Advisory Opinions - Trump’s Tariff Showdown
Episode Date: November 4, 2025Sarah Isgur and David French preview the biggest Supreme Court case of the term, Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump, which challenges President Donald Trump’s power to impose sweeping tariffs on vir...tually all goods imported into the United States. For additional analysis, join the SCOTUSbloglive blog on November 5 at 10:00 a.m. ET. The Agenda:—How to get CLE credit by listening to Advisory Opinions—Laying the groundwork for Trump's tariffs case—Divided liberal justices—National Guard deployment to Chicago on the interim docket—Sex markers on passports—Justices aren't policy experts Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices
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You ready?
I was born ready.
Welcome to advisory opinions. I'm Sarah Isger. That's David French.
And today we are going to set the table before the biggest argument of the term, the tariff's oral argument that will be held Wednesday.
morning, we're going to give you all the tools you need to be able to tune into that oral
argument live if you want to, or at least to be able to tune into our live podcast that will
follow the oral argument as we break it down with a bunch of friends of the pod. Think of
this like ESPN. We're going to have our, you know, the former quarterback from one of the
teams, sideline reporters, color commentary. Really, AO, no different than any of the great
ESPN shows. And then we'll talk about some of the reporting about internal dynamics at the court
coming from another friend of the pod, Jody Cantor from the New York Times, as well as two
interim docket cases, that National Guard deployment to Chicago case that is still pending on the
interim docket and passports, male, female, X, what's a president supposed to do? Finally, angry
cheerleader comes back in the form of some more off-campus speech in the second circuit. All that
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That's typelaw.com. David, first off the bat, we have a little announcement that we will explain
further for that live podcast happening Wednesday right after the argument finishes. Remember,
we will do the live blog on SCOTUS blog during the argument. If you want to follow along at home,
My understanding is C-SPAN will also be showing the live blog during the argument as well.
And then after that, we will do a live podcast that will, of course, be put out in your regular podcast feed later that day or the next morning.
But if you want to tune in video live, it'll be me, David French, David Latt, and Roman Martinez from Latham Watkins, breaking it all down with Amy Howe from Skodas blog, of course, as our sideline reporter, literally from the steps.
of the Supreme Court as soon as the argument ends.
We anticipate that being around 1230 to 1245 Eastern time on Wednesday,
but again, this is going to be a long argument, so tune in.
But David, here's the really fun thing about that live podcast.
It's going to be available for CLE credit.
Really? Okay.
On Monday, you will be able to get CLE credit from that podcast.
I will explain all of the, like, how's you do that on the Wednesday show after the argument.
But if you're looking for some CLE before, you know, the end of the year, tune in for that reason, too.
This will be a little bit of an experiment, David, to see whether this is something our audience is actually excited about and would help them.
Because we're looking at doing about 12 CLEs a year, which for most states would be your, you know, most of, if not all of the credits that you need.
And don't worry, we'll make sure to include ethics credits as well.
Although, obviously, since this one is the tariff argument, probably no ethics credit this time.
That's fantastic.
We've been kicking around this for some time that in reality, if you look at a lot of CLE programs
and how we cover particularly the Supreme Court, a lot of our stuff would be CLE worthy.
And so we're just taking it to that next level, Sarah.
We're making it formally, officially CLE worthy.
so that there's just so many benefits, aside from the intellectual, emotional, and spiritual
of listening to advisory opinions, you can now add educational as well.
So, yeah, I'm very excited about this.
Okay. David, I wanted to set the table, if you will, for the tariffs argument.
Because after the argument, we'll do a tiny bit of table setting.
But this is like our bigger breakdown so that you go into that argument feeling really well,
prepared as a listener to listen to what's going on.
So first of all, remember, these are consolidated cases, and the Supreme Court has, in fact,
allotted a total of 80 minutes for the oral argument.
Remember, normally it would be 60.
Now, they go longer than that anyway, but the fact that it's allotted more time than the 60
minutes means it will go even longer.
So it's 40 minutes for the Solicitor General, 20 minutes for an advocate.
on behalf of the private parties. We'll get to that later. And 20 minutes for one advocate on behalf
of the state parties. Now, that's the time, the free-for-all time allotted, and then you get to the
seriatim questions. That's why it's going to last so much longer than 80 minutes. So, David,
key questions in this argument. One, does the International Emergency Economic Powers Act of
1977? Aiepa. Authorize the president to impose tariffs. Two, if it does, is Congress's
delegation of authority to the president constitutional, if it is, did President Trump meet
requirements under AIPA when establishing his global tariff program? David, of those three
questions, I guess, A, what do you think will spend the most time on? What do you think
the justices will spend the most time on, not us? And two, what do you personally think is the
most important question for you? Yeah, that's a great way to set this up. I mean, I think if you
look at this, we're going to be, I'm going to be a broken record based on previous discussions
of this case. But, you know, they are really, really going to focus on the foreign setting
of this, I think, that that is going to be a big part of this. Because if you're just looking
at this, the same way you would look at a domestic political controversy like OSHA vaccine
mandate, like student loan, debt forgiveness, this looks a lot like those cases. There is a big
grant of power. There is a big grant of power from Congress to the president, no doubt about it.
