Angry Planet - ICYMI: Syria, the Kurds, and Civil War

Episode Date: October 16, 2019

This week on War College, Syrian journalist Loubna Mrie walks us through life in the early days of the Syrian revolution, how it turned into a nightmarish Civil War, and the consequences of US Withdrawal.You can listen to War College on iTunes, Stitcher, Google Play or follow our RSS directly. Our website is warcollegepodcast.com. You can reach us on our Facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/warcollegepodcast/; and on Twitter: @War_College.Support this show http://supporter.acast.com/warcollege. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

Love this podcast. Support this show through the ACAST supporter feature. It's up to you how much you give, and there's no regular commitment. Just click the link in the show description to support now. Hello out there, War College listeners, this is Matthew. I want to apologize up front. I've been traveling a lot the past month, and I've had time to record episodes, but just not enough time to edit them together.

We're sitting on a great conversation about the online defenders of dictators, a walk through the small arms of the Syrian Civil War with caliber obscure, and a look at the likelihood of the end of the world and which form it might take. But I just got off one flight and I'm about to board another. So in the meantime, with everything going on in Syria right now, I wanted to revisit two episodes from earlier this year about the Civil War, the Revolution, and the Kurds. They're both important.

They're both add valuable context to what's happening today. And they were recorded before I was mastering the audio properly. So I've done that. and they should sound much nicer now than they did when they originally aired. Thanks for bearing with us, and I will talk to you next week, I promise. Stay safe until then. I don't think the war is over. I think the revolution is over.

I think when you see people going back to the government held areas because they're sick of the war and because they're sick of the poverty, I mean, I'm not saying that, like, the government areas are perfect, but I'm just saying that kind of the government gave them the option. It's either stability or freedom and chaos. And so, of course, people will choose the stability. You're listening to War College, a weekly podcast that brings you the stories from behind the front lines. Here are your hosts. Hello, welcome to War College. I'm Matthew Galt. And I'm Derek Cannon. The United States military is officially leaving Syria. Maybe. On December 19th, 2018, President Trump declared the war on ISIS.

finished and announced the withdrawal of all U.S. troops from Syria. Since then, things have gotten complicated. On January 16th, an explosion killed 19 people, including four Americans. On the 21st, another explosion fell to convoy in northeast Syria. ISIS disclaimed responsibility for both of the attacks. Here to help us untangle what's going on is Lubna Mari. Lubna Mari is a Syrian photographer, journalist, and writer. She covered the Syrian War as a photojournalist for Reuters from 2012 to 2014.

Currently based in Oakland, California, she is a frequent commentator and researcher on Syrian and Middle Eastern Affairs. Her work has been published in major news outlets and publications such as The Nation, Time Magazine, Vice, and New Republic, to name a few. Most recently, she graduated from New York University receiving an MA in Near Eastern Studies. She's currently writing her first book. Lubna, thank you so much for joining us. Of course. Thank you for having me. So how did you first get involved in the Syrian? revolution. Your father was actually a fairly senior official in the military, right?

He was not an official member of the Syrian government, but he's a businessman. And on my father's side, are very close with the Syrian government. So they're close with the Syrian government, but they don't have any official titles. What was it like in those early days? And how did you get involved? Honestly, it's like very hard to answer this question. But I remember in the beginning, I mean, like, by the end of 2010, I was 19 years old and we were like many Arabs or like many people around the world. We were watching the Arab Spring in Egypt and in Tunisia. And I remember just like watching this news clips and wondering if that will ever happen to my country. And it did. In 2011, the Arab Spring reached Syria and there was like tons of protests. And there was like tons of

protest and then I joined those protests. And to be honest, I had no idea that the crackdown on the uprising would be this brutal by the government. You've spent time with a lot of the different fighting groups, you know, like the Free Syrian Army, the Curtis YPG fighters. How do you see the breakdown in the Syrian Civil War? There seems to be a lot of factions playing into this. How did you see those kind of interspersed groups with different ideologies? he's kind of working together. Like, how is that breaking down? Okay, but before we go to the military side of the uprising,

it's very important to remember that the first five months of the Syrian uprising was completely peaceful. I mean, yeah, there was like kind of push back against the brutality of the police here and there, but the majority of the protests were not militarized. And so it's always important to remember that. the beginning was peaceful. And the militarization of the uprising came as a natural result on the brutality of the police forces. In June, 2011, people started to defect from the Syrian army, and then they started what was called

today, the Friesian army. Groups like Jabhat al-Nusra or Jabhat Feth Hasham, they are. are not really fighting for the same things that we used to fight for, like in the beginning of the uprising. It's very important to draw the line here between the rebels and these radical groups, because these radical groups consider the Syrian uprising as something that it should be fought against because they don't believe in democracy and they don't believe in human rights. and if they saw someone with the revolution flag, they will detain this person.

So, yeah, it's just important to kind of draw the line here between Jibhah and the actual rebels. You seen you were involved from the very inception of the rebellion, the protests, the civil protest. Was there a specific day where the leadership got together and says, this is it, we have to take up arms? Okay, so when that day happened, actually, I knew about it because I was still in Jablet, which is my hometown, which is actually today, Jablis, my hometown called the capital of martyrs due to the 30,000 young men who were killed fighting along the Syrian forces. So I'm from that small town, a very al-a-white town. And I remember one time I was going from Jablis to Latakia and I saw the ambulance. coming from Jisrishur. And these ambulances had the dead bodies of soldiers who were killed in Jisrishur.

And this is where that was the first time where a protest. I mean, like still there is like lots of debates around what happened that day, but that was the first time where protesters or people affiliated with the uprising pushed back against the police forces. so that day was kind of that day was the day that we knew that okay there is something happening that some people are actually pushing back against the police brutality and to be honest that was extremely understandable because in the first few months thousands I'm not going to exaggerate but like I think hundreds of people were killed in a protest like peaceful protest so the Self-Defense Act was very understandable and it was very justified.

Some activists argue that the self-defense or fighting against the government was the beginning of an end for the Syrian uprising because after the protesters started to fight back, it gave the justification for the government to escalate their violence against the protesters. and so yeah, that was the day where people were like, oh, shit, there's something happening. What are your conversations with Westerners like, especially Americans? I'm curious, what do we fundamentally misunderstand about this conflict? God, I don't know how I can start with this. I don't know.

So many, so many. Well, what's one thing that you wish we all understood better? I mean, so, okay, so there's. This is a difference between people who started to follow Syria in 2011 and people who started to follow Syria in 2016. Okay. Like those people who started to follow Syria in 2011, they mainly understand the timeline of the conflict. They mainly understand that, okay, what happened in Syria in 2011, in March, 2011 was part of the Arab Spring. So understanding what happened between 2011, for example, in 2016 is really important to understand how we got here.

