Angry Planet - America’s Secret Nuclear Upgrades

Episode Date: November 20, 2017

If you just look at the number of warheads, the U.S. nuclear arsenal is a small fraction of the size it was during the Cold War. But is that even the right measure anymore? This week on War College, Reuters’ Scott Paltrow discusses a special report the wire service will release this week.Paltrow’s investigation discovered vast improvements to bombs whose names have stayed the same as their power increased tenfold, and weapons with adjustable yields that could lead to the ultimate temptation—dropping the big one.Support this show http://supporter.acast.com/warcollege. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

Love this podcast? Support this show through the ACAST supporter feature. It's up to you how much you give, and there's no regular commitment. Just click the link in the show description to support now. Even though they're considered to represent the biggest danger of accidental nuclear war, there's still no real movement to get rid of them. You're listening to War College, a weekly podcast that brings you the stories from behind the front lines. Here are your hosts, Matthew Galt and Jason Fields.

Hello and welcome to War College. I'm Jason Fields. And I'm Matthew Galt. The U.S. nuclear arsenal may be more accurate, deadly, and tempting to use than ever before. The number of warheads is down, but the technology now allows fewer bombs to do more than enough damage. Today, we're talking to Reuters investigative reporter Scott Paltrow about U.S. nuclear modernization efforts. and also their potential consequences. Scott, thank you very, very much for joining us. Thank you for having me.

So can we talk for a second about the number of warheads, and it's down from the height. Is that right? Well, it was at an enormously high level during the Cold War, reached a peak during the Reagan administration of a total of about 30,000 warheads of the U.S. and Soviet Union combined, Once the Cold War ended, and it looked like there would be some accommodation between Russia and the United States, the treaties and numbers of warheads and missiles and bombs and so on dropped precipitously.

And we are now down to the point where in 2011 we signed the new Strategic Arms Reduction Talks with Russia, which limits each side to 1,550 warheads, or at least what the treaty defines as warheads. There's a little bit of fudge there. But numerically, that's a huge reduction from the height of the Cold War. But what's happening is that relations between the U.S. and Russia have become frostier since the treaty was,

and a number of political things happened, including pressure from the Republicans in the Senate. And so even though we're sticking to the numbers, as a Russian is the limit of 1550 warheads, we are totally modernizing, updating, and creating new warheads, weapons that are more deadly and much more accurate and can cause more destruction. So even though the numbers are down, we are at a point where with very little public awareness

and very little public discussion, none of this was done openly. We're having our entire lead of nuclear weapons upgrade out of cost what the Congressional Budget Office estimates to be $1.25 trillion with the key dollars over the next 30 years. Is that what we mean when we talk about or when we hear modernization, reducing the number of weapons, but upgrading those weapons and making them far more deadly and fancier? Right. The Cold War ended. The weapons, to some extent, were neglected. They weren't upgraded.

and to be modernized, they simply need to be, have old parts replaced, switches, items that might wear out, make sure that they still work. That's the official explanation. In fact, it's being used as a sort of cover story for calling weapons by the same names and model numbers, but making them into entirely new weapons that are much more active. it and therefore much more deadly. Could you tell us a little bit in an article that you wrote, you mentioned specifically the B-61 hydrogen bomb, which officially has been around for many decades, right?

But it's not the same bomb, right? Right. It's been around since the early 1960s, and it's gone through multiple models. And the one that they are building now has the same B-61 designation, but in fact it is being turned from an ordinary gravity bomb, like bombs that just fell out of the bomb bay, as you saw during World War II, to a smart bomb that has a guidance system and movable tail fins and advanced radar. So that it is, you know, except for the exterior, it is an entirely new weapon. And you mentioned also, if I'm thinking of the right weapon,

that it has some pretty interesting features that the yield on the bomb can be modified? Right. That's correct. And that's something that is of concern to many people who are worried about the current situation. It can be turned all the way down to where it's essentially a tactical weapon, meaning that it can be used against troops in a battlefield to the point where it's about a small fraction of the size of a Hiroshima bomb. It can also be turned up to about 32 times the size of the Hiroshima explosion. But the fear is that if a bomb can be turned down lower, there will be more temptation to use it

and more gambling that the other side won't respond with nuclear weapons or with major nuclear weapons. And that's by some people considered to be a very dangerous assumption to make. Right. You're talking about dialy yield and tactical nukes. I mean, these are questions that really I don't think we've really wrestled with in a big way since, I think, Vietnam, and maybe even a little bit before Vietnam. I thought this was, I thought, you know, tactical nuclear weapons was kind of a resolved issue. Is this something that people are discussing? Are generals talking about this now? Well, the United States officially has no tactical nuclear weapons. Russia has lots of them, and that's been a source of concern in Congress and elsewhere that they're violating

a treaty on tactical weapons. We officially have none. However, the B-61 bomb is the first that we have a capability of dialing down to the point where it in effect is a tactical weapon, and we're planning additional weapons, including a bomber-launched long-range cruise missile that would have, would also have the same adjustability. All right. Tell us about some of the other changes that are being made to the nuclear arsenal. What kind of other advances are happening to these weapons? What about the submarines?

