American Thought Leaders - The Most Transparent Elections in the World? Adam Savit on the Taiwan Model

Episode Date: January 27, 2024

What can Americans learn from Taiwan when it comes to conducting secure and transparent elections?In this episode, I sit down with Adam Savit, director of the China Policy Initiative at the America First Policy Institute. He was in Taiwan recently to observe the presidential elections there.What is Taiwan’s significance for the United States? What would Japan do if the Chinese communist regime invaded Taiwan?Views expressed in this video are opinions of the host and the guest, and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times.

If China were to take Taiwan, it would be able to break into the Pacific Ocean. It would be able to send its ships there unimpeded. That's one of the things that's keeping China from being a blue water navy, we call it. What can Americans learn from Taiwan when it comes to conducting elections right? In this episode, I sit down with Adam Savitt, director of the China Policy Initiative at the America First Policy Institute. He was recently in Taiwan to observe the elections. What is the significance of Taiwan for America? What they're doing is trying to get behind that first layer of defenses, which we call the first

island chain. Then there's that second layer that they're trying to do a back around play. This is American Thought Leaders, and I'm Janja Kelleg. Adam Savitt, such a pleasure to have you on American Thought Leaders. Thanks so much for having me. It's a pleasure. Adam, you've been out in Taiwan. Now you're in Japan. You were in Taiwan for the election. And I have to say, Taiwan elections, I've watched a number of videos. I haven't actually watched it on the ground, but I've watched a video of the actual tabulation of the voting happening. And it's this incredible community event. It's wildly transparent. And I just think probably we could learn a lot from this. So why don't we actually start there? Sure. I did have that thought when I was on the ground, is that Americans should

actually be jealous of the Taiwanese election process, the entire spirit around it, as well as the technicalities of how they do it. And yes, I will do the actual motion, which is like this. They always do because literally they hold the piece of paper. They look up like this. They have observers. That's how the ballot is counted. They use paper.

They use a pencil. Not only that, they have to show up at their precise precinct where they receive a notice in the mail to come to a very specific location. It has to be in their hometown, if they're away, you know, we had a guide helping us out in Taipei, the capital and the largest city. His hometown was way down south in Taiwan. So he, at some point during the day,

hopped a train, a high speed rail, which they have a nice train, but it still takes about three hours to get all the way down south. And he voted in his home district, not only within Taiwan. If you are stationed overseas, if you're working overseas for any reason, you physically have to come back. So there's an absolute regrouping of Taiwanese expatriates from the U.S., from Japan, from wherever they are. Now, part of that, actually, they told me is because you've got tens of thousands of Taiwanese businessmen who are in China because it's sort of unavoidable for them to do business with China. They're so physically close. And in the decades preceding the more authoritarian Xi regime, a lot of them went there on business, and some of them still remain. It's certainly a recognition that the malign influence of the CCP is there,

and they will not take chances with remote voting from mainland China. They want to see that piece of paper in their hand. Well, and there's a few things here. One of them is also that you need, if you want to participate in the process, you have to go back. I don't know if that's necessarily absolute for the US or Canada or something like that, but you can see how that helps you reconnect with your country and your community. You have to go to your actual community. That is very interesting. And the thing that kind of strikes me about it is also that the vote counting, it's an event. People come out of all ages and they're watching and it's actually like a kind of a big spectacle of sorts. Absolutely. Well, you know, as foreigners, we were on a delegation, a small delegation of four. I had my colleague, the chair of our China policy initiative at AFPI, Steve Yates, was leading the delegation. We had a journalist, we had a pollster, and weren't able to get into the precinct. But we did watch for the group of Taiwanese citizens. The returns come in again to emphasize the fact that the returns came in and they were counted and complete by 8 or 8.30 p.m. on the night of the event. witness as far as how the average people experienced their elections. We went to a rally of the DPP, which has been the ruling party for eight years and now will be for another four years