Okay. but these people who started to follow Syria in 2016, they only see that, okay, it's a government against radical groups. Oh, it's like the U.S. backing up rebels against the Syrian government or Turkey is backing up rebels against the Syrian government. So I think the main misunderstanding or the main misconception around this war is that people do not remember how it all started. And it started because there was a true organic uprising against a dictatorship.

It wasn't because it's like a regime regime changed conspiracy coming from the West. Also, another thing that I wish people understood more. And I think maybe we, maybe as Syrians, we didn't really do good job by explaining, in explaining to people here, how Syria looked like before the war. And I think in just understanding how Syria looked like before 2011,

and people will understand why so many Syrians rebelled against this government. Okay, well, piggybacking off of that, something that we're hearing a lot in the West and from like American commentators right now is that American withdrawal is going to be a step towards ending the war. And it'll certainly be a step towards ending America's involvement in the war, but the conflict won't end when we leave, right? I mean, listen, in an ideal world, I would be like, hey, we should stay. against all interventions, we should stand against all foreign troops in Syria, blah, blah, and all of that. But today here, we're not talking about, okay, if the U.S. withdrawal, it means the final decision will be for Syrians. This is not going to happen. If the U.S. withdrew from Syria, what we're going to see in Rojava, a similar situation to what happened in Afrin.

I don't know if you guys are aware of what's happening in Afrin, but a couple of days ago was the University of the Oliver branch operation and the situation in Afrin and the stories that we've been hearing from Afrin. It's just mind-blowing. And if Turkey took over these towns, like the Roche Ava towns, which probably will happen, we will just see what happened in Afrin, but on a larger scale. So here we are not talking about like the U.S. withdrawal and then, okay, it's going to be peaceful operation. No, it's going to be a battlefield for Turkey and the Russians. And again, Syrians are completely outside of the picture. In your opinion, should the United States stay?

You should ask people who are uncommishly, to be honest. But from what I'm seeing and from what I've been, I've been talking to my friends there. And yes, they want the U.S. to stay. They want the U.S. to protect them from Turkey. Because, again, as I mentioned before, that the U.S. withdrawal means the Kurds will be fighting Turkey again. and this is this is not going to be because of anyone. Al Jazeera just had an article that came out that basically Turkey the Sultan. Yeah.

I basically had a phone call with the with, you know, President Trump, I guess on Sunday. And he basically reiterated strongly, according to the article, that Turkey is ready to take over the Mambiz region. The Kurdish-held regions in Syria. Is it 100% guaranteed that the Kurds are going to be attacked? or be attacking Turkish forces if this happens? I mean, honestly, I'm like, I'm not a fan of hypothetical scenarios, but I think from what we saw in Afrin, this will be repeated again in Rojava on a larger scale. And I think we will not be able to blame the YPG or Kurdish forces if they decided to seek help and support from the Russian and the Syrian troops. I mean, the Syrian government troops.

I think what is going to happen in Rojaava, I think it's, again, it's not going to be good for anyone. And it's scary, you know, because in the past years, despite all the mistakes that were being committed by the YPG, like the Rojaava territories are kind of the most stable territories in Syria today. And it's just like heartbreaking to see like this whole experience going to be like crushed by Turkey, which is going to happen probably. What bothers me today in all the discussions that has been happening around like the withdrawal, especially from the American point of view, is that they're focusing so much on ISIS. I mean, of course, ISIS probably will come back on like a larger scale.

But but like the true threat here is Turkey. the true threat here is Erdogan. And like we saw it before, you know, like I know I keep repeating the Afrin example because there is insane human rights violations happening at that very small town and no one is covering it. Let's, I mean, let's dig into that because that's something that Western media doesn't talk about. You're right. And I think it is important. Like really explain to our audience what happened there and what might happen again.

Oh gosh. So, so when Turkey invaded. I mean, Turkey and Arab rebels invaded Afrin. The first thing they did is that they pushed the Kurds out of the towns. And during that time, Al-Ghuta was being under siege, Al-Ghuta and the suburbs of Damascus. I mean, this is one example of what happened. So people were being pushed out of Al-Ghuta to Idlib.

And then when civilians from Al-Gutha reached Idlib, they were kind of encouraged in a way to go and take over the empty houses in Afrin. So here we started to see a demographic change in a Kurdish town. So Afrin was like 39% or 93% Kurdish and 7% Arab. Now it's 50% Arab. So basically the democracy in Afrin changed completely. the Arab brigades that are controlling Afrin now are just the worst brigades ever. They are killing people under torture, stories about waterboarding, stories about rape and jails.

People are being killed under torture in jails and interrogations in jails are happening under the eye of the Turkish command. I was talking to my friend recently who just got out of jail in Afrin and he told me the interrogation was was being was done by a Turkish commander who had a translator like like like an Arab translator. I don't know why these stories are not being covered and I don't know why like even Arab activists I feel we kind of led down this very small town. that actually was the very first Kurdish town to rebel against the Syrian government. So I don't know, just like this whole situation there is really hard, heartbreaking. And I don't want it to be repeated in Rojaven. I don't. To be clear, we're talking about ethnic cleansing led by Turkish forces.

Yeah. Okay. I just want to make sure, make that super clear for the audience. This is not the first time that I've heard of this. but you're right it doesn't get a lot of coverage yeah I mean also because like it's very complicated

because like these ethnic cleansing sadly is being done by like by using Arab proxies they're like they're using the rebels who once stood for

you know like democracy and like a united country for everyone they are using these brigades brigades in order to achieve their agenda in Syria. And I don't know. Seriously, I have no words.

How disappointed are regular Syrians, especially, you know, with Trump saying, hey, we got what we wanted and now we're leaving. How do you feel about, I mean, how do you and most Syrians that are, that were part of the Syrian civil war that had stake in the game? Yeah, I mean to say that people had high. hopes on the U.S. will be like a big statement. I think Syrians, especially after the chemical attack in 2013, people just wanted any solution to

hold the asset government accountable. They just wanted any power to just stop the atrocities that were being done in Syria and that were being committed in Syria. Me personally, I think

I'm not really, again, again, I'm not pro intervention and I don't think I cannot see how you know, like the U.S. would have stopped the war in Syria. I think they only escalated the situation by just

you know, just like this is such a hard question I don't know how to answer. Like part of me I feel that okay, the ideal scenario would be just like to hold the government accountable. But how can you do that without an military intervention? You know? Like how can you do

that without supporting, again, like intervention, you know, but like we should not be supportive of any kind of intervention. But I think there must be some way, again, I am not a politician. I don't know how this things could be done, but I think just showing the Assad government any, it's so hard to answer this question without sounding interventionist, you know? And like, I'm sure if someone heard this, it would be like, oh, she's like pro-intervention Yeah, of course she wants like the U.S. to bomb the country. But like this is not the case.

