your fund for like the next seven years like please don't invest in this company well i have to imagine to what we were just talking about him you know you don't have to uh speculate or you know say percentages or numbers or anything but like if you just think about what the problems are with the current system, I think a lot of it does hinge around these large dollar-sized transactions, whether that's a softbank-style round of a currently private company where you're raising a billion dollars at once with no governance and no rights

and preferences, or you're in the public markets and you're a long-term holder and you're trying in a publicly traded security to get a 500 million dollar position you know those are hard right now and like if you could solve those and you could probably like make some money on those transactions you know i just that's of all the things to worry about with this it's honestly the thing i worry about the least like you know because people always like, what if the incumbent exchanges just copy your reforms and put you out of business? I'm like, you mean if we change the world?

Well, also, there's like an innovator's dilemma there. Like, I don't... Yeah, right. I mean, wouldn't that be great? I tried really hard. In the early years of this, I tried very hard to give this idea away for free to the incumbent exchanges.

I begged them to build it so I wouldn't have to. And, you know, here we are. But they're not going to cannibalize their revenue stream either. They're not going to get rid of the trading. That's always a problem. Listen, I wish they would copy us. That would be great. But it is important for us, especially in recruiting, just to be really clear-eyed about this. We don't exactly know what the rewards for us will be. But we hire people who are going to sleep really well at night knowing we solved this problem, whether we get paid or not. It's just that's not the most important thing. And I think that's how you build truly great companies, is you have people

who are in it for the mission. You have an understanding that business model is important and economics are important in the same way that oxygen is important. But you don't live for oxygen. It's the other way around. And that's become kind of a cliche idea in our world today, but I think it's even still underappreciated how powerful it is. Yeah. Okay, well, real quick, if it completely fails, what are the most likely reasons? Oh, how can we count the ways?

I mean, listen, we go through this with every employee, so I'm happy to be very open about it. The first and most obvious thing is we are dealing with a very conservative system where change is really hard and people resist change. It's not just in a lot of enterprise software situations, you have the generalized resistance to change that people are used to.

They're all crappy enterprise software and they don't really want to get the new stuff and be trained on a new thing. All that usual stuff. But here we compound that with the fact that this is a reform that is actively opposed by people who are making astronomical amounts of money from the status quo. And the government's involved. You said it, not me. So it ain't going to be pretty.

And like a lot of people think it's a suicide mission to go up against those entrenched forces and win. And it may yet be. Though those people thought we'd be dead long before now. So at least we've gotten something right and like is is there any reason why the why it would you would fail to be able to get companies to list is there something we'll get to that next sure so yeah that's like the general you know like people didn't even think we could get this approved by the regulators that was a huge accomplishment in itself that was very very unlikely and we were sabotaged multiple times and we almost died many time i could tell you all kinds of crazy stories of what that looked like behind the scenes.

But also, even if we get everything right and we survive our political problems and we fight off the forces of darkness and, and, and, and, and, customers might still walk up to the precipice of this and say, you know what? I'd like to go second. And maybe everybody would like to go second.

How do you lean startup your way to knowing if customers will buy? We have spent a lot of our time on that question. But, and, you know, I think I have, you know, we use every trick in the book. So if your listeners

have studied any lean startup, you'll know about how to build a concierge MVP. You'll know how to build, you know, non-binding letters of intent as proxies for, I mean, like,

you name it, you name it, we've tried everything. And, you know, we have significant companies who have signed up as much as they're allowed to sign up so far. And we obviously have all this software and we've built all these relationships.

So I have a lot of confidence in this. But at the end of the day, until customers do it, you don't know. Now, whoever goes first will reap unbelievable rewards, I think, of the messaging and positioning that that will win for them as being seen as a leader who's changing capitalism itself. But maybe that's not enough to overcome the risk. And also demand from the long-term investor community, right? Yeah, very significant. And they feed off each other.

So when companies want to know more about why they should do this, they often say, well, how do I know what investors will think of this? And we're like would you like to talk to some of them that's like a radical idea like what market making imagine that it's like well yeah would you like i can put you in touch with the ceo of some of the world's largest asset owners and they'll take your call and you guys could talk and they're like really and when i talk to asset owners i'm like they're like well how do i know it's really true that the next generation of companies wants XYZ? I'm like, would you like to talk to them? Because we have become so intermediated.

