American History Hit - FDR & Stalin

Episode Date: January 23, 2025

They say that the enemy of your enemy is your friend, but did that apply to President Franklin D. Roosevelt and his Soviet counterpart, Joseph Stalin, during the Second World War?Despite their ideological differences, the United States and the USSR joined ranks on January 1, 1942, attacked by Japan and Nazi Germany, respectively. Their leaders would meet for the first time almost two years later at the 1943 Tehran conference.Don is joined by Phillips Payson O’Brien, Professor of Strategic Studies at St Andrews. Phillips is the author of 'The Strategists: Churchill, Stalin, Roosevelt, Mussolini and Hitler – How War Made Them, And How They Made War'.Produced by Freddy Chick. Edited by Aidan Lonergan. Senior Producer is Charlotte Long.Sign up to History Hit for hundreds of hours of original documentaries, with a new release every week and ad-free podcasts. Sign up at https://www.historyhit.com/subscribe.  You can take part in our listener survey here.All music from Epidemic Sounds.American History Hit is a History Hit podcast. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

Want to explore even more history? Sign up to History Hit, where you will discover history from around the world. From the American Revolution to prehistoric Scotland, there is plenty to discover. With your subscription, you'll unlock hundreds of hours of exclusive documentaries with a brand new release every week, exploring everything from the ancient world to World War II. Just visit historyhit.com slash subscribe to bring the past alive. Christmas Eve, 1943, Franklin Delano Roosevelt sat poised before his radio microphone, preparing to address the nation. It had been an arduous journey these past months of November and December, traveling in Algeria, Tunisia, Iran, Egypt, Malta, Sicily, and Senegal.

Now, with his thinning gray hair neatly groomed, Roosevelt began to recount the pivotal meetings of the past weeks. In Cairo, he and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill had conferred separately with Chinese Generalissimo Shanghai Shek and Turkish president Ismet Inanu. In Tehran, the pair had sat down with Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin. For Roosevelt, this marked a momentous occasion. His first face-to-face meeting with the man who held Russia in his iron grip. We did discuss international relationships from the point of view

are big, broad objectives rather than details. But on the basis of what we did discuss, I can say even today that I do not think any insoluble differences will arise among Russia, Great Britain, and the United States. In these conferences, we were concerned with basic principles, principles which involve the security and the welfare and the standard of living of human beings in countries large and small.

To use an American and somewhat ungrammatical colloquialism, I may say that I got along fine with Marshal Stallone. He is a man who combines a tremendous, relentless determination with a stalwart good humor. I believe he is truly representative of the whole thing. heart and soul of Russia. And I believe that we are going to get along very well with him and the Russian people. Very well indeed. Hello, this is American History Hit. Glad you're with us. I'm Don Wildman. By the beginning of World War II in Europe, Joseph Stalin had been the supreme leader of the Soviet Union for some 15 years, having assumed that mantle from Vladimir Lenin in 1924.

After a series of internal power struggles, and then the great purge of the mid-1930s, Stalin had emerged with absolute power over Soviet affairs domestic and international. In August 1939, he signed a non-aggression treaty with Germany, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, not 10 days before the Nazis invaded Poland on September 1st, 1939, triggering the war. Stalin had expected that agreement would guarantee the security of his communist state, while the capitalists to the West proceeded to destroy each other. This would prove to be a strategic blunder of titanic proportions when Hitler broke this agreement in 1941 launching Operation Barbarossa and invading Russia.

Suddenly, Stalin would need to join with those capitalists and forge critical relationships with their leaders, including, and especially Franklin Delano Roosevelt, president of the United States. This high-stakes alliance and the unlikely relationship between these two leaders is our subject today. In the company of a man who authored the book entitled The Strategists, Churchill, Stalin, Roosevelt, Mussolini, and Hitler, how the war made them and how they made war.

