Angry Planet - Nuclear Sponges and the New Nuclear Arms Race

Episode Date: August 10, 2019

Nuclear war. These days it feels like we’re closer to Global Thermonuclear Annihilation than at any time since the Cuban Missile Crisis. The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists—an organization of experts that calculates humanity’s odd of Armageddon—seems to agree. The Doomsday Clock is set at two midnight to midnight. It’s easy to see why. On August 2, the US pulled out of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, North Korea continues to test ballistic missiles, Russia keeps talking about all its fancy new nuclear weapons, and Democratic presidential candidates are on stage talking about America’s lack of a “no first use” policy. Here to help us figure out how doomed we are is John Carl Baker.Baker is the Nuclear Field Coordinator and Senior Program Officer at Ploughshares Fund. His work has appeared in The New Republic and the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.You can listen to War College on iTunes, Stitcher, Google Play or follow our RSS directly. Our website is warcollegepodcast.com. You can reach us on our Facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/warcollegepodcast/; and on Twitter: @War_College.Support this show http://supporter.acast.com/warcollege. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

Love this podcast? Support this show through the ACAST supporter feature. It's up to you how much you give, and there's no regular commitment. Just click the link in the show description to support now. There are five states in the United States that are essentially a nuclear sponge. That's what they've been called, because their whole job in some kind of full-scale nuclear war would be to absorb a giant attack, presumably, from Russia. You're listening to War College, a weekly podcast. that brings you the stories from behind the front lines.

Here are your hosts. Hello, welcome to War College. I am your host, Matthew Galt. Nuclear War. These days, it feels like we're closer to global thermonuclear annihilation than at any time since the Cuban missile crisis. The Bulletin of the Bulletin of the Bulletin of the Bulletin that calculates humanity's odds of Armageddon seems to agree. The doomsday clock they oversee is set at two minutes to midnight.

It's easy to see why. On August 2nd, the U.S. pulled out of the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. North Korea continues to test ballistic missiles. Russia keeps talking about its fancy new nuclear weapons, and Democratic presidential candidates are on stage talking about America's lack of a no-first-use policy. Here to help us figure out how doomed we are is John Carl Baker. Baker is the Nuclear Field Coordinator and Senior Program Officer at the Plowshares Fund. His work has appeared in the New Republic and the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.

John, thank you so much for joining us. You're very welcome. I'm happy to be here. So first, what is, or I guess was the INF Treaty? And what did it accomplish? Well, the INF Treaty was signed in 1987. It was a landmark treaty, one of the main treaties that led to the end of the Cold War between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. And it banned an entire class of missiles, intermediate range missiles, which basically means that they were missiles with a range of 500 to 5,500 kilometers. And both sides had a lot of these missiles. I believe they destroyed more than 2,500 of them as a result of the treaty.

And for a very long time, neither side fielded any of these at all. But recently, there were reports that Russia was in violation. It appears that these reports are probably the truth, although we don't really know unless we were on the inside of the U.S. government. And because of that, there have been a bunch of tensions surrounding the treaty, and the Trump administration made the decision to pull out of it, which essentially means that the treaty is now dead. All right.

So how bad is this really? I saw one kind of galaxy brain take in a publication that will go unnamed earlier today that said that this might actually be a good thing for Europe. Is that in any way true at all? No, it's not true at all. The collapse of the INF treaty is in all ways bad. You'd have to be crazy or a member of the nuclear priesthood to actually think that this is a positive step. You know, if someone breaks the law, you don't get rid of the law.

And that's essentially what the Trump administration did. Instead of trying to bring the Russians back into compliance with the treaty, they basically gave up. And they didn't really make a concerted effort to try to meet them halfway or figure out what the problem was and keep the treaty. in existence. This is not surprising because John Bolton and others in the administration simply do not agree with arms control. So they're more than happy to see this treaty fall by the wayside. And part of the reason it's really bad is that next on the chopping block is the New START Treaty, which is also a bilateral treaty between the U.S. and Russia. And frankly, the future of that treaty is in serious doubt if it's not extended and it all signs right now point to the Trump administration

not wanting to extend it. That means that for the first time since 1972, there will be no constraints on the U.S. and Russian arsenals. And to put that in context, the U.S. and Russia together control more than 90% of the nuclear weapons on Earth. And if those treaties no longer exist, INF is dead and New START could be next. They could even start building up their arsenals further. So it's extremely bad news. Can you give us a little bit more background on New Start? When did it come, like when did it occur? When was it signed?

