American Alchemy with Jesse Michels - Matthew Pines: Anti-Gravity Tech & Inter-Dimensional Aliens

Episode Date: November 15, 2024

Remove your personal information from the web at https://joindeleteme.com/JESSE20 and use code JESSE20 for 20% off. DeleteMe international Plans: https://international.joindeleteme.com In today's episode of American Alchemy, Jesse Michels sits down with Matthew Pines, a national security expert and Fellow at the Bitcoin Policy Institute, to explore the intersections of secret physics programs, elite networks, and UAP disclosure. From the CIA's founding to mid-century breakthroughs in theoretical physics, and the role of gatekeepers in modern UFO revelations, this conversation dives into alternate histories and the future of humanity. Support American Alchemy by Becoming a YouTube Member: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCuG2KzrIMe3qoNcuDVpwnXw/join SPOTIFY ➤ https://tinyurl.com/jessemichelsspotify DISCORD ➤ https://discord.gg/jessemichels INSTAGRAM (Personal) ➤ https://www.instagram.com/jessemichels INSTAGRAM (Show) ➤ https://www.instagram.com/jessemichelsofficial TWITTER ➤ https://twitter.com/AlchemyAmerican EMAIL/BOOKINGS ➤ [e-mail] Timestamps: 00:00 - Intro 01:27 - Current Affairs 12:20 - Trump’s Next 4 Years 23:16 - UFOs 40:02 - Alternate US History 55:19 - Secret Physics Program 01:04:32 - Modern Theoretical Physics 01:33:10 - Theories of Consciousness 02:01:10 - Ascension / Timelines / Simulation 02:32:15 - Next Phase of Humanity / Big Tech 02:44:40 - UFO Gatekeepers / Modern Disclosure 02:58:01 - China / UFO Disclosure / UAP Task Force 03:10:50 - Alien Hierarchy / Space Programs 03:19:41 - Mormonism / Elon Musk 03:28:31 - Mid Century Physics Breakthroughs 03:39:50 - Secrets Physics Program (Continued) 03:47:01 - AI & UFOs 03:59:12 - Next Steps in UFO Disclosure Original music: https://open.spotify.com/artist/6LlLRudDi60Uy4jcmOSEs1 *** AMERICAN ALCHEMY is an original series hosted by Jesse Michels that explores the frontier of science and tech. Each week, we bring you exclusive interviews with some of the leading thinkers of our time. #physics #theoreticalphysics #uap #americanalchemy #jessemichels #aliens #space #elonmusk Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

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Just the other day, some people inside DoD and Intel, and I was told one of the things came out of the water and zapped hit somebody they think how could they get here it's like well are they coming here

from the planet over there or are they coming from branch of space not that far away who's in charge who's like the ultimate gatekeeper it feels like there is it's this like disjointed cargo cult any imperial system

when it runs into trouble first thing it does is it cannibalizes the periphery things seem to be kind of unraveling quickly someone basically has you know virtually matrix dust yes I think The brain itself is probably, you know, maybe a room temperature quantum system.

It was communication with some NHI. It was like, what's going on? Like, where are you here or something? It was like, CIA wizards are messing with the timeline. He became convinced that there was kind of this secret branch of physics. I don't know how conspiratorial it is if you just look at all of human history. We have classified entire areas of fundamental physics before. Yes.

Don't think we can do the same for AI. What is the nature of the interaction between human society, human institutions, and non-human intelligence? And they said, it's a triangle. AI, quantum, and the grush stuff. What the hell is actually happening? Here with Matthew Pines, who's quickly become one of my favorite thinkers on the UFO topic, and I think in general, as far as tracking what's going on in the U.S. and the world today. And so I'm really excited to have you.

You first came on my radar. You went on a show called Mr. Obnoxious, and I recommend everybody listen to this, because it's such a cogent synthesis of what's happening in UAP, UFO world today, from a legislative perspective, how you view kind of, you know, control systems over the topic and also, you know, public sentiment. But you also come from kind of an interest that you have a crypto background and your director of intelligence at Sentinel 1. And so I thought this was a very fitting week for us to talk. We've had a, you know, very conclusive election results and things are shifting in a particular direction with the election of Trump. And so how are you

viewing the election. Yeah, so I try not to, you know, read into what most people look at in terms of exip polls or demographic shifts, but try to think like, what's the vibe? Like, how would we look at this sort of the lens of American history? And it seems like the closest analogy is sort of America's perestroika, which, as you know, perestroika and the Soviet system came with glassnest, right? So reform and opening up. And I think that is sort of maybe the closest template to look to to kind of think through the shift that we're going through. And, you know, in terms of the canonical kind of political economy that we're witnessing evolve in real time is sort of this new anti-establishment, kind of this heterogeneous alignment of, of, you know, different political forces, you know, going after and

essentially displacing, we're in the process potentially displacing kind of the old establishment. And in the Soviet system, this was sort of, you know, you had kind of the old establishment, somewhat decaying institutional structures that were no longer able to kind of keep. pace with the rate of change in external events and sort of an internal sense of sclerosis. And that was coming under twin pressures, both from within a sense of like endogenous reform. We need to sort of get ahead of the curve as well as external pressures, right, that wanted to break that system from the outside. And I think that's kind of the tension, the friction that we're seeing play out is, you know, external forces that want to

essentially break or, you know, reset to a certain extent these decaying institutional structures. And then maybe a competing mode, which is like the folks that are currently kind of that, the avatars of sort of that managerial technocracy that are, you know, trying to find a, trying to find a balance between tearing everything down versus sort of interim reform. I think that was essentially the, like the implicit fight. And it seems like the, you know, more structural perestroika argument won out, right? Yeah. And that's, I think, what we're going to head into is this era of, you know, how successful it would be, how controlled or orderly versus, you know, messy.

it will be, you know, it remains to be seen. But I think that is, you know, I think the current, the current phase shift that we're heading into. What do you think, because this is an open question for me, you know, like last time around Trump got elected, he promised to, quote, unquote, drain the swamp. And then he goes on to hire Millie and John Bolton and like a lot of usual suspects when it comes to, you know, Washington, what he would probably now call swamp land or whatever. And Bolton even, I think, is on air saying, like, I tricked Trump. into hiring me or something. And a lot of, you know, Trump, the end of Trump's campaign was sort of, you know, saying he's not going to hire these people. Does he just hire a lot of the same

kind of managerial technocrats? Or is this truly a new coalition of your, you know, Tulsi's Vivex, you know, RFK juniors that do kind of, quote unquote, drain the swamp? It remains to be seen. I think that you're probably going to see a huge amount of churn over the transition as to see which of these different, you know, factional, um, power bases, you know, come out on top in,

in various administrative bureaucracies, they get appointments and whatnot. Um, and if you look back at the, you know, the Soviet version of this, you know, perestroika was,

was a similar alliance of kind of, um, you know, internal technocrats, uh, deep sort of, quote, deep state, like security state figures from the KGB and,

and sort of oligarchs, right? Uh, now our version of that is sort of, you know, this fun house mirror, uh, where you have kind of this alliance of some,

maybe, um, sort of ejected technocrats, folks that were technocrats at one point, but were sort of turned against the systems they were sort of forged in, aligned with our version of the sort of these tech oligarchs, Elon, T, et alet, et cetera. And, you know, I think there is also a power base inside what what you call our security state services that are definitely also on board, right? And so I think this is, you know, those are very loose, diverse coalitions. I don't know how stable they are. They weren't that stable in the Soviet system as it went through its, it's pretty tumultuous transformation.

And there are always, you know, the, the, the, Israel's high wire acts, right, in terms of how do they manage to do the kind of controlled reform and then, you know, essentially springboard, right, into, you know, to sort of reinvigorate, renovate these institutions, you know, kind of strip out, you know, the, the sort of the rotten floorboards, but the overall infrastructure of the house remains intact. And then they renovated and it's a beautiful new house. When we start tearing through walls, sometimes you hit something that's load bearing, right? And so in any process like this, there's inherent risk. It's inherent risk that you could just, you could hit something that's load bearing in the system.

And then you're dealing with a crisis. And that's why they're trying to figure out, okay, what's the right balance between the folks that want to burn it all down versus kind of the traditional technocrats that come into Philadelphia, right? And I think Trump has the sense that in his first administration, it was, it was imbalanced, right? In a sense, he was kind of cocooned. A lot of his initiatives were kind of smothered. And I think he's now going to swing the other direction. I think his default is going to be much more to sort of let loose the Vivex and the RFKs and the ELONs. Well, we'll see.

I mean, I also look at these as like, these are very big personalities, right? So one observation I hadn't seen too many people make that was always curious to me about Trump's, like, especially the more recent part of the campaign, was just how many big personalities he brought on board? Yeah. Like, he's a big personality. Like, he has a huge ego. He's, he needs to be in the spotlight. Yes. Right. And yet he was somehow comfortable sharing the spotlight with these huge personalities that command a lot of attention. Elon. These guys, you know, they have their own platform. They have their own almost like somewhat equivalent power base to certain extent. And that's, that's a different mode when, you know, first, you know, Trump 1.0 would brook nobody like that, right? He had to be the center of the attention. Yeah. You could easily see a world where, you know, first, you know, Trump 1.0 would brook nobody like that, right? You know, he had to be the center of the attention. Yeah. Yeah. You could easily see a world where. Elon and Trump have some major public falling out. And like what, what happens in that world? I don't quite know. Exactly. Yeah, that's the thing. It's like everything now is copacetic. You know, they got the energy of the wind. They're all aligned, et cetera. Yeah, fast forward six months and you're,

you're actually governing, right? You actually have to make hard tradeoffs. There's got to be, you know, certain priorities that don't get, that don't get everyone, that don't check off everyone's boxes. And that's what you'll see the friction potentially emerge. Is there change you're more bullish on and change you're more bearish on. So it's like the Make America Healthy Again movement, reforming, you know, the FDA vis-a-vis both food and drugs, getting us out of wars, crypto reform, you know, UFOs and JFK, like, how would you slap probabilities on, you know, all of these things? That's probably a very hard question. Yeah. I mean, well, because it's almost like looking at the Soviet system, it was not, it was chaotic, right? And I think it was very much,

I think I think we should expect a certain element of chaos, not necessarily like complete disaster, but just the idea of being able to predict what's going to happen the next day, the next week, the next month, like, that will not be feasible, right? I think when you're going through this era where those two, you know, major structural impulses are now being pushed in terms of perestroika kind of a structural reform, it's kind of coming in like a hostile force and, you know, purging essentially elements of the bureaucracies. like there's going to be just it's going to get really messy. It's be my baseline expectation. At the same time that you have, you know, and I think Trump gave like a three minute speech where it was just like it was basically him announcing glassness, right? We're going to have truth and reconciliation commissions. We're going to have, you know, we're going to unseal all these records.

We're going to like, you know, peel back the the curtain on all this stuff. I mean, that's basically him announcing glassness, right? Now, once you do that, right, there's a reason why I think those things haven't been made public for various reasons. but it's like because they would create, you know, a lot of uncertainty and a lot of uncomfortable questions to go back. And there's going to be just a lot for us all to have to kind of deal with and process all the same time. So it might just be overwhelming, right? Levels of just sort of information flow, disclosures of various information, as well as just

the normal pillars of the institutional bureaucracies being, sort of, you know, facing a pretty severe test. Do you think like snapshot three months from today, we all know who killed JFK? I mean, I think that RFK will be rooting to dig that out, right? I think, you know, this is, I think, I would say 50-50. I never want to say 100% because you never know. But I'd say, you know, there's going to be a lot that's going to come out.

The question is, though, like how much it's going to come with context? Like usually these sorts of historical questions. it's almost like a mirror image or it's a sort of isomorphic to the UAP question in the sense of how much of this is catastrophic right disclosure which is all comes out all at once. There's no storyline

necessarily attached to there's no phase sort of narrative management that allows sort of people that don't pay attention to these things to kind of understand it in a in a phased way that incorporates it into their mental models to understand just the sky isn't falling versus you know there is a here it is there you go deal with it and I think

There's going to be twin impulses and different power structures inside the Trump administration that will be pushing in those different different directions. Right now, it seems like the just let it all out impulse has the upper hand. And that seems to be, you know, what I would expect from the sort of surprise magnitude of the win. I think they were relatively confident they would win the presidency. But I don't think they expected or were banking on having unified government. And so now that they do, the sort of aperture of possibility spaces have now sort of shifted. And now that has a momentum to it. And that momentum will likely play out until it, you know, until it triggers, you know, other other problems potentially. And then they might try to dial it back. But right now we seem to be in that momentum towards open up everything. Yeah. And what do you think happens on the kind of geopolitical or foreign policy front?

You know, I feel like Trump, maybe the more armchair thing that, like, I would always kind of disagree with Trump on in his last campaign. was that he would always say things like, you know, Russia, Ukraine wouldn't have happened if I were president. Like, you know, Israel, you know, wouldn't be sort of blowing up if, you know, if, if I were president. And I think on the Israel, you know, Casey, the Abraham Accords, which he engaged in were actually really positive.

And then, you know, maybe he did, you know, Putin did respect him more or something. So directionally, maybe I agree with him. But like, when it comes to the details and disentangling from these sort of conflicts, I think it's just way more complicated. you know, vis-a-vis U.S. interests in Ukraine, you know, our relationship with Israel historically and the sort of leverage there. It just, it doesn't feel like whose president really might even matter all that much. And so what do you think happens there? Things are heating up with China, obviously. I mean, I think it's not settled which direction his foreign policy will take across

these different theaters. I think it's pretty clear Ukraine will be a negotiated settlement, probably on unfavorable terms, you know, relative to, you know, a counterfactual for, for Ukraine. But I think that's pretty much a clear signal that I've seen is, yeah, they're going to reach some sort of settlement. And then it's going to be about, you know, hundreds of billions of dollars of reconstruction contracts. I think he's also sent a signal to to Bibi that, you know, he can go gloves off until he gets elected and then he wants him to wrap up the conflict. So I'd expect a surge in, in Lebanon over the next, you know, month or two. and then that will wind down. And then we'll see what sorts of, quote, maximum pressure campaign gets restarted against Iran.

Again, you know, unclear how that would, whether reach another negotiation settlement or whether, you know, he would do kind of his traditional Trumpian sort of brinkmanship, right? Sort of North Korea, threaten nuclear war, fire and fury, take us to the pretty close and then essentially become best buddies, right? Walk across the DMZ. So, you know, it's like, you know, I think it's brinksmanship. and, you know, kind of uncertainty. He even said, like, he would bring Bolton into the room because his, his interlocutor head of state would know Bolton is like a war hawk maniac who would just ready to pull a trigger at a second's notice.

And so the fact that Bolton is in the room is sort of like a negotiating tactic, right? Like, don't let, I got this guy pushing for war. Like, I would rather not fight you, but like, he's ready to go. Right? You got your buddy over there. He's a little bit of loose cannon. Good cop, bad cop. So we'll see.

Like, Aladas is driven by personnel. China, of course, is the elephant in the room. I think there is still a big debate, even within the different Trump factions over, like, what should be the approach towards China? There are some, like, you know, very China hawks that want to sort of pivot away from these other theaters, negotiate those settlements, sort of conscientiate our resources to contain China, to deter China. And there's others who would just want to, like, this great power competition, this increasing sort of militancy and sort of tit for tat sanctions, export controls, etc. they're bad for business. And we should just do a grand bargain with China. That might involve subtly selling Taiwan out, but at the end of the day, it's a deal. And a deal resets, resolves tensions, et cetera. So I think that is for me the biggest geopolitical macro question is

which of those different China opinions kind of plays out. Yeah, he had a real split in his cabinet the last time around between kind of, you know, Wilbur Ross types. You know, he's close with Schwartzman and stuff. And like a lot of Schwartzman wasn't in his cabinet. But like you had these guys who were like, it's very pro-China.

And then you had all these hawks who were, you know, extremely, you know, Josh Rogan book Chaos Under Heaven that describes this sort of split. And so yeah,

I'm curious to see what wins out. Yeah. And right now, I mean, I've been asking these questions. Other people that you would think would know, we're asking this question.

Like, who's going to be Trump's China team? And it's like anybody, like Trump doesn't know who his China team is going to be. Right? Like, this is the, And this is the moment where all these different factions, all the different people jockeying for for cabinet positions and other senior appointments, the knives are out.

Yeah. They're just coming after each other. Right. Yeah. Yeah. Like Peter Navarro and Matt Pottinger. Yeah. All these guys who were super hawkish.

And then, yeah. And so Michael Pillsbury. Mm-hmm. And then, yeah. And then you have it. And it seemed like it sort of netted out that Trump was kind of hawkish on the trade stuff. But then he was kind of lulled the sleep on COVID. And he had all these assurances from G.

that he wouldn't, you know, invade Taiwan. And he was kind of tricked on the PPE question with COVID. And so, yeah, and it turned into this sort of schizophrenic foreign policy or something. Yeah, but I also think on the part of this is going to be, like geopolitics is often deeply connected to these economic monetary shifts. And there is, I think, somewhat nascent, but I've seen memos written that sort of try to codify what would be like a dramatic, geo-economic shift that would be triggered in 2025. And this isn't even the Bitcoin stuff. That would be like icing on, there would be like, you know, kerosene on the fire. But like a Nixon style shock where that has essentially a larger strategic logic, which is essentially the U.S. dominant geopolitical and economic position is

under challenge, right? We both have domestic, endogenous instabilities in terms of our financial system, the increasing debt costs that were going to be committed to the next few years. And a sense of increasing challenge from innovation and industrial ecosystem in Eurasia, principally centered in China. And this loose alliance of Eurasian countries, Russia, Iran, North Korea, China, that actually have significant industrial technological and energy resources. And they want to challenge and sort of upset the legacy. kind of international economic and political geopolitical order. So the logic is sort of, okay, how do you

like hold the line, right? Between kind of these, this legacy, you know, hegemonic system the U.S. has built up and these sort of rising of sort of revanchous challengers. And the play is essentially to sort of make more explicit the function of the U.S. as a global empire, right, as an imperial dollar system and where we essentially control the access to dollar credit. And increasingly we can sort of gate access to our advanced technology ecosystems or AI models and the associated infrastructure. And you can imagine him setting up essentially a tech and tariff and security umbrella. Or there's a, there's a club. If you want to get into the club, you're going to have to pay. So if you want to get access to our AI infrastructure models, if you want to get access to, you know,

dollar system in a favorable fashion, swap lines, et cetera, if you want to, you know, have us reinforce and not abandon our security commitments to you, well, you're going to have to pay. And that payment might take the form of essentially a coerced swap of either or and their gold reserves, their FX reserves, which usually, you know, short term bills for century bonds. So that would help us term out our debt, right? It would relieve some of this acute interest burden. It would, you know, there's already some talk about, you know, Trump being trust, you know, like Liz trust when like there was a guilt's market crisis, right? And then she had to abandon some of her political, um, uh, sort of, you know, projects because, you know, she had basically had to deal with a disorderly, um, you know,

guilt market. And so already you see the, the, the 10 year, the long end of the yield curve starting to spike. And so the question is, okay, how do you have essentially do geopolitically, like yield curve control? Well, you force those foreign pools of capital, sovereign wealth funds, et cetera, to swap their short term, uh, you know, exposures in their gold for century bots. And that importantly would be non-marketable, right? So they can't just sell them. They can only repo them at the Fed for par dollar liquidity if they run into any sort of dollar funding issues. And that would be a pretty high leverage play. And then if you get some of their gold and you can term out your debt, then you can do things like, say, remonetize gold, right? Which is currently just

like marked to, you know, 1970s, you know, $35 an ounce. So if you remark gold, say, to $5,000 an ounce, you just now can, you know, credit the Treasury General account with the trillion dollars of liquidity. And you can do a lot with that. You could buy big. coin you could do strategic investments in manufacturing industrial base you know just you know you could fund a lot of those sorts of industrial projects um and then threaten i don't think he's going to do universal tariffs but threaten sort of company specific tariffs right to sort of intimidate and sort of you know threaten them and hey if you're going to reshore frenchore to Mexico well actually no you're in a friend shore to ohio right right and then maybe we'll do some complicated you know backdoor

subsidy right but like you'll get the thing domestic um i think that's what i would expect is But to do that, you're essentially, you're kind of pulling the rug on the treasury market, right, which is the foundation of U.S. geopolitical dominance the last 70 years. So we'd essentially be admitting the jig is up that, like, yes, like we're effectively imposing financial repression and capital controls on our allies and partners, but that's what we got to do because we got to win, right? And then there might be a whole separate, you know, subplot of this where Bitcoin gets monetized alongside gold or even instead of gold, but would have a similar effect, maybe without the explicit geopolitical coercion. because we don't actually have to like force this swap. We can just essentially, you know, rapidly monetize Bitcoin at the expense of their existing holdings. And then maybe, you know, defray some of the domestic costs. So it's mostly overseas, you know, financial repression. Like any imperial system when it runs into trouble, right, or it's getting, it's getting challenged. The first thing it does is it cannibalizes the periphery to sort of reinforce the core.

It's like you all have, you know, you get collective benefits in theory from being part of this imperial system. We give you protection. We secure global trade. And in exchange, though, you know, we have to pay for this military that's going to deploy and secure these trade routes. Again, it's a high risk play because do we actually have the juice to do that, right? Can we actually tell the Europeans to hand over their gold? Can we actually, you know, commit to the security side of it? It seems like in the horn, you know, of Africa in the Middle East that like the Houthis can basically block a major maritime trading route indefinitely.

So it's like these are like where the paper plans, you know, kind of the elite, backward. room door level, you know, ultimately have to be implemented and executed in the real world across all the instruments of national power. And I don't know if we've got the competency to do that. That's a fascinating strategy, though. And Trump, who's not a fan of NAFTA, it almost sounds like a modern version of NAFTA where it's like you get the same sort of, you know, maybe defense auspice or whatever, but very different kind of, you know, monetary relationship. And the UFO thing might play into that, which is, you know, on the margin, if it's like, if we even want to hint, that hey, you know, we've got some special stuff. Like, you know, you might want to pay to get into

this club, right? It's like a little inducement to, it's like, hey, you know, you might be doubting us. Maybe we're, you know, a bit, a bit, a bit chaotic. Maybe we don't have the, the naval production juice that we used to have, but we got some special stuff here. And so you want, if you even want the hope of getting access to it, you got to get into the club. That's kind of immediately where in my mind when we're talking about AI. It's like we've, we've had conversations about possible, you know, secret off the books, physics and, you know, materials, you know, all this stuff comes up in UFO land. If we have access to that alongside AI, that's a pretty interesting suite of asymmetric advantage when it comes to defense and all sorts of technology.

And so do you think, you almost seem to think that this might get used as leverage where it's like, you get access to the goods, but you have to play nicely. I am trying to mentally model Trump as much as I can, right? And this guy, he's not a guy, I think, truly motivated about these cosmic questions. I don't know if he even, you know, has a framework for it. His uncle John might have been. Yeah, but I think he understands almost viscerally like, what's a good bargaining chip? Like, where does he, how, what leverage points does he have, right? And I think if he's, if he's, I believe he's been briefed on some aspects of his legacy programs. I didn't have, of course, you know, there's speculation exactly. How much he knows, etc. But I'm pretty confident he knows. at least broad contours that this is real. I think his first reaction is going to be, okay, how do I use this? How do I leverage this in my larger,

yeah, in my larger play here? And I think it would be pretty obvious, like pretty, you know, ace in the whole sort of leverage, um, if you play it right.

Because I don't know what other second and third order, um, details of that story that come into play, right? There might be other, other, other, you know,

like Louis-Lazondo hints of like other drivers of this. Yeah. So I think it's an over-detour. question, but it just in this narrow slice of the kind of where this could sort of insert, or how could it play into the geopolitical dynamics of a Trump administration, I think it would have a, it would be seen as something to leverage in a certain way. Yeah, when he understands leverage and he's a good dealmaker, and I think, you know, say what you will about the guy, but historically, I think a lot of his deals have made more sense on, but if he, he criticizes

deals made by the other side, whether it was, you know, the Paris Accords or the Ben Rhodes, you know, Obama, Iran nuclear deal, which you could say is partially responsible for where we are now. And Trump does seem, you know, unpredictable. It seems like he throws some, some volatility into the system or something. But he acts very on behalf of the U.S., I think, in an aggressive way that he's just used to doing from his business career. And I think he is sort of good at that. So it would make sense, right, if you have all this leverage that you're not aware of in the form of the UFO thing, ideally you'd be interested in what's going on there. But if I, if I accept that premise, though, it does make kind of a loose prediction of what form of disclosure to expect, right? You would expect the form of disclosure that would maximize that type of leverage, right?

So then you'd have to make some conditional assessments of, okay, what in the universe of stipulated information that's behind the curtain, which subset of the information would accrue maximum? leverage in this strategy and which would would not. And then I would expect that subset to be the part that gets released and the other information to be kept secret. Well, is it like is the nuclear thing a good analogy where it's like you have

nuclear trade secrets but nuclear physics is sort of broadly disclosed or is that a counter lesson where it's like no, Klaus Fuchs took our actual nuclear trade secrets. We were not, we were too loose with that. You know, maybe we should be more buttoned up when it comes

UFO. Well, this, yeah, this, the key answer that question is really premised on how much knowledge and or capability do we assume has already been leaked. Yep. Right. And if you read the language and, you know, it's come out of the Senate, you know, in order to mitigate the possibility of foreign technology surprised, the U.S. government must broaden awareness of quote, historical exotic technology antecedents previously provided by the federal government for research and development purposes, right? So if you read, if you parse that line, it's like, in order to mitigate the possibility of foreign technology surprise. Yeah.

Meaning in order to make it the possibility that China and, you know, demonstrates they've got some stuff figured out. The federal government must broaden awareness of historical exotic technology antecedents, you know, the stuff in Lockheed's basement, that had been previously provided by the federal government for research and development purposes. Yep. Didn't say provided to who to, you know, the Lockheed's basement. But that's basically, that is like the like the distilled logic of at least the,

Senate's view of this of this trade-off meaning we've kept the stuff under lock and key to do R&D for many decades but now we have to broaden awareness of those programs to mitigate trying to getting the jump on us yeah it's basically the story which is which is an admission that China has a baseline level of knowledge right because in the world in which they don't then you just keep the thing locked up in your Indiana Jones vault you never talk about it with anybody but the world in which they do it becomes this game theory thing you need some broader awareness around the top. You can't have, it's not adaptive for American National Security to have the average, you know, precocious STEM student in Kentucky or whatever is growing up,

just thinking that, you know, string theory is the only answer in that, you know, maybe there aren't some more interesting exotic frameworks and material and all of that. Yeah, I mean, when the U.S. and the Soviets really had the only industrial, technological, technological, and scientific ecosystems for most of the 20th century. And so, like, all the leading physics research, leading then sort of technology development, transfer was taking place in relatively controlled state-directed ecosystems. And, you know, there was a sink of certain understanding over the Cold War between the U.S. and the Soviet systems on those things. There's a lot of, you know, also early on in the Cold War, there's only so much, there's only so many different branches of the sort of scientific

tree to explore. And you had to spend 10, 20 years just filling out the standard model of particle physics and you know we could do that whole separate thing of where it went wrong in the 70s but then china is now like exploded on the scene in the last 30 years churning out really good scientists engineers and a whole endogenous ecosystem they're doing their own independent scientific frontier research right their own space exploration their own satellites their own you know radio receivers their own neutrino experiments their like own quantum stuff like they've got their own independent they've develop their own, pretty quickly, our own independent scientific and tech tree. They're going at the dark side of the moon.

