American Thought Leaders - Welcome to ‘Post-Journalism’: How Polarization Became the Business Model–Martin Gurri
Episode Date: October 9, 2024“Post-journalism essentially is the idea that journalism commodifies polarization,” says former CIA media analyst Martin Gurri.Instead of seeking objectivity and broad appeal to the general public..., media seek to become a refuge for a subset of the population: “a temple of ideology” for people who share the same worldview, Gurri argues.“If you take the Russia story where [Trump] was supposed to have been basically Vladimir Putin’s agent, [the New York Times] published at least 3,000 (by my estimate) stories on Trump being manipulated by the Russians. … They got millions and millions of subscribers because of that,” Gurri says.He’s the author of the “The Fifth Wave” Substack column and author of “The Revolt of the Public and the Crisis of Authority in the New Millennium.”In this episode, we dive into the radical transformation of the media and information ecosystems.Views expressed in this video are opinions of the host and the guest, and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times.
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What is post-journalism? It's an entirely new business model.
And it was stumbled on by the New York Times.
In 2016, the New York Times had less than 1 million digital subscribers and was struggling.
Trump comes.
By the end of the Trump administration today, the New York Times has 10 million digital subscribers.
Martin Gurry is a writer, a former media analyst at the CIA,
and author of the
pre-Shan 2014 book, The Revolt of the Public and the Crisis of Authority in the New Millennium.
Post-journalism essentially is the idea that journalism commodifies polarization.
In this deep dive interview, he breaks down the radical transformation of our media and
information landscape after the internet, in effect,
democratized information. The elite have seen their authority completely hemorrhage away,
and they are on the warpath about it. They're trying to create censorship structures.
They're giving us reasons why democracy can't survive unless we censor information and
communication that the everyday public has access to. This is American Thought Leaders, and I'm Jan Jankiewicz.
Martin Goury, such a pleasure to have you on American Thought Leaders.
Happy to be here.
Let's talk about post-journalism.
I'm very excited, actually, to have this conversation,
because we live in a world today where media do not work
the way that we thought they did.
And you've been looking into this.
Andre Mir, who wrote the book Post-Journalism, has been
looking into this.
Let's dive in.
Okay.
I think it's best to go back and say we never really
understood what was going on with media. For example, in the old days of newspapers, the newspapers
were never sold to the public.
No American newspaper ever survived by selling newspapers
to the public.
They sold airspace, or eye space, eyeball space, to
advertisers.
Now, when you have advertisers more or less dominating your
business model, you can have a special kind of style.
That's the old journalistic style that was so kind of
remote and abstract.
And you will very much make a case that you
are being objective.
You're not taking sides.
And you take opinion
to be this dangerous, volatile substance, and you kind of put it in the corner of your
newspaper and say, this is opinion over here. You can look at it or not. But the rest is
fact. It's reporting. It's great. It's objective. Well, that model blew up with the internet
because all the advertisers went online.
So now what is post-journalism?
It's an entirely new business model.
And it was stumbled on by the New York Times.
And the New York Times may be the only one who can be
successful, because I'm not sure you can
have more than one.
But it basically means that you are now a temple of ideology for a specific set of people
who believe in that ideology. So in this case obviously it's very liberal,
very progressive people, very anti-Trump people. When I say the New York Times
stumbled into this, it was 2016. In 2016 the New York Times had less than 1 million digital subscribers and
was struggling. Trump comes. By the end of the Trump administration today, the New York
Times has 10 million digital subscribers. They, by trial and error, realized that by posing as the sort of like hand-holding therapy,
almost religious, it's a creedal thing, safety garden,
where everybody who was terrified by Trump could come trooping into this protected garden
and be told the right words, be told, no, no, no, he's going to get impeached,
no, don't worry, look at all the horrible things that he did.
For example, if you take the Russia story where he was supposed to have been basically
Vladimir Putin's agent, they published 3,000, at least 3,000 by my estimate, stories on
Trump being manipulated by the Russians.
Was that correct?
Well, in the old journalistic world, it would have been very incorrect because when the report was made on that particular subject,
there was no collusion whatsoever, right?
Was it correct from a business model sense?
Well, yeah, they got millions and millions of subscribers because of that.
So now you have a very different model, and you have
a very different tone.
And you can call Trump a liar.
The word is used all the time.
You can censor certain news.
If you talk to Barry Weiss, who lived in the New York
Times for a while, she'll tell you she could not get certain
stories published
because they went against the great story that they're trying to promote.
Post-journalism essentially is the idea that journalism commodifies polarization.
And so far the New York Times has done it really well.
As I say, there can only be one pope. There can only be one church.
I'm not sure that any other newspaper can survive doing
that particular trick, but they're doing it pretty well.
And by the way, the word is not mine.
It's my friend Andre Mir, who wrote a book called Post
Journalism, who I would recommend to anybody who's
interested in the subject.
Well, I would also recommend that book and many others,
and of course your book, The Revolt of the Public,
which I think was updated in 2018.
But you first wrote it in 2014.
You were seeing a lot of the, I guess,
you saw the beginnings of the disruption,
and then you foresaw a lot more of what was going to happen
already as early as 2014.
Yeah, okay.
