Angry Planet - How the Kurds Defeated ISIS and Lost a Nation In the Same Week

Episode Date: October 23, 2017

The Kurds live in Syria, Turkey, Iran, and Iraq but have no country to call their own. When they decided to create one for themselves inside Iraq, it didn’t go well.After Iraq's Kurds held an independence referendum—which passed with more than 90 percent of the vote—Baghdad's armed forces moved fast. Its armies and allied Shi'ite militias took the city of Kirkuk and the surrounding oil fields. Within days, the Kurd’s economic engine was gone.At the same time, Kurds in Syria captured Islamic State's capital, Raqqa. The United States, which has backed Kurds in both countries, had little to say about either event.So what's really going on with this U.S. ally without a country?You can listen to War College on iTunes, Stitcher, Google Play or follow our RSS directly. You can reach us on our new Facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/warcollegepodcast/; and on Twitter: @War_College.Support this show http://supporter.acast.com/warcollege. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

Love this podcast. Support this show through the ACAST supporter feature. It's up to you how much you give and there's no regular commitment. Just click the link in the show description to support now. The reality is that the war is not going to end here. And as we have just seen in Iraq, you know, the fractions and the torments will continue. And I don't see any stabilization of the region any time soon. And I actually, we're seeing a new layer of war, a new wave of war coming in both Iraq and Syria. You're listening to War College, a weekly podcast that brings you the stories from behind the front lines. Here are your hosts, Matthew Galt and Jason Fields. Hello, welcome to War College. I'm your host, Matthew Gould. Jason Fields is lurking today. The Middle East is complicated, and few regions are, complicated as Kurdistan.

Between a recent referendum in the region that overwhelmingly voted for separation from Iraq, the recent issuing of arrest warrant for the Kurdish VP and Baghdad's troops entering Kirkuk, things are decidedly more so. Here to help us sort it all out this week are Benedetta Argentieri and Joey Lawrence. Argentieri is an independent journalist who spent a lot of time in the region. She was previously on our show talking about the women who fight ISIS. Lawrence is a photojournalist who has also been in and out of Kurdistan. Thank you both so much for joining us.

So right up at the top, you both know each other, correct? Correct. Yeah, Benny is my dear friend, and she's got me out of trouble many times, and she also happens to be a lot smarter than I am. So we've gone on a few different expeditions together in Syria, and as well as Iraq slash Kurdistan, depending on which day it was. So let's get some basic stuff out of the way to put what we're going to talk about in context for the audience. Where is Kurdistan geographically?

When we think about Kurdistan, usually we refer to the region of northern Iraq. But when you talk to the Kurds, Kurdistan is a much larger region that takes as well Iraq, well Iraq, of course, Iran, Syria and Turkey. So it really depends who you talk to. But for this show, I think that we would refer just to Northern Iraq. Because in Northern Iraq, since 2003, there was a federation called Kurdistan Regional Government that allowed the Kurds to have finally some kind of autonomy. All right, and it's a single group of people and a single culture, despite all those official borders kind of getting in the way, like Turkey and Iran.

It is a single culture, although linguistically they are divided in two different dialects, and they are not the monolithic groups. They have like several politics and there are several like political parties as well. So it is a region but with nuances, let's say. Just like kind of anywhere else on the map. exactly. Okay, so you've both spent a lot of time there. Jerry, you have some really striking and beautiful photography, these really intimate close-up shots to some of the fighters that you've met. What are the people like? Well, we could say that the people of Kurdistan are probably among some of the most kind-hearted people that I've ever met, but you could say that about the region in general in the Middle East, of course, to kind of echo what Benedetto was saying, although there are, um, a lot of rival political factions in Kurdistan, we could say one thing that sort of binds everybody together for the most part, I would say, is the Kurdish dream of independence. And we saw what happened