A well-known figure on the socials for his commentary on the war in Ukraine, Phillips O'Brien, teaches history and strategic studies at St. Andrews University in Scotland. Phillips, welcome to American History. Nice to have you. Thanks for having me, Don. Glad to be here. Phillips, when FDR and Stalin first meet, it's November 1943, we're deep in the war in Tehran at this point, the Tehran Conference. Many communications have gone back and forth over the years by this time. And I want to quote one of these messages, I won't date it.

This is from FDR to Stalin, and it really captures an interesting tone between them. I hope to talk over many things with you. We understand each other's problems, and, you know, I like to keep discussions informal, no reason for formal agenda. The, you know, really strikes me. It's a very interesting chemistry that's going on here. Well, what Roosevelt's been trying to do since Pearl Harbor, really, is to set up a personal meeting with Stalin. So once they become formal allies, which, I mean, in some ways, they become informal allies from the moment Hitler invades. So that Roosevelt sends Harry Hopkins to meet with Stalin and to set up getting U.S. aid. But really, they become formal allies in the war against Hitler in December, 1941, when, you know,

when Germany and the United States go to war. Roosevelt's been very keen to have a meeting with Stalin. Roosevelt believes in personal relationships. He believes he is personally important to not only winning the war, but setting up a sort of a post-war world that will work. And so what he's trying to do is in many ways charm Stalin. I mean, Roosevelt is a very charming man. A lot of people are won over by Roosevelt,

and then they believe they're Roosevelt's friends. He had a way of making you think he liked you, I would argue far more than he really did. And what he's been trying to do with Stalin is establish a close personal relationship, which he believes will be key for the future. And that's why that he uses that tone. It's in a way to say, look, I'm your friend. We can speak as human beings, and let's try and work this out. Did Stalin feel the same way?

Is there any record of that? No, I don't think he did. I think there's two interesting things about Stalin. One, he was actually very respectful and a little nervous to meet Roosevelt. That Stalin, I think, understood the power balance. He understood the United States was extremely powerful in the world, you know, 1942, 3, 4, and 5. And that American power was something he had to live with.

And that Roosevelt was the exemplar of American power. He'd been president for so long, no longer than any human being, history. So I think there was that basic, you might say, respect and slight nervousness. The first time they actually meet, Stalin is very nervous about setting up the table properly for a formal event. The other thing, though, is he remains suspicious that Stalin is, in some ways, acting throughout the Second World War as of being more friendly towards the United States and the United Kingdom than he really was, that he hadn't gotten over and changed his basic ideological outlook that capitalism and communism were not going to be long-term friends.

And so he was always playing a bit of a role of, I don't want to say a false friend, but you'd say a temporary friend. Yeah. They were, in his mind, allies to win the war. And that was it. He has that famously inscrutable expression that he wears on his face in every picture. Who knows in personal life, I don't know. But the sense of this sort of little bit of a smirk, which he belies this obviously iron-fisted leader's style behind closed doors, I'm sure.

How much would FDR have known about the purges and all the controversy of the 1930s? I mean, it was terrible stuff happened there. Yeah, I mean, he knows. I mean, he knows as much as people can know about it without being there. But on the other hand, I think what Roosevelt, this is what Roosevelt's not an ideological man. And I think that's an important thing to understand about him. He is a practical politician. In many ways, the New Deal is not ideologically motivated.

It's practically motivated. He's just trying things. And when it comes to dealing with Stalin, because he, you know, he views Stalin, you know, Stalin has been bloody. Stalin has been brutal. But heck, you know, that's what happens in the 1930s. You have Nazi Germany. you have the Soviet Union, you have Imperial Japan. By the way, he's no fan of the British Empire,

which he also believes can be very brutal. So I think he views Stalin is pretty tough and pretty brutal, but not someone with whom he can't deal. And that's the difference. The other thing is, I mean, through these years, the 1930s United States, there's a lot of people who empathize with Russia, who are interested in those kinds of politics,

at least socialism, but certainly lots of communists. in the United States, all that will play out, of course, over the 20th century. But that was a big pressure going on internally here that Roosevelt had to recognize and had to sort of account for, right? Well, there certainly was sympathy for the Soviet Union, particularly in the left wing of the Democratic Party. And Roosevelt is a Democrat. And he is desperate to keep the party together. In the 20s, when the Republicans are in power, they're not going to recognize the Soviet Union. However, the Democrats have at least an element of their party that is more sympathetic. They're not communists.