I get accused a lot of being prescient and having
prophesied all kinds of things.
If you look at the very first page of that book, I say
prophecy is a bad business model.
You want to be wrong, make a forecast.
I come from CIA.
I can tell you this is a bad idea.
What I had working at the global media analysis wing of
CIA, was a very high place, a very high perch.
And I could see farther than most people from there.
So I could see this thing coming.
I could see the internet coming.
And I could see not only that it was changing communications and
changing, but that there was something very political and
socially disruptive.
Tremendous.
As countries digitized, I could see behind that tsunami
of information sweeping through, I could see just ever
increasing levels of social and political turbulence.
And at the time, of course, it sounds naive.
Now, of course, we know that it's probably the most disrupting medium that has come since at least the printing press,
and that the disruption that it began way back at the beginning of the century
hasn't even come close to be over yet.
Why don't I tell you how I've been describing what has happened?
This is actually from my reading of Andre Mir, which frankly has changed a lot of my
thinking about media.
He's really coming from the vantage point, as you do, that it's actually the nature of how media work has this profound, even a greater influence on how we communicate than the actual
topics that are being discussed or the opinions.
Right.
I mean, Andre, he's a McLuhanist.
I am somewhat of a McLuhanist.
Maybe just briefly, so Marshall McLuhan, just
give us a little thumbnail of what he is.
Well, he was a very brilliant, very eccentric writer.
I mean, if you read his books, you end up scratching your
head a lot, because he talks about everything.
He talks about everything with a lot of confidence and says a
lot of weird things, but basically had what you just
said, the principle that technology as a whole, not just media, but technology as a whole has a structure that determines human behavior.
It's an ecological force, right?
It changes the landscape.
Technology changes the landscape.
So you are forced to behave differently because the landscape is different.
Now, the information landscape, to me, is the most important.
And he's famous for saying the medium is the message.
The medium is the structure.
You and I tend to, most everybody tends to just bicker
over, well, he said this about that.
This is a lie.
This is truth.
Deal with content.
McLuhan dealt with structure.
And Andre Mir does the same thing he believes that the
structure of communications of information determines a great deal of
our behavior simply by being an ecological force but being
transformative of the landscape that we live in so if you have a television set
you have the whole family gathered there passively taking things on.
If you have the internet, you're sitting pounding away
going, I like, I dislike, I'm going to yell at this guy.
It's very different.
The structure is different.
Your landscape is different.
You're going to be different.
It can't help.
And you can deal with the little tactical content
questions, but what matters is the bigger picture, the
structure has been imposed on the landscape.
Well, so I'm gonna explain in my very glib way of what I see Andrei's argument is,
and I'm gonna get you to comment on it, okay, because actually maybe I
can learn a bit more and add to my story or fix it. Back in the day, before the printing press,
before the Gutenberg press, human beings lived and tended to live in smaller groups. They would
share a value system, the whole kind of cosmology, the whole concept of reality.
And as we know, through a lot of studies in psychology, a lot of the, as we know through a lot of psych studies in psychology,
a lot of our communication is actually nonverbal, right?
Our emoting can be much more important in a way.
What we're emoting with the eye contact and everything is very, maybe has a much
bigger influence than even the words that I'm using and some, some people would argue.
If you ever talk to somebody who speaks a foreign language, you don't understand,
you know, that's true because you can communicate.
Right.
Yeah, exactly. Exactly%. So then with time, suddenly we get to the Gutenberg Bible,
of course you get to the written word, and there's a few steps now, and suddenly you can actually
mass produce information and send it out as a single message, right? But the written word
is much more abstract than this type of communication.
So it's actually hard. Shakespeare was good at transmitting emotion. And of course, there's
pamphleteers and propaganda and things like that. But it's actually difficult. You have to be really
good at it to transmit that stuff in the written word. But what happens subsequently, we get radio, then we get television, we get the internet,
we get social media, and then we get AI juiced up social media. This is a very rapid progression.
We have this way of transmitting a single idea or a single video to millions of people in many cases.
But now we have that same ability to emote, that ability to communicate in all these
other ways than just the written word, and for people to receive them that don't share that same
value system necessarily. And so we basically end up in this situation where we either kind of pick
the people that we agree with and we push away the people that we don't or the messages.
And that's inherently polarizing.
And hence, what I think Andre said, he says that polarization is the software of media today,
which when I first read that, I was really kind of stunned.
But I think there's truth to that.
So, okay, here we go.
There's my story.
What do you think? truth to that. So OK, here we go. There's my story.
What do you think?
Well, what Andrei says, of course, is that he
estimates in some way that I'm not sure I can follow, that
there were possibly, in the 2,500 years of literacy, there
were possibly 300 million people who consider themselves
to be authors to an audience. 300 million people who consider themselves to be authors to an audience, right? 300 million.
In the last 40 years, we have 5 billion, okay? This has just exploded exponentially. The number
of people, he calls it the emancipation of authorship, right? Now, when you have 5 billion
people in a room, what happens? Well, it's this gigantic noise.
It's this gigantic noise.
So the thing you need, whereas what you needed in the olden
days of top-down communication was enough money to get a
printing press, to buy newspaper, to get a delivery
system, if you had that kind of money, you could hire the
reporters, you could do it.
