American Scandal - Boeing | Point of Failure | 3

Episode Date: August 27, 2024

In 2012, Boeing engineers and test pilots are under pressure to deliver a redesigned 737 quickly, to compete with a similar plane from their rival, Airbus. The 737 MAX has bigger, more fuel efficient engines, but it’s also prone to stalling. A complete redesign is out of the question, so engineers settle on installing a piece of software instead, called MCAS, which can automatically push down the plane’s nose and prevent a stall. But to avoid costly additional training, Boeing opts not to tell pilots about the new software – with disastrous results. Need more American Scandal? With Wondery+, enjoy exclusive seasons, binge new seasons first, and listen completely ad-free. Start your free trial in the Wondery App, Apple Podcasts, Spotify or visit wondery.app.link/IM5aogASNNb now.  See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

Hi, this is Lindsey Graham, host of American Scandal. Our back catalog has moved behind a paywall. Recent episodes remain free, but older ones will require a Wondery Plus subscription. With Wondery Plus, you get access to the full American Scandal archive, ad-free, plus early access to new seasons and more. Join Wondery Plus in the Wondery app or on Apple Podcasts. podcasts. It's 2012, six years before the Lion Air crash involving a Boeing 737 MAX 8 aircraft. And at Boeing's Research and Development Center in Seattle, Ray Craig is about to step into a flight simulator.

Craig is the chief test pilot for Boeing's new plane, and it's his job to make sure it will hold up in every scenario a pilot might find themselves in. Today, he needs to investigate a problem engineers discovered when testing a scale model of the MAX 8 in a wind tunnel. The engineers found that when executing a tight model of the MAX 8 in a wind tunnel. The engineers found that when executing a tight, high-speed turn, the plane tended to pitch sharply upwards and stall, which could result in a crash. So Craig has come to find out if the same thing happens in the simulator.

Craig steps inside and sits down at the captain's chair. The seat and controls are nearly identical to what the actual cockpit of a 737 MAX 8 will look like. But the windshield in front of him is a digital projection, and cinema-quality speakers mimic what he'd hear inside a real plane. Seated inside the simulator, Craig fires up the controls, releases the parking brake, and then launches the plane down the runway. Once he's airborne, he throws the plane into a sharp turn, and sure enough, he feels the nodes start to pull upwards.

Craig tries to force it back down, but as alarms blare, he loses control and the plane stalls. As the simulation winds down, an engineer pops his head into the simulated cockpit. See what I mean, Craig? Well, you were right. Got the same result. We haven't seen any other issues with our tests, but when we go into these high-speed turns, we always get the same problem. Well, it's pretty unlikely that a commercial pilot would have to make a turn at that angle and speed, but I mean, it's possible

if they're dealing with turbulence or some other kind of sudden event. And if this is how the plane is responding, it's a concern. Well, we all agree. Why do you think it's happening? The position of the new engines. Now that we've mounted them in front of the wings instead of beneath, it's changing the plane's aerodynamics. But we can't move them back and still meet the new fuel efficiency requirements. Bigger engines won't fit under the wings.

Yeah. Well, could the aerodynamics be improved some other way? This could be a serious flaw. Well, we could redesign the wings or tail, but I don't see management okaying a major design change at this stage. We're under a lot of pressure to get this built on time. Yeah, but at the end of the day, this is about safety. We need to report this issue so the design team can figure something out. We need to report this issue so the design team can figure something out. The engineer nods and turns to leave, and Craig begins shutting down the simulator.

As alarming as the stall was, Craig's not really worried. He knows that Boeing executives have been adamant about keeping the MAX 8 on schedule and under budget. But he also knows that Boeing has a long history of prioritizing safety above all else. In the end, Craig trusts they'll do the right thing and make sure the MAX 8 is as safe and reliable as every other Boeing in the air. Get ready for Las Vegas-style action at BetMGM, the king of online casinos. Enjoy casino games at your fingertips with the same Vegas strip excitement MGM is famous for when you play classics like MGM Grand Millions or popular games like Blackjack, Baccarat, and Roulette. With our ever-growing library of digital slot games, a large selection

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If you have any questions or concerns about your gambling or someone close to you, please contact ConnexOntario at 1-866-531-2600 to speak to an advisor, free of charge. BetMGM operates pursuant to an operating agreement with iGaming Ontario. In the past decade, Boeing has been involved in a series of scandals and deadly crashes that have dented its once sterling reputation. At the center of it all, the 737 MAX. The latest season of Business Wars explores how Boeing allowed things to turn deadly and what, if anything, can save the company's reputation. Make sure to listen to Business Wars wherever you get your podcasts. From Wondery, I'm Lindsey Graham, and this is American Scandal.

