American History Hit - Frenemies: France & the USA, a History

Episode Date: June 9, 2025

Since their respective revolutions, the USA and France have been intrinsically linked. But what have the highest points in their relationship been? And what about the lowest?In this episode, Professor Kathryn Statler joins Don to take us through 250 years of cooperation and conflict.Kathryn is a Professor of History at the University of San Diego, and author of books including 'Replacing France: The Origins of American Intervention in Vietnam' and 'Lafayette’s Ghost: How Women and War Kept the Franco-American Alliance Alive'.Edited by Tim Arstall, Produced by Sophie Gee, Senior Producer is Charlotte Long.Sign up to History Hit for hundreds of hours of original documentaries, with a new release every week and ad-free podcasts. Sign up at https://www.historyhit.com/subscribe.  You can take part in our listener survey here.All music from Epidemic Sounds.American History Hit is a History Hit podcast Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

Want to explore even more history? Sign up to History Hit, where you will discover history from around the world. From the American Revolution to prehistoric Scotland, there is plenty to discover. With your subscription, you'll unlock hundreds of hours of exclusive documentaries with a brand new release every week, exploring everything from the ancient world to World War II. Just visit historyhit.com slash subscribe to bring the past alive. The region around Milau, a town here in southern France, is lovely, distinctly rural. Cultivated farms, open grasslands, there are meandering rivers, gorges, and deep ravines.

It's the evening of August 12, 1999. A soft, warm breeze drifts through the center of Milo. Most of the town has wrapped up work for the day, but it seems the farmers have not. A line of tractors rumbles in from the fields outside of town. descending steadily towards a public lot. There, 300 people have gathered, a lively, mixed crowd, organized, waiting, children playing among adults. One farmer, pipe-in-mouth, directs the event.

Around him, the farmers and others, load pre-arranged items onto carts, which are then hauled into town by the tractors and dumped in front of the Milau police station. Piece by piece, what emerges is unmistakable. the components of a brand new, dismantled McDonald's. The iconic American fast food chain has become a target of cultural and economic protest. With heavy U.S. duties now levied against French goods, these local farmers have taken action to make their feelings known,

not with words, but with tractors and torque wrenches. Apparently in France, or at least here in Milan, nothing says, Vive la resistance, quite like turning a happy moment, Sad. Good day. Bienvenu, my ami. This is American history hit, and I'm Don Wildman. France and the United States, it is a combination as foundational to our national story as wine is to cheese on a crusty baguette. You couldn't have one without the other, or at least it's not likely to taste nearly as good. The historic relationship between our two countries, pillars of Western democracy each, is deep, entrenched, you might say, involved in everything from the Louisiana purchase to the beaches of Normandy to Bridget Bardot.

The United States was born with a relationship with the French, who came to our side when we needed the most, bankrolling our revolution, providing arms, armaments, and naval strength. From then on, our relationship has been a patadou of gratitude, passion, frustration, and passive-aggressive spite, swapping statues, soldiers, and shared ideals of liberty and justice across the centuries. On today's episode, we uncork this full-bodied history, asking the flavorful question, are we friends with the French? Is it love? Or are we really frenemies? My guest today is Catherine Stadler, Professor of History at the University of San Diego,

author of several books on the subject of Franco-American relations, including replacing France, the origins of American intervention in Vietnam, and Lafayette's Ghost, how women and war kept the Franco-American Alliance alive. Professor Stadler, bonjour. Bonjour. Thank you. It's a pleasure to be here. It is a unique relationship in the history of the world, isn't it?

France and America. You don't find too many nations an ocean apart with such a strong bond, so fundamental to the development of both countries. And yet, we are still such different cultures. Why is it important to understand this relationship? Well, I would argue it is important to understand this relationship because France and the United States have the strongest, alliance in the history of the world, at least the modern world.

We're going to go through a lot of the topics of why that is the case, many of which surprised me as I did my prep for this conversation. There's a zigzag to this relationship, which is very surprising. Many of the events of the 19th century, most Americans don't even know about or think about very much. But let's start in the cultural rivalry that's so familiar to so many. Americans famously love to hate the French. I don't subscribe to this personally.

but you can go to Willie the Scottish Groundkeeper on The Simpsons. You know, he leaps to mind. It calls him cheese-eating surrender monkeys. Which is a really funny phrase. And then on the other side of the ocean, you have the French trade protest against the McDonald's. You know, so furious about their Roqueford cheese being restricted by U.S. trade. It's a back and forth that remains as lively today as ever, really. I would say that is completely true.

The current environment is to love to hate the French. as you say, I think in a lot of ways it's the one country it's safe for Americans to pick on because there's such a long history of alliance and friendship and honesty that you can get away with it. In a lot of ways, in my research, I compare France and the United States to sisters. So they are sisters, they squabble, they have their issues. But at the end of the day, they are tied by memory, they're tied by family, they're tied by alliance, and they're there for each other when the chips are down. And so it's fun to hate the French, obviously. And you reference cheese-eating surrender monkeys. So that comes out in the 1990s. I think it's a 1995 Simpsons episode, but it makes perfect sense because this is the height of U.S. power after the end of the Cold War, and the Frencher are pushing back against this. So French, French, French, Foreign Minister, Dominguez Viltan, talks about the United States as a hyperpower in the 1990s. And there's this fear that American military, economic, political, and cultural power is going to take over.

And so you definitely see this rivalry in the 1990s. It's not helped by the French engaging in nuclear testing in the 1990s either. And so the French also go their own way. And there's this pushback that is going on. So we get this. And then it subsides with 9-11 when you have the French come out the day after in Le Monde, the famous article where the French say, We are all Americans. We are with you. And even though parts of that article are critical of previous American foreign policy, it is an unbelievable testament to the alliance for the French to acknowledge that they are Americans. This is unheard of.

