Angry Planet - How hot will the Saudi-Iran conflict get?

Episode Date: January 28, 2016

Saudi Arabia executes a cleric who is a member of the Saudi Shi’ite minority. Iran’s government, which sees itself as the leader of the Shi’ite world, doesn’t work very hard to stop an attack on the Saudi Embassy in Tehran that follows the execution. Saudi Arabia closes its embassy and tensions between the two nations, which had been growing for years, hit a new high. With hot wars in Yemen and Syria, billions of dollars sloshing around between governments and militias and militant groups, its a good time to look at what’s really going on and what’s likely to happen next.Support this show http://supporter.acast.com/warcollege. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

Love this podcast? Support this show through the ACAST supporter feature. It's up to you how much you give, and there's no regular commitment. Just click the link in the show description to support now. The opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the participants, not of Reuters' News. The reality is the old order in the Middle East, where the United States was a guarantor of certain countries, it's died because the fact that it was not sustainable beforehand, regardless of it suited. people's preferences, it just was fractious and it was not going to work.

Saudi Arabia and Iran are vying for influence in the Middle East and beyond. There are many ways to look at the conflict, a religious rivalry, a political struggle, or simply an economic one. This week on War College, we speak with an expert on the region, who explains that none of the popular narratives are exactly right. He also helps us look ahead at what's likely to be the next phase. of the battle. You're listening to War College, a weekly discussion of a world in conflict focusing on the

stories behind the front lines. Here's your host, Jason Fields. Hello and welcome to War College. I'm Reuters' opinion editor, Jason Fields. And I'm Matthew Galt, contributing editor with War is Boring. Today, we're talking with journalist Mertaza Hussein about Saudi Arabia and its recent diplomatic split with Iran. Murtaza, thank you so much for joining us. Thank you very much for having me. Can we start off with just the basics? Can you explain what's behind the split between Riyadh and Tehran? Well, Riyadh and Tehran have been involved in a long-running Cold War in the region, which is played out in Yemen, in Syria, and other proxy conflicts throughout the Middle East.

Unfortunately, it seems like over time this conflict is escalating. And the recent execution of 47 political prisoners, including Sheikh Nimmer-L-Nimmer, has really ratcheted up the tensions to here-to-fore unprecedented level. And you've seen retaliatory actions in Iran, not by the state per se, but by non-state actors against the Saudi embassy, which has led to a severing of diplomatic ties. So there's now a very real possibility this Cold War could become a hot war, although indications from both sides are that's not their intention. Who are these political prisoners exactly. Can you kind of explain who they are and why they were executed? So it's the nature or the identity of these prisoners is one of the very interesting points of

this recent flashpoint in the sense that Sheikh Nimir al-Nimir was a very influential and widely revered Shia religious figure in Saudi Arabia in the Shia regions as well as in Iran. And his execution is very provocative because he had great ties to Iran and he was widely respected, and he was executed, but alongside him, there were 44 other prisoners who were not Shia Muslims. There were Sunni Islamists, some of them were Al-Qaeda-linked figures, and they were executed alongside of him. And when he was executed, it was portrayed as a terrorism prosecution, whereas, you know,

he really was not a terrorist by any stretch. He was a popular leader. He had much more in common with the revolutionaries of the Arab Spring than he did with al-Qaeda or any of these groups. And they'd sort of lumped him in together with those individuals to say, well, we're cracking down on terrorism, whereas by any stretch of the imagination, he did not fit that category. So Saudi Arabia is trying to characterize his execution as security issue,

where in reality it's more about suppressing their own religious minorities and also antagonizing Iran further in their conflict. Am I remembering right that Shiites actually make up something like 50s, percent of the Saudi population? They do break up around the low 10 figure of the Saudi population. More importantly, though even they're concentrated in the areas where

oil resources are, and they have not seen a fair share of those resources. So not only are they a significant minority, they are living in strategic areas of the country, so their political status becomes even more

difficult to ameliorate because there's the possibility from the Saudi perception of, although it hasn't really been something which people have been advocating, of separatism or foreign influence in those regions, which are very economically vital to the country, which is where the Shia population happens to be concentrated. Is Iran actively working on behalf of the Shia inside Saudi Arabia? Well, this is the allegation of the Saudi government.