For decades, Boeing was viewed as one of the most trustworthy and reliable companies in the world. Time and again, company leaders chose to prioritize safety over profits. And those choices earned them the loyalty of both airlines and pilots. But Boeing's culture started to change in 1997 when they merged with rival airplane manufacturer McDonnell Douglas. The new leadership team soon prioritized stock price over everything else. So in 2010, when Boeing's European rival Airbus

announced production of a new aircraft that directly threatened Boeing's best-selling plane, the 737, Boeing executives knew they had to respond quickly. Soon, the company was at work on a redesigned 737 that had to meet two specific requirements. The new plane needed to be more fuel-efficient, and pilots needed to be able to fly it without any additional training. But to meet both of these goals quickly and cheaply, compromises had to be made. And some of those compromises would have unforeseen consequences. This is Episode 3,

Point of Failure. It's 2012 outside Seattle, Washington. Chief Test Pilot Ray Craig is sitting in a conference room at the 737 Design Headquarters, watching as a team of engineers funnels in and takes their seats at a long table. As he waits for the meeting to begin, Craig looks up at the giant countdown clock above him, methodically ticking down to the MAX 8's first flight. Boeing managers install the clock to make sure nobody forgets that finishing this plane on schedule is top priority. And that's why the mood in the room feels so tense right now. Craig and several 737 engineers have been called in today to figure out what to do about the MAX 8's pitch problem. And when the lead engineer kicks off the meeting, he says that they all know why they're here.

The wind tunnel and simulator tests have revealed a problem with the MAX. The wind tunnel and simulator tests have revealed a problem with the MAX. In certain situations, the nose of the plane will pitch up too steeply, causing the MAX to stall. The reason why this is happening is because of where the new, bigger engines have been placed, in front of the wings rather than under them. But they can't move the engines. They need to come up with another solution. An engineer at the end of the table raises his hand and suggests they focus on redesigning the tail. Other engineers chime in with more thoughts and suggestions,

but after some discussion, they all agree that a new tail would be the best way to fix the issue. Craig glances over at the Boeing manager seated in the back, and they don't look pleased. Redesigning the tail at this stage would be an expensive change. And it would definitely put the plane behind schedule. So one of the managers asks if the engineers are sure they've exhausted all possible options. And for a moment, the engineers sit quietly, unsure how to respond. But then one pipes up, saying there's a piece of software that might be able to help. This software was developed for one of Boeing's military planes.

It takes readings from the plane's angle of attack sensors and the accelerometer, which measures g-forces on the plane. If those sensors indicate the nose is pitching up too much, the software moves the horizontal stabilizer at the back of the plane to push the nose back down. It's called the Maneuvering Characteristic Augmentation System, or MCAS. After some discussion, the group of engineers agrees that MCAS could work, and installing software would certainly be cheaper and quicker than redesigning the tail. But Craig interjects, saying he wants it on record that as a pilot,

he prefers a hardware fix to a software one. He'd rather fly a plane that's aerodynamically sound, not one that's dependent on some lines of computer code. Everyone in the room notes his objection, but the engineers point out that the MCAS software would only activate during high-speed maneuvers generating a lot of g-forces. For commercial pilots, such maneuvers would be extremely rare, what's known in industry jargon as outside the normal flight envelope. And at that point, most pilots would probably appreciate or even need an automated system that could help prevent a stall. So with the manager's approvals, the engineers agree on installing MCAS in the 737

MAX 8. Craig leaves the room with mixed feelings. It's not the choice he would have made, but it does fit with the kind of company Boeing is now. Plus, he reminds himself that MCAS relies on two sets of sensors, the accelerometer and the angle of attack sensors, both of which have to indicate that the plane is pitching up too high before the system would activate. So as long as that redundancy is built in, MCAS should operate safely. That is, if the FAA approves it. Installing MCAS on the 737 MAX may be the cheapest and simplest solution to the plane's pitching problem. But since the software has never been installed on a 737 before, it's possible that the Federal Aviation Administration will consider it a new feature.