with the referendum. We saw probably what was the democratic will of most people, even people who don't support certain political parties or their bitter rivals for years, in some cases have gone to war with one another, they were in support of sort of like voicing to the world that they were unified in their vision. But what happened afterwards showed some of the things that are happening behind the scenes, if you will. That's my impression of Kurdistan. I've spent most of my time in what it's called West Kurdistan in Rojava, which could be also considered Syrian Kurdistan. What exactly was this referendum, what happened with it? And what has the aftermath been like these past two weeks? So in the summer, the KDP, so the ruling party of the Iraqi Kurdistan

region, decided to hold a referendum whether the people of Kurdistan wanted to be, wanted to have independence. And they held this referendum and elections despite the US and other Western countries, I would say, they weren't very happy about it because they knew like the U.S. especially, that it would complicate an already complicated relationship with the Iraqi government and with Baghdad. So technically, KERG is still part of Iraq. So Baghdad pays public stipends to soldiers, to teachers, to doctors. And they need Baghdad for, you know, money, for financial, for international supports, and that kind of thing. So, and because of the momentum that occurred, leave for the war against ISIS, they wanted to get more and more independence.

And so this is the idea of the referendum, although there are like specific behind-the-scene decisions that the ruling parties made in order to stay in power, because this is another important aspect. We're talking about a region that is extremely corrupt and where tribes rule a lot and still, and nepotism is very much there. So all of this mix created the kind of the perfect chaos, if you allow me to say that. And then what happened is when the referendum was held and an overwhelming majority, so we're talking about 92% of the people who voted, voted for independence, It was like kind of shocking for Iraq. Also, because what was extremely problematic was the referendum was held also in areas that are not considered, quote, unquote, Kurdistan.

Such as Kirkuk. Kirkuk is a very disputed city from many parts, and it has a history by itself or other parts of Iraq like Singer. So this kind of ranged Baghdad thinking, okay, they're taking up too much. Because all these areas that I'm talking about, so Singer, Kerkuk and others, were taken because of the Pashmerga fighting by ISIS. So they were in control until really recently about this area. So do you think that there's a sense that because the Kurds were so instrumental in the fight against the, against ISIS that they have earned an independence? It's a very tricky question.

They were absolutely instrumental for the war against ISIS. I mean, if you were going to Urbiel until really recently, the coalition against ISIS was mainly based there. And they were, like, most of the operations were conducted from Erbil, the old coalition. Now, I think the Kurds have earned independence regardless of the fight, against ISIS. I think it's time for the international community to recognize and at least discuss the Turkish question that is always being neglected because of the Turkey position on the Kurds,

which has always been very, very harsh. And also, Turkey has always been so hush on the Kurds because it's the biggest community it's in Turkey. So Kurds in Turkey are roughly 25% of the population, which is a huge number. Over the years, Turkey tried to disperse this population by displacing families and so on, but because of groups such as the PKK, the Kurdish question never really went away. And it came back fiercely with the war against ISIS. Yeah, if I could add something, I think that this referendum was always a gamble. when Barzani led it, I don't think that they had anticipated quite the size of the backlash of the international community. If you talk to most Kurds who voted in the referendum, they thought that

maybe they could voice their opinion now and some sort of independence could come in the future. But as soon as, let's say, their voices were heard, we sort of saw a lot of different international superpowers conspiring to sort of crush these ideas. And the way that they did it is the way that the Kurds are always sort of divided and conquered. And they tore apart the two main political parties and the two factions that rule Kurdistan being the KDP and the P UK. And right now it's too early to say what exactly happened. I mean, we can check Twitter. There's probably some new information there that wasn't there five minutes ago. But it seems to be. at least maybe you agree with me, Benedetta, that the KDP sort of did this referendum to gain

overarching power. They had disenfranchised the PUK over time, especially in the war against ISIS. All the weapons went straight to them. And in light of this crisis and all the international community sort of provoking them, it seems that the PUK split and made some kind of deal with Baghdad evacuating their areas and then also KDP having to evacuate or let's say retreat from the disputed zones under their territory so I think that's probably how it unraveled so fast I will have to correct you on something okay the weapons never there's been a lot of talks and a lot of anger especially around 2015 because the weapons because the US government shipped the weapons first to Baghdad and then they were supposed to go to Kurdistan.

