Angry Planet - Saying Goodbye to Afghanistan

Episode Date: July 22, 2020

Afghanistan. U.S. troops have been leaving for years, fast, then slowly, then fast again. There is some kind of peace deal between the United States and the Taliban, but it doesn’t involve peace. The Afghan government isn’t even a party to it.Russia—which lost its own war in Afghanistan a generation ago--may have been paying the Taliban to kill U.S. troops.Soon, though, Afghanistan will ostensibly be on its own again. What’s next, aside from more war, of course.To help us understand all of this, we have Kathy Gannon. She is a veteran reporter with the Associated Press based in Pakistan and Afghanistan. She witnessed the Taliban’s victory in 1996, the U.S. invasion in 2001, and has won numerous awards for her work. She is the author of I is for Infidel: From Holy War to Holy Terror in Afghanistan.Recorded 7/21/20The lay of the landWhat the Taliban wantsTaliban VS Kabul The strength of Afghanistan’s warlordsRumors of bounties on U.S. soldiersNo one wants chaos in AfghanistanWar College has a substack! Join the Information War to get weekly insights into our angry planet and hear more conversations about a world in conflict.https://warcollege.substack.com/You can listen to War College on iTunes, Stitcher, Google Play or follow our RSS directly. Our website is warcollegepodcast.com. You can reach us on our Facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/warcollegepodcast/; and on Twitter: @War_College.Support this show http://supporter.acast.com/warcollege. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

Love this podcast? Support this show through the ACAST supporter feature. It's up to you how much you give, and there's no regular commitment. Just click the link in the show description to support now. Jason, the international community has been billions of dollars. It's almost 20 years. The poverty rate in Afghanistan, in areas under government control, has gone from 32% of the population to 55% of the population.

to 55% of the population. You're listening to War College, a weekly podcast that brings you the stories from behind the front lines. Here are your hosts. Hello and welcome to War College. I'm Jason Fields. And I'm Matthew Galt. Afghanistan.

U.S. troops have been leaving for years, fast, then slowly, then fast again. There's some kind of peace deal between the United States and the Taliban, but it doesn't involve peace. The Afghan government isn't even party to it. Russia, which lost its own war in Afghanistan a generation ago, may have been paying the Taliban to kill U.S. troops. Soon though, Afghanistan will ostensibly be on its own again. What's next, aside for more war, of course. To help us understand all of this, we have Kathy Gannon. She's a veteran reporter with the Associated Press based in Pakistan in Afghanistan. She witnessed the Taliban's victory in 1996 and the U.S. invasion in 2001 and has won numerous

awards for her work. She's the author of Eyes for Infidel, from Holy War to Holy Terror in Afghanistan. Kathy, thank you for joining us. My pleasure. Can you start off by just giving us a picture of how you see the situation in Afghanistan now? Well, I think right now it's a bit of a situation. stalemate. The Taliban certainly are in either control or hold sway over 50% of the country. The government in Kabul is still quite chaotic and divided. There's President Khani there as the

president, but you still have some bickering and political confusion between himself and Abdullah, Abdullah, who was his rival in the presidential election. So there's still political turmoil in Kabul. You have a peace deal now between the Taliban and the United States, which really was negotiated to allow for the U.S. troops and NATO to leave after, gosh, 18, 19 years now in Afghanistan. And the deal, while you're right, it didn't include the Afghan government, the deal was meant to set the stage for negotiations between the Taliban and the Kabul leadership.

Keeping in mind that in Kabul is quite divided, you have President Khomey and the people who make up his supporters and his support. You have Abdullah Abdullah, who was the previous government and who disputed the results of the presidential elections last year. in a tentative agreement of sorts with Chani to have some say in the cabinet and also to lead efforts in the peace talks. But until now, the negotiating team from Kabul has not really gelled and they haven't come up with a group yet to negotiate. And so at this point we have the Taliban on one side, the government and its political allies and opponents. trying to come together. On the other side, in the middle, you have the U.S. and NATO trying to leave after 19 years in a way that's not going to see the country return to a place where attacks can be staged

against whether the United States or its allies. So you're still in quite a state of flux. They're still trying to figure out one of the key stipulations, of this agreement, which was prisoner released before the start of negotiations. There was a lot of negotiations on who would be released. The Taliban is a thousand of government employees and soldiers, excuse me, and the government is to release 5,000 Taliban. So that's still in a little bit of a negotiation because while they've released about