And that military alliance that we had seen in the American Revolution, we'd seen in World War I, we'd seen in World War II, we had seen in the Cold War, that comes rushing back. Now, it's interrupted with the Second Iraq War in 2003. That's a crisis moment for the United States and France. And that's where we get the boycotting of Brie and pouring your red wine into the gutter and freedom fries. I think this is what you're getting at here. But it's quickly, surprisingly quickly done away with. And Obama and Sarkozy really bring the alliance back together very quickly.

And as the terrorist threats become more and more evident, especially in 2015, in France with the Charlie Hebdo. and then also with the Stade de France, the Batacan, that's where you really see this military alliance, I would argue, come back together, that the two countries are back. Yes. And what is more popular in France than Mickey and Minnie Mouse, right? Well, the Euro Disney was a whole other issue. That caused all sorts of controversy as well. But now is incredibly popular after the French and the Americans adapted to how Euro Disney. would be represented in France. It took a while, though. Absolutely. Disney made all sorts of mistakes, right? They didn't offer alcohol, so that did not fly in France. And in France, everyone eats at noon, and Disney was not prepared for that, so you had incredibly long lines. And of course, Disney's supposed to be the friendliest place on Earth. And that was not necessarily how people

were trained. The French were trained as they were running it. But now, again, we've adapted both France and the United States, and Euro-Disney runs pretty well. It is a mixed-bag marriage, is what I would call it. But it's a marriage in that we are still together. It is a whole bunch of military history, you know, back to the beginning, which we can move through like a hot knife through Brie. The question of our relationship traditionally begins with France's stalwart support of our revolution against the British, the critical role they played in that victory.

It's fair to say the revolution fails without them, or is it? It is absolutely correct. There is no American Revolution without the French. Absolutely no American Revolution. There's no chance at American independence without the French. So the French are the first to provide secret aid. They do this incredible runaround where they have Beaumarchais, the famous French playwright, creates a dummy company,

Rodriguez Ortales and company, and funnels money to, to the French revolutionaries through Silas Dean. And this is this initial ability to get money so that they can get arms, they can pay the Continental Army, all of these things. And this French aid, about 90% of French aid, is what's funding the Americans to win

at the Battle of Saratoga. So this is actually the start. And then I would argue the most critical component to French aid is in fact the Marquita Lafayette. So the Marquita Lafayette is an early adopter of the American Revolution. He comes on his own to the United States. He presents himself to Congress. He becomes the favored son of George Washington. I would call him the Forrest Gump of the American Revolution. He's at pretty much every key point. He's helping chase down Benedict Arnold.

He's suffering at Valley Forge. He's instrumental at playing this cat and mouse game with Cornwallis before the battle of Yorktown that allows George Washington and Rochambeau and DeGrosse to get an order so that they can corner Cornwallis at Yorktown in 1781. So he does all of these things. And on top of that, he's constantly appealing to the French government for more aid, more ships, more admirals, more generals. And it's effective. He is incredibly effective at getting that aid. Of course, Benjamin Franklin is working his mojo, let's say, in Paris at the same time. But it is absolutely amazing what Lafayette accomplishes at the moment where the American Revolution is really floundering, 1779, 1780. Well, this year, 2025 is an anniversary of Lafayette's visit to the United States on the 50th

anniversary of our Constitution, I guess, back in 1825. 1824, 1825. Yeah. And he is celebrated, you know, as a national hero in those days. That's really one of the first times that Americans take account of the goodness of France, because as we will now discuss, there was a lot of other stuff that happened between the Revolution and 1825. It's Lafayette's Victory Lap that marks a whole different change in that time frame. But what's so interesting to me is the French come to our support, but at this time, they are a monarchy. They are King Louis. I mean, it's not about democratic ideals at all for them at that point. It has a lot to do with their ongoing rivalry with the British, of course.

What do they feel about the Americas that is idealistic in ways that will come later for them? Well, what I would say is that it is self-serving. There is no doubt that Louis XIV and then Louis XVI, want to cause controversy for the British, right? They want to cause, let's say, maximum consternation for the British. So the French foreign minister at the time, the Compte Vergen, is busy figuring out ways to tweak the British and one of the biggest ways is to support the colonists. But he's persuaded by Lafayette to do so. I'm not sure how far he would have gone if it hadn't been for Lafayette. And so the difference is the French government, they're in it for what's good for France. And they

want revenge for the seven years war. So 1763, France has kicked off the continent. This is an incredible loss of territory, a huge blow to the French Empire when the Americans and British, right, the American colonists and the British work against them. So that's seven years war, 1754, 7, 63. They absolutely want revenge for that. So they're motivated by that. But people like Lafayette, they are motivated by idealism. He has embraced the American Revolution, and he wants the same thing for France. And of course, we forget about him, but he is the leading light of the early French Revolution. When 1789 to 1790, it's really Lafayette, who's not running the country, but fueling the liberal phase of the French Revolution. He's more American

than the Americans, as far as I'm concerned. He's embraced the cause, absolutely. It is all backed up on each other. You don't have a monarchy that's been in power for hundreds of years go down in a few days. This was a movement that was happening in the age of enlightenment. You had Voltaire, all the rest of them writing these things, at least in the media, in the movies, you feel this magnet towards America in the French culture, this understanding of this kind of espriedicor would be the word, I guess, or the term. That is, they are representing something that we all feel is kind of baked into French culture. And that certainly emerges only a few years later. And one can argue, though it's an argument, whether the American Revolution was the spark.

that lit the French Revolution. The American Revolution was the spark that lit the French Revolution. In some ways, there are many things going on. The French would argue against that, I would say. So there is the Enlightenment. There is the cultural shift where the king and queen are less and less respected. And of course, we see that with Louis XVI and Marie Antoinette. The nobility wants more power.