But the grant of an enumerated power to use that the president's sole discretion worldwide,
where are you finding that? I think that is going to be the really big question for Trump,
and then the really big question for the plaintiffs here is going to be, well, but wait,
doesn't our authority over the president here, when the president is conducting diplomacy and
International Affairs. Isn't that when we the corridor at our smallest and the president is at his
biggest? And so I feel like that's going to be the back and forth here, that you've got a statute
that's much more reminiscent of OSHA, much more reminiscent of student loans, but you have
the diplomacy aspect. Okay, I want to now, you know, read you guys the different arguments from
the different sides. So first, summary of Trump's argument. The plain text of IEPA,
gives the president unfettered ability to set tariffs for any country at any level for as long as needed
whenever an emergency is declared at the president's discretion. If Trump says persistent trade imbalances
and inflows of fentanyl both constitute unusual and extraordinary threats to national security,
everything he needs to impose tariffs has been met. Okay, that's a summary. Now I want to read you
from the Solicitor General's brief. These consolidated cases address President Trump's lawful
imposition of tariffs under Aipa, which the president, in his exercise of power over the military
and foreign affairs, has determined are necessary to rectify America's country-killing trade deficits
and to stem the flood of fentanyl and other lethal drugs across our border. To the president,
these cases present a stark choice. With tariffs, we are a rich nation. Without tariffs, we are a
poor nation. The president has stated that one year ago, the United States was a dead country,
and now, because of the trillions of dollars being paid by countries that have so badly abused
us, America is a strong, financially viable, and respected country again. President Trump's
Aifa tariffs are plainly lawful. Congress has long granted the president brought authority to
employ tariffs to address emergencies. Aipa continues that tradition by expressly authorizing
the president to, quote, regulate dot, dot, dot, importation, end quote, of foreign goods to address
declared national emergencies.
Since the early days of the republic, regulating trade has always encompassed the imposition
of tariffs, AIPA's broader statutory scheme confirms that regulating importation includes
the use of tariffs.
Okay, that's the Trump argument, both summarized and quoted.
Fascinating how many Trump quotes are in there.
Oh, yes, a lot.
That was interesting to me.
Yeah, yeah, because have we raised trillions of dollars from these tariffs?
I think so. But anyway, fascinating decision. Okay. I'm going to consolidate not only the two private
parties, but also the state argument here into one. So this is the summary of their side.
The Constitution gives Congress the sole power to tax and set tariffs. And while AIPA allows a
president to regulate importation or exportation of goods during limited periods of emergency,
the word regulate does not include tariffs, which are,
not explicitly mentioned in the law. And trade imbalances are not an emergency. Okay, now quoting
from the state's brief. Defendant's hyperbolic rhetoric obscures what this case is about. The question
is not whether America is a rich nation or a poor nation, whether tariffs are country saving,
or whether without them we are declining into a vassal state. The question is not whether
control over tariff policy would empower the president to make trade deals or reduce the national
deficit. Question as in other recent cases of executive overreach is, who decides? Quoting, by the way,
Gorsuch's concurring opinion in the OSHA case, the vaccine mandate case. Congress, not the president,
decides whether and how much to tax Americans who import goods from abroad. This court should
reject the president's bid to seize that power for himself. And David, I also want to give you a little
taste of what the two lower courts decided, because I often find those as interesting or more so than the
briefs from the parties, because those were sort of your advisors, if you will, at this point to the
Supreme Court. So from the district court case, the district court in D.C. said that Aipa does not
authorize any tariffs at all because IEPA does not use the word tariffs. And the power to
regulate is not the power to tax, i.e. the power to impose tariffs. So IEPA doesn't even
apply, is basically what the D.C. District Court said. Now, the Federal Circuit, this was a 7-4 decision,
basically held IEPA might authorize some tariffs, just not these tariffs, or any other tariffs
that might be too enduring, too significant, to widespread. And of course, the SG's response to that
was neither AEPA nor the major questions doctrine allows courts to fashion such a textual
know it when you see at limitations on the president's emergency powers. David, what I find,
of course, we've talked about this interesting, is the Federal Circuit only had jurisdiction
if AEPA did allow for the imposition of tariffs because they can only hear cases about tariffs,
basically, for our purposes, whereas the D.C. District Court would have jurisdiction regardless.
So I do lean more D.C. district court in this case and think that that was the better navigational
tool through AEPA holding that in fact AEPA just doesn't authorize tariffs. For what it's worth,
if you're wondering who are the actual parties here, for one of the petitioners, and remember
there's two private parties, this is the learning resources one, it's a family-owned business,
fourth generation. They have created and sold over 2,000 hands-on educational toys and
products for children. Now they employ over 500 people with offices in Illinois, California,
and New York. Petitioners develop their products in the United States and perform some manufacturing
and assembly domestically, but outsource most manufacturing to factories in other countries,
including, but not limited to, China, Taiwan, Korea, Vietnam, Thailand, and India. Attempting to
pay the tariffs in 2025 would cost petitioners $100 million in cash expenditures.
compared with just 2.3 million in 2024, a 44-fold increase.
Okay, so David, we've set the table a little bit.
Will you steal-man the SG's side for us?
Because I know you don't agree with that side.
But what do you think their best argument is heading into Wednesday?
Oh, I think it's actually a pretty easy argument to make the steel man version of it,
which is that, look, read the statute, that grant of power is,
broad. It is legitimately broad. If you look at it, in many ways, it seems broader than the grants
in OSHA. It might even seem broader than some of the grants in the student loan case. It's a very
broad grant of power. And then the other element here is the element of, wait a minute,
court, can you even get into the business of judging, second-guessing presidential emergencies?
I mean, we have a very long history here of Congress delegating to the president, the ability
to declare emergencies. And here, certainly Congress disagrees in some elements of Congress,
maybe a minority of Congress right now, disagrees with his exercise of his tariff authority.
But you know what? Who can do something about it? It's Congress. Congress can do something about this.
And they're not doing anything about it at all. So you combine a very broad grant of authority,
very broad grant of authorities to declare emergency, diplomacy overseas, which is where the president is at the
apex of his power. And really what you're left at with is a policy argument against Trump.
That's how I would frame it. That look, what they're, the real argument here, the real argument here
is that these are just bad. These tariffs are bad. Well, again, you're not the court of last result
on bad policy choices. You're the court of last resort when it comes to questions about the law.
And here, the law has granted explicitly in this statute, the president of broad authority,
And if you back up constitutionally and you sort of back up statutorily around presidential
emergencies, you just have a very large no-go zone for the court around diplomacy, around emergencies.
Why? Because both Constitution and the Congress have put it that way. So there you have it.
It's a declaration of an emergency, which is squarely within the presidential prerogative.
It is the use of a broad power, which read the statute. It's a very, very broad power.
and look, if you disagree with the subjective reason he chose to declare the emergency,
well, Congress, you can do something about it. That's how I would do it, Sarah.
