American Thought Leaders - Here’s What People Get Wrong About Modern Warfare | John Spencer

Episode Date: September 5, 2026

Underground and urban warfare have become the decisive battlegrounds of modern warfare, yet for a long time, military doctrine has been built to avoid both, said John Spencer, a retired U.S. Army major and chair of Urban Warfare Studies at West Point’s Modern War Institute.He’s repeatedly embedded himself in active war zones, from Gaza to Ukraine, and personally walked through the nearly two-mile-long Hamas tunnel, wide enough to drive a truck through, that led from Gaza City right up to the Israel-Gaza border wall.A leading expert on urban and underground warfare, he argues that subterranean warfare is spreading globally. He also argues that enemies of the West have deliberately weaponized the laws of war itself, using civilians as shields.How can democratic nations defend themselves when non-state actors intentionally weaponize civilian deaths to create political leverage? How are manipulated statistics and social media disinformation warping the public’s understanding of modern-day battlefield realities? And what do we keep getting wrong about modern warfare?Spencer is the author of the new book “Twenty Times I Almost Died: Life Lessons from the Edge of Survival.”Views expressed in this video are opinions of the host and the guest and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times.

The laws of war aren't a suicide pack. They aren't meant to handcuff every nation of the world and to outlaw war. War is not illegal. It is reserved for very special cases, like self-defense. John Spencer is a retired U.S. Army major, a combat veteran, and a leading global scholar on urban warfare. He recently wrote a book titled,

20 Times I Almost Died, Life Lessons from the Edge of Survival. Name the war, you're probably going to mention a city, As a battle we remember from World War II, Civil War, American Revolution, you name it. You're going to talk about a city fight because that's where the decisive battles are. He joins me to discuss the intricacies of modern warfare, whether just war is possible today, and what people often get wrong when thinking about war. The Genocide Convention is two pages long. Everybody can read it, but they just want somebody to tell them what it says. This is American Thought Leaders, and I'm Yanya Kellick.

John Spencer, such a pleasure to have you on American Thought Leaders. Oh, thanks for having me. You open your book, which is about all these ways that you almost died, among other things and lessons from them, with a descent into a large tunnel, with nobody attacking. And tell me a little bit about that experience and what it taught you because I thought it was profound. Sure. So it starts about 150 meters underground deep in green. Gaza actually and you're right on the surface is like well you weren't really facing death although sometimes people are facing danger they just don't know it so there was a little bit of

a blissfulness of the people around me as there were two IDF soldiers standing in front of us as we went into the opening of this tunnel but i knowing underground warfare life that i've studied that what the soldiers were guarding was the abyss forward of us that they had not cleared that went all the way back to enemy-held territory or Hamas-held territories. This is early in the Israel-Hamas war. I think it was December of 2023, so right after the October 7th attack. But what it taught me was one that it was a dangerous environment because of being in tunnels just the air you're breathing and the contaminants.

Tell me a little bit about this time. This was a very unusual one by your estimation. Absolutely. It was one that was found that, The idea I found quickly after the attack that was an invasion tunnel that led right up to the Israel-Ghasa border wall. It was called the Erez Tunnel. So it was almost two miles long. It went from the right 100 meters really from the wall all the way back to Gaza City.

It was more like one of the tunnels I've been into, like in North Korea, the invasion tunnels they found there, where you actually could drive a truck through this one. So just this massive tunnel. And I talk about in the chapter the investment that had to go into building this thing. It had lights, comma wire, of course, all the oxygen needed to not only breathe, but to drive a truck down and understanding underground warfare. I understood that. Every one of my stories is a lesson. And what was really really hit me on being in that tunnel with a few other people actually.

Interesting people that didn't know what they were signing up for, like Deborah Mezzing, from Will & Grace that was there. are with us was that some of these things you can't understand, and that's the story of all my war studies, unless you go walk the ground. So to really get a grasp of the over 600 miles of tunnels at Hamas built, there were a lot different, ones like the ones that I was in that day or other days, some small, some large, that one was very unique that it was meant to flow massive amounts of fighters and vehicles up to the border wall for an October 7th-style invasion. although they didn't use it on the October 7th attack. How is it that you became, I guess, one of the preeminent experts in tunnel warfare of all things?

Some of it's a bit of nobody else is doing it. People consider me the world's leading expert in urban warfare and an leading scholar in underground warfare. It's a really interesting, almost PhD student dreamed to be in a field that there's very few other people doing. So over a decade of studying urban warfare and underground warfare and writing books and articles about it, but also traveling the world doing it, it's the scholarship that builds that expertise. And when we created the Modern War Institute at West Point, which I helped create, I started to really focus on that. Actually, I was in a Pentagon project where I was an advisor to a Forest Guard General who told us, go look at something that we're not thinking about.

And it was urban warfare, and that was back in 2014. So I caught the bug, but also found that I'm an academic, I'm a war scholar by the very nature of it, to find something that nobody else is doing. So it's really shocking when you dig into it. Like, where is the body of knowledge, the repository, the experts in both urban and underground? There's very few. I, of course, love the study of it and the history of it. And really, it's the present and the future.

