American History Hit - LBJ & the Vietnam War

Episode Date: September 24, 2026

How did a President who was so reluctant to ramp up America's presence in Vietnam become the one who increased it more than any other? When Lyndon B. Johnson was sworn in as President, he had big plans for his domestic agenda... but it would be his foreign policy decisions that eventually brought him down.Our guest today is Pierre Asselin, professor of American Foreign Relations at San Diego State University. He is a leading authority on the Vietnam War and is the author of A Bitter Peace: Washington, Hanoi, and the Making of the Paris Agreement and Hanoi’s Road to the Vietnam War, 1954-1965.Produced by Tomos Delargy. Edited by Tim Arstall. Senior Producer was Freddy Chick.Sign up to History Hit for hundreds of hours of original documentaries, with a new release every week and ad-free podcasts. Sign up at https://www.historyhit.com/subscribe. You can take part in our listener survey here.All music from Epidemic Sounds.American History Hit is a History Hit podcast. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

Want to explore even more history? Sign up to History Hit, where you will discover history from around the world. From the American Revolution to prehistoric Scotland, there is plenty to discover. With your subscription, you'll unlock hundreds of hours of exclusive documentaries with a brand new release every week, exploring everything from the ancient world to World War II. Just visit historyhit.com slash subscribe to bring the past alive. It is just before midnight on August 4, 1964. In the White House, President Lyndon Johnson faces a camera to address the nation.

He reports that two American warships have been attacked in the distant waters off the coast of Vietnam. The assault was unprovoked, he declares, and America has answered. Glaring into the camera lens, he tells Americans that he will request from Congress a resolution, granting him sweeping new powers to defend American interests. interests in Southeast Asia. It is a moment of resolve for the president, a demonstration that he will not, America will not, be pushed around by any nation, certainly not one led by communists. But there is a snag in this version of events, an uncomfortable truth of the attack that has already begun to unravel. Reports have been distorted. There is evidence suggesting there may

have been no attack at all. For Johnson, the consequences will be all too real. He, inherits a war he never wished to fight, a conflict tangled in the paranoia of the Cold War. Yet in the coming years with one decision after another, Johnson is drawn deeper into the quagmire. Choices he makes will consume his presidency, divide the nation, and ultimately force him from political life. This is the story of LBJ and the war that broke him. Don Wildman here. You're listening to American History Hit. Thanks for joining us. For this, our guest is Pierre Asselin. He is the Dwight E. Sanford Chair in U.S. Foreign Relations at San Diego State University.

A leading authority on the Vietnam War, he is the author of A Bitter Peace, Washington, Hanoi and the Making of the Paris Agreement, and Hanoi's Road to the Vietnam War, 1954 to 1965, among a raft of other publications. So, let's discuss LBJ and the Vietnam War. Pierre, welcome back to American History Hit. It is nice to see you again. Don, thank you very much. It's really great to be back. Before we delve in, I want to refresh our understanding of Lyndon Johnson, the man. The American story of the Vietnam War is so deeply entrenched with the history of this guy, with his personality, his psychology. I think it's important.

So let me start off. Lyndon Johnson, born into an impoverished family in the hill country of Texas, enters politics in 1937, an FDR New Deal man to the bone. Talk to me about his political style. He's a fascinating historical character. And it's a very tragic one, too. I mean, you mentioned it, right? I think people fail to recognize his background when they look at Johnson. I mean, you know, there's so much focus on his presidency in the Vietnam War that I think sometimes we discount his formative experiences, which turned out to have a huge impact on the way he approached Vietnam and other issues. So, yeah, Johnson is from. Central Texas. Father was a failed politician, failed legislator, failed business person. And I think that

these failures end up conditioning Johnson from the time he's very young. I mean, this is an individual who ends up growing in extreme poverty whose family sometimes cannot even afford groceries. Johnson, for the rest of his life, will kind of be haunted by this upbringing, you know. I mean, while some people would be kind of proud of having risen from, I guess, you know, the ashes of poverty, Johnson would always kind of carry that as a source of humiliation and would always be kind of sensitive to these issues. But yeah, that poverty that surrounds him ends up really kind of shaping his views as he enters politics. It's such a class identity, which is going to be such a theme in his political life as he's surrounded by these patrician politicians, the likes of which of which of FDR and. JFK, no less. As a politician, he is incredibly skillful when he gets that national level. He inflicts

what's known as the Johnson treatment. He's got a six-foot-four frame, for one thing, which he uses to, quote-unquote, charm others. I'm sure it's looming over them, really, is what usually is the case. He had a real mouth on him. I mean, he was a guy's guy. He becomes Senate majority leader in the mid-1950s, widely considered the most effective and powerful Senate leader there has ever been. Fair to say? Yeah, absolutely. And he's the youngest person to ever assume that position at that point. But yeah, I mean, given his humble origins, it's really remarkable the extent to which Johnson comes to assert himself at first in the legislature, eventually in the Senate, and really earn people's respect in those positions. So, yeah, and this treatment, you mentioned,

I mean, I mean, Johnson was, it becomes, for a period, at least, a significant asset of it. I mean, he's a big guy, right? He's a Texan. And as much as there's insecurity that surrounds him, there's also certain pride in that. And he definitely uses the Texas background in Washington to have his ways on issues that really matter to him. He becomes vice president eventually under Kennedy. This is the last position a man like Lyndon Johnson should ever be in. And these two guys, JFK and him had butted heads in the past because essentially Johnson would have been in charge of him in the Senate.