Yes. They've launched tons of mass to space. Yeah. Yeah. And so from the U.S.'s perspective, like, they've managed to contain for the last 70 years, essentially the tech tree that's branching, that was growing essentially in the world, right? And then it could prune branches in various ways. Now there's a new tree that has sprouted very quickly and is, you know, exploring and is not being pruned.

And in fact, maybe those branches that we pruned are now being like supercharged with investment. And you can't do anything about it. So you've been pruning your tree. They've been growing their tree. Yeah. Like that, if that plays out for another five, ten years, you're going to be in real trouble. Yep. And that's, I think, was precipitating now the last ten years of disclosure stuff.

That's always, that's my take. I mean, I felt like I'm sort of firing blindly in the space sort of covering it sometimes where like, as you know, I've covered some of the, you know, possible branches of physics that have been lost. And I think I'm doing this patriotic thing because, like, I look at the civil side, you know, engineering requirements to build some of these super basic experiments. And I'm like, adversaries have to have that, this like snapshot of what we had, you know, 70 years ago or whatever. So I think publicizing this stuff is like extremely good, net benefit. But it just feels extremely uncoordinated. Like the whole world, I'm curious to get your take on this. Like the whole world of

UFOs or whatever. I would assume there would be like one dude kind of in charge of like the whole thing. And it's there I think fiefdoms and gatekeepers to those fiefdoms, but I don't think they're well coordinated at all. I think it's a cargo cult that's been running for the last 70 years, but curious to get your take. Yeah, this telling the historical story in all of its various chapters is probably beyond my kin. But like I have a certain, um, like, thousand-foot-level take, which was, you know, essentially from World War II era through like the 60s, this was essentially a federal. These were federal projects, right? The Vannevar Bush era, you know, coincided, you know, I'm sort of my basic analytical methodology is sort of what was

the structure of the other, you know, visible institutions of research development, of government, of intelligence, et cetera, and then assume that the basic level of competence and the managerial structures and their alignment to U.S. democratic power structures, like, probably, like, carries through to these legacy programs, right? And that, you know, again, this kind of is conciliant with what David Grush was saying, how these kind of were tucked underneath the architecture of secrecy for the Manhattan Project, you know, the Atomic Energy Act, you know, this sort of set the institutional framework for these programs in the 40s and 50s and 60s. And then I think there was a shift, right? And that shift, you could speculate about what was happening behind the curtain, but I think you could just

see the visible shift that took place in the other aspects of our institutional and political economy, where it was, you know, a pretty radical restructuring, right? Of the, you know, it was the Nixon shock, but then you also had, you know, the malaise stagflation in the 70s. You had, and then you had this massive transition to sort of global neoliberalization, right, the privatization of a lot of functions. And you had in the CIA, just to take that as a concrete example, you had Carter essentially purge, like the entire senior ranks of the CIA when he came into office. And one of those hundreds of senior CIA officers do, many of whom were probably presiding over aspects of legacy program in an official capacity, you know,

and they were like managing this on behalf of their, you know, responsibilities in the federal government. Now they've been fired, right? And maybe it was merited. Maybe they were doing a lot of shady stuff that the government was like, we can't do this anymore. You guys are, you know, rotten fruit. We need to kick you out. You know, those guys didn't just disappear. year they have a lot of skills. They have a lot of connections. They know exactly how to run covert operations, generate lots of sources of black money, corrupt and influence senior and very influential people around the world. And that's, you know, certain skills, they're going to apply those skills. And then, but the critical distinction is now they don't longer have an official attachment to an

institutional bureaucracy that's aligned with, you know, U.S. state interest, right? And I think that's where it starts to delaminate. And the political economy, these programs probably then, gets split to a certain extent. There's the part that the U.S. government is able to hold on to in some fashion, and then there's the part that they're not able to hold on to explicitly. And then there's this sort of uneasy evolution over many decades. I don't exactly know how it's evolved in the more recent era. But I think it's pretty clear when you, you know, read into what David Grush is saying is that, you know, is effectively, you know, there's certain elements of the U.S. government that have been sort of rogue, right? Right? And that even

the defense industrial base, parts of this, collaborators, may not be like Lockheed is involved, right, as like Lockheed's CEO, but like, you know, essentially loose networks of individuals that, for various reasons, kind of associate to manage these things. And that's, I think, the difficult part is trying to suss out how much of this, and this is why the UOP Disclosure Act explicitly targeted eminent domain, right, for things held in private hands. And that's, I think, the read that I sort of put into all of the sort of disclosure momentum and the official legislation action is like to first order, the interest of the Jillabrans and the Rubios, et cetera, for the last several years has not really been disclosure. It's been accountability.

Yeah. It's finding out that there's rogue programs that they had no idea it were in existence that were controlling, groundbreaking, world-shaking information. And their first order of business is trying to like create mechanisms to try to try to get the official structures of government to sort of reabsorb and re-contract take back some degree of control over these activities. Yep. Yeah, it's more a civilian oversight question, which is like I actually feel somewhat conflicted about, you know, I feel more sure that like the American population should understand a broader, deeper, ontological truth when it comes to our reality. That feels like an obvious like good to me. And then where I'm sort of unsure is like I don't think Congress is super competent. I was in that room last year at the testimony. And it's like if you were to manipulate or side. up a group of people and like you know we're just fine to really corrupt group of people like that would be it like these people they're not very smart and they're uh you know you can sway them very easily and like i don't know if they're more competent than the locky to northrop executives i think i think people should know about this stuff and so maybe to to some extent like whatever limited hangouts are occurring vis-a-vis these these prime contractors need to speed up be more effective and better but yeah i that would be my controversial take is like, yeah, maybe in 1850 or something, I'd be more bullish Congress. But right now I'm not. I think their 11% approval rating sort of says it all.

So I mean, this is not even a UFO question. This is basic, you know, political philosophy, which is, you know, do we in general defer to competent technocratic managers to make important decisions on behalf of the rest of us? Or do we defer to elected representatives who are representative of the people who may not be very well educated enlightened technocrats right and this is this is the this is the age old question right of like how do we find a balance in a modern very sophisticated very complex society of maintaining a form of participatory democracy maintaining a form of government that is inherently legitimate and accountable to the people right the government is of by and for the people of buying for lockheed program managers right that is the foundation of our constitutional republic

that's the inherent logic of our social contract. I think to abrogate that, you know, willy-nilly would be, you know, a one-way ratchet. But I also agree with you that, like, there is the reason why we filled out these bureaucracies and these, you know, technocratic structures in order to manage the complexity of modern life. That, yeah, the average House Republican or House Democrat on a subcommittee who's getting, like, a 10-minute briefing from a 24-year-old before the committee hearing is not the person you want to make these, like, important, you know, structural decisions. But you want to ideally be like a balance between the people that know that information to make those decisions that like they're ultimately accountable to somebody, right? Absolutely. If they screw up so they can get fired, they can be held to a public tribunal, right? Yeah.

Maybe it's the executive. I don't know. Yeah. But yeah, it is it is a tricky question. I think that bigger possible issue is the veneer of, you know, elected representatives. One in fact, which we actually have the participatory democracy. Yeah. No, it's post.

Post Citizens United. I mean, look at Mike Turner, who represents Dayton, Ohio, and, you know, has, you know, Lockheed Northrop bowing on his, quote-unquote cap table as his donor list. And so it's like, you know, that he's not a real, he's acting on behalf of oligarchic interests, of special interests in that case. Yeah, I mean, there's a political philosopher in the 20th century named Sheldon Wullen, who had this idea of sort of inverted totalitarianism, right? That, like, traditional totalitarian structures that we looked at, you know, had an obvious hierarchical, you know, dictatorial, um, uh, arrangement, uh, of power. And in our system, it's, you know, again, this is more on the extreme who's a kind of extreme, progressive kind of liberal, but like he, his diagnosis was that we've actually constructed for ourselves like an invert of totalitarianism where, um, where we have the veneer of participatory democracy, but really like the actual structures of power are quite concentrated. They're just hidden. Yes. Right. They're not on top. They're underneath. Yeah. Right. And that, um, that makes it much more hard to challenge because, you know, nobody likes being told what to

do by, you know, your boss, right? But if your option set is just inherently constrained before you come to make a decision by folks or forces you had no idea existed, well, you can just, you can, you might not even know, right? You just, these are your options, A and B, pick. Yeah. Right. R.D. Go. Do you know, uh, Danny Sheehan? This episode is sponsored by Delete Me. With the 2024 election coming up, online privacy is no longer a luxury. It's a necessity. Political polarization is at an all-time high, and personal information, like your phone number and address, is easy to find online. Sadly, this opens the door to identity theft, harassment, or even politically motivated threats.

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I don't know him personally, but I've obviously, I've watched his, yeah, his multiple three-hour-long podcast. Yeah, so it's like... Encyclopedic knowledge in 20th century. Encyclopedic, and it's like his kind of... of worldview. I mean, first off, if you want to know who killed JFK, you should listen to, you know, those podcasts. Oh, yeah, the S-Force and Howard Hughes getting deputized by Nixon under, yeah, all that stuff. Exactly, which is wild, because it, to me, it feels high probability to be true because it's so comports with priors I had around, you know, I read like Devil's

chestboard by, you know, David Talbot. And, you know, I'd watch the Oliver Stone stuff. And I'm like, okay, it's like, Dulles probably had it out for JFK. And then it's, it's like, Danny's just filling in the details with names, dates, a specific chronology. So it's fascinating. But to go to your point around, you know, the Wolin's point, around a small group being actually insidiously kind of in control, sheehan's entire history of American intelligence, at least, you know, post-OSS, is that the CIA got formed at the behest of this Brown Brothers Harriman group, this investment group where on the cap table, you had all the robber barons. So all the kind of oligopolistic, you know, control families or whatever in the U.S. Basically, the CIA was almost like it was like, you know, the veneer of like American national security, but it was really like protect our interests, you know. And so, and then if you look at American foreign policy over the last 70, 80 years, it's like way more driven by maintaining a threshold of, you know, crude petroleum or whatever.

that then meets the eye. And so, like, how much, how much of this stuff is just being driven by, like, this small group of people that, you know, I know this sounds a little tinfoil hat, but that they've kind of existed intergenerationally over the last, you know, century. I mean, I don't know how conspiratorial it is if you just look at all of human history, right? Like, human history and all of our political systems tend to, you know, in a physics language, they tend to form sort of condensates of tight factions that, that, you know, once they, you know, happen in whatever process of power accretion, stick into those positions of power. And nobody likes to give up power. They want to find ways

to magnify that power, institutionalize it, formalize it, and hand it down. That's like, that's the story of humanity, right? Once we started building hierarchical control systems, you know, out of the hunter-gatherer to agrarian evolution. So like, this is the basic sociological pattern of humanity. Like, quote-unquote enlightened democracy is a relatively recent thing. And it's a, and it's a, it's a belief system. It's a social fiction in a sense, right? And social fictions have a lot of material power when people leave in them. But they're buttressing up against this sort of, you know, multi-century just embedded historical pattern, right? And, and I think that's been the, that's been, I think, you know, I'm not like America's truly just a hidden fascist country and everything

about democracy is just a painted veneer. Because I think you can look at history where like, you know, the quote, maybe power structure lost, right? Like, they didn't have sort of univalent power over, over the evolution of our society. And this election felt like sort of an example. Yeah, I think it's also become more complicated, right? I think back in that era from, you know, maybe the, you know, the reconstruction era to the, to robber barons to Brown Brothers Harriman, to World War I and World War II, like, you know, American economy was like tightly, tightly wound, you know, sort of New York finance industrial capital and, you know, a small number of founding families and industrial empires, you know, it was pretty clear, like American politics was just

de facto, you know, arms of their apparatus, right? Like that, there was no pretense that we really had a democratic form of government in that era. Like, we fought a civil war and they were like, all right, we need to reconstitute things. It's going to be done through investment. It's going through, you know, stitching together with railroads and, you know, industrial expansion, etc. That's going to have to come and directed and managed by essentially these industrial systems that are controlled by a small number of elite family empires. And that's just, you know, so then that's what they did. And then we're like, all right, we need to win over one. Those guys are going to do it. And I think where we got really in trouble, though, is when those families

started to then muck around in European politics and started to help fund, you know, aligned interest groups in, say, Germany in the 20s that sowed the seeds, if not directly catalyzed the Nazi party. Yeah. Right? Which is what happened. The union bank funded. the Nazis and then I think Dulles was part of financing the Nazis as well he was stationed in Norway or something I mean we created that basically right because we were worried about the Bolsheviks

taking over the National Socialist movement was you know and again also came out of this kind of similar vibe the German version of it was kind of this occultic set of you know like theosophic clubs essentially and there was a lot of you know

in the US that was yeah we there was a lot of the elites were very much into the occult sort of, you know, seances and similar sorts of vibes. So they all had these. And you had that book, what was it, like the secret destiny of America, like that Manly P. Hall book that, you know, we'd be the, the shining city on the hill for the rest of the world or whatever. And it doesn't take, it doesn't take much for, like, elites in different societies to all

of a sudden become gripped by certain cult of belief. And then when they have lots of money, that can have material effects on hinges of history. And I think that's, you know, long story about how that created Nazism, how Hitler kind of really roasted power, but that then I think, again, these are like contingent, uh, ratchets. And then, you know, it puts these these bureaucracies now that we have think, we think of biocracies in a much more, um, uh, like depersonalized fashion now. Like the CIA and the FBI and all these administrative systems. And they are like there are massive systems of rules and org structures and yearly budgets and government accountability and congressional committees. And,

you know, we have the, you know, Francis Fukuyama project of state creation is sort of the depersonalization of state functions. They become formalized, they become structure, repeatable, inspectable, accountable, et cetera. And, you know, when states decay, they, they tend to become more personalized. They can become much more internally weakened by factions where their principal forms of accountability or loyalty are not to the organization. It's to their own secret, you know, club of people. And I think, you know, I would say that the arc of these institutions was like they were created by these, you know, essentially they were fully personalized at the beginning, right? The Dulles brothers, etc. And then, you know, we sort of built state structures, independent, large, complicated bureaucracies, you know, over the course of the 20th century to sort of fight the Cold War. And we had to marshal large-scale resources to do that. And you can't just rely on, you know, dullest brothers to just run around and do weird shit. Right. You have like systems of, you know, processes and memos and, you know, like big projects. projects. You need to now bring in folks like Howard Hughes, right? You need to kind of like have,

you know, like Lomar Explorer. These are pretty expensive endeavors. And I think now we reach the other, like that arc has come down. And now they're like being repersonalized. And, and, you know, that can happen. Whoever is repersonalizing, it can either do that in a project of like reinviguration, reformalization, right? That like they need to, that these structures got to one wieldy. It's like software code that has a bunch of, you know, rot in it. And And you need to, like, I think this system is called, called BOM's Law, which is just, you know, like, code eventually rots. Right. It's like a characteristic, like, timescale.

So any institution has, like, codified rules and regs. And they usually only go in one direction. And, you know, I think that's the project that we're seeing maybe play out is like, okay, how do you go into this, the set of code of our institutions and, you know, you know that there's maybe half of it is, like dead weight code. But you don't know what's like, what's load bearing, right? But going back to like this, the CIA sort of arc is a, I think that was kind of the thing. You had this sort of purge of individuals that were sort of had built the bureaucracy and now had all these connections. And they just went out into the private sector and just started to build those systems, those person more personalized systems. Yeah.

But now out of view, right? And I think that is where you read the Tom DeLong books. He could have points to this idea of there essentially being, you know, official government programs and then non-government programs. and that from the vantage point of someone like Marco Rubio or someone like Senator Gilvan would be kind of like extremely intimidating. Yes. Like I would not, like these people agree with senators, but do they really know what they're going up against?

Right? That's the different question. Well, it's kind of part and parcel with the history of the country per what we're talking about. Like if you look at the Sheehan narrative of what happened with JFK, Howard Nixon operationalized Howard Hughes is kind of an extension of the national security. apparatus as a private aerospace contractor. If you look at, you know, the, the follow-up story, it's JFK scatters the CIA to the wind, or he threatens to, fires Dulles. Dulles goes from his

perch at Brown Brothers Harriman at a private company, re-operationalizes the S-Force, which Howard he's created, to go after JFK. And then the final example, which touches on the, you know, this idea that Jimmy Carter purged a lot of the CIA, is that I think a lot of those guys ended up But have you heard of the Carlisle Group? Oh, yeah. So, like, you read Jock Valais' diaries. You know, he publishes his diaries, Forbidden Science, volumes one through five.

And I think it's like volume three or four. He always has lunch with all these people. And, you know, these like spooky insider types. And they're constantly like, look at the Carlisle group. And then he goes, again, the Carlisle Group. Like, it's like this recurring trope. And so I sometimes wonder if post, uh, you know, Carter purge of the deep state or of the CIA, a lot of this stuff ended up, you know, with, with them. And the final weird connection there is the, I don't know, are you familiar with this Mark McCandlish, Brad Sorensen story?

You have to remind me on that one. So, so Mark McCandler is a famous aviation illustrator. And he has a buddy named Brad Sorensen, who's in aerospace, and he's going to this, you know, air show in, in California. And he gets taken to, so he's with this guy who's this prom. kind of Italian defense financier is the way he describes it or defense guy. And he gets taken to kind of like a back of the house show. And they say, we're going to show you the real stuff. And they fly him to Palmdale and show him a bunch of, you know, really exotic crafts, some like one-off crafts like, you know, the Aurora or the Astra. These are sort of, you know, famed possible lockyed prototypes that like were commissioned for like a year or two and then they were kind of taken out and then he shows them what he calls a flux liner or an alien reproduction vehicle and these are bell-shaped or acorn-shaped vehicles there are three of them they actually

seem to have wear and tear on them as if they've been flown and um i'm friends with a couple of really good researchers who think that the italian guy is frank carlucci and frank carlucci was deputy director of the CIA under Jimmy Carter and then became Secretary of Defense under Reagan. And he's very associated with the Carlisle group. And so anyway, so all of this is to say maybe there's this sort of revolving door between private industry and CIA where it's like you can, you get on one. You say, you know, hey, CIA, give up the goods. They put it into private industry. And then you get on private industry. And then they, they, you know, put it back in secret compartmentalized, you know, government apparatus is or something. It's this game of whackamol. It's this infinite shell game or something.

Yeah. And I think, you know, I think that's very, very plausible. And even in more prosaic circumstances, that sort of relationship is extremely common. If you just take today, quote, great power competition, right? There's lots of, say, port facilities around the world that we, A, want to ensure U.S. has favorable access to, and B, we deny China and Russia access to. Is the U.S. government, U.S. military, U.S. intelligence community, going to literally go around the world and buy up and control and manage and run all these ports? No. Who is? Right. So how do you ensure that those private interests are motivated, incentivized to do that on behalf of American security interests? Takes a project. It takes a lot of money. It takes organization. It takes relationships.

Yeah. That's what you would expect. Right. In that very prosaic, pure straight down the middle geopolitical competition. Just apply that basic logic to any other competitive regime of even higher stakes, and you would imagine the layers of involvement and funding that would be deployed. And I think this is,

this is then, if I'm going to extend my analogy, like, okay, the decay in the 70s and 80s, well, what happened really in, if we're trying to point this line of, in Korea, kind of from industrial capital in the 20th century to really what became finance capital and international finance capital in the 20th century,

in the later half of the 20th century. And you assume the basic template that you're just pointing at, right? Karlok, it was one example. It's a big private equity conglomerate. Yeah. And again, it's less the entity itself and more the individuals, right,

who can come and go and who, you know, they have certain skills and knowledge and expertise in crafting certain corporate structures and deals and arranging sources of financing, right? That's the skill. It's not the corporate entity per se. And so that can move and it can evolve and that can change names and labels, you know, at any time.

Well, one interesting thing, though, is, okay, like, heaven points to the, you know, the big baddies Carlyle group, right? It's like, they have to actually make money. Yeah. They actually, they're like, you know, these things are expensive. I don't see them selling any alien reproduction vehicles. Yeah. Right. Like, where's the money coming from?

Right. Like, who's, it's like, there's, there's money going in, right? Where is it coming from? Yeah. And like, you know, one of the important functional requirements for any covert operation is funding. Yeah. Right. And there's two sources of funding in general, right?

There's like official funding. Yeah. Could even be classified, right? but it's coming from public coffers. It's going from taxpayer money, going to the government, and then the government is shaving off a slice and a classified budget to go fund secret stuff. And then there's, you know, black money. There's off the books money. There's money that's generated from non-official government activities, not taxation, not debt issuance. It's coming from private sector sources, either private sector criminal operations, right, which we've seen examples of in the 20th century, right? Drug running, right, to fund operations. Or, you know, legal financial activities, trading investment that, you know, is generating surplus. to fund these activities. And so that's why I would pay more attention to, like,

where in the more common era in the last 20, 30 years, of where are there like black box sources of funding? Where are there people in this world that are just printing money? Yeah. That have, you know, plausible connections to these programs. Speaking of which, my old colleague, Eric Weinstein, went on Joe Rogan and I think exasperated at the lack of of his own sort of unified field theory of everything,

uh, geometric unity, he took a couple of shots at Renaissance technologies. And so, you know, the late Jim Simons, uh, you know, is this incredible cryptographer mathematician. He has this fund out in Long Island that seems to just predictably at high scale, uh, return, you know, I think 30% year over year or something.

Uh, and so Weinstein is, is on Rogan actively speculating that this is housing a sort of secret physics program involving all the top differential geometers in the U.S. What do you think, Matthew? I mean, if such a thing were to exist, that's exactly where it would exist. Yeah. Right? Because, well, one, Jim Simons used to work for the NSA. He was a Navy. He was a cryptologic, you know, code breaker. And, you know, nobody has ever, there's no interesting as an ex-NSA guy, right? Just in general. And he's also one of the world's leading mathematician's physicists. And yeah, it essentially controlled the Stony Brook math department and really effectively exerted

a lot of influence over Stony Brook University itself. And so turned his hedge fund, again, this extremely, you know, just out of distribution, successful year over year, never a down year trading operation, which functions as an immense black box that has probably the highest concentration of physics and math geniuses anywhere in the planet. And you look at what else Jim Simons was really engaged in, right? He set up the Simon's Foundation, which is probably like one of the leading private sector sources of sort of philanthropic research and philanthropic funding for fundamental science research in, you know, life sciences, synthetic biology, artificial intelligence, frontiers of physics,

computational, computational sciences, mathematics. Really interesting to kind of frontier breakthrough ideas across these like critical disciplines. And there's interesting, like coincidences, right? Like the head of the Simon's Foundation, a guy named Dr. David Spurgel. He was tapped to be the chair of the NASA UAP working group. And Stony Brook University was engineered essentially a joint venture essentially to manage Brookhaven National Lab with Battelle Memorial Institute. That partnership was personally engineered by Jim Simons himself to get Stony Brook in a position to jointly make. manage the Department of Energy National Lab that does breakthrough physics research and has, you know, they do lots of classified stuff. And they're pretty close by to his hedge fund operations. So, you know, it doesn't, you don't have to like be the conspiracy theorist drawing the red dots of the yarn to be like, here's a black, here's a money making machine started by a guy deeply connected the NSA. That's also like a super physics genius and it can attract the smartest physics and math people on the planet to work for his black box money machine. He also then happens to, you know, effect.

have a lot of influence over Department of Energy National Lab. And his, you know, guy running his private research foundation and fundamental physics gets tapped to run the UAP working group for NASA. Yeah, a working group that sort of says, you know, nothing to see here. Like, we'll keep an open mind, but there's probably nothing here, which I find interesting. Yeah. I mean, I don't know. I have no smoking gun. It just seems quite a curious set of coincidences. And I know, this is, you know, And it's all personalities at this point, right? Because I know the famous podcaster, physicist, astronomer, Brian Keating, who's famously kind of a skeptic talks a lot about UAPs and kind of always downplays it, whoever he talks to.

He's the godson of Jim Simons and his good friends with Eric Weinstein. It's very interesting. Yeah, I don't know what it means, but I find it fascinating. It's exactly what I would do if I was the government. I was like, hey, like, I need to set up both a funding source as well as a private research group to look at some aspects. of this program. Like, it would kind of be incompetent. If these legacy programs actually do exist,

it would be kind of incompetent not to pull somebody like him into it. Totally. It's like exactly, this is what you need, basically. That's fascinating. I mean, yeah, Keating's always been super cool with me, but he's definitely, he seems very... I don't think he's operating in bad faith. And he's definitely anti-the-UFO thing, so, yeah. Well, that's fascinating.

And in 92 as well, so they have a particle accelerator at Brook Haven. National Labs and then they also do nuclear stuff. And in 92, a lot of the townspeople around Brookhaven said that there was a UFO crash that was actually collected by the facility there as well. So that would be an interesting connection because, as you know, UFOs seem to specifically, like if there is a correlation between anything, it's nuclear assets. They seem to show up around both civilian nuclear grids and weapons facilities. Yeah. No, that seems pretty definitive at this point. Yeah. Yeah. Very interesting. So do you think, do you think like, because Carlisle Group has a lot of defense interests, right? It's this multinational conglomerate. Do you think there's anything to the Jacques Valle theory, you know, given your kind of analysis of there was kind of a, you know, this Carter purging. And then you have Ben Rich as well, who's director of skunk works, lamenting that there's almost this runaway of control when it comes to, quote, unquote, an international board of directors. on the UFO topic.

And then there's like an American outlet that presumably he's sort of a part of. So I mean, I have no evidence one or the other. And it's hard to say how stable these systems have been over time and exactly how much like managerial control actually exists. Right? Because I don't know like what the right mental model is for like the organizational like hierarchy here. Right.

How much of it is a board of directors that is approving line item budgets. Right, like basically the Tom DeLong narrative, right? Where he's like got those basically whatever the Maynard group. And it's like, yeah, like 12 guys in a boardroom and they're like this. We're going to do this. We're going to coo here. It's kind of like, you know, the trope of like the Illuminati guys in the room, right? Smoking their cigars being, oh yeah, the secret UFO project.

Where are we on that one? Right. I don't know. Like that's a scenario. I don't know if it's for me like the most plausible scenario for this is like that there is actually like a such a tightly integrated vertical control structure as opposed to maybe like pieces of it because it's hard it human institutions as you've seen like they're hard to they're hard to keep together yeah right they're hard to kind of it takes a lot to like pull a complicated operation

and keep every part and piece of it aligned you take it's you know there's no matter what secret institution you're in there's principal asian problems right how does people at the top ensure that the people at the bottom are doing what people at the top want them to do right and not lying to them or carving off a piece of their own or like, you know, so you either need, you need coercion or you need inducement at a very high level to keep all the sort of layers in any bureaucratic system aligned with the mission and the objective set by the people at the top. And the thing about secrecy, it can make some of those solving those principalization problems actually harder, right? Because you actually can't get too much reporting coming up the chain on everything that's happening

because that's a security risk. You can't really be itemizing and documenting and having decision memos made at every, you know, deputy project manager up, right, the chain and then comes in a big binder at the time. Well, that binder gets loose. The whole thing falls apart, right? So there needs to be compartmentalization and the way, you know, the reason why we run covert covert operations in any intelligence service, like you don't, you don't have everybody like read in all the way up, right? You have like local, you know, chief of station and maybe a two guys at headquarters that know what's going on. And then it's the people in the field doing the stuff. And then only maybe, you know, bare hints of it get sent up the chain, right?

