American History Hit - Vietnam: The End of the War?

Episode Date: April 28, 2025

How did the US get out of Vietnam? In this episode, we are diving into how 'peace' was agreed in Paris, and what it really meant for Vietnam.Don is joined by Pierre Asselin, professor at San Diego State University and author of, among others, ‘A Bitter Peace: Washington, Hanoi, and the Making of the Paris Agreement’ and ‘Hanoi’s Road to the Vietnam War, 1954-1965’.Produced by Sophie Gee. Edited by Tim Arstall. Senior Producer was Charlotte Long.Sign up to History Hit for hundreds of hours of original documentaries, with a new release every week and ad-free podcasts. Sign up at https://www.historyhit.com/subscribe.  You can take part in our listener survey here.All music from Epidemic Sounds.American History Hit is a History Hit podcast. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

Want to explore even more history? Sign up to History Hit, where you will discover history from around the world. From the American Revolution to prehistoric Scotland, there is plenty to discover. With your subscription, you'll unlock hundreds of hours of exclusive documentaries, with a brand new release every week, exploring everything from the ancient world to World War II. Just visit historyhit.com slash subscribe to bring the past alive. January 27, 1973, the Hotel Majestic. Avenue Claiborne, Paris's 16th Arode-Cimon.

A palace, one of Paris's most luxurious grand hotels, government office for the Ministry of Defense, the head office of UNESCO. This many-storied building has lived many lives. Today, it gains another string for its bow. Inside, delegates from the United States, South Vietnam, the Viet Cong, and North Vietnam, formally sign an agreement, ending the war and restoring peace in Vietnam.

Tomorrow, on the 28th of January at 8 a.m., there will finally be a ceasefire. The U.S. will get to work withdrawing their troops and dismantling their bases, and the North Vietnamese will release their prisoners of war. Peace at last. Or so they think. Hello, listeners. Glad you're with us. I'm Don Wildman, and this is American History Hit. It's 2025, the 50th anniversary of the fall of Saigon, when North Vietnamese forces took the capital of the South, effectively ending America's involvement in that country's civil war. The events of the war have been examined so many times in scholarship and media, yet one aspect of this period often escapes notice.

Our exit plan for withdrawal. I'm not talking about Huey's on the embassy roof, all that's in a previous episode of ours. Today, we explore the more official pursuit to achieve Nixon's peace with honor. What deal did we mean to strike? What were the objectives? And why weren't the North Vietnamese, in the end, persuaded? This critical chapter we discussed today with a former guest of our show, Professor Pierre Asselin, who occupies the Dwight E. Stanford chair in American Foreign Relations

in the Department of History at San Diego State University. Nice to be with you again, Pierre. Thanks for coming on. Well, my pleasure, Don, is good to be back. Let's put this all in context. When Nixon first runs for election in 1968, he promises an, quote, honorable end to the war in Vietnam. What then evolves into peace with honor, a campaign slogan in 1972. And right there's the dilemma.

It will take eight years for the failure of our efforts in Vietnam to finally resolve themselves. And in the end, it comes under Nixon's successor. What were the major factors that log jammed this process? So Nixon had a very clear understanding of the situation in Vietnam. I think for all of his flaws, we really need to give Nixon credit for understanding what was happening in Vietnam and what that meant for the larger international global Cold War context. From the moment he assumes the presidency, Nixon is cognizant of the fact that the American military, enterprise in Vietnam is not going to meet its stated objective of effectively providing for

a South Vietnam that will be forever protected from the communist menace. Nixon understands that in light of previous failures, the U.S. is likely to lose in South Vietnam, to not meet its political objective of, again, preserving the South as a non-communist entity. So then the question becomes how to end the commitment while salvaging American credibility and honor so that the U.S. can continue fighting the Cold War in other parts of the world. So for the U.S., right, Vietnam is certainly important, but it's one battle within the larger context of this global Cold War. So for Nixon, the idea here is to deal with defeat in Vietnam, but deal with it in such a way that the United States will have the staying power to remain in the larger Cold War fight

against the Soviet Union, China and other rivals. Yeah, we often talk about it on this podcast. Korea, part one, Vietnam, part two. That's really rough. But, I mean, that's kind of the idea. So the idea was to emerge from this with our credibility intact in order to continue the fight against the dominoes falling, right? Exactly, exactly.