Like Syria is not Iraq. You know, like like the demands for change, the demand for changing the government came from the people. You know, it was it was an organic uprising. It wasn't, it was not regime change demanded by the West. And people asking for intervention in order for protection. Like how I am going to tell someone who lost all his family and saw his his, his house being.

bombed on his head that, no, you should not ask for intervention. Like, intervention for people who are now in Syria is a survival act. It's not, you know, like, it's not something that, okay, people are asking because they're just like, like pro intervention. And they love the United States. It's really happening out of, out of desperation. That was a very hard question. I don't even know if I could have answered that either.

It was designed to be a hard question. I mean, it's basically, that's the question that everyone's asking themselves right now. And you're right. A lot of people are coming into the Syrian uprising into the Civil War kind of late, especially the people that have been following 2016 to 2018 now. It sounds like Syria is tired. Is that? I mean, yeah, but like also like, like now, if you ask anyone in Rojava, do you want the U.S. to leave?

Of course they will answer, no, we don't want them to leave, simply because they know if the U.S. left, the, like, the Turkish troops will probably come the next day. You know, so it's like, it's very hard to answer these questions. If you are on a survival mode, if you don't know what the future is going to hold for you. Like, here we're not talking about an intervention where there is no other foreign countries are intervening in the country. And also, like, people talk about intervention. They only talk about the U.S. intervention. why no one talks about the Russian intervention?

Why no one talked about like Husbalah intervention? Why no one talks about Iran intervention? I mean, if as activists we want to stand against all interventions, they're just, you know, like stand against all interventions, not only the U.S. Well, let's talk about that. Okay, so for example, the Russians have an air base, which is 20 minutes from my hometown, Jabla.

they have an air base, they have a hospital there, they are supporting the government with everything, they are supporting the government with troops underground and with weapons and ammunition. I don't think the government would have won this war without the support of the Russians and the Husbalah and Iran. I mean, yeah, like Russia is like any other country, they want to have more power in the region, and that was the main reason why they supported

the Syrian government. How it looked like, I don't know. I know that the Syrian government won the war because of these foreign powers. For example, the soldiers, these Syrian soldiers are being treated really badly compared to the Russian soldiers. Like, for example, if the Russian soldier was injured or, you know, the Syrian soldiers, or was hurt, they will just move him to a private hospital and they will take care of him. But today in Jebelie, for example, there is thousands of injured government soldiers with no support

whatsoever. And there is, you know, like now after eight seven years of eight years of the war, we are starting to see kind of a pushback against the government and a pushback against how it has been treating these local soldiers especially the other whites. You said something really interesting at the top of your answer that I wanted

to circle back to. You said you don't think the government would have won without Russia's help. Do you consider this war kind of over already? I was literally just arguing with someone earlier today about this.

I don't think the war is over. I think the revolution is over. I think when you see people going back to the government held areas because they're sick of the war and because they're sick of the poverty, I mean, I'm not saying that like the government areas are perfect, but I'm just saying that people just, they don't, you know, like kind of the government gave them the option. It's either stability or freedom and chaos. And so, of course, people will choose. stability and they it's very hard for me

to answer such question because like this is my personal opinion you know like so like so many Syrians will be arguing with me if I answer this way but for me yes the revolution is over it's over because it's not like that we

failed but because the Syrian government really used everything to destroy this uprising and by the way in the very very very very beginning of the uprising. The Syrian government supporters and its soldiers used

to write on banners or on the walls in areas that were witnessing protests. They were writing, I said, or we burned the country. That was their main slogan. And they did that.

They literally burned the country in order to keep Assad in power. And so long story short, yeah, I think that revolution was destroyed, but not because we didn't deserve democracy or freedom or we didn't deserve change. No, because literally the government did everything they could in order to crush this uprising. And it gave a very good, you know, it's not like a very good example, but I think Bashar al-Assad Lassad today gave an example for dictators in the future that if there isn't

a uprising in your country, you can crush it and you can get away with it. And today, honestly, like I wonder if Husni Mubarak is looking at Bashar al-Assad and be like and like he was like, okay, maybe I should have done that. Or like Ali Abdullal-Sala is looking at Bashar al-Assad and he was like, okay, maybe I should have done that because Bashar al-Assad proved that you can kill 500,000 plus people in your country and get away with it, although every human rights organization is saying that, okay, this dictator is killing his own people, but no one is able to stand up. for him. It's like there's no consequences.

Unfortunately, no. No. And like, it is weird today after, you know, after almost nine years from the beginning of the Arab Spring, how dictators today. I mean, like Cece, for example, he talks about the revolutions or like the Arab Spring in a way that, okay, that was very, that was a very bad thing, you know? So they use Syria and like Yemen and like Libya and every country that rebelled against the dictator as an example of what chaos is. Basically, these dictators are saying, okay, if you rebelled against me, this is how you will end.

And of course, no country in the world wants to end up in like in a raging civil war. But, and this is another hard question. But from Assad's point of view, what are you left with? You know, what does he have and what does he, what does he even? want at this point? And also, who are his supporters? And what do they want? I think the supporters of the Syrian government, I mean, they are not all on the same page, but there is a big chunk of the Syrian government supporters. And if we took the minorities as an example, if we took the Aloysa as an example, they were convinced that this uprising

is to destroy them that this uprising was going to push them again back to the mountains and this uprising was just like to kill all the minorities so there is like a big chunk of the government supporters

that they are only supportive of the government because it's an Allah white government and they feel that okay having Bashar al-Assad and power is the only reason why they're alive and I think most of of other white people kind of

you know like I grew up believing that thing like I grew up believing that you know like that Hafiz al-Assad was the reason why we are like in the cities now or why we're not in the mountains anymore so there is like there is something that is rooted deeply in

certain societies in the in Syria so this is one part of the Syrian government supporters, but also there is like government supporters who just are just like afraid, you know, who just like, okay, they know the Syrian government is bad. They know that, okay, there is a dictator. They don't mind sending their children to public schools where they will be chanting for the immortality of Hafez al-Assad, who died like 10 years ago. They don't mind as long as there is stability in the country. So it's like very hard to ask what

the government supporters want, but it's clear that they were not willing to sacrifice anything for change. Do you see any reason for hope in any of these situations? Your questions are very hard, okay? Like, I do not prepare for that. I don't know why you're doing this to me. We don't mess around on this show. I think probably what I'm going to say next is something that all activists, not only in Syria, but every activist who took part in the Arab Spring kind of will agree with me in that. You know, like, they will feel exactly how I'm feeling. But like, it's very hard to witness something that is so big and so hopeful in your country and seeing it being destroyed and stay sane. it's extremely difficult and sadly I have I have many friends who are dealing with depression who are you know like just like doing drugs in order to kind of distance themselves but