You brought up a few things here that I think are interesting. One is the congressional
acquiescence aspect. If Congress didn't like the way the president was interpreting that
grant of power, they could at any point step in and stop this, and they haven't. So rather than
the court sort of refereeing these two powers, they are capable of doing it themselves.
The fact that Congress hasn't chosen to isn't really our problem, so to speak, because they could.
They just haven't, which means maybe they did intend to give the president this broad amount of power.
Now, there's a second part to that, though, which is, is Congress allowed to give away its power to the president if it is a core constitutional power of Congress?
This is, you know, we've talked about non-delegation doctrine versus major questions doctrine, and I've always
shorthanded them as major questions doctrine is, did Congress give the president that power?
Non-delegation is, can Congress give the president that power? I think both of these are at issue
in this case. Non-delegation has basically been a quasi-dead letter. The court has been very, very
hesitant to say that Congress can't do certain things. But boy, it feels like we're heading up
into that area of the canyon, so to speak.
So did IEPA in the, quote, regulate dot, dot, dot, importation, end quote.
Did they give the president the power to set these tariffs?
Is obviously question one for the argument.
But question two is, okay, let's say they did.
Let's say David's argument wins the day, David's Steelman argument.
You know, it is broad.
This is foreign policy.
The president's at the zenith of his power.
He's acting both with his inherent powers and congressional powers.
as well, can Congress delegate away such massive amounts of its taxing authority to the
discretion of the president when it is explicitly a power given to Congress in the Constitution?
And so will you see the court finally or at long last sort of rev up the non-delegation motor?
Or will they use major questions as a way to almost like avoid that?
because the reason that the court has not done a lot of non-delegation is this, I'm waving my hands in the air, air of constitutional avoidance, this idea that you don't want to have to tell Congress they can't do something. And so you avoid the constitutional separation of powers problem by simply requiring that clear statement. This is more the Gorsuch version of major questions doctrine, where you decided on major questions so you don't have to decide it on non-delegation.
You know, if I'm looking at the flip side of the argument that I just made, you know, that non-delegation major questions, those kind of, these questions are going to kind of, in some ways, I could imagine how they could merge together in a bit.
Like, if you're talking about major questions, which is, you know, no elephants and mouse holes, and you're going to be the Trump administration, you're going to essentially say that what happened here was they delegated and enumerated power.
but the delegation doesn't exactly contain the exact language of the enumerated power.
So it does say regulate imports, but it does not say impose duties, for example.
So if you have an Article 2 power, I mean, I'm sorry, an Article 1 power that is explicit
and you're arguing it's been delegated and the delegation doesn't include the exact language of the power,
I think you, that's one of your weak points.
That's one of your weak points.
Because they are saying regulate,
but they are not saying imposed duties, for example.
And so that, when you don't have that specific language,
I think it gets tougher to argue that there's been a specific delegation.
All right.
When we get back, I'm going to run you through what it looks like
in the hours and days before an oral argument.
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All right, David, first up, in the hours and days before an oral argument, one of the things
you want to do, especially with what is at this point the biggest case of the term, is get your
side of the story out there publicly. These justices do not live in hermetically sealed caves.
They read the newspaper. And so you want to kind of like get the vibes headed your way because
it's one of the only things you can do in the days before the oral argument. The briefs are done,
you know, all of that. So I wanted to read you a quote from Michael McConnell, who's the Council
of Record for the businesses, right? Quote, it is practically what the American Revolution
was fought over. The principle that taxation is not legitimate unless it is adopted by the
representatives of the people. That quote appeared in Axios in the morning read. Here's another one
from a senior director at the Brennan Center, always looking to get their version of the story
in these, so these outside groups who file amicus briefs, they're also going to be working the
reporters this week. Quote, the stakes of this case reach far beyond trade policy. The decision
could shape whether the use of emergency powers to bypass Congress becomes a tool of routine
governance. I really agree with that. So again, sort of that consequentialism is something
you want out there in the water and the vibes. Now, this is interesting.
Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent doing the Sunday shows, right, on behalf of the administration to
talk about this. His vibe check, if you will. Imagine if someone had held their hand up in 2006,
2007, and said, we're on the verge of a housing crisis. Well, President Trump raised his hand and
said, we're on the verge of a trade crisis, and I'm going to use IEPA. That is what emergency
powers are for. Again, very consequentialist. So that's our vibe check. That's something that, you know,
you really want your amici, your friends to be doing for you, whether it's the Treasury Secretary
for the government or Brennan Center, et cetera, for the other side. So, David, remember we said
there's the two private party cases. One went through the Federal Circuit, one went through
the D.C. District Court. They both have lawyers, but the Supreme Court only gave them one 20-minute
period of time. So, who gets to argue it? You know, we talked about the decision within the VOS case
between Michael McConnell and Neil Cotill, because it was a Washington Post piece that criticized
the choice to have Neil Cotill argue for them. But that, of course, didn't decide the whole
question. There was still going to be, okay, but now there's Neil Cotill for VOS and Pateech
Shaw for learning resources. He's the head of Aiken Gump's Supreme Court practice.
This is very common, David.
The two parties meet.
They have some arguments about why their guy would be better, why their guy would be better.
It's very, very cordial, like awkwardly cordial.
And then inevitably, there's a coin flip.
So Neil Cotill won the coin flip.
He will be arguing for both learning resources and VOS at the court.
What do you do then for those days?
You have moots.
You are just drilled like you are in basic training.
So the moots are going to have, so first of all, the Solicitor General's
office holds their own moots internal to the building, so to speak, with their own lawyers.
So including like 20 pushups if you get a bad answer or plank position?
But Neil Cotillall will sit in on a moots organized by different groups.
You know, his law firm, other law firms, Georgetown Law Center is known for holding these
moots as well. And this is going to surprise people, I think. It's not that you bring in nine
lawyers who each play one of the justices. It's more likely around five lawyers in a given case.
And while, of course, they try to channel different justices, they don't play anyone.
They're just asking the hardest questions, trying to make it harder than it will be in the actual
argument where you're not going to have sort of friendly questions in the mood. They're all going to
be poking at your weakest positions, which is why they are not public, almost always.