4,000 from the government side. There's about 1,000 or so that they're still reluctant to release. And the Taliban still have maybe 100 or so or 200 or so still to release. So you have the prisoner release which is still being

negotiated. You have Kabul in flux politically with different factions and groups still at odds with each other and still not in a position to start negotiations because as of now, they don't really have a negotiating team in place. You have the Taliban on the other side who have stepped up attacks against the Afghan government forces.

They have agreed not to attack U.S. troops, and they're not attacking U.S. troops. And they have now a fairly strong negotiating team ready to go to start negotiations. So that's where you are right now. Is the Taliban a unified force? I think it's difficult to say whether it is a solid, unified force without any fractures, but I think it is fairly well solidified. I think that the Taliban are far more cohesive, for example, than Kabul is at this point. The Shura or the Leadership Council is in pretty strong control.

the negotiating team is very strong and the battlefield soldiers are the ones that may not be willing to agree to all that is negotiated. For example, if there is an agreement, you may have some Taliban that are on the battlefield who say, listen, we don't agree with this and we're going to join up with the Islamic State or we're going to resist it.

But I think by and large you will see the vast majority of those Taliban fighting in the field who will go along with the negotiated settlement because the Taliban have put in Mullah Omar's son as the head of the military committee. So he brings with him the credentials of his father. So that goes well with the soldiers. You have the negotiating team has five people who were held for many years in Guantanamo. So that also gives them a great deal of credibility. You have Mueller Brother who was in prison here in Pakistan for eight years.

So that also gives him a great deal of credibility with those in the field who may not trust Pakistan. So they see him as being maybe more opposed to Pakistan. and more independent. So there are a lot of reasons why the Taliban are a more cohesive unit and a more coordinated unit at this point than is the political leadership in Kabul. So what does the Taliban want at this point? I mean, I assume they want to control the country, but can you tell us a little bit about the kind of state they want to build too? Yeah, no, actually that's not true. They have not said that they would, want to control the government. That doesn't say that they don't want to, but what they've said

is that they recognize that they have to share power. They haven't said what that means. They say they want an Islamic system. They haven't said what that means. They said that they're willing to negotiate a ceasefire, complete ceasefire. They say that women can work and women can go to school, girls can go to school, but a woman cannot be president and a woman cannot be the Supreme Court Chief Justice. But they can be on the court, they can be judges, but they cannot be the president of the country and they cannot. So they are quite clear on some of their issues that they're prepared to negotiate.

But there's a lot of vagueness. What do they mean by Islamic system? What kind of constitutional changes do they want? They do want constitutional changes. But I think, Jason, for me, one of the things is they do have a negotiating team together. If there is going to be an end to this war, there's going to have to be a negotiated end to it. So at this point, they've got a team together. It's a strong team.

It's a fairly cohesive team. It's the other side that hasn't gotten their act together. Now, if you really want to know what the Taliban want, or don't want or what they're prepared to concede or not concede, then you have to get the other side together and move to a point where you're negotiating. You're sitting at the negotiating table. And if the political leadership in Kabul brings together a strong, solid team of strong political leaders, of strong political leaders, of strong women leaders,

that can sit opposite the Taliban and say, okay, here's what our lines in the sand are. here's what we're prepared to negotiate. And the Taliban say, okay, here's what we're prepared to negotiate. Then at least you can see some movement forward. Until then, it's all speculation. And where you are now is the Taliban do have a strong team together. They have said some of the things very vaguely what they want. Where the problem lies right now is that Kabul, at this point,

the Kabul leadership is not cohesive and strongly united to the point where they can put. together a strong team, come to the table, sit across from the Taliban and say, okay, here's where our lines in the sand are and we're not going to go beyond them. We're strong enough to say that. And here's why we're strong enough and to speak in one voice. But unfortunately right now, Kabul is speaking in many different voices. There is a concern that not everyone in Kabul is really that interested in negotiations. They're quite happy with the status quo. So I, I think the issues are right now is getting a strong and solid team together from the Kabul side.