So what happened in the thing, that of course the weapons kind of got lost in transition for men, like a lot. So finally they were able to get some of the weapons directly. But I also wanted to say something about the politics within the Kurdistan region, because that is very interesting. Sometimes ago, and I start with a little antidote, sometimes ago I was in a reveal and I was talking to a shake of a very prominent family of a big tribe. And he was very vocal, which was very weird for me, against Berzani. And the main problem was that Berzani, who is the president of KRG, hold that position for way longer than it was supposed to, meaning they were supposed to be a little bit.

elections a couple of years ago to re-elect the president of the KRG. And because of the KDPs, the KDPs is a major party in certain areas, while in other areas, the major party is P.UK. And because of the war against ISIS, Bersani decided not to hold elections to basically stay in office until the war of ISIS. was like ending. And then when Musul got retaken, which was, what, July, then there was time to get election again. And instead of calling elections, it called for the referendum. So many people, especially not living in our field, but let's say in other places in

Kurdistan, who I talked to, they said to me, you know, we are actually against the idea of this referendum because first we should elect our president. And then, you know, talk about a referendum that might lead to independence, but we will have to vote anyway, because this is a one-time chance. So it was a kind of, yes, I agree with you. It was a bargain in so many ways. And of course, Barzani didn't expect the international backlash and that, you know, this referendum would totally backfire in this way.

But at the same times, I see this referendum as a way of survival for Barzani. who is now is like over 80s and he put all his sons and nephews and everybody in his family in the top position of the Kurdistan government. So this is why it's problematic. First to understand what really is going on and then, you know, to understand the ratio behind it because there are so many different things in place. Right. So it's it was, this is much more internally politically motivated than I first

thought. Yeah, and one thing I wanted to add, Benedetta, what I was saying was traditionally during the war against ISIS, a lot of the resources went through KDP first instead of PUK. And when they, I wasn't talking about Baghdad versus Kurdistan, but basically when Barzani declared this referendum and was going to sort of, if it were successful, let's say, usurp all power, it would have really undermined the PUK and put them, basically in a powerless position if there were, say, a future Kurdish state. So you can see now why they might have taken a back deal with Baghdad because that sort of kept them in power to some regard versus being totally swept under the bus.

And again, this is all like sort of developing right now or conspiracy theories or whatever, but the fact of the matter is there has been political divides, against PUK, KDP, and they've sort of made an effort to appear they were more unified than they actually were during the referendum process. But once again, it seems that the superpowers have put phenomenal pressure on the Kurds and sort of tore this thing apart at the seams. Let's talk about that. Let's talk about this international backlash that they weren't expecting because it's taken them by surprise. Why is the U.S. upset? Why is everybody in the region upset about this? Why can't they just let Kurdistan be independent? I think that there are several

reasons for it. And the first one is that this could be considered precedent. So I know this is a bit of a stretch, but then you see places like in Spain, everybody wants to, you know, be independent and you have Catalonia and then you might have places in Mexico. I think that, I know that this is a bit of a stretch, but I think that this is a position that the U.S. is taken into like consideration while, okay, yes, the Kurds are, you know, important and have been a formidable ally, allies, but at the same time, what could happen is that, you know, this could have dominant effects in so many other areas. And most importantly, in all the other three, like countries that have occurred, whether it's like Turkey, Iran or Syria, where, well, Syria is a little bit, let's take Syria aside for a moment because it's a little bit more complicated than that. And also because I think that probably the U.S. is not ready to participate in, or at least not yet, in the front termination, can you say frontamation of Iraq, a country where the U.S. has spent billions and billions of dollars and is still planning to spend billions of billions of dollars and getting back the oil.