But now JFK sees him as a way of winning the conservative Southern vote, which had really taken place in the 50s sort of things shifted. Johnson's demeanor countered Kennedy's glowing Massachusetts glamour. That's the dynamic that's sort of heading into the events that we're talking about today. It's a terrible political marriage, right? I mean, both of them compete for the nomination in 1960, right? And it's a very, very nasty competition. You know, JFK will really go after Johnson's background. Johnson will go after JFK's health. I mean, and it's funny, Don, right? Because for all this talk these days of how dirty politics have become, I think we need to look back and realize that, well, there's always been a certain level of nastiness in America.

politics. And it's really kind of this snow holds bar fight. And then eventually, JFK gets the nomination for the reasons you mention. JFK then appoints him as his vice president. But it's the relationship itself. They'll never get over the things they said about each other as they're competing for the nomination. And then they'll never get over the worlds that they come from. I mean, these are two individuals who couldn't possibly be any different. And in a way, right, for Johnson, you know, JFK stands for all that is wrong with America. This is, you know, Johnson, extreme poverty, right? Profound humiliation, rural background now is essentially kind of serving under this individual

who's from the East Coast, right, very privileged background, a very, very clean individual coming from some of the best schools and the greatest institutions of the East Coast. And this is where it kind of gets worse is that, of course, you know, JFK will surround himself with like-minded and kind of like-trained people, right? I mean, JFK's advisors are from these Ivy League. And despite the fact that Johnson's is his vice president, JFK will never refrain from insulting him, from humiliating every chance he gets from making fun of the accent to the way that Johnson dresses. And of course, you know, Johnson picks up on this. And it validates a lot of the things that he's believed for a good part of his life about Washington, about certain American classes. We're talking about a nation that's actually shifting its focus enormously post-World War II and then, of course, Korea comes along to complicate things.

This is now an office, the presidency, that's much more involved in foreign policy than ever before. Johnson is a politician who really is focused on domestic policy. That was his passion under the New Deal, et cetera. And he wants to make people's lives better, given his background. In the Kennedy years, Vietnam is basically a carryover from ultimately Truman's domino theory through the Eisenhower administration. It has now become the potential of another Korea, which we don't talk enough about in American history in general. What it takes to stop the spread of communism becomes this enormous, complicated tangle for American policy. By the time we get to Kennedy administration, where do we stand in Vietnam?

You know, I like the fact that you brought up Korea, Don, because we call it the forgotten war. And in many ways it is, right? I mean, I mean, teaching this stuff, it's astounding how much attention Vietnam gets in Korea. It's barely a footnote. But as it turns out, I mean, Korea, I mean, the war in Korea itself is hugely significant as a standalone historical development. Beyond that, you cannot possibly understand why the U.S. gets involved in Vietnam and why the U.S. behaves the way it does in Vietnam unless you understand Korea and the impact it has on the American political consciousness. You know, everything America does in Vietnam. I mean, a lot of what

America does in Vietnam is conditioned by what Americans think they learned from Korea. And so under JFK, the U.S. is committed to Vietnam because of Korea, right? I mean, the outcome of Korea really kind of allows China to elevate its position worldwide. And Vietnam really becomes about, not just containing communism in Vietnam, but really containing China generally. And the Soviets themselves are an issue, but by the mid-50s, the Soviets are committed to peaceful coexistence with the United States. So they're not really a concern, right? Despite how we kind of tend to define the Cold War as this conflict between Washington and Moscow, it turns out that by the 50s, tensions between the U.S. and the Soviet Union are relatively low. but it's China now that's kind of emerging as problematic.

And so Truman and then Eisenhower kind of get involved in the area supporting the French, their efforts to be colonized and tame Indo-China. And then JFK will essentially continue the commitment. As far as I'm concerned, I think JFK really takes a major step here by deploying these military advisors who essentially secretly participate in combat operations. And so JFK, you know, who is a staunch cold warrior further commits the United States to Vietnam? And then Johnson inherits all of this from Kennedy. But, yeah, I mean, Korea prompts the United States to get involved in Vietnam.

Truman commits the U.S. The commitment increases under Eisenhower. And then it kind of reaches new levels under JFK. Yeah. The Geneva Accord, which is in the 50s, was negotiated to, create a ceasefire. This is this is under the French, right? And calls for a temporary division of Vietnam along the 17th parallel. That's that's the fateful North Vietnamese, South Vietnamese situation that we enter into. Ho Chi Minh is the figure in charge up north. An anti-communist

government is established in the South. This is when the United States is pouring tons of aid in before, to the French before, which carries over into this. All of this is, to give context to Johnson taking control of this situation. I want to know what LBJ was thinking, as you understand it. Obviously, we have the assassination of John of Kennedy, which is the horrible tragedy that happens in 1963. And now LJ has taken over. An important part, I mean, not to get cynical, but this is entering into an election year for LBJ. That's going to be critical in everything he does from the moment he takes over from JFK, right? So from the moment Johnson enters the Senate. He's supportive of American policy in Southeast Asia. He's in favor of supporting