And that's the thing, right? I mean, credibility, prestige, those are really, really important currencies in international relations. You know, it doesn't matter if you have big guns or a powerful economy. It's always about how you use these things, right? And where are there not people believe that you're going to use your economic might, your military might, to meet your objectives? And that's how Nixon approaches it.

The other element, I think, Don, that accounts for the length of the disengagement is the model that Nixon is using. Nixon was always a big fan of Charles de Gaulle. And specifically, he admired the way Dagal had gotten France out of Algeria. Algeria is such a mess, right, for the French. And Nixon, rightly or wrongly, believed that Da Gaulle had indeed achieved what the Gaul himself called La Paed in La Paed in Laudelaire, right? Peace in honor in Algeria. And just as it took DaGau four years to extricate France from Algeria, again, with a view to maintaining French credibility internationally after Algeria, Nixon would take four years to get the United States out of Vietnam.

And that's not coincidence. Nixon is very closely following the Gaulian playbook in Algeria when he's looking at Vietnam. That is the first time I've ever heard a parallel there. That's interesting. Yeah, yeah, yeah. And that's the thing, right? The French war in Algeria is so much in common with the American War in Vietnam. It's sensible because we always compare the American War in Vietnam to the French War in Vietnam. And that's wrong. We should be comparing it to the French War in Algeria. There are many more parallels and similarities between those two conflicts than they They are between the American War in Vietnam and the French war in Vietnam that preceded it.

Well, and fittingly, I suppose this whole conversation will end up in Paris, because that's where this whole accord is negotiated, the Paris Peace Talks. But before we get there, the first play for peace happens under Johnson after the New Hampshire primary, 1968, when he, Eugene and McCarthy had done so well that Johnson actually, in reaction, halts the Rolling Thunder bombing campaign on March 31, 1968. So how then do negotiations develop from there? I think the Americans were always more committed to a diplomatic solution than their counterparts in Hanoi. And when Johnson decides that he's going to try and solve this diplomatically, various efforts are made to connect with Hanoi.

Ultimately, all these initiatives are going to fail primarily because the leaders on the other side, the leaders in Hanoi, have no interest whatsoever in a negotiated. solution. They're going to pretend to be interested because it's going to elevate their profile their standing internationally, right? They're going to look reasonable. But we now know from the record on the communist side that fundamentally this willingness to negotiate was not matched by an actual desire to find a compromise solution to the war. Until the latter stages of the war, leaders in Hanoi are going to remain convinced that they can win this militarily if they're patient enough and if they make the proper investment. Did they see us as a furtherance of the colonization? Were we the next colonizing power to come in after the French? So that would be the public narrative, right? So the communists had a really remarkable propaganda machine.

And they were extremely good at controlling the narrative of the war, particularly the narrative that the international community consumed, if you will. And they certainly presented the American intervention as kind of this neo-colonial crusade, right? But again, amongst themselves privately, they recognize this as the United States essentially trying to contain their Marxist-Leninist ambitions. In the context of the Cold War, I really think the United States had no choice but to become involved in Vietnam. And while the outcome and the circumstances that produced were certainly tragic, you know, it's hard to imagine the United States avoiding Vietnam in light of what's happening internationally. But what we see communist leaders do from the moment the Americans intervene is starts tracing

these parallels between what the Americans are doing and what the French did before them. And of course, the international community loves this stuff, right? Because Vietnam has already been a victim of colonial exploitation and manipulation. So it becomes easy to cast the Americans at that same light. There's a commitment on the part of leaders in Hanoi to this Marxist-Lenin and design. That would be a terrible thesis to get out there for us because that was our past as well. We decolonized ourselves and great sympathies would rise up in their favor. We now know leaders in Hanoy were really shocked by Nixon's victory and they were deeply troubled

by it. During the last year of his presidency, Johnson tries really, really hard to make peace happen. He curtails the bombing. He is very, very accommodating. And as it turns out, Hanoi will interpret all of this as weakness on the part of the American. And so instead of encouraging Hanoy to negotiate, Johnson's overture are going to essentially kind of make Hanoy solidify its position, right? So that's, it's all perception, right? But we now know that in Annoi, Johnson's, I guess, flexibility was interpreted as weakness. Nixon comes to power, and leaders in Hanover are very much aware of his background, and they are concerned. then Nixon decides to Vietnamize the war, which is really the Americanized, the Vietnamese civil war, and they like that.