The bourgeoisie wants more power. There are social aspects going on. their cultural. The biggest one, though, I might argue, is economic in that now they've spent all this money on the American Revolution. And so they're in debt and they have to figure out a way to get out of it. And that's really the crisis point, right? That's the short-term cause, I would argue. But there's this longer-term cause of, hey, the Americans did this and it worked out pretty well for them. This is an example. And we can follow this example. And certainly people like Lafayette are pretty for it in France. This is what we can do. We can follow this example.

It's important to recognize that. The French monarchy spent an enormous fortune on this support of our war and that in many ways brings them down. If for nothing else, then they're not able to spend kind of money they would have on their own people. I did a TV show once that was a miserable place to live Paris in those days. You know, for the street people, it was just a misery of sewage and filth. And so all that was working against the aristocracy who are living outside those walls. And all that was fueled by a budget that can't afford to take care of matters. You know, so you end up with revolution in some ways.

That's treating it simplistically, of course, but it was definitely a huge factor. How quickly, though, it turns around. Treaty of Paris is signed. We are now an independent nation. Very soon afterwards, we end up in a conflict with them, what is called the quasi-war. 1798, so we're only a couple decades out at this point, and things are very, very tense between us and the French. Why is that? Things are tense between the United States and France in the 1790s.

They are tense for a couple of reasons. They're tense because, first of all, the United States does not support the more radical phase of the French Revolution. Once we get into the Great Terror in 1793, 1794, Robespierre fueling that, the guillotining of Louis the 16th. Interestingly enough, the Marquis to Lafayette, since he is part of the, of that liberal phase of the French Revolution, he has to flee the country. He goes to Austria and he's imprisoned. And so once he's imprisoned, that angers the Americans. They feel that France has

failed Lafayette on top of that. So you have all these issues. Ultimately, what happens is Washington declares the United States neutral in this conflict, which the French don't appreciate, because of course they've helped the Americans in the revolution. So his farewell address, which talks about no entangling alliances. It's very clearly against. against the French. He is stepping back. And so the French really don't appreciate this. On top of that, in 1795, the Americans do sign the J Treaty with the British. And this basically allows the British to prey on French ships, American ships that might be sailing with French goods. So there's a trade war going on. And this is one of the things that's going to really lead to that

quasi-war that you're talking about from 1798 to 1800. And so it's really a free-for-all. So the French and British are obviously at war. American ships are caught in the middle. French goods are being seized. British goods are being seized. And it's a problem. John Adams at this point as president actually tries to calm relations. He sends a negotiating team to Paris in the hopes of sort of calming things down. It doesn't work because before they're even allowed to meet with the French government, they have to pay an enormous bruntiness. None of this goes over well with the American people. But Adams, to his credit, keeps this from going into a full-scale war. So it's problematic. It's conflict, but I'm not sure I would actually call it a war. And by 1800 with the Treaty of Mort Fontaine, the United States and France basically agree, okay, we're going to dissolve our military alliance, which has been in place, by the way, since 1778.

They agreed to dissolve it and sort of resolve disputes and things calm down. And so it's very interesting because for the rest of the 19th century there, with the exception of the Civil War, there's no real military conflict a little bit with the War of 1812. But there's nothing that's going to lead the United States and France into potential military conflict with each other. Was it a sticking point that we hadn't taken part in their revolution? Was that anything? I mean, we really weren't in any position to do so in those days. And maybe everyone understood that. But we really stepped back from that, which was, you know, interesting, given how involved they were in ours.

Right. So again, this idea of American neutrality, Washington's farewell address, we should also mention the 1798 Alien and Sedition Acts, which were designed to deport French citizens in the United States who were causing problems, who were trying to get the American people to shift to the side of France. because what's interesting is the U.S. government is staying neutral, but the American people, for the most part, are not. They favor France over Britain. And so you have French officials agitating the American public as well. There's a sort of official, unofficial divide that's going on in the United States as well. Yeah. There's another unofficial factor to that. Most of these engagements, these mixed bag marriage kind of things, end up with an advantage to the United States often. And in this case, the quasi-war ends up with. us the legitimate Navy. You know, we've had to fight this battle primarily in the Caribbean, but nonetheless we were out there doing this stuff. We didn't really have a Navy before this. And that's going to figure in heavily into the next conflict, which is to say the 1812 conflict, also a very complicated affair for the French and Americans. So I will say it's generous to call it a Navy, the American Navy. That's a very generous term.

And actually, I might push back a little bit and say it's going to be the Barbary pirates more than any concern with France. that is going to push Jefferson to think about, wait a second, we better build up a little bit here. It's not going to be until the end of the 19th century that the United States Navy is really going to take off. I don't want to dismiss it completely, but we are not going to be a sea power until the end of the 19th century, really. Well, you hear my struggle as a storyteller here. I'm trying to find themes in a sprawling story that unify this thing into some sort of understandable stream. But that's the real thing we're discussing is the fact that this stream goes back and forth. zigzags through history. Like no other country we deal with, it's amazing how many different events

there are. I will say this. Here's my theme. So if you look at 250 years of Franco-American relations, right now we're talking a little bit about crises. So we've got this alliance that's lasted 250 years. When you count up the actual years of crisis between the United States and France, so let's take the quasi-war, the war of 1812, the Civil War, where the Civil War, where the the French threatened to come in on the side of the Confederacy. Let's take the Battle of Dienbeon Fu in 1954, the Suez Crisis in 1956, certainly the French leaving NATO, the integrated command of NATO in 1966. There's a little bit of tension in 1973. And then, of course, we get the Second War in Iraq in 2003. So there are these moments of crisis. When you total those all up,