What about the range of some of them? The Trident 2 nuclear missile is the nuclear missile that we use from submarines, and it has been transformed into a vastly more accurate weapon. Nuclear missiles have something that's called a fuse, spelled F-U-D-E, which is essentially a device with sensors that tells the warhead one to detonate. And up until now, the fuses on the Tridentes had been. very inaccurate and there was about a 20% chance of actually hitting the target. The fuse and other parts of the Trident missile and more have been rebuilt and now there is

close to 100% chance of hitting the target. And that's important because many people consider our fleet of nuclear missiles submarines be the most important part of our nuclear original because they are undetectable and their missiles are intercontinental. They can fly, you know, extremely long ranges and they have the same yield or killing of them as land-based missiles. So the fact that these are now much more accurate, you know, it shows a major change and a major ambition to upgrade.

And, of course, to go long with doing bombs and the new missile. We are also planning to build as a direct part of this plan, a new fleet of nuclear submarines and building a new heavy bomber. So that's why the cost ends up adding up to well over a trillion dollars. In addition to the souped up B-61 bomb, they're also hedging their bets by building, you know, long-range cruise missile. that would be launched from a bomber, but it would allow the bomber to stand off at a distance far away from, say, Russia, way outside of the range of their missile defenses, and the cruise missile can travel quite a long way into, say, the heart of Russia. And that is the plan to have the adjustable capability, you can appeal also. So there's a whole range of improvements and tweaking and moderate.

And in some missiles, there's a third stage that's being increased in size so that the weight of the warhead can be heavier. That gives you an idea of the scope of what's going on. You mentioned specifically you've done some research into whether or not the United States even feels. it needs ground-based missiles anymore, that maybe just two legs of the nuclear triad, meaning bombers and the sub-fleet might be a smarter way to go. Can you sort of explain why that might be? That is actually one of the biggest concerns of people now, and this sort of growing coterie of scientists and former government officials who were very worried about the current situation. And the reason is we have land-based nuclear missiles, intercontinental ballistic missiles that are housed in silos in the ground.

They've been in the same locations for years. The Russians certainly know where all of them are. And the problem is that if we get word, whether it's correct or not, that Russia has launched missiles at us, we would have the president that would have only a few minutes to decide whether to launch ours or not. And that's because it all together takes about 30 minutes from the time of warning to actually getting a missile off the ground and the ideas to get them off the ground before the Russian missiles hit us. And so you would have either President Trump or President Putin making a decision. within a matter of minutes on whether to push the button. And there have been many instances, which, for example, William Perry,

former Defense Secretary describes in a book of false alerts and equipment malfunctioning to falsely indicate that an attack was underway. And at one point, when Boris Yeltsin was the head of Russia, he actually had his finger ready to push the proverbial button because, Norway had launched an experimental scientific missile, and it warned Russia, but Russia had never warned the radar technicians, and so where it came that a U.S. nuclear missile was heading towards Russia, and it was only, you know, about seconds away from pushing the button when they realized that this made no sense, and it had to be a mistake, and they pulled back. But that's the level

of danger. And the concern is, you know, having a weapon where you must make a decision whether to launch Armageddon or not in only five or ten minutes. There's an interesting story because this is related directly. There was a Russian Soviet officer named Stanislav Petrov, who just died a few weeks ago, who was a hero for having stopped the Soviet Union from launching. This was actually it was 1983 and there was just some sort of

radar malfunction and anyway it was only one man stood between the world in nuclear or

malfunction and nuclear Armageddon and something similar occurred during the Cuban missile crisis

which was there was a Russian sub that was under I guess because they weren't in direct communications. They weren't under orders to launch under circumstances.