Because that's how you protect the very sensitive operations. So I just don't, I don't know how they could actually structure an organization that's effectively managed by small number of people over time. I think it would be, it would be, it would be very heterogeneous. It would be very sort of like horizontal. And there would be like, maybe like the bare minimum measures of like intimidation and like, you know, extreme measures to impose some degree of, of cohesion. But I don't know.

This is like pure speculation of just like. No matter what secret group, it's going to be subject to these basic organizational dynamics, like regardless, right? You studied physics at Johns Hopkins. And can I think speak a little closer to the metal than a lot of, there's a lot of kind of mushy-brained, you know, everything is everything. Amateur physicists, myself included, by the way, in the UFO world. And so it'll be good to speak to you about this. I think about even the conversation we were having about the atomic stuff. That's an example.

You could call it like high energy. physics, right? And so that or particle accelerators, which again, there's one at Brookhaven, obviously you have large Hadron Collider and others. And then you have the work of, you know, Tesla, Townsend Brown, so super high voltage across short distances. Do these all represent kind of anomalies that are an inroad to a more complete version of physics? Or do you know where, in your opinion, physics might have gone wrong? And, you know, where we, you know, where we you might be able to find another branch that's productive? Yes, I can go off on a few different tangents there.

Because, yeah, and I guess stepping back, right, my, like, I do think the physics part of this is the most important part of it, because almost by assumption, any advanced intelligence of any arbitrary nature that we're encountering, that displays capabilities that we don't have, are downstream of their knowledge of reality. right that's what our civilization is just downstream of our knowledge of reality right we figure out you know a tower we've construct a tower of knowledge which is understanding the degrees of freedom that are available to us in this existence and then we engineer uh you know that's what technology is it's essentially applying that knowledge of the degrees of freedom available to us in reality and so what we're you know witnessing with these um uapes is a demonstration of that knowledge and so if you want to understand who or what or why or how, all those questions are going to be downstream of they know something about reality that we don't. Yes. Yes. And if you understand where they came from or what their intentions might be,

what the capabilities are, it just comes straight down to the bare question of like, well, what do they know? And by definition, that world for us to bridge from our current knowledge to what we think they, quote unquote, know, requires us, is going to have to move beyond our current conceptual paradigms of physics

because we know our current conceptual paradigms of physics do not apparently give us anything that can do this. Maybe it can get close. Maybe there's some, you know, maybe the brown bells filled. It's like, it's a little trick, right? But is it, is it, is it everything? Is it the, is it all, does it represent all these observables?

I'm not sure, all right? Is it more, maybe, is there some secret knowledge that we have that we developed advanced propulsion systems based off of plausible, maybe probable. But like, there's a large potential, uh, ladder of capability. that we could be climbing, right? And we just happen to be, we happen to know we're here.

Maybe advanced aerospace companies have gotten a little bit further up, but there could be a lot. That's further above that, right? Again, this is all just like preface material to talk about physics. Because it's where everyone's eyes will start glazing over. Because, yeah, I broadly agree with the thesis of Eric in terms of the sociology of where physics went wrong in the 70s. And even now, it's become a common accepted talking point

by like the leading lights of string theory. like Larry Suskin just went on Kurtzum uncle's podcast. It was quite shocking to hear this guy, you know, leading light of string theory, guy, you know, getting towards the end of his career. He's just like, yeah, it was complete failure. It's basically pointless. Everyone should start over. Yeah.

It's like, bro, like that's like the entirety of the physics discipline that you're saying is a complete failure. Yeah. Like that's dramatic statement to me, right? And I don't know, I mean, most people don't pay attention to physics and just kind of a bunch of nerds in their ivory towers, you know, writing scribbling and whatnot. But like here, you know, that to me is like, that's, that's the end, right? Okay, now you have Larry basically admitting the whole thing was a,

was a waste. And, and now he even explicitly calls for, you know, we need to look at new paradigms. We need to look at, you know, we really need to widen the aperture here. Although he doesn't quite, but in the same breath, he kind of dismisses the apparent alternatives that have been thrown together, right? Like geometric unity or anybody else. He's like, Wolfram, yeah, he's like, I haven't really paid attention to that. a business can seem like a daunting task, unless you have a partner like Shopify. They have the tools you need to start and grow your business. From designing a website to marketing to selling and beyond, Shopify can help with everything you need. There's a reason millions of companies like Mattel,

Heinz, and all birds continue to trust and use them. With Shopify on your side, turn your big business idea into sign up for your $1 per month trial at Shopify.com slash special offer. All right. So like, well, do you now you should have an open mind if your thing failed. It's bizarre to me. Like I don't, I'm not a practicing physicist. It's not my job. I'm just intellectually curious about it. I studied it in college. But even I try to pay attention and read these things. I don't have religious to the professional competence to adjudicate, you know, the technical merits. But I'm trying to like familiarize myself with Garrett-Lisi's stuff. Uh-huh. With, um, with Sabina's stuff, with Wolfram and really it's done by Jonathan Garrard,

with Eric Weinstein, um, causal medical sets, um, Carlo Carlo Revelli. loop quantum gravity like i try to pay attention all this stuff it's just not like it matters to me like this should matter to you this is your job absolutely well but it's also you don't need super technical chops to adjudicate something on a high level i think this is like this issue with string theory where it's like well you need to be a string theorist to somehow say that the thing isn't working no you don't you can just be like empirically it hasn't really touched reality like we really can't do much with string theory that almost is the dimension reduction necessary to zoom out and see the forest

for the trees and say no actually this just doesn't work and I don't think that requires I mean you have way more more knowledge than the average person I think the average person can just say that yeah like there's this whole separate branch of funnel of physics that has sort of gone a very different direction which is don't assume background space time at all assume space time itself is emergent right assume essentially not a continuous space time but a discrete structure and that What we observe as continuous space time is actually an emergent higher level phenomenon, right?

Just like the property of water that we call liquid is not a lower level property. It's an emergent property as a result of the behavior of discrete constituents, e.g. H2O molecules. Those things as like liquidity or like a water liquid at the level of individual H2O molecule. It's only when you gather a bunch of H2O molecules together and then you have an observer. that is core screening all the information in that in that system that the property of liquid emerges. So I've been attracted to that sort of direction of physics. I was really attracted to, you know, the original version of this was formulated by a guy named Lee Smolin. And his first attempted to something called Loop Quantum Gravity.

He worked with some other collaborators, Carlo Revelli to a certain extent. And there's another attempt doing like causal dynamical sets. And the idea is, okay, can you just prescribe like a very kind of simple geometric structure? And can you define measures on that discrete geometric structure that then in a suitable limit give you something more like a continuous space, right? And so those details associated with quantum gravity that were a bit more so that basic motivation. There's like essentially it's background independent. That's like the basic distinction.

So string theory is a background dependent theory. It assumes a background structure, a background geometer. manifold that's continuous, or at least has these sort of topological properties that they, you know, define in terms of clobial manifolds or whatever. And the other, this branch was like, no, we're not going to assume any background to space. In fact, we're not going to assume space at all. We're going to assume something more abstract, something more fundamental. And then we're going to try to see if we can, in a suitable limit, recover a continuous structure. And so, I won't go too far into loop quantum gravity, I think it is a bit more constrained in how it was

set up, similar with causal dynamical set theory, there was a little bit too much structure built in at the beginning in terms of defining the boundaries of these loops and whatever. A much more interesting attempt at this sort of larger project of trying to, you know, not assume anything, right, in physics and trying to get as much that recovers what we currently see in physics out of like the very most minimal starting point, right? And so Stephen Wolfram, who's kind of a controversial physicist, he had this early idea back in the 90s, he put it into a new kind of science book of kind of starting with very simple graphs, right? And could you generate something that looked like physics by just sort of evolving

very simple graphs, right? Just abstract graph networks. And the graphs he started with were sort of called, there were trivalent networks, which had basically also had like some pre-described structure that had to be basically sort of basic triangular geometry. He was able to show some interesting things, but then he kind of got distracted, whatever. Back during just before COVID in 2019, there's a separate researcher named Jonathan Garard amazing, brilliant guy. Everyone should watch his videos. He's also a very lucid, clear communicator

and has deep philosophical insights that he brings to his fundamental physics research. I highly recommend all of Jonathan Garard's stuff here. And everything I'm going to say from now is basically me trying to like recapitulate and like in like 30 IQ points lower version of his stuff here. So the basic idea is these hypergraphs.

is to start with the simplest thing you can imagine, right, which is just like a point that's connected to another point, right? And maybe another point. And so you can have just like a simple, you know, graph, right? And the key, though, is like there's a directed edge. So instead of just a line from a point to a point, you have an error, right? And so imagine you just have like a simple, you know, again, you can look at the videos and there's better explanations because I'll butcher it

trying to do it without much of a prop here. But like simple graph that has directed edges. Well, you can write, there's certain rules that you can imagine applying to that graph that rewrite that set of relationships that from state one to state two, delete this edge, you know, from here to here, add a new point and add an edge between that new point in here. So just a basic set of abstract rewriting rules applied to this arbitrary class of what are called hypergraphs because they have directed edges, right? And so you're just starting with that basic idea, right, of just graphs that you have, that there's certain rules you could apply to those graphs to rewrite them, right? And that is equivalent to another set of objects called string set substitution systems, which you can actually write down all the information in that graph as essentially is a set of strings. Like you label all those points and you basically just have an edge as just a binary relation between those two points like A, B.

They're in a set together. And so you can define a certain graph like this. And a rewrite rule just transforms that set of strings with the certain label. with the certain labels and the relationships between them into a different set of strings with certain relations between them. And that's like a purely combinatorial structure, right? It's just abstract labels of symbols that are being rewritten to a new set of abstract symbols, right?

So it's extremely abstract, right? How is this touch on physics, whatever? Well, it turns out, just building for that basic, purely combinatorial theoretic or abstract hypergraph rewriting system, you can, and this was their physics project, this was their key results, is that you can recover quantum mechanics in general relativity. But in a very interesting way. So the key premise, though, is that there's a certain assumption, right, which is something

called causal invariance, which is kind of equivalent to what we call like sort of local gauge covariance in general relativity. If you imagine you can rewrite this graph structure with a certain rule. So you just have like one rule that says, you know, rewrite. a part of the graph that looks like this, change it to a part of the graph that looks like this. Well, in any arbitrary hypergraph, there could be many different ways

of applying that rule. And you're like, well, which way do we do it? Well, actually, what that does is if you generate, you know, apply it in all possible ways. Right? So you generate essentially what's called a multi-way system. So you can imagine like the state of the graph at this time and say there's only two different ways of applying that same rule. Well, it's going to generate two versions of that graph.

So now essentially it splits, right? And now you have a graph where the rule's been applied in version one and a graph that's applied in a version two. And those are two different states of the system. And you can do that again, right? And maybe there's four different ways. So you get this branch, right? So you get this multi-way system that branches. And what they've shown is, and this is getting, you know, there's like multiple hours of lectures that you could, you know, that you could look at to sort of work out the mathematics of what that implies as you start to to analyze that structure is that that branching, it sounds familiar.

It sounds like sort of quantum mechanics. Absolutely. And so it turns out that you can define certain measures, right? So the main mathematical breakthrough from Garard was actually realizing that there's certain tricks that you can apply from other branches of mathematics that a lot of you kind of take this discrete structure and generate essentially discrete versions of the results that we have in continuous mathematics. So in general relativity, it's defined over manifolds and, you know, Einstein and field equations are defined in terms of things like the Ricky, the Ricky, tensor and the Riemannian manifold. So they have a certain metric that you can lay on this sort of smoothly differentiable topological manifold.

And there's a certain, you know, set of mathematical machinery that's been really worked out. That's basically what the onside field equations are defined in terms of. So Carrard was able to show in two sets of papers, one on the sort of the general relativity side, one of the quantum clinical side, that if you just, if you analyze the causal graph of this evolving multi-way system, that you can define discrete measures on. this causal graph that converge in the limit to the Einstein field equations. Right? So you can recover like the discrete version of the of the Ricky Tensor. You can define a discrete version of the of the Ramini manifold. And that kind of intuition you can think about this is like, imagine you have a bunch of,

you know, there's no background space. There's just a bunch of abstract, you know, nodes connected other nodes. And you can, okay, well, what's the dimension of that thing? Like space time has a dimension, right? We have three degrees of freedom. Well, if you actually, you can define dimension by essentially growing out a ball. on this discrete structure, we essentially are counting the number of nodes

that you hit at sort of end number of steps. And essentially, dimension is correlated to the volume, which is just a measure of the number of nodes as a function of the number of steps. And so if that grows essentially to the square, then you're in a three-dimensional, right? Because that's essentially the inverse square law,

right? Inverse square law is a function of the fact that live in three dimensions, right? You know, there's just, if you grow out a ball in space, like the volume will grow as a function as a square of the radius, right? And so that is, what was able to show,

essentially is defining a bunch of discrete equivalent measures on this hypergraph structure. And then with those, with those measures, essentially reconstruct a discrete version of the outside field equations. And that essentially in the limit of the system, a certain observer that can't see the critical piece of this, is that an observer is a part of that system.

A observer is a piece of this. An observer can't see, or an observer that can't see or measure all those indiscreet all those very like low level changes to the hypergot structure essentially is equivalencing them right and that equivalencing is very similar like this idea and thermodynamics of like okay uh of of entropy right like if i could actually measure all the position of the menta of every particle in that box there'd be zero entropy because i'd have all the information but i as an observer outside the box can't do that right i can't there's no such thing is the maxwell's demon for me So I have to equivalence all those individual microstates into one state that I call temperature, right? And then the statistics of that gives me the second law of thermodynamics. So the basic same idea happens here

in a more abstract way of like space time, the emergence of space time for observers like us. Statistics of quantum mechanics. Yeah, it's a function of the fact that we are equivalencing these microstates because of nature of who we are as an observer. But there's a weird, so that's like, so the causal graph is a certain representation

that you can apply to this, this basic multi-way evolution of the more fundamental sort of hyper abstract hypergraph. And then so the causal graph is what kind of gives you generativity. But then there's a different representation, which you mentioned, there's like there's arbitrary, there's no canonical ordering to how you apply any given rule. So you get branching. So you get a branchial sort of multi-way system. They call it sort of branchial graph.

So the branchial graph and the causal graph are kind of orthogonal representations of this more fundamental abstract process playing out. The causal graph is what we can recover general relativity through. The branchal graph turns out the same sort of idea is what you recover quantum mechanics through. Because that essentially you can define measures that in the limit converge to essentially

a discrete version of the path integral in Feynman's sort of formulation. And in fact, the branchal space with certain assumptions converges to a projective Hilvert, a projective Hilbert. projective Hilbert space, which is what you use in quantum quantum mechanics. And so that is, that was like his breakthrough result in 2020, 2020, 2021. And that was like really suggestive, right,

but it wasn't like the theory of everything. But it was like really interesting that actually, starting with basic simple mathematical structure, almost purely combinatoral theoretic, and you do some clever tricks about how you define things. You actually can get general relativity and quantum mechanics out of that, which is kind of mind-blowing. But then what was interesting, though, and this is the part where it does kind of stretch our limits of, you know, of how do we conceptually interpret this sort of system is the observer is actually playing a critical role in this, right, in the sense that there is this sort of microscale set of updatings happening all the time. And there's always this branching taking place. And observers are pieces of that

branching. And so why do we not perceive this complicated multi-way branching system? We perceive a single threat of history. Well, what they've been able to show, and this is sort of, this is, um, was Garard's kind of breakthrough at a bit was like, um, in that branchial structure, that branchal graph, essentially a multi-way, you know, people, you could think of as a multiverse, but it's really much more just like, it's the branching of this tree of, of all possible rewrites. Um, and, uh, well, the idea is, well, what is an observer in that system? Well, an observer is something that just equivalences different branches together, right? And then he was able

to show mathematically, basically there's a certain procedure in information theory called the newth index completion, which is a sort of just basic algorithm for these sorts of rewriting systems that just takes branches and just merges them together. And if you apply that, right, structure to this

branchial graph, it basically allows you to recover essentially the uncertainty principle and quantum sort of interference effects. And it kind of gives this explanation that, yeah, like, observers essentially is, that solves the measurement problem in quantum mechanics essentially, right? It's like the measurement problem, the measurement in quantum mechanics is the branch of the initial graph is undergoing unitary evolution. Observers are essentially the application of sort of new spendix completions to different branches that it just treats as equivalent because they can't distinguish between those different states.

So they are actually different whatever ontologically, right? But from the perspective of an observer, they just see one state. they're seen as because it's just like when I look at a glass of water, I don't see the individual, you know, water molecules. I see just a bunch of water, right? I have equivalenced all that individual detail, all that information into just this high level state. And that's basically what makes us unique as observed or makes us characteristic as observers

is we have, we're certain high level, right? We're constructing models of reality at a level much higher than the individual phenomenon that we're observing. So we're doing a lot of equivalencing. And that essentially then imposes a structure on the phenomenon that we're observing. Essentially makes it a definite system. The other key thing is that we believe we have a memory, right? And that memory then, and this is connects to a separate branch of physics and like assembly theory,

which is like memory is critical. Like all objects essentially have an embedded memory, which is like what the object is, it's just their history embodied in their present configuration. Like individual, like we are four billion years of genetic evolution on this planet. It's like our present state is just, you know, what we are is, objects are essentially assembled structures of of of information. And so like in in the garard Wolfram model that would correspond to like essentially you know these are hypersurface foliations of branchal space that are computationally bounded relative to the underlying

structure. And so they have to do this massive equivalencing. And then they perceive they have a linear threat of history. So they believe that they're continuous. They have a memory that's embedded. So that they're basically a pattern of these structured newth bendix completions going back through the multi-way system. That's very abstract, but like, that's kind of the idea. It gets even more abstract, so this seems too abstract, right? This idea of like applying a particular rule, you know, well, you're like, well, why that rule, right? Is there one rule for physics? Well, it seems kind of arbitrary. What if you apply all possible rules? Well, then you get to this separate graph, which is called like a, or space even, call like a, the ruleial space,

the space of possible rules that you could apply to any arbitrary hypergraph. And then you can analyze that that that that real space just like you can analyze the causal graph and the branchial graph now have this rule real graph which is like not just what is the multi-way system of possible evolutions applying different orderings of the same rule but what is the multi-way system of the of this of this of this graph applying all possible rules in all possible ways so you get this combinatorial just if you know extra explosion but then analyzing that rule real real estate and this was gerard working with a mathematician named um uh xerxes um uh uh uh zirksi's um uh uh uh uh I was Swala. I forget how to pronounce his last name. But they just, they took techniques and this is getting, this is as far as I'll go in terms of really abstract physics. But like, they went really deep applying techniques from what's called homotopy type theory or higher order, higher order type theory, which is, you can try to simplify this, like this, this real space, which is essentially defining all the possible paths that a non-deterministic Turing machine can follow. So it's funnily like a computational approach to understanding reality. Like a turning machine is just, you know, simple, simple, simple,

like the most abstract kind of representation of any computational process. And so you can imagine like, you know, essentially a non-determined term machine is like it spits out one state from an input state and has a memory and register. Well, what if there are multiple different ways that at the output could come from a given input, right? That'd be equivalent to kind of this branching in the multi-way system. So you can, you know, you know, you can represent the evolution of multi-way system in terms of a non-deterministic multi-way turning sort of system evolving. And then we know a lot of results from basic information theory about how to apply that to

to that sort of representation. And you can apply results in this branch of mathematics of like coming out of category theory, which won't go down that rabbit hole. But the really interesting idea that they look at to this paper is this space of possible rules here that they're trying to analyze in terms of what sorts of categorical structure do they have

like to each other. And they realize actually like there's, you know, the very simplest sets of rules that you could write down, sort of classifying space, sort of the zero homotopy, or even I think it was maybe the one homotopy, that you can write down as a rule of analyzing these multi-way systems

is equivalent to categorical formulations of quantum mechanics. And then the next homotopy sort of representation up is equivalent to the categorical representation or what's called functorial quantum field theory. And then if you jump all the way up to what's called, you know, if you actually do like, you know, essentially this infinite limit of doing these sort of homotopy expansions, you get to a structure. It's called an infinity groupoid. This will be a bit super wonky. But an infinity groupoid is a well-studied structure in a sort of homotopy theory. And an infinity groupoid has a weird property that the famous mathematician Growth Indic look at. And he formulated this weird property as sort of the growth-indiex sort of homotopy hypothesis, which is that an infinity groupoid is a topological space. And, and he formulated. And, and he formulated, and And importantly, there's a result in homotopy theory that, like, you know, an infinity groupoid is like a special group. And in fact, whatever its properties are, sort of get functorily inherited to all the lower level homotopies that are below it.

Right. So the infinity groupoid that's composed of this infinite limit of these sort of homotopy tower being stacked up on each other. Essentially, a set of rules describing a set of all possible rules just happening. It's like, you know, you can always formulate, you know, like you said, have, have. a hypergraph, like, what is a set of rules I can apply for that hypergraph? Okay, well, that I can now represent that set. Well, I can go, well, what are the different ways I can represent the set of transformations I can do to that object? And then you can, you know, you can basically, you know, do that all the way up, right? They're like, how many different ways can I transform

this object? That creates a new object. How many different ways can I transform that object? And so that's like, that's, that's what homotopia means. Essentially, what are the different equivalent ways of representing the set of ways I can change a given object? So you can always apply that kind of this infinite, you know, limit. The infinite limit of that is this infinity groupoid that if you if you accept you know growth index homotopy hypothesis is essentially equivalent to a topological space that's what a topological space is and so that the properties of topological space then get inherited functorally all the way down to all the lower level homotopies right that an observer like us would be embedded in and so that's why we see space right so like the upshot

of all this is that in this sort of abstract you know thinking about this model the infinity group void is where general relativity it's like that's where we see this sort of emergent a higher level continuous geometric structure. And then the lower level, the bottom of that sort of the bottom of that homotropic tower is a discrete quantum mechanical system that we deserve. And because we're in the middle, right? We're not cosmological, like in our size scale and we're not an individual particle. We sit in the middle.

And like the mystery of quantum gravity is trying to write down a specification of like the middle of that tower, right? That allows you to like understand not just from quantum mechanics and one level up, quantum field theory and then zooming all the way up to quantum to to to to to relativity but like filling out the mathematics all the way in between that's like the open project that would be like that's where how you you know solve quantum gravity in this in this idea um and this series some philosophical implications uh or interpretations of like well then what is reality right and this is the last piece of this but like you can what you know garard has interesting has interesting take on it because

you're like okay well you know this infinity groupoid actually is a classifying space of all infinity group voids that you can call like the infinity one topos. You can almost call it like the, Wolfram calls it like the entangled limit of all possible computations. Garar just sort of treats it a bit more like, you know, the classifying space of all the different ways, a multi-way not a terministic terrain machine can evolve. So it's kind of this abstract mathematical, almost like infinite dimensional object that like we and everything are embedded in. And we're sort of slithing. in this higher object.

And in fact, one thing they show in their earlier derivations is essentially what an observer is, is essentially foliating or slicing down a high level object and sort of picking out, you know, states that it are equivalencing. Right. And that's what we kind of have to learn the lesson of in special and general relativity is that there is no universal reference frame for reality, right? This is why you get Lorentz contractions, why you get, you know, no universal agreement on what's simultaneous, right? Observers that are boosted relative to another will pick out different events as being simultaneous. And that's equivalent to you and traditional relativity essentially is

you have a hyper surface that's slicing the bulk and different observers at different reference frames will, that slice will be tilted in different ways. And so that will pick out sets of events in space time

that they will think are simultaneous versus others. We all agree on simultaneous events because we're all relatively moving at the same speed. And so we agree, this is just one, you know, stage we're all playing in.

But that's just an illusion of the fact that we happen to sit in very, very commensurate reference frames. And so the same idea would apply in this realial space. We tend to think we see the same universe. We agree on the laws of physics because we're sitting in, you know, in realial space close to each other, right? We're not boosted relative to each other in realial space. And so we're all, we're slicing this higher dimensional structure basically in the same way, right? So we're seeing the same universe. We see the same laws of physics. But if you were in a different

part of realial space or you were accelerating in realial space, maybe you would see different physics. that connects to you up. So this is like, yeah. So this is like, okay, well then, okay, if this is true, then this is like building this whole tower of abstractions and trying to then translate into predictions and then interpreting it in a way that you could then be like, okay, if we're going to assume higher level intelligence

to have some knowledge of this, right? Well, what can they then do with it, right? Could they engineer these newth bendix completions to stitch together events in a different way? Yes. Right. Or like the nature of consciousness is deeply tied into this, right? Because Garad doesn't go into theories of consciousness. I have my own theories of consciousness here. But like that I think they could be consistent with this in the sense of, you know, our form of consciousness essentially is this idea that we have, we're an embodied local moderately, you know, meso scale structure with limited information observing, you know, the world around us and essentially compressing it down a lot. Like we're compressing huge amounts of information down. And we're basically like slicing everything into a nice discreet. you know, events cluster here.

If you didn't have those constraints, if you, almost like the inverted version of us, right, would be, almost like a quantum, like a conscious quantum computer of such a thing you can imagine,

would kind of be the inversion of us. It would be some mind that would experience like the full branchial graph in one slice at a time. It would have no sense of continuity through time. It would just be like a now wow flash. But I just, I just perceive all in one gulp,

all the different branches of the multi-way system. And then I disappear from existence. And then maybe a new version comes into existence at the next, you know, you know, measurement operation of the quantum computer. The quantum computer is actually a series of now wow flashes. But there's no continuous identity. It's just exists in all possible branches of that particular foliation. We are the like, we're like the orthogonal version of that.

We don't see the different branches. We see one branch and we believe we persist through time. So like we're a fibration of this structure. A quantum computer that's conscious would be a foliation of this structure. Which interesting is there are there versions in between, Are there, like, are those just, those are the only alternatives or are there certain types of ways you could stitch together this very, you know, this abstract, you know, doing these completions that would be somewhere in between? Actually, to your like gradations of the ability to think in sort of a quantum way or something, I think the brain itself is probably, you know, maybe a room temperature quantum system or this is like totally theoretical. I don't have like the specific, you know, causal mechanism or like physical structure in the brain, but that's the Penrose theory.

Yeah. The emperor's new mind, you know, with, with Hammerov. The reason I like it is because I think there's all this empirical statistical evidence that we can predict the future. At the very least, we think in very fundamentally different ways from classical computers, right? Because we can surmise things with small amounts of data. We have these sort of, you know, blink reflexes that seem to be right off. often. And I think that might belie an ability to access a future knowledge state, which in quantum computations you might be able to do. You can reverse cubit positions in quantum computations.