It's unbelievable. Even like, I won't name any names, but you can imagine some of these next gen companies that have severe political problems all over the world with like unions and local governments and right i always ask them so have you talked to any public pension funds about investing in your company or ipo they're like no do you think i should oh you will on your road show right well no you won't because those funds don't get invited oh right all right because they don't trade enough the allocators will be only the allocators will be there so so it's actually like this wild situation where two of the most logical partners, like being a good owner is one of the most underrated skills

in our world today. Like you see this in sports, you see it in corporations, right? Like having good ownership, like really is a source of competitive advantage. And people who are investing for multi-generational timelines are excellent owners. So you would think that companies that have a long-term perspective and excellent owners. So you would think that companies that have a long-term perspective and excellent owners who have a long-term requirement, that they would naturally want to spend time together. And whenever we do get them together,

it's amazing because they have such a bond. And yet it's so hard to do because there's so many intermediaries in the way and the intermediaries have no incentive to drive connection between investors and companies directly. That is how they get paid. So part of it is just having the willingness

to build those relationships. So if that's not enough, then it won't work. And then we haven't even gotten into all the technical ways it could fail. Like that's like a hundred of them. We will catch you with that one another time. I think this is a fantastic place to leave this. Eric, where can listeners find you and the LTSE?

Sure, ltse.com for everything exchange related. I am still using the leanstartup.com for my personal domain if you want to learn about me. And obviously we're all on Twitter and everywhere else. And for the tools for earlier stage companies. Yeah, you can go to LTSE.com slash tools or you can try any of our individual tools, captable.io, hiringplan.io, startuprunway.io. If any of your listeners are in a venture capital firm and you'd like to extend the suite as a whole to your portfolio companies, we do all that kind of stuff too.

So we do all, and everything we do on the early stage size is free or freemium. So we're not extracting fees from anybody. We don't think that's right. And we also are the only provider in the space who actually believes that you own your own data. I was going to ask you about competitors,

but you said all you need to say. You got it. So anyway, so please, anyone who's interested, please do give us your feedback and try those out. Thank you. Awesome. Well, listeners, that is all we have for today. If you like this or any other episode,

please don't be shy about sharing it on social media or leaving us a review on iTunes. If you want to go deeper on company building topics, you should consider becoming an Acquired Limited partner. And you can click the link in the show notes or go to glow.fm slash acquired. And all new listeners get a seven-day free trial. And starting right now, here's an excerpt of our latest episode with Vlad Magdalene, the founder and CEO of Webflow.

With that, we will see you next time. Welcome, LPs. Today we are doing an episode I have been excited about for a long time with Vlad Magdalene, the co-founder and CEO of Webflow. Well, Webflow is a company I am personally very passionate about since I grew up as a web developer, always fighting between building websites from scratch in PHP and hand coding HTML and CSS. PHP, Facebook days. The Lampstack, baby. Oh, boy. There were WYSIWYG editors out there. You dated yourself then. I know, like Dreamweaver, but they always required you to do all the hosting yourself. I don't know the state of the product today. This

is like, you know, 12 year old data, but generated garbage code and Webflow has been an amazing answer to provide the ease of use of a graphical user interface while still being an enormously powerful tool. And we personally use the site for acquired. We use it for PSL and basically all of our portfolio companies use it as well. So Vlad. It's so powerful that even, you know, I can now update the website and add, which is, you know, the last time I wrote a line of code, I think I was probably maybe 20 years old. Yeah, Vlad, I have the designer creds. So one year ago.

David has an editor login. Thank you, Vlad. That says a lot. So listeners, who is Vlad? Well, Webflow, while most of you may know this company only from the last year or two, it is a at least decade old company that I believe, Vlad, you started as a side project in 2005? Yep. It was actually something that started when I was still in college, when I was working at an agency part time as an intern, and then

turned into my senior project, then turned into a couple failed attempts at starting it as a business. Then I joined into it, sort of worked there for a while, then turned into a couple failed attempts at starting it as a business. Then I joined into it, sort of worked there for a while, then had another failed attempt at turning into a business during sort of the Web 2.0 heyday, and then finally started it, hopefully for the last time, in 2012. Wow. All attempts to start the same business. Same business, same name, different co-founders every time. Two of those attempts just by myself uh sort of looking for a co-founder the third attempt actually was with two intuit buddies uh one of which uh so that attempt didn't work out and can go into sort of like the history behind that but sort of fizzled out and over time one of those

co-founders ended up starting his own company, got into YC, got acquired by Stripe, and then came back as a senior product manager here. So now he's one of our product leaders. The circle of life. Exactly. So I sort of worked on it in many different iterations with multiple people, and finally something worked. Wow.