But then he starts talking to the Chinese. He starts talking to the Soviets. He invades Cambodia. He invades Laos. And then the communist leadership is really, really concerned about Nixon. And that's going to make them a little more humble in the way that they approach diplomacy with the Americans. Was Nixon aware of that? I mean, did we have intelligence that they proceed?

Johnson is as weak? No. So, you know, people always talk about the Tet Offensive as America's biggest intelligence failure in Vietnam, right? How could we not see this coming? To me, the biggest intelligence failure of the whole war is the inability of American leaders to ever understand who they were up against. You know, all along, they assume Ho Chi Ming is in charge, right?

And then Ho Chi Ming dies in 69, and they're still not clear on who's running the show in Hanoi. We now know that long before American ground troops are committed to South Vietnam, we have a leadership of really, really hard men in power that has effectively sidelined Ho Chi Ming and the famous General Jop, a guy by the name of Le Duan or Lezwan is basically calling the shots in Hanoi. And those guys are uncompromising. And Americans never knew until long after the war was over. Who exactly were those guys? and the extent that they never understood also the extent of their commitment to what communists called total victory. Was Nixon extending an olive branch from the beginning?

Was there a strategy to, I'm going to keep this up or else? Or was that kind of behind the scenes only? Before entering into negotiations, what Nixon essentially tried to do was enhance his bargaining position, which I know I respected because the communist in Vietnam, especially after the whole Geneva fiasco of 54, always told themselves that moving forward, they would only negotiate from what they call a position of strength. You enhance your position on the field of battle,

and then you negotiate. And that's exactly what Nixon ends up doing. He's following his own plan, but Nixon understands that it's really pointless to engage with Hanoi unless I have leverage over them. And that's why, you know, Nixon is going to open a secret channel to Hanoi, a so-called back channel in the summer of 1969.

But, you know, he's kind of like the Vietnamese, right? He's using this to probe the other guys. But then in the meantime, what he does is Yonder takes a series of initiatives that are meant to increase the pressure on an order to negotiate on the one hand and then enhance the American bargaining position on the other. And that's very, very clever foreign policymaking, if you ask me. Was he approving others' plans? I mean, this was a military initiative, I imagine,

The idea is you subsume the so-called military struggle under your diplomatic struggle, right? So all along, you want to negotiate, but you understand that you can be better positioned to negotiate if your battlefield situation is favorable. And so as part of that strategy, we see Nixon sponsoring this invasion of Cambodia and a year later that of Laos, right? And that's meant to kind of cut off communist supply lines into the South. And then as I mentioned earlier, you have the Americans engaging leaders in Beijing, leaders in Moscow, further increasing the pressure on Hanoi. And then in 71, 72, the Americans make their big diplomatic push for an agreement. And at that point, Hanoid will be much more accommodating than it would have been in 69, let's say, during Nixon's first year in office, and much more accommodated than it ever was during the Johnson years.

It always struck me as strange that this ends up happening in Paris. I know the greater meaning of it, but that seems to be a darker one for the North Vietnamese and complicating. I never understood that. Well, so, you know, it's funny, right? When it comes to negotiating peace, there are certain cities we associate with peace because of their history, right? It's no coincidence that all this stuff happens in Geneva, right? To the point where people get confused between the Geneva Corps, the Geneva Conventions, and Paris is another one of those places, right? I mean, Paris is where the Americans negotiated their independence, right? Paris is the site of countless other

major negotiations. So having Paris as a site for negotiations is symbolic and it attests to the seriousness with which both sides are going to approach the talks. Beyond that in this particular case, you also have the fact that common acquaintances of the Americans in the North Vietnamese are French and therefore can facilitate these meetings, both the public and some of public ones, which are going to take place in a hotel, and then the secret ones, which are going to take place at the private homes of people that Kissinger and leaders in Hanoi know. And that that channel that Nixon opens in 69 is going to function.

No one's going to be aware of the existence of these stocks, except Nixon, Kissinger, and a couple of their advisors, and then the guys on the other side in Hanoi. And as part of the effort to keep everything secret, they met at the private residences of people they both knew, in Paris or outside Paris. It's an extended procedure. How long do the Paris peace talks take? It's about four years. I mean, it takes four years. The real productive phase of the talks unfolds in the second half of 72 and early 1973. Prior to that, they're talking, but they're not really negotiating, you know.