the failure of the Arab Spring is really heartbreaking and it's very hard to just like move on from that and so like so many activists and I know that for a fact also the Egyptian activist, so many of the Egyptian activists and the Syrian activists, as if they're stuck in 2010 and 2011. They're just like repeating memories. They're just like seeing old videos. They're like listening to old music. They are stuck into that period of time refusing to believe that the thing they witnessed

is completely gone. And so I don't know what is hope. To be honest, I think there is nothing to be hopeful about. Just on a personal level, I think we should just do our best and just like try to move on and try to write our version of the history. Like we should not lead dictators today like Cece or or Hafez al-Assad to write their own version of the story. We should write what happened and what, like, what happened and what. we witnessed. You're working on a book right now, your first book. Is it about this? Is that what you're doing? Are you telling the story? Well, the book starts before 2011. I speak about

how, what was it like to grow up in Syria and go to public schools and what was it like to grow up al-A-Wite? I wanted to explain to people. It's not to explain to people, but I feel that if I explain the history of Allah, whites in particular, people will understand, or it will make sense why so many other whites decide to side with the Syrian government. And then I speak about how I joined the uprising, and then I speak about everything that happened on a personal level.

And then, yeah, and then between 2011 and 2014, I was in rebel-held areas. I try to speak also about the mistakes that we did as activist. It's not like self-criticism, but it's very important now to kind of look back and reflect on what we did wrong. And then I speak about coming here to the US and trying to start over and seek asylum in the Trump era. So yeah, I'm excited to publish the book and working on it has been really kind of healing for me. And do you have any idea when it's going to come out and where can people follow your work?

I mean, you can follow me on Twitter. I don't really tweet that much because I hate pots and I hate trolls and I don't really tweet that much. But when I have a new article, I will post it on Twitter. the date of the book is not really clear yet because I'm still in the process of pitching it to I mean my agent I'm not working with an agent that we're going to also submit the proposal very soon so I don't really have a clear date but I kind of have a clear idea what this book is going to be or how the book will be structured and I think it's very important to have a book written by a Syrian who witnessed the revolution

like out there you know I feel most of the books that were written on Syria are written by with older respect with all the respect to all the books out there but I feel that they just focus so much on the war and the uprising only few really spoke about living in Syria before 2011 and yeah I think that's a missing puzzle of the story that needs to be told Thank you so much for coming on to War College and sharing your story with us. Of course. Thank you for having me. And I'm sorry for being distracted, but also your questions are really hard.

I did not expect that. Well, it's, I mean, again, it's just such a, you can't, when you're dealing with something like this, especially as an outsider, I think the tendency on the part of Americans is to look away or simplify. And you can't do that here. We have to stop doing that. And to simplify, I think the main problem with the Syrian conflict and like all these so-called experts that they offer the simple narrative of this conflict. This is why they have so many followers. You know, it is easy now to go on your show and be like, hey, listen, it's a government against Qaeda and the Qaeda is supported by the U.S. That is like a very simple narrative that every woke person in America who doesn't really.

really follow the conflict will be, you know, will be okay with that explanation, you know, but you cannot do that to the Syrian conflict. It's very important to understand the timeline. You cannot just like simplify things. It's a crazy eight years war. At times of hardship and difficulty, the mountains are your best friend, are your refuge, but also, you know, the other sort of bitter side of the story is that the Kurds have been really, you know, betrayed by both the international powers and also the regional powers. I usually like to refer to the, you know, situation or the circumstances of the Kurds as some sort of a double colonial bind. You're listening to War College, a weekly podcast that brings you the stories from behind the front lines. Here are your hosts.

Hello, welcome to War College. I'm Matthew Galt. And I'm Derek Cannon. The Kurds are a people without a country. They occupy large swaths of lands in Iraq, Syria, Turkey, and Iran, but have no central government. Kurdish fighters have been constant allies in America's fight against ISIS and Peshmerga troops fighting on behalf of the semi-autonomous Kurdish regional government in Iraq. fought against the militants after they stormed Mosul. Without the help of Kurdish forces, said Mosul, Raqa, and across the Levant,

America couldn't have defeated ISIS so handedly. In December, after a conversation with Turkey's president, President Donald Trump announced U.S. troops would be leaving Syria on grounds that ISIS was defeated. Then things got complicated. It's unclear if the withdrawal will actually take place. Turkey thinks the Kurds are terrorists and the Kurds are caught between regional powers and one of the most complicated conflicts in the world. Here to help us sort this out and get the Kurdish perspective is Muhammad Salee.

Muhammad spent years working as a journalist for international media in Kurdistan. He's currently a doctoral student at University of Pennsylvania's Annenberg School for Communication. Muhammad, thank you so much for joining us. Thank you for having me. So I really want to start with some really basic stuff for the audience here, Muhammad. What is Kurdistan? Where is it? And who were the Kurds? Well, Kurdistan is basically the land that has been historically populated by the Kurdish people.

There are also a number of other, you know, ethnic and religious groups who have been, you know, leaving or populating that region for a very long time. But geographically, it is located on the border areas between the states of Iraq, Iran, Turkey, and Syria. And the Kurds are generally referred to at the largest nation or national group without a state of their own. And, you know, this has been basically a result of the great power, you know, dealings and agreements following World War I and the collapse of the Ottoman Empire as a result of that war. So what happened after World War I or the first World War was that the British and French colonial powers divided the Ottoman Empire into a number of different nation estates. And there was supposed to be, as part of a series of agreements, there was supposed to be a Kurdish nation estate as well. But that did not happen.