What were its goals? Sure. New Start was signed in 2010. It was a major policy priority of the Obama administration. It limits the strategic forces of the United States and Russia. So things that are bigger, in other words, than the stuff that was covered by the INF Treaty. And all signs pointed to the fact, and they still do, that the Russians, want to extend this treaty. They think it's useful. And in fact, I believe Vladimir Putin brought it up

in his first call with Donald Trump. But Trump on the call said that it was a bad treaty, was the worst treaty ever negotiated, like he always says about things that were done in the Obama administration. And since then, they basically dragged their heels on extending it. And like I said, if it dies too, we're going to be in a very dangerous position. And the deadline for extension on that one is 2021, correct? That's right. That's right. That's right. Okay. So, well, I mean, obviously, we've got some hawks in the Pentagon that are not fans of arms control, as you said. But the argument on the other side, especially for the INF treaty, you kind of tease this a little bit, is that Russia was violating it. So what is, in what specific way do we think that they violated it? And what's the evidence that that occurred? The evidence is that they have tested a missile, which would be in violation of the treaty. So in other words, a missile with a range between 550,500 kilometers.

And from what we can tell, apparently they did two different tests where they didn't actually break the tenets of the treaty. They tested a missile within the limits of the treaty. But by combining these tests or the information gathered from these tests, they basically had figured out a way to, feel the missile and test it that was in complete violation of the treaty. So they tried to fly under the radar of U.S. intelligence, but U.S. intelligence is convinced that, in fact, they have actually produced this missile, which is in violation of the treaty. And it's not the only new nuclear weapon that Russia's been testing and toying with, right? I mean, Putin stood up in front of the Duma a few years ago and was talking about weapons that seemed a little science fiction.

Can you talk about some of those? Yeah, in March 2018, he announced the whole slew of new nuclear weapons. I think there were five in all. He's announced the SARMAT, which is a heavy ICBM. He announced a nuclear-powered cruise missile, which in theory would have a completely unlimited range. Unfortunately, that probably also means it would be spewing radioactive activity all over the earth. There was a nuclear drone submarine, and there were two different types of hypersonics. One was a glide vehicle, and the other one was a missile. And the These are all scary sounding technologies and we should take them very seriously, but they are years in the making. These are not things that can be deployed tomorrow. And really the most important takeaway from them is that they are all responses to the fact that the United States has been building up its missile defense capabilities. And one of the things that folks don't really understand about the collapse of arms control is that

beyond INF and New Start, way back in 2001 and 2002, the United States pulled out of the anti-ballistic missile treaty. And since then, it has really increased its investments, heightened its involvement in missile defenses. And this is a thing that makes the other nuclear powers, including Russia, who's our main nuclear competitor, extremely nervous. So every single one of these weapons are designed to kind of circumvent U.S. missile defenses. So in a way, there's a really problematic relationship here, which is we're doing something and the Russians are responding to it. And then we're going to respond to the Russians with our own provocations. And this is exactly how an arms race starts.

And that's why the current moment is so dangerous. Can we, I want to pull back and do a little big picture talk here if we can. Especially, I don't, I mean, people my age, I'm in my mid-30s, I think in younger don't, like, understand how we got to the world that we built in terms of nuclear weapons. And I think it's key to understanding that the, the, the, the, the, you know, the, the, you know, the, one of the foundations of the Cold War is this idea of what some people call mutual assured destruction. I like to call the delicate balance of terror. It's this idea that you build these weapons to scare the other person from using them, correct? Right.

So how did we get to a point where everything seemed as far as arms control kind of in my lifetime felt relatively stable? why is the wheels come off all of this? Why are we suddenly, why is this suddenly an issue again, do you think? I think there's a couple of reasons. I think one of them is that you have a lot of people in Congress and in power right now that simply do not understand the value of nuclear arms control. Some of them are just ideologically opposed to it. And that is causing huge ramifications in the defense industry.

and the sort of interest that push for more nuclear weapons. So you're seeing a lot of interest in reviving our nuclear arsenal and expanding it in some ways. Maybe not quantitative expansion at first, but certainly qualitative expansion. So that's part of it. Another one is that there's been much more focused on great power competition in the last few years. This is one of the big buzzwords that we're hearing so much about in defense discourse right now. And great power competition is very closely associated with nuclear weapons and strategic capabilities. It's no surprise that when we talk about great power competition, very soon we'll follow in those conversations, a discussion of Russian arsenals and the Chinese arsenals as well.