So, I mean, there are so many different things in place right now that is very difficult to understand, you know. But at the same times, I'm actually sure that the U.S. in some capacity, in an official ways, have always, like, promised in a sort of more independence to the Kurds for them, you know, to help. Because at the end of the day, the Kurds have paid the, you know, the biggest prize, the biggest price for the in the fight. against ISIS, whether in Syria or in Iraq. All right, so what's going on Kirkuk right now? Kirkuk is an extremely, I think it's a very interesting city. Originally, Kirkuk was a Kurdish city. Then the Basis party in Saddam Hussein conducted an Arabization of Kirkuk

and decided to, well, basically displaced a lot of Kurds and put back like Arabs in there. Why? Because Kirkuk is one of the most important cities in terms of national resources. You have gas and you have a lot of oil. So when the war against, well, when, like, ISIS started, you know, taking all the Amber provinces and marching towards Kirkuk, the Pershmurga, with the PKK, so the HPG, defended the city. Some pockets of the city were taken by ISIS. And, but overall, it was never really a security, but it was not in the hands of ISIS. Of course, you know, Baghdad, which at the time didn't have the strength to control Kirkuk in terms of militarily strengths, was always very wary of the situation in Kirkuk.

And always talked of Kirkuk as part of Iraq and not part of Kurdistan. So when the referendum was held in Kirkuk as well, an overwhelming majority of people that wanted to stay in Kurdistan, or being part of Kurdistan, in independent Kurdistan, one of the first reaction was first like a kind of back and force with the governor of Kirkuk that was very vocal against Baghdad and everything that was happening. and then Baghdad decided to send the PMU and the Iraqi military to take back the city. Now, the PUC-Pashmerga, which are the part that decided to leave without shooting a bullet in Kirkuk and leave their positions to the Iraqi army. That led to, well, a lot of conspiracy theories, first of all, and then to a huge unrest in Kakuk. So now we have people taking to the streets and trying to resist, you know, or clash with Iraqi forces, which is extremely problematic, of course. I think that most of the people who resisted in Kirk Cook, first and foremost, there was confusion.

You saw those same PKK that had a small presence inside the city were some of the first to fight back against Hashidav. Shabi for a little bit under the guise of protecting people and sort of, you know, the PKK's idea of being the vanguard of Kurdish people. And then, of course, a lot of civilians taking up arms themselves. I just don't know how many of those people were splinters of Puk because they add one more layer of complexity to all of this is that there's even a splinter within Pukk itself. And it seemed like some of those Peshmerga, weren't quite on board with the plan, and we saw some minor resistance and fighting and stuff from that side, too.

So I asked my Kurdish friend, like, actually this morning, could have this not been done in a more smooth way where, you know, there's time, the civilians are aware of it, and, like, there's a transition period or something, but, you know, he quite frankly said, well, yeah, If they had done that, there had been mass people fleeing Kirk Cook, an even greater uprising, a nightmare, and discussion when really it seemed what happened was these clan leaders that are in power just sort of made the switch in the middle of the night, if you will. And those pockets of resistance we see are just sort of Kurds defending Kurdistan, and they might not even be politically aligned with anything except for just putting up with

these PMU militias and finding common cause in fighting them. Absolutely. And also, you know, what it is is that there is so much weariness on both sides, you know, about the violence that one group or another put upon people. So when, you know, Kirkuk was taken, there was so many, like, Twitter accounts or even, like, people saying, you know, people are being arrested for being arrested for being Kurds, people are being beaten up and kidnapped, because Hashtal Shabi, which is this militia, has a very bad reputation in terms of violence, especially towards Sunni and Kurds.

So all of this created a very chaotic situation on the grounds, and we saw the pictures, I don't know if you did, of like thousands of cars fleeing Kerkuk and going into. the Kurdistan region trying to reach or build where they thought they would be safe. So all of this is another really huge problem in Iraq and in general on the region that there is no trust whatsoever amongst these groups. So you might go up to an Iraqi soldiers and they would say to you, yes, because the Pashmurga allied with eyes and you're like, no,

I saw it with my own eyes and vice versa. So how do you argue that? It's very, very difficult. And this is like the result of decades of ethnic violence in so many different ways. Right. And to add another layer of complication on top of this, at the same time this is happening,

Raka is falling in serious. Syria, right? They're helping take back the, the capital, ISIS's capital. Yeah. So I think a lot of people, especially in Western media, they get the, just because of Kurds in general, they think that the Kurds in the Western Kurdistan and Syria, Rojava, they think that the political system is the same or that they are also separatist or meaning the parties in power are separatist, parties that, parties that, sort of want to build their own state like the Iraqi Kurds. But here we have another distinction of political ideology.