France. In 1954, the two Vietnams are established. At one point, Eisenhower was considering sending American forces to help the French. Johnson was opposed to that. Johnson supported containment. He supported the domino theory. He firmly believed in the domino theory. At the same time, though, he was concern about direct American intervention in Vietnam, again, on the basis of what had happened in Korea. He's supportive of JFK's approach to Vietnam, generally speaking, even though he's kind of left out of all the major decisions. This is really important. When Johnson assumes the presidency, for all that JFK has been doing around the world, Johnson has been privy to really none of these conversations. He was never part of the so-called ex-com that addressed the Cuban Missile Crisis. He was

never consulted about Berlin, much less about Vietnam. But still, from what we understand, overall, Johnson supported JFK's approach to Vietnam. The one decision, and this is a big one, the one decision that Johnson was against, was the removal of the South Vietnamese leader, Gnoding Diem, or Gnodingsiem, in 1963. When Johnson learned of the regime change, he, immediately acknowledged that this was a mistake and that it was likely to haunt the United States. And it really did because then South Vietnam became even more unstable in 64 and 65. But when he assumes the presidency, essentially Johnson believes in containment, believes in the domino theory, believes that JFK has made some mistakes, but generally speaking,

he's supportive of the American line vis-a-vis Vietnam. When he takes over, and certainly when he's reelected, or when he's elected, I should say, in 1964, he has the chance to break with this policy, doesn't he? Yeah, absolutely. He has tremendously, this is a landslide victory in November of 1964. He's beaten Goldwater. He can pretty much pull whatever strings he wants at that point. Why doesn't he pull out of Vietnam, do you think? There's both kind of like international foreign policy considerations and the men.

considerations, right? On the one hand, by the time Johnson assumes the presidency, the U.S. essentially been committed to Vietnam for 14 years, right? Can an unelected president essentially decide to cut bait here? So there's really this pressure on him to continue. Beyond that, Johnson is concerned that if the U.S. abandons Vietnam, that's going to emboldened the communists. It's going to emboldened the Chinese. It's going to emboldened the Soviets. And in the aftermath of of the Cuban Missile Crisis, you really don't want to do that because looking weak in Vietnam could precipitate another kind of Cuban-style Caribbean-style crisis. So there's that element. And then domestically, Johnson is well aware that as much as he is concerned about sustaining this

American commitment and eventually expanding it, he believes that it could really undermine his domestic agenda if he were to pull out of Vietnam, that it would cause a loss of credibility domestically, which would then make it virtually impossible for him to get conservative support for his very, very progressive agenda. Essentially, Vietnam becomes an element in Johnson's political gain to earn support from constituencies likely to oppose him for civil rights, for Medicaid, for Medicare, and other kind of great, great society programs. Let's underscore that. You're talking about a guy who went through the New Deal and understood how difficult it was to sell those programs back in the 40s and 50s as a congressional force.

Now he's looking at basically an expansion, a gigantic expansion of those same ideas in American governance. He knows who his opposition is. He's been through this before some new guys, but those Southerners are set against creating this kind of America or certainly expanding it. So in order to make that work, he knows better than anyone as that former Senate Majority Leader, he's going to need to pull. There's a lot of strategy he needs. And the last thing he needs is a big vulnerability in foreign policy. Yeah.

And remember, this is someone who's been kind of who has this fear of humiliation, right? And I think people sometimes feel to understand it about American presidents is that, is that, yeah, there's always these immediate considerations, right? But just like the rest of us, they have their own kind of internal personal insecurities, right? They have a family history. They have issues with faith. And all of these elements, whether we like it or not, you know, have a bearing on the decisions, these really, really important decisions that these guys make. And so for Johnson, there's also this element, right, that by supporting the war in Vietnam, he's going to look tough, right?

personally on behalf of this party, and he's going to make America look tough, and it becomes kind of a means to overcome this potential humiliation likely to ensue from disengaging from Vietnam. It's definitely a factor when he's running for the presidency in 64, right? Because I mean, his adversary is a very, very tough guy, right? So for Johnson, supporting the war is a way to kind of enhance his own legitimacy, his own credibility in the eyes of the American people. people, including some individuals who might have been questioning his viability as commander-in-chief of America's armed forces. Yeah. And it's important to keep in mind the time frame here. This is 20 years ago or 15 years ago at this point. We're winning World War II. We are the

major superpower of the world that was solved every problem. We've created the UN. We have all these things that are in very fresh memory for Americans and the international forces. There's every reason to believe at that point that we have the force necessary to take care of this problem in South Vietnam. So you can understand that mentality, especially in the brain of this man. To be soft on communism is this major, major vulnerability for anyone in American politics at that time. And one of those things that's very fresh in people's minds is the lessons of Munich. You know, this idea of appeasing these dictators will only increase, you know, your vulnerability, make them further, you know, more aggressive and will not avert the conflict. So pushing back as

strong as you can is that lesson. You don't want to be a Neville Chamberlain. Yeah. And I think, Don, for me, you know, as a student of U.S. foreign relations, I mean, there's this intangible element that we often discount, which I think is so important, is this idea of credibility, especially for American presidents. I mean, credibility becomes one of the main currencies in international relations. And, you know, whether you believe in something or not, you have have to consider the kind of image your ultimate decision is going to create about you, about your party, about your country. I mean, and credibility in ways that are scary sometimes really shapes the decision-making of American presidents. You know, we always like to think that our presidents

are very rational human beings. But these concerns about how I'm going to look, about how the party's going to look, have such a big bearing on on, on the decisions that that these guys end up taking. And we're seeing that today, right? It's, it's, once you commit to a conflict, even if it's clear that it's not going your way, disengaging from it becomes problematic. Because of the image about you, about your party, about the country, it's going to generate. And Johnson is, is really kind of obsessed. with this idea of credibility, again, in part because of his upbringing. Well, we'll take a short break, but I want to talk when we come back.

