American Thought Leaders - Inside China’s Secret Overseas Police Stations: Safeguard Defenders' Laura Harth

Episode Date: September 30, 2023

Last fall, investigations by the nongovernmental human rights organization Safeguard Defenders revealed there were over 100 secret overseas Chinese police stations in at least 53 countries around the world. Last April, the DOJ announced two arrests in connection with one such station in New York City.In this episode, Safeguard Defenders campaign director Laura Harth breaks down how these Chinese overseas outposts control the Chinese diaspora and illegally repatriate people by force.“You have a regime that is openly writing down that it is legitimate to engage in kidnapping to bring people back,” Harth says.

Since Xi Jinping came to power, what we've really seen is an explosion in these long-arm policing operations. Last fall, investigations by the non-profit Safeguard Defenders revealed that there were over 100 secret overseas Chinese police stations in at least 53 countries around the world. Last April, the DOJ announced two arrests in connection with one such station in New York.

You have a regime that is openly writing down, that is legitimate, to engage in kidnapping to bring people back. In this episode, Safeguard Defenders campaign director Laura Harth breaks down how these Chinese overseas outposts control the Chinese diaspora and repatriate people illegally. This is American Thought Leaders and I'm Jan Jekielek. Laura Harth, such a pleasure to have you back on American Thought Leaders. Thanks for having me, Jan. It's been a few years since you've been on the show,

and you have been doing some amazing work. You broke the story, your organization broke the story, of the existence of these, what they call Chinese police stations in all sorts of countries around the world. Most recently, in the fall of 2022, we learned of one such setup in Manhattan, Chinatown. So I want to start there because that's what people will remember, right? And so just give me the whole picture of the reality. What are these things?

Why are they there? So Safeguard Defenders, we came across the existence of these so-called overseas police service stations, which is a setup between public security authorities in China in cooperation with United Front-linked groups around the world, right? Because what we uncovered was well over 100 such stations in at least 53 countries around the world. So this is a global endeavor. Now we came across them because we had been tracking the CCP's illegal repatriation methods, right?

So the illegal long-arm policing operations carried out by authorities from China, by CCP agents around the world to coerce people back to China, to bring people back to China against their will. And so the stations obviously played at least some role in this. No, absolutely. And I'll just mention for the benefit of our audience, the United Front, of course, are the Chinese Communist Party's overseas influence operations, various different groups, like often student groups and so forth, that are operating here, working hand in hand with authorities from China. Why do these things exist? most, by far the most, comprehensive reporting. So break it down for me. So what happened is, starting in 2016, or maybe going back a bit further, basically since

Xi Jinping came to power, what we've really seen is an explosion, if you will, in these long-arm policing operations by the Chinese authorities, by the Chinese Communist Party around the world. And so we've been looking at the techniques, at the regulations and policies they've described to do this back in China. And what we see then in 2016 is we see local provincial or city authorities in China kind of mimicking, looking at those national guidelines, national regulations, and saying, hey, we can do this as well. Let's demonstrate how good we are. And so they start connecting actively with these united front-linked groups around the world. I mean, they have been

connected, but they kind of start formalizing these bonds with those groups to use those existing networks of individuals and associations around the world to be better able to kind of execute, if you will, some of these operations. And I think one part of what they were doing, something that the Chinese authorities have not denied, is provide so-called consular services, administrative

services, which renewing your passport, renewing your driver's licenses. Now, it's very important to point out that this in and of itself is already illegal. It may not necessarily be a criminal offense, but under international law, this is illegal. This is a violation of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. You can't just come in and set up your consular outposts wherever you want without the consent of the host government. So China had already been doing this. They've not

been denying that they've been doing this. They've even been revendicating the fact that they've been doing this. But on top of that, what obviously concerned us at Safeguard Defenders was seeing that the central authority in kind of coordinating all those different services that they were offering were the public security authorities of these four specific locations in China. And we were able to tie, again, all exclusively on the basis of open source evidence, to tie those operations, to tie some of those stations directly to so-called persuasion to return operations. Now, a persuasion to return operation is the preferred method of the PRC authorities.