Iranian Shias will very visipously deny it, and Sheikh Nimir al-Nimir viscerously denied it, and notably he took positions which were at odds with the Iranian government in the situations such as Syria, where he spoke out against the government of Bashar al-Assad. So the characterization of all these groups as being Iranian proxies has been something which their opponents have been attempting to do, including Yemen with the Houthis,

but it does not necessarily the case. But I fear that, or I think that's reasonable to assume, that in the aftermath of these very provocative actions, they might actually have the effect of driving Saudi Shias closer to Iranian influence because Iran will act as their only protector in the face of an oppressive state. So it could be a self-fulfilling prophecy, even if it were not the case beforehand. All right, you compared this at the beginning of our conversation to a Cold War that has suddenly gotten hot. So you don't see this as just another small step in a conflict that's kind of been

going on since 1979. This is something new. I mean, I hope it does not go hot. It's becoming more contentious as time goes on. Both the Iranian and Saudi leadership have indicated publicly that their intention is to avoid what would surely be a catastrophic conflict between the two countries it were to come to outright conflict.

I think most likely you'll see an intensification of conflicts in Yemen and Syria, which will become more intractable because of the fact that Iran and Saudi Arabia remained at loggerheads. You know, if it were to come to that, I don't think it would come to a hot war per se, but were that to be the case, I think everyone could recognize how disastrous and how, you know, unpredictable such a conflict could become.

And I think that it would be very much in the interest of the United States and other countries to use whatever influence they have to prevent that because it would be disastrous to economic interests as well as the stability of the Middle East and those countries which still remain stable. Does the U.S., which has been an ally of the Saudi government for many, many decades, so does the U.S. have any kind of real influence at this point to hold Saudi Arabia back from war or ratcheting things up any further? Well, there are many competing opinions on this question.

On one hand, Saudi Arabia remains a close ally of the United States. There are close political and economic ties. And really, these ties are at the elite level, because that's where it's the United States. Saudi Arabia's influence is in the United States. Saudi Arabia, from their perspective, they fear that the United States may be pulling back from its relationship or not being so willing to guarantee its absolute security or absolute interests in the region.

And, you know, I think that that's a fear which it's not particularly well-founded, and I'm sure they have the reasons, but they see that Iran coming in from the coal to a certain degree with the nuclear deal and the prospect of out-relevant. bright U.S. confrontation with Iran seeming more and more remote. And for that reason, Saudi Arabia, including under new leadership, younger leadership, Muhammad bin Salman, they're acting out more

aggressively in the region. And unfortunately, I think most of these actions are relatively brash and inept. And I don't think that this war in Yemen is serving their interests. I think maybe they're acting out of frustration over their failure to achieve their goals in the region. But Ultimately, if they were to lose that relationship with the United States, or if it were to be downgrade significantly, there's not really much way to, I don't think it's coming back. And the reality is the old order in the Middle East, where the United States was a guarantor of certain countries,

it's died with the United States acquiescence. It's time for a new security infrastructure to be built, which includes major countries like Iran, because the fact that it was not sustainable beforehand, whether regardless of it suited people's preferences, it just was fractious and it was not going to work. And now we need to have a new architecture, which includes Iran, Saudi Arabia, and others

with the United States at the helm of it. Well, so it's not like Saudi and Arabia and Iran have never worked together, right? I mean, OPEC, they're both members of OPEC, right? Right. I don't think that they have an inexorable conflict. And even this issue, the religious issue, I think that it's something which flares up from time to time, but it's done so most often for, it's a choice.