it's about 5% of the 250 years. So the vast, vast majority of the Franco-American alliance has actually been cooperation for mutual benefit, which I would argue is a very peaceful alliance, in fact. More peaceful, certainly, than the Anglo-American one. Exactly. Let's talk about the Monroe Doctrine, which is 1823. James Monroe is the president. It is kind of a reaction to what has happened the previous, of course,

decades since the 1812, Americans at some point, and even towards the French, are tired of dealing with them in this hemisphere. It's time for us to flex our muscle and get these Europeans back where they belong and leave us alone, having to do with colonies and all the rest of it. I hasten to say anybody who's listening and going, but what about the, you know, there are huge events that happen between them and we're going to get back to the Louisiana purchase in a moment, but that's what I'm saying. It all happens at the same time side by side, these parallel realities of our relationship. So let's talk about the Monroe Doctrine for now. So the Monroe Doctrine, and you're exactly right, the Americans are trying very hard to get the Europeans. Let's keep

hands off, Europeans hands off of the United States and the Western Hemisphere. And a lot of that does come from the quasi-war and the War of 1812 because what the United States is trying to ensure is its neutrality and freedom of trade. And so the Monroe Doctrine is a really good way of getting at that. Now, does the United States have the military might to back up the Monroe Doctrine? No, it does not. But can it issue that Monroe Doctrine and hope that European powers will stay out of the Western Hemisphere? Sure. The other interesting part about the Monroe Doctrine is that Europeans hands off, but it's also the United States will stay out of European effects, which is very interesting. And the United States is going to do so until World War I. So there's a two-part, component to it. But I do think the United States, as you said, it acquires the Louisiana territory because of Napoleon's problems. He can't control Haiti. He had hoped to hold on to the Louisiana territory as sort of a breadbasket to supply other colonies in the Caribbean. All this is going to fail. And so again, Francis Trebles, the United States really benefits from this and

gathers a gigantic swath of territory. So this is an incredible benefit to the United States. So at that point, you've got France off of the North American continent completely, which also factors into the Monroe Doctrine. So that combined with French interference with the United States during the war of 1812. The difference, though, I would say there, is the British are impressing American sailors. they're taking them off of American ships and impressing them into the British Navy. France is harassing American ships as well. It might be confiscating goods, but it's not taking American sailors. And so I think that's the difference. That's why the United States is so much angrier toward the British than the French.

The British are also threatening to, Americans are worried about them inciting Native American tribes, all of these things that the French aren't doing because they no longer have a presence. So as soon as France is removed as a physical presence in the West, it becomes much less of a threat. So you could argue the Monroe Doctrine is directed much more against the British than the French. I'm going to jump ahead again a few decades towards the antebellum period in America and then into the Civil War. This is a very interesting period that France figures in more heavily than people understand. I mean, we always talk about how Britain, which is such a growing power industrially, and the textile industry is huge about that. was depending or counting on the cotton coming from the American South. They were the main customer.

But France had a part in this as well. And they were walking that line as to how to react to the Civil War. Tell me about their thinking and what actions they took. So France during the Civil War, just like Britain, France is also very dependent on cotton. So this idea, the South is convinced cotton is king. We're going to be able to get the British and French in on our side. Napoleon III, who's in charge of France at this point. So Napoleon the third, who had started out as a more representative leader, and then, of course, becomes essentially the new emperor, trying to follow Napoleon's lead. And he is sympathetic to the South as well. But at the same time, you have the French population that is not sympathetic to the South, that the French population is abolitionist,

it's more sympathetic to the Union. And so even though Napoleon III, some of the French officials are in negotiations with the South, talking about recognizing the Confederacy, trying to ensure their supply of cotton. They're also going to directly intervene in Mexico. So now you've got a violation of the Monroe Doctrine going on here as well. So very problematic. But ultimately, France and Britain, for that matter, they're going to turn to Egypt for cotton. So they're going to find a replacement for southern cotton. Good replacement. I have many Egyptian sheets, which I like very much. That's right. So it's an excellent replacement. They never really go back to southern cotton. And even though Napoleon III is emperor, I'm putting that in air quotes, he doesn't have the same kind of control as Napoleon the first, let's say. And he does have to pay attention to public opinion. And so the British, I would argue, are the greater threat for really coming close to interview. in the Civil War and recognizing the Confederacy. It's the Battle of Antietam that sort of turns the tide

where both Britain and France say, okay, this is probably not going to be possible. And then once you get Gettysburg and Vicksburg in 1863, then at that point, both Britain and France decide we are not going to be able to intervene in this thing. The Union is going to win. And they back off. So that's sort of the really quick details, a few details of French involvement. Catherine, we've spent much time talking about the complicated realities of these two countries, France and America, into the middle of the 19th century. There's plenty militarily to talk about, certainly in the 20th century. But when we come back, we're going to talk really about the diplomacy, which happens, as I say, on a parallel track along the way, moving through the early

part of the 19th century. Here's the thing. I've mentioned it several times in this podcast. There are two parallel tracks for the Americans and French, back and forth. At the same time, we are in tensions in conflict, say around 1803, only a few years after the quasi war that ends in 1800, which finalized the separation in our alliance, we are the recipients of probably the greatest real estate deal in the history of the earth, thanks to the French, the Louisiana Purchase. Let's talk about that moment and how the French felt about this. The French response to the Louisiana Purchase is pretty muted in a lot of ways because, of course,