Even if you look at underground in Iran and the challenges of attacking Iran sites, really around the world, even Russia, Ukraine, they're going underground, building bigger and bigger underground because the surface is so dangerous. But I got into it over a decade ago starting to study it. Is the reason there's so few people studying this is to actually do it on the ground, to speak, is risky? Is that the reason or why? It's a great question. And we've, back into the 2014, when we started studying it for the general, like, why isn't there a center, school, books?

Because it seems like something that's been on the rise massively, right? This urban and underground warfare. Absolutely. I've found many reasons. Sometimes the enemy is ourselves. One of the reasons that there is no true, I think, great body of experts is that militaries don't want to fight in cities, militaries don't want to fight underground. So they avoid it and actually we used to write into our books avoid and bypass all urban areas and it makes sense. But as the world grew as in population growth, urbanization but also even asymmetric enemies, when you rise in your strength somebody tries to find an asymmetric advantage and a lot

of this, especially non-state actors like Hamas and others, move into the urban areas and use the urban areas defensive nature, but also the civilian population to their advantage. So you just see it increasing around the world, but also even in places like Ukraine where the Battle of Kiev in the 1940s is the largest encirclement in military history. But it was a much smaller city than when Russia tries to attack in 2022.

It's grown, the nature of where the peri-urban is. It all changed. But really, the big, reason. I mean, I have a lot of job security because no matter how many people I tell, from Congress to other militaries, is they just won't dedicate people to studying and training for it, which is really weird if that's where all the fighting is occurring. Even in, I mean, name the war, you're probably going to mention a city as a battle we remember from World War II, Civil War, I mean, American Revolution, you name it. You're going to talk about a city fight because

that's where the decisive battles are. But there's a cultural aspect of people's thoughts about war or even militaries. They plan for these big battles in the open, which does happen, like trench warfare going on, Ukraine and Russia, but those decisive battles are happening in the cities. I want to dig into this a little more because it is really quite astonishing, you know, especially since these, you know, terror-type actors that use the civilian populations as kind of shields, they don't care about them as much as, you know, let's say the Western force, which has some kind of, I guess, you know, moral boundary there.

I mean, this seems, is it true that this has become more and more prevalent? And that's, is that the reason it's happening more and more in cities, aside from just their expansion? Yeah, absolutely. I mean, even if we take the last 30 or 40 years, I mean, non-state actors like Al-Qaeda, ISIS, Hamas, others, using human shields, although Hamas is a very unique version of a human sacrifice, as their goal is to actually get their people kill according to them.

They need civilian deaths to achieve their political goals. You say according to them, just spell that out for me. How come according to them? The Hamas leadership, whether it was Hania, Sinwar, or others, the ones are giving the orders, have many public statements. And actually even recently, saying they need the blood of their women, children, and elderly to achieve their goals. They said they not only want it, they need it to achieve this goal of theirs in the afterlife, right, martyrdom and everything. So it's a really sick political strategy.

I mean, we haven't seen it. I mean, even the Japanese, the Nazis, nobody, while they accepted civilian casualties, that wasn't their strategy, was to get their own population killed in order to achieve this. this political goal in the afterlife. So that's why I say in their words, because it's their public statements that anybody can reference that they have this human sacrifice strategy.

And of course, their actions, right? There's 600 miles of tunnels in Gaza as one example. There's a 2.2 million people there. All of them could fit in their tunnels with ease and escape the surface, what's going on in the surface. But Hamas actually makes written and public statements saying these are not for the civilians and civilians are not allowed.

you don't see a civilian trying to get in the underground. Where if I go to Ukraine, where I've been many times, as in while we're talking, the civilians go into the subways to seek refugees from the bombings that are happening on the surface. That's a very unique thing. Why do people keep using Human Shield strategy? It is because there are those that follow the law of armed conflict. There's a history of this post-war II, forced Geneva Conventions, things that even the, All nations said we won't do this anymore.

We won't target civilians, which is one of the fundamentals of the law of war, but actually built this thing that we call lawfare, which is when a non-state actor, or a state actor actually, says, not only do I not care about the laws of war, I'm going to use them against that Western democracy that is following the laws. And that's where you get Hamas occupying hospitals, schools, mosques, all of it, because they know that those are protected sites, and that in order to strike them, there are special things that have to be done.

That's a war crime in of itself, but it's this reverse engineering of the rules of war, which I believe in, actually, that these non-state actors have done in many locations. ISIS did it as well, al-Qaeda. But there is a variation, too, of some of these non-state actors needing the population, like a Maoist, you know, fish in the sea to hide amongst the population. population, then you get into counterinsurgency theory, which is, of course, some of my experiences in Iraq, and separating the people from the population, but most people don't want to have this. Separating the people from the population, what do you mean?

So if you're engaged in urban combat, I mean, one of the goals is to, of course, one of the fundamentals of the law of war is don't target civilians. Yes. Target the enemy. Yes. And there's proportionality where there's a collateral damage assessment. In a counterinsurgency, that we have an insurgent within a population, and it may be 10% 1% of the population like we faced in Iraq.

I see. The goal is to they're relying on the population's support to hide amongst the population. So not only do you want to, of course, separate civilians, non-combatants from those that you're targeting combatants. In order to win in counterinsurgency, you'll also have to separate the insurgent from the population that it relies on for support so that they start reporting on them. They don't give them ammunition, refuge, all of these things. You know, the other thing that strikes me nowhere, I want to get back into some of the amazing lessons you have in the book, but, you know, an increasing feature, there's always been information war as part of warfare, obviously, right, messaging and so forth.