And I think we need to be very careful about you're calling people the Democratic Party communists. They're not. But they are sympathetic towards the Soviet Union. They want good relations. Roosevelt's vice president in his third term, Henry Wallace, who's vice president in the time of Casablanca. And Cairo and Tehran is very sympathetic towards the Soviet Union. I mean, Roosevelt, he's on the left wing of the party.

He wants a very good relationship with Stalin and the Soviet Union, someone like Harry Hopkins, who Roosevelt really relies upon. And Hopkins is an extraordinarily powerful figure from 1938, 39 to 43, is also quite sympathetic towards Stalin and the Soviet Union. So Roosevelt is hearing from one side of his party that really, you know, this is a power we have to get along with. it's not an evil power. It's different, but we can be friendly. Yeah, but you use the word pragmatic. I mean, these are men, and this goes for, you know, all kinds of ages and eras, these are men who are going

to send massive amounts of people to their death. I mean, the people that wage wars have to come to terms with the idea of the practicality of this kind of thing. So understanding why Stalin would have done what he did in the middle 1930s, and to define it for anyone who doesn't understand. understand, these are these enormous show trials. It's a result of the internal power struggles within the Soviet Union, starting with Trotsky and all these guys. Stalin has to win out over these people, and he does it in the most extraordinary way. In 1937, there's very, very famous show trials. And just up to a million and a half people are killed or put into gulags in this time period. Anybody with a spy in Moscow would have known this is happening. So we certainly did.

But to take that into account when you're trying to forge a relationship with somebody is a pretty amazing dynamic to go with. But Roosevelt always did it. When he recognizes the Soviet Union in 1933, this is while the Ukrainian famine is going on. Exactly. Yeah, he's the first American president to do that. I mean, there are four, right? Before him, go down the list. Wilson, Harding, Coolidge, and Hoover. None of those guys recognize the Soviet Union. 1933, FDR does for all the reasons. we're talking about. Yeah. I mean, he just, he believes the deal is worth it, that we have to live with brutal countries. He does, he makes no mention of the Ukrainian famine, even though it's ongoing and millions of people are dying. To Roosevelt, I think that is the, the horrors of the modern world, and they're going to have to live with it. He was also, of course, recognizing

the rise. I don't know how FDR knew so much about the world. In those days, we assume that we know up, and it's simply because it just dumps onto our phone every morning. I mean, he understood the rise of fascism, like I guess no one else did, really, in America anyway. Well, what he did, I mean, if you remember Roosevelt had had his career as an aristocrat, an elite. He had been making international trips since he was a young boy. His father used to like to go to Germany to spa. His father was a bit of a hypochondriac. And so it dragged Franklin across the Atlantic, not every summer, but many summers to go to these spas. So Roosevelt was used to international travel. He had done a lot of international travel during the First World War. He

represented the United States as assistant secretary of the Navy. By the way, what he learns from the First World War is a very healthy respect of German power, which is why he is always more afraid of Hitler than Stalin. And one of the reasons I would argue he's more afraid of Hitler and Nazi Germany is that he really believes Germany is a threat. Germany almost wins the First World War. and Russia loses it. And I think he never gets beyond that. And that has that imprint that Nazi Germany is always more of a threat to the United States in his mind than the Soviet Union. At the same time, he is dealing with enormous pressures at home. I mean, he's got the Great Depression is going on. I mean, this is a terrible time in the United States. And yet somehow he has to look beyond this and keep a perspective that we are still a powerful country that is able to provide at least support, if not troops, later on. I'm speaking just of the enormous perspective of Franklin Roosevelt, which, you know, informs everything that happens in the war. Also in 1943, and we're talking about the Tehran