And again, this has been described officially in a written legal interpretation in 2018. It is their preferred method to go after targets abroad and coerce them to go back to China. So it's persuasion, like heavy persuasion. Yes, it sounds very nice. It sounds very, you know, it sounds like it's a gentle talk and invite. Obviously it is not. It starts usually with threats and harassment or even worse, punishment of family members back home,

kind of pushing those family members and convincing their relatives overseas to either, you know, be silent, stop their activism maybe, or convince them to come back. And I think, for example, the Uyghur communities overseas, diasporas, have been talking about this a lot, right? A lot of them weren't able to talk to their family members for years, and then suddenly, maybe because they've spoken publicly, you know, they suddenly get a phone call from a family member or from a public security agent using their family member's phone to come back. So we kind of know that tactic, but others are threats and harassment or worse, delivered directly to the target overseas.

And that's obviously something where we've seen these police stations, so-called police stations, active in, both on the basis of that open source evidence, which included a video of such an operation taking place in Spain, in Madrid. So where you had the people in Madrid, Spain, with the suspect, the target for repatriation in direct video meeting with the public security authorities back home in China, and who also had a family member of that target overseas with them. So you kind of saw it play out on video, and such a station was involved. And then obviously we've seen the indictment coming out here in spring in New York against two people linked to the so-called Chinese overseas police station in New York, which again alleges that these people were engaged in surveillance, harassment, threats against an individual on American soil at the behest of Chinese authorities. So those are the kind of things that we've seen and that

are obviously of grave concern, both for the human rights and freedoms of the people that are involved, of the targets, but also just in terms of the violation, like the brazen violation of territorial sovereignty and judicial sovereignty that we're seeing in these cases. So do you think they came in, they would just establish themselves offering these consular or just helpful services so the US authorities would just play a blind eye, just give a blind eye to it, and then they would just kind of ramp up

the level of activities that they're doing? Like how did these things even get established in the first place? So I wouldn't want to say that anyone turned a blind eye. I mean, in some countries, obviously, we've seen, such as South Africa, where there was some kind of cooperation with local authorities, some kind of consent to do this.

It's been our understanding in the vast majority of all cases, mainly democracies, where these stations were set up, that this was done without the consent of the host governments, right? And again, that's exactly where that violation of the Vienna Conventional Council of Relations comes in. You know, it's a bit of a difficult question what comes first, right? We've seen them doing a series of things and often under the guise of offering services which objectively, you know, if it were not in violation of international law, objectively one can understand is helpful to the community members, right?

What I think is of concern is the fact that you're running these kind of services not through the traditional channels but through groups that are linked to the CCP's influence agencies, that are linked to the United Front. And we all know that the United Front work is not just about trying to influence people. It's not just about trying to set a narrative that is the one preferred by the Chinese Communist Party. It's also about cracking down, about dividing, silencing, blunting critics of that same narratives, right? So when you are running your so-called consular services

or court proceedings or whatever, through these networks, obviously you're giving them an enormous amount of control over the communities in which they are residing, in which they are performing these services. You give them access to a whole lot of data on who is there because you are the ones that they have to come through. And legitimacy too, right?

Exactly, that's the thing, legitimacy. Like you're establishing these people as effectively leaders in the community who if you'll need your passport renewed, you'll have to go through, so maybe you better behave. And I think that's why we called the second, you know, the follow-up report, which uncovered more stations in December last year, Patrol and Persuade. It's a bit, you know, but to really give that sense of ultimately what this is about. This is about establishing control over the communities.