they've been dealing with the whipsaw effects of the French Revolution. The bigger concern, I think, in a lot of ways for the French, is that they're losing Haiti, which they see, again, is a critical component of empire. Interestingly, Napoleon's much more focused on Haiti, you know, as a base, as a supplier of sugar, that this is a jewel in the crown of the French empire. And in a lot of ways, the Louisiana territory is second. to that. So it's a more muted response. The French are grappling with the fact that they've moved from first this sort of liberal phase of the French Revolution, then to the days of terror, then to a directory, then to Napoleon taking control, and now they've moved into an empire. And then on top of that,

now they're heading into war with the rest of Europe. So honestly, the sort of what's going on in America is really taking a back seat to everything else that's going on in Europe. They're besieged on all sides. They're fighting battles everywhere. So it's interesting that it is a muted response. And again, it's Napoleon's troubles that are such a win for the United States. He sort of throws up his arms and says, we're losing Haiti. I might as well get rid of this Louisiana territory, make a little bit of money, not that much money, right? This is a bargain for the United States. And then, focus on Europe. And that's what he does. It alleviated them of a massive concern as to how they're going to manage this gigantic territory. I'm sure the writing was on the wall as far as

America moving west and how much a difficulty that was. They also had Spain going on down there. You know, Spain ends up getting out of Mexico pretty soon, but nonetheless at that time, they are around there. But it's really about Europe. It's really about those wars that they're about to fight. And the need they have to control Haiti, which is an amazing story. that had got a lot of coverage the last few years about the double debt to the Haitian people. It's, oh, my God, the French story in Haiti is really a nightmare.

But we are the recipients of this amazing amount of territory and off we go. I mean, that's really the beginning of Manifest Destiny and this is all written in the stars for us. And it's thanks to France. And it's thanks to, well, it's also thanks to Thomas Jefferson. So this is, he has this opportunity.

Congress is not quite sure. He basically bypasses Congress. But I think Jefferson has this idea of westward the course of empire. You know, we can call it Manifest Destiny. And then that is going to continue to play out as the United States acquires Florida. Then we're going to get the Mexican War, 1846-48. And we're going to continue. We're going to settle with the British and get the Oregon territory.

So all of these things combine to produce Manifest Destiny. And then there's this idea that there's so much territory for the United States. and you're not going to see the sort of official closing of the frontier until the 1890s. And then, of course, the United States is going to start to look a little bit more abroad as it continues manifest destiny. Right. We carefully step into this territory often on this podcast about, of course, the effect on Native peoples and all of what, you know, is so tragic about that story. But one has to consider this idea that just gigantic amounts of territory come at the American people at one time. I mean, it's an extraordinary thing that will never, ever happen again.

And in those days, it had to have looked like divine intervention, you know, that suddenly this country is double the size as it was before. And it's all because of a stroke of a pen. And so it has to be weighed against what, you know, is very real and really troublesome to talk about in the history of American Western expansion. It's extraordinary. One of the things that happens as a result, we talked about the Civil War and the fine line that France walked in that time. one of the things that surprised me is that the move to create the Statue of Liberty actually begins right after the Southern surrender. And we think of it as a sort of gilded age thing. It was 1886 is when they dedicated. It's a gesture that begins in 1865, isn't it?

So that is absolutely correct. So one of the things you mentioned diplomacy, and I would argue it's really cultural diplomacy that's going on. And you can trace this all the way back to the Marquis de Lafayette. It's not only the military, alliance he's creating, but he's creating this belief in America itself. He presents himself as a gift to America. He continues to sing America's praises to the French government for the rest of his life. This continues, as you mentioned, his 1824 trip to the United States, which he is the first superstar in the history of the world to come to the United States. And everyone turns out for him. It's the biggest celebrations you've ever seen. He's far more popular than any American politician at the time. He visits every single state at the time. So this sort of sets this idea of this cultural

diplomacy, this exchanging of gifts. And I would argue again that Lafayette himself is a gift to the United States. The next really big gift is, of course, the Statue of Liberty. And so the Statue of liberty does come out of the Civil War. I think not a lot of people know that. It comes out of Lincoln's assassination. So the French public is devastated by Lincoln's assassination. And there is a lot of talk in France about a way to recognize the Franco-American relationship, how supportive France has been of Lincoln. So again, sort of setting aside Napoleon III, the public outpouring there is unbelievable. And so there are a couple of key French figures, Laboulets, one of them who pushes for some sort of cultural gift to the United States to recognize the entwined liberty shared by

the United States in France, really that succeeded in the United States and that France is still struggling for. So by the time we get to the 1870s and the 1880s where the Statue of Liberty, this idea of a statue of liberty has really come into being. So at that point, you actually have a French Republic. So now you've got one republic giving a gift to another republic. It's the biggest gift ever given by one country to another. It causes actually a lot of headaches. So the building of the statue itself, shipping it to the United States. The French agreed to the statues, the United States needs to build a pedestal. Congress can't come up with the funds. They actually have to have to take out a subscription. You've got school children sort of donating pennies to create the

pedestal that the Statue of Liberty sits on. It's delayed. It's, of course, supposed to be here by 1876 as a commemoration of, of course, the American Revolution. And it doesn't get here until 1886. And then we have the celebration, then the sort of reminders of the alliance. Pieces of it have come. The torch and the, I think the head are available for that Philadelphia exhibition. That's right. Yeah. Was it ever really about the poor and the destitute, as we now suggest, the immigrants? Or was that an attached theme post-France? So the United States, as it does with everything, it adapts things, including gifts, to its own purposes.