It's for cynical purposes, or it's sort of, for populist sentiment, but I don't think they're inevitably enemies. And I think there's a role for the United States to play in helping to reconcile them if they choose to do so. Let's talk about the role of the United States and the alliance between Saudi Arabia and the U.S. for a minute. Would you consider Riyadh a bad ally, or do you think they have been a bad ally to the U.S. in the past? Well, you know, it's a very complicated question because, like I said, said, the United States and Saudi Arabia, the profound ideological differences, they're profound differences on the ground. But at the elite level, they've been very close allies. Saudi

elites and American elites are thoroughly infatuated with each other and have been for a very long time. So, I mean, there are things which have happened in Saudi society or private individuals or even individuals in government, which have been adverse to the United States, undoubtedly over the course of decades, whether either directly or indirectly, and are the the other hand, there are things which they've worked together on and they've supported each other on at a government-to-government level. So I think it's a very complicated question. I would say that the most important thing is to say that United States and Saudi Arabia should not become enemies, such as it should not become to the point where they lose influence with each other. And we have to

look at the basis we have to build a more constructive relationship that addresses, you know, addresses what's going on holistically in Saudi Arabia and addresses sort of the contradictions in this alliance that exists today. And it ameliorates Saudi insecurity about certain issues in the region. We've got to say, well, Iran is not going to be at war with the United States. The United States is not going to wage economic war with Iran, but we're still going to guarantee your security and we're going to make sure that your territorial integrity is guaranteed. The same way that has to be done with Israel now, because Israel has a very similar perspective on what's going on. And to prevent Israeli actions, which could be very destabilizing, the United States has to be

able to act as a guarantor to its interests, which is the interest of everybody's, interest of Iran's, interest of all the countries in the region, that people do not feel so insecure that they begin acting in ways which are irrational or belligerent. You mentioned the elites of the United States and Saudi Arabia knowing each other well, but certainly seems like there's a lot of fear in the American public of Saudi Arabia and potential links to terror. It's not all very well reported, but there's certainly lots of articles out there talking about how Saudi money, whether it was official or unofficial, has gone into helping ISIS. So there's a lot of suspicion there. Do you think that

any of us justified? Oh, I think it's absolutely justified. I think it's become almost a cliche to point this out, but on 9-11, the overwhelming majority of the hijackers were Saudi, but the countries which were invaded after, Saudi was never, you know, it was never even a question of invading Saudi Arabia for reasons which, you know, the American public was not really privy to. It just became like a de facto like that's not even on the table because the fact is that the

elite relationship is quite divergent from popular views certainly in the United States and to a degree in Saudi Arabia as well too of one another. And I think that that gap is a reflection of a number of dysfunctions in American politics and it's

a gap which needs to be closed because I think unfortunately if there's one country in the world and I don't think necessarily there is one country in the world to be blamed for the modern phenomenon of Sunni Islamic radicalism. It would be Saudi Arabia. They're responsible, certainly, in Pakistan

for funding groups which have wreaked incredible havoc on that country. They've funded throughout the world very adamantly sectarian and extremist anti-you know, their Sunni Islamist, quote-unquote, groups which have really been

waging a war against Orthodox Sunni Islam as well as religious minority. And I think that the money all comes back there, and their WikiLeaks cables, mentioning Hillary Clinton, privately, very frankly, acknowledging this. But because of the fact that there's this elite relationship, the popular perceptions don't even come into play. And I don't know why. Like, after 9-11, there were quite harder questions weren't asked. And the reason is because Bandar bin Sultan was very close with the Bush family, and that's just one example of innumerable to show that these elite powers are very closely intertwined with one another. And I don't think that's necessarily a horrible thing.

I think it could be a basis for building a more constructive relationship in the future. But certainly in the past it's been unhealthy, and we need to find ways, constructive ways to move forward to reign in Saudi behavior on certain fronts and bring it more in line with the interests of the Muslim world as well as the United States. Well, I think I should just say very briefly that there has never been any evidence presented in a court tying anyone in the Saudi government or high up even in Saudi society with being involved in the attacks on September 11th. And I think also... Absolutely. Okay, I just, you know, I think... Yeah. I didn't mean to suggest that that was the case. It was just the fact that, you know,

from a reflexive, like at the time of that, you know, there was a lot of emotions in the public sphere, people were looking for what the return address for this is. And the fact that in the public discourse doesn't come up, it's off limits, and it would have been wrong to do that, and it would have been wrong to blame the Saudi government because they weren't involved at a high level, and I don't think that even private individuals were involved at a high level. It's just that it's one indicative factor of the fact that there's just a very grave disconnect between the discussion of Islamic militancy and the countries which actually produce it and which seem to be receiving the brunt of its backlash.

