American History Hit - How The World Sees The US: The Art of Diplomacy

Episode Date: September 16, 2024

How did Egypt and Israel come to an agreement at Camp David in 1979? How did the USSR come to allow the operation of NATO troops in East Germany? Ambassador Stuart Eizenstat has played a leading role in the United States' diplomatic negotiations whilst serving in six Presidential administrations.In a troubled world, which needs diplomacy more than ever, Stuart joins Don to explore the internal workings of agreements that have shaped the world in which we live.Produced and edited by Sophie Gee. Senior Producer was Charlotte Long.Enjoy unlimited access to award-winning original documentaries that are released weekly and AD-FREE podcasts. Get a subscription for $1 per month for 3 months with code AMERICANHISTORY sign up at https://historyhit.com/subscription/ You can take part in our listener survey here. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

Want to explore even more history? Sign up to History Hit, where you will discover history from around the world. From the American Revolution to prehistoric Scotland, there is plenty to discover. With your subscription, you'll unlock hundreds of hours of exclusive documentaries with a brand new release every week, exploring everything from the ancient world to World War II. Just visit historyhit.com slash subscribe to bring the past alive. The porcelain teacup rattles in its saucer as it's passed. We set it down, stilling the surface, hoping our counterpart hasn't noticed the weary tremor in our hands.

The wallpaper in the room is Jade Green, adorned with intricate painted trees. Cherry, almond, verburnum, peony. This green garden room overlooks the tended grounds of Winfield House, the residents of the American Ambassador here in London. It is all designed to calm the nerves, to soothe the spirit. Yet the gold-leafed mirrors and crystal chandeliers hint at the grandeur and gravitas of the place and the many critical meetings that occur within these walls. Sipping from the cup, the handle, so thin and delicate, could easily slip from our fingertips, sending the cup crashing into a hundred shards and slivers on the hardwood floor,

splattering tea on the carpets and upholstery and on our expensive shoes. all from one careless mishap, a human foible. So goes diplomacy itself. Equally tenuous, equally fragile, equally human. Always with the dire potential of prompt and utter destruction. Good day, friends. Welcome to American History Hit. I'm Don Wildman.

In the introduction of the book The Art of Diplomacy, How American Negotiators reached historic agreements that changed the world, the author states this, simple definition. Diplomacy is the management of international disputes, interests, and relationships by negotiation. In the right hands, he goes on to right, it can resolve seemingly intractable disputes between countries for the common good, but in the wrong hands, it can make matters worse. American diplomacy, certainly throughout most of the 20th century, played a hugely pivotal role in conflicts and international dilemmas in most every corner of the globe, attempting to resolve

many such disputes. Victories in two world wars had much to do with this influence, the United States having emerged by the mid-century as the primary superpower among nations, thus possessing critical leverage in foreign affairs. But in our present century, America's international role has become, if not diminished, then complicated by a shifting international order. We now share superpower status with others, most notably China and an ever-emerging India, and Russia is still a formidable adversary. With our leadership of NATO questioned by enemies and allies and deeply polarized division domestically, U.S. international relations have become a delicate dance, demanding of our diplomatic core,

broad experience, peripheral perspective, and chess-like strategy. The American century may be behind us now, but the United States must still lead. It just has to do it without wielding absolute power. So much of this is covered in the expansive book I've mentioned, and its author is our guest today. Welcome to American History. It's Stuart Eisenstadt. Excited to meet with you. Don, thank you so much. I'm pleased to be with you. Sir, you have been at the center of so much to do with our influence in the world today. I'm just going to visit your resume, which weakens the knees.

In the Carter administration, you are the president's chief domestic advisor, then moved to the Clinton White House as U.S. ambassador to the European Union. Under Secretary of Commerce, Deputy Secretary of Treasury, you are an international lawyer. It's an amazing resume, as I say. But let's talk about the book. It covers so much from Nixon in China to Sadat and Begin to the reunification of Germany to Afghanistan. It just keeps going. Why is it so important that we reflect at this time on the history of America's role in all of these dilemmas? So, Don, we live at a really fraught time in which challenges and conflicts are seemingly incapable of positive resolution.