And for Boeing, that would be a disaster. The FAA might mandate simulator training for pilots, and Boeing has explicitly promised its airline customers that the MAX will not require any additional training. In fact, because pilot training is so expensive, that's one of the main selling points for the plane. Boeing has been so bullish about this point that if training is needed, they've promised to pay their biggest customer, Southwest Airlines, $1 million per plane ordered

to cover the cost. But redesigning the tail, one of the only other ways to fix the pitch problem, is itself expensive and risky. So Boeing executives decide to move forward with a software fix, knowing that when the time comes, they'll need to convince the FAA that MCAS is a tweak, not an entirely new feature. But not long after Boeing decides to install MCAS on its new 737s, they face another problem that could bring increased regulatory scrutiny. On January 7, 2013, one of Boeing's newest planes, a 787 Dreamliner, catches on fire at Boston's Logan Airport.

The plane is empty at the time, and firefighters quickly put out the flames. But the incident makes headlines. Investigators determined that the fire was caused by an overheating lithium-ion battery in the plane's auxiliary power unit. It's the kind of discovery that could prove to be a major setback for the Dreamliner, which has only recently entered service. So Boeing CEO Jim McNerney calls the head of the FAA, Michael Huerta, to discuss the issue. Soon after, the FAA holds a press conference assuring the public that the Dreamliner is safe. But just one week later, Boeing CEO McNerney gets more bad news.

It's the evening of January 15, 2013, and he's at his home in an affluent Chicago suburb, preparing to cook dinner when his phone starts vibrating. McNerney answers, and a Boeing official says he's sorry to bother him at this hour, but they're getting reports of another Dreamliner fire. This one happened on an all-Nippon Airlines flight traveling from Osaka to Tokyo while it was in the air. McNerney is horrified and asks if everyone's okay, and is relieved to learn that thankfully, the pilot diverted to the nearest airport, and all passengers and crew were able to evacuate safely. But it does

appear that the problem is another lithium-ion battery fire. The pilots reported seeing a warning light about the battery in the cockpit right before they started smelling smoke. McNerney paces his kitchen, wondering how Boeing should respond. But then he gets even worse news. Both Japan Airways and All Nippon have grounded all of their new 787 Dreamliners. McNerney takes a deep breath, knowing that this would tank Boeing's stock. Shifting to damage control mode, he asks to set up another call with Michael Huerta, the head of the FAA. McNerney needs Huerta to understand that there's no reason to think that this is a systemic issue. to understand that there's no reason to think that this is a systemic issue.

It could be just two flukes in a row, and it would be unwise to do something as rash as grounding the entire fleet, especially since the FAA has never grounded a Boeing plane before. The next morning, when Jim McNerney gets on the phone with Michael Huerta, he's relieved to hear that Huerta agrees with him. This kind of battery fire is rare, and the 787 should keep flying. But on January 17, 2013, only two days after the All-in-the-Pond Airlines fire, the Transportation Secretary overrules Huerta's decision and orders the FAA to ground all Dreamliners immediately.

When McNerney calls to complain, the Transportation Secretary doesn't budge. He tells McNerney that he won't let the Dreamliner fly again until Boeing can guarantee that the problem has been fixed. McNerney is furious, but there's nothing he can do. And while Boeing works on fixing problematic batteries, the National Transportation Safety Board launches an investigation to figure out how the batteries made it through the plane's certification process to begin with. They soon discover that an FAA engineer had actually flagged the batteries as a potential

fire hazard. Lithium-ion batteries are known to overheat, sometimes to the point of bursting into flames. So the engineers suggested building an enclosure around the battery that would vent heat outside of the plane and reduce the risk of fire. The National Transportation Safety Board then wonders why the FAA didn't require Boeing to make this change to the design. And they discover that just as the culture at Boeing had been shifting over the past several years, so had the culture at the FAA. Founded in 1958, the Federal Aviation Administration has always had conflicting roles. On one hand, its job is to ensure safety, but on the other, it's supposed to help the aviation industry grow.

For decades, the FAA balanced these roles. But starting in the 1990s, changes were made that seemed to favor their role as industry advocate rather than industry watchdog. In 1996, Congress passed a law that tied FAA employee compensation to performance metrics, including how efficiently or quickly they moved planes through the certification process. This was part of a wave of legislation

throughout the 80s and 90s aimed at minimizing the role of the federal government in favor of private business and commerce. And in 2005, another law was enacted that gave the airlines and manufacturers more authority to regulate themselves. Airplane makers always had deputies embedded within the FAA to help government engineers understand the plane's designs. But after 2005, those deputies embedded within the FAA to help government engineers understand the plane's designs. But after 2005, those deputies were granted more power. So when the FAA engineer flagged that there might be a battery issue in the Dreamliner, his concern was sent to one of Boeing's deputies at the FAA.