So, Sarah, I have a question for you.
Before we move too far down the road, there's been a lot of talk about how lopsided the amicus briefs are.
That if you look at the list, you're going to see a list of really very few amicus briefs on the side of the tariffs, just very few.
And many of them are sort of from like right-wing policy institutes.
They're not really rooted in economic entities or economic organizations.
and you just have a bunch, just 3x, 4x, of amicus briefs on the other side, against the tariffs.
And so there's been a lot of questions about, does that matter?
Does it matter that it is so lopsided on amicus briefs?
And I wanted to get your thoughts on that because my first instinct is no.
My first instinct is that it doesn't necessarily really matter, but I don't feel confident in that position.
Yeah, David. So I count about six amici for the government in this case and just under 40 amici against the tariffs. It's a big gap. To your point of whether it matters, yes and no, I don't think it matters in terms of it's influencing the court, but it probably matters if you're handicapping the outcome that it's that lopsided, as in it tells you which side has the better argument if there's just not a whole lot.
of groups coming in on one side or another. But, you know, that can also be gameed. And in these
really big cases, you do see that happen more often where, you know, there's more, let's say,
there's more money to interest on one side or the other. Well, guess what? Amicus briefs cost money.
And so maybe they paid a lot of different law firms to write amici for them, things like that.
So it's a very weak predictor, I would say, but it ain't nothing. And in this case, I think it's
quite interesting just how lopsided it is, because I don't think there's a huge discrepancy
in, you know, resources, potential friends, et cetera, between the two sides. As in, this is the United
States government, and they were only able to find six friends, if you will. You know, that's
an interesting way putting it. Is it a sign of a disparity in the merits, and therefore it's the
disparity in the merits that's going to tell the outcome, not the disparity in the meekis briefs,
but how much does a disparity in the amicus briefs communicate to the court that there's a disparity
in the merits? I think they would go sort of out of their way to not be influenced by a large
majority of amicus briefs. It can also backfire a little. If you've got some really strong
amicus briefs, you know, for instance, going to the history of the understanding of tariff policy
at the founding, let's say, they get watered down by having 35 other sort of like, you know,
holla back girl amicus briefs so you know having too many can also kind of you know the clerks are
sitting there yes they're reading every single one of these but at some point when they're all saying
the same thing it's like flip flip flip flip let's go let's go let's go um so you know you can also
end up distracting your own side other interesting things to think about as you tune into the argument
on wednesday morning let's pretend we're neal caught y'all so first of all he almost certainly has an
outline of his argument. I will just say, like,
Husband of the Pod color codes his. I don't know that Neil Cotill color codes is,
but it is a relatively common thing to do with your outline. I think that a lot of it's learned
from your law school habits. However, you would prepare for those law school exams is,
like, kind of similar to how you end up preparing for these big oral arguments. He'll arrive
in the morning well before the argument, but no, he doesn't have to sit with kind of everyone
else. In the Supreme Court, there is a specific room for the Solicitor General where they can
like chill and prepare on their own. There is also a lawyer's lounge where they can chill on their
own. It's not fancy, but it's not not fancy. You know, very nice tables and chairs and, you know,
lots of former Supreme Court justice portraits looking down on you, judgingly. Even the advocates
need to put their electronics in a locker. The lockers are free these days. They used to cost
a quarter or then it went up to 50 cents, I think, and nobody could ever remember to bring a
quarter. So the lockers are free. That's true for if you're going to listen, if you're the
lawyer, electronics not allowed in. When you walk up to the podium, the thing to do is to crank
the podium. There's a crank on the side that raises and lowers it. And it's both a sign that
you've been here before, right? You're not some newbie. And it's important to have it the right
height. Also, it provides you just like this physical thing to do for a second before you're about
to launch into your argument that's like a little bit comforting, if you will. And then the first
words out of Neil Cotill's mouth or anyone else presenting an oral argument to the court is always
Mr. Chief Justice and may it please the court. So that's what to expect for Wednesday's
argument. And from there, of course, we'll see you on the flip side after the argument if you want
to join advisory opinions or I'll be part of the live blog during the argument, you know,
giving my color commentary on what's going on. David, one more thing before we leave this,
Joan Buscupik had this piece in CNN about a very old case from 1981 called Dame's and Moore
v. Reagan. It was an 8-1 decision. The court held that Aipa authorized the president to take
action involving Iranian assets as leverage to solve a problem based on Iran's holding of
American hostages. The Supreme Court blessed the measure as a, quote, bargaining chip to be used
by the president when dealing with a hostile country. This case will be relevant, no doubt,
in the argument. But what's interesting is that Chief Justice Roberts helped draft that opinion
for his boss, then Associate Justice William Rehnquist, who wrote the majority opinion in that
eight one decision. And then immediately afterwards, had to get back to studying from the bar exam
with his fellow clerk from the Brennan Chambers of that term. And do you want to guess who
that fellow law clerk was who had also worked on dames and Morvee Reagan from the Brennan Chambers?
That would be one, Michael McConnell, the Council of Record in this case.
So anyway. Now, this case, very different.
It's a very different case. It's about recovering $3 million of frozen Iranian assets as part of the, as part of the Iranian hostage crisis.
It's, yes, it is a case for the proposition that Aipa grants the president some authority, you know, over imports assets of hostile countries.
But it's factually so very different from this one, just night and day different from it.
I realized that the administration would rely on it in part, but it doesn't get them nearly all the way there.
It gets them out the garage, maybe, I would say, out the garage.
All right, David, speaking of news pieces, there was this piece in the New York Times by Jody Cantor.
It's really about the division in the ranks between justices Kagan, Sotomayor, and Jackson.
And in particular, sort of the Kagan view of the proper role on the court and the Jackson view of
the proper role. I'll just read a piece of it here. Justice Kagan's approach goes like this.