From the Taliban side, you have that. From the Taliban side, you know what they want in very vague terms. But at least they're willing to sit at the table. And if the other side comes with a strong team, you can call their bluff. You can have that negotiation. But at this point, you don't have that strong, solid negotiating team. from the Kabul side. Sorry, go ahead.

No, that's fine. Sorry, that was it. Why does Kabul like the status quo? Well, I mean, I think there are some who like the status quo. If you're the president and you say you're going to be the president for the next five years, why do you really want to get into a negotiation that is going to perhaps require you to share power? If you're the interior minister or the defense minister and you're in a very solid position in Kabul, why would you want to get into negotiation that says that maybe you have to negotiate that away?

Over the last 19 years, you also have to realize that the people who were put in power in 2001 were a lot of warlords in that who were in power between 1992 and 1996. And when they were last in power, Jason, if people look by, at history, they will see that it was a very violent time that these warlords fought each other for power, for position, to maintain their strength. And 50,000 civilians were killed during those years between 1992 to 96, which gave rise to the Taliban. Taliban came, of course, they were a regressive regime that denied rights, no question about it. People were happy to see the back of them. No question. But what was put back in were these warlords. Now, they have strength in their positions

again. They've consolidated their power. They have lots of money. They have lots of position. There's a strong argument for why they might be not wanting to negotiate and get into negotiations where they may have to share their power. So I'm not quite sure that, that, is ready to negotiate. And certainly, I think they've certainly shown that they have some reluctance to negotiate. Can they hold the Taliban off indefinitely so that they don't have to negotiate? Well, I mean, I don't think the Taliban have the strength to take any cities. They've shown that. It's been almost 20 years. They can attack a city. They can take parts of it. They can get pushed back. They don't have the ability to take a city. But at some,

point, the powers that be, whether they're in Kabul or whether they're among the Taliban, have to at some point start thinking about Afghans and building a life for Afghans and creating a country for Afghans where Afghans can live in peace and there can be some prosperity. This was before the pandemic. So that means that more people are poor in 2020 than they were in 2012. And that poverty is set at somebody who earns less than $1.90 a day. So the poverty rate has gone up in government-controlled areas, despite the fact that billions of dollars has been spent, corruption is rampant. There's a lot of reasons why a negotiated peace is necessary so that Afghans can start to develop their country and Afghans can have some kind of a life in peace.

At this point, the leadership, whether it's Taliban leadership, whether it's political leadership, they haven't really shown or indicated where they're committed to finding a more prosperous life for Afghans. For themselves, yes, they've been very successful at that. No one has a vision for the future. Well, I mean, vision for the future for Afghans, they certainly seem to have a vision for themselves. Where does Pakistan fit in now? Well, I mean, I think for sure. Pakistan is always looking at its borders, what its interests are.

There is a real fear in Afghanistan that Pakistan will have too much authority over or power over what the future will look like. I think that has decreased substantially because Pakistan has its own Pashtun population is disgruntled. so they don't have quite the hold over the Pashtun population, which they would like to have, which is also the backbone of the Taliban where the Pashtun, which is why everyone, and rightly in many ways, said that Pakistan was giving the safe havens to the Taliban, which they were because they felt that they had an unfriendly government in Kabul

and so wanted to have authority in, have some position, or ability to control events in Afghanistan. I think Pakistan's ability to control events in Afghanistan has dwindled considerably. The Taliban don't trust them a great deal. The leadership within the Taliban is suspicious of Pakistan. The head negotiator of the Taliban, Mullah Brother, was in jail for eight years in Pakistan. And he was put in jail because he tried.

to negotiate peace with Hamid Karzai without Pakistan's involvement. And he was put in jail. And at the time he was put in jail in 2010, the CIA was also party to his being put in jail. And according to Hamat Karzai, twice he had asked both Pakistan and the CIA to please release Mueller Brother.