That deputy decided that the risk of fire was small enough that Boeing didn't need to change the design, and that was the end of it. But now, after the National Transportation Safety Board concludes their investigation, they decide to issue two citations. One to Boeing for failing to adequately test the battery, and one to the FAA for not properly supervising the company. After the NTSB report comes out, Congress then holds a series of

hearings to determine if the FAA needs to be reformed. Ultimately, nothing happens, but Boeing executives start to worry that in the wake of the Dreamliner scandal, the FAA might be inclined to take a closer look at the 737 MAX 8. Still, the company sticks with its decision to downplay the Max's new MCAS software. They decide to present MCAS as a tweak to the existing electronic control system and nothing more. Their hope is the FAA won't ask too many questions. But after installing the new software, engineers working on the Max 8 start to see some problems with MCAS. And in 2014, one young employee named Curtis Eubank decides he

can't keep quiet about it. Eubank is in his late 20s, and he's only been at Boeing for a few years, but he's a true aeronautical nerd at heart. In college, he worked on a rocket that set a record for reaching the highest altitude ever by a student-built device. So when he sees a potential catastrophic problem with how MCAS works, he trusts his gut and asks for a meeting-built device. So when he sees a potential catastrophic problem with how MCAS works, he trusts his gut and asks for a meeting with his manager. On the day of the scheduled meeting, Eubank feels a slight buzz of nerves. It seems like raising concerns

is not something Boeing's engineers are being encouraged to do anymore, but Eubanks thinks this issue is important enough to break company norms. He knocks on the office door, and his manager calls him in. Hey, Curtis, come on in, have a seat. Thanks, and thanks for agreeing to meet with me. Yeah, no problem. What's on your mind? Well, I've been thinking a lot about MCAS. I have some concerns. Oh, what kind of concerns? It just worries me that it's so reliant on the angle of attack sensors.

I mean, they're so vulnerable, easily damaged. What happens if a broken angle of attack sensor causes MCAS to kick in when the plane is installed? Well, there is a way to turn it off. Yeah, but shouldn't we have a built-in backup system to avoid the error in the first place? Well, I'm not sure that's necessary. MCAS is designed to kick in only if the accelerometer also registers the right level of g-force. It won't happen just based on the angle of attack data. But more redundancy is always better than less, right?

Generally speaking, yeah. Well, I was thinking, maybe we could load the MAX with the same synthetic airspeed software that's on the Dreamlayer. I mean, its whole function is to compare values from several sensors. And if one is out of alignment with the rest, it deactivates that sensor. Well, you know, that's not a bad idea, but we don't even know if synthetic airspeed would work on the MAX. I mean, the Dreamliner has sensors, the MAX just doesn't. But we could test it, make adjustments if needed. Yeah, yeah, but at what cost? I mean, really? All that additional work could put us over budget and behind schedule. Not to mention, it might require pilot training. These are all things we need to avoid. Well, it's worth looking

into, isn't it? I mean, we can't... Look, look, look. I don't think you understand. The way things are around here, someone's going to have to die before Boeing changes things. Eubank is stunned into silence. He knew that Boeing had become increasingly cost-conscious and that safety was not the priority it once was, but he's never heard it laid out in such stark terms before. For the first time, Eubank now truly believes that Boeing is gambling with passenger lives. I'm Jake Warren, and in our first season of Finding,

I set out on a very personal quest to find the woman who saved my mum's life. You can listen to Finding Natasha right now exclusively on Wondery+. In season two, I found myself caught up in a new journey to help someone I've never even met. But a couple of years ago, I came across a social media post by a person named Loti. It read in part, Three years ago today that I

attempted to jump off this bridge but this wasn't my time to go. A gentleman named Andy saved my life. I still haven't found him. This is a story that I came across purely by chance but it instantly moved me and it's taken me to a place where I've had to consider some deeper issues around mental health. This is season two of Finding, and this time, if all goes to plan, we'll be finding Andy. You can listen to Finding Andy and Finding Natasha exclusively and ad-free on Wondery Plus. Join Wondery Plus in the Wondery app, Apple Podcasts, or Spotify. He was hip-hop's biggest mogul, the man who redefined fame, fortune, and the music industry. Diddy built an empire and lived a life most people only dream about. But just as quickly as his empire rose,

it came crashing down. Today, I'm announcing the unsealing of a three-count indictment, charging Sean Combs with racketeering conspiracy, sex trafficking, interstate transportation for prostitution. I was f***ed up. I hit rock bottom, but I made no excuses. I'm disgusted. I'm so sorry. Until you're wearing an orange jumpsuit, it's not real. Now it's real. From his meteoric rise to his shocking fall from grace, from law and crime, this is the rise and fall of Diddy. Listen to the rise and fall of Diddy exclusively with Wondery Plus. At the beginning of 2015, many engineers at Boeing are feeling disillusioned. They believe that their concerns over rushed production timelines and quick-fix solutions like MCAS are being ignored by the company's stock price-obsessed leadership.