And so I wanted to show how U.S.-led diplomacy resolved difficult problems to create a better world so that people could have optimism that we could continue to deal with our challenges today about diplomacy. But there were two other reasons for writing the book. One is with hot wars in Gaza and Ukraine, I wanted to take a hard look at how and when U.S. military force can or should be used as an element in diplomatic negotiations in light of what is a very mixed record of success. And so I thought it was very important and perhaps 40% of the book focuses on military forces

and instrument of diplomacy. And third and last, but not least by any means, is I'm really concerned that we're moving into a period of isolationism. You can see this with the very lengthy, six-month delay took to get Congress to fund monies and arms for Ukraine. And that will lead to a vacuum that Russia and China will fill. So I wanted to write the book to show the need for continued U.S. engagement, and it avoidance of isolation, which would be contensrophic.

We had that between the two World Wars. It's one of the reasons we ended up in World War II, because after After World War I, we became an isolationist country. And it was desperately important that we not do that again. Out of frustration that somehow we can't deal with these problems, and let's just focus at home. It is one of the central themes of this country's identity, really, this sort of duality between the George Washington stay out of foreign entanglements

versus the 20th century leading the world. This is the constant dance that the zigzag course, we've always been on, isn't it? It certainly is. And we thought that was resolved after World War II and certainly that it was resolved after the Cold War, that we would engage, that we would create all the post-World War II institutions,

the World Bank, the UN, the International Monetary Fund, the General Agreement on Trade and Terrorists, and that we would create a sort of rules-based Western-oriented free market democratic world. That has proven to be much more complicated. In the 21st century, with the rise of China and the strength that Russia has exhibited. And the rise of autocracies, and may I say, Don, with some of the elections throughout Europe, and I just came back from the Netherlands, where the far-right party of villagers became the predominant party in the coalition,

that the move toward autocracy and away from democracy is something that is very troubling and something we must deal with. We'll get into this later, but I just want to ask, well, it's fresh in my mind. Is that shift that we're all watching right now going on all over the world? Is it filling a vacuum that's been created

or is it literally pushing the old order off the table? I don't think it's pushing the old order off the table, but it's certainly competing with it. And the question is why? And I think there are a number of reasons. First is the income inequality that we have in so many Western countries, in particular in the U.S. Second, it is immigration. If there's one thread that connects in the U.S., across the Atlantic, into the U.K., and across the continent,

it is the changing face of these countries. And, in fact, America's face is changing. will be done within 30 years a majority, minority country. And some of our largest states like California already are. Now, to me and to many of us, this is actually healthy. It creates multiculturalism. It adds to the dynamic and elevation of the country. But when it's done through illegal immigration,

people coming in boats across to Greece or coming through the southern border illegally, that is something that really strikes a wrong nerve. Even among, for example, Hispanics in the U.S. who say, well, I came here legally, this is not fair. So the issue of immigration is a major factor internally. And then third, it is the competition of an alternative model. The Chinese say, look at what we've accomplished with an autocratic system. We can make decisions quickly.

We don't have to go through all this debate and all this division. We make a decision, it gets done. Now, of course, it could be the very wrong decision, violates human dignity, human rights, and so forth, but it is the alacrity with which these autocratic countries can sometimes move that makes people say, well, you know, our problems are so overwhelming. Maybe we need to have an import of some of that, and that is a disastrous feeling. The book, as I mentioned before, has literally chapters of how the United States

has worked in the world diplomatically. And for me personally, growing up as I did, it's really, it's a menu of all the news and the current events that I lived through. So it's fascinating that way. But you're able to take us behind the scenes into the nuts and bolts of negotiations. And for that reason, I just want to visit on some pretty simple topics here and get your feedback. What is it that makes a diplomat?

What is that role and how do you have to operate within that job? So first, this book is based not just on dry history, but. on interviewing over 130 officials, both in the U.S. and abroad. For example, for the Good Friday Agreement, it included Tony Blair, Jerry Adams from Sinn Fenn, Bertie O'Hern, the former Prime Minister of Ireland, so that I try to put the reader in the negotiating room. It's important to understand that international negotiations are not like a game of poker where one side wins or the other loses. They have to be win-win situations for both sides.

And that's why I call it the art of negotiation, the art of diplomacy. It's like an artist creating a painting to frame negotiations. So the other side is convinced it's in their interest to reach agreements, which are also in your interest. Now, the starting point is exactly where you're pointing is, pointing the right negotiator at the right time. And here are some of the elements that I find, even though every negotiation is different, common skills that are necessary for a successful negotiation. The fierce determination to succeed, to seize the moment, to sense, a sense of ripeness due either to the pain of the status quo being so great like in Northern Ireland,

or the prospect of gain so substantial as Sadat getting back to Sinai or the fall of the Berlin Wall. Second is a word that you wouldn't necessarily associate with diplomacy because you think of pinstripe diplomats, and that is courage, the courage to take political risks, Sadat going to Jerusalem, the crown prince of the UAE, making peace with Israel, and in Northern Ireland, David Trimble, John Hume, Jerry Adams, Bill Clinton, Bertie O'Hurie, Tony Blair, and the great mediator, George Mitchell, all showed tremendous courage to break Don from established patterns. Third is a high degree of intelligence, wisdom, and good judgment. Kissinger showed this in his opening to China.