Even on a six to three court, the Democratic appointees can sometimes strategize their way into
narrower rulings, smaller losses, or even outright victory. To do so, the liberals must generally
sway the chief justice and Justice Barrett. Admirers of Justice Kagan say she is prudent to show
restraint, displaying her frustration only in flashes. Justice Jackson's outspokenness could
risk those votes or further erode faith in a court that may yet
stand up to Mr. Trump, they say. Justice Jackson, on the other hand, is aiming for an audience
beyond the court, speaking to the public in history. Her proponents argue that Justice Kagan is
the one taking risks of missing the moment and lending cover to a court that is weakening
democratic norms. As the three justices wrestle with their choices, the debate in liberal
legal circles over their strategy is intensifying. Friend of the pod, Dan Epps
law professor at Washington University and co-host of the Divided Argument podcast, quote,
you can try to hold the center together and assume that people on the other side are acting in good
faith and try to maintain common ground in the name of preserving the rule of law, or you can
raise the fire alarm. It's sort of like war. If you're outgunned, do you try diplomacy or even
appeasement, or do you make a noble charge and possibly get blown away? David, this, at least,
you know, I would say so far for this calendar year is the most important.
interesting piece if you want to understand the inner thoughts of this Supreme Court. The title was
the debate dividing the Supreme Court's liberal justices again in the New York Times on Halloween.
What did you make of it, David? I thought it was super, super interesting. And it really echoed a lot of
the debates I'm hearing from the Democratic side of the aisle politically. So politically, how much
do you just go full on full bore high volume resistance?
to Trump versus how much do you try to negotiate, get best possible deals that you can,
et cetera, and how much are you going in full-bore opposition versus, hey, we're rethinking
and reworking sort of our own platform to how are we going to reach voters in a way that's
more compelling to them? Because we didn't in 2024. So there's this really interesting political
divide, which is sort of how much are we going to go down like the all full-bore T-P?
party resistance versus, you know, we're really moving in this very different direction,
which is going back to the American people with a whole different vision or moderated vision
or whatever it is. I was echoing that, but in a very, very different context, in the court context.
And it struck me that the Kagan approach is plainly correct if you're dealing with John
Robertson, Amy Coney-Barritt. The Jackson approach strikes me as something that's defensible.
if you're dealing with Donald Trump,
like where there's no,
if you think that there's no capacity to reach a deal,
that there's no way that all this person is going to do
is just steamroll and steamroll and steamroll,
then at that point about all you can do
is just make a public case as loudly as you can.
But I don't, that's not what the majority of this court is.
The majority of this court is not a steamroll,
steamroll, steamroll, steamroll court.
And that's been proven time and time again.
And I really do think, as we've said before, people are getting a bit of a misimpression
about the court this term because so many of these emergency docket cases that have come up
have been where the conservative majority of the court has traditionally granted presidents
a lot of authority, and that's over the executive branch.
So in this circumstance, I mean, even what Justice Jackson is decrying isn't some big
departure from conservative jurisprudence.
It's in line with sort of a lot of bigger readings of unitary agreements.
executive. And so it's very interesting to me that there is such that it's like the political
divide, but in a very, very, very different place. And it seems to me that Justice Kagan has the
better argument just logically and also has the, she can point to the scoreboard. And to say that
there are concrete moments when things have been better from her perspective when she's engaged.
One of the things that will really delicately, but nevertheless, I think jump out at you after
reading this piece is how frustrated, I think a lot of the justices are with Justice Jackson,
that they sort of see her attitude, as the piece says. Her audience isn't her fellow
justices. She's not really interested in building consensus, speaking as an institution. In fact,
she seems uninterested in the institution of being one of nine. She sees her role as being
one of nine. You know, she is taking up far more speaking time than her colleagues,
the piece notes, despite them putting timers into the justices, like, little, like, where they
sit. And it's, it's like a metaphor, like the speaking time at oral argument. She's like
way speaking more than everyone else. But also, she's writing more separate dissents, even when,
for instance, Justice Sotomayor, who, if it's a six three case, is going to get to assign the
dissent and oftentimes assign it to herself, you then have Justice Jackson saying,
um, forgive me, but I'm also going to write a dissent. And you see justices Sotomayor and Kagan
getting very frustrated that she's diluting their message. She's not a team player. And
Justice Jackson herself has said that it's one of the hardest things she's had to adjust to,
that she was used to being a district court judge and kind of, you know, being her own, uh,
boss, if you will. And that being only one of nine has been a really difficult.
transition for her. I mean, David, you know, you said Justice Kagan's method, if you will,
or strategy is obviously correct. I think that's true if you intend to keep the Supreme Court
around, so to speak. Like, if you intend to tear down the institution because it is too far gone,
for example, then no, Justice Kagan is actually lending credibility to the institution. You know,
it mentions her attitude is, let's make this opinion 30 percent.
better. That's if you're planning for a long-term institution-building exercise when you're
nevertheless in the minority. Justice Jackson seems far more inclined to undermine the institution
qua institution, and that's why she's speaking to audiences outside the court. I just think that
itself, A, I think it's a historical. You know, there were nine appointees from Democratic presidents for
a long time on the court. And we didn't end the institution over that. There were eight appointees
from Republican presidents in the early 90s. And we didn't end the institution over that. The court has
actually only been 5'4 for just a few years most recently when justices Sotomayor and Kagan joined
the court up until Justice Barrett joined the court. So I don't agree with this like we must
burn down the institution thing at all. I also think, of course, you can't have it both ways.
You shouldn't listen to this institution, but also this institution needs to hold Trump accountable.
Well, the institution can't hold Trump accountable. It can't, it won't do any good if it rules against
Trump. If you've already undermined any credibility and legitimacy, the institution has. So which is it?
Do you want to end the institution? Or do you want to try to persuade it to, you know, create real
separation of powers between the executive and Congress? I guess I'm just,
stumped as the end game here. You talk about, like, destroying the institution. What does that
look like? Does that look like, well, I have made an outcry great enough that the next Democratic
president is going to defy the court? Is that, is that the end game here? I mean, this is,
so, you know, these are the questions that I have. Like, what's the objective? And when you say,
and I agree with you, I think there is just sort of a hashtag resistance element to this that
feels very 2017 to make a, you know, to have a recent historical analogy. It feels very 2017.