Of course, you know, you have those people that are actively cooperating with them, collaborating even. But I think there's also a very wide group of, you know, victims that are not necessarily only the people that are being actively threatened, harassed, you know, maybe returned to China, but also that middle group that just really doesn't have anywhere to go right and i think so finding a way to engage them and say hey you are now in the free world and you should be able to enjoy that and like what are your concerns how can we make sure that you know we can we can kind of get the hold that the CCP tries to have on you, even overseas, how can we stop that, knowing very well that obviously the CCP's preferred weapon is using family members back home. So it's a very difficult situation for a lot of those people. I want to go back to that video from Spain that you mentioned earlier. And this is a situation where the person that's in Spain,

the Chinese national, is acutely aware, if I'm not mistaken, of the fact that the people on the other side from the state security have one of their family members. So basically what you see is you have the target overseas who was someone accused. you know a lot of these people you know this people people notice very well you know there's always a lot of accusations against people that are being sought overseas and this is not to say that among all those people among those thousands of people that are being returned that there is not someone that may you know effectively be a criminal or have committed criminal offenses.

But it's important to remember that these operations are clandestine under international law, under national laws. And these are all just people that are accused, right? They haven't been tried in a court of law, just as a bit of background. But so this person was accused of environmental pollution. Basically, what we believe happened is the people tied to one of these stations in Madrid were tasked by public security authorities back in China to kind of find that person. You know, they must have known he was in Spain. Maybe they had learned it from the family member back in China. Bring him in.

So they're bringing him in to a location. Just to be clear, these police stations are not classic police stations, right? They could be private residences, office buildings, and so on. But anyway, they bring this person in. And so we have the individuals linked to the station in Madrid sitting next to the suspect.

And they are in a video meeting with public security authorities back in China, who obviously identified themselves as being from the public security, and this family member who has like a nameplate, which doesn't even say the name, but, you know, relative of family member in front of them. So the setup was very clear. I think, you know, for the suspect or the target overseas, it couldn't have been clearer what was happening

here. And it was actually a successful operation. So that person voluntarily returned to China following these activities. And while it's a classic example of what we know has been happening, it's a classic example of what is described in tons of documents, official documents from the Chinese authorities on the basis of open source evidence, again, exclusively from Chinese authorities, state party media. We managed to tie these stations to at least 84 such operations taking place around the world. Only three of them we know exactly where they took place. So one in Serbia, one in Spain, and one in France. There may have been many more. Maybe not all of these were as clear-cut as the Spanish one, we don't know. But I would say there's enough evidence to kind of demonstrate and you

know taking also into account the indictment obviously that's happened here in New York, there's enough evidence to say that these are not just innocent consular administrative services being performed. Right. I mean, they're multipurpose. That's a good way. Exactly. I think that's a good way to say it. Actually, that is actually perfect because what they basically did and what they describe is they have this multi-purpose platform right where it's basically the public security authority that can kind of field queries depending on what is needed so you know if you need a driver's license you'll go to the station it will be sent to the public security which will then send it down you know to the local equivalent

of the DMV you know if it's court issue, it will go to the court. So they kind of act, that's the way to describe it, at least as this kind of nexus through which to go. But again, it's always the public security authorities having a very clear overview. And I think that tells you a lot as well, because in what country would it be the police acting as the central agency for fielding requests on driver's licenses and passport renewals?

And, well, it makes sense if you know the Chinese system, the communist Chinese system, where obviously things such as passports and driver's licenses can indeed be weaponized against you to make sure that you comply. Absolutely fascinating. You know, actually, you were, of course, testifying on the Hill recently, and China Daily decided to bring this issue up, you know, and it's always very interesting. I actually enjoy reading China Daily headlines from time to time, so kind of understand what the current obsession is or what the current view needs to be. But so clearly, you've hit a nerve with this. We've definitely hit a nerve with this. We've seen actually already before, starting in January 2022, when we released our report, involuntary returns, which is kind of the precursor to police stations, and which

described the methods being used to coerce people back to China. We've seen disinformation campaigns against safeguard defenders across platforms, really, and in a way that we believe tried to kind of drown our reporting by putting out fake reports with the same titles, a lot of content, obviously a lot of insults and the usual things I'd say against Chinese human rights defenders or human rights defenders working on China. But it was interesting to see, again, there was a Global Times during the weekend before the hearing on the Hill, and then China Daily came out on the day of the hearing