You know, you have to keep in mind, we're in 1964. The years that come up in this conversation are completely different worlds. It's unbelievable what happens in America in the 1960s, from 64 to say 66 and 67, the rise of television news. Everything shifts under people's feet in that time frame for that baby boom generation. We'll be back after this short break to talk about all of that. and more. Welcome back. We're speaking with Pierre Assel and author of A Bitter Peace, Washington, Hanoi, and the making of the Paris Agreement. Pierre, it's 1964 and Lyndon Johnson is still new

to the presidency. Everything's about to tectonically shift underneath him, though. Tell me about what happens in the Gulf of Tonkin and how it would transform his approach to the war. So in early August 1964, the American Navy is off the coast of North Vietnam supporting South Vietnamese commandos secret activities inside northern Vietnam. And Johnson is well aware of this. So there's a mission that takes place on the 2nd of August of 1964. And during that mission, the primary American warships supporting the South Vietnamese commandos comes under fire. In response to that, the U.S. deploys a second vessel to support more operations on the 4th of August. And this is where it kind of gets interesting.

The weather is really bad on that day. And then according to the U.S. Navy on site on the 4th of August, the American vessels commander attack. It turns out that there's no evidence that there ever was an actual North Vietnamese attack on that day. And having worked in the Vietnamese archives for 30, years, I have yet to come across anything suggesting that the North Vietnamese Navy did actually try anything against the American Navy. What were they thinking was the attack? A nervous radar operator,

sonar operator. It could have been, it could have been whales, it could have been fish. It could have been, you know, somebody firing a shot and then, and then from there, like, kind of all hell breaking loose because essentially in light of what had happened in the second of August, everyone was on edge. I see. And I think, you know, we have to also, I think, I think we fail to recognize sometimes that the people who serve in our military are very, very young. They're very, you know, it's a very good military. But, I mean, a lot of these guys are kids, right? And so in a very tense situation, information that would kind of under normal circumstances, not generate any sort of panic can have the complete opposite.

And it seems that that's what happened here. August 2nd is the first attack. And that is a documented attack. Yeah, exactly. Did they take fire or they saw ships approaching? They take fire from Vietnamese small gunboats, I guess we want to call them. And then they sink and damage, I think, two or three of them. But then on the four, there's no evidence that anything happened.

Right. And that's when the misreading of maybe malfunctioning equipment, who knows, freak weather, it could have been anything. And pilots in the area, actually, that's important. Pilots in the area reported no sighting of enemy ships. No, no, and that's the thing. And there's no evidence that either of the ships took fire. And so, I mean, Johnson himself is reported to have said what he found out about the lack of evidence that, you know, those dumb sailors were probably shooting at flying fish, something along those lines.

I mean, Johnson himself kind of was kind of at his doubts about this. But it was enough for him to use this as a pretext for getting the U.S. more involved in the U. Vietnam and getting Congress to give in that proverbial blank check to wage war in Vietnam, the so-called Tonkin Gulf Resolution. Again, remember the timing. This is August of 1964, the elections in November. So that has a lot to do with what's happening at this point. You know, technically, right, the whole Vietnam War ends up being predicated on, I mean, I don't know if you want to call it a lie, but in a way, and people need to recognize that it's kind of par for the course for the United States, right? When you look at World War I, right, the sinking of the

Lusitania. Oh, it's not carrying contraband. It was carrying contraband. 1898, the Spanish-American War. They blew up the Maine. They didn't blow up the main. The war of 1812, right? The British are doing all this stuff. Well, they're not doing it anymore by the time the war breaks out. So there's kind of a long history of presidents getting the wars they want on the basis of any premise. So if we make a big deal of Vietnam in a way, right, the way the war begins, it's a very American way of starting wars. I think the interesting point, the story point, is that Johnson doesn't seem like the guy who would be doing that false flag kind of thing. He just doesn't seem like that kind of president, but maybe he is. But and as you point out, right, I mean, technically, as of 64, the world is going America's way. So acting tough. And even if it results in kind of an increase in the American military commitment to Vietnam, that's perfectly fine because it's going to make Johnson look good. It's going to help him win the presidency. And then at the same time, it's going to give South Vietnam a chance to get its act together.

I think that's an element that we fail to acknowledge, right? As Johnson had caution in the aftermath of the overthrow of President Xi'em, South Vietnam is a mess. So for the U.S. to kind of stand tall in Vietnam, at a minimum, suggest and signal to the North that, listen, we're ready for you guys. All of this will buy time for the South to consolidate itself by acting as a break, perhaps, on North Vietnamese ambitions in, in the South. Right. It is that week that Johnson gives his famous televised speech, informing the American public

and announcing retaliatory airstrikes against Vietnam. Finally, I have today met with the leaders of both parties in the Congress of the United States. And I have informed them that I shall immediately request the Congress to pass a resolution, making it clear, that our government is united in its determination to take all necessary measures in support of freedom and in defense of peace in Southeast Asia. That leads on August 7th to Congress jointly passing the Gulf of Tonkin. We've been in our times, we've been through this already, you know, our versions of this, where the Congress gets behind the president and everybody says, yeah, let's go.

And that's the Gulf of Tonkin resolution. What did that resolve to do? For Johnson, this was extremely important because now essentially there's congressional buy-in, right? Again, going back to Korea, Johnson was concerned that without congressional support, you know, Vietnam could become Johnson's war. Kind of like Korea was remembered as Truman's war and Truman's failure. So through the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, now Johnson can say, listen, this is not just my war. This is America's war.