So for the French, this is supposed to be a symbol of the Franco-American Alliance. It's a reminder of what France did for the United States during the American Revolution. it, of course, is supposed to symbolize this idea of liberty and freedom. It has nothing to do with immigration that, you know, give us our poor. It has nothing to do with that at all. But the United States coops it into its own national narrative, which is where we stand today. I mean, I think some people know this is, of course, a gift from France, but they certainly don't understand necessarily why France did this. in terms of commemorating the American Revolution and that this was supposed to be the symbol.

Also, it's so interesting, it's also France's way of projecting power. So it's, you know, it's lost colonies. It's gained some colonies. But this is a way to say, hey, we have this connection with the United States as well. None of that's made it into the modern day. That poem is written by a poet named Lazarus. It's attached to this statue later on. It's a complete sort of projection of how we need to see it at that time because immigration

was such a necessity, such a big deal in the later part of the 19th century for Americans, needing that labor force and needing all of the goods that would come with that, it becomes a very convenient symbol. But that's the double sort of self-serving relationship that we're talking about, a very pragmatic idea of let us do something for you, you'll do something for us, that is the French and American alliance. The 20th century moving on is largely shaped around the military alliance between the U.S. and France. I mean, we can fairly say that. How is that initially formed when America was such an isolationist country prior to World War I. So the French and American reestablishment of a military alliance in World War I, it comes from a

couple different areas. It is, first of all, an economic alliance because once the war starts, the United States, in keeping with this theme of a nation of merchants, loans money to France and continues trade with France and Britain. It's pretty even. with Germany in 1914. And then as we go through 1914 to 1917, when the United States officially enters the war, trade and loans to Britain and France have far suppressed what the United States is doing with Germany. Germany, it's almost nothing to Germany. So there's an economic component. There are individual Americans, so J.P. Morgan, for example, is making loans to the French. So there's this official and unofficial economic support of France.

going on before the United States enters the war. Then you've got things like American volunteers heading to France. So one of the most famous is appropriately named the Lafayette Eskidreel. So these are American pilots who, as soon as war breaks out in 1914, head to France. They're mostly from wealthier, upper middle class families, so they have the luxury of doing this. They're trained with the French Air Force, such that it is, and they see combat. And they're, and they see combat. many of them die. And in fact, today, you can go just a little bit outside of Paris. In Denise and Cloud, there is a park and there is a half-scale Arc de Triomp where many of these pilots are buried. It's an absolutely beautiful monument to those Americans who fought for France.

I just remember, I stood inside of that, that little arch. So they have this tremendous impact on American imagination that here are these Americans flying for France. And so you've got the economic component. Now you've got this military, but it's also cultural. It's this idea, we owe France a debt from the American Revolution and we're going to repay it. Then you've got American propaganda and French propaganda that's very effective against the Germans, portraying them as barbarians, as brutes, engaging in unrestricted submarine warfare, which challenges American trade. And all of this is eventually going to lead to 1917, where Wilson is going to go to Congress and ask for a declaration of war. They are going to debate for four

days. It's not a given, but we do ultimately come in on the side of Britain and France. And from there, you're going to see this massive mobilization, two million men shipped to France under Black Jack Pershing, general Blackjack Pershing. And they are going to hold until we get about a million men or so, million soldiers who are ready to go, and then they're going to throw them into the fray in spring of 1918, and they're going to make a difference. So they're going to stop the German offensive at Chateau Theory. They're going to start launching an offensive at the Battle of Bella Wood, and then they're going to be instrumental in that that Muzargon campaign from September to November 1918, which is eventually going to result in the armistice. So it is absolutely

a military alliance that we haven't seen since the American Revolution. And it reinforces that Franco-American bond. And on top of that, when the Americans get there. So they arrive, they start arriving July 4th, 1917. They go to Lafayette's tomb. There's a parade to Lafayette's tomb. It's the Picpus Cemetery in Paris. And the Americans there announce, they say Lafayette, we are here. We are here to repay our debt to the American Revolution. And you hear that over and over again in World War I. You've answered my question. I mean, how much was that rhetoric that Wilson would have used it in the Congress, for sure, framing this as a debt we owe to the French?

And you've already answered the question. And it was completely due to that. I would say his war message is definitely more focused on unrestricted submarine warfare, the Zimmerman telegram, the fact that the Germans are trying to get Mexico to come into the war, to regain their territory. But he also frames it as this is a fight for humanity, for democracy. And of course, France fits the bill there. France is a representative government. We're in the Third Republic of France. Germany is not.

So all of these sort of more nebulous cultural components have an impact as well. Right. And the Treaty of Versailles, I mean, Wilson sticks around to work on that and also the 14 points. He wants the League of Nations. All of that happens on French territory. And Americans, for the first time, really, modern Americans are here. about this through, you know, the newspapers and the machine of media is now delivering the goods to American populations. And so we now know this story of France in the current day more than ever

before. We can skip ahead. World War I is, you know, pretty much now recognized as Act 1 of World War II. The same themes are at work here. We just get into the battle a lot sooner. The French utterly collapse against the Germans very early in this war. And the U.S. has to choose between supporting the Vichy regime or that of Free France, which is Charles de Gaulle in exile. Was there any doubt which France we would support? There is a lot of doubt into which France the United States is going to support in World War II. What I would argue is World War I is very clear cut. The fact that Wilson comes to France, the first president to leave the United States for six months to negotiate a treaty,

to get the Treaty of Versailles, to try to set up an... international system where war is going to be avoided. And it's a pretty good attempt. The League of Nations, there's all sorts of disarmament, there's attempts to settle territorial disputes, all of these things go on. I will also mention after World War I, United States and France agreed to the American Battle Monuments Commission, which is going to help create American monuments to the American dead. That's where we get bellow wood, we get Chateau Theory, these amazing cemeteries where so many Americans are buried. We have all these commemorative mourning periods in the 1920s. There's a real attempt here to create a peaceful international system. So I'm pushing back a tiny bit on World War II simply being