It is interesting to me in a lot of ways in that the Aspects of Islam are very tied up with Saudi royal legitimacy. The Saudi monarchy is deeply tied to a very strict sect of Islam, right? I don't want to, Wahhabism, I don't think I'm pronouncing it right, but. You know, Wahhabism is considered now, although initially it was the term which was self-descriptive. It's now considered to be a pejorative. Oh, okay. Well, like, I mean, the people, it's like very ambiguous.

It's hard to kind of say, but, like, if you were, in the Muslim context, we'd call someone Wahhabi, it's like an insult, like, oh, you're just being, like, sectarian or something like that. Oh, okay. So, but it's, like, in a way it is, like, restrictive, because, like, people did describe themselves as that, and it's based on the proselytizing of Mahmahab. So, if I could, like, like, my own thesis of it is basically,

in the past century and a half or so, there's been a revolutionary movement in Sunni Islam, which rebelled against the normative Sunni Islam, which existed during the time of the Ottoman Empire, and existed in independent centers in Syria and Egypt and South Asia and elsewhere, and it started in the Arabian Peninsula. So there was that uprising, which initially was crushed by the Ottomans, and then it revived itself again during the time of that empire's dissolution.

And it was targeting the orthodox normative Sunni Islam that existed throughout the Muslim world. At the same time, that was happening from below. From above, there was colonialism targeting. those structures from above. So essentially, you know, the normative Sunni Islam, which is based on centuries of cumulative jurisprudence on top of one another, has been hugely eviscerated almost in most parts of the world. And the final death blow was its co-optation by these military states, which arose in Egypt

and Syria and elsewhere. Like the Azhar has been a very important center of Sunni Islamic tradition, and now it has credibility is shot because it's seen to be tied to these dictators in the country. And so in that context, when that legitimacy is gone from that side and then, you know, from the bottom, you have very well-funded, oil-backed, state-backed ideology, which was an insurgent ideology coming outside Arabia. It becomes, like, that becomes a normative thing. So we're going through a very unfortunate revolution, which I hope that can come to some reasonable conclusion. But I think we're seeing the play out of historical processes which were initiated before colonialism, through colonialism,

and to the present day. Do you think that this ideology can ever coexist with the West at all? It's a very difficult question. I think that I don't think Salafi jihad is necessarily the normative form of this ideology. Maybe if you call it Wahhabism or Salafism, I think that the the normative values are quite different, and they're illiberal. So I think it's not necessarily in conflict, but you may not like each other, and it may not meld on certain issues. And that's not to say it'll be the case forever. The ideologies all evolved.

They're just not static, and we're going through a moment, and it's very tempting to view a moment as being, you know, reflective of all time. And I think that with a view to Sunni Islam, this is a very atypical moment for Sunni Islam and it'll change over time as well too. So maybe in our lifetime it's not going to be, it's going to be a difficult thing to reconcile. But in future generations, you know, even in Saudi Arabia, as critical I am in Saudi Arabia, they're taking steps, they want to reform their society, there's a great desire. And especially among those people who have gone out in the world and have a view of their country from an objective circumstance, there's a great

desire to reform and to rediscover their own Sunni Islamic traditions and reconcile them with modernity. So I'm optimistic. I think that ultimately it's going to work out, but it's going to take a long time. And looking at it through the daily news cycle, it could be very disheartening, but I think ultimately, I'm hopeful that they'll be able to create a version of Islam which co-exist and is constructive for the people living in their society. Do you think the confrontation with Iran right now makes that harder? I mean, Does it harden both sides of the conflict and their attitudes? You know, absolutely.