That's what
you need. What you need now is attention. How do you get attention in this
enormous, gigantic room with five billion people in it, all talking at the same
time? Well, number one, you want to talk louder than anybody else. So yelling and
screaming is favored by the structure. Number two, if I can get you to
start yelling at me, and
then people start lining up behind me saying, oh yeah,
he's a bad guy.
He's one of those guys.
And suddenly I'm a leader of my tribe.
I get way more attention.
So Jonathan Haidt, who's a social psychologist who's
written some wonderful books, he calls it the Tower of Babel.
Where it's a strange situation where we're all speaking foreign languages to each other.
And I'm yelling at you and you're yelling at me, and we're both gaining from it because
people are lining up behind us. But in fact, I'm not listening to you because I barely understand
what you're saying. And it's the same with you. There's no communication. And so polarization is as much a factor of a rhetorical
posture, and it's a question I have.
It's a question I have, OK?
And I don't have the answer, which is, to what extent is
internet anger, rage, which everybody talks so much about,
real, and to what extent is, you know, back in the day of the Elizabethans, lovers, the
gentlemen would write sonnets to their girlfriends, right?
Well, I'm pretty sure the sonnets didn't come trippingly out of their mouths.
That was just what was expected.
You know, if you were a gentleman in Elizabethan England, you're supposed to write a sonnet
to your girlfriend.
It better be a good one.
If you are an opinionator, as all of us are in the Tower of
Babel, you better pretend to be angry, whether
you are or not.
So is it a rhetorical posture?
To what extent is it real underneath that?
I don't know.
It's a question.
Fascinating.
Because again, the medium is dictating the nature of the
rhetoric.
And this is what keeps me up at night.
I think you're right.
Is there room for people that don't want to be angry in
their communication?
This is an enormous room with 5 billion people.
I think there's room for everybody.
I think if you want increased attention, follow the New
York Times.
Start your own little church of progressive elitism and
say, this is a protected garden.
Come to us.
And you will go from 1 million to 10 million
subscribers in five years.
Otherwise, there will always be people who don't want to
be yelled at.
And I never, to my knowledge, have ever written in an angry
or enraged mode.
People read what I write.
So yeah, you can do it.
But you're swimming upstream.
Another way to talk about this, and of course, I'm
particularly interested in this because it is of profound
significance for what we want to do with the Epoch Times.
It's never been our purpose to make people angry.
It's never been our purpose to polarize people.
Our purpose actually has been to inform.
But what you and Andre would say would be, well, no, the
purpose of media these days is to validate, not inform.
Well, yes, in a sense that's true.
I would say, though, that in what the web does, and I think
in some sense this is even more depressing than
everything else we've been talking about, because it's
making up for a lack of what should be happening in the real
world, is create communities.
So there is a possibility.
You, representing the Epoch News, have a possibility of
creating a special kind of community.
Doesn't have to be angry.
It can be a specialization.
You're interested in this particular part of the world, or this particular topic, but we all,
you come here, and you are now in my protected garden, we'll
talk about the things that we want to talk about. And you're
safe from the Tower of Babel. All right. So yeah, I mean, I
think it's community as much as anything else.
It is. And the, again, what the thing that keeps me up at night,
since we're talking about this, is I have to believe that there's enough people out there
who want to learn new things, who want to be challenged, who want to figure out how to
communicate with people that have dramatically different ideas than they do.
Because my concern is, to me, the logical conclusion of this Tower of Babel setup,
where you have the people that are most effective at kind of, let's say, harnessing their particular tribes,
we'll just end up fighting each other. I hesitate because there is such a gigantic air gap between the Tower of Babel, the digital world,
and you and I sitting here in this room in the flesh.
It's such an air gap.
And the people who go and rage online,
go feed their cats and take their puppies for a walk
and are probably the meekest of the meek.
It's hard to tell how those two worlds interact, far more
so than has been with any previous information
structure, with a possible exception of the printing
press, which was terribly disruptive.
Basically, you're saying in real life, you can be
this super nice, compassionate person, but suddenly you're on
X or some other place, and you're just a terror.
Well, I mean, that's what I'm talking about.
Because you're expected to be.
Because the structure is telling you, if you just kind
of become this mealy-mouthed, nice guy, nobody's going to
listen to you, and nobody talks their way on the web.
You have brash, loud scream rage. mouth, nice guy, nobody's going to listen to you, and nobody talks their way on the web.
You have brash, loud scream rage.
So is that really what's happening?
If you were on the street confronting what we're seeing, we're seeing almost staged versions
of the online conflicts, for example, between pro-Israel and pro-Palestinian groups. So maybe
that's the bad future would be that suddenly this becomes real, okay? But
honestly, if you look at a lot of the people who have been, for example, I have
looked at the protests in Colombia, I wrote about that. I mean, these are a
bunch of privileged characters that they say a lot of harsh words about killing Zionists, for
example, but I, you know.
Most of them aren't ready to do that.
I think if you dropped them in Gaza, they would
just basically go into fetal position and hope that
somebody would rescue them.
Because they're not killers.
They're not really ideological warriors.
They're internet warriors, which is an
entirely different thing.