Act 2, Right, World War I's Act 1, World War II of the same war. I think the 1920s get completely overlooked and we focus on the 1930s and Hitler. that Hitler is trying to revise the Treaty of Versailles. He is, but it's really the Great Depression that gets us to the rise of totalitarian regimes. It's going to get us into World War II. World War II is a mess in terms of how the United States is going to deal with France. So it doesn't necessarily want to work with the Vichy government. It does for a while, though. FDR and Charles de Gaulle probably have the worst relationship between two, in theory, of state ever. FDR doesn't trust Charles de Gaulle. There are all sorts of French leaders who have

sort of escaped France. They're in the United States. They're whispering against De Gaul that he's going to be a despot. He's going to be a dictator. So DeGal is FDR's last choice. So I want to work with Vichy. There's, I could work with Admiral Darlane. He's looking for anyone other than Charles de Gaul. And at the end of the day, Charles de Gaul and the free French are really the last one's standing and he's forced to work with Charles de Gaulle. And it's really interesting to speculate. This is one of those crises, I would argue, that this is where things really don't go well between the United States and France. Eisenhower steps in and is sort of a mitigating force between FDR and Degal. And if FDR had lived, I think it's really interesting to see how well

Degal would have fared immediately after the war. I mean, he's out pretty quick. He's out of power anyway pretty quick after the war. But that is a real problem. And so U.S. policy is a mess, even though the U.S. is, of course, working with Britain and coordinating with the French and getting ready to launch D-Day. And you've got all sorts of coordination with free French forces behind the lines. And this is successful coordination that's going to allow D-Day to succeed. It's going to allow for the liberation of Paris in August of 1944. All of these things, going to work together. But the behind the scenes is a mess politically. It's worth mentioning that the rivalry between Churchill and Eisenhower about whether or not we would even do D-Day,

the last thing they wanted was a charge across the channel. They wanted to come from a whole different angle. And that, you know, I always wondered how much the Americans were like, well, we sort of owe it to them. Let's do it right in there. You know, there's a lot more to thought thinking. I understand. The only thing I'd say about D-Day is it, I mean, that's really the last phase. So they do go a different approach, right? They go in through North Africa. So the British and Americans work through North Africa, which is also going to benefit the French because they're going to liberate Algeria. And so the French are going to be able to use that as an operating base. Then, of course, they're going to go through Italy,

sort of soften up, right? There's this idea. Everyone always talks about softening up the underbelly of Europe. And then we're going to get to the D-Day invasion. So it really is the, at that point, Churchill sort of run out of reasons not to do it. Not to mention, you know, the Soviets pushing. They've been pushing from the beginning for a major second front on the continent. These are big broad strokes, I admit. There's so much history that we'd be here for hours if we talked about them. But we have to discuss the formation of NATO as an organic outgrowth of Franco-American alliance or not. So the NATO alliance, I would argue, comes from the French search for security after World War I. So the French after World War I are looking for

security. They're looking for an alliance with the United States. The United States backs off after World War I and says, look, we did our bit. We don't want to get entangled in another military alliance that might drag us back into a war. So the French are never able to secure that alliance with the United States. And so the French in the 1930s, they continue to look for that alliance. This is why we get the Magina Line in France. We get this defensive network because they can't get a military alliance with the United States and Britain. Britain's doing the same thing, by the way, backing away from the continent. And so after World War II, and as the Cold War heats up, there's this fear again that now the Soviets are going to move on us. And at this point, because of the

U.S. fear of communism, the United States is much more willing to engage in that military alliance and really sees NATO as a way to secure the French, but also, to secure Western Europe from communist advances. And there are communist advances. There are political advances. France has a huge communist party after World War II, as does Italy. There's all sorts of concern once you get the Berlin conflict and you get the Berlin blockade and you get the Berlin airlift. This is an actual potential for military conflict on the continent. So I would argue it's a gradual progression. You've got this right the Cold War heats up. It's a war of rhetoric. its economic warfare through the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan.

Then we have potential military conflict with the Berlin blockade. That's what gets us to NATO, which France is very happy about because finally they have this military security. And we're back in a formal military alliance that we haven't seen since the Franco-American alliance of the American Revolution, right? You have a standing military alliance after war that you haven't seen since the American Revolution. And it's with France, right? It's France driving it.

So we have traveled a whole 150 years from the disillusion of that alliance all the way through. And it is really World War II that creates the situation that forces us back to where George Washington warned us about. Well, I might suggest that it's actually the Cold War, not World War II. I don't think we – yeah, I don't think we would have had a military alliance. I think the United States would have demobilized. It was in the process of demobilizing, just as it had for every other war. and that France was, you had this economic aid, that France was going to be reconstructed. There was no doubt about that.

But it's really the escalating Cold War that pushes the United States to agree to a standing military alliance. Of course, now we have the communist threat to defeat. Speaking of which, your specialty is Vietnam, as I mentioned, the books that you've written. We're spending a lot of time these days because of the anniversary of the fall of Saigon on the factors leading up to this. everything, of course, to do with the French and their colonial efforts in Vietnam, which ultimately fail and we step in in the 50s. It's another situation where the French sort of hand off, if you want to call it that, to the Americans. And off we go on a huge era of American history, starting with the French. I love your phrasing of handing off Vietnam.