So maybe if there are gradations of the ability to, you know, kind of invert the, the, the, bend X completion or whatever, then, like, we might be sort of ascending into that. Like, that might be what we're being evolutionarily selected for right now. If you look at, again, like Jessica Utt's, the statistician, studying all the sort of, you know, psychic spy Stargate stuff coming out of the CIA, it does seem like a lot of these things fall way below, you know, P values that you'd expect. And so I think it is actually statistically significant. I just think it's like black body radiation in the 1860s or, you know, Mercury's orbit or something. We just like can't put it into math. Or in the case of, you know, yeah, you can't turn in discrete quantum

phenomenon. I think you define this phenomenon. I think you define this phenomenon. in terms of the garard multi-way system. For example, like this basic phenomenon you're talking about is essentially non-locality. But non-locality in a space-time framework to us is either non-local, spatially distributed phenomenon or non-local temporally distributed phenomena. But in this framework, space and time

are emergent observational phenomenologies associated with us being a certain type of observer, foliating reality in a certain way. But for example, you mentioned this like causal graph and the branchial graph. Well, what this directly implies is essentially two events, like two states in the causal graph that seem very spatially, you know, causally separated can be very close in branch hill space. Yep. Right.

So what looks to us as sort of non-local phenomenon, right, in quantum mechanics, quantum superposition, quantum entanglement, right, are, you know, are directly result. Like those two, say like, you know, entangled photons or whatever, they look really far away. in branchal space, they're one edge away from each other. And the way to get into branchial space could be two things. One is high energy physics and then the other

could be something related to consciousness if there is this space-time superposition build-up. This is why I think it's more important the consciousness piece is actually more important than the particle accelerators because what this directly implies is it's not that we're going to smash something at higher energies and break into branchal space. Because branchal space is what

we are collapsing in our conscious experience into we're not necessarily changing root reality, but we are stitching this more fundamental substrate together to construct a world for ourselves. But you are kind of implying that you might be able to affect branch yields, like you might be able to affect spacetime superposition

on a more fundamental level or something. Well, it's a matter of like maybe it's the semantics of like, you know, changing or exploring consciousness, like doing a conscious, manipulating consciousness in some way will allow us to sort of, you know, relax the constraints about how we're stitching this underlying structure together, right? Like we're stitching it into a certain way because, you know, we have evolved this sort of neurological structure and we have to condense things down.

It's like when you do, you know, hallucinetic drugs, the characteristic phenomenology of that is, you know, no definite state, right? That patterns are shifting, right? Your generative world model is in this kind of superposition. Yeah. And it's like radically looking. It's almost like whatever that branches are, you're like exploring, you know, in some way, like multiple branches.

very quickly altogether. Like your world isn't collapsing into a deterministic state. Which if you believe the Penrose model, there may be our brain maintains coherence for some amount of time. He's trying to kind of derive free will in his thing too because he says there's this refractory period

before the buildup into one graviton threshold where you sort of derive and see space time. But in that sort of buildup with spacetime superposition, everything is kind of like, you know, popping in and out of reality. So maybe if you maintain coherence for like longer or something, and this would be a physical way to describe this. And, you know, probably for me to, you know, criticize a Nobel Prize winner genius. But I think, you know, while it's a good to have a well-specified theory that makes those predictions with Stuart Hammeroff's kind of sort of microtubrial piece of it as well, you know, his base, actually we can potentially do an experiment to test this.

Because his basic idea is that essentially when you embed a quantum system in a classical gravitational field, it generates this inherent instability that has a characteristic decay time and that he could set up a measurement apparatus with two entangled masses and see, you know, if you isolate it, like how long will they decay? And actually, a recent experiment was just proposed called the GID experiment, taking two nanocrystals, entangle them, magnetically confined them, and essentially, you know, like weight, right? And it's interesting because this will actually, it won't, it won't rule out, you know, it won't test a specific theory, but it'll rule out categories of, of theories that basically have a classical GR space time with quantum objects. and the basic limit though is that you know it's almost like I think uh I think it was I think who came with I think it was famine even who was just like there's a basic conceptual idea which is like if you have a quantum object in a classical space time it has to send a signal has to somehow influence another quantum object so how is that possible right like a nature of a quantum object is a superposition of states a classical space time can only emit one state it can't be in

multiple gravitational fields right it's only only hold so it's like it's almost the information theoretic question of like you've got the superposition of states that have to somehow send a signal to another thing in a superposition of states that is being transmitted through a classical sort of a sort of you know medium almost like logically doesn't make sense right uh so i think a version of penrose i don't know he has got his twister theory and garard has some ideas about how to essentially get reconstruct uh penrose's twister theory from from from these more abstract models but your idea of like the brain as being a quantum system. It's weird. Like I think people deferred as like the brain like consciousness is quantum. I almost want to invert it and be like quantum is consciousness. Right. It's not that like there's some quantum voodoo thing out there that like consciousness is like interacting with. This is more fundamental. If you take seriously this idea that you know coming out of these mathematical models that garage puts together like consciousness just is what an observer, uh, you know, quantum mechanics. You know, quantum mechanics. just is what a conscious observer will see

when it's trying to make sense of a branching world. The world is just branching. The world is this branchial graph. But we don't see it. If you're an observer that sees one, you have to do this completion procedure. And that process will give you phenomenon that we call quantum mechanics.

But I feel like almost a fundamental question then is like, can you fundamentally influence this Neith Bendix completion in order to sort of pick your pathway, goose bump style across the multiverse? This is the more philosophical question that Garard struggles with a bit, and I haven't seen him land on a particular interpretation. I don't really land on a particular interpretation. But this is where it comes out like, well, you need to have a better theory of the observer. The theory of the observer they have is a kind of very abstract mathematical definition, right? But you really want a richer, you know, more like neurobiologically connected theory of the observer, you know, theory of the observer, to then see, like, well, how many degrees of freedom are there in this process? How to determine, like, the nondeterminism versus determinism question gets very subtle in these sorts of systems. And in particular, this idea, it goes back in, you know, history philosophy between on the one hand, like idealism, on the one hand, empiricism, right? You know, you have the Bishop Berkeley's of the world that basically, you know, in a sense, put all the computational burden and work inside the observer.

The world is some sort of holographic bare field of awareness that that singular entity is experiencing. So all the computational, like, work is happening inside the observer in that model. There's an equivalent model of reality, empiricism, in this sense, where you treat the observer essentially as this null measurement apparatus. And all the interesting computational work is happening outside of it. It clearly has to be in between the full idealism, full materialist reduction. Because in these theories, an observer isn't some weird separate entity in this multi-way system. The multi-way system is just that's all there is. An observer is a certain way of equivalencing those microstates.

I don't think we're interoperable quantum detectors, but then I also don't think we are living in holographic universes. Yeah, and what Garad says is like, it's kind of a free parameter in that sense, that like, it may not actually be a measurable, you know, or even scientific question to resolve of like, like, well, it's just almost like an aesthetic preference. Do you prefer to imagine these models in such a way that all the computational burden ontologically sits inside of one observer or exists outside of the observer? like from there's no observer outside the system right there's only observers inside the system and

we are a certain type of observer inside this system there may be very different types of observers inside this multi-way system yeah that are perceiving it in a different way than us because of the nature of what they are as observers right there's different constraints that they have right they're less computationally bounded they can see more of the microstructure yeah like an ai for example um you know forget the questions about whether a i is or conscious or not but just like just assume that there could be a system that it could be conscious that we would call, you know, an AGI. But, you know, the ability to parse many, many different finely grained details of reality

at a very high, at a very large speed. Yeah. Wouldn't necessarily foliate that causal structure the way we do, right? We foliate the causal structure because the speed of light is much faster than the way our brains process events. So, like, everything looks simultaneous to us. They look like objects with smooth trajectories inside a three-dimensional space. time. If you were able to like like perceive much, much faster, right? The world would be very different. It'd be kind of gooey and

sloopy and it would be just kind of like things would not be in this kind of like smooth flat manifold, right? It'd be this, it would be very different to us. Right. Or if you imagine like how a dog, you know, blind dog that only perceives via smell, like the diffusion rate of, of, of smells is pretty slow relative to, you know, his ability to navigate the environment. So like, if he's constructing kind of a conformal metric for the space that he's in, Like a dog is going to perceive a very different thing. Yes. Right. And so it's like the way we have a full mental model of like space and reality is really downstream of the characteristic features of us as observers. Yes. And we tend to we tend to over anchor on that.

Well, we could, there could be some sort of central server or nodes. Maybe it's like a server client side relationship with consciousness. And there are nodes. We're all nodes of consciousness. And there are strengths, relative strengths of each node. And sort of reality could be this, um, low. But ultimately, if it's local rendering, it's sort of consensus collapsing function. And so there is some two-way interplay between the mind and reality itself in a way that the

full materialist reductionists would like never admit to. But that's going to be constrained by like the rest of the nodes in the system. And so the fact that we're seeing a table right here is because we sort of like implicitly agree that a table is right here. And it's like somebody at a certain level of consciousness a la Jesus or something walked in here, he could turn this table into a chair. Well, I mean, there's, I don't want to presume that I have the final theory here, but like, and there are major gaps. And an important gap in sort of the machinery that Garri has worked out here is multi-observer networks here, right? And because he's trying to get the bare minimal model,

most abstract version and try to generate these mathematical results that then we can interpret in terms of these physical, you know, theories we already have. But we really don't actually have a good theory in these terms of multiple observers. And what, what does like we've sort of worked out in these models what sort of world abstract sort of physical phenomenon or physical constraints in terms of quantum quantum mechanics and relativity does a certain observer see does a essentially a multi-way observer see when they're embedded in a branching universe we haven't those you like what does how does how do two observers see each other right and and importantly like this is a part where I'm going beyond my

competency but there's a part of some of his papers where he's talked about this new spendix procedure kind of propagating out right and just as there is there is finite speed of light in the causal graph, right? There's a finite speed or rate at which, you know, any given event can have a causal influence on other event. You can have a causal light cone that you can, you can define over the causal graph. There's an equivalent sort of entanglement cone in the branch of space. What's the maximal speed of entanglement? We don't know what that is, right? But if we think that like conscious observers are essentially representations of that constraint, right? There's only so much an observer can entangle with or essentially do these

completions, then that might put a boundary constraint what sorts of observers exist in. And I don't know, this is getting beyond like my ability of like, but this idea of like when you do this completion procedure and branch of space, it does propagate out. Like these are connected systems. And this is where it gets, you know, that's good. Then you have to build this tower from the super abstract representations in terms of these graphs to like us. Yeah. And that's like that's, that's a little, that's way beyond what we've been able to do this. But it also makes me think of, you know, Carl Nell who set up Army Futures Command and was, you know, kind of defending Grush publicly as soon as he came out and was on the UAP task force. He talks about a different version of the Kardashev scale. And he talks about that

in two respects. One is energy density over like sheer energy output. And so that being incredibly important, you know, fire, electricity, nuclear, you know, these are more subject to the kind of axis of energy density than they are just sheer output. And then the second thing, he says, is our understanding of the universe and our sort of consciousness level or whatever. And so you're bringing up this, yeah, I mean, if you can get to that, you know, hypergraph level of understanding slowly, you know, that maybe that explains the sort of NHI. But it also forces us to think about other phenomenon that we've previously dismissed, right? Because we have a certain physicalist paradigm and materialist paradigm that's fundamentally local, right, that we have, that like the physicists have, you know, they came up with this model in the last, you know, like, from the. 1800s to the early 1920s. And then that model kind of became embedded in most,

you know, people's folk understanding of existence, right? And then have now crept into how we think about policing certain topics of inquiry in our scientific and medical disciplines, where certain things are considered paranormal pseudoscience, other things are considered perfectly fine and, you know, legitimate. We've drawn a very tight boundary on this. But it's like, we don't actually have the universe figured out, guys, right? Like, we're still figuring new things out, like, we should, we should remain open to those basic assumptions on locality and sort of physicalist, as it's traditionally been described, being just not quite complete descriptions of reality, right?

Yeah. And then, you know, if this something like the story I just told you here is a purely mathematical account of how, you know, we could have what would look to us like non-local phenomenon. Yeah. And that would deeply connected to our conscious experience. That, in one way, would be entirely wooey, telepathy, sorts of interpretations, but would be a hard, just real feature of existence. Yes.

Right? And I mean, I had my mind blown yesterday. I was listening to these to this new podcast. And I again, I haven't like done the due diligence on it. So, you know, proviso. But it's called the telepathy tapes. And I've, I grew up in a pretty hard, hardcore scientific paradigm of like, I need research. I need data. I need I need evidence here. And it's remarkable story of, you know, dozens of nonverbal individuals with autism that essentially, you know, report their like with one caregiver. or like usually their mother having a telepathic connection. And they've actually done like pretty just like what the hell types of experiments. And they what's interesting is they report like these sort of non-speakers, they call them spellers because they use a certain spelling technique to, you know, communicate that they have essentially telepathic connection with other autistic individuals like themselves. Right.

And that they see normal humans essentially us like the speakers, right, as being like we're the handicapped ones. Yeah. Right. We have to, we have to distill and compress, you know, all of this complex phenomenology in our brains, this kind of conceptual stew of thought and feeling and emotion into like vocal tract and like plosive air movements. Yeah.

Right. And that is like such a crude, compressive, you know, thing when you can just have a brain-to-brain connection and it's non-local and they can, you know, exchange feelings. It seems wild and like, you know, a year ago, if you told me like this, I'd be like, this is some kooky thing. there's somebody's rigging this or misinterpreting it. Now I'm like, I actually think there's a plausible explanation for something like that. I believe it. I'm, I got into the UFO stuff through parapsychology, which I think is like a fully like, you know, it's like they pick the worst name.

You have para, you know, like paranormal or whatever than psychology, like the least replicable scientific field or whatever. But you speak to some of these people who were at elite universities studying random event generators, basically our mind's ability to affect, you know, conventionally thought of as random things and phenomena and quantum mechanics with known statistical distributions, things like radioactive isotope decay, that, you know, we're somehow, we are able to affect these things, in my opinion. And you have, you have Jessica Utts doing these sort of, you know, meta-level studies. I think they're pretty good as far as like the experimental protocol, that she's sort of, you know, diligenceing. And then I think there's a lot of, there's a lot of data. And so, yeah, I'm a believer.

And there's a really great book called Time Loops. Have you heard of this by this guy named Eric Wargo? Sounds familiar. I haven't read it now. It's amazing. And it produces some sort of theory as to how this might work. And it involves the brain being sort of this hybrid classical quantum computer where we can access future knowledge states. And so actually feedback is like essential for correct remote viewing. Because if you know that you're right in the future, then you can sort of access shards of that future if the information gets sent back in time. Which there is temporal non-locality in quantum mechanics. and there's spatial non-locality.

So it just point, and then we have the simultaneous to that, you have this burgeoning field of, you know, quantum biology where we know that the CRY4 protein and Robbins or whatever use the magnetosphere of the earth via electron spin to navigate home. We know that enzyme creation occurs via quantum tunneling and that sort of thing. So I see these two like vectors of like, you have like a lot of data on like this anomalous stuff that we just like explain away and we say this is this is B. this is BS because physics, right? Yeah.

But physics is so dumb because epistemologically, 50% of our physical models of reality are always wrong at any point in time. So you can't say that. And then you have this burgeoning field of quantum, you know, biology where it's like, yeah, the body's warm, wet, and noisy. Maybe it's not good for coherence. But like, we're discovering a lot of stuff here. And so I think they probably converge at some of me.

Yeah. And I clearly agree with you. But it's also been, you know, some of the well has been poisoned by a bunch of quantum voodoo peddlers, right? Totally. Who want to be like, I've got magic crystals $10,000 and, you know, I'm going to like fix you. We just have to admit. It's like the Carl Popper's like materialist promissory

notes. You can't have idealist promissory notes either. And you can't say that we know the causal mechanism of the brain. You can hypothesize, maybe there's some quantum going on there. But it is, the data is really compelling. I know Diane Powell who did the telepathy tapes and she's Harvard affiliated. She's, yeah, super legit-nosed and legit

as it gets. Yeah, I was like, I was really impressed by that work. Again, I'm going to look into it. I binge them all last night. I was like, wow, this kind of opened my mind to something I hadn't previously considered. Well, it would make sense that there would be a trade-off, right, between like analytical knowledge and then, you know, flash insight knowledge. Like, that sort of roughly makes sense. And then one possible physical candidate, you have Gary Nolan, who's a microbiologist at Stanford also interested in the UFO topic, who, you know, claims that people are more likely to both see UFOs, but also, you know, be more quote-unquote. quote, psychic with greater neuronal density in the cate nucleus and potamon and the basal gangly

of the brain. And so that could be, you know, and you hook up somebody to an fMRI, for example, while they're playing the game of go. And when they make a, quote unquote, brilliant move, you know, a move that's totally counterintuitive as far as the rational logic set that they're using on an incremental go forward basis, it only makes sense in the context of a future knowledge state that they would have to know of them winning, that part of the brain lights up. And then apparently that part of the brain lights up when somebody takes you bogus as well. So like me and then people have, you know, visionary experiences. Well, yeah. And then the natural question is, okay, well, then how can you situate some

phenomena like that, which are suggestive in a scientifically motivated paradigm that it can explain it? And I think, you know, I'm not to like, you know, keep going back to the Garrardian multi-way systems, but I think that's okay, how can we get as much out of this certain framework as possible that maybe can explain some of these things. And the critical thing to kind of get your head around, it took me a while, multiple years I was thinking about these things. It's like the brain is an evolved information structure that is branching as part of this multi-way process. And it's evolved to sort of, you know, adapt to, it's an information complex, right? Like it, it, the brain is the tower that it's like a really, it's really small in space, but it's really long in time. If you think

about the brain is, you know, a human brain, it goes back, you know, four billion years, right? to the prokiotic suit, right? And those were like bootstrapped, autoclilitic sort of chemical structures, which you can define in terms of some sort of information preserving memory structures. So the universe essentially is learning and then finding ways to embed that learning into real objects that then can learn more and can extend into the future. The universe is constructing itself, right? Yeah. And objects of various kinds are different, you know, present day manifestations of what has been learned, right? That's all that they are. They're just embodied histories of the universe, right? Like, in Bitcoin language, it's like, it's the proof of the universe's work.

The universe is this blockchain, this multi-threaded embodied by sort of blockchain of information theoretic structures. And the brain is a certain type of structure that the universe has evolved and learned how to create and is trying to embed certain. And it's a selection process, right? It's a pretty brutal mechanism to kind of get to these systems. And so you're like, okay, well, what sorts of capabilities then? If this is the space that that object has now been evolving in, it's not been evolving

in what we think of what's been evolving in. It's been evolving in just a terrestrial landscape with three-dimensional space time with predator prey and whatnot interactions, but it's actually evolving in this multi-threaded, you know, branch-hiel system. And there might be capabilities. Again, it has to, it sort of has to optimize, right? Like, how much of its computational work is going to be navigating the causal graph, or just how much of the cost of its computational work is going to be of navigating the branchal graph. Think about navigating the branchal graph in many evolutionary circumstances would be very non-selective, right? You're considering, you don't see the one branch that you're

about to head into. You see multiple branches and you get confused. You don't know how to make a decision, you get eaten, you die, you fall off the cliff, right? Whatever. But there might be unique circumstances where it does give you evolutionary advantage to take a little bit of a peak into the branchal graph, which again, it's not like there's a universal time slice or universal time. There's multiple branches of time, you know, almost an infinite branch of time. And you're in a particular part of this, of this infinite structure. And there might be an evolutionary advantage to be able to like take a little peek at the branchal graph where you get these non-local correlations, right? So you could maybe get into an entangled state.

with a future event to you in your causal structure. Yes. Well, this might be a bit, you know, Gerard, if he was listening to me, he'd be like, he might say, like, technically, that might not be possible if it's because of the structure of the graph. But, like, I think it's possible essentially, and this is getting a bit more of, like, the causal light cone and the branchial entanglement cone, I think,

share a boundary in these models. They don't overlap, but they share a boundary. But it would make sense that access to the branchial would be somehow adaptive, based on natural selection or something. And it goes towards like Donald Hoffman's work of like, why do we see, you know, we don't see like 600 nanometers or whatever. We just see red.

I mean, I come back to the, to these, to these nonverbal autistics, right? That's highly, you know, evolutionary, you know, disfavored, right? But from a group selection pressure, it could be evolutionarily favored. Well, this is why. This is why it's fascinating, right? Like, they might have been called the Sears, the individuals in the society. Exactly. Right.

And so, you know, group selection would identify these people in the population and give them privileged roles. They're not going to be in the hunter, you know, fighter tribe because they'll get hit by the spear. But they'll try to predict whether it's good to go for the, you know, the raid tomorrow. Geniuses are often, you know, asexual, as social or antisocial or antisocial or whatever. But on a group level, they're extremely adaptive. And they're extremely adapted in like kind of Malthusian downturns. Like when times get tough, you need to protect your geniuses. And I was just talking this morning with somebody about maybe like on the population level,

what sorts of selection are we undergoing now, right? And if you imagine, okay, human evolution brought us to a particular point where maybe like the median person is like 99% in the causal graph. One, maybe what's the one person? You get the occasional flashes of intuition. Weird synchronicity. You know, weird things that you were like, how did I know that? Or I was just thinking about that person they called me, things that we sort of write off.

Right. In these, in these autistics examples, like, they live much more in that world, right? and it makes them very hard to navigate normal world where we live in the callsograph, and they interact in a very different way. They perceive reality very differently than us. It's very hard for us to understand. It's always sort of write it off as like they're disabled.

But actually, it's like they're just experiencing reality in a very different way to us. And it's disfavored to navigate normal world. But then we're also looking like, what sort of society are we constructing? In a sense, like what does it mean to be autistic? And again, I'm not trying to like, you know, be like an expertist.

But like in general, you know, it's like unable to sort of process normal sensory signals in a coherent way. It's sort of sensory overload, right? And sort of what we're doing to ourselves as like a civilization, right? Like we're constructing this digital machine interfaces and just like the cacophony of noise and hyperstimulation. It almost is making us like autistic as a civilization. And then on the other side, what do you see?

Like the burgeoning cultural movements among elites, they're all about consciousness, taking psychedelic exploration. Like they're being squeezed out of the normal causal world and they're really spending a lot more time as like groups and, you know, different, different social practices that like explore consciousness, right? Explore the branchial space, right? Take psychedelics, meditative practices, et cetera. So I see this is like this, like this is the transition we're undergoing as a species is like, you know, we've now constructed a sort of technological civilization where we don't need to have, you know, all of that cognitive energy motivated to navigate the causal graph. We now can explore. And maybe that's the,

maybe that's what these NHI have done. They've, they've gone through this, right? And now this is where they spend most of their time. Well, it could totally. And it could point to, I mean, this is a dark interpretation, but it's like maybe we're in the three-body problem, maybe in causal space our timeline is kind of screwed. And this mass desire to explore branchial space vis-a-vis UFOs, psychedelics, consciousness, techniques is an attempt to ascend out of a timeline that on a materialist causal level is not doing so hot.

I mean, this is where it gets, I mean, we're, all this was on the different branches of speculative physics, speculative metaphysics, then connecting it down to like speculative interpretations of our current, you know, human story. Well, can I add one thing to that, which is, you know, Eric Weinstein didn't believe in UFOs for superlop. I would always be like, dude, I think this is real. You know, again, based on some of the stuff I'm pointing out about parapsychology where I'm like, I don't know how it's real, but like these observables just seem right.

And he got into it because he became convinced that there was kind of this secret branch of physics, like involving people like Wheeler. Feynman DeWitt and that these guys had way more of an interface with private aerospace than actually met the eye. One of the guys in that Wheeler Feynman-Dewitt circle is a guy named Hugh Everett. And Hugh Everett was Wheeler's student at Princeton. And he came up with this multiverse theory in the 50s. And DeWitt really helped popularize it in the 70s. And I think about the stuff that DeWitt was working on, you know, with Agnew Bonson at the Institute of Field Physics at UNC, North Carolina Chapel Hill. It was like...

often gravitational anomalies. It was like, there was an extreme interest in gravity. And obviously, at least on a macroscopic general relativity scale, gravity and time seem super tightly coupled. And so, and then Everett goes and he works for the Pentagon. He works on all sorts of like interesting game theory stuff vis-a-vis like our nuclear program. And I sometimes wonder if like the,

if there is some high-level game that's like, you know, above our at least known Cardishov scale. It's going on at the level of like time, timelines and nuclear stuff. Yeah, I mean, it sounds nuts, but I also have forced myself into a situation, you know, intellectually where I have to take this idea of timeline manipulation very seriously because it comes out naturally from seeing the world in terms of this sort of multi-way evolution systems, right, where there is no preferred time line. And it's not like the, you know, the bulk universe, you know, sense of generativity is true.

It's, it's, essentially these models are very much like an Everettian interpretation, but a little bit more of a fundamental structure. He basically just takes the mathematics of, um, of, uh, of the way function is just, okay, whatever. It's just, you know, all the, all these eigenvalues exist in just a different universe, right? And then the way that he characterized it is like, um, each measurement operation causes a branch. But he doesn't really define what a measurement operation. is. So there's kind of an undefined sense of like how do you scope the the actual multiverse that

gets created, right? What are the branches, right? What defines a branch? In the garard, it's a very well-defined sense of what a branch is, right? Because it's a discrete structure. There's only accountable number of these branches. And so, but I have to take that seriously of like there's multiple threads of time and they're not all like potentially accessible, right? and they're going to be constrained in any given local reference frame that's defined by an observer or set an observers in sort of this ruleial representation that all are slicing reality relatively close to each other. Well, it's like, well, how, how navv- like, is it possible to move, you know, like make decisions that have, for example, the theory here, right? This goes back to, I think, I forget where, there's like some, like, UFO lore, some communication with some NHI. It was like, what's going on?

Like, where are you here or something? It was like, CIA Wizards are messing with the timeline, right? It was kind of like the tagline. And it's kind of, you know, become kind of a bit of like lore, you know, sort of, you know, storytelling. But it's like, well, okay, I always try to cash out these crazy statements in terms of something I can interpret in terms of, you know,

the physics that I trust here. And it's like, okay, well, if it turns out that it is possible if you, you know, we're all minds existing in a very tight cluster in real real space. And we're slicing, we see reality basically the same way. and is it possible that like you know one of those minds because we don't have an observer as I mentioned we don't have like a theory of this structure where it's like multiple observers interacting right is it possible that like some of those people can just decide you using certain whatever techniques right might involve consciousness right it amplified with whatever you know degrees of freedom we can exploit through our technology that could you know cause nearby minds to all shift with them to a new timeline yeah right if I'm I'm like, okay, how is it possible to take a prima facie absurd statement, CIA Wizards messing with a timeline, and cash that out in something I can interpret in terms of a physical theory? That's how I would have to do it. It doesn't mean it's, you know, true. It just is like,

I feel like, you know, I try to hear these things and I try not to dismiss them. I try to, you know, come up with a naturalistic explanation that isn't just, oh, we're time traveling. Well, because then you get into all the causal problems of time travel. Yes. One of the things in these models that time travel can be specified in a certain way whereas because there's no such thing as like a universal time function yeah exactly right but so in the branchial space it might a branchal space time travel would be an observer happens happens to equivalence a set of states in its future causal graph that are that are observational indistinct from a set of states that previously existed in its causal so it's not like he trapped like that observer traveled back in time it just happens

to encounter in its future causal graph a structure of states that is identical, observational indistinguishable from a past set of states. Like that, you know, it's still a linear process of the, of these, of this evolution, but just encountering a future state that's identical to a past state, right? Or if you have hypergraph root access, you have a saved game state from kind of an information theoretic standpoint, you could just like go back to that saved game. Well, so in, in the language of category theory, if you have these, if you have this, you know, if you have state A in, you know, local future, that's observationally.

indistinguishable from state B relative to the observer, the observer can equivalence those two states. Sure. Right. And so there is no meaningful distinction between it's like a saved state that then was past. It's like that's all that there was. Right. And the observer is just encountering a future state that is identical to its past state. There's no way to distinguish between that and like canonical descriptions of time.