It feels very much like, oh, this is the moment for more left-wing voices to really rise in anger.
But that is, for the Democrats, has been the dead end of all dead ends, has been sort of indulging
the real anger of their left-wing base. That has been, that has taken them into some bad, bad,
bad places electorally. So I'm really stumped by what the ultimate objective is here,
Sarah, unless what we're talking about is just beating the drum so much to such effect,
rallying people to such an extent, which I think is a completely mistaken way of thinking
that what Supreme Court opinions can do, but rallying people to such an extent that what the
next Democratic legislature court packs or the next Democratic president defies the court,
What is the end game?
Because it feels to me, if you're trashing the institution and trashing the institution,
there's something you want to happen there.
There's something you want to happen as a result.
And everything that I just said seems pretty grim to me.
All right.
When we get back, we're going to check in on the interim docket.
Two cases worth a mention.
Why haven't we gotten that Chicago opinion yet?
We'll find out.
Okay, David, we had thought we were going to hear
from the Supreme Court in that emergency application from the administration to use National Guard
troops in Chicago. And then we didn't. And then we found out why. In fact, we got an order from the
court directing the parties to file supplemental letter briefs addressing the following question.
Whether the term regular forces refers to the regular forces of the United States military,
and if so, how that interpretation affects the operation of 10 U.S.E.
12-406. So David, everyone was like, wait, what? Oh, oh my gosh, yes. So Marty Lieberman,
who was the deputy at the Office of Legal Policy and a professor now at Georgetown Law,
he had an amicus brief, speaking of amicus briefs, that was incredibly influential in this
case. So let me read you what he wrote. The merits of this case largely turn on the proper
meaning of the phrase, quote,
the president is unable with the regular forces to
execute the laws of the United States,
end quote. The statutory preconditioned
the president invoked as the basis for
his order calling into federal service
members of, members
and units of the National Guard, in
such numbers as he considers necessary to execute
those laws in Illinois.
The parties sharply contest the meaning of the word
unable in
12406 and whether the proper test
was satisfied on the facts of this case.
The principal function of this amicus
brief by contrast, is to explain why it's unnecessary for the court to address those questions
because the applicants are not likely to succeed on the merits for an independent reason.
Namely, that both the president and the Solicitor General have mistakenly assumed that the term
the regular forces refers to the civilian law enforcement personnel, in this case to
actors in the Department of Homeland Security, including immigration and customs enforcement
officers. That is incorrect. The regular forces to which 12406 refers are the regular or
standing military personnel serving in the United States Armed Services.
Even assuming arguendo that the president has the legal authority to deploy those
regular military forces to help execute federal laws in Illinois, an uncertain question
that this court need not and should not address, there is no basis for concluding that the
president would be unable to enforce such laws with the assistance of those forces if it were
legal for him to direct such a deployment. Accordingly, a necessary precondition for the president's
orders to deploy the National Garden, Illinois, has not been met. David, I think I join everyone
who has been following this case with a bit of embarrassment that none of us really thought much
about that. The district court mentioned it briefly, the circuit court not at all. The two
parties didn't brief it. And here we are, and now it seems really, really obvious.
I am so mad at myself, Sarah. I mean, what are we even doing here?
if we can't read that statute and get to those words regular forces and it not rate,
because that's not a normal way to describe a civilian police force, regular forces,
especially in connection with a statute about the National Guard, which are the reserve
forces.
And so I saw that and I'm like, oh, I'm sorry, listeners, we should have flagged that so long ago.
We should have flagged that so long ago because it does make a lot of sense.
And it also makes sense in the context of what is a National Guard?
What is a, the National Guard from a national security standpoint, yes, for state governors,
it is like a first responder type force, like if there's been tornadoes or flooding or whatever.
But when it comes to the national, to the federal government, to the president, to the big military,
the National Guard is often a bright glass in case of emergency force.
It is the reserve force.
It is when the regular forces are inadequate.
you mobilize the reserves.
Duh, okay, wait a minute.
It's right there in the statute.
I don't know if that will win the day.
But my goodness, Sarah, it's in hindsight so completely obvious, just so complete.
And I should have spotted it.
I should have spotted it.
I should have said something about it because this is my wheelhouse.
This is military law and regular forces.
It's not a normal term for civilian law enforcement.
Yeah, David.
This is your fault.
I know.
I'm sorry.
briefing is due in the next couple weeks so we can maybe expect to hear something from the court
you know right before thanksgiving roughly speaking at this point um and again this is why we've been
not calling it the emergency docket of late because how much of an emergency can this be
when we've been doing this for months now and then they asked for more briefing that will take more
weeks etc um a not an emergency be clearly not in the shadows anymore um and
I expect they will write something here.
And the stay is still in effect.
So this is, yeah.
So this is, I would say overall, if you're the Trump administration, this is not a good development.
Okay.
Another interim docket case, David, is about passports and gender identification or sex identification.
David, when do you think passports started having a passport holder sex on them?
like would just give me like a vague like how how far back do you think that goes 1920
1970s it's really recent like in your lifetime but okay from the 1970s up until the
Biden administration your choice was male or female then the last administration expanded it
to m f or x and defined it as gender identity like you got to pick what you wanted
M, F, or X as a sex marker.
Okay, so President Trump comes back into office.
He issues an executive order that defines sex as an individual's immutable,
biological classification as either male or female and went back to only M or F,
and it had to be your biological sex at birth.
So the First Circuit said no to this, that you have to have the MF or X,
and they have now applied to the Supreme Court on this one.
David, I actually find the whole thing a little bit bizarre, I guess.
A, I think the Trump administration will win this for what it's worth.
They're sort of claiming equal protection.
That's a non-starter administrative procedure act.
But like, if the Biden administration could do it and it wasn't arbitrary and capricious to
change it, then why can't the Trump administration do it?
Why would that be arbitrary and capricious to change it back?
So, like, I think the Trump administration wins this one, but there's something weird about this, David, because if there's a national security purpose and a foreign policy purpose to passports, which I think is the main purpose, then it seems to me that we would just want two different things on here.