And they spend, you know, particularly under Johnson, they spend a lot of time talking about talks, right? Like what shape should the table be, right? How many people should be present and should the press be there and so on and so forth? I remember the table thing. That really does emerge. You know, there was an argument over the shape of the table being symbolic of who's in charge of this talks, you know, or who's, is it a round table or a rectangular one is what it came down to? And they ended up around one. Because that, and again, right, we might think, oh, this is stupid.

But that's the thing, right? If it's like a square table, it basically means that all four sides are equal. But that was the problem with Vietnam, right? Hanoi did not recognize the government in the South. The government in the South did not recognize Hanoi, right? So these little things that many people are quick to dismiss as stupid or inconsequential actually mean an awful lot in the context of a serious negotiation. So who's at the table? I mean, obviously, the U.S., North Vietnam, and South Vietnam. Anyone else?

So this is where it gets really, really interesting, Don. After Nixon assumes the presidency, we technically have two ongoing negotiations with respect to Vietnam. We have these kind of semi-public talks that were initiated by Johnson, and then we have these secret talks that were initiated by Nixon. Now, the secret channel becomes the primary channel for negotiating. But then to help maintain the secrecy of those meetings, Nixon and leaders in Hanoi will agree to keep the semi-public channel going. In the semi-public negotiations, all four parties are represented. The Americans are there, the North Vietnamese are there, Saigon is there, and the Viet Cong is there. But in the secret channel, it's just the Americans and the North Vietnamese. What's interesting in the secret channel is that it's an American, North Vietnamese negotiation,

and essentially the main party to the war in the South, the government in Saigon, is not part of those talks. It's not even informed about the existence of the talks, much less their substance. No kidding. We should probably define the difference between North Vietnamese and Viet Cong, which a lot of people are confused about. So when we talk about the North Vietnamese, we're talking about the leaders of Northern Vietnam,

officially the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, esconsed in Hanoi. They're really the masterminds, if you will, of the anti-American, anti-South Vietnamese effort, right? They are the guys in charge of the People's Army of Vietnam, what we call the North Vietnamese Army, the NVA, those professional soldiers who come down the Hoechiming Trail to take on South Vietnamese, America, and other allied forces in the South,

who were extremely well equipped and trained. Now, when we talk about the Viet Cong, we're talking about indigenous Southerners, people in the South who will join the anti-Sygon, anti-American crusade as part of an organization known as the National Front for the Liberation of Southern Vietnam, which is presumably autonomous, independent, and southern, but which we now know was in fact controlled and established by Hanoi. So when it comes to all major decisions, it's really basically Lesuan and two or three of his advisors in Hanoi

who make those calls. And then the Diet Kong will essentially follow. So publicly, again, right, as part of its effort to control the narrative of the war, Hanoi will claim that the Viet Cong is this popular indigenous front that merely seeks emancipation from the evil Americans and their South Vietnamese abettors. But in reality, it's an instrument used by Hanoi essentially to facilitate the mobilization of the South Vietnamese masses and recruit fighters among them. So many of them went down there as part of that operation of the passage to freedom,

which under Eisenhower, we had sponsored at great expense. Yeah, after the partition of Vietnam, after after the French war, there was a 300-day period during which people could move from the south to the north, the north to the south. And we saw about like a million people leave the north to resettled in the south. A lot of these guys were Catholics, were concerned about, you know, living under a communist regime in northern Vietnam. And then those guys, you know, become.

really, really staunch supporters of the regime in Saigon. Right. But along with them came some 100,000 Viet Cong fighters. Eventually, yeah, Hanoi will start. So what you have in 54 also is that you have a movement the other way, right? People from the south moving to the north in 54, 55. And then as the situation escalates in the south, starting in 5960 or so, these Southerners who had regrouped to the north, then are redeployed to the south. And at first, yeah, Those are the guys kind of, you know, fighting South Vietnam and eventually the American advisors

supporting the armed forces of South Vietnam. And when that's not sufficient, that's when leaders in Annoi make the decision to start deploying North Vietnamese combat units into the South. And what's interesting done, and I think we forget, is that we start witnessing the appearance

of northern Vietnamese combat units in late 64, early 65, before the Americans commit their own combat troops to sell Vietnam. It's complicated stuff. I mean, anyone who sort of knows Vietnam to be a confusing matter, this is why. It's so long in development. And you know, Don, that's why I appreciate what you're doing here, because I think we've simplified the story of the war, right?