The Kurds inside Rojava follow a completely different theory under the philosopher of the Abdullah Ojelan, who's seen as a Kurdish philosopher, but is also the founder of the PKK in Turkey. So he's sort of there, let's say, if you will, idealized. framework, which is a very complicated to describe. We would probably need an entire podcast episode, but it's, it's sort of, it could be interpreted as an autonomous zone inside of the state working in duality to split up power and decentralized power by local forces. So what I'm trying to say is that the Kurds inside Syria never really, were trying to get their own Kurdistan, they're more fighting for autonomy, and their forces, of course,

just took the city of Raqa, which is going to be, let's say, a key step towards some sort of settlement with either the Syrian regime that's in power now or whatever future regime happens to that country. So you could say that it's a key ISIS stronghold. It's a huge victory for Kurds, but it's not like the leaders in charge of Rojava are going to try to declare independence tomorrow. Instead, I think they see their future in the framework of the Syrian state. I think that what is, like, it was a little bit of a pity that Raqa's, let's say, victories was completely overshadowed by the situation in Iraq. But I think that also poses a huge and larger question on what happens next. Because, you know, it's like, yes, the SDF, the Syrian

Democratic forces alongside with the U.S. advisors on the ground, we took the capital of the Caliph, you know, the so-called, you know, Islamic state. But the reality is that the war is not going and here. And as we have just seen in Iraq, you know, the fractions and the torments will continue. And I don't see any stabilization of the region anytime soon. And I actually, you know, foreseen not as a fortune to other kind of things, but how everybody, like the superpowers of the world are positioning themselves. A new layer of war, a new wave of war coming in both. like Iraq and Syria. This is my personal takeaway of this. And I think that this is reason also why, you know,

we haven't seen so much proclamations from the White House or this U.S. government in general. Yesterday we had like pictures and videos of, you know, the commander of the Raka Openeration Rajda Vlatt declaring victory in the main square of Raka with a huge, huge flag and banner of the YPG and the SDF and Abdullah Oshlan. But, you know, you would expect some kind of word from the president, Trump. But I think that this hesitation is also reflects not the chaotic, but a lot of doubts of what's going to happen next. And next is like in the next couple of weeks.

It's not in the next couple of months. I don't know if you agree with me on this joy, but I was like kind of puzzled by this. Yeah, I think a lot of people made more talk about what flag the SDF chose to hang in the center versus getting to the points that actually matter and let's say how they were able to actually do it and what that flag might represent. I think it's quite low-hanging fruit to say, oh my God, it's the PKK leader. there are so many political reasons why they hung that flag there. Number one, the fact that it's banned itself gives the flag a sort of taboo power, if you will,

but the SDF had this sort of reiterate that they are not a proxy force of America and they're going to make their own decisions. And quite frankly, in my view, they can hang whatever flag they want there. But I think that in terms of a future settlement, what they fear, is sort of the Americans betraying them after this sweeping military victory against ISIS. And of course the Turks are on the border ready to destroy the Rojava project. And I think that that's why right now there's probably a lot of peace talks going on between SDF, the Americans, the Russians, the Syrian regime to sort of see where this all falls.

Because the regime might have an interest in making a peace deal with SDF because there's no way they can fight them to take back the country. they could, but do they really have the capacity to fight another war after all these many years? Or is there going to be yet another back-channel deal with Turkey getting involved and finding ways to sort of undermine this project? So there's been a lot of like sort of hot takes like the day after ISIS, what comes next? But truly if ISIS was the glue that held all these groups together, we're going to see what happens when that sort of mold comes apart. and I think that's what's going to happen next in Rojava. And if I could add just one more point,

is that a really interesting area to watch right now, I think to kind of unify our conversation tonight, is to watch the border zone between Rojava and now Iraq, because it seems that the Peshmerga are retreating from a lot of those disputed areas that are on the border of Syria, and it seems like Baghdad's approach to the Syrian Kurds is going to determine a lot of their future as well. So those border areas were always under embargo. The Iraqi Kurds were under the influence of Turkey.