conference, which we'll define in a moment. Of course, we have the Pacific War raging at that point, 1941 onward. So all of this has come to pass and is being brought to bear on this meeting that is going to happen between these two men. So let's talk about Tehran. There is going to be another one called Yalta later on, but what happens during this first conference? Well, Tehran is a, I mean, it's a fascinating sign of how desperate Roosevelt is to meet Stalin. That, where is Tehran? It's just over the border from the Soviet Union in Iran. There's actually not very far for Stalin to go. That, you know, it really is close. It's about as close as one can go and leave the Soviet Union. Whereas for Roosevelt, it's a trip around the

world, that he has to leave Washington go through the Mediterranean to Egypt. and then fly up to Tehran. It's a long, long trip. And Roosevelt's doing it because that's the only way Stalin will meet. Stalin says, really, I can't travel. If Stalin is, by the way, afraid to travel, he's afraid to fly. So he really doesn't want to travel far. He also is personally always paranoid about his rule. So he doesn't want, I think, leave Moscow for very long or leave the Soviet Union because that's where his power is. But Roosevelt's willing, as an older, Roosevelt is a ill, not ill man, but he is growing weaker in 43, make this trip halfway around the world to meet Stalin.

So that is really important to understand, is the power dynamics. Roosevelt is desperate to have this meeting. Stalin is really not so desperate, but is finally willing to do it. Prior to this period, the United States had been supporting Russia through a similar program that had been in place for the UK before we. we got involved in the war called the Lenleese program. Was it the same thing? Basically, were they transferring the whole idea over to Russia?

It all comes in under the same lend lease plan. So basically it allows, what it does is it allows Roosevelt to hand over to U.S. allies almost anything he wants. So he can provide them any kind of military commitment or non-military in the sense he can provide aluminum. he can provide economic resources, that if he is as president, decides this is in the U.S. interest. So it's like, I don't want to say he has carte blanche because he couldn't like hand over the atomic secrets.

But he can, he can hunt out or pretty much any military good that he wants to to help the Soviet Union. I'll be back with more American history after this short break. The dynamic plays out quite interestingly at Tehran because they end up actually as housemates, don't they? I don't mean that in the casual sense, of course, but rather than staying elsewhere at the U.S. Embassy and so forth, they share a domicile during this period. I guess that would have been a practical matter as well because you've got a man with polio. You know, FDR is dealing with his condition all the way. And so it's difficult for him to move around. Well, that wasn't the plan, though.

The plan was that Roosevelt was going to stay in the U.S. consulate. And Stalin was going to stay in Soviet. The Soviets had a very big compound. But what happens is Stalin, I hope, wants to bring Roosevelt into his orbit. And what happens is when Roosevelt gets there, the Soviet said, well, we have reports that there's going to be an assassination attempt on you as you travel between the two places. So why don't you come stay with us? And Roosevelt's, I think is quite skeptical of the reality. I think they understand that this might be a ploy by Stalin, but to show how trusting he is and how much he wants the relationship.

to work, he agrees, and he could only bring two people with him. So he can only bring his two closest advisors, or Harry Hopkins and Bill Leahy, they're the only ones allowed to live with Roosevelt. And by the way, this is an extraordinary moment, because the president of the United States is basically a prisoner of the Soviet Union, because he's living in a Soviet compound, which is patrol overwhelmingly by Soviet soldiers, who could have taken the president hostage at any time had they wanted to. And Roosevelt has handed over his freedom to Stalin as a sign of, look, I really do trust you and I want to get along. But I don't think sometimes people realize just quite a dramatic thing it was to basically turn his person over to the Soviet Union in a way

that no other American since or before has been at the mercy of another foreign power. Amazing. How long does the conference go? There's just a few days. I think it's about four days. And on the agenda is what exactly? Unlike Yalta, a few years later, is about how the world is going to be after the war. The Tehran conference is how they're going to win the war. So it's about how are we going to see the war through to a successful conclusion. So the big decision that they have to make, and it's one, by the way, Churchill is also there, but Churchill doesn't stay in the Soviet compound.