because their candidate did win the presidency. And they claimed there was 100,000 people there. I don't know about that, but it was a full stadium, a midsize stadium, maybe 40 to 50,000 people. In any case, it was very impressive. They're not quite as rowdy as an American audience. It's a different culture. Everyone is sort of focused on the same thing. There are sort of these parameters. It almost feels like each candidate is sort of a trained announcer. It's like a show. It's a real almost choreographed show. And actually, when we first arrived, we were able to visit the DPP headquarters. Their theme was Team Taiwan. And actually, when we first arrived, we were able to visit the DPP headquarters. Their theme was Team Taiwan. And actually, they had the English letters on these jerseys, and it was a

baseball theme. And basically, in their headquarters was a big baseball diamond. And they had all these screens going, and they had themed t-shirts. They had these erasers that they came up and handed to us and said, this is to erase Chinese disinformation. It's a very vigorous and real engagement by the public, for sure. Well, and I just might mention, since you mentioned it here, is that this Chinese disinformation from mainland China, from the communist regime, is actually massive in Taiwan. They have control of multiple of the largest media companies. Let's say very strong influence in some cases, if not control, kind of pushing the Beijing line and so forth. So this is actually interesting. And now what are the implications? I'm thinking about the Epoch Times headlines. This is something that Beijing didn't

want. Tell me a little bit about that relationship since you've actually been talking to these people on the ground and so forth. I think it is definitely something that Beijing didn't want in the sense that there are three parties, and we can dig down into that a little bit. But taking the two main parties, that's the DPP and that's who won. And that is the most clearly anti-Beijing party. But the thing is, you still can't say they're pro-independence because they haven't come out and said that, just like the United States has strategic ambiguity, even though we do support Taiwan. We don't say Taiwan is independent. That actually is the stated policy. And the DPP has made that same calculation

that it's needlessly provocative to go all the way and say, we are an independent nation. But yes, Beijing would have preferred the other major party, which is the KMT. That was the party of Chiang Kai-shek. So that was the Nationalist Party on the mainland. It was actually our ally in World War II. And he, after World War II, was facing off against Mao and the Communist Party. That civil war raged until 1949, when Mao and the Communists pushed the Nationalists off of mainland China into Taiwan. So that's actually still that original party.

It's been called the oldest political party in Asia, and that's probably accurate. But that party actually became an authoritarian regime under Chiang once it hit Taiwan. So Taiwan actually did not have free and open elections for decades after it's being formed. 1986 is when the dictatorship loosened up strings a little bit, had some local elections, was not the only party. But it wasn't until 1996 that the presidential race was open to other parties. So ironically, even though the KMT was actually the people that fought a war with the CCP, they are also sort of the, let's say, the residue of those millions of Chinese who were bumped out of China into Taiwan. And so they still have sort of a longing or an

assumption that one day they will connect back with the mainland. Now, really, they also are not under the illusion that this CCP regime, especially under Xi, who's gotten more radical, is going to be so unproductive to return to, if you will. But they are much more accommodationist. I did hear people saying, hey, China is huge. China is right there across the straits. We're going to have to live with them. And being needlessly provocative is the wrong tack. Right. Well, before we talk about this third party, which I understand is in a sense a populist party, but these categories actually don't work very well. Before we go there, let's just talk a little bit about the importance of Taiwan vis-a-vis the U.S.-China relationship.

China is arguably the biggest strategic threat to the U.S. Some people say it's the only actual strategic threat. Taiwan is sitting there very close, with this, let's call it propaganda, that it absolutely is going to become part of the mainland. It's a central theme of Xi Jinping, the Chinese dictator. And at the same time, there's the U.S. watching and also involved in a whole bunch of different, let's call them altercations around the world right now. So what is the importance of Taiwan to the U.S.? Why should Americans care? Well, yeah, I would like to emphasize some of the discourse on the America first right,

which AFPI, of course, identifies with, or America First Policy Institute. Some of it does veer into sort of a cynical and I think incorrect view of Taiwan. You know, presidential candidate Vivek Ramaswamy, he recognized that the semiconductors, those advanced microchips that Taiwan specializes in producing, you know, he recognizes that as a strategic value to the U.S. But basically what he said was once that is off shore to the U.S. or to other countries, then we could abandon Taiwan to the predations of China. I think that's absolutely wrong. Just one other example, a huge example, is that the way that shipping lanes run, for example, from the Middle East, where you have natural gas and oil flowing through and much other trade that's going around through the Malacca Straits past Singapore and then up