And so the result, the outcome of that was that the Kurds have been. been divided among these four nation states in the region. And unfortunately, they have been grossly mistreated by the governments of these states over the past century or so. Okay. So why do these regional governments, Turkey, Iraq, have so many different ideas about who the Kurds are, where the territory sits? Yeah, well, the primary, you know, the primary reason why, if your question is, you know, why these states and their governments have not been treating the curse justly, I think, you know, the primary reason really has to do with the very conception of the idea of the nation in these newly emerging, you know, nation estates after the first World War. So what has happened is that in all of these countries, but particularly in places like Turkey and Syria, the dominant nationalisms have been sort of defined along very narrow lines and terms. And they have been effectively ethno-nationalist regimes that have seen Kurds primarily as some sort of a threat to the well-belled.

to the survival of their national estate, of their nation-estate projects. And, you know, this viewing of the Kurds as a threat to the survival of these national states, as a threat to the survival of these nationalisms, has basically meant that these states have not really refrained from any sort of means in order to suppress the Kurds

and to ensure that the Kurds would remain, you know, as a subordinate group within the borders of these national states. I think the clearest example of that, and the one we've talked about on the show before is in Turkey, correct? Yes, yes, that's correct. So in the case of Turkey, you know, right from the beginning, when Atta Turk basically launched, you know, his war of independence and later, you know, the national state of Turkey, well, at the beginning, beginning, he made some overtures to the Kurds and tried to rally the Kurds around his struggle for the independence of Turkey, mostly along religious lines, which was kind of, you know, the common identity threat between both the Turkish population and the Kurdish population in the country, as, you know, both groups are largely Sunni Muslim groups. But after the, you know,

the state of Turkey, the Republic of Turkey, the Republic of Turkey, Turkey was established by Ataturk, he basically backpedaled from any promises of inclusion that he had given to the Kurds prior to that moment. And in the case of Turkey in particular, there has been a very sort of uncompromising view of what the character of this nation state is and should be like. And so the Turkish nation estate has been a purely ethnic Turkish or has been conceived as a purely ethnic Turkish nation estate that has meant that, you know, every other group in that country. And as we know, you know, that country, the country that we call Turkey today has been historically a very diverse, you know, territory and land. But with the establishment of the Republic of Turkey, the state has been constantly on some sort of crusade or campaign in various forms, military and cultural and other forms as well, to ensure the subordination and in many cases actually the erasure of the culture or of the identity of these other non-Turkish groups. within the borders of that nation estate. And they have been pretty successful in a way in terms of melting to a very large extent.

A lot of these other sort of rival identities into this Turkish national identity. But in the case of the Kurds, because the Kurds constitutes such a large sort of, you know, portion of the population of Turkey is something around 20% and you know there has been a sense of Kurdish national awareness since the late Ottoman times so it has not been really a very successful project as far as the Turkish you know a nation estate project has been concerned they have not been really able to assimilate or melt you know the Kurdish identity into this newly forged

Turkish national identity. So, you know, there have been different rounds of armed struggle and, you know, political struggle by the Kurds toward, you know, this sort of exclusionary vision that has been at work within this nation estate, which is Turkey. There's a dream of a United Kurdistan with what you've just said it along with how Turkey's kind of handling the Kurdish, you know, positions and the Kurdish people. Is it possible in the future? Do you feel that there could be a United Kurdistan? Well, it is very difficult to tell because of the very difficult geopolitical circumstances in the region and also because of the

reluctance of the, you know, major world powers to recognize an independent Kurdish entity. like a lot of people when you know they they talk about Kurds or Kurdistan would usually you know say that the eventual dream is some sort of a united Kurdish estate but I think you know that is not really necessarily the case first of all because you know the Kurdish populations in each of these countries have you know their own sort of particular characteristics their own particular condition that, you know, they have been working with and struggling within. And not the aim of all these, you know, Kurdish populations in each of these countries is even necessarily to establish an independent state, you know, we like that would secede from that country,

you know, let's say, for example, an independent Kurdish state that would secede from Turkey or an independent Kurdish state that would succeed from Syria. The ultimate goal for the Kurds is really the recognition of their cultural and political rights, a recognition of their identity. And as long as the national states, as long as the central governments or regimes within these national states are willing to genuinely accept this, and, you know, to work with Kurds as, you know, as an important component of their states and allow them to enjoy cultural and political rights within, you know,

within the territory that they populate or occupy. I think that would be quite satisfactory, you know, to a lot of the Kurds. But the problem has been that, you know, the policy, the attitude from these central governments has been really by and large, one of denial or, you know, just colossal oppression, amounting to, you know, genocide or ethnic cleansing. So, you know, within this kind of circumstances, the Kurds have been, you know, naturally resisting and reacting to, you know, to this kind of oppressive measures. And, you know, these really oppressive policies of these,

central governments and regimes has really fueled, you know, the Kurdish desire for, you know, for wanting to have some sort of of an entity, whether, you know, that is in the form of an autonomous, genuinely autonomous entity within the borders of the nation states or, you know, in the form of independence. So, you know, having said that again, even if hypothetically, you know, the Kurds would be able to secede from these governments, from these states in each of the four countries. I think, you know, there are also some genuine differences among the Kurdish populations that might not necessarily be conducive to the creation of a united, independent Kurdistan. And I think, you know, that is fine. And, you know, there are like a lot of other cases of, like,

you know, one nation sort of having, you know, sort of being divided into more than one state, right? You have like a number, you know, over 20 Arab states or, you know, even in cases like in Europe. You know, for example, you have Germany and Austria, which, you know, share the same language more or less and, you know, sort of ethnically are pretty close or the same. But, you know, the same. But, you know, There is more than one nation-estate. So, you know, that would not be necessarily sort of, you know, something that Kurds would not be happy with. But the most important thing, as I said, is really the recognition of the cultural and political rights. And there is more than one way to get there to achieve that.

And it doesn't have to be necessarily in the form of the creation of a new nation-estate, of a new Kurdish-Nation estate, although that would be ideal to many Kurds. if it did not, you know, lead to a major regional conflict. But again, the, you know, the recognition of the political and cultural rights are really what the Kurds are after. Now, that's something more along the lines of how I dealt with and what I was exposed to. When I was in Special Forces, when I was in Iraq, I worked with very, very closely with a lot of Kurdish soldiers within the Iraqi Special Operations Command. We built rapport with them. Some of these guys I still actually have actually talked to through some form of social media. Recently, you know, the American troops have kind of been given a withdrawal order.

What's the general feeling, you know, especially with the Kurds in Syria and how do they feel about that withdrawal? Is it something that they're taking personally or is there an opinion? left or right there within the Kurdish population? In general, it has not been taken wool at all. And there is a sense of abandonment, if not betrayal among many Kurds, toward the U.S. This has been probably one of the most successful examples of a relationship between the U.S. and a local population, really. And the Kurds have been, you know, very grateful and happy for this, you know, assistance and cooperation that they have gotten from the United States in the fight against ISIS.