And twice they said no, because they weren't ready to negotiate with the Taliban back then. So there's a lot of suspicion within the leadership of the Taliban toward Pakistan. So I don't think Pakistan's abilities to control the situation in Afghanistan is as great as it once was. Is that significant anymore? That's not to say that they wouldn't like to. That's not to say that the Pakistan doesn't have a desire to make sure that they have a friendly neighbor, that they have their border is protected.

And it's not to say that they won't cause problems. They see the Baluch Liberation Army has safe havens in Afghanistan. Baloch Liberation Army is attacking Pakistan. So, I mean, it's a very volatile neighbor, whether it's a neighborhood, whether it's Afghanistan, Pakistan, Pakistan, India, Iran, India, Iran, Pakistan. it's a very volatile neighborhood and then throw in Russia and China into the mix and the United States. This neighborhood is a volatile one and each participant in the neighborhood is looking after their own

interest in figuring out how do they best protect their own interests. And that doesn't always work peacefully and it doesn't always work well for the neighborhood and it doesn't always work well for relations between the different neighbors. All right. We're going to pause there for a quick break. You are on with Kathy Gannon. We were talking about Afghanistan. Welcome back, War College listeners.

We were talking about Afghanistan with Kathy Gannon. How was Russia involved at this point? And what do you think about the story that ran in the U.S. press about bounties being put out for U.S. soldiers? Yeah. I mean, I think there's no question Russia. is involved. I think Russia, since 2000, what, 16,

15, there has been talk about Russia giving weapons and money to the Taliban. No question. And in part, for the same reason why the U.S. is now negotiating and wanted to negotiate with the Taliban was because of the growth of the

Islamic State in Afghanistan. And the Islamic State is close with the Islamic movement of Uzbekistan, which is the IMU, which is the terrorist group that has many Uzbeks and has caused problems for the Central Asian states. In 2018, Russia reinforced its bases in Kazakhstan, I believe, because they were worried about the growth of the Islamic State and the IMU, which is working with the Islamic state, in the northern areas of Afghanistan. So they started putting it, putting it

a lot of money and weapons to the Taliban, and that's at least what the intelligence and what many Afghans believe and say and the American intelligence say. And so they would be doing it for that. They would also like to give the U.S. a black eye. They had to leave with their tail between their lakes in 1989. After 10 years in Afghanistan,

unable to pacify the Mujahideen, who were supported then by the United States, who, with the help of U.S. stingers, which were given to the Mujahideen to fight the Russians, helped to defeat the Russians. So the Russians, I think, would very much like to have seen a black guy given to the United States and to see the U.S. leave, not as a victor, but, you know, as having to lead. So I think that's all those factors come into play. Did they pay bounties to the Taliban. Well, I mean, first it was Taliban-linked fighters.

Then it was Afghan militias. So first, this was in 2018-19. I don't know that the Taliban really needed to have be given money to kill American soldiers. They were trying to kill them then. I'm not saying that they didn't take money. I'm not saying that money wasn't given. But I'm not clear on, you're in a war.

one side of the war is fighting the other side. They were killing American soldiers. They were killing NATO soldiers. They were killing Afghan soldiers. It was a war. They were fighting each other. Trump had dropped the mother of all bombs in Afghanistan. So, I mean, the story is a little bit vague in my mind

that they needed to be given money to, as an incentive to kill U.S. soldiers. I think they were killing them willingly. Were they taking money? Absolutely. I'm sure they were. Money has been passed around in Afghanistan since 2001 in suitcases. The CIA was passing around money in suitcases to their allies. No doubt the Russians were, the Iranians were, the Chinese were. So mountains of money has come into Afghanistan and people are giving it to their allies for their agendas. I'm not sure that specifically the Taliban needed to be paid to kill. US and NATO soldiers back in 2018 19. There was a war going on. There is a war

going on and they're on opposite sides of this war. So no doubt the Russia putting money in and no doubt they took money. Exactly how that played out in terms of bounties, I'm not quite

clear on that at all. Yeah, the characterization of it in the U.S. press, and the sources behind it have been a little bit strange, I think. Sure. And I think for sure Russia was spending money. For sure, Russia would like to see, no doubt, the U.S. to leave with their tails between their lakes. They would like to at least give them a rough time while they're there. But at the same time, Russia doesn't want chaos in Afghanistan. It's at their southern border. China doesn't want to see chaos because of The Uyghurs in the Turkistan movement, they worry about on their borders.