Southeast Asia. It passes right by Taiwan in order to get to our allies, Japan and South Korea, two of the biggest economies in the world. If that trade is disrupted, there will be massive ramifications for the U.S. economy and the U.S. strategically, militarily, because if China were to take Taiwan, it would be able to break into the Pacific Ocean and be able to send its ships there unimpeded. That's one of the things that's keeping China from being a blue water navy, we call it, meaning that they can deploy their ships all over the world the way the United States does. Now the United States is the only true blue water navy in the world, meaning we deploy in the Middle East. We deploy,

what we see right now, we deploy in order to protect the shipping lanes in the Red Sea from the Houthis, which leads up to the Suez Canal, which is an absolutely crucial shipping lane for the world. So actually, you could compare the waters off Taiwan to that, except there's even much more volume going through those lanes than there is through the Red Sea. So that's just one huge example. You were talking a little bit about the spirit. You talked about how this is basically a brand new democracy, I mean, 30-odd years in. And so there's this kind of spirit to do the democratic process and do it right. And at the same time, the realization of this external threat that is exerting massive influence, sometimes through

these business people that are deeply embroiled in there, but in all sorts of ways. And some of it is just these overflights of military jets, which I'm sure you encountered while you were there, just to remind people who's just across the strait and that you have to play along to instill fear. It's a very unusual climate in its entirety to me. I wasn't aware of any overflights while I was there, but I think the day we landed or right before, probably the viewers have heard of this missile test, or it was unclear whether it was a satellite launch or a missile test. But Taiwan has an emergency text and broadcast system. And the English translation of that text said that there was a missile launch.

Apparently, in their native language, it actually said a satellite launch. But in international reports, it actually said a satellite launch, but in international reports, it said that now. And actually, frankly, whether on purpose or not, that's sort of cognitive warfare right there, which makes people upset. But yeah, as far as the precarious situation that Taiwan is in, as I was there, I kept on thinking of Israel, you know, where I have been on the ground before. And it's a very similar situation where you have sort of a relatively small, fragile democracy on the borders, you know, with Israel, it's land borders, but they're surrounded by, by about 100 miles of sea. It would take a much more difficult invasion. But, you know, Beijing has other methods to use. And yes, they are conducting a election under significant duress. But it actually struck me that, you know, we were there, I think, maybe two days before and we stayed one day after.

You know, there was this intensity built up around the election. But once the election was over, life goes back to normal. And part of that was reflected, as you notice, or as you noted, in that existence of that third party. So let me know if you want me to drill down on that. Absolutely. jump in. Yeah, so that party is called the TPP. And as I mentioned, the DPP, it gets a little confusing here

because they're all three letters, and I won't go into the actual names. That would just be confusing. So the DPP is the more aggressive towards China and the KMT is a more conciliatory towards China. And, you know, it's funny or it's natural that I go to those metrics to tell you about those parties, because there is no direct correlation between left Democrat, right Republican, which an American would understand coming to this political situation. It is largely defined by their relationship to China,

because that is the dominant question politically in their lives. Because of that, though, for the first time, there's a fairly large third party. And that third party, as you mentioned, I agree with the word populist in the sense that they're saying, you know, listen, these other parties have been focused on this China threat. Yes, it's real. But, you know, they've been ignoring our everyday concerns. You know, they have the same problems everyone in the world is having now. Inflation, cost of living, health care. And they feel that these questions have been ignored. And especially the youth who are, you know, are disillusioned and also kind of detached

from the violent and oppressive history of actually living under the CCP. It's almost it's a populist party and it's kind of actually living under the CCP. It's almost, it's a populist party, and it's kind of an escapist party. It's sort of, they're throwing all of these sort of random ideas into a pot, making a promise. And they know that as a third party, they'll never actually have to govern. So they really don't have to go in depth on these policies. But it was enough that they got a good share of the vote. I think it was something like 25%. So the winner, DPP, was something like 40%. And then the KMT was somewhere in the 30s. And they were 25%.