But, you know, things are not sort of on a path yet that the Kurds would feel secure enough, you know, to be sort of to be acting on their own. So the news of the U.S. military, you know, with the role or pull out from Syria has been really very worrying and concerning to a lot of Kurds. They, you know, given the circumstances of the Kurds and given the general atmosphere of a lack of willingness, whether it's within Syria or the broader region and Turkey, you know, being such a major actor now in the Syrian affairs, because of this unwillingness, this regional unwelliness, this regional unbearance. willingness to embrace the Kurds and accept some sort of, you know, genuine political status for the Kurds. Many of the Kurds are very rightfully concerned, you know, that once the U.S. troops are out, that would actually encourage the Syrian government backed by the, you know, by Russian military and Iran, on the one hand, and Turkey enjoying, you know, the support of the NATO and the protection of the NATO, on the other hand, trying to sort of bring an end to the Kurdish-led

political entity that has been sort of established in northern Syria since 2012, but particularly since the, you know, they're joining forces with U.S. military in beating back ISIS in northern Syria. So it is in no way, you know, really good news to Kurds in Syria or to Kurds in general in the region. And very interestingly, you know, it's one of those things that the Kurds across the board, no matter what their, you know, political or ideological differences otherwise, they agree on, you know, on this, that, you know, that this is not a good thing and that, you know, this is going to expose Kurds to, you know, know, to the brutality of these regimes in the region. And we already, I mean, you know, the know-how regimes like the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad or, you know, or Erdogans really have been treating and dealing with the Kurds. In the case of, you know, Erdogan and Turkey, for example, last year, right around this time, you know, they conducted a military operation in Afrin region in northern Syria, which is a predominant.

currently Kurdish populated region. And what the Turks really did with the help of their Syrian rebel allies, you know, that have many jihadi groups among them, that they have committed a large-scale ethnic cleansing of Afrin from the Kurds. So what they have done is basically, you know, expelled the Kurds from their homes, take over their property and settle, you know, Arab refugees. Syrian Arab refugees or, you know, Turkmen refugees who move to Turkey or have been displaced from the, you know, environs of Damascus and, like, settle these people in the homes and properties of the local, you know, Kurdish, Yazidi, and Christian populations of Afrin. So, you know, there is really no benefit of doubt that the Kurds can extend to Turkey or even to Syria, but, you know, probably to a much lesser extent to Syria when it comes to, you know, to dealing with

these governments and regimes in the region, really. Who do you believe is the biggest threat to the Kurds in the region, both in Syria and Iraq? Who do you believe that? You had mentioned jihadi groups working along with the pro-Assad forces, correct? Well, no, working along the Turkish military in Afrin. Yeah. Okay. Yeah, so I would, at the moment, the way that things appear, I think, you know, there is more or less a consensus among many Kurds, you know, that Turkey probably poses the greatest threat in some ways.

And, I mean, it's a very complicated picture. I don't want to simplify it. You know, Turkey, for example, deals with the Kurdistan regional government in Iraq, has, you know, relatively strong economic ties in particular with them. but at the same time, you know, there is this undertone of animosity, even in the case of Iraqi Kurdistan, you know, that is coming out of Ankara. But in particular, with regard to the Kurds in Syria and the Kurds in Turkey, you know, the Turkish government has been very vocal and serious in stating, you know, that it sees, you know, the Kurds in these. countries, the Kurdish political movements, as a threat to its national security. And now you can debate, you know, whether that's a fair and legitimate, you know, sort of perception to have or not. But also given, you know, the fact that Turkey is a member of the NATO and is the strongest of all the states in the region that have Kurdish populations inside

them. Turkey definitely, you know, given it's highly aggressive and Beliko's attitude and policies toward the Kurds and also, you know, the sort of the international position that it enjoys, you know, at the moment poses really the most serious sort of threat to Kurdish ambitions in the region. And even though, you know, I mentioned that Turkey has been dealing with the Kurdistan regional government, there have been, you know, very strong economic relations and political relations to some extent as well, diplomatic engagement. But Turkish officials, including President Erdogan himself, have, you know, said, like on a number of occasions, that they do not really view, you know, a Kurdish entity anywhere in the region

favorably. And that applies to the Kurdistan region because they see any sort of, you know, success of the Kurdish political movements in any of the states as some sort of threat to the, you know, to the territorial integrity and national security of their country. But, you know, as I said also, you know, this is something that is really debatable. And if Turkey were to move, modify its, you know, position the way that it ideologically seed the Kurds. And if it were to, you know, to be willing to engage with the Kurds in the region, it could really gain and benefit much from, you know, having the Kurds on its side. And as I said, especially in the case of Turkey and also Syria, the Kurdish political

movements, there are not pursuing, you know, a project of an independent Kurdish estate. you know, Turkey should welcome that, should embrace that and, you know, should try to accommodate Kurdish political demands and aspirations. And, you know, that would really open the doors to, you know, to extensive cooperation, you know, between Turkey and the Kurds, whether it's within Turkey or in Syria or Iraq, you know, or generally across the region. Do you see Turkey flexing to recognize the Kurdish regime or at least give them political recognition? Do you see them leaning towards that? You mean in Syria?

In Syria, yeah. Well, I mean, there have been some signals recently coming out of Ankara that, you know, there is apparently, I don't want to see some sort of effort, but this idea has been floated, you know, that a military campaign against Syrian Kurdish. would not necessarily be, you know, successful for Turkey. And there seems to be some, you know, serious concern within a Turkish military establishment, like about this, which led the Turkish president actually, apparently to replace the two main generals who were assigned with the task of a, you know, of a military operation into northern Syria because they had voiced, you know, skepticism about the success of any such military campaigns. So, you know, this idea has been floated recently that maybe, you know, the best way to tackle this is to,

a, revive, you know, the so-called peace process within Turkey between the Turkish government and, you know, the Kurdistan Workers Party, which is the main, you know, Kurdish political. organization in Turkey, although it is, you know, an outlawed one in Turkey. And, you know, so the idea is if this peace process were to be revived and if, you know, Turkey and Kurds meant, you know, fences, that would smooth things when it comes to Syria. And if that happened, you know, that is quite likely that any serious rapprochement inside Turkey between the, the, the Turkish government and the Kurds or the Kurdish political movement in Turkey would really play a very important role in facilitating and understanding a positive, you know, relationship between Turkey and, you know, the Syrian Kurdish political entity. So, but, you know, given the circumstances of Turkey and the dynamics within, you know, Turkish national politics, this is not also something, you know,

know, that is easy to happen. It is not impossible. It could be achieved. It could happen. But the dynamics, especially, you know, the political dynamics within the, you know, ethnic Turkish sphere in Turkey are such that, you know, any sort of aggressive or bellicose policies toward, you know, the Kurds or, you know, the Kurdish political movement in Turkey is always, you know, quite conducive to the parties in power in terms of helping them, you know, maintain sort of their, you know, their status and being able to, you know, to win votes and succeed in elections. And Erdogan has been doing, you know, quite a lot of that and pretty successfully over the past few years, as we have seen that, you know, usually around the time of any major elections in Turkey,