So when CEO Jim McNerney announces that he's planning to retire and he's handing over the reins to Dennis Mullenberg, the engineers get a glimmer of hope that the company's culture might change. Mullenberg is an engineer himself who worked his way up under Boeing's old guard and seems well-positioned to return the company to its roots. But when Mullenberg officially takes over as CEO, he continues the cost-cutting practices of his predecessors. In Mullenberg's first year in charge, Boeing cuts its workforce by 7%, including jobs on the Flight Crew Operations team, which looks for flaws in the way pilots fly the planes. Meanwhile, work progresses on the 737 MAX,

and for Mark Fortner, that means shepherding the new plane through the FAA certification process. Fortner is part of Boeing's Flight Technical and Safety Team, the division that writes the manuals for new planes. Before coming to Boeing, he served as a pilot in the Air Force, and that mission-oriented spirit is still strong with him. Right now, his mission is clear. He needs the FAA to sign off on the new plane without requiring additional training for its pilots. The person in charge of FAA certification is Stacey Klein. She's also an experienced pilot, but she doesn't have an extensive engineering background,

and Fortner and the technical team decide they'll use that to their advantage. So when Klein visits Boeing Systems Integration Lab in Seattle in May of 2015, Fortner and his team bring her into a conference room for a presentation. A screen at the front of the room is showing a PowerPoint on the flight mechanics of the MAX. One of Fortner's colleagues pours Klein a glass of water, and as he slides it in front of her, Faulkner hears him remind Klein that Boeing wants to make sure that no additional simulator training is needed for pilots. He also says any pilot who flew the last iteration of the 737 should be able to fly the MAX after just a few hours of

orientation on an iPad. Klein nods. She understands Boeing's goal, but says she wants to make the best decision for the safety of the passengers. Then, once everyone's settled, one of the engineers moves to the front of the room and tells Klein that the team wants to lead her through the data. The lights go down, the screen illuminates, and then one after another,

the engineers stand up and talk her through their charts in sentences crammed so full of jargon that even Fortner isn't quite sure what they're saying. So he sneaks a look at Klein. The image that comes to his mind is of a dog watching TV. She's staring at each graph the engineers present to her with intense concentration, but Fortner doesn't think she understands much, which is exactly how they planned it. but Faulkner doesn't think she understands much, which is exactly how they planned it. When the demonstration is over, Faulkner walks Klein to the exit and asks her if she knows which way she's leaning yet.

Klein refused to answer and says she needs to take time to evaluate all the information. But if this meeting isn't enough to confuse her into a submission, Faulkner knows there are many more to come and Boeing can bury her in data. mission, Fortner knows there are many more to come, and Boeing can bury her in data. In January 2016, the 737 MAX 8 makes its first official test flight. It's a huge milestone in the development of a plane, and it goes off without a hitch. But there are still many challenges ahead. Over the next several months, a team of test pilots push the plane to its limits. They take it through tight turns, steep ascents, and try to create stalls. In the back of the plane, engineers sit hunched over computer screens that display data about the

plane's performance. They're surrounded by barrels of water, which are emptied or filled and shifted around the cabin between each test flight to represent the weight of passengers. The pilots and engineers also test the MCAS software, and it works as expected, forcing the plane's nose down to prevent stalls at high speeds. But about a month into testing, they discover a problem. The MAX 8's nose also has a tendency to pitch up at low speeds, including during takeoff. So now, instead of having an issue that occurs only in rare situations, the MAX 8 has an issue that could occur every time it gets in the air. What's worse, MCAS was specifically designed not to activate at low speeds.

So during takeoff, it won't do anything to help prevent a stall. Boeing knows the FAA will never certify a plane with a problem of this magnitude. They also know that at this late stage, updating the design would mean months, if not years, of delays. So, again, it falls to Boeing's engineers to figure out a solution that will keep the plane on schedule and under budget. Working quickly in March 2016, these engineers decide that the easiest solution is to expand the scenarios when MCAS can kick in. Now, instead of activating only in high-speed situations, MCAS will also activate at low speed to prevent the plane from stalling during takeoff. But the change has an

unintended consequence. Because the accelerometer only measures g-forces at high speeds, its reading is not used to activate the MCAS at low speeds. In these scenarios, MCAS will activate off the angle-of-attack sensors alone. Following these adjustments, Boeing enlists its test pilots to figure out how MCAS responds to bad data from faulty sensors, knowing that angle-of-attack sensors are prone to damage. One of these test pilots is Craig Bomben. He's a graduate of the Navy's famous Top Gun program and used to fly experimental aircraft for NASA. So when he climbs into a simulator with another pilot in the spring of 2016, Bomben is as prepared for system failure as any pilot could be.