Now, of course, the presidency is winner take all. So they lost that. But we've got their parliament. And it's a strange sort of um hybrid system so they do have districts the way in the u.s we have congressional districts so they're geographic so you'll have a vote there uh where the winner takes all right so in that district the winner wins if it's dpp they get seat. But then there's this other part of the system where the voter gets a third. So they get a presidential vote. They get their local representative vote. Then they get this other party vote. And those party votes are added up. And the percentages of those party votes grant them a certain amount of this other pie of legislators.

I know it sounds, it is quite confusing. Actually, there were Taiwanese that we were with who didn't know about this system. So that was exactly how it worked. You know, much the same way Americans might not know the ins and outs totally of caucuses and the way electoral votes work and this sort of thing. So that is how it works.

And essentially the DPP came out with 51 seats. I think the KMT came out with 52, but then there's nine with that third party, the TPP. And this is the first time where no party had a majority. And therefore the TPP will be the kingmakers. The TPP will determine what legislation can be passed and what will come to William Lai, the new president, TPP's desk. And the DPP is very concerned that that will mean that weapons systems from the U.S. will not be funded. They'll be cut back

or they'll be removed entirely. Let's talk about that, actually, because this is one big question right now, frankly, in American politics. How much of this military aid or military spending or military support should we be providing outside of the country? That's a real serious consideration or serious question. And we should give consideration to each situation uniquely because each situation is unique. The first thing I think of and the thing that we as Americans have been having a discourse about for almost two years now is, of course, the war in Ukraine. So that's the front burner issue regarding foreign military aid. Now, again, I'll go back to our America first frame at AFPI. So when this war first started, I think Russia aggressively and unprovoked attacked and invaded the sovereign territory of Ukraine.

Also, Russia is an adversary of the United States. There's no doubt about that. And Ukraine had every right to defend itself. And I think that we were right strategically to give some support to Ukraine in the form of arms, in the form of aid, etc. Now, somewhere along the line, we got to the point now where we're $100 billion plus into an investment of aid into Ukraine. And most importantly, there is no endpoint. There's no stated limitation on this aid and there is no goal. So what is the metric we use to measure the effectiveness of this aid and when will this aid ever end, essentially? So that is something to be very concerned about. But that is one situation. Taiwan is another situation. And again, what Taiwan gets as far as military equipment from the United States is not aid. They're actually paying for it one way or another. In fact, they

have orders backed up. And part of that is our supply chains in relation to Ukraine, because so much of our efforts have gone there. But it's also problems just with our industrial capacity in general and our supply chains. And Taiwan, you know, is ready, willing and able to pay and to defend itself. It is diversifying now away from huge weapon systems, expensive airplanes, expensive ships. It is going the route of asymmetrical equipment and asymmetrical strategy. And DPP officials were mentioning that things like standoff weapons, meaning missiles that can hit mainland China, it'll never match the missile fleet of China, but it's there as a deterrence. And Taiwan has proven that they can pay for the weapons. They have a serious

plan about how to use the weapons. And it's really a net benefit for the United States. So what do you think the ultimate impact of the election going this way is on the U.S. and on friendly nations like Canada, my own home country, and so forth? It sounds strange to say. I don't think it has a definitive uh impact or i don't think it'll have an extreme impact on the overall trajectory of this situation if the kmt got in they would be a little bit more soft a little bit more conciliatory towards china but strangely a good thing is that she has been so extreme that across the political spectrum in Taiwan, as well as the U.S., these parties and the average person is realizing

the threat. And I think from China's end, they're not really going to change their tactics either. I think it's still not in their interest to launch an actual hot kinetic war on Taiwan because other methods have been fairly successful on their own. And this is the gray zone tactics. This means, well, as you mentioned, an example would be the satellite missile launch on the day before the election. They are constantly sending dozens of military aircraft as well as sea craft across the demarcation line in the Taiwan Strait. They have a full blitz on Taiwan media. They own or influence big, large organs within

the traditional Taiwan media. They have social media influencers. Some of them are openly marked on Twitter and elsewhere, but some are either live propagandists or bots. These are operative on TikTok. I did ask someone on the ground whether TikTok is present in Taiwan because some of the work we've done at AFPI has been to combat TikTok in the United States. And it's really a conundrum because it brings up questions of corporate independence and persecuting one individual company. It really is a hard nut to crack in a free country like the United States. Now, they said they did have TikTok. They claimed that the Taiwanese government is actually more