And they've taken it enough that in a university
environment where that is rewarded, they have been very
vocal in some ways, I think very vicious, about the
opposite side.
Media has been democratized, right?
And then on the other hand, one of the constructs I've heard it described as is, you know, there's
the sort of the vestiges of the traditional media model trying to, you know, basically
stop that, you know, the revolt of the public, so to speak.
But you're making me think about this differently,
because you just explained to me how the New York Times
built its business, which is definitely not the old model.
Nope.
No.
Everything is going to change.
Everything's going to change.
The people, and there's no question in my mind that it's not just media,
which was obviously, for pretty understandable reasons,
first to be disrupted by the internet.
There was a class of individuals with a following,
by the way, that ran the world in the 20th century.
I call them elites. You can call them whatever you wish.
They basically ran these very important institutions,
not just government, but, for example, the universities,
the media, of course, scientific establishment, business, entertainment.
These are people who ran these institutions and they expected a certain deference and
respect and control particularly.
And that got blown away, got blown away.
All the institutions of the 21st century were started in the 20th, which was the heyday
of the top-down, I talk, you listen model of organizing humanity.
And that model required a semi-monopoly over information to be legitimate.
And that got blown away by the internet.
So the last 20 years I've seen this.
Revolt of the Public is, of course, the title of my book.
But the subtitle was The Crisis of Authority of the Institution,
the crisis of authority in the 21st century.
The elite have seen their authority completely hemorrhage away, and they are on the warpath
about it.
They are on the warpath about it right now.
They're trying to create censorship structures.
They're giving us reasons why democracy can't survive unless we censor material, unless
we limit the amount of material information and communication that the everyday public has
access to.
Because the public, in this view, is very gullible and can be easily misled by these
populists like Donald Trump through means like fake news, for example.
And therefore some set of guardians who don't share this weakness of gullibility must be
interposed between the origin of the media, of the source, and the public.
In other words, they must censor and detoxify the flow of digital information.
We are at the present moment in this very politicized pre-election moment, are confronting an administration
that without ifs or buts says, we need to censor free speech.
Things are not like they used to be.
Back in the days of the Constitution framers, information was very different.
Things have changed, you need to allow us to censor it so that we can
protect the truth.
And of course, those of us who come from Cuba have heard this
story before.
And it's not about truth, it's about control.
But what's interesting, though, is the thing
I've come to realize is that a lot of the people that are advocating for this fact
checking, I say that in quotes because I think fact checking
is actually a good thing in general.
You have to do it every day when you're doing news.
But they believe that this is the right and good thing to do
for the good of humanity.
So many people I've encountered believe that.
Yeah.
And the argument they give is, well, I'm
perceptive enough to see when somebody like Trump
is trying to manipulate me with fake news.
But there's millions out there who are not perceptive.
And it is my duty to protect them.
Between that proposition and what the Cuban Communist
Party put out as its policy for media, there isn't that
much space.
It's essentially asserting that there is a vanguard that
is wiser than the public that should be in control of
information so the public is not misled.
And I don't know how you square that with our
traditional democratic values.
Yet, we are in this unbelievably chaotic
situation, which is leading to all sorts of problems.
And the question is how to deal with it.
I mean, I think that's part of the situation where we have
all these different solutions to deal with the problem of
this new communication structure.
Yeah.
Number one, it's not a problem.
It's a condition.
You have now been hit by this tsunami.
And you're kind of flopping around in the tsunami in this
gigantic wave of information.
And yeah, it's nice to say, well, if you listen to me,
like New York Times, I will shrink your information set to
the tiny little bit of very comforting news, using words
that are very soothing to you, so that your particular
ideological slant is protected from all this wounding world that's tossing
around so much, right?
And you can do that.
It's a business model and many people are doing it for other ideological stances.
It can be Breitbart or whatever.
But we're caught in the wave.
We're caught in the tsunami and there are no in the tsunami, and there are no solutions.
We have to ride this thing out. We have to figure out what works and what doesn't.
We're in basically the very first stages of this colossal transformation,
and I'm not gonna live to see the end of it, okay? I'm looking at you. Maybe you
will, maybe you won't, all right? But to give you a parallel so that we are not overcome with moroseness and pessimism,
it's a story that a friend of mine, Antonio Garcia Martinez,
a very smart human being, fellow Cuban, a story he tells, which is, suppose you went on a time machine to the
Thirty Years' War.
Now, the Thirty Years' War, including World War II, was the most horrific war ever fought
in Europe, you know, in terms of slaughter, percentage of slaughter of the population.
It took Germany two or three generations to recover.
It was horrible.
And it was horrible for a reason.
So suppose you go there and you ask a typical bystander, say, well, what do you think of
the printing press?
Well, he would say, it's the most destructive and vicious invention that has ever been foisted on the human race.
Because look, these people are coming out of this church over here with their creed,
and those people are coming out over there with their creed,
and there's four words missing here that are not in there,
and now I've got to kill you.
They have to kill each other.
Because why?
Because they have little books that have different words about what you're supposed to believe in terms of religion.
So it took the printing press years and a lot more disruption and a lot more horrible
disaster and human tragedy for it to be, you know, we learned what to do with it.
Today we know that without the printing press we wouldn't have had the scientific revolution,
we wouldn't have had the American revolution.