Interesting. I've got the American people behind me. So for Johnson, this is very, very important. So on the one hand... He shares responsibility. That's exactly it, right? It's not on him alone, right? And then beyond that, you know, it gives them...

I mean, the resolution, Don, when you read the language, I mean, it's unbelievable. It's a total abdication of congressional responsibility. It basically says that it gives the president the authority to do whatever the hell they want, for as long as they want. I mean, it's just, it's astounding. It's really, I mean, I mean, as you were pointing out earlier, after 45, you know, the American presidency becomes almost imperial when it comes to foreign policy. But then if that wasn't enough, right?

I mean, I mean, Congress essentially puts on paper the fact that when it comes to Vietnam, we're perfectly fine with the president doing whatever he wants for however long he wants. And so for all this talk, you know, that comes afterwards about, oh, you know, Johnson shouldn't have done that and Nixon shouldn't have done that. Well, Congress should have never surrendered over all of its powers. I mean, that's why it's there, right? That's the purpose. It's checks and balances. And in that one document, Congress basically announces to the American people and to the world that from now on, it's essentially President Johnson who decides. Well, don't forget, there's a lot of congressional careers riding on that election as well.

That's exactly it, right? And again, it's one of those aspects that doesn't change, whether you agree with it or not, for the sake of your own political survival, you go along because it's politically expedient to do so. So I want to compare, you know, what JFK was doing versus LGB in terms of the escalation. There was a whole conspiracy theory about whether, you know, JFK was pulling out of Vietnam. I don't want to go down the rabbit hole, but there are many dynamics here. LBJ differs in what regard? Everything he does in a way is kind of consistent with what a previous American administrations have done, right? He continues the commitment. You know, I always show my students this graph that talks about, like, you know, the American presence in Vietnam and done,

it's this perfect bell-shaped curve. You know, it's amazing because everything is consistent with itself, right? And that's why I'm a firm believer that, however it turned out, and looking back, it's easy to say that the U.S. should have never gotten involved in Vietnam. I just don't see how Johnson could have somehow, ended this, or even Kennedy before him, and survived politically. Because, you know, again, at the time, everyone was kind of on board. And, you know, the Cold War is really important. And as of 64, 65, a lot of things are going right for the United States. You know, in 65, the Indonesian Communist movement is completely crushed. I mean, I mean, the Indonesians achieve in a few months what Johnson

himself thought that America could set out to do in just a few short years. You know, there's a coup in Algeria, there's a coup in Ghana. All around the world, these regimes are changing, and very often they're leftists or communist regimes that are kind of naturally toppled by progressive pro-American forces. So all of this encourages Johnson to commit. So there's not a major difference. And yeah, I mean, JFK wasn't going to pull out. And in many ways, Johnson does everything that JFK, more likely than not would have done if he'd survived the assassination attempt in Dallas. I mean, the advisory team remains the same, right? It's the same people. So Johnson's a little more hands-on, but generally speaking, he tends to defer to the advice

of these advisors, who, again, were picked by JFK. So this leads to 1965 Operation Rolling Thunder, A gradual and sustained aerial bombing of North Vietnam. Primarily what's going on is they're trying to disrupt supply lines, what becomes the Ho Chiman Trail, all that infrastructure, and also to convince the North to stay where they are. You know, don't do this. You know, they're not really into regime change at that point. It's really about protecting South Vietnam from the North. All that later stuff happens as things get more complicated. Where do we go from there?

Rolling Thunder leads to what? Johnson settles on a policy of gradual escalation. And of course, in hindsight, right, he gets criticized a lot by the military. But again, you know, context is everything done, right? And when you look at the context at the time, it's perfectly sensible. So on the one hand, right, if you make a dramatic escalation, you stand to compromise the whole domestic agenda, right? Because then it looks like America is about to engage in a major war. So then domestically, that completely derails Johnson's program.

So there's that domestic. And then internationally, if you dramatically escalate and suddenly escalate, then when you consider Korea again, you might kind of make alarm bells ring in Moscow and Beijing. And you might provoke a Soviet, but more likely Chinese intervention in the conflict. So again, right, hindsight being 2020, maybe gradual escalation wasn't the right. policy because it gave North Vietnam a chance to adjust. But when you look at the context at that time, I don't see Johnson being in a position to pursue an alternative course, just because I think it's, you know, in light of the Cuban missile crisis, in light of the Korean precedent, anything too drastic is likely to incite

fear in Moscow, in Beijing, and then precipitate an intervention by those countries, which, by the way, again, based on my work in the archives in Vietnam, the Chinese had certainly considered and were prepared to do. They told that they would tell the North Vietnamese in 65 that if the Americans do something drastic, you can count on us to help you the way we help North Korea. So the message was very, very clear. So Johnson wasn't sure about that, but in a way he kind of guessed right about Chinese concerns, about a drastic escalation.

So bombing the North, not invading the North, I think was a sensible policy. I've never understood why in that point, mid-60s, it wasn't articulated that we had done what we'd done in Korea, eventually successfully, protecting South Korea by dividing the country. So why was that not the elected course in Vietnam the same thing? Here's a division. It's going to be the same thing. It'll all work out well for the South. So as far as Johnson was concerned, right, the North, the communists in the North were not respecting the status quo. They were trying to take over the south.

Johnson would have been fine with a two Vietnam solution, because technically, right, the north is communist, the south is not. That's containment. That's fine. But Johnson thought that he could not lose South Vietnam, particularly in the aftermath of the loss of China. And again, this is all these, in South Vietnam strategically was not important for the United States.