effective at filtering it to some degree. I also asked them if they had WeChat. Now, if people are familiar with WeChat, that's literally a CCP chat client, just proven to be a CCP subsidiary. And that's even available there, which is kind of puzzling, you know, but, you know, this gentleman was saying, anyone in the know is not using WeChat, but that's still there as a channel as well. And another thing they said, is even if it's a known propaganda outlet, or it's a suspect outlet, you're still getting these things flashing in front of your face, you're seeing these articles. And unlike us, where we see the filter in English, for example, the Global Times is a big China propaganda outlet. You can

go on the internet. You can read that stuff. Hopefully you understand what you're reading, but it's through some sort of a filter, but they are Mandarin readers. So this is stuff that's flying in front of them through different overt or covert. And I'll use the word they're sort of marinating in this Mandarin media environment, which you've got 1.3 billion Chinese who are flooding it. Yeah. And when you say filter, you mean your own filter, like understanding that you're seeing something that has political decision-making behind it. This is the challenge with TikTok, wherever it appears, frankly. In one place, by the way, it doesn't appear, of course, is mainland China, because you can draw your own conclusions from that. I have a number of episodes I've done with people explaining how the TikTok system functions. But I've also understood

that with TikTok, you can view TikTok as an espionage issue, aside from a sort of massive influence issue, which is where, for example, you have, within a fairly short time, a whole bunch of American TikTok users thinking to themselves, yeah, Osama bin Laden, he had some good points there in his letter, and not that they've ever read it. You just have these influencers, which then the dial can be dialed up or dialed down depending on the kind of interest, depending on the algorithm, which really amounts to the interests of the Chinese regime, since this company is sort of beholden to the security state there. Now, so this is the climate, right? But, I mean, most people don't realize that on the ground. Obviously,

TikTok is being used as a massive influence operation there, as certainly as WeChat in terms of surveillance and so forth. Listen, it's either they don't realize it, and maybe some of them don't. I feel like in Taiwan, that's probably the place where they're most educated on it. But the problem is, even if they are educated on it, it still works in a way because it's addictive. It's crazy. You know, it's like it's like you're compelled. And again, I point to the more traditional, you know, newspaper mastheads like the Global Times. And sometimes I'll Google, I'll look at the result, I'll look at the title, I'll look at the little sub headline, and I'll say, oh, that must be, that'll stick in my head in a way. And as much as I know that that

is CCP propaganda, it's made an impression. And, you know, sometimes you'll be reading stuff and you'll bring it up in a conversation, you'll sort of forget. Oh, where exactly did I hear that? You know, and was that true or was that not? You know, that it even works in that traditional sense with with we professionals who are, you know, supposed to be, you know, you know, very picky with the sort of information that gets through that filter. So I can't imagine on the ground in Taiwan reading Mandarin directly, and all of the CCP's best propaganda is focused at you. Well, it also reminds me of, and I don't think this is the case anymore, or at least certainly not regularly anymore, but these large, incredibly well-produced supplements that the China Daily would place in the New

York Times and the Wall Street Journal once upon a time, with a tiny note saying this is sponsored content or whatever. So given that Taiwan is obviously an independent country, by almost any rational measure you might use. And at the same time, there's this one China policy, doctrine of strategic ambiguity, and so forth. What are the implications of President Biden saying the U.S. doesn't support Taiwan independence? Well, there's a couple issues going on here. Number one, we do have the baseline reality of the one China policy, and that's that since 1979, and under the Taiwan Relations Act, we recognize Beijing as the address for the Chinese state. That has all kind of awkward implications because also it obligates us to

also arm Taiwan or provide Taiwan with the tools needed to defend itself. So that's already an awkward situation. But we also have the issues of the communication style, let's put it that way, of President Biden. And it seems whenever he's asked, he'll blurt out something different. Now, in this case, that is actually accurate. We actually don't endorse Taiwanese independence. But it's strategically unwise for the President of the United States after our preferred, ostensibly preferred party, which is more aggressive towards China, has just won the election. So the president shouldn't be emphasizing that and stating that emphatically at this point in time. But yes, that is the stated reality of U.S. politics. The other piece, though, is that Taiwan is a country with