So while everyone might want to give the U.S. a black eye, I don't know that I think Holosad, as the U.S. envoy, has been negotiating with both China and Russia, to try to come up with a deal that will allow the country to move forward and will unite forces, against the Islamic State, which would seem to be the main enemy right now in Afghanistan for all of these players. And the Islamic State, whether that includes Uyghur factions, whether it includes the Islamic

movement of Uzbekistan, the Islamic State, you know, renegade Taliban. However, you define other in terms of militants operating in Afghanistan, I think China the U.S., Russia, all want to see a situation where they can have a unified force against that force, that movement, whether it's the Islamic State or those militants that have very strong agendas against Russia, against China, against the U.S. Can you talk a little bit more about those groups? Do we have any idea how strong they are, how many there are, that kind of thing? Yeah, I mean, it's difficult to know.

I mean, the Islamic State, it wanes and grows. There certainly has been strong operations against the Islamic State in eastern Afghanistan. I know I've talked to some Department of Defense intelligence people from the U.S. that are worried about their movement into Poonar and Northistan because those areas are very mountainous and easy to get lost in and very difficult to route them out of. There is a concern that they may not be large in numbers, but they're able to plan operations. And they have traced some failed operations or operations that they managed to discover

before they could be carried out to Afghanistan and two operatives that came from Afghanistan. There was some information that the Islamic Movement Novos Pakistan was doing recruitment in northern Afghanistan among those backs there. But I think it's very difficult to put a figure onto the numbers of fighters. And I'm not sure that numbers really reflect how dangerous they are. But there certainly is a wide-ranging concern, whether it's in China, whether it's in Russia, or whether it's in the United States, about what they can pull off,

what left unattended they could present, what kind of a danger they present if left unattended. And in a way, that's one of the leading reasons why the U.S. wanted to get this deal with the Taliban. Whether the Taliban could come through on that is another question altogether. Will the Taliban be a good partner against these groups? Would the Taliban be a good partner against al-Qaeda?

What is proof that they will be against al-Qaeda? What is proof that they have broken ties with al-Qaeda? Is there proof? What kind of intelligence does the U.S. have, that they have, in fact, broken ties with al-Qaeda? So there's all kinds of questions left unanswered on that end of the deal, which was the big part of the deal vis-a-vis the U.S. Because all the U.S. is interested in, I mean, it's interested in, obviously, that Afghanistan finds some sort of stability.

but its big concern is its own national security, as it should be. I mean, that's everybody's main concern is their own national security. And I think the U.S. sees their national security being threatened by the Islamic State. And they see the Taliban as an ally against the Islamic State. Now, there's been no explanation or details of the agreement that gives guarantees or, or, that we know about what those guarantees are from the Taliban, that they can, in fact, be that partner against these insurgent groups or these terrorist groups like the Islamic State.

And have they, in fact, broken ties with al-Qaeda? And if they have, what's the proof that they have? So all of those questions are still unanswered and explanations haven't been given because when they're asked, the U.S. says, well, you know, we have intelligence reasons why we can't give that. Yes, we're following that. But I think those are very strong and important questions that need to be answered whether the Taliban will break ties with al-Qaeda. If they are breaking ties with al-Qaeda, what is the proof that they're breaking ties with al-Qaeda? Where are the likes of Aiman al-Zawari or Saif al-Adu, these people who are very strong within al-Qaeda, whether they're able to organize, al-Qaeda the way it once was, but that doesn't mean they can't tomorrow. So where are they today? And what is the strength of them? And what is al-Qaeda in the Asian subcontinent that has started up back in 2013-14? Who's running that? Where are they running it from? They've taken credit for

attacks in Afghanistan and in Pakistan, in India. I think there's a lot of unanswered questions on those fronts that I think need to be answered to explain whether this deal gives the United States the national security guarantees it wants. Can we talk about, all right, so what is the U.S. presence like currently? And I'm also wondering how America has changed Afghanistan? like what has the U.S. presence, what do you think the lasting legacy of the U.S. presence there will be? Oh, you like small questions, don't you? I do like small questions, yeah.