And three officers, three top officers had to agree. And two of them voted to launch a missile at a U.S. naval vessel, and one refused. And it was only because that one refused that there was no nuclear war during the human missile crisis. So is sort of the idea that if our nuclear deterrent were at sea or in the air, then there would be a longer time to respond because we'd be less worried directly about having our own weapons knocked out? Well, that's one part of it. There's several considerations. One is that once we launch the ICBMs, there's no way to call them back, call them off. And that was done deliberately because there was few. of hacking and before that there was fear of, you know, some sort of electronic interference that could turn them off or alter course. And so once they're off the ground, that's it.

They're on their way to their target. In memories, of course, there's much more time to call them back. And there's much more time for the submarines because, number one, it's impossible to know where they are. Under current technology, as far as we know, there is no way to tell where in the ocean a nuclear submarine is. So there's no urgency to fire because there's no danger that will be destroyed. And also, you know, there's more time to decide because the submarines are mobile and they can be much closer, located much closer to the shore of the target country. and therefore, you know, once they fire,

we take much less time for the missiles to reach their targets. There's also the issue of the silos themselves and the men and women who work in them. These are the people that are famous for getting in trouble for cheating, and a lot of the silos have been kind of passed over from the modernization campaigns. Is that also kind of part of this too? Is that kind of thinking of just abandoning it totally?

actually no I mean I think the that cheating scandal and so on caught the attention of the Air Force and Congress and because there is now this emphasis in beeping up our ICBMs and we're investing so much money the person you know the personnel are being trained much for carefully and they're setting it up so that there is a reliable group. And I spoke with a nuclear expert at Princeton, who himself had been in the Air Force and had been an ICBM launch officer. And I asked him that if the decision came and he had to turn the key to launch, would he do it?

And he said at that time, yes, absolutely. A fellow were trained and we would follow orders. And I think that's, you know, the mentality now. Do you think there's any chance that we actually will get rid of our land-based missiles? Or is that something people are just throwing out as an idea? I don't think there's any chance. Republicans are very much in favor of beating up our nuclear arsenal. The president certainly is.

And there is a belief that they're necessary, you know, that you've had them for 40 years, or 50 years and that we need them. And, you know, even though they're considered to represent the biggest danger of accidental nuclear war, there's still no real movement to get rid of them. Speaking of accidental nuclear war, I'm wondering if you know anything about the rumblings that kind of came out towards the end of October, where we learned that the Air Force was prepping the B-52s to be in the air again, constantly patrolling the sky. with nukes, then they kind of pulled back and said, no, that's not actually happening.

Can you explain that to the audience a little bit? Well, I'm not actually, I have to say, I'm not familiar with this most recent discussion that you mentioned. I do know that during the Cold War for many years, we had B-52s in the air at all times prepared to fire, and that was, of course, very expensive and very paranoid. But the idea of having things being so tense now that we have to have keep 52s in the air at all time seems to be really excessive and perhaps a sign of how relations are worsening. Did you get a sense from talking to people how dangerous experts think this time really is, the tensions and... I think that the dangers.

is increasing. That there are people who, important people, such as former secretaries of defense and former top generals who are coming together and saying that things are so bad that the danger of nuclear war now is worse than it was during the Cold War. And that's because hostilities have increased, but the public is totally unaware of of the dangers. There's no institutional memory of things like the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Berlin Wall crisis, both of which threatened to trigger the nuclear war.

If you talk to kids, these days they've never heard, you know, students, college students, that've never heard of these events. And there's just no preparedness for dealing with crises. So that makes the possibility of an accidental war much higher. And also you have a question of the rationality and judgment of two individuals who are the only ones who have the authority to launch Armaged, mainly President Trump and President Putin. What about North Korea? Well, yes, they're getting there. They don't have nearly as large an arsenal as Russia or United.

states and can't be nearly the same amount of damage. But yes, they're definitely getting there. Well, it sounds like we live in an ever more dangerous world, which is unfortunately what we seem to discover every time we do this show. That's sad. It is sad. Do you keep up with the bulletin of the atomic scientists? I've looked at various issues.

I haven't kept up with it because I've only been working on this for a relatively brief time, but I've looked at it's a very good publication. It's interesting that they have their so-called atomic clock, which supposedly indicates how close we are to nuclear catastrophe, and the closer it is to midnight, the worse, the day. danger is. And for this year, for 2017, they moved it closer to midnight than it has ever been since 1953, which was the year after both the U.S. and the Soviet Union launched their first hydrogen bonds. So I think that's a pretty strong indication that at least the scientific world is

quite alarmed now. Well, Scott Paltrow, thank you so much for joining. joining us, scaring us to death, and educating us all at once. Thank you very much for having me. Thank you so much. Thanks for listening to this week's show. If you enjoyed it, leave us a review on iTunes. It helps other people find it.

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