Economically, it wasn't important for the United States. But in terms of credibility for Johnson, it was everything to the United States. You know, it's funny. Like, people always wonder, why Vietnam, right? Well, that's the thing. Why Cuba? You know, at the height of the Cold War,

these little places around the world, given the global stakes, become incredibly important. I mean, when you think about it, right? I mean, Cuba's awesome, right? Very nice people. But the world almost ended over that tiny island, right?

Under JFK, Laos, landlock Laos, two million people, is considered like the finger in the dike. If Laos becomes communist, all of Southeast Asia. And so Vietnam, that's the thing, right? In the context of the Cold War occupies this important place.

So communism cannot be allowed to win in Vietnam because I think Johnson himself thought that if we lose in Vietnam, next thing you know, we'll be fighting them on the beaches of Waikiki. Yeah, or in the Philippines. It's the straw man for the Philippines and Taiwan, for that matter. Yeah. But they believe it, Don, and that's the thing.

They have every reason to believe it in light of what's been happening in Asia. Again, right, hindsight is, it's so easy to say, oh, you know, we, we overreacted. But at the time, knowing what Johnson knows, I don't think anything he does is malicious, in other words. So by the end of 1965, there's several deployments of troops leading to the total number in Vietnam to be about 180,000 American troops are there. It reaches the peak of over 540,000 by 1968 and 69, which is when everything gets very, very complicated. That's the Tet Offensive and all this coming up. But one of the alarm bells going off for him that this is not working out the right way.

As early as 65, as early as 1965, you know, we've got Johnson basically saying, like, I'm not sure this is going to work out. But again, right, he knows he can't quit. So he sustains the bombing and he keeps increasing the American true presence, essentially hoping that this is going to work. I mean, there's this great quote, you know, as early as 64. you know, when he's present, that this is the biggest damn mess I ever saw. So he knows it, right? And so through 65, 66, 67's his fears are amplified. For me, like, I think the big

moment is when McNamara basically says in 67, you know, this is not going anywhere. November 67, McNamara's out. And I think for Johnson, that's, that's when he realizes, like, okay, I got a huge problem here. Like, but again, you know, you can't just pull out. Right. And I want to harken back to what we said in the first part, which is you've got this man who has a very sensitive nature. At a time, remember that we have television going crazy in these days with satire programs, laughing's going to come on a while. All kinds of stuff is happening on television on a big scale that is a microscope into Lyndon B. Johnson, you know, making fun of him, all those guys. And then that's the thing. Johnson himself in late 1967, he launched. this big PR campaign known as the Progress Campaign. And he basically brings Westmoreland, General Westmoreland back from Vietnam. He brings bunker back from Vietnam.

And then he has them go on television essentially to convince the American people that everything is going well in Vietnam. And this is where it's interesting, right? You've got all these people saying, oh, the media, right? The media lost us the war because it was so anti-war. Well, it turns out that essentially the pro-war forces, including Johnson himself, also tried to co-op television. And so they create this, you know, Westmoreland's on TV. He's on meet the press. He goes before the national press club. He goes before Congress. Bunker does the same thing.

And the instructions from Johnson are very clear. I want you to go out there and convince the American people that we're on the right path in Vietnam. And it's in that context, right? So Westmoreland never says anything about the light at the end of the time. tunnel. But he says, I think it's during a national press club speech, that the end is beginning to come into view. So all of a sudden, hopes are raised, and then 1968, Tet Offensive, and then Johnson's credibility is completely shot. But Johnson sets himself up for that failure, if you will. Let's take a break there and come back and talk about that, because what happens from 68 on, we've done shows on this, the Tet Offensive changes the whole picture of the impact of Vietnam on the American public's view.

We're back. Let's discuss, Pierre, how the war situation was impacting politics back in America. It has been going on for, let's keep in mind, over five years at this point. I mean, that's a long time even today, you know, for things to happen. And the American public is now really tired of this story. The press has really turned against them. If you take Vietnam art of the equation domestically, right, it's a very contentious situation. We've got civil rights, right? We've got the feminist movement. We've got gay liberation is starting in the 60s.

The environmental movement is starting in the 60s, right? So you've got all these various kind of these challenges to traditional America. And then Vietnam gets added to that. And Vietnam kind of becomes the common denominator, right? All these groups advocating for different causes will eventually share this opposition to Vietnam. And next thing you know, they start coordinating their activities in conjunction with the Vietnam anti-war movement. And so domestically, politics reach a level of contention that in a way America has rarely seen since the Civil War. I want to share an anecdotal memory of

mine that really shed some light on the situation. I mean, I'm a little kid at that point, probably eight years old, something like that. And it's a small house and we were middle class family in New Jersey. For dinner, I remember them, my parents pulling the black and white television into the dining room and seeing the Vietnam footage going on, black and white, grainy footage, going on with the likes of Dan Rather and those guys over there, and seeing like scores coming up. What was the body count that day? It was that kind of droney sort of reportage that was going on that Americans were just getting so cynical about for every good reason. That's the backdrop. Then you have the anti-war movement happening in the universities and all that sort of thing, along with everything else.

And the last person in the world who should be fielding all of this is in office. LBJ, who really wants everyone to love him and they don't. Yeah. And that's the thing, right? I mean, he's this reluctant cold warrior. He wants to do the great society, right? He talks about it as his great lady. But then he has to deal with what he called that bitch of a war, right?

which eventually derails, derails everything. And I think, you know, again, right, as much as we think that we're polarized today, man, Don, like, and again, right, I mean, what you mentioned, in the 60s, it's not just yelling and screaming at each other, we're killing each other. I mean, you know, these domestic homegrown terrorist organizations emerge, right, the weather underground, and they start blowing stuff up. I mean, that's how contentious. It's really important they say that.