They didn't want to help the Syrian Kurds, but now they just sort of fled. So I think that this border area is going to be key as well. Otherwise, Rojava finds itself completely under embargo from all sides. which has been actually in times in the past a couple of years going back and forth. Yeah, I think that the Russians sort of probably have an interest in a federal Syria. And they may, maybe you disagree with me, Benny, maybe you agree with me. But it seems to me that the Russians sort of see the future of Syria as federal. And if the regime wants to claim they want to retake every inch of Syria,

they're obviously going to need the backing of the Russians. if the Russians aren't on board, it's not going to happen. So I really see some kind of agreement being made between the two forces, but whether or not that sticks could be anyone's guess, because let's say the Syrian regime, when it says it wants to take back every inch of the country, they might actually be serious about it over time and actually have that in their mind. So, yeah, I think it's a really interesting day for both of those. events to happen you know within the same with within the same span of time and the

future of Kurdistan looks as uncertain as as always but that's always been the struggle for them so is Kirkuk the only region in the Kurds controlled or controlled I guess that is rich in natural resources is there other stuff in Kurdistan so there is another place that is awfully quiet about, which is the Mosul Dam. The Mosul Dam, as you might remember, is the biggest dam in Iraq that controls powers for like half of the country. It's a huge, huge dam that, you know, was taken by ISIS and then retaken by Peshmerga.

Now, there's been words around that the Iraqi army decided to kick them out, to kick the Kashmirga out and take back the Mosul Dam. But that is very much it in terms of natural resources. And Kyrkuk is the main place for natural resources in general. Then, of course, there are other places in northern Iraq that have gas or a little bit of oil, but nothing compared to then, you know, again, Kerkuk or even Basra or the southern part of Iraq. so they don't really have an interest in that. It's more a question of borders, you know, because northern Iraq, you have Turkey,

you have Syria, and you have Iran, of course, that all the borders like go around it. But other than that, there are not much natural resources. Yes, one of the criticisms that other Kurdish movements have about Iraqi Kurdistan is to get to the place where they are. They really relied on foreign investment. and Turkey basically owns that place because of all the different channels of influence they have there. Most of the goods, you know, are purchased from Turkey and a lot of Turkish business is set up there. So if Turkey was not, you know, on board with this referendum, as we see now, they really have the influence to kind of destroy the place.

So without Kirkuk, it seems the possibilities of Kurdistan, Iraqi Kurdistan, let's say, being, its own state without the oil-rich resources there seems very unlikely. The thing that is very important about Iraqi Kurdistan is that the pipes run through their territories, the oil pipes. They go underneath and they go to Turkey. And another thing that is very peculiar about Iraqi Kurdistan is how the leadership relied, as you were saying, Joy, completely on foreign aid, meaning they do not. not have anything. And when I say anything, I'm saying anything, everything that you see,

everything that you eat in a rocky Kurdistan is exported from outside. They don't have harvest, they don't have fields, they don't, for whatever reasons that that was, which is mainly cultural, but they relied completely on the outside world. So that makes it extremely problematic in this kind of setting and scenario, international scenario, where, you know, the referendum backlash so much because Iraqi Kurdistan might find itself literally starving. I want to talk about two of the other main regional players and how they figure into all of this.