The more I study the conflict, the more I realize, whatever I learned from my mentors and my professors and from books, most of it is actually wrong. or distorts these really, really complex realities. In these peace talks, what are the U.S. objectives? I'll start you off. Release of American prisoners of war, obviously. In terms of what the Americans really want, there's the credibility and honor aspect that we addressed earlier, right?

But in terms of like tangibles, right, it's absolutely imperative for Nixon to get the prisoners of war back. I mean, that's, and the Hanohan, understands that. Hanoy understands that. This is Washington's kryptonite, right? And Donna, I really want to underscore that. All this talk about, oh, Hanoy, torturing Americans and this and that. It's true, right? I mean, of course, Hanoy was not always very nice in the way it dealt with American POWs. But at the same time, it always made sure that those guys were

kept alive because every single American represented leverage in the peace stock. And so Hamler was always, I mean, there were all these policies in place across the north telling peasants that, you know, if an American ejects and lands on your backyard, you better not touch that person because tempted as you might be to kill them because they bombed your village and maybe they killed your wife or your husband. I mean, the punishment for hurting an American was very, very harsh because again, communists understood that from previous war against France, right? the leverage you have in a negotiation with the larger number of POWs that you have. And so Nixon's priority to bring those, I mean, they're all men, those men home safely. The second priority for Nixon is to give South Vietnam a fighting chance. And I think Nixon, despite some one of my colleagues have argued, I think Nixon is genuinely committed to do whatever he can to give South Vietnam a chance at survival.

But again, right, you can't win at the back bargaining table what you fail to achieve on the battlefield. Well, that's the irony of this whole thing or even contradiction in terms because it's a peace talk, but we're doing it knowing the war is probably going to continue on. And indeed, we're trying to strengthen our side so that they can continue on. The other side isn't even interested in peace

or they're interested in getting us out so that they can take over. I mean, that's what's so complicated about this. And that's the thing, Don, right? I mean, the mere fact that the secret talks are between the Americans and the North Vietnamese give you an idea that, okay, this is really not about ending the war. This is about ending American participation in the Vietnamese civil war. And that's exactly what the agreement will do, right?

The so-called Paris Agreement of 73 provides for the end of American involvement in Vietnamese affairs. But the core issues responsible for conflict in Vietnam, those are all left to be negotiated among the Vietnamese later on. So we weren't trying to create a north and South Korea? We weren't trying to replicate that situation? No, whereas, you know, Pyongyang and Seoul eventually accepted the status quo. Hanoi was never going to accept a Korea-style two-state solution. That was never going to happen. And again, I want to emphasize this done, because a lot of people,

misunderstand that. When people look at Geneva in 54, they'll often tell you, oh, it created two countries north and south Vietnam. Absolutely not. The Geneva Accords partitioned Vietnam temporarily into two regroupment zones. And Hanoi, the communists were emphatic. This is not a political marker. This is a military demarcation zone. So neither side ever, ever agreed to creating in Vietnam a situation, a two-state solution, as we ended up having in Korea. And I think our inability to understand that accounts for a lot of the misconceptions we have about Vietnam. I don't want to open this counterwarms, but I got to ask you, did the French want us to do what we did?

Yes. I really think that the Americans understand that getting involved in Vietnam, it's not in their best interest, right? Because, you know, after World War II, there's recognition that the age of Imperium is over. and now all these new countries are emerging in the so-called third world. And the U.S. really needs to find ways of becoming friends with these new third-world countries. And then you get the French who want to reclaim jurisdiction over Vietnam, which they lost in World War II. And the Americans have no interest in getting involved in a war that's essentially colonial in nature

and that could punish America's image in the third world at a time when they understand that they'll be competing against the Soviets. the affection of those same third world leaders. But then the French, they really do a number on the Americans, right? And it's really the French who pressure the Americans into getting involved in Vietnam. I would argue they dupe the Americans into getting involved in Vietnam just to get someone to pay for their war, which they themselves can't afford. And they succeed. We're coming back to that in a future episode because that's good stuff.

All right. So we know what the Americans want. We want to release to the American prisoners with withdrawal without formal capitulation. We're not going to surrender. We're not going to keep our honor in place. A preservation of credibility is really what we're trying to accomplish. And strengthening the South Vietnamese. What about the North Vietnamese? What are they really saying in public that they are trying to accomplish?