Wow. That's so cool. Well, we'll get into all of that. So it's the 2012 version. That was the start of the company. That's the best vintage so far. We know so cool. Well, we'll get into all of that. So it's the 2012 version. That was the start of the company. That's the best vintage so far. We know it today. Exactly.

Wow. And I think it only raised maybe a few million dollars between then and now when you did the... Yeah. So we started in 2012, started that with my brother. And then one of my buddies from Intuit joined a few months later. Brian ended up being the third co-founder. And then we, about a year later, we got into YC and then did a seed round, which at the time seemed huge. It was $1.4 million, even though other companies were closing their seed rounds much faster or they were bigger. And then we ended up doing a small, well, small relative to today extension of another 1.5 about a year later, and then got to profitability and sort of didn't worry about funding for a long time. And that was what, 2015 you got to profitability? Late 2015, yeah. Awesome.

Listeners, you should know the company then for the last four years has raised no money, as Vlad said. And then this year raised a $72 million Series A from Excel that is coinciding today with sort of this no code movement. So I think we'll get in a little bit of that. So this notion isn't brand new. WYSIWYG web editors had existed before. And it's kind of like the right ones run anywhere. It'll finally be good this time. Like it's still not good this time. So why is it that Webflow has really found product market fit and created this nice product with a web-based WYSIWYG editor

when it's failed so many times before? So two things. One, I think if we tried the same exact thing in 2007, it would have failed. And I'll tell you why. Like the reason direct manipulation works in Webflow is that we can actually not emulate, we have the real thing inside of the browser itself. So Webflow is built in a browser. You can sort of think of Webflow as dev tools or web inspector with a lot

more visual tools on top, right? A lot of other WYSIWYG tools, what they try to do is like, hey, we're going to take a graphic design tool like Photoshop or Illustrator or Sketch or whatever, and we're going to try to randomly guess or best guess what the generated code should be. It's the approach that doesn't respect the core principles, the core foundations of what the web is. And the web is like, you know, you have these DOM nodes, and they're essentially boxes on top of boxes, inside of boxes, etc. And everything is a box, right? You want to make a circle, you have to make a box with rounded corners, right? That's a circle. Or you have like a, you know, an SVG or something like that. I think Webflow is the very first application that said, okay, here are the core primitives. You know, you have styles, you

have classes, you have like CSS abstractions. And what we're going to do is create a pretty shallow abstraction that still forces you to understand those core principles, not necessarily the core syntax. So for example, when you're doing layout in Webflow, it's Flexbox or CSS Grid. You just don't know it. The visual tools built on top of it are a representation of those same like constraints and limitations. They're not like draw anything and then we'll try to guess what the code is, right? It's literally like adjust the margin and the padding. Exactly. You're almost like one-to-one making code changes. You're just doing it through a different language. It's almost like if you're using software to create music, you have to understand the core principles of music. You might not, you know, have a piano

in front of you, right? But you don't get to cheat by saying, I'm going to create like a masterpiece by not understanding like good rhythm and et cetera. So that's the same thing with Webflow. Like you, it does have a more, you know, advanced learning curve because you have to understand the box model because you have to understand, you don't just draw a box and then go like drag it anywhere. You have think okay when the screen resizes i have to think of this box as being 50 of the width of the current viewport not 500 pixels right and then when i resize i change it to 495 pixels or whatever i sort of have to think in a more like relative the way that a front-end developer would think but we're erasing like 95 of the complexity and like knowing how to glue all these things together, etc.

And the other thing that made it possible was that when we first started building it in 2012 was the first time that browsers were getting good enough. There's like Chrome 1.0 days. Safari and WebKit were kind of like on the same. They're using the same engine. Firefox and Internet Explorer were sort of like the old guard in terms of like, hey, this is like a way to like view documents or whatever. But Google's really pushing Chrome as like an application platform. Like they were like Google Maps, that's sort of the standard of like what's what's possible as an interactive type of thing in the browser. That was impossible in 2007, 2008, etc. So you in order to create that full abstraction of like, I'm previewing exactly what's going to ship,

you have to actually show that in the browser in an iframe or something. And browsers just didn't support that until like 2011, 2012, 2013 to be really like, that's when browsers were kind of kicked into gear of like, holy crap, this is the next wave of application. MARK MANDELMANN, JR.: It's an application platform. MARK MIRCHANDANI, JR.: Exactly.

Yeah. MARK MANDELMANN application platform. Exactly. Yeah. Exactly.