And the first that we've already brought up, can we briefly describe Turkey's relationship to the Kurds and why it is so contentious? Yeah, sure. So the history of Turkey, I mean, it's a nation state based on an ethnicity of being Turkish. Historically, Turkey is for the Turks, even the founder at a Turk, differs completely from the current leader who's more Islamist in flavor, if you will, but I guess they could all find the common hatred and racism toward Kurdish people

because they see this entity is really capable of splitting of the southeast of Turkey. So Erdogan sort of rose to power the way he does, playing different factions of people being on board with the Kurds and wanting to negotiate a peace settlement with the PKK. But as things have sort of evolved over the time, we saw a ceasefire broke in the summer of, I believe, 2015, and since then, the situation has gotten really, really bad inside Kurdistan. I mean, we're talking about very, very famous politicians in jail, institutions, clothes, academics, teachers, journalists, all these things, places like Sir, the historic district in the Kurdish regions of Turkey, like completely inviscerated by new clashes with the PKK.

So to answer your question in a short way, relations are not good. And when Turkey looks across the border to Rojava, they see their old arch enemy sort of of gaining power and gaining the backing of the Americans to them. That's something that they want to stop by any means necessary. And it seemed the relation with the Iraqi Kurds was good as long as they didn't want too much or they didn't go too far. And it seemed like they were able to tolerate this autonomy because they benefited financially from it greatly, let's say.

But as soon as they wanted a step further, I think Turkey fears its own Kurdish population being inspired one day to make claims of their own. But at the same time, the way a president like Erdogan gains power in the first place is by having an enemy. And it just so happens that happens to be the Kurdish population. I think that it's very interesting on how Erdogan, like recently divided the Kurds into good Kurds and bad Kurds, because this is really what it did until really, really really. The bad Kurds were the PKK Kurds, the Rojava Kurds, that part. While the good Kurds was Borsani, was the KDP, was the ones that it was, like the Kurds

that were economically dependent from Turkey and therefore movable and controllable in so many different ways. I mean, like Turkey entered Iraq and deployed hundreds of soldiers. in Bashika or in other places and constantly tried to go to Kandil, which is the headquarter of the PKK in Northern Iraq, never succeeded in it. They were able to fly drones and airstrikes over the mountains of Kurdistan thanks to Bordzani, Placid, to Bordzani saying, yes. And in the meantime, they were benefiting economically.

So the question was really, you know, like dividing, like this Erdogan defended himself from the accusation of being, you know, let's say, racist or ethnically or trying to destroy the Kurds by saying, no, no, we have the good Kurds. And the good Kurds are the Iraqi Kurdistan and the Iraqi Kurdish ones, but in specifically the ones from the KDP. And I think it's the old political maneuvers that actually tells you. a lot, how far also Turkey is willing to go into these Kurdish questions. Because if one hand feeds the Kurds, on the other hand, like, crashes completely even its own population, because we shouldn't forget what happened in southern eastern Turkey where places like Cisre or even Yerbarakir and Hamid, like completely destroyed by the army because of the Kurds.

So, I mean, again, it's very difficult, or at least for me, it's very difficult to read what is the strategy or if there is a long-term strategy for the Kurds by Turkey. Yeah, that good Kurd versus bad Kurd thing is, I couldn't have said it better myself, Benny. I mean, people's motivations become very, very clear when all of a sudden Kurds in general were demonized. it wasn't just that the PKK was the terrorist group now when Erdogan announced that also the Barzani Kurds, if you were, if you will, became terrorists as well in a way. So, yeah, I think that's a really telling point. One last question. What about Iran? Where do they fend all of this?

I knew that this was coming up. What other country could it be? Dun, dun, dun, done, done. Iran has their own Kurdish population as well. And they fear the exact same things happening to them with uprisings in their population. But I think, Benny, you yourself have been to Iran and I have not. So I think it's better that you. I did just photograph the foreign minister the other day,

and he didn't really have his talking points together until a few days later when they went hardcore against the referendum. But then maybe you can talk about this. Yes, Iran has a Kurdish population that is really smaller, like compared to all the other three countries. But I also think, and of course, you know, that is something that Iran doesn't not even want to be mentioned. I mean, Kurds, they are not to be mentioned. They are being crushed heavily. And because there are such a minority, words or like news really, really. never really came out about the Iranian Kurds.