its own governance and robust democracy, as we've been discussing in this interview. While it doesn't have an embassy in the United States, it does have a trade office, which effectively functions as an embassy. I don't know if this is the elephant in the room. It's not really. It's like, yeah, Taiwan's been an independent country for a long time. It has nothing to do with Beijing, actually, from its own perspective. It's very odd. I mean, it's just existing in this weird falling between the cracks of what a state is. It's sort of a philosophical question of what makes a state, and does it need UN recognition? Does it need US recognition? Or is it a political unit which has its own elections and has its own army and conducts its own

foreign policy? And under those definitions, it is a state. And I think that's part of why even the DPP, which is more independent minded, finds that it's not worth it right now to declare that independence because they're getting a lot of the benefits of independence without that crazy provocation of China. At the same time, they are pursuing diplomatic priorities, I think it is a dozen exactly states that are left that recognize Taiwan as the one China. And indeed, one did drop off. That was one result of the election. And I'm sure that the CCP twisted the arm. And it's called Nauru. It's the second least populous country in the world. It's a Pacific island country of like 15,000 people. But it's important. And this gets back to the regional strategic picture, which is that those small Pacific countries, which are islands that are spread across thousands of miles and they have a few thousand people, but their territory covers thousands of miles. And those thousands of miles are the territory that the U.S. military would have to

traverse if they need to get over to Taiwan and China in the case of a war. So this is our backyard where China can be building military bases. They are trying to do so on the Solomon Islands, where Australia used to have some influence, but now China is putting their claws in there. And what they're doing is trying to get behind that first layer of defenses, which we call the first island chain, consisting of Japan, Taiwan, Philippines, and perhaps even further down, depending on how you define it. Then there's that second layer that they're trying to do a back-around play. And a lot of that is influence in the Pacific island nation. Well, yeah. In fact, I've had a number of leaders,

one leader from one of the states in the Solomon Islands, who now no longer is in his position because he decided to stand up against the communist regime's influence in that country. Similarly, former President Penuelo of the Federated States of Micronesia, which is much closer to the U.S., has that special relationship. I forget the term right now for that. But again, emphasizing how powerful, he had stories where the Chinese ambassador to FSM, when he was on mission somewhere, would literally be walking behind him and telling him what he should be saying and what positions he should be taking, which he took issue with, of course. But that's the kind of thing that happens out there at the moment. That's very haunting, but I believe it.

I think it's called the compact countries. Correct. That's exactly right. Yeah. Yeah. So there's three countries. They're independent countries, but actually the U.S. is responsible for their defense and some other diplomatic functions. So they're sort of client states in a way. And it's Marshall Islands, Micronesia, as you mentioned, and I think Palau. three contiguous island states with huge ocean areas around them, which if you look at it on a

map, literally, it's like the middle of where we would need to jump to get to China. And we ignored these states. And we really were out to lunch on that question. You know, one thing I wanted to mention very briefly before I take us to Japan, because I want to talk a little bit about Japan, where you are now, and why you're there on your way back to D.C. This gray zone warfare that you're describing that the CCP engages in, now that you mentioned the overflights to remind people who's in charge, the media control and so forth, of course, these are elements. But there's other elements which are actually physical. For example, what's a merchant marine for China

is very different than the merchant marine for the U.S. You've got reinforced hulls, you've got electronics that are basically built to be able to interface with the Chinese military. The merchant marine in China can function and does sometimes function as an arm of the PLA, and that's very interesting. But that as a model is something that China applies across the board. Another one would be Huawei. Why are Huawei products so incredibly cheap all over the world? And they've gotten this foothold because there's a strategic imperative here. It's not just like doing business. right? Sure. Sure.