I think one of the really sad things to see is the skyrocketing of sectarianism in mostly Arab countries, but just throughout the Muslim world generally. And it's a byproduct of these political conflicts. Unfortunately, both Saudi Arabia and Iran, they have great influence throughout the world, especially, I think Saudi Arabia, because that massive ability to proselytize and to give their viewpoint out there. And there are real grievances, too. Like the criticism what Iran's doing in Syria is very well-founded,

even if criticisms in other places or not. So, you know, it's going to be, I think that it's going to get worse before it gets better. I don't think it's going to be a hot war per se, but I think that these ietudes are going to continue to harden in the short to medium term. And the sad thing is, people are couching it in religious terms, but at the end of day,

it's just identity politics. Like, it's not even an ideology, it's just an identity. And they even create new mythos based on the past or new symbols and formative stories which seem to give weight to these ideologies and these identities, but they're really historically contingent. And I could easily point to many, many different episodes in history which undercut them. But, you know, at a time of heightened sectarian tensions

and heightened violence and, you know, refugee crisis, like it becomes compelling to some people. becomes compelling and it's hard to target that or undermine it when the physical circumstances are so bleak. So until like the war ends in Syria, the war ends in Yemen, this is only going to get worse. It's like a running sore. I mean, I know this is asking a lot of you since it's not like anybody else has been able to figure it out. But do you see any way to help in Syria, help bring people back together? I mean, and as you said, I mean, it sounds like it's going to get worse before it gets better,

but is there a path that you see? The path I saw was helping reconcile the various outside parties in the conflict, Russia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, bring them to a common terms where they can meet on some level playing field. The really tragic part of the Syrian revolution is that, you know, in the most recent meetings in Geneva, there were barely any Syrian representatives. It was mainly the rest of the world. So that's sad. That's not what they wanted.

The revolution really got out of hand to the point where this is how it's being settled. And unfortunately, this recent uptick and conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia is going to make that more difficult. And it's not like Bashar Assad is an easy person to deal with on his own. He's been very, you know, it's his fault. If he just walked away from power, this all could have been diffused at the very beginning. And now that both Iran and Saudi Arabia are feeling more under threat, they're going to harden their positions. and from the perspective of Assad, if he has his backing from his foreign backers, he's going to be less inclined to make any concessions or feel less pressure.

And from the perspective of those many rebel factions which are dependent on the GCC states or Turkey for their backing and their own ability to negotiate is hamstrung by the conditions of their backers, those conditions are going to become more strenuous than they were now or more zero-sum. So it's going to be difficult. see it's I think that the real tragedy and the real risk of this uptick in Saudi Iran conflict is not a conflict between those countries directly but it's more bloodshed in Syria more bloodshed in Yemen and then in a way it's actually puts Islamic State what you know even if they're not being supported by either side

it gives them this this free reign it gives them a safe space to operate from absolutely and this you know revolutionary history there have been many states in the world which were viewed as anathema by the entire, like, the existing order. They were, they had revolutionary ideologies, they were brutal. And, but they benefited the fact that even though they're widely despised by all their states around them, those states were so busy at odds with one another that they were not able to focus attention on them or unite to confront them, and they were able to solidify themselves.

And that's kind of how Bolshevik Russia was able to establish itself and survive. And this conflict in Saudi Iran is really a Christmas gift to ISIS. It really is unbelievably in their favor, but who's going to be committed to uprooting them? And the Iraqi army is doing its foremost to do that, and along with sectarian militias, which their involvement is very troubling for a number of reasons, but they're fighting ISIS. But is that able to uproot them from major urban centers like Mosul and Raqa? It's a very difficult to say.

It surely would be easier if every country in the region were focused on that goal, but they're not, and it doesn't seem they're going to be in the meantime. So if ISIS has a chance to survive, this really is, this is it. Well, thank you so much for joining us for another sobering segment of War College. Mertaza Hussein, it's been a great conversation. Thank you so much for talking to us. My pleasure. Thank you for having me. I appreciate it. Next time on War College.

The Israeli Army feels it really can't predict what may happen on any of its borders or on any of its fronts. So he's embarking on a massive plan to muscle up the army as a body that will be prepared for anything.