Fourth is preparation, preparation, like a school person doing homework. But preparation, so you've known more about the issues than anyone else, and you can therefore frame compromises. And a good example of that is Jimmy Carter at K.F. David, where he understood Begin and the great anecdote that I put in the book is that after 13 days at Camp David where it looked like everything was going to break down and Began said, Mr. President, I can't negotiate anymore.

From the CIA profiles that Carter had studied, he knew that Began loved his eight grandchildren. So he autographed photographs of the three leaders to each one by name presented it to Began. And Began's eyes teared up, his lips quivered, he put his bags down and he said, okay, I'll make one last time. Next is another skill that may not seem obvious, and that is, Don, the ability to listen, to be a good listener. What is the other side saying?

How are they saying it? Putting yourself in their shoes. It's what my former boss when I was Deputy Secretary of the Treasury, Larry Somers, said, unsympathetic empathy. Then next is building trust in your partner. This is not some commercial negotiation with. the deal is to squeeze everything out of them and humiliate them. Quite the contrary. You want to create a sense of partnership.

And a great example of that is Jim Baker, Secretary of State of George H.W. Bush, taking Soviet foreign minister Chevronazi on a personal trip for three days to his retreat in Jackson Hole, Wyoming. And that's one of the reasons he broke down the distrust and was able to create German reunification within NATO. We should remember the famous statement of Margaret Betts, who was prime minister saying, I love Germany so much, I want two of them. Then it is also creativity. You're always going to hit an impasse.

You have to come up with creative solution. So, for example, in the Good Friday agreements on Northern Ireland, the militias, Protestant and Catholic, did not want to disarm. They each distrusted each other. And so George Mitchell, the mediator came up with the concept of what was called the Mitchell principles. You don't have to disarm, but you have to pledge to a nonviolent negotiation. And that got over that problem.

Next, again, is something that may seem strange. And that is stamina. These negotiations last weeks, months, years. It's like a marathon with a sprint at the end. The term shuttle diplomacy came because of Kissinger, spending almost two weeks. weeks shuttling between Syria, Israel, and Egypt without almost any sleep. Jimmy Carter got maybe three hours in sleep at Camp David. And what happens, negotiating the Kyoto Protocols on climate change, for five days,

we got maybe a total of 10 hours of sleep. Wow. Next is being able to exert leverage, both positive and negative. One of the things that made the each of Israel peace treaty possible was adding sweeteners like F-15s, F-5s for Egypt, and the Abraham Accords more recently with the United Arab Emirates, adding F-35, something that the UAE wanted.

I'll be right back after this short break. Meantime, if you'd like this to cover anything specifically, if you have any ideas of subject matter we should be looking at, send us an email at AHH at historyhit.com. We'd love to hear from you. I've always been under the assumption, Stuart, that you would know what was going to happen before you move into this room.

Like the last thing you'd be. want to do is sit across from somebody and have surprises. Am I completely wrong on that? You don't want to be surprised because you've studied, but what will be a surprise is to what extent are they dug in on a particular issue? Is it just beating their chest for the home audience where they'll ultimately concede? Or is it a real red line? Is it something that, and that's what you have to sort out. And is that red line something that is compatible with your own red line, can you find a bridge between their need for something and your need for something? Also, one of the things that really is very effective in negotiations is called back channels.

So, for example, the way in which the 1993 Oslo Accords occurred, when the PLO and Israel had not talked directly, was using unofficial channels. Kissinger's opening to China happened through Pakistan. John Kerry, when he was negotiating the nuclear agreement with Iran, there was such distrust between the U.S. and Iran that he went through the Sultan of Oman, Khabas. So the use of back channels is also something that's very important. And you have to know how to get out of this negotiation, right? You've really got to think the whole thing through before you're there. You do. In the military section of the book, one of the lessons that I got from a number of the people who were very self-revealing.