So they're kind of closely knit, and that's part of the reason why we're hearing more about them. As for why the wheels are completely coming off, I mean, part of it has to do just with the fact that the Trump administration is vehemently opposed to arms control. And they are terrible stewards of the kind of liberal order that they inherited. They don't really believe in a lot of its tenants. And they're actively trying to do harm to it in a lot of different ways. And international nuclear arms control was one of the major accomplishments of what has been called, the so-called international liberal order. And the Trump administration simply doesn't believe in that.

Do you think that modernization is important, though? Or you like a get rid of all of them? My take on modernization is that you have to talk about modernization in terms of values, right? What does modernization mean? Well, it's a nice phrase. Everybody likes to be modern. Everybody wants to have progress. But really, what we talk about when we're talking about modernization is we're talking to,

we're talking about a recommitment to our nuclear arsenal. So we are saying that not only do we approve of our nuclear arsenal, but we want to keep it going essentially indefinitely. We're definitely committing to it for 30 more years to the cost of something like $1.7 trillion. But what we're saying, what we're signaling to the world is that this is a thing that's going to be around for some time, and we are fully committed to it as the United States. And that's a problem because people are already terrified by the fact that we have a president who talks really flippantly about using nuclear weapons. He doesn't like nuclear arms control. He supports the development of new weapons and new systems. And so it's terrifying to people.

Yeah, but we were talking about modernization before Trump came along, and presumably these weapons will be here after him, correct? Is there room for that conversation that doesn't include, like, they keep status quo going and is not used as a backdoor for a new arms race? I think there is potentially, a way to do that, yes. But the issue is that there is almost no discussion of the real nuances of what that kind of a modernization program would entail in Washington. The discussion is almost entirely about making sure, for instance, that you modernize every leg of the triad, command and control

structures, and everything else that's associated with it. I mean, when it comes to command and control, that's a modernization program that I support, because that's something that's inherently related to the security of the weapons, something that would make sure that the weapons don't go off accidentally, unintentionally, and so forth. So I understand the value in modernizing our command and control structure. And maybe we could make the case with, for instance, nuclear submarines, that those are sort of like the deterrent of last resort. I think the case is a little bit stronger for those. But in the case of something like ICBMs, the case is very, very difficult to make. I mean, you have major defense figures like Secretary William Perry talking about how we have no need for ground-based ICBMs.

That's a modernization program that should be looked at extremely closely and scrutinized because not only is it going to cost a lot of money, it's a recommitment to a Cold War arms race frame that I think the United States needs to move away from at this really dangerous moment. I don't have the number in front of me. Do you know, have any idea how many like Minutemen silos there are peppered across the United States? I believe there's something like 450. Okay. And do you think that we will get to a point where we look at those silos, those same way that I think people, anyone who learns about it, looks at the way like Strategic Air Command worked during the 50s and 60s, when we literally had bombers crisscrossing the planet with nuclear weapons 24 hours a day?

Is it that kind of level of frightening? I mean, I think it's that level of, it should be seen as that level of archaic, maybe, is one way to look at it. I mean, there are five states in the United States that are essentially a nuclear sponge. That's what they've been called, because their whole job in some kind of full-scale nuclear war would be to absorb a giant attack, presumably, from Russia. That's a very scary proposition. And there's really no need for it, given that we claim that our arsenal is purely for deterrence. Well, if that's the case, let's talk about the deterrent value of things like submarines, because that's a modernization question that we should be talking about.

The case for ICBMs, like I said, is just much, much harder. And that's where we should be talking about how we can limit modernization, cutback programs. And if we have to have a modernization, have one that's much more responsible and tailored to a deterrence-only posture for the United States. Okay. What are the – you just lit on something I think is very interesting. I'd like to pursue it. what are the states that are the nuclear sponges?

Oh, let's see. See if I can name them. Colorado, Wyoming, North Dakota, Nebraska and Montana, Nebraska and Montana, yes, thank you. I think that I like to hammer certain parts of this home to people. When we talk about deterrence,

especially when you're looking at what we've been built upon in the Cold War model, I think it's important to understand that we weren't just talking about stopping nuclear war, but figuring out what the tradeoffs were in like a cold kind of calculus, like sitting down with with actuaries and like figuring out the math behind, you know, which states could absorb the most damage and what is the tradeoff that we would do? Where would we nuke Russia, right? So deterrence was not just about stopping a nuclear war, but also preventing it from getting, like, making sure that damage was equalized on both sides should it occur, right? Mm-hmm.