But it seems as technology has changed, as social media has risen, is the ability to kind of, I don't know, create memes, viral memes around issues and things like that has increased. that has become much more of a part of warfare. I don't know if that's actually accurate, but it seems to me like it has. And that somehow changes the dimensions about these decisions. Like if it's a counterinsurgency, how do you use the civilian population

if you are the non-state act or even state actor in some cases, in case of China or something like this? How does the information warfare war fit in here? Absolutely. I mean, it's in the book too. is one of the reasons that I've had my character tested is when I was willing to go to war zones report

on what I was seeing against what would be the popular opinion. So was I going to stand up against for the truth? And many times I've had to take personal liability almost to say the things that matter. And I think we should live in that world. You're right though. Information warfare has always been a part of war. I mean, the reason we run marathons

is because a guy was running back from a battle to explain what had happened. And even Roman times, the senators would hear how a battle is going, is Saka General, that aspect. It's always been there. But we live in a different world. And even some of the past wars, whether it was World War II, Korean War, whatever, had we had this algorithm-driven, social media, instant access to the battlefields, I think wars might have gone differently. It's a present. So that aspect of anybody fighting a war, especially in an urban area, where there's all the cell phones.

And we saw this in Gaza, where Hamas would actually create content based on what was trending and try to use that towards the other aspect of information warfare is narrative warfare. So who's controlling the narrative where I cover wars like between India and Pakistan, where what the world took from it is almost the opposite of what. what actually happened. That is a new nature of warfare that nations and populations have never had to deal with. That instant, ubiquitous, but also algorithm-driven content to where, of course, war is hell. War is awful. It's death and destruction. So to get fed the brutality of war to every phone of a population, if it's the United States, it's our population or others, and you're right, China developing the tools of information warfare in order to be able to do that to influence a population. And it's not new, right? Vietnam War, you can win every battle, but you can lose

the war. Well, so this is that I thought back as I was thinking about this. I mean, some people would argue that Vietnam was lost on the information war. And it's a, I mean, that's astonishing in a sense, right? I mean, there's many reasons that we lost. I mean, basically, you know, fighting a war where the stated goals would be hard to achieve, whether it's to stand up a nation, a legitimate nation. But Vietnam is what we call the Kronkite effect, right? So the most trusted American journalist goes to Vietnam, happened to be during what was launched as a TED Offensive and comes back and say, there's no way we can win this war. It was at the time, because he was trusted, it was a different opinion than what the government was.

government and the military was saying, I mean, the president said if we lost Cronkite, we lost the war and it was the start of that information warfare because all war is a contest of wills. That includes the two militaries fighting, the two governments, but also their population. So especially in a democracy, if the population doesn't believe that it's a just war, it's a good reason to fight it, or that there's a foreseeable way they achieve the state of the goals, going back to ancient warfare, you won't be able to continue the war. The layer that new though is that information warfare or in all the tools of social media people are talking directly to the populations a lie can spread the around the world and we've

seen this in many cases in wars today where something happens it spreads around the world as a lie on who did it what how many people died if civilians died and no matter what you do you can't put that back in the bottle and people are convinced that that's what's happened as much so as and when I thought strongly against this. The entire idea is about a war and where somebody gets driven something about a single war every day, like the false claim of Israel creating genocide in Gaza, when it's all, I've seen mountains of evidence to the opposite, literally fields of food and soldiers doing the opposite of genocide, but the world spreads it. When you mean the opposite of science, do you mean like

warning the civilian population that there's going to be action or things of this nature. What do you mean by the opposite? I mean, by the literal definition of genocide, it's trying to destroy a whole and part, a group, a religious group, all of that, both by intention and by action. So the opposite of genocide is, your intent is the opposite of destroying the people. And that's what I've seen in my now eight trips to Israel,

seven into Gaza, probably the only person outside of the IDF that's been into Gaza so much, is that I've actually interviewed all. all the political leaders, all the generals, everything, like, what are you trying to do here to answer the intent question? Are you trying to destroy the people or you're trying to get to the hostages and destroy the enemy, which is not a, you know, killing the enemy in war is sometimes the goal. It's not a war crime. The other part is the actions that you talked about. So if you can't prove the intent is to destroy all of the people of, like in this case, Gaza,

then people will look at the actions. Like, you know, in Russian, Ukraine, Russia, shields, thousands of babies and gives them the Russian parents. That's a genocidal act, according to the Genocide Convention. You can prove it through actions. And what Israel has done to try to protect civilians, right? These are those things you just mentioned that, thanks to my, you know, war scholarship before October 7th, we have, how do you prevent civilian casualties in war? It's a big field of study.