Basically the world today is what it is.
It's probably the most liberating, the most liberating information transformation in the
history of the human race.
But go back to the Thirty Years' War when when it was beginning, and people would say it's
terrible.
It's terrible.
So right now we're in the middle of this tsunami flipping around, and it looks terrible.
It need not be.
It need not be.
As you have said several times, it's a democratization of information.
It need not be a bad thing.
In fact, you can see how our democracy, which is, by the
way, a word that we use for these enormous constructs like
the federal government, which are democratic in some
abstract way.
We vote for somebody and then they disappear.
Our democracy could become a lot more participatory and a
lot more interactive thanks to the internet.
Now, is that going to happen?
I don't make predictions, but it could.
Right.
Yeah, it could.
And then, of course, what does it mean to protect rights?
I mean, this question is suddenly at the forefront.
We're actually having that argument, too.
What does it really mean?
What are the real foundational rights that we have? I don't think we all agree on this question.
I think, well, I mean, let's put it this way. I think the disagreement has to do with people who,
so Justice Brown, who said, looking at the First Amendment, it may go too far because it hampers the government
in carrying out its duties.
Well that's the whole point of the First Amendment, right?
So there are people who are looking at it.
By the way, I can show you a poll that has a majority of Americans saying the First Amendment
does go too far.
And I can show you another poll that shows a substantial minority of Americans saying
we should censor the Internet.
I mean, this is people who feel like their point of view can only survive
if these rights are somehow smothered.
And there are people who would like to control the
institutions in a way that they used to back in the 20th
century, who find themselves very uncomfortable.
If you're an elite today, it's a very uncomfortable thing.
They're always looking at you.
They always know who you are.
Every mistake you make, every misjudgment, every shady deal,
every sexual escapade, everything that you do is being talked about endlessly.
And you don't want that. You want to be back in your sealed room where you make decisions that
nobody knows about it. So there's a pressure to, maybe we should, you know, abridge these rights
so that we can go back to being the way we'd like to be.
I keep thinking about The Viral Inquisitor, because
this is, of course, the title of Andrei's new book, A
Collection of Essays.
But you tell me that's your word.
It's my phrase, yeah.
And it happened as follows.
If you read his first book, Human as Media, he explains,
which I thought was a brilliant argument, because
most everything he writes is brilliant.
He explained that there's this thing about lies online.
There's this terrible feeling of lies online.
And he goes, no, the internet has what he called the viral
editor, which is, how do you know there are lies online?
How do you know?
Well, because somebody online caught it and put it out that
it's a lie.
So he says, it's a viral editor.
Many, many people, it's far more accurate than the fact
finders or the actual editors of magazines.
So this is what Elon Musk's idea of the
community notes, right?
It's basically the viral editors.
But it's unstructured.
It's a completely unstructured thing.
It happens because of the structure of the medium.
People are going to find out if you're lying, and they're
going to put it there.
And if you want to see whether it's a lie or not, you will
find out.
Now, me being sarcastic, and sometime having passed after
that moment when Andre wrote that, I realized, well, now And so the viral editor had become sort of like the digital
equivalent of the Spanish inquisition, the viral
inquisitor, who is constantly hunting for a way to get
people to believe that he's the real deal.
And so I think that's a very interesting thing.
And I think that's a very interesting thing.
And I think that's a very interesting thing.
And I think that's a very interesting thing.
And I think that's a very interesting thing. like the digital equivalent of the Spanish inquisition, the
viral inquisitor, who is constantly hunting for
heretical opinions that they can then pound on and
criticize.
So that's the origin of that phrase.
So you see a future, because there's foundational
questions here, right?
Many.
One of the questions.
OK.
Tell me a few of the ones that are coming to your mind.
Well, the foundational question is how do we
ride this tsunami without breaking apart
somebody like myself?
How do we make sure that
liberal democracy, whatever it is that we mean by that, and
includes very much, maybe primarily those rights we
were talking about before, is conducted at the end of this
process without being damaged, number one, or maybe even
being improved, number two.
How do we come to terms with the fact that the public
left to its own devices is mainly against?
Because we were fractured.
I mean, I say the word public, but it's many publics, right?
It just sounds stupid to speak of the public in plural.
So I always call it the public. Back, an old guy like me, in the day of mass media, the
mass media world looked like a gigantic mirror in which we
all saw ourselves reflected.
It was meant for all of us, and all of us were there.
Well, online culture has just shattered that mirror, and the
public lives on the pieces.
It can't unite or mobilize around any program, any ideology, any organization, any leader
mostly.
It's too fractured.
It organizes and mobilizes around repudiation.
The public is always against.
Now, you push that to the logical conclusion, and you
get nihilism, right?
You get the idea that destruction is a
form of progress.
So on the one hand, you have the public heading in that
direction, and on the other hand, you have these elites
who are wanting to drag us back into the 20th century.
So we're going to talk about foundational questions.
How do we get beyond this?
This is exactly what I was thinking.
It's this sort of the nihilism, because we're seeing that even people that traditionally or groups of people that I wouldn't expect, very kind of forward-thinking, American dream people,
I guess, I don't know, like buying into or sort of accepting these incredibly nihilistic narratives.