whether it is, you know, the parliamentary elections or municipal elections or present. presidential elections, you know, Erdogan has been sort of starting some sort of military operation against PKK or Syria, you know, or, you know, the Kurdish-led entity in northern Syria. And he has been able to use that to his advantage to win over, you know, those sections of the Turkish population who do not favor, you know, a sort of reprients. Roshmo or agreement with the Kurds. So it seems to be, even though, you know, it's bad policy, so to speak, it's been really good politics for Erdogan. And he has been able to use, you know, this anti-Kurdish sort of, you know, attitude and policy to his advantage within the

sphere of domestic Turkish national politics. Let me ask a dumb American question. if I can. Well, they say, you know, there is no dumb question. They can only dumb answers. Well, let me ask an ignorant American question then. It seems to me that from the outside looking in, I know this is a really complicated conflict, but the Kurds were, the Kurds in various regions and in various ways were instrumental in defeating a, what was ISIS, which was a, not just an existential threat,

but a direct threat to a lot of these regional powers. Did that not buy them any kind of political goodwill from anybody? Why does it feel like that didn't earn them anything? Well, I would say, unfortunately, no. And that's actually a great question. You know, one would think that given the prominent role that the Kurds have played in, you know, in defeating the Islamic State or, you know, the so-called ISIS, that, you know, that there should be some sort of.

sort of change in regional attitudes, both maybe at the popular level, but also sort of at the more elite political level. But at least when it comes, you know, to the elite political level, we have not really seen that. And that is again, you know, as I said, it goes back to the very way that, you know, these nation states in the region, no matter, you know, the change of government or the change of regimes have by and large come to view Kurds at the threat to the survival of their own, you know, states or their own sort of, you know, national projects. And unfortunately, you know, this very hostile view toward the Kurds has been, you know, very sort of very much persisting, has been very resilient and, you know, has sort of transcended these, you know,

changes of, as I said, political regime or ideology, more or less. You have to, you know, to really sort of separate the state of Iraq from the other ones in this case, as at least, you know, in the last couple of decades or so, there has been sort of more flexibility from the Iraqi governments to a certain extent toward, you know, the Kurdish question within that country. and there has been, you know, sort of a better understanding. But generally speaking, broadly speaking, you know, the prominent role that the Kurds have played in defeating ISIS, which, as you said, you know, posed a very serious threat to the very existence of these, you know, at least of the political system and the state in both Iraq and Syria, you know, the central governments have.

not been really willing to sort of use that to turn over a new page in their relations with the Kurds. And as I said, you know, as complicated at the Kurdish question is in the region and within the, you know, sort of boundaries of each one of these states, each of these states, it is not something that cannot be solved. it actually, you know, if there was some sort of flexibility, if there was some, you know, willingness to understand and to engage with the Kurds and grant them, you know, some form of genuine political and cultural autonomy within the borders of these national states,

you know, that would definitely, you know, play a very important role in terms of easing, you know, regional tensions as far as, you know, the Kurds and the central governments in these states are concerned, but also it would really contribute greatly to improving the relations between, you know, each one of these states. So, you know, the interstate relations, because, you know, it has happened on multiple occasions that the Kurdish question has been also a cause of tension between, you know, the regional states. And so, you know, a genuine resolution of the Kurdish question in the region within, you know,

each state would contribute a greatly to domestic stability within the borders of, you know, those states, but also contribute very significantly to improving interstate relations. And really, you know, sort of unleashing this potential that these. the states have in terms of, you know, development and progress and not using a lot of their resources to, you know, to suppress and oppress and ensure the subordination of the Kurds. There's been, we've talked to us some Syrians here on this radio, on the podcast here. And it's, it's the Syrian conflict, I'm going to say conflict is confusing to many people that are, casually observing it. Initially, you know, this Syrian, the Syrian people that it started this thought

it would be a revolution, not unlike their own Arab Spring that they saw in Egypt and in the northern African countries. And once, like, the larger groups of folks got together and got involved, such as Russia, Turkey, United States, and even, you know, Kurdish fashions, it seems to have, most people can, kind of, they hear the Syrian conflict and they immediately assume it's about ISIS. how do you see the Syrian folks that were there at the initial onset of the revolution that's kind of metastasized into a civil war and has now kind of lost its revolutionary kind of base? How do the Syrians that are anti-Assad see Kurdish factions in the north and Afrin and elsewhere in Syria? How do they see them? Do they see them as them helping the

revolution or are they just part of the problem? Well, I mean, you know, we have to make a number of distinctions here. First of all, as you said, you know, the water started in Syria in 2011 was a, you know, genuine popular uprising from a population who was largely, you know, fed up with a dictatorship running the country and, you know, robbing them off of their potential and their resources, you know, for a better future and for a better future and for a country. a more human future. And, you know, at that stage, the protests were not only confined to places, you know, to sort of the larger cities like Damascus, Alapo, Holmes, or Hama. There were also quite, you know, substantial protests happening in the Kurdish parts of Syria. But unfortunately, you know, the way that, you know, that situation in Syria evolved. It gradually moved from a peaceful, you know, uprising by the Syrian people of all, you know, different sort of ethnic or religious backgrounds, probably, you know, maybe to a lesser extent,

so in the Al-Ary areas for whatever reason. You know, that sort of peaceful uprising really evolved into a, you know, conflict between the population and the Assad regime. And of course, you know, the culprit for this was really the Assad regime and, you know, their main backers

who were, you know, were the Iranian regime at that point early on in the conflict. So they resorted to violently suppress the protest and gradually, you know, that sort of extensive

and brutal use of violence, you know, led to, you know, to the creation of sort of an armed resistance or rebellion among, you know, the ranks of protesters. And, you know, gradually, unfortunately, that, you know, that armed rebellion came to be taken over by, you know, sort of jihadi, Salafi groups of the type, you know, of Jephatan Nusra, which is affiliated with al-Qaeda or, you know, later on ISIS. And so, you know, this situation in Syria has to be really seen in different stages. And each stage is really different, you know, from what came before or after.

So, but, you know, unfortunately, right now, you know, at this point of time, what we have is that, you know, that sort of initial hope-inspiring, you know, sort of movement that we saw in Syria in 2011 and to some extent, you know, at the sort of beginning of 2012 somehow, that is gone. What we now have or what, you know, we sort of came to see later after, you know, that point with the takeover of the Syrian uprising by armed groups, that came to be dominated gradually by, you know, Salafi jihadi groups that really, you know, espouse very strict and exclusionary visions as to the future of Syria.