We call it civilian harm mitigation measures. And Israel has implemented more of these civilian harm mitigation measures, things trying to prevent civilians from getting hurt, like evacuations, phone calls, flyers, all of that, but also daily pauses to allow civilians to get out of harm's way, giving out their maps, tracking civilians by their cell phones, not taking airstrikes. They've actually done more of these than any military's ever tried in war, but then are accused of targeting civilians when all of the evidence, real evidence, actually there's no cases of Israel targeting civilians. Of course, there's been civilians that have died going back to our conversation

about Hamas' strategy, but also collateral damage is unfortunate. But the law says you do everything you can to minimize it. And from the genocide claim, if Israel's intent has been stated by their political and military leaders, like, we are targeting Hamas. And then all of their actions, to include putting their own soldiers at risk in order to give these notifications and take all these actions, it's the opposite of genocide. And actually has, which is a lot of people that just don't know a lot about war, it's protracted the war, what they've done. But also, you know, something can be brutal and a lot of death and also be the opposite of genocide. I think that, like, I think in our, that term has started, it's something that I've studied quite a bit as well. And I

understand, thank you for defining it. So, you know, I guess officially, because it's a very, you know, that more official definition than I've heard from most people. Of course, the war in Gaza was brutal. A lot of people did die, and they say, well, that's genocide. But you're saying something like that can still be the opposite of genocide, even though it's horrible. And of course, the Palestinian people have suffered greatly. Absolutely.

And that's why I'm fighting for not allowing the name. It's a very important classification, right? We have war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. Genocide being the ultimate, created after the Holocaust to define the worst human thing you could ever do, which is trying to eliminate an entire race, religion, you name it. I don't want that word to just be synonymous with bad. Like, war is bad. War is hell.

War is killing. It's awful. But we can't redefine a term trying to say, well, it's really bad. Yeah, it's really bad for many reasons. And I could talk for a long time about why is it so bad in Gaza? Well, Hamas prepared the ground for 20 years. They are trying to get their civilians killed. Egypt wouldn't allow the civilians out, which I've never seen in a war that I've ever studied,

where one country could save thousands by just creating a humanitarian zone outside of the main combat area that the enemy doesn't then use to its advantage. But you're right. Some people would just say, well, I mean really bad, like a number. And there's three types of lies in my work. Lies, damn lies in statistics. And I've had to try to fight against these. It's a really good book, actually, that I read in my master's degree.

That never knew I need so much. About, you know, statistics in war. Like how many people died? Who was? How many civilians died? And this has been the very unique thing that I don't want to continue to other wars where I can just say a number. And then associated to a term like genocide.

Like, okay, 70,000 people have died in Gaza, according to the Hamas, Gaza health ministry. So that means it's genocide. And that's what, as a war scholar, I don't want to see happen because that's almost a strategy for all those people that don't want to adhere to the laws of armed conflict and say, well, if we just kill enough people, then everybody will be against it and we'll achieve our goals, which is not the goal of the armed conflict either. And this is so, you know, it's interesting how our conversation is developing, but this is something, you know, I struggle with personally. because there is a lot of horror, you know, in war and so on and so forth. The point is the moment, it's almost like the sharing of that has been democratized through social media. That's not a problem.

I think that's actually a somewhat positive thing because, you know, in the past, there's a lot of this stuff could be done under shroud of secrecy and so forth. And who knows, you know, how many, you know, millions of people died and, you know, Soviet Russia and communist China. is uncountable, but it's, you know, massive and massive amounts because of that shroud of secrecy. But the flip side is that, like you said, you can, a falsehood can see, that seems very real, can be unbelievably powerful in hitting the will of a country or a very powerful ally, right, in terms of, and how to solve these things, right, becomes a lot more difficult, I guess, is that's what I'm saying, because of that, the nature of it. Yeah, this is, this is the, I mean, it gets into like the double standard.

There is, like you said, it's great. I want people to understand what are the rules of war, because I believe in them, the laws of armed conflict, especially post-war II where awful things happened so that war should be deteriored. We don't want war, but there are reasons why we do believe that war is just, like defending yourself, which I believe all wars are wars of choice. You can either choose to defend yourself like Ukraine did, and then Ukrainian stood up and said they didn't want to be Russian and they didn't want to be invaded or even Israel after October 7 saying, we're going to defend our nation. It's a choice, but there are rules because we don't want anybody's wars, the civilians being the brunt of wars.

And that's why not targeting civilians like Hamas did on October 7 is what we don't want to see. and in order to uphold that, then you have to take action to stop it, which is the danger here. I want people to understand, but we also live in this don't trust anybody kind of post-COVID world where you have interpreters of war and what they're seeing, whether it's a video going, look, clearly those people were innocent that spreads really rapidly because people want to believe certain things

or they trust podcasters or things interpreting the law of war, like about what's legal, what's not, who is a combatant, who's not, how do numbers work? That is the dangerous space again going back to, if you create a double standard for Israel and war, then it will be applied against the United States later for US. Well, I'm sure it well. Yeah. Haven't studied this long enough, I've seen it already tried with like the United States and during the two battles of Fallujah in 2004, where international, you know,

you know, human rights activists were saying that we were doing war crimes, that people were coming up with numbers of civilians that weren't true. It was like a mini situation, and it actually had repercussions on the ground, but it didn't stick as much because of, of course, the Israel kind of concept of everything they do is wrong, everything that they say is not true. Very few people actually have information. They just have access to these influencers and interpreters of. war. Tell me about your background. How is it that you got to be doing the work that you do?