Again, an interesting difference as well. That the big decision they make is about the invasion of Europe. up in 1944. And this, by the way, allows Roosevelt and Stalin to bond against Churchill. Churchill doesn't want to invade France. He doesn't want to do what we know as D-Day. To him, that's going to be too bloody, that Britain doesn't have the soldiers to spare for that operation. Far better not to do it and to fight in the Mediterranean is Churchill's view. But Roosevelt wants to do D-Day in 1944. Stalin wants D-Day to happen. So really what happens is Stalin and Roosevelt get hang up on Churchill at Tehran and forced Churchill to accept D-Day in 1944. So a lot of the discussions

are about this. And this is all, of course, been pre-planned. They know these decisions are in the wind. They've got to do this now. Oh, absolutely. Basically, the U.S. had been trying to bash Churchill's head in on D-Day for all of 1943. So there have been a series of conferences before that just between Roosevelt and Churchill and Washington and Quebec. And in those, Roosevelt's always pushing D-Day and Churchill's always resisting. But when Stalin's there, there's nothing Churchill can really do because it's two against one. These iconic meetings, you know, we know from great photographs and so forth and these sort of scattered moments, but these are long days. Is there a record of these men sitting and casually talking and having drinks and so forth? It must

have happened, especially if they're living together. Well, certainly there's both the formal sessions of which we have different sets of minutes, which are like formal conferences, you sit around a round table, a big group, and you'll propose issues and talk about it. And then there are the informal meeting. So the first time that Stalin and Roosevelt meet, it's actually an informal meeting. So when Roosevelt moves into the Soviet compound, Stalin comes over and pays him a visit. Crucially, Churchill is not there. So it is just Stalin, Roosevelt, and their interpreters, because Stalin didn't speak English and Roosevelt didn't speak Russian, or at least their linguistic abilities were not such that they could communicate with each other. So it's just the two men

and their interpreters. And they have a very friendly, Roosevelt, you might say friendly discussion. Roosevelt's trying to really show how he and Stalin and get along. And what Roosevelt does, I think Churchill would have been appalled. It's basically Roosevelt says, oh, you know, I hate European empires. I'm a bit like you, Joe. You know, we look at the world in the same way, not like these terrible British and French imperialists. Sure. And that's how it goes. One of the tipping points in all of this, in the big picture and more contained here, is the

fate of Poland. And one of the important things to consider, the difference between FDR's pressures and Stalin's is he's dealing with a lot of Polish Americans back home, gigantic amounts in Chicago and so forth. This has to be a pressure on him as he's realizing, yikes, you know, this guy wants Poland, for sure. he's already in it. And how are we going to deal with this down the road? Oh, I mean, Poland in many ways, becomes the emotive issue. And by 1945, it's up there is the most

divisive issues between Stalin and Roosevelt. And it goes back to so many different things. I mean, Stalin signs the Nazi Soviet pact with Hitler to divine Poland. So his first move against Poland is to cut it up and take as much of Poland for the Soviet Union as possible, whereas Roosevelt still recognizes the pre-war Polish government, which Hitler invaded and Stalin helped take over. So Roosevelt at this point is still trying to work, formally recognize the London government, which is the successor of the state, Stalin cuts up. So they have this difference in 1943, certainly about who they're going to recognize as what happens, of course, is that Stalin ends up occupying Poland with the Red Army. And that gives him. And that gives him.

as the war goes on, the lion's share of the say of what's going to happen so that Roosevelt can ask or beg even to try and have some kind of concessions about Poland, but ultimately it's up to Stalin. Yeah. So that's November 1943, the Tehran Conference in Iran. The next time they meet is Yalta. February 1945, quite a different set of circumstances. It's clear the Allies are marching towards victory. It's a ways off yet still. But Adi Day was. a big success. All these things have happened now. So they are now basically figuring out the aftermath. These big three are meeting again, but the men are in totally different conditions, especially FDR. I mean, yeah, the big difference is Roosevelt between the end of Tehran and the

beginning of Yalta goes from someone who still has vibrancy and strength and the ability to be dynamic to a dying man. Yes. That in February, 1945, he is clearly dying. I mean, People are shocked if they haven't seen him for a while. He's much, much thinner, that he's not eating. He just, his skin color, I mean, people often said he looked almost like he was dead. Yeah. And he simply doesn't have the strength to negotiate with someone like Stalin. And Stalin, of course, feels this and understands it.