And I don't know if you have anything you want to add to that. I just want to throw that out. I just want people to understand, like, these are the kinds of conversations that people were having, you know, up through the 70s about what deterrence meant. And I think it means something. I think when we. when we talk about deterrence now, we mean something different than what it meant to the people that built the structures that we exist on now, if that makes sense. I think that's true. And I think, you know, one takeaway from that is that, and I'm, you know, I clearly come from a background in arms control and disarmament.

I mean, I'm an advocate for the abolition of nuclear weapons. I don't hide that. But I think it's very important to understand that when we talk about deterrence, we act like that is. the primary focus of the U.S. arsenal. And in practice, that's not really true. Our arsenal is oriented towards nuclear war fighting. And what I think a lot of organizations are trying to do right now is to meet the advocates for nuclear weapons on their own ideological framework and say, look, you claim that you're an advocate of deterrence. Well, let's take you at your word, right? They're calling their bluff and saying, how would we move to a deterrence-only posture? And there's

a couple of different ways we would do that. Our arsenal and the way that it was the way that it's set up would look quite different. And the U.S. might even institute a no first use policy to basically declare before the world that deterrence truly is the only purpose of the U.S. arsenal. And that's quite different, I think, than what many advocates are talking about when they discussed deterrence today. Deterrence is a valuable concept in a lot of ways, but frequently it can just be a justification for new programs, some of which are quite dangerous and destabilizing. I do so love it when the guest perfectly sets up the segue to the next question. So let's talk some domestic politics then.

What exactly is a no first use policy? And were you excited as I was to hear it talked about on the debate stage? I was really excited about it. And a no-first-use policy to summarize is something very simple. It is a policy that declares that the United States will never use nuclear weapons first. We will never initiate a nuclear war. That's all it is. And I was excited to hear that on the debate stage.

I knew that Senator Warren was an advocate for no-first-use already because she mentioned it in a major foreign policy speech she gave a few months back. But it was exciting to hear her rebut what was a terribly framed question. from Jake Tapper, and also to rebut some of the objections from, I believe it was Governor Bullock that she was engaging with in that exchange. It's really exciting that no first use has made it to the mainstream of U.S. political discourse. I think it's a common sense policy. I think a lot of people listening to that debate were probably shocked to hear that no first use is not already the U.S. policy. So we're really encouraged by that. I'm extremely encouraged by it, and I really hope that it gives some momentum to the legislation

that currently exists in Congress that would institute a no-first-use policy, and that it will inspire the other presidential candidates to debate working that into their platforms, because if they're elected, they will have the opportunity to institute a no-first-use policy. Are there other countries in the nuclear club that have no-first-use policies? Yes, China has long had a no-first-use policy, and it recently, reaffirmed it. India also has one, but it has some qualifications to the no first use policy, which are basically that if there is a major chemical or biological attack on India, that it will potentially respond with nuclear weapons. But other than that, they have a no first use policy,

and they've reiterated it several times. And does Russia play coy on the issue like we do? Yes. In the 1980s, I believe it was, Russia actually did institute. a no first use policy for a while. But once the Cold War was over and it became the Russian Federation, I believe they pulled back from that. What's what's the logic of people that don't want a first use policy or don't want a no first use policy? Like why would you ever, why would you ever want everyone to be afraid that you were going to hit them with nukes? It's a great question. The logic behind it is that the U.S. needs to retain quote unquote ambiguity as to when it would use nuclear weapons. So in other words, we don't explicitly say that we will use nuclear weapons first,

but the whole point of maintaining that ambiguity is to signal to everyone else that you might. So it is an implicit threat to use nuclear weapons first. And for people who are advocates of this ambiguity, they think it gives us flexibility. They think that there's a value in having a lack of clarity about U.S. intentions and actions, whereas advocates of no first use like myself, think that's ridiculous. The world needs to know that the U.S. will never use nuclear weapons first into conflict. That will actually help stability and help prevent miscalculation or an accident from happening. Again, this kind of comes back to stuff that we'd already been talking about that so much of our idea of deterrence is rooted in these outdated ideas. Do you think

it's possible to have an honest conversation in Washington about what we can do about these weapons and how to actually have deterrence that doesn't mean keeping everyone afraid that we're going to launch, we're going to hit them with a nuke. I do think we can have an honest conversation in Washington, but I would say that Washington, although it is an important part of that conversation and inspiring figures like Senator Warren and also Representative Adam Smith, the head of the House on Services Committee are a part of that conversation. Ultimately, Washington is not going to move by itself. I think the history of nuclear weapons shows that the public activists on the outside have an important role to play here. And we're only going to get to the point in Washington

where people start questioning the sacred cows of deterrence and of modernization when there is action on the outside. And what's exciting is you're starting to see that. I've been curating a Twitter feed the last week of all these letters to the editor from around the country and all sorts of places, Georgia, South Carolina, Iowa, from people who are advocating for no first use. That's extremely exciting to me. I think the public needs to take an issue in nuclear weapons. This is an issue that affects them. And the issue is too important to leave to eggheads and politicians in Washington. So I'm very inspired.

