Angry Planet - How Germany Kicked France’s Ass So Fast in World War II

Episode Date: April 9, 2018

When France fell less than two months after Germany invaded in the spring of 1940, conspiracy theories grew to explain the loss. One of the most common was the idea of a massive German spy network, a “Fifth Column.”Historian Marc Masurovsky takes us through what really happened. Was it subterfuge, or were the Nazi armies just that good?You can listen to War College on iTunes, Stitcher, Google Play or follow our RSS directly. You can reach us on our new Facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/warcollegepodcast/; and on Twitter: @War_College.Support this show http://supporter.acast.com/warcollege. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

Love this podcast? Support this show through the ACAST supporter feature. It's up to you how much you give, and there's no regular commitment. Just click the link in the show description to support now. Determined command, actually, to their credit, played with French psychology, and they understood the French senior staff were clearly still nostalgic about World War I and had really clearly not learned the lessons for the first world. You're listening to War College, a weekly podcast.

that brings you the stories from behind the front lines. Here are your hosts, Matthew Galt and Jason Fields. Hello and welcome to War College. I'm Jason Fields. And I'm Matthew Galt. In World War II, France fell so fast to the Germans, the U.S. thought a fifth column had to have had a hand in it. But what were the real reasons one of the world's superpowers collapsed in only a few months?

Was the German army that good? were the French who had held off the Germans for four years in World War I that bad? Here to discuss it with us is Mark Mazorowski. Mark, thanks for joining us. It's a pleasure. Can we start actually in a somewhat unusual place? Can we talk a little bit about the political situation in France before the war started? What was the government like?

Was it a liberal democracy? What were the stresses? There were some worrisome developments in several years that preceded the Second World War. France had been governed by a Popular Front, which was a coalition of left its party on the Léon-Blum, from 1947 to 1938, the popular fund basically collapsed, and in came conservative regimes that essentially were, were tilting far more towards a conciliatory approach towards Germany while re-emphasizing sort of a heady, nationalistic, almost chauvinistic agenda, obviously anti-communist, but kind of bringing back the good old days of French conservatism with their allies

in the business community. So what you see is France pretty much divided and polarized, heavily so, and almost in a situation where it can't really claim to be a United country. And there are also forces in France that are pro-reconciliation or at least pro-accommodation with Nazi Germany. And there is also a powerful anti-fascist religion, which, of course, results from the those forces that were allied with the populist front, but also some of the extreme French nationalists are also heavily anti-German. So essentially, you have, is a very fractured country. Also, France was going through a heavily pacifist phase, namely that, I think, perhaps a

the result of the first World War, there was this general feeling that, but never again, in other words, let's not do this again, and let's basically just adopt a purely defensive posture and not seek to have an aggressive, powerful military. And so that also undercut the military sector. An alliance was given to this Maginot line that was built in eastern France to ward off any kind of invasion from the eastern eastern. east, mainly from Germany. This was a sort of a 700 kilometer long

succession of bunkholes and fortifications extending from the Aden forest all the way down to the southern edge of Azef, and the idea behind that is that anybody who wanted to come through in the German would meet with fierce resistance and be forced

basically to go around Malign Manjino and therefore be fragmented and of course the French sought by producing that effect, they would be easier to ward off and defeat such an invasion, while the joke was on the French, after all, because of their heavy reliance on this line, and they didn't really see it coming when the Germans basically invaded in May 10th, 1940. What you have is a very powerful pro-German lobby in France, a pacifist movement,

a disgruntled left, which is not raising the flag of defeat. On the international scale, you've gone to the Munich Conference of September 1938, where we saw the appeasers in England and France essentially bowed to Hitler and sacrificed Czechoslovakia as the next victim following Austria. And living with that, you sort of wonder whether anybody could actually hold out against Hitler and a rearmed Germany. Can you tell us a little bit about the size of the French military at that point versus the German one? Well, that's the part that's actually kind of fascinating because the French had, at least potentially, a standing army of close to five million.

while the Germans had a standing army of about 3.5 million. Now, the advantage on the German side was the fact that they had 10 armed divisions. These were the panzer units. And the French were not as well equipped on that side. They had mostly light-mechanized infantry divisions, but because of this sort of reliance on a defensive strategy, they weren't really keen to essentially emphasize independent autonomous panzer or at least equivalent of panzer units,

essentially having their own sort of operational orders to act together as a homogeneous group. But rather than instead, those units were basically fielded to support the infantry. So this was in sharp contrast with essentially what the Germans had developed as a strategy, which was basically to segregate the panza units and to basically make them into an autonomous strike force. And that's kind of what we discovered as part of the Blitz Creek strategy. Also, the Air Force was well developed on the German side, but equally on the French side. the problem on the French side again is that planes were not geared towards an aggressive stance.