Yeah, I mean, yeah, I don't think the legacy, the U.S. legacy in Afghanistan will be one of, you know, remarkable development. Obviously, here it is. 20 years later, and the poverty level is higher than it was, even in 2012. People are very disgruntled about the level of corruption and how Afghanistan developed post-2001. I think that there was a lot of hope among Afghans in 2001, that their country would look very different in 2020 than it does. So I think that Afghanistan was a difficult country for the U.S. and for the coalition to get into and they

maybe they weren't completely committed to it initially when they got in because Iraq was already on the cards. So I think there is a lot of different answers to your question and parts to your question that I think it's quite impossible to say, okay, here's the legacy of the U.S. in Afghanistan.

I think there were a lot of missteps and a lot of resources that were redirected to Iraq and a decision not to go strong into Afghanistan and rebuild Afghanistan when in fact Afghanistan had come out of 30 years before and desperately needed rebuilding. And I think the results of that are being seen today. I think that people who were put in power in 2001

had a reputation when they were last in power for perhaps being less than committed to clean governance. And so I think the results of that are being seen today. So I think that it's not specific American legacy or coalition or Western legacy or NATO legacy. I think that Afghans, if you ask, many Afghans are quite frustrated. and disappointed and sad about where their country is in 2020, 20 years later. And I think maybe a lot of Americans maybe are quite sad to think with all that money that was invested, where did it go and what was built of it? On the other side, you know, I mean, it is 2020.

You have a new generation of Afghans, and they're all regardless of, you know, they have a desire for their country. you have, whether they're in the villages or in the cities, Afghans have always wanted to see their country grow. Their leaders haven't given them the tools and behaved in a way that allowed that, and that's still holding them up. So I guess I've skirted your question, but I don't know that it's possible to really give a definitive one-point answer,

here is the legacy of the U.S. in Afghanistan because the U.S. came in with the coalition and with NATO. And, you know, so it's seen in the broader picture. And I think there's a great deal of frustration among Afghans right now with the lack of development, lack of security, lack of future. I mean, Gallup did a survey in 2018 where people had less faith in their, their country's future than ever before, and they didn't see a future. So I think there's a lot of frustration among Afghans

who really just sort of hope for something much better in 2020. So I think, and I'm sure there are a lot of people who were working on behalf of the U.S. and the coalition who also maybe looking today are quite frustrated with the way things have turned out and what has happened with resources and how they've been used. Kathy, I just want to say thank you so much for taking us through this. And, you know, I just, I've always really admired your work and I think it's amazing what you do.

So thank you. Well, thank you very much. And it's such a complicated issue like anything, you know, but there's so many levels to it. And it's so nuanced. And they're, unfortunately, in wars, everybody wants a good guy, bad guy, right, wrong, good, evil. And Afghanistan is so much more than that, and it's just really a lot of gray and missteps. And at the end of the day, Afghans, whether it's in this particular war or the last one or the one before, they seem to somehow get caught in the middle in their life.

They keep waiting for it to get better. That's it for this week, War College listeners. War College is a production of War College LLC. That is Matthew Galt, Jason Fields, and Kevin Nodell. It was created by myself and Jason Fields. Hey, we have a substack. Go to warcollege.substack.com to get our weekly newsletter every Monday. We collect the stories that fall through the cracks,

put them together, and tell you what's going on in the world. If you like the show, please visit us at warcollegepodcast.com where you can find our Twitter and Facebook pages and drop us a line. We will be back very soon with more conversations about conflicts on an angry planet. Stay safe. Until then.