Do you think what are the other big nuclear issues that we need to be talking about right now? What should the politicians be debating on this issue besides no first use? Well, they should take a hard look at modernization like we talked about. I think politicians need to seriously consider that there is no reason to have ground-based ICBMs, and that if we were going to put a modernization program on the chopping block, that's a good place to start. So that's one. The other one is that we should be doing everything we can right now to get new start. extended. Unfortunately, it's not really in our hands. It's up to the president who has signaled

that he really doesn't want to do it. But we can use legislative vehicles to try to prevent the U.S. from going above the limits that were imposed by New Start. That would be good. And we can also, the presidential candidates anyway, can signal that they would like to extend New Start and that they would also like to pursue strategic stability talks with Russia and maybe even get to talking about reductions. We have to keep some semblance of international arms control right now because things are coming off the rails. And if New Star goes, there's going to be almost no constraints left. And the third thing is politicians in the United States, citizens of the United States, and all residents here can do their part to advocate for the treaty on the prohibition of nuclear

weapons, which is a UN treaty that was passed recently that seeks to ban nuclear weapons from the face of the earth. Now, that is a lofty goal, and it is admittedly one that is many, many years in the future. But the hope is that the treaty, which will be entering into force sooner than you think, will be a way to pressure the nuclear arms states to actually get their act together and start pursuing disarmament under their NPT obligations. So that's a hugely exciting development that I think everybody here should get involved in. That's on any other podcast. That would be a wonderful place to end, but long-time listeners will know that War College likes to go out on a down note. So let's talk about North Korea a little bit.

How credible do you think the threat of nuclear weapons from Korea is? They've tested nukes, right? They're testing missiles. Last time I had checked in, they're having trouble getting a warhead onto the missiles. Is that still the case? Well, I think the question is mostly about their reentry vehicle on the ICBM. There are questions about whether it works properly and whether, you know, the nuke would actually be delivered to its target once it got up. But I would say that the threat is credible enough.

We have to assume the capability is there. But that's all the more reason why this is an issue that can only be solved diplomatically. The military option is just, I mean, it would be an absolute catastrophe. That's even if it remained a conventional conflict, which now we have to assume that it would. would go nuclear. Secretary Bill Perry, who I referenced earlier, he always says we have to deal with North Korea as it is, not as we would like it to be. And the fact is that they are, effectively, a nuclear arm power with extremely advanced capabilities when it comes to missile technology. And there is no military solution to this crisis. So we have to deal with them diplomatically,

and we have to find a way to freeze their program in place at the very least, and potentially create a roadmap so that it can be rolled back over the long run. That's something you can only do diplomatically. And I would say, too, that that's going to mean making some concessions on our part. We're going to have to deal if we want to actually limit their program. And that may put us in an uncomfortable position. We may end up giving away some things we don't really like. But we have to deal.

You can't get something for nothing. What about Iran? Iran? Yes, sir. I would say that the Trump administration's decision to leave the JCPOA was unbelievably foolhardy. The good news is that Iran does not yet have a nuclear weapons program. It is breaking some of the limitations imposed by the JCPOA, but there's no indication that they are embarking on a kind of crash program to produce nuclear weapons. Let's hope it remains that way. I think it's encouraging that the presidential candidates have almost all universally, except for Trump, of course, resolved to reenter the JCPOA if they take office. That's ultimately the tool that's going to keep Iran from building a nuclear weapon. And it's also going to be the tool that keeps us from potentially going to war with Iran, which I think no one wants. So the solution here has to be found outside of the Trump administration.

And it really involves keeping the JCPOA in play as long as we can so that hopefully a future administration. can reenter it. John Carl Baker, thank you so much for coming onto War College and crawling out through the fallout with us. You're very welcome.

Good to talk with you. That's it for this week. War College listeners, War College is me, Matthew Galt and Kevin O'Dell, who's created by myself and Jason Fields. As always, if you like the show,

please leave us a comment on iTunes and remember to rate the show. It helps other people find us. We're on Twitter at War underscore College and we'll be back next week. Stay safe until then.