on the Hill. And yeah, I think it's fair to say they're still pretty upset about it. We clearly hit a nerve with that, which for us is a signal to keep pushing it. Clearly, there's something here that annoys them. Clearly, there's something that's been happening. The responses that governments have given to what we reported on

clearly does not sit well with them. So I think, you know, it's kind of we're on the right track. We need to keep pushing it, not necessarily police stations, but, you know, the whole transnational repression, long-arm policing angle of it is definitely something they're not happy to see uncovered. And if you'll allow me, there's just something, obviously, these attack pieces are, well, not nice. They're quite defamatory, frankly speaking. But there's something I always find very interesting is that within those pieces,

and I don't think at this point they even realize they keep actually admitting to a whole series of violations that they're continuously doing, starting from, you know, when they talk about our director, Peter Dahlin, being put through residential surveillance at a designated location in China back in 2015. I'm like, well, thanks for admitting it, guys, but you know that RSDL, it's been, you know, human rights procedures at the UN have been calling on you to abolish this system because it's a grave human rights violation. It's a grave and forced disappearance. It constitutes torture. And you're just writing about it as if it were some beautiful thing. You bring up his forced confession. Guys, forced televised confessions are not an okay thing to do. There's nothing to boast about here, yet here you are attacking us and boasting about your grave human rights violations. Then obviously they go on and say, oh, all these people overseas, they're just volunteers,

they're doing consular services. Once again, not okay guys, that's illegal. So it's kind of almost funny in a way, if you will, the way they keep implicating themselves, but it also tells you, I think, how far removed from reality they are. The CCP is always on about how they respect the sovereignty of other countries, how they do not interfere in other countries, how they respect the international rule of law. All these things, the fact that they write about this seemingly thinking that these are okay, that these are somehow evidence against safeguard defenders rather than against themselves, shows you really how their mind works and how far removed from reality it sometimes is, if you will.

Well, the term brazen comes to my mind as you're describing this. You know, most of what we've talked about has been this, you know, quote-unquote voluntary return, right? It's just, you know, basically through coercion. But there's actually some examples of, you know, basically through coercion. But there's actually some examples of, you know, forced return. And I know you've covered that as well. Yeah. Right. Well, so we do consider these persuasion to return operations also forced returns, right? It's coercion. And I think a lot of people can sympathize or empathize when, you know, people

are going after your family members. It's one thing when they come for you, which, well, obviously is very hard, but when they go after your family members, I think everybody can understand how that would be a very effective way of leveraging people, right? So we do consider that a forced return, not voluntary as they like to put it. But there's other systems and we again base ourselves on what the CCP itself has been saying, what PRC authorities themselves have been saying. In particular there is a written legal interpretation from the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection from 2018 which really outlines the methods that are being used. The first one is extradition. This obviously requires some cooperation

from the country in which the target is. It has become increasingly difficult for the PRC to do, especially within democracies, because of how the domestic system, you know, is gravely violating basic human rights. Repatriation, which is when they use immigration law. So rather than have someone go through a judicial proceeding fighting extradition, they'll try to have someone deported. This is something we see happening a lot, for example, attempts, or actually happening in Southeast Asia, so countries bordering China.

But also we're very concerned about what's been happening a lot in the Middle East region. And it's one of the reasons why we are so concerned about the cooperation agreements, judicial and police cooperation agreements, that they keep signing with countries, particularly in the Global South, because it kind of opens the doors to making all these procedures easier. But if those mechanisms are kind of cut off, which luckily more and more in democracies are being cut off, they move to the clandestine means, right, which start from persuasion to return, which is their vastly preferred method, again, because it's easy to go after people when you're holding their family members hostage.