I could give a bunch of examples, but I'm seeing that
a lot in a lot of different areas.
And I mean, there can be no future in that.
Right.
Right?
Right.
I mean, OK, barbarism, right?
If you are into bashing at the institutions that the elites
control, as a view of the public and hate what's going
on with the institutions, and if you look at opinion surveys, they
do, you just take a hammer and go after them.
You have really no alternative in mind.
In the olden days, radical groups had wanted power, first
of all, so they could impose a program based on some
ideology.
The public today doesn't even want power.
It has no ideology.
It is opposed on principle to ideologies and programs.
It thinks those are the kinds of things that the elites do.
So they just go after the institutions and bash at them.
And bad as these institutions are, helpless and useless as they seem to be in this new
age of the tsunami, they're necessary.
You cannot do away with them.
So yes, the consequences of nihilism is barbarism.
You told me you're optimistic, though. I have always been a short-term pessimist and a
long-term optimist.
And I think being Cuban helps.
Being Cuban helps.
Because, for example, when people start talking about
Donald Trump and saying dictator, I laugh inside.
I was 10 years old and I had already known two dictators.
I was basically trained on dictators as a kid.
I can smell them.
I know what you need to have.
Forget it.
Americans have no idea of dictators.
The situation in this country is
dire to those who have no perspective from outside the United States. It is not as dire
as you think. Our institutions, and this is the brilliance of the framers that put it
together, are a lot stronger than we think. Yes, they're being battered, no question about it.
We're all tumbling along in the wave.
But they're stronger than you think.
The American people is sort of undergoing a psychotic moment,
I think.
But compared to what I experienced when I was in Cuba,
it's a fundamentally sound and sensible people.
And I think in the end, we will recover our wits.
And I think in the end, we will see this to the end
in a way that is enhancing of democracy.
And it's not an analytic judgment.
It's an act of faith.
I'm not a Marxist who believes that history is inevitable, right?
It all depends on what we do.
Each of us has a part to play. We've done this before, all right? I mean, the 18th
century, the actual democracy, which was not a democracy, we called it a republic, that
the framers came up with was kind of a gentleman's club, right? It was very egalitarian if you
belonged to a set of people, right? But women were left out, poor people, originally, if
you didn't own property, lots of people were left out.
The original republic was remade in the early 20th century. It's going to have to be remade again, and hopefully can be remade in a more democratic way.
There seems to be this AI revolution happening. When I say AI revolution, in the sense that AI
is becoming democratized. There's something profoundly
impactful. Even in terms of elections, you see an image, however fake it was, however
completely created out of thin air, basically, by an AI. It could change your behavior and change
your decision-making because you just saw it at that first moment. And even you know later that it's fake. But we just have no idea how all this is
going to impact us or do we?
Is this really as profound as I think it is right now?
We have no idea.
And I actually know a little about a few things.
But I know a lot about images.
I actually did a study of visual persuasion when I was
in CIA with two very, very smart people.
And I think in an earlier conversation, I said that I'm
skeptical that I can give you words that are going to
change your mind.
No matter how I give you words, you're going to be
sitting there thinking, I've read all this before.
It's not what I believe.
I'm hunkering down.
Images are different.
Images bypass your frontal cortex.
And literally, this happens.
Because I think we're trained to see images
as part of the real world, as opposed to text and words,
which are much more abstract.
Come in your reptile brain, and you just respond to them.
You just respond to images in a way that you do not to text.
Part of the issue with the internet, when you think about
it, the internet in some strange way is a triumph of
the image over the printed word, I think.
And a lot of persuasion takes place that way.
The problem is, how does it work?
Who knows?
Persuasion towards what?
And you're right.
Even if you know it's false, it doesn't even have to be,
oh, you later find out that it's false.
Even when you know that it's false, even when you know
you're being manipulated, you're being manipulated.
Now you can then say, well, I won't go that way, but I've
literally been present in studies where a young woman
was being shown very emotive visuals, with a video.
And she was going like, this is nothing.
And she had electrodes in her brain, and her brain was going
crazy, was going crazy.
You could see it.
She could not.
She thought she was immune.
She was not.
So that's another layer of complexity to throw at you.
I see our duty in media.
What I want to do, okay, what I want to do,
what I think is our duty in media is to inform effectively,
give people good information so they can figure out what they want to do with it,
what they want to do with a better understanding of reality
by having a more complete picture.
Is it possible to do that today?
I don't think it was ever possible to do that, honestly.
I don't think it was ever possible.
And here I'm saying you're this optimist.
What do you mean?
The old model, which I think you guys are sort of still adhering to in some ways.
The old model was all the news has fit to read.
Walter Cronkite saying, that's the way it. That's all that happened, right? Well, no.
Then and now, there was a tremendous distorting
selection process.
In other words, why do you pick this news and not that news?
Because you do your best.
You do your best.
You tell yourself, of course it's always good to have
this news.
But you also have to be careful about the other news. In other words, why do you pick this news and not that news? Because you do your best.
You do your best.
You tell yourself, of course it's always going to be
through the lens of the journalist or the media.
But it's more than that.
It's more than that.
There are, as in every structure, ways of guiding
you to places.