In public, what they're saying is that they just want peace. They just want to be left alone. They want independence and freedom, right? But then privately, what they really want is to not commit to any sort of sort of an agreement that could eventually create challenges for their goal, which will always remain the reunification of Vietnam under communist authority. I mean, that's why they don't want a negotiated solution. And then when they decide that, you know, we're likely to have to sign something, then the goal becomes to not sign anything or not agree to anything that could,

that could derail that fundamental objective, which is, again, not the independence of Vietnam, but its reunification, its independence under communist rule. Eventually, they conclude this process in 1973. A military aspect of this really puts pressure on this, doesn't it? The offensive against South Vietnam in that time period in 72 did not work out for the North Vietnamese. The Americans just want to get out of there. Is that fair to say? Yeah, I mean, I mean, 72 is a really, really hard year for both sides.

For, I mean, for all parties, right? You know, we always make a big deal with the Tet Offensive, right? But arguably, the 72 offensive is even bigger than the Tet Offensive. On the communist side, it produces even more casualties. And it's a dismal military failure for the communists. At the same time, though, I mean, Nixon is up for re-election. He's been in office for four years. It doesn't look like the U.S. is anywhere close.

to peace. So the pressure is also mounting on the Americans to end this. And then for the South Vietnamese, I mean, this war has been going on for a really long time. People are tired. So 72 is, it's really, for everyone, it's a challenging year. And essentially in 73, all sides will agree to end this because it has to end, at least for the moment. Yes. And this stalemate leads to the Paris Peace Agreement, 1973, January 27th, 1973, an agreement on ending the war and restoring peace in Vietnam is how they publicize it. Yes. It puts into action what consequences.

The Americans start withdrawing immediately. That's pretty much it, yeah. And this is really what the only thing that this agreement will achieve, right? It will formalize the departure of the Americans, right, the withdrawal of the last American troops from Vietnam. they leave in March of 1973. It compels the Americans to basically seize all military operations in Vietnam and across the rest of Indochina. And in exchange for this, Hanoi gives the Americans their prisoners back.

And that's pretty much all that. And a ceasefire, I suppose. Yeah, yeah, yeah. So there's a ceasefire. And then essentially all of this long enough to allow the Americans to get their prisoners back to disengage before the Vietnamese resumed. their civil war. And that's all that agreement is. It's really kind of a, it's a military solution. It doesn't solve any of the political problems that are at the heart of the

conflict on the Indo-Chinese Peninsula. So that's what I want to ask you. So, I mean, smart people are at this table. Henry, Henry Kissinger, among them, they knew what was going to happen after the Americans left, right? They knew this wasn't going to be the end of the war. Kissinger had a pretty good understanding that, I mean, this is beyond anybody's capacity to resolve, right? But for Kissinger, it's been made clear to him by Nixon that when he goes into these negotiations, first and foremost, he has to secure these American objectives, right? And then if he can lay some kind of foundation for, you know, an enduring peace in Vietnam, then great. But fundamentally, Kissinger, his position in these talks is to make sure that these basic American conditions are met.

Did they feel in that real politic way, like the game had shifted at this point? We've proven our point. We're not going to let communism just run havoc around the world, as proven by a 20-year commitment here, or at least a 15-year commitment, I suppose. And therefore, we are willing to go with this compromise. peace idea because we'd made our case. At the same time, we've also drawn closer to Moscow. We have these other relationships.

China is opened. All of that's the real politic of the side. So the Vietnam War, so called, is subsumed by all that, as you say. No, absolutely. And that's the thing. I mean, you know, it's when you consider what Nixon manages to achieve, right? He ends the war in Vietnam, and in the same instance, more or less, he makes peace with the Chinese and the Soviets. So, I mean, to me, right, the ability to engage Moscow and Beijing kind of offsets defeat in Vietnam.

And that's Nixon did achieve peace with honor. I mean, the mere fact that he got a signed agreement from this leadership in Anoy, to me, it's almost miraculous. And fundamentally, it's a testament to the effectiveness of his strategies intact. And again, right, some of those tactics and strategies were extremely violent and caused a lot of deaths. But, you know, they were all meant to fulfill larger, long-term objectives. And in that respect, I think that from a very, very kind of narrow standpoint, Nixon was successful in needing his primary goals. And were those objectives worth the cost is really when you get into the hairy stuff? That's exactly it, Don.