Simplistic. Because, well, I would argue that the French take from the French the issue of Vietnam, Certainly they replace France in many ways in Vietnam, but it is the Franco-American Alliance, I would argue, that gets the United States into Vietnam. France doesn't want to hand its colony back. It starts a war in 1946. It asks for American help. The Americans come in, really in 1950. They send the military assistance and advisory group to help train the French and the South Vietnamese Army. they send their first initial economic aid, and they recognize the French puppet government, the Baudei government in South Vietnam as a counter to Ho Chi Minh's supposedly communist government in North Vietnam. It is communist, but it's also a nationalist government. And so from there,

the United States continues to send more and more economic and military aid to France until we get to 1954 and the Diembian food crisis where the French try to draw the North Vietnamese into a set piece battle in a valley of all places and they lose. The North Vietnamese just absolutely out maneuver them. This is an incredible embarrassment for France. It doesn't necessarily have to end the war, but at this point the French are very, very determined to end it through negotiation. So we get the 1954 Geneva Conference. The French negotiate with the Vietnam, Ho Chimen's forces. They agree to a temporary division of the country at the 17th parallel and elections that are going to be held in 1956. And the United States refuses to sign the agreements.

The United States is there. It refuses to be a signatory. It decides it's going to support its own South Vietnamese government. And even though France has agreed to this, the Geneva Accords, the United States has not. And from there, it's going to start replacing France. It's going to send direct. economic aid to the South Vietnamese government. It's going to send American military advisors. It's going to start to create an American bureaucratic presence in Vietnam. It's going to start teaching English. The Eisenhower administration really engages bureaucratically in Vietnam in a way that's going to make it so much harder for the JFK and the LBJ administrations to get out. And it's because of this Franco-American alliance. The French and the Americans squabble over this.

They argue about what the right thing is to do in Vietnam. And ultimately, the Americans decide they can do it better, that they are going to be the ones who are going to ensure a non-communist South Vietnam. The friendship failed. They're an old washed up colonial power. It's time for the United States and it's modernization to step in and save the day. And we know how that goes. It does not go well. Catherine, if a listener has made it to this point in our conversation, they feel like me right now.

My head is exploding with how much history has defined this relationship. And we're not even getting past the Cold War and Vietnam. There's a whole other bunch of stuff that happens under the fight against terrorism. Never mind the political aspects of things as France walks the same line that we're walking on right now, which is sort of the democracy versus authoritarianism, which we heard about for so many years over there. I need a final word on this from you who has spent so much of your career defining this. for yourself. Where is Franco-American relations headed at this point? And how much is it still based on the historic precedence? I'm a historian, not a political scientist. I study history,

so I talk about the past as opposed to where we're headed in the future. However, having said that, if we go with historical precedent, I think the Franco-American Alliance is going to endure. I think that ever since 2001, so ever since 9-11, we've been back in a lot of ways to a military alliance, so security alliance. We've had our ups and downs, and again, the United States intervening pretty much more or less unilaterally in the second Iraq war in 2003. That caused a huge problem for the French. You saw a lot of fallout from that. But again, we rebuilt pretty quickly. ever since the threat of ISIS, 2014, 2015, a sort of renewed war on terror concern about terror.

You've seen a stronger military alliance. Again, we've had our ups and downs. Most recently in 2021, when the Biden administration undermined the French sale of submarines to Australia, the August conflict. And the French were incredibly angered about that, that the Americans were going to sell these nuclear power subs instead of the French non-nuclear powered subs. And there was a huge fallout from that as well. The French actually recalled their ambassador from the United States, which they've never done. But again, you saw this rebuilding pretty quickly of the Franco-American Alliance that we are going to continue to work together. What I do think is happening, I do think you're seeing France taking the lead in Europe and saying, hey, wait a second, we do need a little bit more

independence. We do need to build up our own military defense structure. We either contribute more to NATO or and maybe at the same time, we build up our own independence. The thing I would point out is France is an independent nuclear power. So Britain works with the United States. France is the only other independent nuclear power. If you're looking at the UN Security Council, who sits on it, there's a reason France sits on it that it's one of the permanent five. It's the third most powerful nuclear force after the United States and after Russia. It's, as the French say, they said it in the 1960s and they said it more recently. French nuclear weapons can point in all directions.

What they're saying is we have an independent force. And I think that's valuable by France preserving relative strength. with respect to the United States actually makes them better partners. So the United States can't just dictate to France. It has to take these things into consideration. And I actually think that's a good thing. I think that's why the alliance has survived is they are each other's most honest critics. And we don't like to hear what the French are saying. And they don't like to hear what we're saying when we criticize them. But I think that's what makes an alliance work instead of sort of. Well, it's the autonomy. It's a mutual respect that has gone back all the way through the ages and carries on today.

The other thing I think we have to acknowledge is the power dynamic between the United States and France shifts after World War I. No one really recognizes that France is no longer the stronger authority. The United States emerges out of World War I, the stronger power. And we don't really notice that. I don't think until World War II in the Cold War. But there's no doubt that the United States becomes the more dominant power. For sure, we know this after World War II. And so France has to wrestle with that and the United States has to wrestle with that.

But I think they do a pretty good job despite some crises along the way. And that's where we sit today. The big problem is that California wine is delicious. It is delicious. I'll tell you, I still like the French better. I still like the French wine better. Professor of History, Catherine Stadler. of the University of San Diego is author of books like replacing France,

The Origins of American Intervention in Vietnam, and Lafayette's Ghost, how women and war kept the Franco-American Alliance alive. She is an expert on Franco-American relations, and I expect an excellent chef as well as a result. Merci beaucoup, Catherine. I hope we see you again. I've been pretty. Thanks for listening to this episode of American History Hit.

As you've made it this far, why not like and follow us wherever you get your podcasts? American History Hit. a podcast from History Hit.