Bomben checks his instruments, then turns to his co-pilot. All right, let's confirm. Today's simulation is to test a runaway stabilizer scenario caused by failure or loss of both angle attack sensors and a bad MCAS activation. Yep, that's my understanding. Are you ready? I'm ready. Let's take her up. Through their simulated windshield, a video screen shows the ground receding beneath them. Then after a few seconds, MCAS kicks in, pushing the nose down. Bombin grips the controls. Okay, here we go. We have activation. And this is strong.

My first instinct is to pull up on the control stage. Bombin pulls back on the control column, but the nose keeps diving down. Okay, this bad boy's really fighting me. Look at the trim wheel. It's spinning like crazy. Yeah, definitely a runaway stabilizer. Cut out switches? Affirmative. The co-pilot reaches down and flips two switches on the center console, turning off the electronic trim system. As soon as he does, MCAS deactivates, and Bomden is able to bring the nose of the plane back up. And there we are, back in control. How long did that take us?

Well, from the time we identified the problem, four seconds. That's not too bad. Not bad at all, and it's all following standard procedure. Yeah, but that's if they recognize what the problem is. The real question is, what happens when they don't recognize it? Well, let's rerun it and find out. The co-pilot switches the electronic trim system back on, and Bomben pulls back on the controls, taking the simulator into another climb.

Once again, MCAS activates it, but this time the co-pilot does not reach for the cutout switches. Bomben yanks back on the controls with all his might. God, I'm still losing altitude. How much longer? Six seconds. Five, four, three. MCAS should switch off automatically after ten seconds

to prevent the plane from going into an unstoppable dive. And right on cue, it turns off. Oh, that was not fun. But, you know, it's workable. But then, just seconds later, Bauman feels the nose of the plane dipping down again. Oh, son of a... MCAS is firing again. All right, hit the switches. The co-pilot does as he's told, and the plane dipping down again. Oh, son of MCAS is firing again. All right, hit the switches.

The co-pilot does as he's told, and the simulator levels off again. Bauman shakes his head. Too faulty angle of attack sensors, and it looks like MCAS is just going to keep firing until the pilot switches over to manual. That's not great. No, but any pilot worth of assault should recognize what's happening and go through the procedure for a runaway stabilizer, certainly before MCAS fires a second time.

After shutting it down, Bombin and his co-pilots step out of the simulator and head off to write up their findings. And by June, from the reports of Bombin and other test pilots, engineers working on the MAX 8 are aware that a faulty, recurring MCAS activations are a potential problem. Still, they remain convinced that it's nothing the average 737 pilot can't handle. One engineer even writes in an email, I don't think this is a safety issue other than the pilot could fight the MCAS input

and over time find themselves in a large mistrin. No one seems to acknowledge that during takeoff, when a plane is at a relatively low altitude, a large mistrin could result in a catastrophic crash. On January 5, 2024, an Alaska Airlines door plug tore away mid-flight, leaving a gaping hole in the side of a plane that carried 171 passengers. This heart-stopping incident was just the latest in a string of crises surrounding the aviation manufacturing giant, Boeing.

In the past decade, Boeing has been involved in a series of damning scandals and deadly crashes that have chipped away at its once sterling reputation. At the center of it all, the 737 MAX, the latest season of business wars, explores how Boeing, once the gold standard of aviation engineering Descended into a nightmare of safety concerns and public mistrust the decisions denials and devastating Consequences bringing the titan to its knees and what if anything can save the company's reputation now Follow business wars on the Wondery app or wherever you get your podcasts You can binge business wars the unraveling of Boeing early and ad-free right now on the Wondery app or wherever you get your podcasts. You can binge Business Wars, The Unraveling of Boeing, early and ad-free right now on Wondery Plus.