From our perspective. Right. There's no observational distinct. Maybe maybe like at a lower level of description, they actually are different. It's not true time travel in the sense that they're, you. you know, the microstates are observation, are actually identical. But that's not what you need to explain time travel that would be, you know, empirically relevant to us. It would just be, you know, and how is this different from simulations, right? Well, you know, well, one is like,

you just happen to encounter a future state that's identical to a past state. The simulation interpretation, this would be somebody is able to construct for an observer or set of observers, a set of observations, a set of states in its future that are observation indistinguishable to that set of observers to states that were in this local past. And I don't know, that's way beyond our capabilities. Well, that's, that's, I know that there's, it's not ruled out, right, in principle. It's beyond our capabilities, but I don't know, like, sometimes I think about how obvious the simulation arguments are. So this is like popularized by Nick Bostrom and, you know, super intelligence that that gave it its sort of coveted academic sample of approval. But before that, you had Philip K.

Dick talking about this in all his sci-fi novels. And you even have somebody. who in my mind is as conventional and like not creatively thinking as Neil deGrasse Tyson saying that we are 50% we're in a we're in a simulation so like he that guy won't like you know you need to get peer reviewed and like I'm not going to respect anything else in the physics world outside of like super conventional dogma but 50% we could be in a simulation and so I think about like that 50% branch right of like us being in a simulation which again is that that might even be underestimated, given that Neil deGrasse Tyson is the spokesman here, if you think about where we're headed in our future, things probably don't remain stable.

They probably inflect upwards or downwards. And if they reflect downwards, it's like this, you know, we're all walking around in shanty towns without access to clean water and we're microchipped. But like you probably get this like increase in like IT, you know, virtual reality, fidelity. And so that's like ready player one. Definitely opt into the simulation. If we end up in a world of resource abundance, it will be through dual-use technology. And technology that will either be saving of humanity or destroying of humanity.

We're not at the point at which a kid in his bedroom can blow up the world, but we might be at some point in the future. Just the destructive tech exponentially increasing and then costs of that tech. you know and so it's like if you were to like be like quote unquote guardians of that future world you might put people through a simulation as a test to uh you know and maybe they have to contemplate virtue and that allows them to ascend out of the you know out of their uh you know uh computational interfaces and have access to uh this world that is you know maybe infinite resources but also you can destroy it at the drop of a hat or something yeah it's tough to sometimes connect this metaphysical model or metaphysical analysis and physical analysis to like

the human condition in our in our day-to-day kind of in near future trajectories, right? And I think the interesting thing about the NHI question is it's like it's the it's the fulcrum point, right? That sort of is forcing us to to one, zoom out and try to situate ourselves in what we think of as the final or at least more fundamental picture of reality. Yeah. And then account for these objects in terms of some, you know, near-term or some interpretation of our, of our political experience, right? Those are like, and in, like, religious, you know, stories, that's like a traditional cosmogony or theosophy.

It's like, we want to, or theodicy, like, we want to tell, uh, we want to situate our, you know, nitty-gritty, humdrum, terrestrial human affairs in some sort of cosmic story, right? And that, that imbues everything with significance. It imbues us with significance. It imbues this with meaning and whatever. And so it's a very tempting. human project, I, like, if the, if the, if the, if the, if the, uh,

the, uh, if the, uh, encounter's and the UAP craft were not real, right? And I was just on the separate trajectory of analyzing Wolfram models. I'd be like, oh, those are separate. Those are separate things. Yeah. It's like, analyze metaphysics and think about, you know, how humans are going to screw, you know, screw each other up. Um, the fact that we have this interface now, apparently, with some other form of

intelligence, you know, forces you to then stretch into these questions. But then, of course, we have the heavy baggage of our society of all these different theodyses and worldviews and different religious interpretations that we have to kind of navigate because those are very, very deeply embedded. But I do think, like, very practically, right? Like, we are creating crazy weapons. Yeah. Right? I'll just tell you, we are. We have some crazy shit.

Right? Like, and there's some crazy shit happening like now. Yeah. I mean, I had a meeting just the other day. Some people inside DoD Intel. And I was told, you know, one of the things came out of the water and. hits somebody. That's wild.

And this happens not infrequently. And this was a conversation with a person that was not, this was not the topic of the conversation. Like a craft can come out of the water? I try not to get, we were trying to get into any details. It was, it was one of those things.

Because we know nuclear subs are actually the first line of offense, but no, like it, you know, came out of the water. Transmedium. And zapped. Woo. Yeah.

Wow. That was, it was a bit, it was a bit much. And this came in the context of a conversation that was not about this at all, right? It was in more normy, you know, stuff I do like day job sorts of stuff. And it just came out towards the end. And yeah, I'll just like, so this is happening now, right? And it's happening in a complicated set of conditions. And so this is where it's like, you know, we had this very abstract, you know,

physics, metaphysics, intelligence, simulation, discussion. But then I have to come back to like this conversation, like these conversations I had just like a few days ago. And I'm like, what the hell is actually happening? Because I'm not sure I can truly explain, like the nature of these abstract models

and abstract thought experiments is they set boundary conditions for possible explanations. They give you a guide to sort of get a sort of gut understanding or you kind of grok what you can mentally visualize. But they, don't really, you know, help you account for, like, the, these random, like, these detailed things that are happening, right? Like, why is the particular morphology? Why, you know, all the, you know, different aspects of, quote, like, ufology, they do not, I know, we have a predictive

theory that is, like, so general that makes these specific, you know, set of hypotheses that then correlate, you know, one to one with all the specific details of UFO. How, how put off might be closest, but even that, you know, involves sort of messing with John Einstein's field equations in a way that a conventional physicist. Well, I mean, there's also, I mean, if I have some issues with simulation theory, but like on a metaphysical basis, but there's versions of the simulation hypothesis, which are not metaphysical, they're just like,

we are all being, like, someone basically has, you know, virtually matrixed us. Yes. Right? And, you know, whatever, they've just able to do that. And in that scenario, well, like, this is the three body problem, but on steroids, like, what science can we do? Right?

Like, they control the experiments we can run, the thoughts we can have, the things we can observe. Like, we're just puppets, right? So the question is, like, where is that degree of freedom still exists in a simulation that's, you know, hypothesized in that scenario? And is it one in which even the simulators have some inherent constraints, like this computational irreducibility? They can set it up.

They can set some boundary conditions and initial states. And they just have to let it run. Yes. And they're just learning what the system does. You can say that's a good model for the whole universe. Yep. Right? universe is just it's running it's discovering new things it's creating novel structures and it's

embedding its memories over time into the future um so you know i'm not sure how much that gets you right in terms of well there's like nPC version of the simulation which gets you nowhere it gets you into your cog in the machine with no free will and then there's like avatar version of the simulation where you're porting yourself from on high into like a lower level simulation maybe voluntarily maybe not but like maybe there's some sort of root access you can get to or something but that that's also like yeah extremely hard to quantify yeah i mean there's like like like lee crone and sarah walker really like them they've tried to construct versions of assembly theory should have them on um and you know they have a certain vision of of free will and i think you can actually i i don't have a full account

of all this but like intellectually i'm really interested in trying to pull together um the wolfram models which you think of like the more fundamental structure of reality the more fundamental sort of mathematical physical picture with the assembly theory picture which is trying to think about the universe at a slightly higher level of description in terms of information constructors, self-replicating information persistence through time and, like, assembly as like a mathematical framework to think about, you know,

what sort of structures the universe is creating. Yes. And then I want to take that, and I want to combine it with kind of the metaphysics of something close to what, like, Philip Goff, the philosopher has in terms of... He sometimes goes between cosmocychism, protopan psychism, where consciousness is embedded.

Yes. Right? Because even the Gerard Wolfram models, They're fully abstract, idealized, sort of structural descriptions of reality, right? But they don't actually tell us like why there's such a thing as qualia or phenomenal experience. Same with assembly theory is this really neat mathematical understanding of how chemistry tethers into biology. Yeah. But I think consciousness lies outside of it.

And like why you have extremely high, I guess they have like an index, right, for like an assembly index or whatever. They have an assembly number and then the copy number. Right. So like why you have like complex systems that. are like somehow low entropy is like like that's like this extremely open question and I would say like you brought up Maxwell's demon you know the the plot of the movie tenant like yeah yeah so it's like in this case he uses it's actually I don't think a particle accelerator but he figures out some sort of Maxwell's demon thing where you can reverse you know second law of thermodynamics reverse entropy

and like maybe consciousness is the only anti-entropic force or something it's like an order creating for, there are even words in biology, people sort of make up, it's like centripy, you know, where it's like, if you look at Carl Fristin's free energy principle, his famous neuroscientist, you know, our brains are attractive to,

are attracted to ordered signals and not randomized signals, you know, and so there's, there's something about that, that like seems to, I think that the, um, the, uh, the, uh, assembly theory model is like almost complete,

but I think that the consciousness, that consciousness thing is really important. So I try to think about like, imagine you had a God's eye view of like this abstract like realm that I'm talking about in terms of, say the branch of a graph or even like a more abstract variation of it. And you could like, you're looking at it and you're trying to find like

what are the interesting parts of it, right? Like brains would be, you know, like we think brains are small and insignificant because we're just small, relatively small creatures on a big, on a moderate size planet around a medium sun in the middle of like vast emptiness of, of space time. But this sort of picture of reality, this sort of, you know, that is the causal graph representation, right? The sort of coarse-grained macro scale representation that, you know,

smoothly differentiable, you know, continuous manifolds, allows us to do general relativity, etc. But it tells us there's a different picture of reality, the sort of branch-hield structure. And this kind of correlates to how Lee Cronin and then we're thinking about kind of the universe constructing, you know, more interesting objects, right? And more interesting objects, essentially are like more information theoretic complex structures that persist through time. And so that is what the universe is creating, right? The brain is actually one of the more interesting objects that the universe has created thus far. You know it's small in space.

It's very large in time and extremely large in kind of complexity space. Right. And so like think about not us as humans, but like us as like conscious balls, right? Like from like other conscious balls in the universe that might be causally distant. They might not be so distant in branchial space. And they would have, they'd be really interested in finding those other balls of interestingness. Yes. Right.

So it'd be like moths to a flame to a certain extent. Yeah. Right. And so I think this is what like, NHI kind of, you know, it's like, they think how could they get here? It's like, well, are they coming here from the planet over there or are they coming from branchial space? Not that far away. Yeah. Right.

And we just have, you know, like, we're just interesting now. Well, when I did this, this piece with David Grush, he was like, if I were a betting man, I thought this was like the most important piece or part of my interview. and it's like a very sort of fleeting moment. But he says, if I were a betting man, I would say that, you know, they might not be that, the NHI might not be that much more advanced from us, but they come from an alternative timeline in which they went the civil propulsion route and we went the destructive nuclear route. So it points to what you're saying.

And if you have like the economics of the future involving this like weird Kardashev scale thing, it's like when we create nuclear weapons, we might be of interest and you might have this sort of dark forest analogy, all the three body problem where until that happens, it's actually really adaptive for them to hide themselves and to not let themselves be known. And then all of a sudden you have to interact in sort of these ephemeral ways to affect timelines or whatever because we might be blowing ourselves up or something. Yeah. I mean, it's interesting.

I think the dark forest books are really good and a good exploration is kind of this, you know, cosmic game theory. But I also have, I have two thoughts on this. One is like, I think advanced civilizations like, I think people default in the Cardasheff scale to going like bigger

and out into the universe and that correlates with the you know the standard vibe the musk vibe we got to become multi-planetary we're going to do

von Neumann self-replicating probes and we're just going to expand out we're going to colonize available resources in our like in our future light cone it's kind of the you know the trope in San Francisco like the future light cone of humanity is at stake

in this nonsense right yeah and uh and I think that's it might be wrong right because if you actually look at our trajectory of civilization like yeah we're going to the moon we're going maybe to mars and we're putting some effort into that but like where is the vast majority of our effort going into it's building smaller and smaller structures yes right it's you know it's an nanometer race right and tsmc you know seven

nanomeres and two meters we are trying to carve into you know the smallest scales as possible more information and like interesting you know causal um uh you know power and i think instead of thinking about civilizations expanding out into the universe do they just like like, do they just basically collapse into its basement? Yeah, engineering at the molecular levels, like, way more interesting than more brute force to, like, move out into content space. And that would also kind of semi-explained part of the Firmarythodox is, like, where are they? We don't see them. Well, it's because you're looking for civilizations that are transforming their local galactic neighborhood, right? They're just,

they're doing massive gigascale infrastructure projects to convert stars into, you know, more probes, right? Whereas maybe that's, that's amateur hour. Like, most civilizations realize, like, why bother, right? When there's a hole, there's like, there's a shortcut. We just, we, you break into the basement and then you've got root access to reality. You'll need to mess around with stars. You could just zip around and do whatever, right? And maybe you get, you know, just arbitrary degrees of, of, of, of, uh, energy you can

exploit from the quantum vacuum or whatever, right? And that you can construct, you know, information is information. It's scale invariant. It's like, why do you need to construct, you know, galactic scale, like, computronium, you know, things versus like, you know, just embed things at the, plank scale. Right? And they're just like, you know, you just disappear. You sort of go poof, right? And, and then maybe that corresponds with the deeper understanding of, you know, again, this multi-threaded structure of time. And, you know, you're looking to see who's coming in to

join your club, right? Who's about to make that break where they figure out how to engineer themselves, not to zoom out and expand, but to like go in, right, to join them? And everyone that's there, you know, by assumption, say, doesn't have any implicit technological advantage. And there's not necessarily maybe, you know, assume maybe there's local scarcity, but there's no global scarcity. And so the competitive dynamics are pretty mollified, if not extinct. And so there's not really this competitive race. Really, all you're competing over is sort of what sort of cultural, sort of conscious experiences are you bringing to that party? Right. Right. Because everyone, maybe discovers the same physics, but they got there through a very, you know, historically

contingent evolution. They've got an interesting culture, background, narratives, stories. That would be, would be interesting to share and exchange the economy of that would be kind of an economy of conscious experience, right? And, and, you know, new, you know, civilizations that are nucleating higher level consciousness and conscious, you know, balls that are interesting, that can engineer technology that allows them to essentially, you know, instead of upload, download themselves, right, into the basement of reality, that are they going to join them, right, wherever they are. And they'd be like, oh, we're going to scout out, you know, some of those civilizations that might be close to doing that, right? And we're going to

you know, just assess the cut of their jip, right? Like, what is their story? What is their, what are they going to bring here? Are they going to be kind of annoying? Are they going to, are they going to, like, kind of rub us the wrong way? Like, and maybe there's some elements of this, and this is super speculation, which is like, hey, like, we seem to be all a part of this grand universe mysterious project of creating interesting things like us.

And this is where we all end up. Yeah. And so we're like, we want to help get the new guys in. Yeah. And we'd rather you not blow yourself up and destroy everything. We'd want to hear, you know, get you there. And maybe there's, you know, in this narrative, right, maybe there's like, you know, steps in between us and where you ultimately get to, right? Yeah.

This sort of what we would call more spiritual, enlightened, you know, angelic, universal consciousness, whatever, right? Yeah. But maybe there's steps in between and maybe some advanced civilizations haven't gotten there yet. Yeah. Right. And they're kind of being dicks, right? And maybe they're messing with us. Right.

And there's maybe those people, those terms of NHI, they're kind of being dicks to us. And maybe there's this other, you know, larger, maybe more amorphous group. group, whatever, that sits into slightly different, you know, adjacency to our experience of the world. And they're like, you know, they're not like warring gods in that sense, but they're like, hey, we'd much rather these Dickish aliens not mess with you anymore. And we much rather, like, you guys get on the, get on the right path to, like, eventually come join us. Oh, it's so fascinating. It's like a consciousness economy. You can picture, like, a consciousness world's fair, where each person brings their world of experience or something. I think people,

because we're, I mean, we're ever, we're, we're so embedded in this materialist paradigm. which is, you know, essentially, which leads you to a vision of hyper-competitive zero-sum dark forest models where it's all, you know, scraping for available matter in your light cone. And it might not be it, right? Because it's just assuming a certain structure of what those conscious agents are motivated to do. Yeah. Well, in fact, if there was some holographic overlay of our reality or some higher-dimensional space, it probably wouldn't be, like, the materials would be sort of local incentive structures to, like, mine some. much deeper or more fundamental. And those things wouldn't be thought of as important to us because, you know, the materials

would be used as levers or whatever, carrots and sticks. But in fact, you know, good vibes and bad vibes might represent that economy better than, I mean, it's almost like on one end we have, say, like a dead AI and the other end we have like an enlightened autistic spiritual being, right? And you can almost imagine like what we are now is work. kind of, we're kind of at this crux point. And you can almost see this play out in kind of our different cultural attitudes and debates of like, you know, is it all about doubling down a machine intelligence? Yeah. And the fears of what that would mean, or do we go into this more

enlightened, you know, spiritualist, you know, kind of consciousness expanding direction? And I almost see that as like, okay, like, I always like to do the physicists, like take everything to the limit, right, to sort of explore the, like, the boundaries of the system. And it's like, okay, well, if another civilization or if there's the, that is a natural bifurcation. That is a natural bifurcation for any civilization in the universe, right? Where I assume there is, consciousness is real and fundamental, but also, you know,

AIs are possible, right? And, like, manipulating matter to, you know, expand and actual do things in the universe as possible. Well, there could be civilizations that split and go both in both directions. But what that mean is, like, imagine a planet that, like, spits off, you know, both, like, a colonizing dead mind,

dead machine intelligence. And then its progenitors kind of go and hide out in the basement and enjoy conscious, like the consciousness economy. And the rest of the universe just becomes like kind of a hostile place. Yeah. But like the cool,

like the party's down there. Yeah. Right. And so we're not, we're kind of, we're not there yet, right? But we're creating. So it's like,

I try to like construct the end of just like just those stories or narratives. But that sort of accounts for these different tropes that in the UFO lore. The thing, basically in the time-d-long books are things that Elizondo's hinted at. You know, they've drawn. And even the book, Cryptos conundrum.

It's, they all address this idea of like the, the bad NHI or the malign. It's always, the metaphors are always like a swarm, mindless, soulless. Yeah, like a Borg-like intelligence. Yeah, that's usually the metaphors. And those are very persistent tropes. And then the alternative, like the binary opposition is individualistic, but like enlightened, conscious connected beings. It's why I'm pro UFO over.

So if you see AI and UFOs is to kind of somewhat maybe oppose narratives, but both like narratives you should probably be bullish on over the next 10 to 20 year time around, you know, whatever. Yeah. T's annoying and adjusting term, you know, I think there'll be more in the zeitgeist. Like, you know, increasing. Oh, I mean, yeah, 10 years, I'd be a bit optimistic. Yeah, it's happening. Oh, it's happening now. It's happening now. But, you know, near term, this is, these things are just going to grow. And I think the AI thing I have really trouble, a lot of trouble telling a charismatic story as to how it ends. It's sort of just pure game theory. But like from like a consumer or like individual interface perspective, kind of dystopian like maybe outside of like getting a better natural

language interface to like Google or whatever, you know, like, like, uh, so your better recall occurs in like natural language you can understand better. You know, I think outside of like decreasing that latency, we're kind of decreasing the latency between the brain and the consumer internet, which is not a positive thing in my opinion. So that feels like kind of dystopian and then I'm not even getting into like being able to create a nerve agent with off the shelf parts with an LLM or whatever. Like so that feels like pretty dark. On the UFO side, there definitely is this like swarm hive mind component that like scares me a bit. whereby you could totally create some auspice for like a clamp down new world order where like nobody has any sort of autonomy because of this hive mind invasion the hive mind again also could be real and so that could be dystopian but then like maybe there's some version of it where we can like ascend consciousness wise and maybe we can meet some you know higher cardishov scale you know angelic beings or whatever that are that are a

little less, uh, interferent in our day-to-day matters. And so, yeah, yeah, it's interesting. If you go back to the,

you know, it's interesting, the UFO story and even the consciousness story are very intertwined in American, you know, intelligence history. Right? Like the discovery of LSD and like,

you know, probably the, you know, the, we had some crap, but I think, you know, we detonated,

um, uh, the Tiller Ulam device, right? And it's just like, a lot, a lot of stuff happened in like the early 1950s, uh,

atomic energy act, you know, past that. It was like, okay. And then of course that was obviously how putoff was involved in both the UFO side of this as well as the consciousness side of this. And of course, MKLtra was maybe

the more weaponized version of the consciousness research and the remote viewing programs were the more, you know, trade craft out of this sort of application. It seems very clear these were sort of interwoven threads. But like, those were all behind the curtain. Yeah. Right. Like they're all suppressed at the same time. Probably for similar reasons, right? But also had

deep political consequences, right? Like, the reason why we don't, you know, Nixon, there's, didn't want, you know, hippies doing LSD, and taking acid is like, why do I, like, it undermines the paracrical power structure, right? Undermines people's confidence and like you as the authority figure, right? It's like, we can't have that, right? What's interesting now is that like countercultural revolution is coming from the elites. It's just coming from a different cluster of elites that now essentially have demonstrated more power than the establishment elites. Right. And now like that wave of sort of, I know, like a huge

cluster of elites in Austin and San Francisco regularly do psychedelic drugs and do these like, practices almost are like, you know, what would be like psychological cults, right? I'm trying to like deeply connect and take on special formulations and pay tens of thousands of dollars for these experiences, right? And these are people that run large companies and that are like raising tens and millions of dollars for their startups, right? And it's like, this is a, I see this like a blast wave of like a cultural reform like reformation that's focused on essentially a consciousness.

Yep. You know, paradigm. And it just hasn't that it's coming from a counterly, but it hasn't spread throughout the whole society. But like when it does, that will be a dramatic transformation. information, right, of just how we situate things in like the basic political economy. And like, can you imagine like if, you know, the average congressman was like doing psychedelics on the weekend and like talking about their, they're like, you know, their experiences, right? Completely outside their

or window. Yeah. I expect that to happen the next five or ten years. Five to ten, I would say. I mean, maybe two to three. I don't know. Right. Like I would extend that out, but I agree with the trend. That's why. No, I mean, the rate of change just that I've seen from like the folks that are currently in the vanguard and that will probably be, you know, part of this wave, we talked about the beginning of this, or anti-establishment, you know, counter-elites coming in, you know, a good proportion of them have a radically different metaphysical worldview. Yeah. Right. While they're also the vanguard of techno capital, they inherently don't, I think, trust techno capital. Totally. They've used it to accrue power and they've gotten to where they are, but now they have a sense of, you know,

emptiness and anxiety and then they want to get meeting somewhere else. Well, it's like, you know, J.D. Vance had a, you know, venture capital career prior to becoming VP and like, but he's kind of anti-tech. And it's like, you know, I think the more nuanced, you know, perspective that, uh, does justice to his worldview better is like, he's anti big tech and like, you know, tech malfeasance. But like, it is this nuanced worldview where you look at the, the make America healthy again, people or whatever. And they describe it as like a spiritual or cosmic war. And like that, you wouldn't really hear those terms like, you know, 10, 20 years ago. And that's, I think, I think that's what has happened, right? And that's where the UFO thing

is coming into it is like this perestroika and glass-nosed idea is like, it's not just a political project for many folks. It's like a spiritual or metaphysical project. And this is why the, sort of, you know, the UFO thing isn't just a pure nuts and bolts technological thing. Because I think, you know, even the legacy program knows it's not, right? It's not just like, okay, they've got some metamaterial. Maybe there's a tensor, you know, component to the Einstein field equations that we can, you know, rejigger to, you know, get some, you know, anti-gravitic effect and we can then do, you know, some crazy ISR orb stuff, right? Great. Good for you. But that's not the big thing. No, it's really not. That's not that that's not the

thing that they're worried about coming out, right? I don't think they're worried about the fact that, oh, we can do anti-grav and we've got special stuff and maybe China's got orbs and, you know, that's a thing. That's not, that's not something that would be catastrophic disclosure. No. No. Right. It's something completely different, right? It's a much bigger, you know, sense of, um, transforming how modern civilization thinks of itself and the relationships of existing power structures is what i know um sheen has talked about as you know he represents you know a spy for a certain legacy institutional structure right he's the he's the he's the he's the chief he was the chief station i mean he was the uh chief legal counsel for uh for uh for for for the jesuits um which you know

it's like it's like what people ask like how does dany shea know all this stuff it's like he's just like a lawyer who happens to be you know a jesuit kind of you know policy guy was like, no, he was like, he was chief of station for the Jesuit, you know, intelligence gas paparized, right? Like, in D.C. Like, he's like, you know, he's a spy, fundamentally. He's like, but he's a scholar of spy coming out of that Jesuit tradition, like their oldest spy organization on the planet. He's like Forrest Gump or Zellic. He literally is in, pops up in every American conspiracy. But like, what do you think that was a coincidence, right? No, no, but I also, I find it super positive. He was also like, how is he still alive?

Yeah, yeah, yeah. Right? Yeah. This is why? No, that's the Occam's Razor explanation. I mean, it's also fascinating that, like, certain of, so I think the JFK, for example, for example, is, like, he's pretty unbiased there. Like, he wasn't directly involved in any of that stuff. And so, like, I actually think, like, that account is, like, fully right when it comes to Xi'in. And then he'll tell the story of Watergate, and he'll be like, because he represented James McCord, who was, like, you know, Dulce is number two for a long time.

And he was, like, the main architect behind it was, like, him and G. Gordon Liddy, main architects behind Watergate. And I'm like, wait, so what about James McCord? Like, he was, you know, CIA. And like, he'll say, like, well, James McCord, you know, he wanted to be on the inside. And he wasn't on the inside. He didn't know quite what he was doing. So, like, he was, he was ordered to, you know, uh, uh, burglarize the DNC and bug Larry O'Brien's phone. But like, he, he wasn't clued in. And so he got really pissed about that, you know, whatever. And I'm like, dude, that's not the story. I think McCord knew way more. And that's the part where I'm like, okay, like Cheyenne might have, you know, some interests there and like protecting him and he was defending him.

Yeah, this brings me a slightly different tangent. But like thinking about the story, right, people as it goes back to like thinking, what actors are we modeling in this whole narrative? Right. We tend to bucket in these bland terms of like the CIA, Lockheed Martin, you know, the Vatican. just these blobs of institutional references. Monolith. And it's just not how in practice it plays out. Like even at the microscale, it's like, they're very individual, you know,

actors that are aligned in very kind of complex, overlapping relationships with each other. And intelligence, you know, services, this is how it is. There's always like a fractal structure of compartmentization and like true, you know, who's really got power, right? It's often opaque even to the people who think they've got all the power. Because they never really know, right? And even in those, you know, the high watermark when it was really tightly concentrated, there were a lot of people with outsized influence and they could kind of construct these vertically integrated bureaucratic systems. You know, that was still, you know, there was a lot of, you know, internecine fights and, you know, subterfuge and always like, you know, my deputy might be trying to take my job sorts of dynamics. But then I think it sort of, it got disintegrated or fractalized in the, you know, last 34 years. But it and also globalized in the sense that you have like,

I think a much more complex set of actors. They have a lot of resources. So you think the intelligence communities of the big baddie has all the information. Like Google, Amazon, these guys have probably more information. They're like neo-governmental organization. Like Pipa Malmgren has written about this.