I mean, they were basically used for reconnaissance and defensive operations. So what you see essentially is that although one could think that there was an even spread between the two sides, on the German side there was much more of an offensive coherence rather than and on the French and British side, you see more of a defensive strength. taking hold of the way that the order of battle is organized. So why did the French fail to realize that Hitler might go through the low countries? You know, that happened in World War I, right? Yeah, but in a certain sense, it's not that they were caught by surprise.

They just felt that they could stop the German armies from coming in. I mean, yeah, of course they were not aware that Hitler would strike so deep and so wide. so aggressively because, I mean, it starts with Norway and then basically Hitler just sort of picks his way down, gradually down the map. And when finally the attack takes place against the Netherlands, Belgium and France, it's almost a simultaneous attack. The Air Force, the German Air Force plays a determining role, as we saw, you know, with the, almost the leveling of Rotterdam. And Belgium was basically not to be offensive towards the, the Belgians, but it was a cakewalk. It's flat, and just like in World War I, it became the crucible

for a terrible sort of conflict developing again. The only difference this time is that the Germans were a little bit smarter than the French and the British, and essentially they understood that the French were stuck in their ways from the World War I and would essentially adopt again this defensive strategy and basically fight it out in Belgium. So they essentially teased the French into meeting them in Belgium. And while the French basically took the bait, together with the British, the armored units struck through the sort of the weak underbelly, if you want, of the French defensive lines, which is the Alden and the Muz area,

which basically lies east, southeast of the heartland of Belgium. And they were able to throw seven armored divisions through the Aden Forest, which the French did not expect because they thought it was an actual defensive line, unclear as to what possessed them to think that a forest could basically hold off seven armored divisions, but that was the French position. and while the French and the British were mired in the Belgian muck, so to speak, they were basically encircled very quickly as a result of this sort of bifurcation strategy or what Churchill called the sickle effect that the Germans borrowed.

And I think by May 22nd, the British and French was surrounded in some kind of loose pocket and the only exit was Dunkirk, and we know what happened there. It was almost like child's play, and I think it was a determined command, actually, to their credit, played with French psychology, and they understood the French. Senior staff were clearly still nostalgic about World War I and had really clearly not learned a lesson for the first world. France knew they were coming, right? The attack wasn't a complete surprise. No, there was none of surprise. I think what surprised them was a violent. for the of the offensive. And I think they were in denial

for most of the time. One of the exceptions was Colonel de Gaulle who understood what was going on. And he understood also the value of using armored units separately from infantry. And in fact, to his credit, he was able to ward off in a small

pitch battle in northern France a German panther unit. But, you know, that was just him. And, you know, it's one thing to destroy 500 German tanks, that's another thing to try to ward off the 3,000 others. So I guess what he basically was the one that had division, and also he wanted modernized its Air Force, but he basically ran into stone walls.

And I guess the rest was history. So does this mean that there were no more troops anywhere else in France, or was it just that they weren't in any position to put up any kind of resistance? they were deployed but most of them were deployed on the eastern front and the number of units that were meeting meeting up with the German offensive in Belgium were inadequate in terms of countering what was obviously an extremely well-organized attack and again I think the French high commands excessive reliance on a defensive line like the Maginot line proved to be completely ineffective, and French troops are essentially quartered behind it.

So by the time the Germans are attacking around the Maginot Line, as was expected, French troops are not equipped to basically hold them off. It was just a matter of training and of psychological expectations. Moral probably was not very high. French, again, as I tried to describe to you earlier, the mood in France was not belligerent, it was not bellicose, but that was somewhat,

I'm going to say that it was depression, but there was no fighting spirit, if you want, and not of the kind that could basically meet head-on, a formidable force like to what the Germans were deploying. Now, it had the French been better organized, and the British, and probably with more motivation, had their Air Force been a little bit more on the offensive side, and had they also been a little bit more clever about how they use a mechanized unit, again, this is all strategy. They might have been able to stall the German advance.