I mean, yeah, they'll weaponize literally every aspect of, I mean, if you leave any avenue or lane open, they will fill it. I guess I'll call them a genius on that point. I mean, you know, some people will say they're evil geniuses and also, you know, they wait in terms of centuries rather than years. I don't know if they're that incredibly genius, but they just simply have the weight of numbers and the weight of will, which is this totalitarian dictatorship which wants to retain control and expand its control. If you don't mind me jumping in, they also

have the aid of the permissiveness of free nations for them to do all these things. So just if I could add that. Yeah. Oh, yeah. It's not one sided. We often say the key to defeating the CCP is American prosperity and bolstering the American homeland and, you know, American pride, strength, all that stuff. This is absolutely opportunistic. I mean, the U.S. has the potential. It still is the biggest economy, but the U.S. has the potential to have just a roaring economy, to have the biggest and best military, which is a deterrent, which

would help us avoid war. It would not cause war. And yeah, we were asleep at the wheel while China came in through research projects and through corporate acquisitions, taking tons of intellectual property through hundreds of thousands of students, an issue that we've dealt with a great deal at AFPI, which is the question of agricultural land as well as strategic land near infrastructure and military bases. Again, who was thinking about this? Who was thinking that they could buy tracts of a few hundred acres

that are within five miles of a military base like no one you know so they saw an opening they went for it it's legal like you're saying we're open societies we don't we don't think to check you know we have other countries investing when we looked at this question um i think you know it's canada Germany, Italy are some of the top investors in U.S. land. What are they using that for? Timber, wine, this sort of thing. We're not thinking that someone's going to take this land and do something nefarious with it. And that's exactly where the CCP finds that crack and goes in. Well, listen, as we finish up, let's talk a little bit about Japan. Japan is obviously

an incredibly important US ally in Asia. And so you're passing through there, I guess, on your way back here. Tell me a little bit about that. Yeah, I would like to emphasize that for anyone who doesn't see it that way. I think they're the absolute key. Of course, Taiwan itself, the health of Taiwan itself, their military is key. But Japan is really the top ally in this region and is incredibly important because it is still the number three economy. It is democratic, you know, and since World War II has had a strong, strong democratic

tradition, it has a direct treaty alliance with the United States. So if Japan goes to war, we go to war. And the thing is, with Taiwan, there's no question, and many people might not know this, that Japan would be drawn into that war immediately. Part of that is because we think of the main islands of Japan, and people in their head can sort of think of it, but there's this long archipelago, hundreds of miles of these little islands. One of them is Okinawa. So people have heard of that maybe. And that's the largest one. But they go all the way down to Taiwan.

And the last one is only 90 miles off of Taiwan. So if China were to invade Taiwan, they would need to neutralize those Japanese islands. And in fact, Japan is fortifying those islands. And I talked to some people here who are involved in that reform. And they are positioning, just as I said in Taiwan, they're positioning standoff weapons, they're positioning missiles that can reach into China on those islands. So there's just no question that China will hit those islands. And also, Japan hosts tens of thousands of US troops. We have huge naval bases there. We have Air Force bases

there. We are completely integrated defense-wise with them. And China will fire on those U.S. bases too. So a discussion I just had today with some retired military officials about communication between the U.S. and Japan military coordination, what forces would need to be, U.S. forces need to be in Japan for this kind of contingency? What is Japan able to contribute? And another big part of what Japan is going through is, of course, since World War II, they've had a pacifist constitution. So technically, they're not even supposed to have a military. They're not supposed to have an army, a navy, an air force. They call it the Japan Self-Defense Force. So that's the way they frame it. But since China has been on the rise,

and since President Xi especially, they're recognizing that this is a real present threat on their doorstep. And they underlined that for me. They said, we're here on the front line. You sit back there, you understand the threat. We feel this coming down our neck. And also from North Korea. North Korea is testing missiles that are going over Japan. So they're really a frontline state. Talk about Israel, talk about Taiwan. Japan is a frontline state. Adam, this has been a fascinating conversation. Any final thoughts as we finish? Since I'm sitting here in Japan, I would just say, because I'm having this experience right now, we have great allies here. We have real serious thinkers that are thinking about the future of Japan and also have a I'm perceiving a real care, affection and willingness to work with and help the United

States. And as I said, they're still a powerful country. They understand the threat of China. And it's just been a wonderful, illuminating experience to be able to talk with them. I hope that we will collaborate and confront this problem together. Well, Adam Savitz, it's such a pleasure to have had you on. Thanks so much for having me.