Sure. I mean, the book is just a bunch of stories that I ended up putting, you know, that did shape me because I've had an amazing career. I was, some people, you know, whether it's fortunate I had 20 times almost died or unfortunate, I viewed as fortunate. I joined the Army at 17, you know, a single mom with three kids, working three jobs. There wasn't much for me after high school. Join the military. military had an amazing 25-year career from serving as a commander in Iraq twice to my education that I got in the military and then towards the end of my career as I transitioned to that into the Pentagon after working for that four-star general

started studying urban warfare but of course in the military you got to move on to your next job and I moved to West Point where I was teaching strategy and I created the Modern War Institute at West Point, which is a research center for wars. That really points to like, how did you get into this business of, I've seen more war after my military career than I did in my military career because my job is now to go into war zone, study them, and I've been, and this is many of the stories in very near-death situations by the very nature of the knowledge that I'm pursuing, which I do believe that you have to go get.

And we actually don't have war watchers anymore. We used to have them in our, just a long time ago. If you even think back to the American Civil War, there was the Germans were here, the French were here, the English were here, just observing the changing character of warfare, all of this. And for political reasons, we stopped doing it. But after I finished my military career, I continued this war research, so war scholar. But I also believe that continuing to study this urban underground warfare is really important for our own country, but I think for anybody to understand and be able to stand up, whether it's for a political leader or for in the news, to say, just so you're clear here what people are saying about what is happening is not right,

or what is the history of this operation, because then they start going back to those numbers, false statistics. of what's happening compared to anything else. That's how I got into it. A great military career, now a great post career, writing books and articles about the war zones. And I have a bunch in the pipeline right now and really exciting research. As it kind of grows on itself,

the more I study war, the more, unfortunately, there's more things to study. No, we were speaking earlier, and you were telling me you have a book coming soon about Azerbaijan and Armenia about that conflict. It's something I've been thinking about recently. I just had the ambassador on from Armenia, just talking about the impacts of this peace agreement

and this corridor created for Armenia, well, for both, for everyone, but with Armenian great interest, right? Yeah. But there's so many of these conflicts that we don't, there's so many of these conflicts that we don't, like how much do we really know about that? I mean, I followed Goro Karabakh a little bit and what happened in there, and I mean, he has to deal with that reality. Can you just tell me a little bit about what you found there?

Sure. So it was another one of these aha moments, I think, in studying wars and what we understand in the West of what's happening, it actually isn't the reality of what happened. So I became interested because there was, of course, there was a question. there was a war over this region between Azerbaijan and Armenia called Karaba. Long history is covered in the book. In the late 1990s, Armenia takes it. In 2020, though, during the COVID period, really, there's this massive war that's way undercovered. And the only thing that kind of the West takes from it is that it's a drone

war, that the new drones are the future of war. It's what won the war, all of this, and now having walked every battle of that war with almost every general and both sides understanding what happened and what it was a massive war over this region that ended and now there's a possibility for a very strong peace between the two countries in this region the book that comes out in october actually will detail unlike anything's ever before what happened in the 2020 but also there's a 2023 kind of resolution of it. And how did Azerbaijan achieve a victory? Even in Armenian, if you talked to an Armenian,

it's like, yeah, they had a victory militarily, but actually linked to strategy and the thoughts about that region and the politics of it. Fascinating case study. But for me, as an outsider, as a war scholar, is that everybody took this aspect of the drones and how did we get that wrong? through open source intelligence.

Well, just in a word, what is it where that we're going to learn? What was the reality? It wasn't drones? No, absolutely not. It was men and women on the ground, tanks, breaching, mind wire obstacles, artillery. It was a combination. Like we understand, if you understand the war, even in Ukraine,

there is not one thing that wins a war. It's actually those that have the coherence of capabilities. And having better equipment definitely helped in this. In this war, especially even for Azerbaijan, they had better equipment. But it was how they integrated everything on the battlefield, human decisions where the war could have been lost at a single moment, human decisions that led to a breakthrough or a city falling. I mean, at one point, they scale 400 feet of cliffs to infiltrate the city that ends the 2020 war.

That's human thinking and surprise, all these elements of war that are enduring. that isn't what the world took from it, which is we just got to have these drones that the Azerbaijani's had. Right. Yeah, absolutely fascinating. I was thinking the last I was hearing about the Russia-Ukraine war, of course there's a lot of innovation and drone warfare and so forth. It's fascinating to kind of follow that. But really it's the sort of the raw sort of traditional artillery. battery, you know, that seems to be making the difference. Is that right? Like the, like, it's just the old stuff, right? The just bombs, basically. All warfare is a combination of the old and the new.

It's really when bad assumptions, which we could talk about whether it's in Iran, Lebanon, or whether you have these bad assumptions of the futurist or whatever imagines the future of war without the old. So in like in Ukraine, yeah, we learned that artillery really, still important. A ground army, infantry, in order to take ground, hold the ground, armor, to breach mobile protective firepower, all of it. Ukraine teaches you that all the things you thought you don't need anymore, even with their amazing things they've done with drones and robotics, even ground vehicle robotics, aren't the decisive elements that's going to win the war. It gives them advantage here and there, but it's actually all the old stuff that you

you need it as well, like artillery, but there's not one thing, and that's where everybody, we actually call it the vampire fallacy, General H.R. McMaster kind of coined what we'll call the vampire fallacy that it's present going back to like World War I, that if I just had this one piece of technology, I'll win the war and no soldiers will have to die, nobody will have to die, and that's it. It's a fallacy that people pursue. You need it all. And there are There are revolutions in military affairs where there is a cost, like the cost difference right now that we see with drones, right? Where if I can flood you with drones that are cheap to make $10,000, $40,000 and you have to use an interceptor that's two or three million, there's that economic sub-war that's present, that's always been present as well, that you have to stay on top of. But it's when nations get complacent and believe that they don't need things that you find them wanting on the battlefield.