But we also see luring and entrapment. So when they try to get people to another place from where it may be easier to repatriate them, for example, because that host country is willing to cooperate with China, entrapment when someone is traveling to another country and gets stuck. In Idris Hassan's case, an Uyghur man activist is a good example. He's been stuck in Morocco now for two years. We were able to stop the extradition by appealing to the UN Committee Against Torture, but he's kind of stuck in limbo, he's literally trapped in Morocco and there's been other cases as

such in the past. And then we get to the final method, which again is openly described, is written into stone by the supreme body in charge of these overseas operations, which is kidnapping. Now you have a regime that is openly writing down that it is engaging or that it is legitimate to engage in kidnapping to bring people back. Now they say themselves this is a very irregular measure, so not used too often, only when the others are not available, but again there is examples of those kidnappings taking place and we've seen some taking place

fairly recently just over summer for example in in Laos so yeah I yeah sometimes I'm like every time I I've read that legal interpretation so many times I've talked about it so many times but then every time I talk about it, I'm still stunned. Like how, not only why would you do this, but how brazen are you to actually write it down, publish it for all to see and say, hey, these are the methods we are using and we think are legitimate. But at the same time, we do not interfere in the affairs of other countries. We do not violate international law. I don't know. I'm still stunned. Well, and I mean, part of, I think, part of the purpose of publishing that is so people know, right?

It's another fear tactic, I think, right? Yes, exactly. And in fact, again, a bit like with the China Daily article, a lot of times when we've put out reports on these issues or other organizations have published reports on these issues, there's always a question that comes up during those regular press conferences that the foreign ministry does, right, where one of their friendly, controlled medias will ask a question on these horrible human rights groups saying blatant lies. But the answers usually end after denouncing the blatant lies and how all these human rights organizations don't know anything or just anti-China forces and so on. But it usually always ends with a phrase, something along the lines of like a message to those overseas communities. By the way, we can get to you wherever you are. We will get to you wherever you are. We will chase

you until the end of the earth. And I'm not just inventing these words. These are literal words that you can find. If you go back and scroll through some of these foreign affairs regular press conferences, these are the exact words that you will find. And so it's very clear that they want that message, indeed, as you said, out to the overseas communities. And, you know, it goes back to that patrol and persuade, that control element. Like, be aware that we can get to you, we will get to you, until the end of the earth. You know, and one of the things that really strikes me, I want to mention this a bit. Like, I've become aware over the past few years, you know,

that I guess not all of us, I mean, we've talked about the, you know, you're a very freedom-interested person. I'm also a very freedom-interested person. I'm also a very freedom-interested person. Not everybody's like that. Nobody has it in their bones like that, okay? And so when you have these sorts of structures existing, most people will just kind of, I guess, assimilate to that to some extent, right? And just kind of accept it as, oh, I guess this is just how it works.

There's a level of power of having things, just the knowledge that they exist there with these people, that I hadn't fully grasped. Yeah, I think it's definitely psychological pressure, right, that is there. And I don't know if it's true that not all people care as much about freedom. Maybe it's, you know, about their priorities. Maybe they have to care about, you know, their kids or their family members. Like, there's a lot of reasons why white people would not necessarily want to stand up to it, right? And I think, you know, during the hearing

on the Hill, obviously, Roshana Bass was there of campaign for Uyghurs. I mean she's been a striking example of transnational repression, of having these techniques used against her to shut her up, obviously starting from the enforced disappearance of her sister Gulshan Abbas five years ago now, but which continues every day not just by keeping her sister disappeared but also obviously by harassment, threats, online discrediting campaigns and so on. And I think she's made a very good point during the hearing saying, you know, a couple of years ago this would have happened and the room behind us would have been filled with

Uyghurs who are not necessarily like outspoken activists, right, but who wanted to be there to show their support, to, you know, stand up for what they believe in. And, you know, she said, they're not here now because they are scared. So I think, you know, maybe a lot of the time we don't see people standing up. We don't see people demonstrating because they are scared, because there's that psychological pressure. And so maybe rather than suggesting or being a sign of those people not being enough freedom-loving, I think it is potentially or worryingly a sign of how effective and increasingly effective the CCP's operations are.