And, you know, the kind of sort of what has remained in terms of, you know, armed groups of the Syrian uprising, that most of these groups today viewed the Kurds very negative. for a number of reasons, A, because, you know, the Kurdish, or at least in the case of the Democratic Union Party or PYD, which is the dominant Kurdish party in Syria now, because the PYD did not really engage the Syrian regime militarily that much,

you know, except like very short episodes of confrontation, these groups have come to, you know, view the Kurds pretty negatively. They see them as not having contributed as much as they would like to the Syrian revolution, if you would like to call it that way. But also, you know, there has been a huge ideological gap with the, you know, Islamization

really of the and given, you know, that the Kurdish political groups in Syria was whether it's PYD or the others, are really, you know, very strongly secular and articulate and espouse, you know, very sort of a very secular vision for the future of the country. So, you know, the gap, you know, that has really deepened and broadened the gap between the, you know, other factions of the, you know, Syrian sort of, the armed factions of the Syrian revolution and the Kurds.

So at this point of time, what you have is that a lot of these armed Sunni Arab groups in the country are allied with Turkey, which of course, you know, poses an existential threat to the survival and the future of the Kurdish political entity in Syria. but these groups have been really also not showing any attractive example in terms of local management and administration of the area that they have been controlling. And by that I mean, you know, the Syrian, Sunni-Arab Islamist groups. But contrary to that, what you have on the Kurdish side, basically in areas east of the Euphrates River, that you have a quiet, inclusive political entity with a, you know, markedly, really secular character in the sense, you know, that unlike, for example, areas in Idlib province that are, or in Afrin, which are controlled by these Islamist groups, you know, who are very serious about imposing the rule of Sharia, in the Kurdish-held areas, you know, there is a very secular sort of arrangement on the ground where, you know, there isn't really any sort of sharia being imposed on people. People are given the freedom in terms of, you know, exercising their

religious beliefs. And also, it has been a very inclusive entity in terms of trying to absorb and accommodate the local non-Kurdish populations, you know, such at the Sunni-era population, such at the Christian population or Turkmen population or Yazidi population. So, you know, given that it has been operating, really, that it was a-born and sort of has been leaving under, you know, conditions of war, this political entity, you know, in northern or northeastern Syria that has been established and led by the Kurds has done a really great job in terms of becoming a safe haven for all sorts of, you know, ethnic and religious groups in the country and a place where, you know, a lot of those individuals and people who have been, you know,

escaping both the brutality of the Assad regime, but also the brutality and the ideological strictness of the, you know, Islamist groups in the rest of Syria, you know, the Kurdish-led entity has been really sort of, you know, a haven, a home to all of, you know, these different types of people and groups.

So at this point, you know, the way that it is to sort of put it very briefly, there seems to be a very major gap between the Islamist factions of the, you know, Syrian rebellion and the Kurds. And, you know, there has been a broad international recognition of the good work, of the good job that the Kurds have done, you know, given their limited resources and given the great, you know, strain and a stress of operating under war.

But, you know, contrary to that, the world also has really come to recognize that a lot of these other Syrian, you know, you know, factions and primarily the Islamist ones, have really, you know, not being able to espouse anything, any sort of vision that is attractive, A, you know, to their own populations, but also to the outside world. And quite to the contrary, some of them, such as, you know, Jabhat al-Nusra or ISIS have become, you know, a global security threat. and not only, you know, sort of confined within the borders of Syria or the region. So, you know, at this point, as I said, the way that things are, you know, the, the Kurds have come to sort of win a lot of support and recognition for the work they have done. And, you know, that has been really quite the opposite of what a lot of the armed series. and, you know, rebel factions have achieved.

I think that may be one of the most thorough answers we've ever gotten to any question on this show. I know. I know. It was amazing. It was absolutely amazing. I got one final question. So I recently heard a Kurdish saying,

or what I've been told is a Kurdish saying, and I think that it kind of sums up a lot of this. And I wanted to just run it by you and get your thoughts. And if you can explain to the audience, like, why it's important. And the way I heard it told to me was that the Kurds have no friends but the mountains. Well, yes. So, you know, that's a quiet sort of famous, you know, Kurdish saying, at least to the Kurds themselves. So, and, you know, this is basically a saying that is born out of the very difficult conditions or circumstances of the Kurds, you know, whether it's over the past century or before. but especially over the past century, you know, where the Kurds have been subjected to, as I said, you know, highly oppressive, highly brutal policies from the central governments of the states that they were sort of forced to be part of.

And, you know, there has been sort of this constant state of rebellion, whether political but very often also armed rebellion by the Kurds toward the central governments. and the states, you know, that they have sort of come to become part of. And so, you know, that saying basically sort of comes from that sort of background and history where the Kurds have taken refuge in the mountains and, you know, the vast majority of Kurdistan, the greater Kurdistan, whether in Iraq, in Syria, not Syria so much, in Iraq, Turkey, and Iran are, you know, very mountainous. And so, you know, these mountains have been always a home for Kurdish, you know, revolutionaries and rebels. And so, you know, that saying basically comes from that bitter experience that, at times of hardship and difficulty, the mountains are your best friend, are your refuge.

But also, you know, the other sort of bitter side of this story is that the Kurds have been really, you know, betrayed by both the international powers and also the regional powers. And, you know, I would, I usually like to refer to the, you know, situation or the circumstances of the Kurds as some sort of a double colonial, you know, bind that the Kurds are in a double colonial bind. And what I mean by that is that, you know, first of all, after the First World War, the, you know, the European Western colonial powers, Britain and France, they refused to, you know, to recognize and help Kurds achieve an independent state of their own. And after, you know, that happened and the Kurds were forcibly made part of these other states. with the blessing of the Western colonial powers, that really these, you know, these nation states that emerged in early 20th century,

they have also objected the Kurds to a, you know, new colonial relationship whereby, you know, historically they have been, you know, taking the resources of the Kurdish areas, you know, whether it's like oil and gas or other minerals and have been, you know, using these to really build or help build their, you know, war machinery, which they have also used, again, to suppress the Kurds and, you know, force to force Kurds to stay part of their

estates. So, you know, that, that condition of double colonial bind has been really going on, you know, for a century, ever since, you know, the fall of the Ottoman Empire and the establishment of the modern nation states in the region. And that bitter historical experience has meant that, you know, generations of Kurds have been living in, you know, in a states of conflict and warfare vis-a-vis, you know, the central governments. And these central governments have done, you know, very often, you know, the best that they could in terms of brutally suppressing any sort of Kurdish movement for, you know,

for political and cultural recognition. And so, you know, to sort of put it in a nutshell, that thing is really born out of a, you know, of that kind of history. Mohamed, thank you so much for coming on and telling us all about this. I appreciate that one. I hope it was good. Thank you so much War College listeners. College is me, Matthew Galt and Kevin Nodell. It was created by myself and Jason Fields. I promise we will absolutely be back next week. I think you're really going to like the next one. It's a little weird. Stay safe until then.