For example, Steve Hadley, who was President George W. Bush's National Security Advisor during the Iraq War, which led in part to Tony Blair's political demise. And what he said, Don, was something really important, and it's applicable to Gaza today. And that is, before you shoot the first bullet, know what the political outcome is going to be. that you're seeking, and then build your military strategy around that rather than the other way around. If you go in militarily without a clear plan of what happens at the end of the war, how do we put the pieces together because a war, a definition is going to be disruptive of the established order. So we got rid of Saddam, but we didn't know what would come in his place.

Exactly. One point in the book about Carter before Camp David, he had 20 different peace agreements ready, right, drafted before those camping? No, not before, during the negotiations. He actually negotiated 13 days and 13 nights, and he personally drafted 20 separate peace agreements. Wow. By tearing up one when he found out it was unacceptable to one part, coming with another, and doing that nearly over 20 single time.

It's the greatest act of presidential diplomacy. I think in American history normally died, presidents come in at the end of a negotiation that say they're Secretary of State or an ambassador like Dick Holbrook at the Dayton Accords ending the Bosnia War and they sort of do the ruffles and flourishes and sign the agreement. Not so with Camp David. Almost every single advisor urged Carter not to do Camp David, not to invite President Sadat and Prime Minister to beg him because the potential for defeat would be so great. And then when we did Camp David, Camp David was a framework.

It was not legally binding. It called for a binding treaty between Egypt and Israel within three months. Well, three months passed, four months, five months. At the six months, Carter said, I'm going to go to the Middle East. I'm going to do shuttle diplomacy, and I'm going to see if I can make this into a treaty. And we all said, no, it hasn't worked for six months. If you go abroad and you come back with nothing, it'll be a. state on your presidency. He said, I've taken it this far. I've got to do it. And a humorous

anecdote is that on the last day after three and a half days, no deal. Air Force One is being refueled at Denverian Airport. All the staff was already going back to the airport. Carter himself was changing into informal clothes and suddenly begging calls and says, I'd like to see the president one last time. He was at the King David. hotel and we thought, well, it's just a courtesy. I'm sorry it didn't work. Thanks for coming. So Carter says, okay, I'm going to get dressed again with a suit and tie because Began's very formal. Entertain the prime minister while I'm doing it. So we're in the lobby of the King David Hotel and Began says, now boys, this is a very famous hotel. Yes, says the Carter staff.

We know that. And he said, well, not for the reasons you think. When I was headed the year ago and I blew this hotel up with the British bringing it. And we says, don't worry, I'm not going to do it again until the president leaves. Well, he went up in the elevator to the presidential suite. That's where the deal was finally made for the treaty, which Sadat had already accepted. And then when they came down, Don, the elevator broke between the first floor and lobby. And the Secret Service had to pull Bacon and Carter out but first. And I call it the breach birth of the treaty.

That's funny. That's good. That's what is interesting to me is the human side of these things because just by the very nature of these negotiations so complex, so long running, the public gets such a small glimpse of what really is going on. I had my own anecdote. I had a brief visit in Russia at the time that Endropov was dead, but no one knew that he was. And my friend was the son of Arthur Hartman. Did you know Arthur Hartman? Yes. So I was staying at Spasso House and I was hanging out for Christmas. holidays. And I had this one moment where Arthur was on my right and the ambassador from Luxembourg was over here. And he was probing, trying to find out if the Americans knew what had happened to Andropov. And there was, I could feel these two men on either side of me standing off on a very low stakes thing. But it was a very fascinating little human moment of how these conversations happened between

these nations, really. Yes. And pressure relations are super important. I mean, even in the situation where John Kerry was negotiating finally with Iran on the nuclear agreement, and it looked like it was going to fall apart. And the foreign minister's reef stormed out and went to his hotel room. And John Kerry took a risk. He actually went to his hotel room. And he said, look, we've got to resolve this. We've come this far.

Let's make sure that we settle it. Let's all calm down. And let's look at the broader picture. Another example is Bernie Erinson, who I call an unsung hero along with Chad Crocker, Southwest Africa, was mediating the 50-year civil war between the FARC guerrillas and the Colombian government. And they deeply distrusted the U.S. because of the Kissinger-Nixon era. And he convinced them by a personal relationship that this was a different administration that we were going to accept the results of the day. Democratic election, even if it meant left-wing people being in. But then the personal element, Dodd, was one of the leading FARC members suddenly developed a serious kidney problem and was rushed

to the hospital. And Bernie went to the hospital, went to his room to wish him a recovery, and that melted the ice. It really made a huge difference. So these personal touches can oftentimes be extremely important. There's a good chunk of this book is about something. something I remember fondly, and obviously for the reasons that happened, but the Balkan wars actually resolved well. It was one of those moments that American power really got the job done, didn't it? It did. So I do have, as I mentioned, a good 30 to 40 percent of the book is on the use of military force. And we've had terrible examples where it didn't succeed. Vietnam, the Iraq War under George Zabia Bush, Libya, and Afghanistan. But the Balkan wars.