When you're faced as a normal person with the battery of social media and news and, you know, in legitimate skepticism against government messaging from wherever, however much you may like a government or not, or how do you actually figure out some semblance of reality? Yeah, this is the, and I have young kids, and towards the, into my book, it's really about a code that I created for, I leave my life by, I want my kids to leave by, but it's a crisis in my work, especially of critical thinking, but it's in other fields as well, how do we know what we know? I talk a lot about in my book, why am I facing danger so much is because I truly believe you have to go there and see it. And in some places,

even what I thought with all my study, and then I go there and like, I didn't know anything. There is a crisis of critical thinking that is being eroded by the aspect of I can have any information I want right now, but it's almost like digital literacy needs to be started in primary school. Like, well, how do you know what you're seeing is the truth? Because most people either don't want to go because they don't want to take the risk or can't, you know, vast, vast majority, right? So they're not going to have that opportunity. Yeah, absolutely.

I cut you off at digital literacy. So tell me about that because some people will even say, well, digital literacy, you're just telling me I need to sort of condition myself to a particular type of propaganda, aren't you, John? No, no. I've truly, and I do this for myself because I love access to information, I consume information. And of course, we could get into what our artificial intelligence does or doesn't do for us. But in this world of don't trust any information, you almost have to become your own investigative journalist. As in somebody's telling you something. And I actually find that they're telling you one thing, but they're not connecting the dots for you.

They're like, look, I've done the research. Just believe what I'm saying, whatever is true. For me, it's like the law of war. Or like the genocide convention. The Genocide Convention is two pages long. Everybody can read it, but they just want somebody to tell them what it says. And in digital literacy, which is, whatever the topic is, it isn't that hard to find the information that makes an insertion and the evidence for an insertion true. And because of the research that I fell into, even I, when I was growing up in the military, it wasn't my thing to do that.

I had to learn, okay, what is research, what is evidence? if you have a hypothesis and how do you prove that? And that's the critical thinking that everybody can do now with the access to information, but they want their trusted person to tell them what is true because they don't have the time, whether it's politics or war, to do that themselves. And in this day and age, it's the emotion that people connect as well to their belief. Like, you're so emotional about something that you actually haven't taken the time to connect the evidence to the assertion.

To allow for the fact you might be wrong, to allow to... That's right. Or who you're trusting, which I don't know, I guess I'm just, I'm more discerning than I just have one voice. I trust that person's position daily on the news or whatever it is that they've done the work. Because fact-checking, and I'm a writer too,

I mean, where, I mean, for example, in New York Times putting a baby with cerebral palsy on the front page of the paper of record and saying that that's because of malnutrition and starvation when the person has a congenital disease that's the fact-checking that is the critical thinking right that we used to trust some people for now we're trusting your comedians or others to do that for us when and what I teach my kids is like you can do that you can what is it that you heard now do a little homework Even if it's two more minutes to say, well, how do we know that's true, whatever the topic is? I see.

And so because the information might be out there just might not be front and center. That's right. And you're saying often it is out there. Absolutely. Fascinating. Well, that's kind of, I guess, what we do as a media, but I don't know if everyone is going to be doing it. I mean, this is the speed, which goes back to our question about war. because of the traditional information trusted Kronkites are gone and more people get their information from X than any other source, there is that wanting to be the first to get out there.

So in war, we always say that just so you know, the first report is always wrong. So in this age of wanting to get to the story quicker, wanting to get to that assertion quicker, it actually is more wrong than right because it's the first report because they want to. to be the first. Whether it's true or not, they just want to be the first, which gets you to the sad state of affairs that we're in and the need for every individual to have that critical thinking before they get emotional. Let me dig into a little bit more. How do we know this? How long is this information new or things like that? What would you say is the reality that you discovered that was the most distant from what you thought you were going to see in a war zone? That's a tough one. I mean, I've studied everything from why the Russians failed to take Keeve, which was a surprise to me,

unlike the human factors that prevented it, to, of course, every visit to Gaza, the dystopian reality of how much effort the soldiers were making to protect siblings and being criticized around the world. There's nothing that compares to that, really, the scale of that, as in going to Israel, going into Gaza, watching IDF soldiers try to protect civilians while trying to get their hostages in the entire world. I mean, umpting countries around the world saying that they're not. That, I don't know, and hopefully I'd never have to face anything like that again. That really the opposite of reality, despite the evidence on the ground, that everybody else has access to. Like, some people say, well, we didn't have access to go there, but everything from the number of,