In the summer of 2016, Boeing appears to be on track to release the 737 MAX 8 on schedule. In August, the plane completes the last of its safety tests, including nearly 300 certification flights. The same month, the FAA approves Boeing's training plan. Pilots who flew the previous generation of 737s can fly the MAX after just a few hours of training on an iPad. No costly time in flight simulators will be required. For Mark Fortner and his colleagues in the Flight Technical and Safety Department, this training approval is a massive coup. In a text conversation with one of his friends, Fortner brags that he Jedi-mind-tricked the FAA

into giving Boeing the training requirements it wanted. But Fortner's tune changes when, just a few months later, he learns that MCAS is now also activating at low speeds. No one at Boeing had told him about the change. Now Forkner wonders about the system's safety and worries that he unknowingly lied to the FAA since he told them that MCAS only fires at high speeds. But ultimately,

Fortner remains silent about his concerns. When a representative from Lion Air contacts Fortner to request MAX simulator training for their pilots, Fortner even goes out of his way to convince them that such training is unnecessary. In an email to a colleague, he dismisses Lion Air, calling them idiots. And in July 2017, four months after the FAA officially certifies the MAX 8, Lion Air becomes the first airline in the world to put the new planes into service. And just over a year later, by October of 2018, they have 11 MAX 8s operating in their fleet. But on October 28th, something goes wrong with one of those planes. That night, after flying the plane from Bali to Jakarta,

the Lion Air captain finds a maintenance worker and tells him that something very odd happened on the flight. The captain says that the takeoff started normally, but after a few seconds, his control column started shaking and several alarms started blaring in the cockpit. At first, the captain thought they had a flight control problem, but when he looked over at his co-pilot, he noticed that his control column was not shaking. The captain knew that meant there was some kind of

sensor failure on his side of the plane, so he transferred control of the plane to the co-pilot, and at first, that seemed to work. But then, without warning, the plane suddenly lurched downward. It happened so fast and with such force that the captain heard passengers screaming in the back. The co-pilot tried to bring the plane up, but it was as if a ghost had taken the controls. Over and over, the plane pushed itself down. While the co-pilot struggled to bring the nose back up, the captain looked through the MAX 8's quick reference handbook, trying to find a checklist for what to do in this situation. But with all the alarms blaring and the plane bucking in midair,

it was nearly impossible to read. Hearing this story, the maintenance worker leans forward and asks the captain how in the world they were able to correct it. Captain says that fortunately there was a third pilot in the cockpit who happened to be hitching third pilot in the cockpit who happened to be hitching a ride in the jump seat. He noticed that the trim wheel was turning like crazy and suggested that the captain cut the electronic trim. He did, and suddenly the plane stopped pitching down. Everything went back to normal. The rest of the trip was uneventful,

but the captain is still on edge. He's never felt anything like that in a plane before. The captain then hands over his flight log and asks the mechanic to check the plane's sensors and electronic trim system to try and figure out what happened. The mechanic assures him that he will. But that night, as the maintenance crew reviews the captain's logbook, for some reason the only issue it mentions is that three warning lights had gone off. There's no written record of the extreme runaway trim, nor any mention of the captain's theory about a failed sensor on the left side of the plane. It's unknown if the captain thought that verbally telling the maintenance worker would suffice as an official report, or if he

did produce a written report that somehow got lost or destroyed. Logs do show that the crew back in Bali, where the plane originated, had replaced the left angled attack sensor earlier in the day, but the captain didn't report any warnings coming from that sensor, so the maintenance crew in Jakarta didn't check it. Instead, they ran basic tests, cleared the logs, and followed the procedures to check the warning lights the captain did report. The crew decides there's no reason to hold the plane, so they power it down for the night. And then the following morning, October 29, 2018, the plane is ready for Flight 610 from Jakarta to Pangkal, Penang. That morning, while the sky is still dark, Flight 610's captain, Bhavye Sunejauneja eats breakfast with his wife Garima Sethi.

He promises to call her when he lands as part of their usual routine and then kisses her goodbye. Captain Suneja and his first officer Harvino rendezvous at the airport and begin their pre-flight checklist just as the sun is starting to come up. list just as the sun is starting to come up. Suneja checks the plane's maintenance logs and sees that three warning lights came on during the prior flight, but he's not concerned because he sees that all three were cleared by the maintenance crew. Then, at 6.20 a.m., Suneja eases the plane down the runway. He pulls back on the control column and the plane lifts off. But only a minute after the plane is in the air, his control column begins to vibrate in his hands. Alarms go off, warning of disagreement in the sensors reading altitude and speed. Sunaja's co-pilot Harvino looks at him with concern. You want me to take over?

My side's not shaking. No. Get on the radio. Ask for a holding altitude so we can figure out what's going on. Arvino picks up the radio. This is LNI-610, second in command, requesting approval for holding altitude. What's the problem? We have a flight control problem. What's the intended altitude? 5,000. LNI-610, you are cleared for 5,000 feet.