were instances where it did. And the combination of diplomacy plus military muscle through NATO was tremendously important. And what existed down in Bosnia was getting, and this shows you where we've come, because Russia was in a different situation. We had unanimous security counsel support for the use of military force. And several days of bombing, a threat of use of use. using ground forces by the U.S. and NATO, finally convinced Velosevic that he had to concede and he went to Dayton with Dick Holbrook did a brilliant set of negotiations for over 10 days,

but without that military muscle, it wouldn't have succeeded. So, yes, military force should be a last option after you've existed all other means, negotiations, economic sanctions, even a threat of force. but it is in the right place if it has a achievable political objective useful. So let's contrast the two Iraq wars with the father and the son, George H.W. Bush in the Gulf War and George W. Bush in the Iraq War, which again was an Achilles' heel for Tony Blair. The differences are start. First, Bush got U.N. Security Council support.

Bush won. He got NATO support. He got a 38 country coalition together. And importantly, he had a political objective before the first bullet was shot, which was achievable. It was just getting Saddam out of Kuwait. And when he was on the run, he and Colin Powell were both criticized. Well, you got Saddam on the run. Chok him.

go to Baghdad and Colin Powell said if we go to Baghdad we'll own it well yeah we did end up owning it in the second Iraq war under George W Bush without UN support without NATO support with a much thinner force and here was something really critical colon pal came up with the phrase it's often said overwhelming force but he made it clear to me in one of the 130 interviews I did it was decisive force. That was 500,000 troops used in the Gulf War. Contrast that time with what happened in the Iraq War. We first went into Afghanistan in 2001 after the 9-11 attack.

Then in 2003, we went in, this is Bush 2, the Sun, into Iraq, and we divided our forces. In fact, most of them went to Iraq. and were taken from Afghanistan. So we had what Don Rubstel, the Secretary of Defense under Bush, to call it a light footprint. It was the opposite of the decisive force. So we lost at both ends. Did you find the moment of East Germans collapse

to be a predictable thing, or was it as shocking to those in the Foreign Service as to those in the public? There was a small group within the state. State Department that believed that it would happen sooner rather than later, but a very small group. And I want to tell you that one of the basic points that I make is the incredible importance of good intelligence. It is knowing what's going to happen, for example, and I'm going to come back directly to

your question on the fall of the wall. But in the Iran situation with Jimmy Carter, the CIA. said six weeks before the Shah left under pressure, obviously, that Iran is neither in a revolutionary nor pre-revolutionary state. And they did not know that he had incurable cancer. You can't make good decisions with it. Now, the answer to your question on Berlin was, except for a very small group,

almost no one in the White House, in the State Department, or in the CIA. or in MI6 saw this coming. It occurred in a deed because of a miscommunication. So when it happened, here's where I think the genius of George H.W. Bush and Jim Baker came into. All of his political aides, Don said, you've got to go to Berlin and, effect, dance on this wall, beat your chest

and show that the Western democracies have now, in effect, defeated communism. And he said, no, I'm not going to humiliate so very. If we're going to make something out of this, I have to respect how they feel about this. I have to put myself in their shoes. And that's, again, one of the reasons why we were ultimately successful because he didn't humiliate them at the time. And he convinced them that a united Germany in NATO was actually in their Soviet interest rather than having a united Germany free-flowing as a sort of neutral untethered force.

That was a very heavy lift. And here again, there were tradeoffs. The French only agreed, Minteran, because Chancellor Cole said, okay, I will agree to the Euro. I'll go out of the French franc. And that was very important to Minteron. Second, again, for Margaret Thatcher, she was convinced that if a United Germany was in NATO would be better, as was the Soviet Union. And again, she got over the delusion, as I mentioned, that she said, I love Germany so much. I want two of them.