It doesn't mean that they would have been able to ultimately succeed, but they would have at least dealt a heavy psychological blow against Hitler, but, you know, this is all what if. who actually surrendered which government was it in france by the spring in nineteen forty there's pretty much no government the government essentially abandons Paris and flees to the south there the national assembly will be left of it votes endorses marshal philippe petin as the next leader of france

the only one who can save them the hero of Verdun, who was at least 80 years old, but he still had his wits about him. And, you know, he was a symbol of all that was good about France, quote unquote, a symbol of a sort of old France, nationalistic, and slightly monarchic on the side. But, you know, he was also authoritarian and not one to be to be cajoled by democratic principles. So that particular government settles in Vichy. And on the 22nd of June, an armistice is signed between that new leadership and the German military. So what you have is France is half occupied by German troops,

and the agreement of the armistice is to allow the Pitan government to rule over the so-called free zone, the unoccupied zone, but it does have access to the occupied zone and is able to establish an administrative presence in Paris. So that's the way that the checker board looks like in the third week of June. In the meantime, you had to go making his famous speech, that's France, and then a surrender, and he basically leaves for London and establishes a free French, and that's an official beginning, guess, of the official French resistance. Was there a reason why the Germans at that point didn't just steamroll over Vichy as well

and just conquer all of France? Well, I think opinions are divided on this one, but the general consensus is that France was the most important power in Western Europe at the time. And Hitler knew that he needed the assent. and consent of the French to basically reinforce the Reich, have access to resources, and essentially complete and strengthen his hold over the European continent. And the only way to do this would be to have an ally on his flank, more like a vassal, and the one who would be willing to do his bidding in exchange for an illusion of freedom.

and in that in our regard it was probably a sensible thing to do why hit you know 40 million people against you if you didn't have to do that so I think by that in that sense it was a calculation there was no intention really of subjugating France although I'm sure there was there was a plan to do so but the reality on the ground was that France was defeated and there was an expression of political willingness coming out of the political class of France to seek an accommodation with a third Reich. Again, as I told you earlier, there was an undercurrent for at least a decade of pro-German sentiment, which is very strong in some sectors of the business community and of the political community,

and even amongst the intellectual class of France, to establish closer relations with the former enemy. And that probably might have played a role. I mean, the German ambassador for the Reich in Paris is Otto Abbottes, who played the critical role in Paris in the latter years in the mid to late 30s as a German agent of closer Franco-German ties. And he was so good at it that the French government expelled him because they thought he was plotting against the security of the French nation. and he comes back and basically finds all of his old friends. It all works for everybody, at least for those who chose to dally with the Germans. And you have in October 1940 the famous meeting between Petan Hitler at Montailles, which signals officially the beginning of the collaboration period.

What happened to all those French soldiers, the ones that, you know, presumably weren't killed in combat. Well, the official figure, at least the one that I was able to find, is 1.8 million. French soldiers were captured and eventually sent to Stalachs in the Third Reich. So that's where they ended up. Well, they were treated as prisoners of war, and in fact, the Vichy government spends an extraordinary amount of energy trying to secure their release, or at least the stab.

proper conditions for them in those camps. And I think there's a ministerial portfolio that's specifically designed for, you know, dealing with a prisoner of war issue. So it was, you know, it was a thorn in the Vichy side. And it was something that occupied their minds because they wanted these men to come back to France and contribute to the new France. And they still were treated a lot better than the Soviets were. Oh, yeah, no, I mean, the Soviets were shot.

In fact, at least in that house, and the Soviet prisoners were shot even before the Jews were dealt with. So it was extraordinary what happened to the Soviet prisoners in terms of ruthlessness. Did the French actually play much of a role in the liberation of France in 1944-45? Militarily, that is? Militarily. Did, you know, the resistance, la resistance is very famous, but did they have any impact?

It's the old joke where everybody was in a resistance. Right. Well, you know, it's still a very contentious topic. There is the, it's kind of a myth, if you want, that the resistance was the embodiment of the souls and French nation at war with Germans. And, of course, it was fracticidal because in order to be in the resistance,

you had to rise up against your countrymen. And, you know, it meant probably that you, much like in the American Civil War, that families were broken up. You had to fight against your former bosses, your former colleagues, your friends, and people that you knew in your village or in your town. So it's a, you know, it's a traumatic episode.

And there are a number of waves of French resistance, operations and movements and there are those that were referred to as Resistand de Premiera, in other words, those who had resisted from the very beginning from the get-go. And unfortunately, many of those

first resistance were dead by 1942. So what you have is a gradual realization by 1942, the Vichy government is really not cut up in a way that the French thought because, first of all, they're

starving. The requisitioning is inhuman. There's mass starvation in several in a number of cities, particularly in the south of France, on a scale that had not been known in recent times. The betrayals are constant. Of course, the trauma of seeing the Jews being deported, interned, marginalized, harassing the streets affects the increased number of people. people, but the French would slow to wake up in that sense. And I guess if one wanted to draw a map of France somewhere around 1942, 1943, you would basically see that from village to village, you could either encounter pro-Germans, pro-Vichy or anti-Germans and anti-Vichy, but you really had to know where to go.