Suneja takes the plane higher and continues to follow standard takeoff procedure. All right, we're at 2,150 feet. Retract wing flaps. Copy. Retracting wing flaps. But suddenly, the plane plunges down sharply. Suneja pulls back on the control column to haul the plane back up. What was that? We just dropped 700 feet. I don't know. Extend the wing flaps. Copy. Wing flaps extended. The plane calms down, and Suneja resumes his ascent towards 5,000 feet. But just when he feels he has a moment to think, a new warning light flashes to life. Overspeed warning. We're going too fast for this altitude. Retract wing flaps. Copy. Retracting wing flaps. Oh, and hang on. I don't know if we're going to plunge again once those flaps are retracted like last time. Marvino hits the switch that retracts the wing flaps, and the plane

immediately plunges down. But this time, Suneja is ready for it. He hits a thumb switch on his control column, which manually controls the stabilizer responsible for pitching the plane's nose up or down. Then he pulls on his controls, fighting to keep the plane steady. Okay, I think we got it figured out. But then the plane plunges again. What is going on? Why do we keep losing altitude? Go through the checklist. We need to figure out how to turn this off. Marvino grabs a handbook and starts flipping through it, trying to find anything that might explain what's happening. While he does this, the plane continues to plunge down. Suneja does his best to fight it, but it's like the plane has a mind of its own. Over and over, the nose pitches down. It takes all of Suneja's strength to pull it back up.

Have you found anything? Still looking. LNI-610, this is air traffic control. Radar shows you're descending. Arvino grabs the radio. This is LNI-610, second in command. We have a flight control problem. We are flying the plane manually. Copy LNI-610. Transferring you to arrival control for return to the airport. A second aircraft controller comes on and directs the pilots to head for a clear runway.

But Suneja is still fighting the plane. It plunges again. Suneja pulls back as hard as he can. He's sweating. His arms ache. Have you found anything? What do I do? I'm still looking.

You fly. I'll look. Suneja transfers control of the plane to Harvino, and almost immediately the plane plunges again. Harvino hits his thumb switches and wrestles it back to level. But now that Suneja isn't totally focused on keeping the plane from diving, he has time to survey his instruments. What he sees alarms him.

This is LNI 610, pilot in command. We have no accurate readings of altitude. All instruments are in disagreement. We need the altitude blocked 3,000 feet above and below us for traffic avoidance. LNI 610 received. Blocking altitude 3,000 feet above and below. Sune avoidance. LNI 610 received. Blocking altitude 3,000 feet above and below. Suneja goes back to the checklists, but in the co-pilot seat, Harvino struggles to control the plane as it dives down steeper and steeper. LNI 610, this is ATC. Do you read?

But Harvino and Suneja don't respond. They're too busy trying to control the plane. It won't come back up. All right, I'll take over. Suneja hauls back on the control column as hard as he can, but it's too late. The momentum of the plane cannot be fought. Low-altitude alarms begin to blare. And through the window, Suneja can see the ocean

directly ahead, barreling toward them. They're flying almost straight down, and there's nothing he can do to stop it. The last thing Captain Babia Suneja hears is his co-pilot repeating a Muslim prayer. Then, at 500 miles per hour, his Boeing 737 MAX 8 crashes into the Indian Ocean. From Wondery, this is Episode 3 of Boeing for American Skin.

In our next episode, journalists, politicians, and family members of victims band together to hold Boeing accountable. If you're enjoying American Scandal, you can unlock exclusive seasons on Wondery Plus. Binge new seasons first and listen completely ad-free when you join Wondery Plus in the Wondery app, Apple Podcasts, or Spotify. And before you go, tell us about yourself by filling out a survey at wondery.com slash survey. If you'd like to learn more about Boeing and the 737 MAX 8, we recommend the book Flying Blind by Peter Robinson and the article

What Really Brought Down the Boeing 737 MAX by William Langerweiss published by the New York Times Magazine. This episode contains reenactments and dramatized details. And while in most cases we can't know exactly what was said,

all our dramatizations are based on historical research. American Scandal is hosted, edited, and executive produced by me, Lindsey Graham, for Airship. Audio editing by Christian Paraga. Sound design by Gabriel Gould. Music by Lindsey Graham. This episode is written by Austin Rackless.

Edited by Emma Cortland. Fact-checking by Alyssa Jung-Perry. Produced by John Reed. Managing producer, Olivia Fonte. Senior producer, Andy Herman. Development by Stephanie Jens Executive Producers are Jenny Lauer-Beckman, Marsha Louis, and Erin O'Flaherty

for Wondery.