One, you would want your biological sex at birth, male or female, and two, we might want your gender identity as well.
Because if you are post-surgical and present, quote-unquote, as female, that would also be very
relevant to someone who is looking for someone, checking someone in to enter their country,
checking someone back in to enter ours.
And so, again, from a legal standpoint, I think this case is going to be relatively easy.
But from a policy standpoint, I feel like both administrations are doing this wrong for the sake
of culture war.
No, I agree with you because if you're sitting there and somebody's kind of,
coming in, and as you were saying, they've a fully transitioned person, they're not, it's going to be a hiccup at the customs line, right? If you have male and say somebody like a Laverne Cox shows up, or you have female and somebody like a Buck Angel shows up, there's going to be a bit of cognitive dissonance. It's going to be confusing to a random customs officer. So I'm with you, I think just from the standpoint of clarity.
and identification so that people are easily identified and correctly identified.
There's a very strong policy reason for, you know, a practice of labeling, of identifying gender
identity. But legally, I'm with you 100%. I just, I don't think there, I don't think the Trump
administration loses this. David, speaking of these interim docket cases and what you talked about
this, a few pods ago, this idea of unclean hands, you saw that professors,
Will Bode and Sam Bray. They are like the, you know, Starsky and Hutch of law professors at this
point. They're just like this amazing team. They're writing like the best law review articles that are
fast and relevant and all this stuff. So shout out to Bowden Bray. Yeah, you guys are crushing it out there.
And they talked about the application of the unclean hands doctrine to the executive branch.
I'll read you this. So first of all, for those trying to remember the unclean hands doctrine,
quote, those who would come into equity must come with clean hands. So this isn't about
damages. This is about if you're asking a court, for instance, to issue an injunction. That's
equity, right? Then you can't have been the bad guy, like the bad actor. Legally speaking.
So here's what Bode wrote. And Bray, sorry. Sorry, Sam Bray. Our conclusion allows courts to
distinguish between stronger and weaker cases for application of the clean hands doctrine. Three
questions illustrate the spectrum. Should all egregious behavior of the current administration be
kept in view when a court is deciding whether to grant the executive equitable relief,
like an injunction or a stay? No. Should unclean hands have precluded relief for the government
in Department of Homeland Security v. DVD, where the Solicitor General sought a stay of a district
court order restricting deportations, even though government officials had allegedly violated that
very order? Maybe. Should unclean hands preclude relief for the government in United States v. Russ
the suit against all the federal district court judges in the U.S. District Court for the District of
Maryland? Yes. The court has often ruled in favor of the administration, notwithstanding the
serious possibility of widespread illegal, unethical, or bad faith behavior throughout the executive
branch. Should the Supreme Court feel reluctant to give such aid and comfort to an executive
branch that may have, in a broad sense, unclean hands? Not so far as the unclean hands
doctrine is concerned. As noted above, the doctrine does not consider the inequitable behavior of
the claimant writ large. So David, you had talked about applying the unclean hands doctrine in this
like National Guard context, for example. And I feel like Bode and Bray agree with me that it doesn't
apply, but I feel like you feel like Bode and Bray agree with you that it should apply in the sense that
the president's out there saying things that are false about the city of Portland, for instance,
or about Illinois, and that you can't then go into court and ask for this equitable relief
when you're out there sort of spouting nonsense, is your argument. And my argument is that's legally
irrelevant. You don't want the courts getting into the business of determining the legal
relevance of bluster, basically. And as long as the legal briefs are accurate, then that's fine.
You don't look beyond those.
So, David, unclean hands.
I mean, we just disagree, I think, on even what Bowden Bray were saying here.
Well, and also, I mean, I think if you're going to talk about Bowden Bray, where I totally agree with them is on the unclean hands doctrine, I don't think you go and you look at everything the administration has done and say, these are bad actors.
Right.
You don't look at immigration to decide whether the National Guard case is unclean hands.
Okay, we agree on that.
Let me take it out of the government context, and let me put it in a context that maybe will be easier for people to understand.
Let's suppose that you are a litigant for a corporation, and you want an injunction for reason, let's say you want to compel performance of a contract, or you want an injunction for reasons X or Y, that are very reasonable, they're very defensible legally, and that's what's in my pleadings as I file.
But then before I go into court, the CEO says, well, if we get this injunction, here's what we're going to do.
And it is not what's in the papers at all.
And he says, the CEO says in the newspapers, this is what, you know, and the CEO contradicts the arguments made in your own court papers.
If I'm on the other side, that's Christmas morning for me.
That is Christmas morning because I can walk in and I can say, wait, you're coming asking for equitable
relief, you know, in an equitable circumstance, and we don't even know, they can't even
keep their story straight, and their CEO is contradicting their papers. And I can absolutely,
as opposing counsel, introduce that. Like, there's no chance that I would, that if I was
on this corporation's side, that I could say, you can't consider my CEO's statement about what
the company's going to do. You would never get away with that. And so my position is very similar.
if you have the CEO, the president, issuing declarations about the conditions on the ground to justify an injunction or justify his action that are completely different from the justifications given in the court papers, you better believe, as opposing counsel, I can bring in the CEO's statements and say, what are we doing here? What are we doing here? This is what's really going on here. This is what they're really seeking equitable relief for. And there's a disconnect.
There is not this. Who's being honest here? These two are not compatible assertions, the public
assertion, the private assertion. And I don't think in a million years you could make the court
just look at the four corners of the document alone and ignore the president's statements about
what he says. How about Obama saying that Obamacare wasn't a tax? Oh, I mean, I think that's
absolutely relevant. I mean, I think that's absolutely relevant. But, and I still disagree with the
Obamacare decision. You know, absolutely. You know, we have seen courts refer to presidential
statements and where they say, we don't have the power to do this. We have seen courts do that.