I wonder, though, how much he felt badly for him or whether the opportunity was there for him to take advantage. Stalin killed many of his best friends. Could Stalin feel bad for any human being? I don't think he had that kind of empathy. Point taken. Yes, exactly. In many ways, he overreacts to this by bullying Roosevelt. Yes. So he, particularly on Poland, I mean, Poland is the issue that comes up a lot at Yalta. Yeah. So they get along actually quite well other than Poland. They're meeting on his terms. I mean, again, they're close to Russia. They're in Russia at this point.

They're in the Soviet Union. Yeah, in the Soviet Union. Yalta is on the Crimea Peninsula. Tell me about how they're dealing with Poland. That is the critical issue. Stalin occupies it now. I mean, we're talking February 1945. The Red Army occupies all of Poland. I mean, it's on the Oder River. It's not far from Berlin at this point. And so what is going to happen in Poland will be determined by the Red Army and Stalin controls the Red Army. And that's simply the reality of it. Now, what Roosevelt is doing is partly unacknowledging that, that Roosevelt knows that Stalin is going to have the lion's share of the say in what happens in Poland. But what he's desperate to do is get some kind of concessions so that he can go to the American people. Look,

you know, pre-war or democratic elements still are going to have a say in Poland. It's not just going be a Soviet-dominated communist state. It will have some of the earlier, pre-war Poland wasn't democratic, but at least it would be a national identity that wasn't communist. So he keeps asking Stalin, look, can you include some elements in the government of Poland that aren't communist? And Stalin really fobs him off, fobs him off, eventually he agrees to an indefinite statement that there will be, quote, unquote, democratic elements in the Polish, government. But of course, Stalin believes the Soviet Union is democratic. So he's really making no concession whatsoever. But Roosevelt tries and tries and eventually Roosevelt gives up. And he says at the end of it,

I'm simply too tired, Bill, to Bill Leahy. Wow. Are they already talking about carving up Germany? Is that part of the plan? Well, that becomes, I think, more formalized in Yalta. There had always been a question of occupation zones, which is what they're talking. about. I mean, they're not talking in 1945 of two Germany. So the idea of a East and West Germany as separate states is not actually on the agenda in 1945. The big question are the occupation zones. Because actually both of them, both the United States and the Soviet Union and, by the way, Britain, have a certain interest in at least keeping the core of Germany united. That what the Soviets want, of course, they know that most of West Germany is going to come under British

and American rule. And by the way, West Germany is the industrial rich part of the country. So if Germany actually is divided into two countries, that's not great for the Soviet Union, because they get the East. And so they want to keep, they'd rather keep Germany united, but weak, where they can have a say in the whole thing. And what happens is, therefore, you end up in this bit of this dance about occupation zones where the occupation zones are going to be. But they are not talking about two separate countries at that point. How much of the discussion is about the United Nations, because that's a new idea to Stalin at this point? Or does he know this is happening?