the amount of food that was going in, the vaccinations, the numbers, all of the stuff. Everybody had the same access I did. Of course, I could validate because I was watching somebody do something that what they're doing and the steps they were taking. But hopefully I never have to face that again in my studies where the entire world is pushing every day the opposite of reality on the ground. Even with access to the same information, that gets real. revealed later, right? Like the, you know, the IPC's famine, you know, famine in Gaza, it gets revealed later, but it's too late when the, but the reality on the ground was, but just, just

explain to me the reality of that situation because there might be people watching that don't know. Tell me, what do you mean by the famine? Yeah, so at in 20204, the I, one of the groups that would determine famine around the world. So this is the, the problem with like, who do you trust? Well, this institution said this. The UN said this, and you have to dig a little bit deeper, like, who in the UN? And what's their history of reporting? But early in 2024, the IPC did this study of nutrition in Gaza and had reported that there was nearing famine conditions because they had changed their own metrics of the number of deaths related to starvation

that would requite to famine. And now that same organizations provide. the data that they had showing that none of it was true. There weren't cases of death by malnutrition and starvation that would equate to the famine marker. Again, words have meaning. And what we saw was actually they had changed the meaning of the word because everybody thought there was just awful things and here's just another piece of evidence, despite the

actual number, the amount of food that was going in and the lack of deaths from malnutrition and starvation that were happening. Actually, what the new data that comes out, of course, now it's too late. A year later is that the actual data provided from Gaza during a war had nutrition higher than other parts of the Middle East where there is no war. So it's the amazing amount of reality

where everybody could have gone and seen the amount of food that was going in and actually looked at the data, but that wasn't, there was legitimacy, put to a report saying this institution says there's nearing famine, so all of it just needs to stop. When we talk about this, right, this is the challenge in these, and this isn't, I think, you know, Israel, Gaza is one, is a very, very stark example, but that's not to say that the IDF was perfect or something like that, or everything about it is right, or even the strategy is correct,

or any of all of this, right? It's sort of the way these things are painted is it's just, you know, it's this one monolith versus another. Yeah. Right? Then they get to, because if you, yes, but then they get to the demonization that they're trying to do something bad. So they take the information they have available and then all the interpreters are saying,

well, clearly they're trying to kill civilians. They're trying to starve civilians. They're trying to do that when the actual reality. the opposite. And like you said, I thankfully I had studied war before this and I'm studying other war zones where this what has actually happened on the ground is the opposite of the West takes from it and why I love my job. Even in like the four-day war between India and Pakistan last year, for some reason the world believes that Pakistan knocked a bunch of Indian aircraft down so they achieved this victory and it just permeates across especially English-speaking media

when the reality is almost the complete opposite of what happened during that four-day war. What is that opposite reality, just for the record? Yeah, for the record. So another book that I'm working on is a book on the war that happened between India and Pakistan in 2020-last year. It's four days. The Indians called Operation Sindor. The Western media focused on one aspect of the war about whether aircraft were knocked

down or not. They didn't focus on the fact that India, who had modernized its military, was able to strike any target it wanted across all of the country of Pakistan and did in a very constrained manner and achieved the political goal, which is basically an end to the actions

that Pakistan was taking and attacking India. So it was literally one of the strongest cases of military dominance to achieve a political goal rapidly that you have in a modern error, but for some reason the West just said, what Pakistan really got them and knocked down some planes. One, that's not the measure of war, but it's really interesting what media or numbers were we fixated when this is such a compelling taste because in the opening days of this

four-day war, India strikes nine terrorist camps and not a single target is stopped from hitting those terrorist camps. And then after Pakistan retaliates with a bunch of drones, like hundreds of drones and missiles, India then strikes 11 air bases and is able to just strike all of them without any of them being stopped. Like that's military dominance. But that's not the story that that most people understand. Which is that information. It's not the story I definitely understood. Right, which is this moment, which is I'm going to have to go do my fact checking now. It's crazy. Right. Fascinating. What would you say was the moment when you were doing your research? I mean, you're basically

embedding yourself with military forces, like in many cases in live situations and other cases you're going in after the fact. What is, is there an instance in your mind where, you know, it was, I mean, there's 20 times you almost tied it here, but what, what, what's the example where, you know, you, has there ever been a time where you thought yourself, hmm, maybe I'm spending, I have a little bit too much interest in being on the ground here because of, uh, an incident. There's actually been a few. That's why there's 20, although this is covering everything from when I was,

from killer bees, from African killer bees in Panama, my own combat deployments to now. I was, there's been a couple times in, in my pursuits, you know, I'll give you to, of course, going into Gaza, very dangerous, but I thought very important. And at one point, I went to where the U.S. peer used to be along the coast of Gaza through what's called the Netsurine Corridor, saw where the peer used to be. Saw actually the field of aid that was being waited to be picked up, which is his own challenge. And on the drive back, about an hour after I had driven back into Israel, now two soldiers died on the same road I was on, which was – and I wasn't able to go in another day. That was another realization of going into an active combat zone versus, like you said, like I did in Kiev, after the Russians had withdrawal, although I got a lot closer than I ever wanted to get following the Russian withdrawal from Kiev and how close it is to Kiev. The other example, though, is when I went into study that the Azerbaijan-Armenia War after 2020, I went in really rapidly after because, again, that war ended in a city.

fight and I was alone traveling through a lot of checkpoints with a Russian checkpoint near me. And at one point I'm like, this is probably a bit too far because I had no cell service. I was totally relying on my host to get me into this through minefields and everything. That was a moment in the book and I'm like, okay, note to self, this is a little bit too much in the pursuit of gaining the knowledge that I got from that. which was amazing. Earlier in our conversation, you talked about, you know, believe in Waging just war, you know, following rules.