Just for, you know, perspective of today's situation, it. doesn't even come close to the misery that this country was going through in terms of that. You know, and the events, the real stuff that was happening. It was just really all seemed to be falling apart. I look at my university, right? All this stuff is happening in the world and everyone is so passive, right? People are talking about, but they're not doing anything in the 60s on the other hand. They did something. If, especially right later in the war, if you're 19 years old, 18 years old and you're a man, you better pay attention because if the war doesn't end, you're going to end up in Vietnam, right?

So at first, you've got the deferments, right, if you're in college, but then we do away with this. And I think that's the thing. It's Johnson's refusal to call up the reserves, the National Guards, makes it so that middle-class America is not fighting that war. So it's going to be young Americans who get drafted and get sent to Vietnam. I love my students, but there's a level of despondency that would not exist if you bring back the draft. Because now, right, we're always at war, but it's always the same people going to war, right? The rest of us are enjoying our lives like nothing is going on. But that's the thing.

During Vietnam, you might be enjoying life right now, but just so you know, next week, your number gets called and off to Vietnam you go. So your parents are watching television closely because it's on everybody's mind that the longer this lasts, the longer, the more there's a possibility that my own family will have a personal stake in that conflict. Exactly. It was the TED Offensive that really intrudes on the whole idea of this, that we see this news coverage happening, and they're coming to get us, you know, as far as we're concerned. And indeed, eventually, it takes a long time. They do. But LBJ's reaction to the Tet Offensive,

I want to know. What did he say about that? It shatters him. He was aware, right, that things were problematic in Vietnam, but the scope of the offensive. And that's the thing, the Tet Offensive, it's always remembered for the Battle of Way and like this surprise attacks on the 31st of January. But it's really like, from the communist standpoint, it's a year-long campaign. it's throughout 68. I mean, they're dramatically escalating the intensity of their attacks on South Vietnamese, American, and other allied forces. And it's just the idea that the Americans were unprepared, I think fundamentally done,

here we have to give credit to the communists. You know, it's to launch that kind of attack in that context. I mean, it's more than anything else. It's a testament to the ingenuity of the communists than the lack of preparedness of the But ultimately they don't win. That's the thing about the Tet Offensive. They win this battle. It's just that because of what had happened before and the assurance that it happened between 65 and 68,

oh, we got this taken care of Westmoreland, terrible at his job in terms of telling the American people what was going on versus other generals. I mean, there's great comparisons to be made. That sales pitch backfires in such a way when the Ted Offensive happens that Johnson can't recover, right? No, he can't. And that's the thing. You know, you talk about television. And then there's like these images that come out from the time of that offensive, right? It's funny, right?

When you think about it, right? Like, what World War II image really stands out? People would, and yet Vietnam, which is on a much smaller scale, right? The guy shooting the Viet Cong in the head. The monk setting himself on fire, the little napalm girl. I mean, it's amazing how, like, a war that was very limited in scope created such an impression in the American popular imagination. And as I think, TET produces that footage, these images, that condition the way Americans think about the offensive, you're spot on, Don.

Militarily speaking, this is a disaster for the communists. It's an amazing victory for the Americans, and specifically for the South Vietnamese. But because of the images that come out of Vietnam. And then Johnson promising progress and this being kind of a setback, then this military victory becomes a really main. major political liability. And of course, Johnson shortly afterwards, going on television and saying, I'm not going to run for a second term, then just as people were starting to think, well, maybe we did win this. But Johnson effectively giving up on the war for reasons we can go into, then essentially allows the communists to claim victory at all these levels. That announcement comes on March 31st,

1968. There's an election coming. He's up to that point, been running for re-election. I remember that speech. I remember the despair in this man. You know, I was still a young kid, but I could see it. You know, it was a big bummer moment for America. As you realize, this guy was crestfallen. Meanwhile, you know, hey, hey, LBJ, how many kids you killed today is right outside his office, you know, screaming. Again, the culture has changed.

This is really, really rocking everybody's idea of America. I do not believe that I should devote an hour or day of my time to any personal partisan causes or to any duties other than the awesome duties of this office, the presidency of your country. Accordingly, I shall not seek and I will not accept the nomination of my party for another term as your president. it really the whole thing then shifts very quickly to to nixon running and it's all going to leave lbj far behind what happens as a result of his resignation traces back to tete and the then deception that they pulled off but i find it so ironic because the the great society programs were very celebrated were really really big time and we're living with the legacy even today whether you like and agree with them or not lbj had accomplished so much in his presidency. And yet there's a man who's just gone to pieces. The one element that maybe people are not aware of is that hours after Johnson delivers

his speech, he calls the mayor of Chicago daily and says, you know, do you think maybe I can come back from this? I mean, right away, it's almost like he regrets it. And then, because, right, he decides not to run because, I mean, he loses cronkite, right? And then, I mean, he recognized that, you know, that within his own. own party. I mean, there's going to be a mutiny if he runs. And then, of course, you know, like Bobby wants to run. And so everything indicates that, okay, he really needs to kind of quit. But then Kennedy gets shot. And Johnson is actually considering at one point of just

showing up at the convention in Chicago and essentially announcing that, you know what, boys and girls, I'm your candidate. A plan is actually drawn to that effect. But then the Secret Service tells Johnson, listen, if you go to Chicago, we can guarantee your safety. And so, so the plan, the plan is crap. But for the longest time, there was a sense that, oh, he's completely defeated. And he feels that way at that moment. But then there's that resilient part of him that says, maybe I can come back. But then there's also his own health concerns, right? Sure enough, I mean, he would have died before completing his second term. He was a big time smoker and he had a bad heart. And indeed, that's what happens.