Stalin is one of those things that he can make concessions on because he just doesn't care. Yeah. And it's one of the Roosevelt cares. And he really believes the United Nations is important and he's trying to set up an international body that will work. It's crucial in his mind that is different from the League of Nations, which failed, but he believes it has promise. To Stalin, this is sort of frippery. And as he said, we don't need an international body. We need the great powers doing what we're doing, sitting around a table here now deciding. I mean, the real questions will never in his mind be decided the United Nations. They'll be decided by Stalin, Roosevelt, and Churchill sitting around a table and dividing up the world. So Stalin is a bit

confused as to why Roosevelt cares so much about it. And on the other hand, it allows him to make some concessions to Roosevelt's and seem like he's being cooperative, even when he's a bit confused as to why it's become so key to the Roosevelt agenda. Yeah. Stalin wants to stay neutral on Japan, or is he willing to wage war against them? No, I mean, Stalin has got a very clear agenda, which is to stay out of the war with Japan until Germany is defeated and then try to grab as much of Asia as he can when Hitler is safe in his grave, then he will join the war. And so there is a problem because the U.S. had earlier been putting pressure on Stalin to join the war against Japan. And Stalin had always been resisting, saying, look, I can't. I have to throw everything against

the German army. But I will join. I promise you, I will join the war later. I don't think when these original promises are made, the United States thought Japan would be as close to defeat as it was in 1945. So really, by this point, the U.S. is saying we don't need the Soviet Union. We don't need Stalin, but they don't want to turn around to say that to him because they had been asking him to join for 42, 43. So that's the problem. The Stalin sort of hoists the U.S. on its own partard. So he can make it look like he's being magnanimous. Yes, I will join the war within three months of it ending in Europe, I'll join the war against Japan. And at this point, the U.S., the people around Roosevelt, we really don't need you, but they

can't say no because they'd been asking it. It will play out in a very interesting way because, of course, Truman doesn't want them to come into Japan at that point at the end of the war. And that's all kinds of theories about the atomic bomb and so forth, you know. It's incredible. The pathos of this whole thing, of course, looming over all of this is a couple of months from now, FDR will dive a stroke. It's an incredible timing of all of this stuff.

It doesn't get any more dramatic than all of these events. You do wonder about the counterfactual of whether if he had not died, how the world would have looked, you know, based on the relationship between these two men. He couldn't have not died. He was dying. I mean, he could have died in Yalta. That's the thing is Roosevelt was going to die. Yeah. He was in such bad shape.

And the amazing thing is actually that he runs for re-election in 1944. and they hide just how weak he is from the American people. And he runs for re-election really with no prospect of living out but term. It's incredible. The hubris of it. It's arrogant. I say in the strategists, I don't think FDR has been criticized enough for this decision. The people on the whole treat FDR, I think quite gently. And I think FDR had a number of very positive aspects as a war leader, but his decision to run for re-election in 1944 is super hubris and it's irresponsible because not only does he decide to run for re-election with no prospect of living out the term, he chooses his vice president someone he doesn't like and doesn't talk to. So he chooses Truman

and then he spends no time preparing Truman for the presidency. Exactly. He chooses Truman entirely for political reasons. And he basically is sort of saying, if I die, okay, well then you know, that's it. I don't care. And that's what happened. You, Truman is not prepared because Roosevelt doesn't do anything to help him get ready. A lot of what happens in the 50s has a result of this, this lack of a baton being passed, this whole strange tension between these two presidents and one having to take over in a completely naive way. I mean, relatively speaking, it's amazing. He knows nothing about the atomic bomb. One of those tipping points of American history that, you know, get ignored a lot because we just celebrate FDR.

so much for the grandeur of his four terms, but it was three terms and a week or a month anyway. Yeah. Professor Phillips O'Brien teaches history and strategic studies at St. Andrews University in Scotland. I am jealous. He's the author of The Strategists, Churchill, Stalin, Roosevelt, Mussolini, and Hitler, how the war made them and how they made war. Fascinating. He's a well-known figure on social media. Where can we find you in that regard?

There's a big substack with you, right? Yeah, basically, I do a lot of writing on my substack. Yeah. Which is just, you know, Phillips's newsletter at Substack. So that's where I write a lot about geopolitics and military history. Excellent. Thanks, Phillips. Thanks for having me. I hope you enjoyed this episode of American History hit. Please remember to like, review, and subscribe.

Follow us wherever you get your podcasts. And I'll see you next time.