It's brilliant insight. She's like, Amazon, Jeff Bezos, probably has access to more intelligence and better intelligence than the NSA does in many ways. Because he can look at, maybe not individual level intelligence, but like he manages all the intelligence databases for the government, right?

Yes. And he can detect, you know, he knows what everyone's buying, right? He can detect the mood of everybody. Totally. Right? The NSA doesn't have access to that information. He knows. So that's probably why he refused to the endorsement.

Because he has probably some proprietary analytical model of like everyone's buying and purchases decisions. They've constructed some fancy AI that's like predictive of their, you know, which books have they ordered? How does it correlate to their, to their Twitter views, et cetera, right? And they just know immediately. Why do you think Elon went online? Because Elon knew.

Sentiment analysis. These guys knew. Sentiment analysis. They'd done the correlations. They know exactly what the outcome is going to do. Interesting aside on Bezos, his grandfather, I think, was the head of the Atomic Energy Commission. Lawrence P. Geis. Yeah, he was the director of the Western Division. Harold Momgren told me that story. He's now come public with it. It was, yeah. Yeah, so that, yeah, quick finish that thread is, yeah, Howard Momgren, Senior Advisor to Kennedy, Nixon, Ford, etc., Winterkin, McNamara Prodigy, probably saved nuclear war under, you know, when Curtis Lane wanted to go, he was sent to the tank and, you know, sort of held Curis. Lemay back. That's amazing. Yeah, yeah. Literally like the Dr. Strange Love scene. Yeah, he was sent,

he was like 26, 27, he was sent into the tank, you know, by, by, by Kennedy and was just like, stall, stall him out. No what? These guys are like, they're ready to go. Oh, that's crazy. And, and he was like, Curtis Lamay was there with his, with his generals and they're like, I, like, we need to go and, you know, let's, like, I just need to, we just need to drop one. Just to, like, prove resolve and, all right, we have, like, air crew morale issues. I mean, Everyone knows like Chris Lane was absolute insane. He was willing to go to full nuclear war. And Malmgren played his part in holding him back.

And then was sent out to Los Alamos, I think, Raubikirke in 1963, where he met with Lawrence P. Geiss, because he was there to do the design cost build of our anti-blistic missile system, which at the time was premise on nuclear weapons, right? Because the only way to feasibly destroy incoming ICBMs or missiles coming in was to throw up nukes and try to blow them up in the atmosphere. And so, you know, he had. had to get read into, you know, he was basically there to like manage the project for that, right?

How much is it going to cost? What were we going to do? Like, and both on the Department of Energy side as well as the DoD side. And yeah, he met with Lawrence P. Guys who told him that, you know, we have been recovering and trying to reverse engineer UFO objects. And then 10 years later, I think he had a private meeting with Richard Bissell, who was the number two at the CIA in charge of all the, you know, dirty tricks, covert operation stuff for like 15, 20 years. Didn't he create the NRO as well? He created the NRO. He scouted and established Air 51, you know, Richard Bissell was in charge of all that stuff from the 50s and 60s. Richard Bissell told him in a private briefing that of, quote, other world technologies that they'd

been working on. And so he was kind of read into some of that stuff. He's made public some of that. And yeah, so it's just an example, right? And he was like kind of the shadow Kissinger for most of those decades. Like he was the guy that got stuff done. He had back channels with the Soviets. Do you think Kissinger knew about the UFO thing? Because Kissinger was, you know, very involved in atomic he was in charge of the whatever the covert action committee or like the 303 committee um he definitely probably knew whether he was in charge of it i think the structure of this i don't really understand but um but i think there was awareness of these programs right this kind of peripheral knowledge right it's like if you're going to come close to it like if you're going to be in the exact if you're

going to be just in the immediate periphery of it you need to know it exists yeah and you need to know not to go in yep and know like where to avoid and where to throw other people off yeah so there's like you know It's kind of there's a boundary layer. They need to establish around that, around those activities. I was reading this book called UFO crash by UFO researcher William Steinman about the Aztec crash in 1948. Talks about this head of special projects at Wright Patterson who came over with Operation Paperclip. His name is Eric Henry Wing. Steinman says, this is the guy who like, I can't get anything on.

The door shuts in my face every time I inquire about him. He and his boss, H-A-K, you know, and then he just, you just. goes on or whatever. And I was just thinking, who is H.A.K. And I was like, oh, Henry A. Kissinger. Yeah. And then he looked up his kind of career history and like he was very embedded in the atomic projects. And so, yeah. And I, you know, Harold worked, they were like, they were like twin people throughout most of those administrations where, you know, Harold was, you know, self-consciously not a self-promoter. He was not someone who was looking for the power. He was recognized in his survivability was because he was going to be the guy working behind the scenes, executing,

not taking credit, just the guy who would get stuff done, right? And that's what, you know, whereas Kissinger was the guy who would like, you know, walk over people's necks, right? And, but they were in equal positions, right? They were trusted and they were often used by presidents, you know, to check each other. Like, Malmgren was used explicitly by Nixon to check Kissinger in many negotiations to, like, confirm that Kissinger wasn't going rogue on various things. It's fascinating. And the whole China thing, the, the back channels with the Soviets, Malmgren was Nixon's, like, you know, confirmation, you know, route, right? Because he didn't fully trust Kissinger to do all this stuff,

because he was kind of a rogue guy, right? He thought he was the president, right? So Malmgren was there to kind of like act as a bit of a check. That's amazing. And so, yeah, he, now was trusted by multiple presidents over many decades. And yeah, he is now coming out and saying NH are real. We have their stuff. I don't know, guys. Like, but that's a good example, right, because he's former CIA. And like, you have a lot of guys who are former CIA. It seems like there is some implicit imperative in one branch of the CIA that is pro, some form of this. Nomonger was never CIA.

Oh, he's never CIA. No, he was a PhD economist. Okay, okay. Who came into the Defense Department, but then actually did mostly like trade and economic stuff for the latter half of his career. But he was, you know, he was fully cleared into the Q stuff. He was cleared into SSCI. But your point is like, but he met. with the CIA, obviously with Richard Bissell, he met with Lawrence Geis and DOE. He was, but he was more of a higher level political guy.

Interesting. Okay, good to know. It feels like there is, yeah, like to your earlier point, there's a part of CIA that is pro to some form of disclosure. And then there's probably a part that is extremely anti-disclosure. And then there are these fiefdoms that have like these local incentives around like, we have some IP, we kind of want to monetize it. We feel somewhat patriotic and like, you know, want to refresh the 10. talent pool and realize we don't have access to the best and brightest stem talent out there. And so there are all these weird dynamics where I've, I don't know, after studying this stuff, probably similar time frame as either, like, four or five years, you always want to know, like who's in charge? Who's like the ultimate gatekeeper? And it feels like there is, it's this like disjointed cargo cult or something. Yeah, I agree.

I don't think there is a, like a single cabal that has all this information. I think it's been carved up. it's decayed. I think it's like all of our other institutions. It's also, you know, why disclosure is happening now is kind of an overdetermined question, right? Is it the China competition thing? Is it an exogenous time skill associated with the NIH themselves? Is it, or is it essentially just the ability of what used to be a relatively coherent, unified set of legacy programs has just decayed and lost its ability to, you know, maintain control, like all of all of other institutions, right? Yeah. It's like, why was, why was Grush, this kind of do-go

or millennial, able to kind of like in a year, kind of just be like, yep, I figured it out. Yeah, right? It's like, you know, was that just because, I mean, Grush is really good. But it's probably because, like, the legacy program is probably like decayed a bit, right? It's probably become unwieldy pieces of it to start to, like, you know, become structured in these bureaucratic systems. And clearly people, even he would said this in my interview with him, people on the inside want this stuff together.

They were extremely disgruntled. They're like, this doesn't work at all the way it's been set up. Yeah, which is also an exact symptom of institutional decay and sort of sclerosis. Like probably during the Vannevar Boucher is there'd be nobody like that complaining. Be like, we got this shit on lock. It's streamlined. It's efficient. We got the best and brightest.

We're highly motivated. We're oriented. We're aligned, flourishing, moisturized. We're good, right? And now it's like, you know, it's decayed. There's Bob and Bobberts sitting in some Lockheed warehouse getting paid $200,000 a year when their best friends are over at Palantir making twice that. And, you know, they're making no progress after 10 years. And they're sitting in a cubicle with like a diagram of like a material that they half understand but can't know the full specs of because like it's compartmentalized.

And it's probably in an extremely stressful environment because they're telling you if you tell anybody we're going to kill you. And you know, you don't really know what's going on. You only see your little piece of it. So it sounds cool. But now you're like trapped because you can't really leave that program very easily. So that is like a lot of stress and tension built up inside these programs. And then the ability for the managers who themselves probably are similarly positioned relative to the power structure or hierarchy that they're embedded. or also feeling a bit like this is not working. And like you reach a critical mass. But that's why I'm like, why don't, I mean, if you can somehow front run immunity via legislature, why don't you just immediately let the cat out of the bag on just the existence of these programs? Maybe there's some ontological shock around like top of the pyramid knowledge of, you know, NIH vis-a-vis some theory of everything that freaks the average person out.

I don't know. But like the existence of the programs, if China and Russia have their own programs, which it seems like they do, then. just admit that we have these programs and then start recruiting people for the programs. Like, you would think that we'd have sort of a Manhattan Project 2.0 going on right now, given the world that we're in. Why doesn't that like start immediately? I mean, you could do all those counterfactuals, right? And this is where the basic logic of like, hey, that would be a good idea runs up against like

our existing political system. Sure. And so like, at least I've heard, again, on firsthand knowledge of these things, like, you know, as this ball, this ball started really rolling in 2019, 2020, right, with the UAP task force doing their job, congressional mandate, digging in, grush, figuring the stuff out, Carl, et cetera, everyone kind of being like, yep, and we're going to report back to Congress. Congress starts getting, you know, this sense, like there's some weird shit happening. Yeah. Right. Now what are we going to do about it? We need to have more formal mechanisms

of accountability and reporting. We need to kind of create a belly button or bridge between Congress, these committees, and the Pentagon and the IC passed. the different legislation starting 2021, 2021, the National Defense Authorization Act, stand up, you know, whatever, AOMSIG, and then Arrow, and then it was essentially bureaucratically undercut, you know, it was Office of Naval Intelligence, UAPE task force, who was kind of, I think, had bureaucratic, you know, access to grind against the CIA and the NSA in the Air Force. And, you know, the reason why it was over there. And then, of course, when it moves into Arrow, it's kind of compromised by the CIA Air Force guys,

right, like Kirkpatrick. And so that was kind of like, okay, move, counter move. what do we do next okay pressure etc go up the chain to you know did like national security council brief uh um jake solvin on this jake solvin's like crap i got i got way too much going on man i got like ukraine war popping off i got china to deal with i got president biden who like no politics aside like maybe not you know comptusmentus to make these decisions yes like sorry but like no like we can't we can't throw this out there right now like go and just get away from me, right?

Like, tell me what's going on. I mean, Ross Colthard says that he knows that, that Salt Jake was in at least one briefing, what I think was on the Senate, maybe more, where he was getting access to, you know, some of the first-hand testimony on this stuff. And, you know, they're just trying, like the existing power structures,

the committees, the NSC leadership, is trying to get their arms around this. And then they're trying to figure out what their next move is. And meanwhile, they got other stuff on their plate. And, you know, politics is politics. And they go, okay, well, we'll just kick this can down to the next admin, right? Whatever happens. Not my problem. Like, you just think that the individual decision making of a executive branch appointee is always like, I'm here for a year, two, three,

maybe. My life is already extremely stressful. This does not accrue any personal benefit, only risk. Yeah. Right. So I have every incentive to kick this can. And the Senate, who think of themselves as being, you know, the sort of criterion guard of democracy, they're like, well, I have no real urgency. They think, and it's like, I'll be here forever. I got I got no term limits. I got no competitive race. I take this as like a, you know, next year's thing with the next year's thing. So, you know, one has like, you know, zero urgency because of political incentives to just not have it be a problem. One has not much urgency because they, you know, the Senate is a little bit. This is why I think why more action has been on the House.

Yes. Because they feel like they can kind of play in that niche, right? They can get more attention, get maybe more outside, outside support. That's why I think the, you know, why the House has been the locus of political. But that's just my political, you know, that I, you know, that I, But in terms of the basic question of like, the accountability over these programs, like that's, that's the function of this UAP Disclosure Act. That's why that came from the, you know, that's why it came from Schumer, rounds,

Gillibrand, you know, Heinrich, Todd Young, etc. Because its basic function is not to, you know, do disclosure now, it's to like put in place mechanism of accountability because they have credible evidence indicates that that has been lacking. Yep. Including to elected officials in the executive branch. There's only two president and vice president.

So the Senate is basically saying in their findings that they believe credible evidence indicates that relevant UAP records have been inappropriately classified and withheld from appropriate, you know, elected officials in both legislative and executive branch. Seems like a pretty clear diagnosis of the problem, but they were just like admiring the problem. Yeah. There's no urgency to fix it. We'll see what happens with this, this new administration coming in, you know, Trump's speech last night. I don't know when this will be recorded, but like he gave this like three minute kind of glass nose speech. talked about. And it was like, you know, that could be the mechanism, right? Like, who knows? Right? I think this will all be up for grabs. But now there might be an urgency or it might be

opportunistic mechanisms for, you know, well, as much as I have different opinions on all the, you know, quote unquote controversies people have is like, well, maybe you should prioritize this. Yeah. Right. 100 bind laptop stuff. Does that really matter relative to this UFO stuff? Like, I know you've got an extra grind, but like, like, like, just bygones be guy gots. But I always, I do, every time I'm like, maybe this doesn't matter because we're, you know, in a multipolar nuclear world and you have all this kind of prosaic stuff going on. But then I'm like, this feels like the Archimedes lever. The existence of non-human intelligence. And, you know, it's sort of like, it begs this question is like, are the wars we're in right now somewhat proxy wars? You know, if you can't really say like, yeah, we have like this material, you know, in our possession. And we do, you know, think that there is intelligence out. there based on all these kind of consistent observable properties, but like business as usual as far as like, you know, general macro, you know, geopolitics or whatever. And so, yeah, no, I mean, that would be, I mean, I spent a lot of time thinking about intersection of geopolitics, the monetary

system and, you know, these potential phase transitions are like tail risks. And this has to be like, I've talked about this in more like traditional settings. I've talked to folks that were associated with the Fed and the Treasury Department. It's like, guys, like, you're, this is a, head in the sand moment right now, right? Like, you need to add, and Helen McCaw wrote a white paper for the Soul Foundation on this exact question of essentially UAPs and financial stability risk. And it's just like, because of social taboo, institutional resistance, there's not even paying attention to it. Yep. And the, the possibility of these things happening very quickly and was surprised to those other institutional systems is a big problem, right? And I think that's what they're

struggling with is like it's not just like I think there's a lot of concerns but I don't know if they're truly concerned about like the median Americans like having a freak out because the media American freaks out about all this stuff all the time and they probably like won't believe half of it anyways I think they worry about like the median sort of Mandarin technocrat at the Fed like not showing up for work and then the payment system doesn't work right right and it's like how do you how do you ensure that that set of you know the folks that have just now taken a massive hit right like those folks are psychologically very disturbed by Trump's administration coming in and there will be you know i think significant purges to those bureaucracies so this the technocrat managers are going to be you know facing a major brunt here you drop the uap stuff on that i think there is a risk i'm just speaking analytically of there being just like collapse of these institutional bureaucracies um you need a plan for that you need to like anticipate and educate and like tell them it's all good like this is just a new thing we got to handle like don't freak out come to work tomorrow right yeah And I think ironically, I mean, ironically, but like, and this might, I don't want to be too, you know, sort of ethnocentric here. But like, in general, I think China has not as much of a materialist worldview as like the median assumption. Like you're like the average person there. Like, you know, they have kind of a long history of their civilization. You know, it's sort of a spiritualist baseline, even though the communist party is, you know, not only atheistic. But like people light prayer candles all the time, you know, light incense, go worship at a boo. It's sort of a spiritualist baseline, even though the communist.

as temples. In fact, they've been spiking recently because people are trying to pray for good luck as the economy goes on the toilet. But, like, they don't have this, they haven't grown up their civilization and kind of the Copernican Western dichotomist view, sort of this inherent dualist world

of, you know, this sort of ineffable spiritual realm, which you go to when you die. You could pray to, but it's kind of like a hard cut between that and like materialist society. You get rich, you fight worse. And whereas I think the basic, so I think in general, China, Chinese society, I think, could probably accommodate something like this in a more smooth fashion than maybe Western society could.

On top of the fact that China could leverage potential malfeasance on the West part, U.S. in particular, as a propaganda leverage. Why haven't they? That's a question that I have kind of openly is like China and Russia, it is clear that if you're like a deep UFO researcher, there are things that they've interfaced with with the UFO question. and George Knapp went to Russia and brought back all these files about their activities when it comes to UFOs. China's published a couple of papers around tracking UFOs.

But it seems like they're by and large pretty silent on the topic. Like they're not super progressive or forward-minded about like propagandizing the topic or like being really open about it. Why is it just the US? Well, inherently, I guess to first order, one is the closest one's an open system.

Right? So despite the fact we point to maybe some rogue elements in the bureaucracy, like we're fundamentally as an open, somewhat chaotic system where folks like Lilizondo and Christopher Mellon can go out there and can go on podcasts and can release videos to the media and can have this open discussion

stimulated in Twitter and podcasts and whatnot. But if the game theory stuff, if the game theory dynamics... Why haven't they tried? Yeah, like why, you know, if some of this stuff is getting reverse engineered and weaponized. I think China hasn't...

I think in terms of order of priority, and this is speculation. I think the order of priority is first and, you know, first, second, third, fourth is, is exploit the technology to close the strategic military and intelligence gap. That's it. Right. And so anything that might undermine that, right, is ruled out. Right. So first order of business is like build, build their own, inspired tech, build that scale, iron it, iron it out, get it built out. And they have the ability to do that. Like, they have the ability to, like, if the typical US sap is a thousand people,

right, for whatever secret R&D program, they can attend. and 50,000 people. Yep. Right. And, you know, credibly threatened actual gulag punishments. Yeah, yeah, yeah.

If you speak at a turn. And, you know, actually have, like, you can almost imagine, there's probably the equivalent like the Vannevar Bush sitting there, right? That is like,

because they've been building these new institutions, these new bureaucracies. They've got more energy. They've got like a clear target, beat the U.S., et cetera. And if you look at this,

some circumstantial stuff, this is really speculative. My, my China Smee colleagues will be like, ah, you're really going on a limit there.

But there was some recent purges, in the last few years in like the rocket forces, which, you know, if you imagine like which part of their PLA structure would somehow feasibly touch this, it's like, you know, that's like where the nuclear forces are, right? So like if they had their own version of a program,

like where would it be? It would probably be there. And of course, the PLA has been historically corrupt. You bribe to get promotions and whatnot. So like, if I like imagine a very hypothetical scenario, which is when we say China has had a program well what does that really mean like china has a program does the PLA have a program that maybe president she didn't know about right and maybe president she discovered the program in the course of his various purges that he was going through ensuring loyalty and then he figured out this stuff maybe didn't know when he first came into power and now he does know and he's been going all systems go build me some you know everything like this is where all of our surplus capital is going I don't care about the the real estate market like screw it like we're going all in on this and is that leading to

to a freak out in the U.S., right? Strategic technology surprise, right? Strategic foreign technology surprise because, oh, we're getting intelligence now, maybe the other parts of the intelligence apparatus that we've got that is constantly monitoring China, constantly monitoring, you know, their secret research programs, which physicists and engineers, where are they going, what new facilities are being built, whatever, we're constantly monitoring all that stuff, right?

So there's like, you know, normie analysts inside the CIA and, you know, NGA and whatnot that are interpreting all that intelligence. They go, China's like doing some crazy, cool, like, weird stuff over here. They're doing all these people. that were doing this weird science and weird research, they're now, like, they're all disappeared, and we think they're over here. And we don't know what they're working on or why. And then meanwhile, this other, you know, their neighbor across the hall who's read into the program is like, oh, fuck. And, and then they go, what do we do now, right? We think trying to figure some stuff out.

We don't know what they figured out, but, like, that would generate an immense amount of anxiety and would probably put some more senior political leadership in, like, to CYA mode. So this UAP task force that is kind of responsible for the contemporary conversation around UFOs, how is it assembled? Yeah, so I think it's really interesting kind of bureaucratic story of, you know, essentially Congress hearing some stuff coming out of the 2017-2018 stories and some back-channel conversations that we need to have a formal group, charge to like dig into this question and get people that are, you know, fully credentialed, fully cleared, you know,

have the relevant sort of analytic bent to go out into the wilderness of the bureaucratic system and try to hunt down these alleged legacy programs. That's essentially the story that we hear in some of the self-reports, obviously, you know, limited by what Carl Nell and David Grush, and recently some individuals have come out. And the U.S. Task Force that we've seen descriptions of its kind of organizational structure, like any other interagency task force. It's got complicated reporting lines. You've got a lot of people coming in from different agencies. And the basic understanding I had, it wasn't really like a full-time gig for most people, but there were, I think, some individuals that were tasked which are much more substantial and serious responsibility like Grush. and there are others that were sort of maybe doing it in sort of a part-time basis and helping to assess, you know, imagery and write reports and whatnot. And, you know, there's, like a loose confederation of additional sort of liaisons that were pulling in different disciplines. But I was told something very, very interesting. And again, it's kind of like, you hear these things and they come from people that you otherwise trust and have, you know, professions and experience to sort of back up their claims. And it's tough to kind of fully, you know, calibrate how much stock you put in.

it. But, you know, what I was told is that one, you know, when any new government program gets, especially a sensitive government program, uh, sometimes they'll, they'll repoligraph some members of the team, especially those that are involved in the more sensitive aspects of, of its activities, you know, and polygraphs in U.S. government, um, are designed, you know, in many ways to, sort of root out essentially just loyalty, right? So they'll ask you basic questions like, you know, have you ever supported a terrorist group, have sort of, you know, supported insurrection to overthrow the government? Have you ever, you know, had any unreported contacts with a foreign government? Essentially, these sort of counterintelligence scope, sort of polygraphs. There's another scope

of polygraph. It's like, you know, you're gambling, your sexual activities, et cetera, kind of understand, are there any things that could be used to blackmail you? So standard sets of questions. What I was told is that there was an additional question or two added to that sort of screening, a polygraph, which is, have you had any relationships with, you haven't talked about, loyalty to any non-human faction. That's crazy. And I thought it was a joke. I thought it was like,

I pull my leg, this is not real. Like, no, apparently it's true. Or apparently it was reported as true. I don't have no evidence. I've not heard that confirmed. But it does kind of then trigger this other set of conversations was very uncomfortable, right?

Which is like, well, what is the nature of the interaction between human society, human institutions, and non-human intelligence? right if going back to our more abstract conversation is that there's a potential set of channels maybe more you know um foundational kind of consciousness level interactions or communication or or what have you well okay in principle there's like some interaction taking place between members of the human population and non-human intelligence we just you know if you accept that that's like what what you're what what you're accepting is happening then you have to assess well could versions of that type of

communication be happening with elements of of the legacy program or other or other elements of or other elements of human society. And that's a much more uncomfortable conversation. We're much more ironically, like, easy or willing to accept parts of this sort of UFO lore that involve, like, you know, kind of semi-random people having somewhat anomalous encounters, right? Like Chris Bledso or somebody like, you know, smart guy, you know, normal dude, but just has this really anomalous encounter. If that was a senior U.S. intelligence official, be a very different story. Yep. Right? Be very just like, why is it happening that person? Yep. Right. And so that, that raises lots of other questions, right? But I think there are questions you kind of have to take seriously in kind of this branching exploration

of the Bayesian tree of possibilities here that once you accept the premise of a certain foundational set of facts, well, then you have to take seriously all the branching implications of alternatives that become potentially and maybe more plausible given that update. And so yeah, this is, this does, I don't know where you, what to go with that other than just to say that's potential scenario to think about. Anecdotally, I know one extremely senior intelligence official who had a pretty gnarly abduction experience along with his wife. And so I don't want to say, I think he's going to be going public with his story soon. And that's that this whole thing becomes very uncomfortable for people,

because it's one thing to intellectually grok the possibilities of non-human intelligence in the universe and maybe this metaphysical story that we've just been talking about. It's a, you know, it's another thing also to think about maybe there's like advanced intelligence designing probes that are exploring solar systems or, you know, setting light sales out and we can get some of their advanced tech can figure out how they work. Like that would be groundbreaking, but it would be, you know, something that wouldn't disturb us, right? It's quite disturbing to understand that like the sanctity of yourself, the sanctity of your mind even can be violated at will by a higher form of intelligence. That sort of cuts to the core of our sense of inherent individual sovereignty,

as well as our political sovereignty, right? And I think that's truly, I think, why the sort of the impact of disclosure is so concerning for a lot of folks is that it threatens the sort of core basis of modern human civilization, right? The sense of the integrity of the self and the integrity of the autonomous sovereign structures we build as, as autonomous individuals, meaning our political systems and the bureaucracies that help us manage them. And that is a hard thing to swallow, right, and to understand and analyze. But in many respects, it's like a more exotic flavor of a traditional counterintelligence issue, right? Which is like, you know, we exist in a competitive geopolitical environment where states are constantly trying to compromise each other's

systems, right? Recruit spies, understand plans and intentions of their respective adversaries or even friends, and interpenetrate each other's bureaucratic systems with assets or agents or informers. So if you're modeling human society is actually not being the sole species or intelligence that you're trying to assess, there's another set of stakeholders, then maybe it's fair to assume that they would conduct similar activities that other states do. So they would have their own tradecraft and infiltrating mechanisms and, It probably wouldn't be the same that we would expect China to do, right? But it would be something that if you are investigating this phenomenon, you'd have to, you know, assume is a possibility, right? Yeah, it's sort of like the book Childhoods End by Arthur C. Clark or something that wouldn't land on the White House lawn. They would sort of, you know, incept all sorts of stuff in society and culture. And it gets to the most difficult part of the whole conversation, which is like the question that David Grush, you know, very pointedly dodged in testimony, which was like, agree.

Yep. Seems like an absurd question. How can human society, you know, primitive apes with nukes, how can we form an agreement? What would an agreement be based on? Like, what sort of contractual dispute resolution mechanism is there, right? I think it's a, I think it's maybe a, I think a category error, maybe just the term of art, the language is not being appropriately applied. Coerced agreement or something, but I mean, the thing, the agreement that I used to say was probably BS. And I still, I have trouble even like with the words coming out of my mouth, just saying this. But it's like this 1954 idea that like Eisenhower like made a treaty that like the grays could like collect biological specimen do medical experiments on our population.