So for example, long before the current war in Gaza
and the horrible massacre of October 7th in Israel,
I would say a person that gets shot in Israel
or the Palestinian territories
is worth many hundreds of thousands of people, maybe millions of people, who get
shot in the Congo.
Because every person that gets shot in Israel or the
Palestinian territory makes it to the news and becomes a
controversy and an issue.
Millions have died in the Congo, and we have paid no
attention, millions.
All right?
So there are certain-
But that's not a reflection just on their
intrinsic value.
It's just somehow we've assigned this kind of value.
A different kind of, this is not McLuhan, but agenda
setting theory says you read the news as if they were the
important, whatever makes it to the news, this was Trump's, you know,
highway to the White House,
was, yeah, everybody kept yelling at him,
but they kept covering him.
So in the people's minds,
he's important because he's being talked about
all the time.
So if you cover Israel
and don't cover the Congolese
because these are important
and these are not, okay?
Plus, okay, the arts, philosophy.
When was the last time you saw anything that doesn't exist?
Well, you get a little arts column and you get many, many
aspects of human experience that are just simply not
covered in the news.
Politics gets this gigantic
disproportionate primacy. Why? Well, I don't know. But parallel with that, we have come to believe
that the most important thing in society is politics, right? When I came to this country
many, many, many, many years ago, this is the first thing I noticed as
a young kid in sixth grade.
And I'm looking around and I'm going, nobody's talking politics.
I'm not kidding you, in Cuba the sixth grade kids talked politics endlessly.
It was the only subject, right?
This country, politics is not that important.
It really has a limited effect on our lives.
But in the news it becomes not that important. It really has a limited effect on our lives. But in the news, it becomes this powerful thing.
Now, if you want a historical reason for that, it's because
in the olden days, journalists were essentially cat's paws
for politicians and whatnot.
And we're putting out ideas that the
elites found interesting.
So I say it has never been true that you
can inform the
world, you have to make dire, amputative choices.
Sure.
Absolutely.
And by the end, you're not really
representing reality.
This is representing something very either personal or
institutional to you, right?
Something that you have been told is the important stuff,
or that you feel is the important stuff, and you're conveying that to somebody.
So lots of information is dying out there.
You're not a postmodernist.
You believe objective reality exists, just for the record.
Right?
I absolutely believe objective reality exists.
But I also believe that most reality that you and I
think we know is mediated.
It's mediated reality.
Of course it is.
So I just feel that our moment, now we're talking
crisis of authority, right?
So truth should be connected to reality, obviously.
But truth is something we receive from trusted sources.
Except, unless we can confirm it with their own eyes that that's hardly anything.
It's trusted sources.
When trusted authorities, when trust evaporates and authority goes into crisis, we enter this moment of post-truth.
Where anybody can say anything and pretend that it's so, right?
So.
And we're just trying to mitigate this also because there's so many things right now, right?
I'll tell you what Andrei says about that.
It is the most fun, because he and I, I guess, both began in
propaganda analysis.
So he says the most interesting news you can read
is fake news.
And the most interesting part of fake news is the fake part.
Because, this is me original, because, you know, somebody can say, well, the sky is blue, and I saw it, and it was blue.
It really was blue.
But somebody tells you, the sky is puce.
And you go, I don't even know what that means.
But why is he saying that?
Who is this person?
Who is behind him? Who
is he aiming this report at? Is it me? Is it somebody else? What does he expect to happen
because of this? So a whole range of intellectual questions get asked about this fake news that
is blatantly fake. Far more interesting than somebody honestly trying to just tell you
the sky is blue. I think young people should be trained to think that way. In other words, don't think in terms of platonic truth,
because us being perspectival animals in a vastly mediated
society, you can only get at it sideways.
Think of it in terms of perspectives and why you're
being told this information.
Who is it that you're being told this information.
Who is it that you're being told?
Why did it come out this way?
Why would anybody tell a blatant lie?
Why do people lie?
More than how do we get at the truth, there's a fascination, I think, much more interesting
is why do people lie?
What do they think is happening?
Are they lying to themselves or Or are they actually trying to
force that on you? When I was in government, we studied the jihadi videos and jihadi pronouncements,
and I read more bin Laden than you would ever want to and stuff. And it was clear to me
that these people believed deeply that they could murder 3,000 innocents, and they were
heroes to themselves. And that's not it.
You think that's not an insight.
It's a big insight because inside CIA, when the people talked about them, they called them the bad guys.
So the bad guys did this.
The bad guys did that.
Well, you had the feeling that bin Laden woke up every morning thinking, what bad thing can I do today?
He was a hero to himself.
That's an insight into the people you're dealing with. So insights get gathered from whether you're lying to
yourself, whether you're lying to the other person.
You achieve a much richer understanding of the
information set by looking at what's false than you do by
looking at what's true.
You may not learn as much in terms of platonic truth, but
in terms of what's going on in the world, maybe so. That's true. You may not learn as much in terms of platonic truth, but in terms of
what's going on in the world, maybe so. No, I mean, that's fascinating. And there's a whole discussion
we could have possibly about how important ideology is in understanding somebody. Because
somehow we assume that people we're dealing with or countries we're dealing with or cultures have
the same assumptions we do.
And in many cases, they're not.