But he really thought about coming back, which is, which is, I think a part of the story that Maybe Americans are not familiar with. It's news to me. Johnson dies on January 22nd, 1973 of a massive heart attack. Get this irony. That's just one day before the signing of the Paris Peace Accords, which officially end the American military involvement in the Vietnam War. That takes some more time to get us out of there.

But that's the weird dichotomy of Johnson's departure from politics and from life. This is kind of interesting. People might be aware of this also as that, you know, Johnson and Nixon, I mean, they really don't like each other, but Johnson will offer Nixon some advice on Vietnam, which Nixon will be grateful for. Johnson was no fan of Vietnamization, the gradual withdrawal of U.S. forces because he thought that might embolden the communists. But in terms of the negotiations that Nixon conducted, it appears that Nixon did consider Johnson's input when it came to the negotiating process with the North Vietnamese.

So there's an interesting relationship there. And then, yeah, as you point out, in 73, Paris Peace Accords, providing for the disengagement of U.S. forces. And I don't know if you want to call it whatever, irony or whatever. And then Johnson dies just around that same time. You know, he's a tragic figure in everybody's mind. But I think what's more complicated about this is that those of us of a certain age, you know, talk to people younger than us today is like, oh, boy, you don't know what it was like in the 70s. Everybody was really unsure of where America was going to go. This is a very dark and cynical time.

I don't think that I often consider his resignation as a part of that movement, you know, towards Watergate and all the rest that happens in the 70s. But indeed, it really is because when you question the American military, you really question the spine of America, don't you? There's a lot of lessons to be learned from Vietnam, right? I mean, but I think sometimes we learn the wrong ones. So, for example, right, as you probably know, Don, a lot of people on the right and in the armed forces would claim that we lost because we weren't. allowed to fight the way we normally do. That's, you know, the constraints imposed on the military were legitimate, again, because we didn't know what the Chinese were doing. I mean, I've got North Vietnamese diplomats who worked in China at the height of the war, telling me

that they themselves were afraid of the Chinese, because they, you know, at the height of the cultural revolution, no one knew what Beijing would do or not do. So Johnson was perfectly right to be cautious about everything. But fundamentally, you know, the, The U.S. just came up short in Vietnam militarily. There are, as one of my colleagues likes to point out, there are limits to American power. And, in all honesty, we've seen it ever since Vietnam. And as Iran demonstrates, we have a big bad military, but the results just have not been there. So you can blame the civilians all you want.

But at this point, it's not just Vietnam that was lost. It's Iraq-Afghanistan. We can't claim victory there. Iran, I mean, so to the... The years is really good at bombing people, but bombing doesn't necessarily deliver the political goals. Exactly. Yeah. It's a big world. Yeah. I think that, you know, in all of these, Johnson recognized that. These limits to American power constrain the U.S. to kind of get out of Vietnam and under Nixon under presumably honorable terms. Yeah. And I think that what we've, we've also established here is there were limits on Lyndon v. Johnson. You know, that personality that he assumed could charm, charm everybody, you know, 20, 30 years before wasn't going to. going to do the same thing when circumstances changed?

It's interesting, Don, because, you know, as we mentioned at the beginning of the show, right, he's a tragic figure. But if you were to take Vietnam out of the equation, he would be one of the greatest presidents in American history. Most historians would probably rank him like number three after Lincoln and FDR. Just because what he does domestically, it's so amazing. It's really, I mean, it's remarkable, right? Civil rights, voting rights, Medicare,

food stamp expansion, all of these programs. It's all Johnson in one term, in one single term. But then Vietnam just that, you know, it's, it makes it very tragic. In a way, he ends reconstruction, doesn't he? You know, 100 years later, he is, he takes all that to a finishing place with Martin Luther King, etc. Who incidentally, you know, turns against him with Vietnam? That's the last thing that Martin Luther King Jr. is doing.

Yeah, and that's the thing, right? King initially doesn't want to oppose the war. because he feels Johnson has been so good to African Americans. But in 67, the pressure on King is such that he turns against the war. And that's a huge blow to Johnson. I mean, we talked about some of the elements that make him turn against the war himself, that losing King, losing civil rights supporters. I mean, Johnson essentially felt betrayed by that,

really deeply profoundly hurt by that. Pierre, we have a lot to talk about. I hope you'll come back. and we can shape some episodes around these conversations. Anytime, my honor. Professor Pierre Aslan has been our guest today. He is the Dwight East Stanford Chair in the history of U.S. foreign relations

at San Diego State University. Author, as we've mentioned already, a bitter peace, Washington, Hanoi and the making of Paris Peace Agreement and Hanoi's Road to Vietnam, 1954 to 1965. Pierre, go out and enjoy that Southern California sunshine. That sounds good.

Thank you, Don. Thank you very much. Thanks for listening to American History Hit. You know, every week we release new episodes, two new episodes dropping Mondays and Thursdays, from mysterious missing colonies to powerful political movements, to some of the biggest battles across the centuries. Don't miss an episode. By hitting like and follow, you help us out, which is great,

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