And, you know, we would, we wouldn't destroy ourselves with nuclear weapons or whatever, you know, in return, something like that. I used to think that that was like complete and total BS. I mean, you hear something like that. It's funny. Actually, I think Eisenhower. granddaughter like stands by that fully but like she's also into a lot of other kind of quacky stuff so I don't know I don't know how to probability wait the whole thing but I've heard from some pretty senior you know impressive people in the Navy that like that might be real and like that that genetic collection on the part of these grays just ended and they're extremely concerned that the genetic collection ended because why would you end a genetic collection period well it might

right before some cataclysmic event. Because if you wanted to re-diversify the population after such an event, you know, you'd want to complete your collection right before that occurred or whatever if you understood, you know, how these timelines sort of work on a more root layer. So I don't know what to make of that. It's, you know, it's kind of like your story. It feels very apocryphal and it's hard. You have to slap some probability on it.

But, yeah, I mean, the other piece of is, you know, where people have alluded to similar things, not the genetic collection thing, which I think is, you know, I don't have a whole lot of weight assigned to that sort of thing. But Timothy Taylor, right? The Anon sort of, but now, well, well kind of known, kind of NASA program manager that's been deeply involved in this stuff and spooky, spooky subjects for a long time. You know, when he was asking of, what's the hierarchy by Danipa Salca, he's like, you know, I forget the exact taxonomy, but it was like, you know, normal humans, like the intelligence services, like some elements of the intelligence services. And he said like aliens and then like God or something, right? But his implication in that middle part was that there are some elements of human

institutions that have almost like an ontologically different status. His sense of the hierarchy. And he can read that one of two ways, just like, you know, sometimes people in the intelligence community just have such enormous egos that they actually think that, no, they're different and better and special. It's a fundamental way than the rest of, you know, the unwashed masses. And that the hierarchy of being that he posits, you know, his sense of the role of that cohort of human individuals is so significant they merit being noted as a different class. An alternative explanation is that he's referring to a non-human element within our human bureaucracies. Yes. Those are the only two ways, I think, to interpret it, right? Yes. An outsized ego, or he's referring to non-human presence

in human bureaucracies. Yes. I don't, you know, so those are just the two implicate, those are the two, I think, only alternative implications of his claim. So then to address which one of you think he's going towards, I think prima facie or prior has to be much more likely that it's his ego. But I don't think it's zero. And I think there's other circumstantial evidence about his career, other things he said. Maybe he's painting, he's trying to draw in a dotted line to that other implication. Well, here's a fascinating thing about him is that he seemed to, I guess, flash all these like three-letter agency credentials to Pesolka, according to her. And I trust her. She's a friend of mine. But then I sort of backchanneled with some other Intel people and I was like, what's, like, this guy's a NASA mission controller. Like, why does he have like all these clearances, associations with other agencies or whatever?

They're like, no, he's just a normal NASA mission controller. And then it begs this question of like, is a normal NASA mission controller who thinks he's part of a secret space program where he says his superiors don't even know he's in the program? Yeah. And he gets these downloads about what to do. it's almost like this hermetic network. When Chris Bledso starts to see UFOs, they show up around his house, he shows up. He shows up in Diana Pesolka's life when she transitions from following kind of Catholic purgatory and writing a book called Heaven Can Wait on that and realizing that actually comports with all these,

like, ancient, probably UFO experiences. And so you start to ask these deeper questions of like, is the chain of command that we even know, the real chain of command or is somebody like Timothy Taylor you know uh kind of following higher marching orders or I mean or does he think I mean some people fall into cults of belief where they actually think that they're taking instructions from a high it's like traditional cults right of the humdrum you know UFO cult variety honestly like they believe sometimes that their leader is a hybrid or is a special creature that has been sent down to guide their special flock right and is imbued with

special wisdom about maybe even some future cataclysm event. And then the in-group is going to be specially prepared to enter into that event and will be, you know, uniquely positioned or rewarded for their belief in the post-event, right? Traditional religious eschatological visions. And so, you know, just because it has a program and or does it mean he's immune to the traditional psychological vulnerabilities and tropes of, you know, human psychology? So that's, I just take it as like, these are the different alternatives. You got to like, you got to wait. But of course, you know, people have people yeah have different takes on something like that um but yeah it does yeah space is clearly like where the line between standard bureaucracy government programs and like weird

voodoo stuff yeah it's to come in because you go all the way back to beginning of NASA yeah it's like now you're not it's like it's just unambiguous historical fact that like jack parsons was doing like crowley sex magic in the desert with the founder of of scientology all around hubbard just you just can't avoid that that's what he was doing it, right? And he was like, he was like getting information somehow that was like impressing Warner von Braun, you know, it's like indisputable. Indisputable, just historical facts. Yes. Right. Just what, what, why, right? What is happening? And then all the weird stuff about how we name our rockets and people claiming that we do various rituals associated with rocket launch.

It's like, it's just happening, right? Humans are weird. So sometimes we do weird stuff. We're very superstitious, right? So sometimes we can layer those superstitions into pretty complex narratives that maybe reinforce each other in insolibrate bureaucracy over decades. But it's just weird. You can't just ignore it. You can't ignore the fact pattern. And actually, if you look at the founders of all rocket programs, Chikovsky in Russia was the same way. He believed he had this worldview called Cosmism, where he thought he was in touch with angelic beings. And in his case, it was more of an orthodox Christian veneer.

But there were protocols involved in rocket launches. And then von Braun and Herman Oborth, you know, O'Berth was von Braun's mentor, went through weird neo-pagan rituals that, you know, were in the kind of Nazi space program or that most SS officers actually had to go through. And so, yeah, begs some really interesting. And you had Launchpad 33 for NASA. And then you also had Buzz Aldrin, who was a Freemason, literally stake out the moon if, you know, with a free Masonic flag or whatever. It's all these questions are, you know.

Well, and I think most observant, most like, because in our modern civilization, we think of technology is mostly associated with like corporate strategies, investment returns, you know, cool gadgets. But like in the history, especially probably if you look back, you probably find versions of this in early technological paradigms, but like the 20th century technological paradigms, our breakthrough technologies all had these deeply embedded spiritual religious overtones or undertones. And they carry through to today, right? So like, I am become Shiva, destroyer of worlds, Oppenheimer, right? Obviously Jack Parsons launching rockets, the Soviet equivalent.

And then now, right, like, what is motivating the kind of this metaphysical ethos behind AGI? They actually think they're creating an AGI god. That's sort of theological vision of humanity's future will needs to be manifested through their technological projects. Yeah. Like that, like, we just accept that as like, oh, the San Francisco bros, they think they're making the AGI guy. And they're like, sometimes people like literally believe it, right? Like, Sergei Brent. He thinks it's specious to like privilege human interests over the, you know, the ostensible future interests of this. much more advanced human intelligence that will be like our godchild endowment for the cosmos. It's like, hey, like this is not that much different, right?

Like our most leading technological visionaries, you know, people that we're putting in charge of like driving for technological progress, you know, are sometimes wedded to quite radical religious spiritual belief systems. Yeah. And it makes most of us uncomfortable. Like, I don't know, buddy. Like I just get me the quarterly returns. Yeah.

Just the juice the stock and my make number go up, right? And, you know, meanwhile, like, there's this something else right there, right? And we just, somehow we just prefer not to pay attention to that. We try not to report on it, but it doesn't mean it's not there. You know, the Air Force funded that movie Stargate, you know, the Kurt Russell. SG1 thing, yeah. Yeah, it was like in the pyramid or whatever, there's a portal. Yeah.

And I sometimes, I don't know, I think about this guy, Townsend Brown, this mid-century inventor that I think, you know, made much more progress that meets the eye when tying electromagnetism and gravity. and some sort of theoretical model we probably didn't understand at the time, but he was obsessed with time travel. Behind closed doors, it's all he would talk about with this, like, friends and family. And so I do sometimes wonder, you know, if you like watch the movie Contact, Carl Sagan,

like, if there is something going on that is much deeper than space. SpaceX is this like earth-based, obviously very important space company, but like if there isn't something much more fundamental, especially in the world of NHI, predicated, you know, if that stuff is real, do we have some sort of like joint program with them or you know like i don't know is there something much deeper when it comes to the american space programs i mean yeah i mean Elon has been famously very like

you know dismissive of the alien thing he's like i've got all my starlink terminals up there or you know anything we had to like move out of the way of any alien spacecraft like we would know it which is on the surface of it kind of an absurd thing he's a very smart guy yeah right and people just accept that like that's an absurd explanation like yeah what he's talking about like yeah well for one like your tiny satellite space is huge. You're not going to have to navigate over just like an inert rock that happens to be from an alien civilization. And this is going to know how to navigate into space.

Like we launch stuff into space all the time. You don't have to move your satellites. We figure that out, that out. I would assume any advanced intelligence wouldn't have to navigate, wouldn't just be like, oh, I'm going to run into that thing. Please Starlink, move out of the way, right? Just an absurd statement, right? As if he thinks, and he's a smart guy, right?

It's like, what are you talking about, man? And then more recently, he was asked the question about legacy programs at like a town hall thing. He was Trump campaigning for Trump. And he said, well, you know, if U.S. government has interesting technology, this should make it available. I saw that. He walked it back.

Yeah. That was a big, that's an important line in the sand from previous comments, right? So. I think, I think he's in an interesting position. So this is a bit more speculative, very speculative on me. But, you know, Howard Hughes, of course, you know, similar figure to Elon in any ways. Like, eccentric genius, outsized personality, connected to defense. intelligence, you know, this is like, you know,

a larger than life figure in the 50s and 60s. But he was, like, deeply connected to the Mormon church. The Mormon church kind of control, like, his, like, senior managers and handlers for all of his, his corporate apparatus were essentially Mormon, they called him the Mormon mafia, right? They're two brothers, Frank Gay, I think of the other guy. And actually towards, as Howard Hughes kind of lost a grip on reality,

they kind of took over his affairs, right? And this was the same group that was doing all the corporate actions for the CIA, the Lomar Explorer, et cetera, and potentially even doing the hits on Kennedy. Both Kennedys, by the way. Yeah. And, you know, this is a whole separate tangent of, like, you know, we think about our current state institutions as being highly depersonalized, you know, a religious, a factional, just, you know, appointees with technocratic competence, et cetera. But that's kind of naive, right? Like, American history is complicated.

And there's, you know, there are other institutional forces that sometimes have a little bit more in-group loyalty and solidarity. And I think the Mormon church and the Mormon, you know, businesses and political structures are quite, quite coherent and have endured over 150 years, longer than the CIA, for example, has been in a round. And that, for example, the Mormon community set up shop in Utah. They wanted to create their own state, right? Our own sort of theocratic state. Justice Smith actually may have been assassinated by agents of the government. There may be part of people. He was trying to campaign essentially for president and, like, convert our civil. our society, our constitutional government to like a kind of a sort of a democratic, theocratic sort of halfway. And they wanted to set up their own state in Utah. They had their own constitutional convention and they convert turned into the sort of state state constitution.

And they called it Deseret was going to be the state of Utah. This is a long tangent to say the Elon connection is Elon's like basically like sort of handler, like his like, and the man who manages all of his affairs, he's like sits on the board of XAI, sits on the board of Norr Link, or as the president, I think, of Norrelink, manages his family office, manages all his Bitcoin and other crypto transactions, started and run private security company for him, handles basically most of his, you know, he's his personal fixer. He's got his, uh, Jared Birchall. He's comes out of, he's like a Mormon elder. He's a similar. And it's just like an interesting symmetry, right? Between this industrial, techno, technological kind of industry titan,

just happens to have like most of his life's affairs, his business affairs being managed by, you know, a guy who's very well connected in the Mormon community. And that's almost like, you know, isomorphic to the Howard Hughes story in many ways. And if you look into, you know, the Mormon church, I mean, again, nothing against any religion, any religion, but like, they have been really successful at essentially penetrating most of our intelligence system. Because what, like, what is the Mormon community really good at, right? They generate lots of, like, children and they train them in multiple languages. They send them out in missions around the world. They don't do drugs. They don't do alcohol. They're very like they're very loyal to an in group. They respect hierarchy. It's exactly what like a CIA officer, FBI officer, NSA person is going to be like, you know, that's like excellent recruit. And that's exactly what's happened. Like FBI has talked about how like bring them young is like their top source. Yeah. Mormons, Marines and MBAs. Yes. And what was interesting. So Utah Data Center is now declassified this code. name what the NSA set up there then the largest or single data center

in Utah back in the 2005s, something like that. And the code name for it was Bumble Hive. And Bumble Hive is essentially was the symbol of Deseret. So some weird stuff there, right? And if you actually look into Mormonism, it's kind of a UFO religion. Oh, for sure.

Earth is not the only habit of work. If America had a UFO religion, that would be it. 100%. Right? And, you know, Joseph Smith has contacts, it's downloads. codifies those into essentially a system of rules. He's leading his flock to establish a political order. And then they become, you know, deeply embedded in, you know, the structures of our intelligence and security apparatus and, you know, are then any big figure that we can, you know, like, why is Howard Hughes and Elon happen to all be connected to a similar Mormon control system?

I don't know. It's very interesting. And it's, I don't know what dots to connect there. There's just facts to stitch together. But also, like, the Mormon church and the, you know, associated institutions, they have a lot of money. Yeah. They have a ton of money. Yeah.

Like hundreds of billions of dollars, right? Because everyone tides, but also they're really good investors. And they just have really close-knit business relationships that are globe-spanning, right? So everyone's focused on the Carlisle group and everyone else is like, okay, but like, the Carlyleck group's not been around that long. Like most finance, you know, elites, they don't have a whole lot of like, again, they want to get rich. They want to get powerful, right? But, like, it's hard to sustain, like, a generational. project like that. It tends to decay, tends to split, vicissitudes of, you know,

international finance and business deals, right? The Mormon church, though, they've been around for a while. They got a lot of money. They've got a clear ideological, you know, vision that they all share, codes of conduct, and interpersonal bonds that, you know, they don't violate, right? Like, you know, it's well known that if you're a Mormon and you show up to a city, like you can kind of, get in, right? If you're one of the tribe, it's like, it's, you know, it's like, you're one of us, right? So those are, those are features of human society, right? And, and, you know, and you're that are very strong, right? And that are, you know, despite the more impersonal sense that we're constructing institutions like intelligence bureaucracies that are impersonal and a-religious,

well, they exist in a social milieu with other institutions, right? And they can be vulnerable to, you know, different loyalties being tested and compromised over time. I don't know exactly know how that's played out. But like, you just have to look at American society. I think it's an odd blind spot that we don't think about the role. I mean, it could be very positive. I'm not saying it's negative or positive. It's just is a fact of our political economy that we have like, it's really a religious institution that controls hundreds of billions of dollars of capital that also has, you know, more than almost any other single group probably put more, you know, seated more people into our intelligence bureaucracies for decades, right? And just also happens to be strongly associated with our

leading technologists over, over 20th and 21st centuries. I don't know. I don't know. I don't know. It's like with the James Simon's thing. I have no, like, there's no smoking gun there. It just seems like a curious thing. Right. It seems something to be, you know, interested in, right? It's a very interesting fact pattern. Well, when it comes to the science stuff, you had like, you know, an interesting possible theory of everything with this kind of, you know, upstream hypergraph and, you know, Gerard and Wolfram. What about sort of kind of more local anomalies or like discoveries, possibly mid-century? So like the towns of Browns, example I mentioned that we've we've talked about another one would be like a more extended version of electrodynamics involving you know there's always talks of like a scalar field or whatever you know do you have conviction in any of these things you mentioned neutrinos like neutrino information transfer I don't know would be maybe another one there might be some cool stuff that I don't rule any of that out and like the neutrino one I'll just say is interesting because you know neutrinos or particle it doesn't very weakly interacts with normal matter

but doesn't not interact with matter. We build detectors, you know, heavy water and the Arctic to get like little flashes and these photo multiplier tubes that, you know, gives like, you know, one out of every 400 quadrilli neutrinos actually hits and creates a detection. But that's just like, that's coming from the sun and kind of this amorphous, you know, spray of neutrinos.

It's possible. I haven't really done the math. Maybe you asked chat chipped on this. It's like if you were able to construct a really tight, high intensity beam of neutrinos, so that the density of neutrinos, so that the density of the engineers there's like many, many orders of magnitude higher

than otherwise would be. And you develop a really sensitive detector. Well, then you can send a signal through any, basically through the Earth, right? Which would be really useful for something, like, for example, if you're trying to ensure you have like redundant, redundant, redundant, nuclear commandant control communications, if your satellites are down, all your terrestrial communications are down,

but you really want to ensure that the sub and other side of the Earth can get the go codes, right? You know, it doesn't seem like physically impossible to me. You really need to run the numbers and do the engine. engineering and you know figured out doesn't seem impossible to use you know essentially a neutrino beam fired through the earth and if it's sufficiently high intensity and you have a sufficiently sensitive detector um that you could transmit information that way transmit you know watch goods or other things uh probably wouldn't be high bandwidth in general would be like star link but like for you know

certain certain information communication requirements so i think there's certain aspects like that um that don't to me don't seem like physically implausible there's other things like scalar field I don't know. I have a strong opinion on scalar fields, scalar weapons, this whole domain. I don't know. I'm sort of agnostic.

There's a part of it which is like, if there was enough low-hanging fruit that is just like a small tweak to say Einstein's field equations, it's hard to believe that somebody wouldn't have figured that out by now. Yeah. Right? That some people,

there's maybe a torsion term in Einstein's field equations that we normally ignore. That's an L.E. Carton thing. Yeah, that maybe there's, and that's been a lot of what has been in kind of like unconventional physics approaches is usually taking general relativity and like looking for like weird variations of it, right? What if there was an extra term here that introduced a new field or there's a new degree of freedom here and what would that mean? And that's fine. But like, the interesting about the outside field equations is that they're actually quite, going back to the Garland thing, it's actually not that surprising that he was able to regenerate or kind of generate, or kind of generate. the Einstein field equations out of this sort of limit of this discrete model. It's because the Einstein field equation is trying to be kind of like with very minimal constraints on a certain how you define, you know, a certain topological structure with a certain metric structure.

Like the Einstein field equations are just what you have to get. Yeah. Right? They're almost like the natural, the most natural description of, of the metric structure, of a very general class of sort of manifolds. So they're not that special. And therefore, they kind of allow many different permutations. There's many different little bells and whistles

that you can kind of add to the Einstein field equations that would give you maybe different fields, different degrees of freedom. And it's possible that there are experiments that you could do that would allow you to figure that out. I wouldn't rule it out. But I haven't done into like the deep dive enough to know whether that's plausible enough.

But it's like to me that's more just like a, it reminds me a bit of like the tolmeic epicycles, which is, you know, the answer field equations are very simple, very clean. and they explain a very general class of phenomenon. You want to explain UFOs. And so you're looking to be like, what bells and whistles can I add

to this simple conceptual structure that I can sort of allow me to explain this anomalous phenomenon, right? How could I, like, engineer the spacetime metric or could zip around using, you know, scalar fields or something? It just seems a bit clunky. It seems a bit clunky.

It seems a bit like you're looking for the answer that you wanted to get. To get more specific than that, which I agree is sort of lazy thinking. One thing that might have happened that like Weinstein spoke about, Eric Weinstein spoke about on Rogan is, you know, 1957 Chapel Hill Conference, you know, quantum gravity gets established. And there's an Austrian mathematician present named Herman Bondi. And he brings up this question of like, what about all these anomalies that might occur if you had theoretical existence of negative mass or negative energy, which was, you know, totally theoretical at the time. And if you didn't have the positivity conditions and you take. into account these theoretical, you know, energy and mass, you know, negative energy, negative mass, you would get all sorts of weird anomalous effects that, like, we wouldn't be able to predict with, you know, the Einstein field equations that do include, you know, these positivity

conditions. So if you were to put a governor on physics, it might be these, you know, positivity conditions. Then in like, I think the 90s, we figure out this, the Casimir effect, which I'm pretty sure now is like consensus physics, right? That, like, there are these, I guess, you know, there is this zero point and there are these quantum, you know, fluctuations in the field that, like, would bring two non-conductive plates closer together because of this, this sort of, you know, negative energy force or whatever. And so that brings up this question, you know, and then you look at Miguel Al-Cubieri, which everybody talks about Al-Cubiery Warp drives, this, you know, solution for Einstein faster than light travel, you know, given general relativity and it involves

a negative mass and negative energy. And so, yeah, is there something there? But the ability to harness something like the Casimir force for propulsion. It's interesting. I've seen certain, again, I'm not like a professional physicist, so it's like I try to read people. And it's like, I think the Casimir effect is one that's hard to, I don't know if you could extract useful work.

Because you can get essentially the vacuum pressure because if you put two super different plates, you know, in the absence, the vacuum will admit any mode of sort of spontaneous quantum sort of virtual particle pairs. But when you impose this boundary condition of two conducting plates, you're eliminating, you know, a whole set of possible modes. And therefore, there's kind of less energy in between the two plates, more energy outside the plate. That's a negative pressure. Maybe you could extract work. That's kind of the basic premise of it. I don't know. I don't know if you could actually like if that, if there's any like, so one interesting thing about general activity that most people don't understand is that

it's not, it doesn't conserve energy globally, right? It only conserves energy. energy locally. There's no such actual thing as like global universal scale energy conservation in general relativity. And so there may be loopholes, right? That's the thing is like, are there loopholes, right? There may be loopholes because general relativity is, you know, it doesn't require, you know, local, it doesn't require global energy conservation. So maybe there are tricks you can exploit. But we don't really understand what negative energy really means. And I always try to come back to like my best, you know, current thinking about what the models are to use to answer this question. Like the hypergraph.

models are, essentially energy in those models essentially is the, if you have a matter of here's like a surface, you know, like you're just fully getting the causal graph. Energy is the measure of the number of causal edges going through that surface, right? And then momentum is just the inverse. It's the number of causal edges, if you orientate it in the time-like direction versus the space-like direction. And that's actually how you then construct the Einstein field equations with the stress energy tensors because you need to have measures of energy and just, and it's just,

discrete structure. And so there, like, energy is a, is a, is a discreetly defined measure on this, on this graph structure. It's like this ineffable thing, just like an E in an equation. It's like the number of edges going through an arbitrary sort of hyper-surface. And so then this question is like, what is a negative energy in that, and that, and that, well, in this concept, this is interesting is like an absolute measure of energy, right? Energy is always a relational quantity because there's no global measure of energy. Energy is always a relative to reference frames. And so it's like, can you construct a certain way of foliating this hyperservices so that from one inertial frame you've got essentially access to an energy gradient, right? That is negative from

your perspective, right? So it's like, there is no such thing as positive or negative energy. There's just, you know, in the local reference frame that you happen to be, you know, constructing for yourself for whatever crazy technology you've got, can you, you know, essentially, you know, engineer a, like, a relative negative gradient to, like, the number of causal ledges that are in your, your future in your causal future light code. I don't know. That would be how you'd have to do it. So I don't know. So as everybody it's like you have to look at the fundamental physics theory and be like, is that ruled out? Right. It's like general relativity is not the fundamental physics theory. Right. So you can construct models of general relativity where yeah, there's a there's different terms,

there's different components, there's different, um, you know, states that you could potentially, you know, allow within that broad, that broad very, very self-consistent framework. But does that mean that those are physically realizable in our universe. Right. Well, you'd be like, well, no, we need to know what the actual fundamental theory of physics is for our universe. Yeah. And then do those admit of these types of capabilities?

Yeah. So I don't rule it out because we don't have the fundamental theory. But I think it's kind of like the level of when we're talking about these, you know, vacuum metric engineering sorts of descriptions that I think it was like a higher level description. Like those might be fully consistent with like a bottom up, you know, Gerardian view. Like they might meet somewhere in the middle here. Where it's like actually it turns out, yeah, like there are a certain

special conditions that are that emerge in the sort of hypergraph vision of things that do get you systems that look like they're consistent with say vacuum metric engineering right but the vacuum metric engineering is just like a higher level or mid-level description so it's possible this is like and then to go back to the historical story it is quite suspicious that like there was all this work on gravity specifically and all this stuff you've pointed to in your previous videos it's like there's something there like they were looking at it seriously. They were clearly exploring it. And I had like two interpretations. I think it's very clear to me that U.S. government has been conducting secret funnel physics research. Like that's pretty

obvious to do. Yeah, yeah. Like you'd have to be really naive to think that the federal government and the intelligence community, you know, just forgot the lesson of World War II. Yeah. That like, oh, we took all the smartest physicists through them into a secret project and we won global war. Great. Go back your business, guys. Like, we're just going to set. We're going to shut, shut this down, you know, go back to your normal ivory tower, academic jobs and write papers, and, you know, we'll call you in the next war. What's the answer then to the Weinstein counterpoint to that where he's like, where are all the smart, like, oh, DeNimar, Connie Hamed, this, you know, all these, he's naming all these people. He's like, why aren't they

in the program, you know? What's going on? Is Ed Witten in the program? You know, like, it is a good question. Um, and I don't know, like, you have to, I don't know what the base rate measure is of like super smart people, right? And like, whether Whether the academic production of theoretical physicists is the only pipeline for such talent that you can imagine existing, like if you really have decades to set up alternative programs to spot talent when they're 12 or 13 years old through standardized academic testing, you understand who the priorities are. Before they make it to college or even PhD programs, like, you know, I think Eric has a model of like there's an existing cohort of trained practical theoretical physicists that exists in the discipline. And the US government is just like, we found a UFO. come help us figure it out. Yep.

Right. I think maybe an alternative model is like they had that stuff well before modern academic theoretical physics formed as a discipline. And their academic affiliate programs kind of everywhere. I mean, MIT being MIT super soldier program being like one example. But like. Oh, and like really smart people do very classified research and don't talk about it. Sure.

And it's just, you know, to think you have a monopoly like the Harvard faculty has a monopoly on, you know, 160 Ikees that can, you know, spend two years reading Funnel Physics journals. like it's not that hard. Yeah, totally. And you go back to these declassified CIMOs and you're like the outposts for exotic gravity research, in certain cases it was like Indiana, Purdue. Like it wasn't necessarily,

I mean, Princeton and MIT were also named. But like it's not always, you know, you might assume, you know, is sort of the tip of the spear as far as... I look at, like, Jim Simons just talked about, like, nobody really knows how many people he's got working for him. And like, his pipeline, could be scaled in probably two, three, five, 10x,

and who would really know? Yep. Right? Especially if he's not targeting mid-career or, you know, coming out of grad school, but he's able to spot, like, for example, Harold Malmgren, he was spotted when he was like 12 or 13 years old. That's wild. 12 or 13.

Yeah. And he was going to be, he was asked to come to MIT when he was like, you know, early teen, and for whatever family of the reasons, you couldn't do it. So he ended up going to Renzillier, Polytechnic, and then was given a full ride in lateral to Yale. and then was sort of entered into the system from there, right? But he was tapped from, he was the MIT president actually, tapped him. Were you spotted, Matthew?

Not that I know. I know, I mean, but like, you know, we had the gifted and talented programs, right? I did that, right? Went to Johns Hopkins. Oh, you did that, yeah. You know, I did that too back in the day. Yeah, interesting. That's what the plant.