If we don't factor that, if we don't take that into account,
we could have dramatic foreign policy failures, for example,
and so forth.
Totally.
If you're standing on top of the Empire State Building and
you're looking at Manhattan skyline, it looks
like the heavenly city.
And if you're at the bottom of the Empire State Building and
the cars are choking you with fumes and there's a bum there
looking like he's a dead man and maybe throwing up and
everything, it looks like hell.
It's the same New York City with two very
different perspectives.
So the first thing you have to understand when you get
information is what's the perspective?
Who is this person at the top of the Empire State Building
or at the bottom?
And I think you achieve a much richer.
If you ask me, my definition of analysis, which is I
consider myself to be an analyst, is strain yourself as
much as you can. You can never do it.
You can never do the 360 degree of, I can see every possible perspective. God maybe can do that.
I can't. Okay. But as much, the exercise has to be, what do the people who disagree with me
completely, what perspective is that? Where does it come from? Right do you at least have a more rounded idea of any given
proposition than is it platonically true,
platonically false?
Or this person, Trump said it, Hitler said it, so it must be
false, right?
Or my side.
Right, that's Andre's thing, right?
Two plus two.
Andre says two plus two.
In the current environment, two plus two equals four is false, if said by Hitler.
So the truth is who is attached to and what ideological cluster it belongs with.
Yeah, but I reject that foundationally.
But I think we're on the same page.
See, it's so interesting. I think we're exactly on the same page when it comes to really trying to understand where the perspective is coming through,
because that gets you closer to that, you know, approximation of reality, right, if you can capture that.
You can, what you're trying to get is a grip on what's going on, right?
If what you're getting is mostly a bunch of either very tendentious to the point of almost being false or actually false or actually propagandistic, use that.
Ask yourself, where does that come from? Why are they lying? Why are they being tendentious? Why do they expect to gain? Are they gaining? Is it working?
Who's the audience? Is it me? Is it somebody else? That's an endless game, by the way. You can get lost in it. But it's a
lot of fun. And in the end, you come away understanding how the
information streams and players interact a lot better that way.
Maybe as we finish up, for the typical person that
might be watching this show, what's the best way to stay
sane in this environment?
That's a really good question.
I'm not sure that I've succeeded.
But I always say, read books.
Read books.
Everybody says, well, why do they do this?
The newspaper's going away.
How will people know?
OK, read books. Everybody says, well, why do they do this? The newspaper is going away. How will people know? OK, read books.
It's fine to read articles.
I write them.
Please read them.
But there is such a surfeit of people basically opinionating
and explaining and lying that if you dive too deeply into it,
you may lose your mind.
So do what I said before, which is do the perspective.
But the only way you can do this is by go read the books
and go in depth.
Don't read something that's half an inch deep.
Read something that gets you to the bottom of things.
Read Andre's books, for example.
I mean, that will get you halfway there.
Read books, and not necessarily books you agree with, but a
book gives you enough data and enough argumentation that you
can interact with it and learn whether you are going too much
in one direction or not, or whether you're just right.
And this is an interesting perspective, but you can see
the falsehood in it.
Read books.
Read books.
Books are great.
And would you say classics, too?
Oh, yeah.
Make sure about the classics.
You get so much.
If you get me in my personalistic, just
completely my own personal, what do I do when things really get me down?
I unfortunately, I've never had a depressed moment in my life.
Well, depressive moment in my life. I tend not to be that way.
But when things get me down, I go to poetry.
I think, you know, the human soul is spoken to by poetry in a way that no amount of prose can ever get there.
You read the Rubaiyat, or, you know, I read a lot of Spanish poetry as well.
I actually read poetry in several languages, way better than I speak them.
And it's just nourishment. It's just nourishment.
Because most poetry, the tendentiousness is very human.
Every poet is getting you somewhere, but it's a very human place.
So now you know my secret. I don't think I've ever said that in public.
So start me off as we actually finish. Who should I go read right now?
Well, I love T.S. Eliot, for example.
I think the love song of J. Alfred Prufrock is one of the
great pieces.
He has-
All right.
There's our homework assignment.
Yeah.
Let us go then, you and I, when the evening is spread out
against the sky,
like a patient ether eyes upon a table.
I could go to lunch from that thing, right?
I mean, it is an amazing poet.
He has several others.
The Hollow Man.
You know, we are the Hollow Man.
Headpiece filled with straw.
So I love T.S. Eliot.
I love this guy, Manrique.
He's a Renaissance Spanish poet who has his long view of things.
The group he has, when I get really down, it's like,
nothing matters.
Everybody's died and moved on, and nothing matters.
So why are you worried about this?
You and I, with a loaf of bread and a flask of wine,
and let's just go out and chill.
And Shakespeare, of course, you know, some of the soliloquies of Shakespeare are, you know, what an amazing thing.
I mean, if the English language had produced Shakespeare only, it would be one of the greatest
literary languages in the world, in my opinion.
Well, Martin Gurry, it's such a pleasure to have had you on.
I've enjoyed this a lot.
Maybe we can do it again sometime.
I look forward to that.
Yep.
Thank you all for joining Martin Gury and me
on this episode of American Thought Leaders.
I'm your host, Jan Jekielek.