And in the sense, that's what France looks like. at the peak of the of the collaboration period. So 42, 43. It is extremely divided, and what I'm suggesting to you is that the resistance regardless of, it depends how you define it. But I would define it simply

acting in small, medium, and large ways against the, both against the occupier and against the Vichy government. Small acts could be as simple as giving a bicycle to refugees fleeing or to actual resistance fighters or feeding somebody in need to the medium-sized acts, which were basically to deliver mail for the resistance or to act as a drop, to essentially the higher level, which is, you know, equally full of risk and take up arms, help in blowing up railroads and communication centers and

and perhaps even attacking German forces or wherever that was possible. So what you have is a gradual buildup of activity. And so I do argue in favor of the argument that the French did contribute in different ways, you know, whether you think are not the significant that, again, for historians to decide, but there's enough evidence to show that there was a critical mass of individuals who were ready, basically, by 1944. But again, it was a slow process, and many people who rallied Vichy in the early years were disgruntled by 1942. And you have sort of the famous case of Francois Mitterrand, who was a poster child for Vichy in the early years, and eventually gets bitter and begins to work for the underground.

And you have the resistance of the Darnierreux, you know, those people who saw, oops, you know, we have to, we better switch sides. I don't want to be too simplistic about this, but you have this in every war, you know, on every occupation regime where all of a sudden you decide, oh, you're going to save a couple people, you're going to hide some Jews,

and at the end of the war, you know, when the Germans are going to see, see, see, see, I was great, that was good. I made up for all those bad things that I probably did, or do you suspect that I did, but fundamentally I'm a good guy. So you had a lot of that, too, but that's human. And again, in terms of military contributions, yes, there were isolated instances of military prowess, of extraordinary sacrifice.

Like the Verco was one of the most extraordinary moments in the French resistance. What was that? Well, it was the Mackey de Verkan. In other words, the resistance units in this sort of heavily wooded area, I believe, in eastern France. And they held off an amazing number of German troops, but they were basically almost all of them were massacred. And of course, the German troops were aided by French loyalists to the Vichy government. So it was another example that once you're ready to fight, you were ready to do it all the way. And that, you know, psychologically that does go a long way.

And you're talking about doing so after three long years of exploitation, persecution, and oppression. You know, the temperature rises. And, of course, you cannot expect everybody to take up arms. But resistance, as I indicated earlier, is manifests itself in all sorts of different ways. And they can be, when taken together, they can be very effective in terms of destroying or at least demoralizing the occupier, keeping it busy, distracted, and that's all they really have to do while the plants are being set afoot to liberate the country. So by the time D-Day comes, and also the invasion of the South by American forces, pretty much

I think everybody's ready to do their bit. So whether they contributed significantly before, you know, I'd say in isolated circumstances on different fronts, it was more intense than others. But once the ally troops owned French territory, then the game changes. And, of course, you have the Paris insurrection the week before Paris was liberated. And the city rose up against the Germans? Yeah, absolutely, yeah, against both the Germans and the collaborators. And inevitably what you have is reprisal. That was kind of an ugly chapter, but it was one that, unfortunately, is part of every

very response by people who are oppressed, that they will seek vengeance instantly. Justice is swift. Whether you call it justice or not, that's a damn. It depends where you stand on these matters, but nobody really knows what the numbers are. There was no clear audit. Conservatives basically accused the resistance of, especially the leftist resistance, of executing as many as 10,000 people. I don't know whether that's true or not.

I don't know. But there were a lot of accounts that were settled brutally in all across France. Some of those may have used the liberation of France. It's excuse to settle petty disputes. It's inevitable, but that was what characterized the first. months of liberation. Well, thank you so much, Mark, for taking us through this whole thing. Matt, did you want to ask something else?

No, I mean, I kept thinking of questions and then he would immediately answer them. Thank you. Thank you. I can't thank you enough for doing this for us. Thank you so much for listening to this week's show. War College is me, Matthew Galt, and Jason Fields. You can follow us on Twitter at War underscore College or on Facebook at Facebook.com forward slash war college podcast. please remember to subscribe on iTunes,

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