All right. I don't want to run out of time for this fun, second circuit case that has a little bit of
angry cheerleader vibes to it, David. Will you introduce us to the facts here? Love this case,
Sarah. Love this case. So this is a student speech case, and you're going to see why I love it so much
here in a minute. The facts here are, man, just classic social media crap that gets out of
control. So what happens is you have a guy named Case Leroy. He's a high school senior in a New York
public school. Leroy was disciplined by his school after he took a picture with his friends and
posted it on social media while outside of his school campus and after school hours. He thought
his post, which showed a picture of his friend kneeling on his neck with a caption,
Cops Got Another, was a joke. But he quickly realized others
viewed it as an insensitive comment on the murder of George Floyd. He removed his post after a few
minutes, but not before another student took a screenshot, which he were posted on other social media
platforms, and then the photograph took on a life of its own. After public outcry, there was in-school
discussions, a brief student demonstration, and a school investigation. The superintendent suspended
Leroy and barred him from participating in various school activities for the remainder of the school year.
And so he files suit and obvious leading precedent here is the angry cheerleader case.
And the court walks through the angry cheerleader case and essentially is saying, look, this is off campus.
There's going to be greater leeway for free speech because this was off campus.
He's not in that in loco parentis, a region of the law where the school, while he's on school grounds,
the school has an unusual degree of control over him, that there is actually.
going to be more deference to free speech.
And the Second Circuit, the trial court upheld the discipline.
The Second Circuit reverses the discipline.
And what's very interesting about that reversal is, and Sarah, this is where I just got so happy,
reading this opinion, just got so happy.
Here, I will get to the exact line.
Okay.
Because the way they tried to, the way they tried to distinguish this case from angry cheerleaders
to say, unlike an angry cheerleader where the disruptions at school were very, very, very brief
and minimal and just really more hurt feelings than anything else, here they actually had a student
demonstration. Here they had an actual student assembly that addressed all of this.
And so that, how much more evidence of substantial disruption do you get?
And then you get to this part.
Sarah, this is what I've been saying for years.
Tinker suggests that the more relevant question is disorder or disturbance on the part of the petitioners.
That is disturbance on the part of the speakers themselves.
This is what I've been saying, that courts should be looking at the speech by the speaker
and determine whether that speech by the speaker is inherently disruptive.
It should not be looking at the response of the audience because the audience has its own
responsibilities and its own decisions.
And so essentially what the court did here, which I think is absolutely necessary and the
right frame to look at it is to say if we're going to be looking at that material disruption
standard, that substantial disruption standard, we're looking at the speaker at issue if his
speech by its nature was disruptive. And if it's not, then the responsibility shifts to the
hearers to respond appropriately to the speech. And that's all I've been asking for, Sarah.
It's all I've been asking for in the tinker world. Well, Andy Smerich wrote an interesting piece
for SCOTUS blog entitled, Being a Justice Doesn't Make You a Policy Expert. And in short,
and I'm putting words in your mouth, Andy, so feel free to correct me if I've got this wrong.
his point is we should return to an era of judicial minimalism a la kind of Frankfurter.
You should be deferring as much as possible to elected representatives, that the court is not
politically accountable. And when at all possible, it should be out of the policy business,
except in the most sort of extreme constitutional public rights violations. And he actually
discusses the angry cheerleader case. And David, did we name the angry cheerleader case? Is that us?
I don't know. It's got to be us, Sarah. I think it's got to be us.
Because he calls it the angry cheerleader case.
Okay. In the angry cheerleader case in which the court considered whether a student's profane
comments on social media about her school were protected by the First Amendment,
the court failed to adequately recognize the historical, publicly supported role of educators
informing the character of students through condine discipline. Had the court had members
with any meaningful experience in state or local K-12 education office, it likely would not have
considered a student's obscenity-laced rants at educators and coaches to be protected speech.
Recent cases have made a hash of college sports, upending amateur athletics and causing
enormous problems for university administrators, coaches, supporters, and more. If the court had
members with meaningful experience in higher education policy, it would have understood the
implications of, and perhaps hesitated before, unwinding decades of policy and practice.
interesting, David, because I totally agree with Andy that the now very narrow path that you follow to become a Supreme Court justice has cost us something. As you've noted, it has given us much better writing. The current nine justices are probably in the top 20 of writers ever to be on the Supreme Court. And that's not a coincidence because we now pick people who basically trained their whole lives to be great writers and Supreme Court justices. And so what the loss is, the
is any of that outside experience as an elected official, as a policy expert in something,
you know, to have some like Dunning Krueger effect that you know what you don't know
and that amount you know you don't know should get bigger, basically,
the more you learn about something before you become an all-out expert on it.
However, the like judicial minimalism solution just defer more makes me nervous right now.
Yeah, it makes me very nervous.
And I thought it was very, very interesting.
but then he gets to angry cheerleader and he just loses me that, you know, again, I understand
the character-shaping element of school, and I appreciate when it's done well, but when you're
not at school, guess who the prime character-shaper is? It's the parents. It's the parents. And so
the jurisdiction of the state is going to be very limited over my kid's speech, and my jurisdiction
over my kid's speech is the primary jurisdiction when they're not in school. And so I thought it was
very interesting, but I am completely with you at this moment, completely with you. And I think
that the angry cheerleader case really, really was much more about how much authority are we going
to grant the state over our children when our children are not in the custody of the state.
And I think that the answer to that should be very little, very little reach into our kids' lives
when they're not in actual state, not in the actual, you know, at a school event at the actual
school. I would read a whole profile of what angry cheerleader is doing now. But David, the next
episode will be available for CLE credit. We'll give you details of that. We have another announcement
that will also come at the beginning of our next episode. And again, that will be live. You can find
it on scotusblog.com after the oral arguments conclude on Wednesday. Again, we're expecting that
to be around 1230, 1245-ish. And the podcast will still appear.
in your regular podcast feed. So don't worry if you've got lunch plans or whatever for Wednesday.
And we'll give you details on how to get that CLE credit. Again, we're going to try to make this
a regular thing, assuming that there actually is a desire to get CLE credit. So we're basing our future
CLE plans on whether this is something that you guys actually want out there. Okay, David,
that's it for us today. If you like what we're doing here, there are a few easy ways to support us.
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so much for tuning in. We'll see you next time.