I mean, to the extent that we could, you know, wars of all kinds should be avoided, right? I mean, wars are terrible. They're absolutely, I mean, we're seeing it these days, right? It's just, I don't think most people understand what war does to people. And not just civilians who are caught in the crossfire and end up losing their lives for a reason they don't understand, but for the combatants themselves, right? We send these 18, 19-year-olds to do things that are just unconscionable. And then we expect them to reintegrate society normally afterwards. I mean, to me, it's obscene.

The whole thing is obscene. So we have this situation in Vietnam. It's a very messy situation. And then efforts are made by Nixon and Kissinger to end it. They're only partially successful. Fundamentally, it was left to the Vietnamese themselves to decide their own fate. And unfortunately, that meant two more years of violence, of Vietnamese on Vietnamese violence. So this uncorks another aspect of this conversation, which is this enormous refugee problem that happens.

You know, the famous boat people and just all kinds of emigration that has to take place. It really changes the world for real. And even on this end of things in the United States. I mean, absolutely. I mean, that's around the time of the fall of Saigon, right? About 120 to 150,000 people, mostly southerners are going to leave, right? And then after 75, after the 115, after the war. war ends, Hanoi starts persecuting its former enemies, reeducation camps, anti-Chinese campaigns

that will prompt tens of thousands, hundreds of thousands of others to leave, right? And then a lot of these guys end up in the United States. And it's interesting. I mean, they really change the demographic landscape, right? I mean, I'm in Southern California. And the Vietnam War is very much alive. Just got to San Bernardino, right? Well, exactly, right? And Orange County. I mean, we got, you know, I mean, we have counties here that are like, you know, 60% Vietnamese that have Vietnamese mayors. And that's, that's, I mean, again, you know, when you look at America's relationship with war, right, it's, I think we fail to appreciate the fact that our very look as as Americans is very much conditioned by the wars we've waged, right? And, you know, the presence of Filipinos, right, of Koreans, of Vietnamese, of more recently, right, of people from Iraq.

in Afghanistan. I mean, it's, it's, that's why, that's why, you know, you know, tough as it is, studying these conflicts is important because they, in so many ways, they shape who we are as Americans. It's an extraordinary thing that, it was kind of the last of its kind, this sort of famous negotiation, Paris peace talk, you know, everybody at the table kind of thing. War is a much more complicated and strange affair now than it used to be. And I think we can track that back to Paris, can't we? 1973. Yeah, yeah, yeah. And that's the thing, right? It's so easy to start a war. It's so difficult to end it, right? And I mean, we're seeing that right now, particularly with Ukraine, right? It's very, very easy to initiate a conflict, but then trying to find a way out, trying to end it is extremely, extremely problematic. But I really believe, Don, that we can learn from that past. I think that very often we draw or infer lessons that are completely false. But I think when it comes to negotiate, the end of a conflict.

I think in this particular case, I think there's much we can learn about about Vietnam to resolve some of the situations we are facing today. It is still instructive, isn't it? And I hope listeners have learned a lot. Professor Pierre Esselin is the Dwight E. Sanford Chair in American Foreign Relations

at the San Diego State University. Pierre, if I heard you talking, I would want to know more about what you do. Where can people find that? I've published a good amount. I'm easily accessible online, And otherwise, people are always welcome to contact me. My information is on the History Department webpage at San Diego State University.

And it's always, I always, always like to engage with people about this subject matter. Oh, careful what you ask for. Here's a, I'm going to plug your book, nonetheless. A bitter peace, Washington, Hanoi, and the making of the Paris Agreement, as well as Hanoi's Road to the Vietnam War, 1954, 19965. That is why this man knows so much. Thank you so much, Pierre. There's got to be more to talk about.

about, we'll be back with you soon. Thanks, Don. Thank you very much for having me. Hello, folks. Thanks for listening to American History Hit. Each week, we release new episodes, two new episodes dropping Mondays and Thursdays. All kinds of great content, like mysterious missing colonies to powerful political movements, to some of the biggest battles across the centuries. Don't miss an episode. By hitting like and follow, you help us out, which is great, but you'll also be reminded when our shows are on. And while you're at it, share. with a friend. American History Hit with me, Don Wildman. So grateful for your support. Bye for now.