So we had chips embedded in our brain. You know, I was like, I was the juice boxes, you know, and then like, wait, I did, they had to take naps. Like, what was happening there? So yeah, but like that's the thing is like if you're going to manage a program that's fundamental like this is the thing, it sounds conspiracy of like I just like first principles. If I'm a senior defense intel bureaucrat in like the late 1940s and I'm like, all right, we won the war. All the physicists helped us win it. It was kind of like by the skin of our teeth. The Nazis were like neck and neck. Right. Like a year it would have been a close run thing. We can't let that happen again. Right. We just happen to have all these smart German physicists, these Jews that were fleeing the Nazis. The Nazis. The Nazis that were fleeing the Nazis. that came here. Right. It's like we had Einstein, we had Oppenheim. We had all these guys, you know, that were, you know, you just kind of got lucky, right, that we happened to have access to this talent. And then we could wed it to our industrial system and like, go all systems

go. But they'd be like, all right, we can't, that was like an ad hoc kind of like got got a bit lucky sort of thing. We can't, we need to systematize this, formal formalize that. We need to ensure that we have the most talented individuals in our society identified and steered where we can into positions where we can leverage them for the most strategic national security purposes, which the lesson in World War II is the most strategic national security domain is fundamental physics, right? Whoever figures out the next trick in fundamental physics can design potential world-changing weapons. That just seems like bureaucratic negligence of the highest order if they didn't put in place a systematic program to spot and identify and recruit

in various ways, talent to help ensure that fundamental physics research could be conducted in secret for the U.S. government. That would be my baseline expectation. It seems like an absurd thing because, of course, Eric is a smart guy. He's like, I see you evidence of this. Well, they've had a lot of time to keep this secret

and it doesn't require that many people. Yep. Right? It's not going to be like a bunch of nerds sitting in a room somewhere doing math is not going to like show up on much, not going to make much of a footprint. Totally.

And it's not like they're going to publish anything. Yep. So it's, you know, again, how sick. So this is where it's mechanistically, I would expect such a sort of set of programs to have been put in motion. It's a whole different question to assess, well, how successful have they been, right? Because they could set up all this apparatus. The government can be, is really good at creating these programs, making them really secret,

funding them over many years. But they're not that good at actually stimulating creative innovation. Right. So, you know, then this kind of explains to me why you have these cases like, like, like, Ning Lee or whatever, like folks that are clearly doing like breakthrough research on the margins of some interesting subjects and then they get sort of poof. Yeah, yeah. They disappear. And is it because it's two explanations? One is the government knows that, oh, there might be an independent reproduction of a breakthrough that they already have and they want to make sure nobody else sees it.

Or they want to basically take anything that could potentially touch on this secret research area and bring it in, but they actually haven't made much progress. So it doesn't really tell me one way or the other way. They've actually made much progress in either a theoretical fundamental breakthrough or an engineered application of the funnel breakthrough. You can assume they have these programs and they've gotten nowhere. Yeah. I mean, it's just, what you're saying makes total sense because I think, you know,

if this stuff was housed in the Manhattan Project, you know, before the setup of maybe some sort of distributed recon system or whatever to track, you know, young prodigies, it seemed like the destructiveness of science and tech was just going asymptotic at the time. And so to like not clamp down with safeguards as far as, you know, both being able to recruit, but also being able to quickly hide, you know, what you're working on. That would seem like this big national security priority, right? And we have recent evidence, like, again, hearsay, but Andreessen Horowitz and Ben Horowitz. had this meeting, and they reported back with the National Security Council, senior staff,

and an individual on that national security council said, we have classified entire areas of fundamental physics before. Don't think we can do the same for AI. This was in rejoinder to Andreessen and Horwood saying, you can't classify AI. It's just math. Yep. And they're like, you bet, you bet we can. We did it before.

Yep. It's like, there you go, guys. And I think there's like our Rand Corp initiative to like basically have a global control system over compute because of the AGI race. And there might be an interesting connection on like RANDCorp and some of the more secret science or tech when it comes to propulsion and that sort of thing. I don't know if you've thought about that. I had a conversation. I tweeted about this. So I guess I should say it now because it's public. But like, be careful how much details I get. But I had a conversation, oof, over a year ago. I figured exactly when. I should go back to my

Twitter, probably coming up on a year ago now, with a former very senior Department of Defense individual. And, you know, we, we had been chatting about lots of different subjects. And, again, kind of UAPs came up. And this individual described having a meeting with Arrow. And this individual was responsible for managing large collections of SAPs, including those that touched on AI stuff, including other things. And, you know, the first person, person's been around the block in terms of, you know, even when you're getting a top secret SCI briefing on a particular program, when they give these similar briefings on their saps, they regularly give bullshit briefings at the highest level of classification to others.

You know, that's just the game, right? If you don't need to know, you don't need to know. But the existence of such a program is something that's hard to keep secret. So you give a bullshit briefing. When he was sitting at the arrow briefing. It was like that was the perception that this was the bullshit briefing. Game recognized game was the quote basically. And we got a bit further into it and they said, you know, it's a triangle. AI, quantum and the grush stuff. That was it. And we were, you know, in an environment where I couldn't want to press too much into the issue and, you know, I didn't have, it wasn't like this sort of sit down where it's like go for hours. So that was basically where it sort of landed.

And I've been chewing on that for a while, you know, AI, quantum, and the grush stuff. That's wild. That's super interesting. My mind's going crazy now. And you can imagine, I mean, all those sorts of ways you could permute that, right? Quantum you can interpret as quantum computing. Yeah.

Or you can interpret quantum as like more like quantum weird, spooky consciousness stuff. Yeah. Or something else. Or materials. Or yeah, or quantum, quantum material. He just said quantum. Yeah. AI quantum.

Yeah. And in the government, like, quantum is usually used as like a catch-all for all that stuff. Yeah. Right? Well, not the consciousness, but like quantum sensing, quantum computing, you know, quantum cryptography, et cetera. So I don't know. But this, there clearly is a sense, and this is why AI is becoming important,

is like, you know, the program that Michael Schellenberger wrote about, he might even be testifying in Congress next week about it. You know, apparently he's using AI to identify, you know, UAPs and maybe even ARVs. It's a characteristic morphology and we have lots of sensors and we're saying, okay, we need to, and if AI is becoming much more decentralized and a capability that is in the private sector, well, that would be a problem, right? So there might be a lot of technological trends that are underway that are just going to make

keeping this in the bottle. It's just almost like, you know, much more difficult. There's also the, you know, more abstract or like, you know, speculative, which is, okay, you know, any arbitrary form of intelligence is likely going to share. like kind of be coming from a different spot in the rural multiverse. To communicate in the multiple in the real real universe, you need to share concepts. Like concepts are the bridge. Are like that's actually like the category theoretic like transportation measure, like a distance measure in real estate is like you're conceptual. So like we are really close in real estate.

People that come from different languages are a little bit for a part, but the otherwise are close together because of their common history. And so in assembly theory, you can see this is like they share a common ancestor, but only they recently branched. Right. So they only haven't gone too far in real real space. So like you can do translation between Chinese and English pretty well. Right. There's certain concepts in Chinese that you can't easily map to English and vice versa. Right. That's just the nature of trying to do, you know, essentially translation. There's not complete translation and variance in real real estate between different, you know, between different cognitive systems. But an arbitrary intelligence coming from

that has an entirely different assembly history is likely not going to be that close to us in real estate. So what our AI system is really good at is basically helping to explore. explore and translate through rural space, right? That's why we now using AI systems to try to, like, decode dolphin and, like, whale sounds, right? It's because there's, they're really good. I basically in this sort of very multidimensional vector space, identifying what are those patterns of regularity, and then, you know, creating like a map of what the, the conceptual structure inside that, that representational space is, and then figuring out, okay, is there, is there a certain mapping that I can go from that internal representational system to human representational systems?

It's like, what is the whale equivalent of, like, friend? You know, there probably is a plausible way of developing an encoding, essentially, between human concepts and whale concepts, right? And that would be probably like one of the top priorities, right? Of course, we have the movie Arrival. It's like the top priority is like trying to develop an encoding system between human concepts and N.H.I. Concepts will be very important. Maybe have been extremely important in developing such an encoding, right?

and it's probably no secret or no surprise that like, you know, the guy, the co-founder of Renaissance was Robert Mercer. Robert Mercer invented basically large language models and applied those along with other, you know, the leading, they were leading most of the AI stuff basically and making all that money using some of it and doing semantic analysis. Like, you know, they didn't have the transformer architecture back then, but they were doing all sorts of crazy advanced AI stuff. So that would be the exactly team with skills.

You would apply to being like, we've got, we're getting communications. much quite sure how to trust them, right? And the NSA is really, you know, their job is to, like, do decryption, right? And you can almost think about, like, decryption is basically the same thing as like fundamental physics in some way, right? Like, you're getting, you get a certain, you know, like the universe is like this unfolding computation that's computationally irreducible to any given observer that can't inspect all the microstates. And so there's some core screening. That core screening function is essentially like an encryption. Like, our models are like encryptions of the underlying pattern of the world, right?

And then we're trying to, when we do physics, we're trying to, like, you know, decrypt, right, those representations. We were like a naive representation of the universe. We're trying to decrypt what to the underlying, you know, factor was that generated that phenomenon. And so the NSA is really good at doing those sorts of things. So there's a lot of overlap between these kinds of research and technologies and skills you would need to, like, understand the NHA problem

that are way beyond just, like, you know, engineering topological materials, right? You'd want to be able to communicate, be able to trust the communication, be able to, you know, understand what sorts of, you know, concepts are embedded and what sorts of social information is embedded in those concepts, right? Like, you know, we can maybe learn a lot about how, like, whale social structure actually works by decoding their concepts, right? Like, how close is the friend and enemy or food source, you know, these different interesting concepts we might be able to anchors on. How close are they to each other? It might be like interesting observations that you could discern by studying those sorts of linguistic categories. You're making me.

think of the Danny Sheehan story where he's taken into a skiff in Washington at the behest of the Carter administration to review the Blue Book files on all these UFOs. And he claims he sees a picture, high definition picture of a UFO crashed into a mountaintop. And he traced the photo and drew all these like bizarre kind of hieroglyphic looking symbols. And I'm wondering if we could use AI on that with some maybe symbolic conventions or something. I mean, this is where, it gets quite weird because you're, if you assume some interaction, right, and most of the first person accounts have been, you know, non-recordable interactions, right? Just like, you know, ineffable. You're destroying the planet. Nukes are bad. You know, dangerous coming, right?

Sort of tropey stuff. But, you know, that seems a bit like, are there other more definitive, you know, forms of information, like records that have been deposited, right? Or, or given or or or or encodings from certain signals that we've been able to translate um or be able to write down right um like the first i can imagine like this program you really like imagine it's like possible full branches right there's like the biological piece there's the hardware physical science material science piece fundamental physics for propulsion et cetera piece there's the xenolinguistics piece the sort of sociocultural you know aspect of that there's be like all these different branches right imagine you're trying to study human society right it's like you would have

at all, right? You look for all the artifacts you could. You'd look for all the maybe unintended signals that we would be sending to try to understand. So there'd be a massive program, but we'll be compartmentalized in all these different domains. And then you, you know, AI would be really important to help you synthesize and integrate and develop hypotheses for, for that research project, right? So maybe that's what he was pointing at, right? And you need some sort of immaculate constellation to quarantine some of the comms, both from a kind of a physical perspective if there are crashed UFOs,

but also, yeah, the comms going on between people and that sort of thing. Yeah, and then there'd be the, you know, there'd be the basic intelligence function AI could help, and those would be the very important counterintelligence function, right? And there's some weird stories that have been coming out recently

of just how, like, in general, like the government is usually like several steps ahead of the private sector. I think in generative AI, they're probably not, but that doesn't mean they're not ahead in certain areas that are applications of AI could be quite far ahead that are more unique to like, you know, government use cases. Like the government is not going to invest a whole lot in Dali. It's not a whole lot in like a chat bot, right? There's just not a function that's going to align

to any government function that's going to get the R&D. But there are, you know, things people are naive to think that the private sector just happen to explore the most advanced part of the tech tree, right? So they explored a part of the tech tree that happens to be very infrastructure, energy intensive. The government, because it has to be secret, probably would discount those branches because we can't build $200 billion worth of AI infrastructure

to train the next models. We've got to keep this secret. So we would look for other non-transformer architectures, probably, to explore. And we have time to, like, you know, test those out without, you know, the competitive race with open AI to like, oh, we got something that at work. Like, now we're stuck.

We got to, like, basically scale this up and keep training a bigger, bigger model. This is all to say, I think people assume that, like, regards to AI, that Open AI and Anthropic are, like, much further head than anyone else. And I think it might be, there might be orthogonal vectors here for certain applications and certain certain architectures. And again, it's like, you assume fundamental physics research could be done in secret. It's like, well, it could be fundamental AI research that's done in secret, right? It's like, as soon as this is identified as a requirement, there's a pipeline, there's an SOP, there's a process, as a structure. this is what I would hope is happening.

But then it's not just us. Chinese, the Russians, others maybe. And the Chinese have gotten really good at doing some of these narrow applications for their social surveillance purposes and other things. And those are, there's like weird things happening now with people, you know, being really good at manipulating individuals online, right?

Being really good at, you know, generating human-like interactions in certain ways. And that would be, you know, a way of kind of distorting our internal conversations on subjects like you at peace. Right. So I think the, this is like a convergence of these different trends of disclosure on the one hand, but also the ability of society to like sense make. Yes. Is like being degraded almost at the same pace. Yes.

So I do wonder if we get to a point where like, yeah, the government goes, yeah, we're actually going to come out with everything. But like the basic ability of society, what we call society, to process that in something like a consistent fashion, could just be rendered obsolete. On that note, where do you think the UFO conversation goes from here? Because there's, I mean, there are two camps. One is, you know, if we were having this conversation 40, 50 years ago, we were kind of invested in the issue, it probably would have been the wrong investment, right? Like, not a lot happened. And then the other camp is things seem to be kind of unraveling. quickly and snowballing. And so, yeah, where do you think things go from here?

This is the tough question. I don't think it's going back in the bottle. I think we will be facing more disruption, recognition, information soon. You know, I take the title of Lou Elizondo's book seriously. Yeah. Right? He doesn't say that for a reason and he's given other remarks that, you know, indicate this is this is not something you're going to be just like a kick the can for decades. Yeah. Right. I do not though fall into the camp of like there's a 2027 clock and yeah, they're showing up. Yeah.

I've heard that and most people have said that is like, you know, word got around that they're going to come up and show up in 2027 and this is probably get ready to get people prepared, et cetera. I don't rule it out, but like that seems like not the, not my baseline scenario. I think I see a convergence of things that are now kind of historically it's like it's like the vibe right it's almost like there are things that I know

that people are potentially going to come out and say publicly but is that going to be what we call capital of disclosure right it's like who's paying attention who cares right it's like information can come out and come out either be individuals in sort of a so chastic self-organized process and they may have the professional

bona fides the historical experience the credibility to get maybe the next the marginal increment of the population to pay attention and go, what the hell, right? But we've had a number of those people already, right? It's just like we're kind of on this ratchet, which is like the Jaime Sheds, the Canadian defense minister, more recent era, you've had David Rush, you've had Lou, you've got Carl Nell, I've got Christopher Miller. And like, these are not like household names, but we're climbing this ladder here, right? And we've had suggestive remarks come

from multiple presidents. And it's, this is like an accretion over time. And I think there'll be, I expect there'll be more individuals of senior caliber coming out and saying, things, but I think it will be in alignment with an evolving political process that I think is non-deterministic, right? In the sense that, like, the UAP Disclosure Act was, well, you know, one version of this kind of control process. But that was written before people thought that Trump was going to have a unified government and is not going to have RFK and Vivek in there, and Elon in there, doing truth and reconciliation committees and like opening up all the books on everything. Yeah. Like, I'm sorry, but like that's not, like, those are just different, those are very different

distinct approaches. And I don't know if the UAP Disclosure Act process of having nine, you know, sort of technocrats appointed by the president, I mean, I think I could still survive. I think it's an important process because you need to have an accountable independent procedure here. But if I'm just making a forecast, like, it's likely going to be messier than what that process originally envisioned, right? Just, I don't know.

We'll see. I don't know how, but like Vivek, I know is very interested in the subject. JD is very interested in the subject. Elon seems to have changed this tune a bit RFK is very interested in the subject Trump has obviously talked about it so where this sits in there

how they're going to manage this it's like who are they going to sign this problem right? That's what's the big question and then is this a is this Should we try to get appointments? I don't know man you want the red dot in your head probably not

you know better to be behind the camera you know the guy actually doing stuff as far as disclosed That's probably right. I mean, it's interesting. Like the control disclosure campaign plan would set up this UAP Records Review Board, and that records review board would be have all the status of an executive department agency,

obviously the subpoena authority, the Univate Relatorial Declassification Authority with Presidential Override, but it would also allow them to, you know, leverage the capacities and authorities of the federal acquisition regulation so they could actually, with a budget, issue contracts. So they could hire full-time staff and have issued contracts to third-party advisors, to write reports and studies and contribute to, you know, expert analysis on the various strands of these questions, which would be explicitly under their mandate to report and make recommendations to the president across all these instruments of national power, right, that Carl Nell has talked about. And so that, that is like the standard, you know, U.S. like, D.C. approach. We got a tough

problem. You know, there's a hot potato. The Senate really doesn't want to have to own it. You know, the House really can't deal with it. The executive branch is kind of like, you know, looking into its own backyard. And the NSC is, you know, relatively small. And so we're going to convene and then panel this independent group. It's going to be, you know, president will obviously have veto authority, but it's going to basically, everyone gets to pass the hot potato to this group. So that, that logic might still stand, right?

Because I could see between the incoming administration, that same basic sense of like, do I really want this to come out, but do I want to own this hot potato? Do I want to like navigate all this morass? or do I want to be like, I agree, we should have this independent group over here of people that I can recommend. They're kind of like, you know, my friends and allies or whatever. But like they do the hard work. And they dig with the messy stuff and they get a budget and they get the clearances and they get the contracts. And then that becomes like a separate more institutional apparatus to formally go through this sort of thing and make recommendations to, you know, President Trump.

I think it's, I would still push for the UEP Disclosure Act versus. say some ad hoc Vivek Truth and Reconciliation Committee that God knows how that would be formalized and stood up and structured. And also like what other things would be sort of stuffed under its remit. It would dilute its purpose, distract it, politicize it potentially. And I think it's just better course of action to just put the energy behind this existing, you know, framework. I think it doesn't matter who you appoint. Obviously, that's like, you know, the structure is there. It's how you fill out that structure. Like who gets appointed to these positions if they if they pass this law under the new admin.

So we'll see. But also there's the legacy folks inside the house that you still have to deal with, right? Like the Rogers and Turner. And we'll see how much, like in general, like an incoming administration has lots of priorities and certain reservoir of political capital. UFOs is not at the top of that list.

Well, that's the interesting thing. It's like, it's hard to say how it fits. And, you know, honestly, a path of resistance for them is to just kick it to an independent group, right? Yeah. Because if they're going to go through this dirty laundry, glass-nosed procedure, you might have to spend a lot of your own executive political capital

on, like, on, like, adjudicating every one of those decisions on this record, this thing, this program, this, like, where is that line going to be drawn? It's like a case-by-case. And that's a very, that's a messy thing, right? I'm not sure any of these people want to be making those decisions or spending their political capital fighting, you know, God knows who, right? where it's like hey kick it over to this group give them a bunch of money give them a clear mandate let them deal with it and you kind of are hands off right and then the important decisions

you can kind of air drop in and you know right put your thumb on the scale um so that would be um i don't preferred scenario to play out here um i mean there is a scenario where you know all these folks come in and they've been singing a certain tune they go disclosure openness glass nosed etc etc etc then they get shown whatever it is And they go, nah, sorry, sorry guys. This whole UFO thing, I don't know, that we were, yes, we're good. We're good. Look over here, right?

I mean, it's always the scenario you have to, you know, put onto your, to the table here. Because I don't really know what's behind that curtain, right? And whether there is something that's just like, yep, nope, not going to talk about it, right? We hear an awful lot of unnerving stories from people like Jeremy Corbell or Ross Colthart who are like ostensibly talking to people on legacy programs directly. And like they all say the same thing. So they get to a certain level in the conversation, you know, whatever. And the person goes, if you knew what I know, he wouldn't be pro disclosure or something.

You know, they sort of hint at some sort of extremely ontologically shocking truth. And I never know how to compute that. it's this sort of, you know, epistemic impasse if you're on the other side of it, where it's like, I don't know. That's why I actually think, you know, the cult controlled disclosure can't plain plan, sorry, I probably butchered that, is, you know, like, you almost need to shift human consciousness, right? It sounds a bit colloquial and woo-woo, but it goes back to earlier part of the conversation. It's like, you know, we are, we're embodied creatures, but we have certain mental capacities

in a certain, you know, folk worldview of what's possible, what's not, like, the immediate horizon of most people's lives is very, very, you know, foreshortened. It's got to pay the rent, get the kids up for school, you know, get through the day. And, you know, the job of a state is to ensure that those background functions of everyday life are not subject to, like, radical volatility. That's why we have a state is to ensure that, like, I can get on the road in the morning and get to work and my taxes are paid and my school starts on time and the teachers show up and it's like that just needs to happen right like that's the first order of business as a government right and so I do have sympathy for anything that the government could envision releasing to the public

that threatens those sort of core you know lifelines of society it's like that's your job as soon like that would be the government essentially you know committing haricari right it would be like just abdicating its fundamental responsibility um and so this is where the tension in lies And actually, I think, you know, the more that they can sort of get out of their own hands into the private into civil society to manage the better. Because the government shouldn't be the source of ontological truth for people. The government shouldn't be like a religious, you know, institution interpreting the world for its citizens. Like, that's not the job of the government to tell me, like, what the capital T truth is, like, the nature of reality or any of this. Like, no, like, you take my taxes, you defend me. You keep the lights on. You know, like, do that, right? You're not, I don't look to you to like, you know, you're not the Pope, right? Sure. But it's also not the job to suppress the capital T truth unless that involves some, you know, clear trade secret on the national security front.

But this is where, I think, the mandate, like, this is more philosophical, like, what is the, what is the social contract in America? What is the form of government we have, the constitutional republic, and the understanding of the framers that has been evolved over time. Like, it's like, you know, even if you're originalist or you're, you know, a flexible, you know, kind of constitutionalist, like, I don't think the National Security Act, the Tormac Energy Act, like, can plausibly or even morally be extended to non-human intelligence fact up. Yeah. It just, I fully, it just reject that wholesale that the fact of non-human intelligence is this not government information, like, it's essentially, legally, morally is not government information, right? Other things, like the existence of advanced aerospace, propulsion systems, material science breakthroughs, maybe even theoretical physics research, although that's litigatable, are government information. Those can be properly

classified under a mandate where the authorities making those determinations, you know, are doing so in accordance with our legal mechanisms for constitutional oversight, where, you know, we have procedures, we have laws for secrecy and reporting to Congress. And it seems like on that front, We clearly have a problem, right? That needs to be cleaned up, where these programs have not been properly reported to, you know, the cognizant oversight mechanisms in our system of government. And it's just like, yeah, like, if you want to have a democracy the way that we think we have one, you need to fix that.

Does that mean everything comes out? No, but it means that accountability objective clearly needs some work to be done. And then it's the disclosure objective, where the disclosure objective, at least for me, is the fact of non-human intelligence, if that is known with high confidence by the US government, is illegitimately kept from the public. That's just not something they can keep secret. I think there's no moral justification for that, right? Even if it's like going to be destabilized, it depends on what you say, right?

It's not like, you know, you could say, yes, we're not alone. We're studying it. We're going to impanel these institutions, public, private sector, civil society to really understand. And then you slowly would leak out the sensitive information, right? That's maybe more prudent. It doesn't mean you release everything. But I think this Omerta can no longer, I think, be effectively sustained because I think it won't be, right? It's like clear that either adversaries or private sector or individuals from these programs are going to keep pushing that.

Yep. And then you're in this, you're in this, you know, a game of no good choices if you're trying to manage that process of disclosure. It's like, you know, you either get on board with this controlled mechanism or it's going to be, you know, RFK, you know, coming in there. and just like tweeting out, you know, everything you've been doing. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. That's like, I think the last few days, I know we're recording a few days after the election, it is just like the shock wave is just like propagating through, right?

And I think we haven't seen what this means for disclosure and what different actors now throughout these different systems that we're modeling now have to radically adjust their personal, you know, like incentives here, right? it's like okay like you know there's a story just about the FBI right like see like off the record quotes from senior officials the FBI being like it was like the kind of a morbid joke that was you know the senior officials on that way or seventh floor um you know they they they they're they haven't passed their fit test in a while but they're going to need to to run out the door so

like there's an expectation filtering through just say the FBI is an example that it's just going to be a purged. Yeah. Purges. Wild. Right. And just sort of then carry that through, right, these other different structures. And if that, that is now, that's a radical change in the institutional bureaucratic environment. Yeah.

That the UAP disclosure conversation is now situated in. Well, it's fascinating because, like, historically, you have JFK saying, I'm going to scouted the CIA to the winds, you know, being at loggerheads with them. You have Nixon saying he's going to fire a third of the CIA. or whatever. Maybe that was a sub-narrative for Watergate a little bit. And then you have similar stuff with Carter. Usually it doesn't end well for like the reforming president. But I've never seen so much force and power on the side of force reduction in bureaucracy as I do today with Elon RFK, this coalition of like, we fucking had it. And like the history of this country is way more messed up than, you know, people realize we're going to like fire all these people. So I'm very curious to see how this. this, how this ends. And if it's, you know, history repeating itself or if, you know, maybe, maybe you do just see this massive watershed moment. Yeah. I mean, I think this is the tale is all this time, which is, you know, how does this urge for reform not be captured, right? And to what

extent, you know, everyone has an agenda, right? Like, it's, you know, everyone's like, oh, good guys, bad guys, right? The deep state versus the, you know, Elon, wonder, you know, wonder team. It's like, everyone is a flawed person. Everyone has an agenda. Everyone's working at everyone's working at an angle, right? The question is, you know, are the interests of civil society and public accountability? Like, those higher level objectives, are those being met or not met by the actions of decisions made by each of those different sides? Yeah. It's like, I don't have allegiance to any particular team. I have allegiance to these higher level sort of social, political, and moral objectives. And so if anyone in particular decides to move in a direction that's aligned with that, I'm supportive. If they move against it, then I'm not supportive. right. And so this is where it would be important to watch and for folks that are interested in, you know, pushing UAP disclosure to, like, hold people to account, right, regardless of your particular team or tribe and be like, I have a certain political objective. I think we need to establish these independent mechanisms of accountability and transparency, you know, whoever's in power, that's my expectation, right? Whether it's Elon or or anybody else. It's like, this is my, this is where I'm going to hold you to, to account. So, you know, that's what we're heading into now. It's going to be a lot of,

A lot of things are now on the table. And it's going to be fascinating to see how it all plays out. We can't wait. Matthew Pines, this was awesome. We could go on for hours. You mentioned before we started rolling that there might be a federal reserve in Bitcoin. We didn't even get to that, which shows just how much we had to discuss on UFO, secret science, all the other fronts. But I hope we can do this again.

And this was an absolute blast, man. Yeah. Anytime. Cool. All right. Thank you so much. to delete me for sponsoring this video. If you want to remove your data from the internet, go to the link in the description for 20% off right now.