The landscape has changed. There's so many actors, again, I can name, you know, communist China, you know, expressly figuring out how to leverage our kind of rules of the way our society works against us, a form of war fighting absolutely right it's sort of like throwing the rules out the window anything goes the sanctity of human life not enshrined at all or no attempts to to value that at all is it even possible to to to just worry do we do we have to even if the enemy doesn't doesn't that put us at a disadvantage i know this these are topics people discuss

right? Absolutely. A lot. And I don't even know what to think about it because it's to me personally, it's unimaginable to say, okay, yeah, forget it, no standards. Because the enemy has no standards and otherwise we'll lose, but does that mean we're going to lose? Yeah, it's a great question. I get it in various forms, having, again, argued. And what's interesting is that, like we talked about the expertise of urban warfare, one of the reasons the military is avoided because it is the greatest place where there's going to be constraints on the use of military force where you can't do whatever you want. There's protected populations, protected sites, and people often ask me, well, do we need more laws of war? I actually don't believe we do. I think we need better understanding

of what the laws of war mean. And there's an echelon, like you said, having studied the laws of war and taught military history, strategy, laws of war for so long, I know what the, with the doubt the rules looks like. If you go back into ancient warfare, it's gruesome. And I understand why the, how the laws of war evolved, because they're constantly evolving, even outlawing like biological and chemical weapons, things that are really important. They evolve and how important they are because I know what it looks like if you don't have them.

And after World War II, which is the greatest, you know, the most, you know, the most, you know, the most awful human experience in our history how important it was to come back together as nations especially the great powers and say look we're going to evolve these even to be even stronger because we never want what happened or during World II to happen again I believe it's still possible there is accountability that has to happen and it's really bad when you have you know there are multi-international organizations like the UN Security Council that really matter and when you have one of the voting veto members violating the laws of war, it becomes a problem.

Well, just to give an example, right, there's, you know, nuclear nonproliferation treaties, which, you know, major actors just simply say, yeah, whatever, or, you know, we're not supposed to be using biological weapons, but frankly, everybody's developing biological weapons, right? I mean, this, as far as I can tell, right? So, you know, people wonder, like, what meaning does this have? Is this really, you can become despondent. But I'm trying to understand, you make a good case, I think, and things I've read from you, that you need this, you need these boundaries.

But how do you face the fact that you have these enemies that seek to subvert you at the best, if not destroy you at worst, that just are not, don't have those constraints at all? Yeah, it's hard. And the war actually accounts for this. The law of war actually accounts for whether it's an internationally armed conflict or a non-internationally armed conflict, whether it's an intra-war or entrust a war. It tries to argue with, and this is the scholarship of the laws of war, but the laws of war aren't a suicide pack. They aren't meant to handcuff every nation of the world and to outlaw war. War is not illegal. It is reserved for.

very special cases like self-defense, which is, you know, Article 51 of the UN Charter. Like all the great nations, I'm a realist, so I believe in nation states, sovereign borders, and the laws of war. Even non-nuclear proliferation, like you said, I mean, there's nine nuclear-armed countries. I don't want any more. I definitely don't want a terrorist state who says it wants one to destroy the United States to have one. This is the aspect of getting, especially those that don't study war, quickly informed on what are the rules, but what's worth fighting for? And I believe non-nuclear proliferation is worth fighting for.

I believe freedom of navigation, because I understand how much the United States economy and the global economy relies on freedom of navigation. I also know when we've gone a war about that in the past. But this is the debate that we get to have in democracy, but unfortunately is that I deal in a space where there's a lot of people that are just a lot of people that are just anti-war which is fine war is horrible I'm I'm but I'm not okay when people are anti-fact or even anti-common sense on trying to redefine words like the many of the ones we talked about I want informed populations and I want war

reserved for when it's needed but I also believe that war there are cases where war is necessary where military action is necessary of course you use all foreign of national power and then I understand when the rules, whether it's the global international order or the rules of war are really important and that's why for us we elect political leaders to fight for those things. Now we could have a big long discussion about deterrence next but I think we're going to have to finish up as much as I would love to talk to you for another hour. Maybe a quick final thought as we finish up and we'll definitely have you back after your book comes out.

Sure. I firmly believe in deterrent's theory and taught it. The way that you prevent wars is to prepare for war, especially if you're the only superpower in the world. I believe in strong nations and strong militaries that deter war, because just what you talked about is if you don't deter war, if there's no consequences for any actions, then those that want more power, want more land, want more populations or resources will take it by. force in violation of all the rules because nobody's going to do anything about it. And now we believe we're so handcuffed by our own rule set that we just have allowed it all way down to what you talked about, which is, of course, China's waging war against us, both economic warfare, information warfare, intellectual property warfare. They're doing it. And if we don't do anything about it, they'll win.

Well, John Spencer, it's such a pleasure to have had you on. Thank you. Thank you all for joining John Spencer and me on this episode of American Thought Leaders. I'm your host, Yanya Kellick.