Yes. Do you think that I've always wondered why it seems that from president to president or administration to administration, things do change. Obviously, the world changes around it. But it's frustrating to me that there isn't more of a system to this, that you would think at some point we'd get it, that there is life is not a zero-sum game. And so, therefore, you have to understand these things. But it seems to zigzag so much. Yes, and one of the things that I talk about in a self-critical way about U.S. international negotiations and diplomacy

is that it oftentimes depends on who was elected president. So I'll give you three concrete examples. First, on the positive side, Ronald Reagan ran against Jimmy Carter very hard. We lost decisively to him. But when he came into office, he implemented faithfully the Sulf Nuclear Arms Treaty, even though it hadn't been ratified by the Senate

because he thought continuity was important. Contrast that with climate change. The U.S. policy on climate change, and that was the key negotiator for the Kyoto Protocols for the U.S., depends on who wins the presidential election. When Republicans win, we pull out of the effort, when Democrats, when we go back into the effort, How can countries negotiate with the U.S. on climate change when it can change so radically?

Depending on who wins this presidential election, Trump is going to wash his hands of it. Biden will continue. So it makes it extremely difficult to do. And the other example, and a very telling one, is what happened when we negotiated the so-called JCPOA nuclear agreement with Iran. It had frosted on, but it boxed in the Iranian nuclear program. It got rid of two-thirds of their centrifuges. They got rid of their plutonium plant. It required them, and they followed it.

They followed it, according to the International Automic Energy Agency reviews, by getting their enriched fuel down to civilian levels. But what happens? President Trump comes in, and he walks away from the Arama. Why did he do that? I don't really understand. In part it was because it was negotiated by Obama, and he wanted to show something different. In part, there were flaws, but not flaws that couldn't have been corrected.

And he wanted a quote, quote, maximum pressure. Let's put more sanctions and more sanctions, and then we'll get more. Well, quite the opposite has occurred. They've now broken out. They've got new centrifuges. They've gotten their plutonium plant back. And they're now enriching uranium almost to weapons, It's so often the tension between the domestic political agenda versus the international reality, isn't it?

It is. I mean, presidents in the United States system do have more leeway on foreign policy. He is the commander in chief. But you can never divorce domestic politics from foreign policy. That's certainly true with respect to what we're seeing in Gaza and in Ukraine. Yeah. Does it worry you that younger people are not? not being attracted to the Foreign Service. Is that a concern? It is a concern, but an even deeper concern is that young people are getting all their news on TikTok and social media. And social media is unvitted. People put any kind of wild conspiracy theories. And so their knowledge of history and Eurohistory program is extremely limited. Example, one of the chapters I have is on my Holocaust negotiations, which I

I lived through many administrations. And a recent survey was done, which showed that in the United States, for so-called Generation Z and Millennials, that's kids between 18 and 39, the young adults, that over 60, about 60% couldn't identify how much was. They had no idea what it was. And the distortions of the Holocaust, the misappropriations of it, are rampant on social media. So that's really one deep concern I have about the younger generation. It's the old king line from, why can't they just get along? We all sat out and saying,

I wish, but the truth of matter is there's so many agendas in the world and the only grease that makes it work ever is the diplomacy available at hand, isn't it? Yes. Senator Moynihan once famously said, everyone's entitled to their own opinion, but not their own facts. But how we live in alternative universal facts, tweet MSNBC on one hand, bucks on the other, TikTok again. And diplomacy is more important than ever. If we're going to avoid a world of constant conflict, we have to energize diplomacy. We have to employ all the tools that I discuss in my book to try to find common ground. I think in the end the Ukraine war will end with some common ground.

In fact, I suggest a novel ending, which is a Korea-style armistice where we don't recognize whatever territory Russia maintains at the end of the war. When we build up Ukraine as much as we can to get back as much, but knowing they're not going to get 100% back. So I really try to apply these lessons to current conflicts like in Gaza and Ukraine. Exactly. Rare are the books that are written by the men and women in the room. when it happened. But the art of diplomacy, how American negotiators reached historic agreements that changed the world is one of those books. And it's a really accessible record of amazing events, as I say, by a man who's responsible in part for part of it. Stuart Eisenstein,

thank you so much for participating in this world that we live in today. Never mind this interview that we've just had. I really appreciate it. Thank you for giving me the opportunity. Hello, folks, thanks for listening to American History Hit. Each week we release new episodes, two new episodes dropping Mondays and Thursdays. All kinds of great content like mysterious missing colonies to powerful political movements, to some of the biggest battles across the centuries. Don't miss an episode. By hitting like and follow, you help us out, which is great,

but you'll also be reminded when our shows are on. And while you're at it, share with a friend. American History Hit with me, Don Wildbe. So grateful for your support. Bye for now.