But there is also another thing, and I think it's about the, let's say, overshadow influence that Iran is playing on Baghdad. Because that is another thing that, you know, many people in the U.S. have been very worried about and how, you know, Iran and these Shia militias have been more and more prominent in the region and in the Iraq in general. So I think that the real game changer is Iran in sense of what's going to happen in Iraq on the long term. Of course, they see, you know, the finally being able to. to have an extensive influence and therefore start challenging all the other Sunni countries such as the goal for, or even, you know, or even Turkey in a way. And they played a long-term kind of game, a geopolitical game, also lying with Assad several

years ago, knowing that would anger the Sunni countries. I don't know if this makes sense to you guys. but it's a very complicated chess game in so many different ways. Of course, you know, Iran was not very content about an Iraqi Kurdistan that would be independent. But at the same time, an independent Iraqi Kurdistan could be a solution for so many. And this is now I'm playing devil's advocate, because by allowing an Iraqi Kurdistan to to actually leave or to be funded properly, you could argue that all the other Kurds could go to their own countries instead of having quests in other countries such as Turkey or Syria or even Iran.

So it's very complicated and very, and so much confusing even to me on why there is such a backfire on this idea. media. Benedetta, Joey, thank you all so much for coming on War College and talking us through this very complicated topic. Thank you. Thank you. Where can people find your work and tell us about your new film? So I'm directing a new documentary about women taking up new roles in the Middle East that

challenges what the media mainstream portrays as Muslim women, usually frail, timid, and crying and victimized. And I traveled, well, now, well, I'm going to travel to three countries, and most of the shooting already done it, in Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan, to meet this woman who are leading this kind of feminist revolution because they want women to take up new roles, but also to change society with it. And one of the main character of the documentary is Rajda Flavlis.

the commander that led the Raka campaign. And yes, that's it. And hopefully it's going to be out soon. And Joey, what are you working on? I've actually got a fine art photography book coming out on my work from over the years in Kurdistan. It's called We Came From Fire out by Powerhouse Publishing. And actually, it's not out until 2018, but I did launch a behind-the-scenes film about the making of those photographs in my trip in Kurdistan, which is for free at We Came Fromfire.com. You can watch all my journeys as a photographer in Kurdistan.

And as well as the movies are free, but if you want to pre-order the book, that helps me out so much. because the photobook industry, let's say, is a little challenging. But you can find all the information about the book there. And if you pre-order, you can get a fine art print that's exclusive that comes with it. So if I were to plug myself, enjoy the free films, but also consider helping out this independent project that I've grown quite passionate about over the years in Kurdistan. Thank you all both so much.

All right, listeners, that was this week's War College. I hope that you enjoyed it as much as Jason and I did. War College is Jason Fields and Matthew Galt. This week I took on hosting duties, but Jason was right there in the background, producing and helping lead the discussion. If you liked the show, please check us out on Facebook.

You can find us at facebook.com forward slash war college podcast. We are also on Twitter. at War underscore College. The archives are everywhere. We're on ACAST. We're on iTunes. We're on Stitcher and anywhere else. Premium podcasts are distributed.

We also really love it when you guys rate and like us on iTunes. It helps other people find the show and lets us know what you like about it. This week, this one from Temest 05, caught my eye. Hey, War College team, great podcasts, with enough details in a condensed segment that helps grab and keep my attention. I can appreciate a long podcast, 60 Minutes Plus, but for my commutes or small house chores, I love being able to get in a 30-minute informative session like yours. The guests so far have been great journalists, authors, and practical experts. Please keep up the diverse mix.

The Q&As really help illuminate a guest thesis or main expertise. Please maintain that format in future episodes. I think it would be great to get foreign military experts or analysts. Always interesting to get their perspectives in particular on U.S. military or other issues that concern us. Thanks so much for doing this. Keep up the good work. We had a foreign military expert on today. I hope that you enjoyed it.

And I'm sorry that we ran a little bit long, but Kurdistan is really complicated, and we thought we needed to give it the time to breathe. Thank you guys so much. We will be back next Monday.