And on that note, actually, I think from a European perspective, it's been very interesting and something to think about maybe. You know, when we look at the Anglo-Saxon countries, and we know there's a lot that needs to be done. There's a lot of issues. But, you know, we see outspoken activists, Hong Kongers, Chinese, Uyghurs, Tibetans. We see them, you know, in Australia, Canada, the U.S., the U.K. And they're very outspoken and they're there. And they're not huge numbers, but they're there.

But when you go to the European continent, for example, in the country I live in, in Italy, until very recently, basically there was no known dissident in Italy. Yet we have one of the biggest Chinese overseas communities in the world. So the question was like, okay, like either, you know, these communities really are not producing any dissidents and, you know, it's for some reasons all the dissidents go only to the Anglo-Saxon countries, which would say something. also because of legitimacy, because of the fact that some of these community leaders have been cozying up to the local law enforcement and political establishment and so on,

maybe the control is even more effective in those places. And so I think it's a bit of a different way to look at it. Chicken and egg question, if you will. Sure. No, and I think you raise a really, really good point. Well, maybe not freedom loving, maybe freedom obsessed. Yes. Maybe that would be a way to put it.

But no, but in all seriousness, I mean, most people just want to live their lives, right? Which is okay. Which is okay. And preferably free, I think. Yeah, yeah. Well, let's say I'm fairly certain that most people would prefer leading their lives free from the potential threats and harassment of an authoritarian power that is keeping your family members hostage.

I think it's a fair assumption to make that. Probably 100% of people would prefer to live that way. And then, you know, within that space, if they wanna, you know, talk about the other crimes that the CCP is committing or not, or other authoritarian regimes, you know, that's another question. And yes, not everyone's cup of tea.

Right. Yeah. I mean, it's more a reflection on how powerful these types of coercive tools can be on just normal people without basically the direct enforcement. That's what you think of all the time, right? The subtle stuff in some ways is the most insidious. That's what I'm getting out of our chat here today. Exactly. I think it's both. And again, it mimics a lot of what is happening inside China, where a lot of the time you'll see them, for example, when it comes to human

rights defenders, right? They'll go after one to kind of make an example out of that one person. But you scare the wider community. You set a very clear example for all of them. And our sense is you have a bit of the same thing happening overseas, where you set up a system of control where people know that the system is in place. When needed, there can be some examples that

are being used and I mean the reason we learn about these cases is because Chinese propaganda is talking about them right because they want to send that message out to the communities you know Laura this is such an important conversation give me tons of food for thought here a final thought as we finish yeah I think thank you for having this conversation. I think the important thing is to keep having this conversation. You know, if some people are going through this, are listening to this, and maybe hearing things that sound familiar to them, you know, know that they're not alone, that there are people that want to support them.

And in particular, we released a multilingual guide on what to do in cases of transnational repression, how to recognize it. It's available also in simplified Chinese, traditional Chinese, Uyghur, Tibetan, and English. It kind of describes what the acts may be, but also lists some of the channels, reporting channels, where people can turn to to actually report such instances. Because if this is happening to you, this is not okay. Okay, you should not accept this.

We understand you may be scared, but there are, in particular in the U.S., channels available to report it also anonymously. So if you feel scared for your family members, if you feel scared that this may lead to trouble for you, you can report anonymously. And it's really important that people do because I think it's the best way, if people start coming forward talking about it, it's the best way to help the authorities in this country and other countries to actually gain a better understanding of what exactly is going on, who are the people doing it, who are the actors, what are the methods, and so on. So, you know, I think that's my final thought, really, an appeal to potential victims or

people that may have seen or known of other victims. Please come forward, also anonymously, and, you know and help us, help everyone to really better address this issue in the future. Well, Laura Harth, it's such a pleasure to have had you on. Thank you, Jan. It was great to be here. Thank you all for joining Laura Harth and me on this episode of American Thought Leaders. I'm your host, Jan Jekielek. Thank you.