Angry Planet - The Complexities of China's Liberal Nationalism

Episode Date: January 30, 2023

Only Nixon can go to China. The now-forgotten aphorism once represented so much in American politics. After Nixon met with Mao, relations between the Communist country and America thawed. Trade opened up and, the popular notion went, with economic benefits would come a lessening of authoritarianism in China and the eventual end of Communism.Here in 2023 the idea that economic modernization and prosperity would lead to a flourishing of democracy in China seems quaint. What happened? And do the West’s preconceptions of what democracy and freedom are vibe with what’s actually going on in China.That’s what we’re here today to talk about. With us is Sungmin Cho, the author of the new article Does China’s Case Falsify Modernization Theory? Cho is a professor at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies.Angry Planet has a Substack! Join to get weekly insights into our angry planet and hear more conversations about a world in conflict.https://angryplanet.substack.com/subscribeYou can listen to Angry Planet on iTunes, Stitcher, Google Play or follow our RSS directly. Our website is angryplanetpod.com. You can reach us on our Facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/angryplanetpodcast/; and on Twitter: @angryplanetpod.Support this show http://supporter.acast.com/warcollege. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

Love this podcast. Support this show through the ACAST supporter feature. It's up to you how much you give, and there's no regular commitment. Just click the link in the show description to support now. People live in a world with their own making. Frankly, that seems to be the problem. Welcome to Angry Planet. Hello, and welcome to Angry Planet. I'm Matthew Galt. And I'm Jason Field. Only Nixon can go to China. Now, I've forgotten. an aphorism once represented so much in American politics. After Nixon met with Mao, relations between the communist country and America thawed, trade opened up, and the popular notion went, with economic benefits would come a lessening of authoritarianism in China and the eventual end of communism. Here in 2023, the idea that economic modernization and prosperity would lead to a flourishing of democracy in China seems quaint. What happened? And

do the West's preconception of what democracy and freedom are vibe with what's actually going on in China? That's what we are here to discuss in a nuanced way. With us is Sung-Ming Cho, the author of the new article, Does China's Case Falsify Modernization Theory? Cho is a professor at the Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies. Sir, thank you so much for joining us. Thank you for the invitation. So we like to get kind of basics out of the way for people that may not know what is modernization theory and what does it say broadly? It is very simple and intuitive theory that if you help a country to develop an economy, then that will lead to the increase of wealth creating middle class and then middle class will spend money to

for better education of their children. So they will lead to the rise of educational level. And then as the economy develops, there will be urbanization and also more connection between the society and outside world. So economic development will bring in all the good things which will end up spreading democratic and liberal values And then they will create a force for the democratic transition from non-democratic country to a democracy. And then good example is there are many, but good example is in recent history, South Korea or Taiwan are the best examples that their economy develops.

And then there was grassroots movement and more demand for the openness in the government. And then there was some strong democracy protest. And then in the end, they will bring in democratization of the political system. So there's kind of this perception in the West right now that this has not happened in China. There is an idea that their economy has grown of the last several generations. but democracy has not flourished. And in many cases, outside viewers would say that authoritarian has or authoritarianism has and the Communist Party is as strong as it's ever been. What I really liked about your article is that you give a very, you kind of refute that a little kind of, right, but it's more complicated.

There's a lot going on here. So can you talk about the ways that liberal values and democratization has actually happened in China? Yeah. So it is a complex reality. And then because of our cognitive tendency that we want to have a simple understanding and simple explanation for the complex situation. So we quickly jump to the conclusion that, okay, Xi Jinping is still a very strong leader. So there was no democratic change period. So China, clearly, China's economy has clearly developed very rapidly,

and it became the second largest economy overpassing Japan in 2010. So despite that stunning economic development, China's political system just remains as non-democratic system, and even worse, after Xi Jinping took power, there was a more stronger authoritarianism. So it's very clear observation that China has not democratized at all, whereas I also like to draw people's attention to what is happening behind what is observed. which is Chinese people's perspective and then how they view the party,

the leader and also the policies. So at the political system level, China is a non-democracy, but if we turn our attention to what's going on inside the society and people's mindset, attitude, values, then there has been some progressive development in people's value system, which is repeatedly confirmed with various surveys,

which I present as an evidence. But again, even laying out different layers of non-change and changes, I have to admit that the situation is even more complex, because Chinese people's their perspective is not also straightforward that they only have an increasing set of democratic and liberal values. At the same time, their nationalism also has greatly increased. So the challenge for outside analysts is that how to reconcile this seemingly conflicting trends of that increasing democratic and liberal values, and also increasing nationalism. Yeah, it's interesting because I, China's a pretty big blind spot for me.

But I do know a little bit about the pop culture and especially like the online culture around it's people that live stream. Like it's people that are on. I can't remember what the platforms are, but they're similar to Twitch, but it's not Twitch. and I've talked to some of them and I've read news reports and I've seen documentaries and it's striking, watching that stuff, it really struck me how these are people that have, what we would kind of classify as typical middle class Western values, like they're striving for fame and fortune.

They want a nice, comfortable life while still being very pro like Chinese Communist Party at the same time, like those things exist together, right? Yes. And that dual attitude can be conceptualized as a liberal nationalism. So we tend to think that if Chinese young generation, especially, if they are liberal, which is repeatedly confirmed through a survey, then they are supposed to be. internationalist as well. They are supposed to admire

Western culture and support for the better relationship between China and the Western countries. But also on the other side, survey data also repeatedly confirmed that young generation in China is even more

nationalistic than their elder generation. Then our when we see that survey result, Our next assumption is that, okay, Chinese young generation, they are nationalistic, so they should be illiberal. Because they are nationalistic and China is an illiberal country, so their value system should be illiberal, which conflicts with the previous finding of increasing democratic and liberal values. So to explain this similarly conflicting observation is that our assumption is wrong.

Our assumption that nationalists means that they support illiberalism is wrong. They can be nationalistic at the same time they can be democratic. And then to solve this puzzle is that Chinese young generation, they are liberal on domestic issues, but they are nationalistic on external issues. So they can support Xi Jinping's strong policy against the U.S. national unification of Taiwan because they are nationalistic. But that does not mean that they also support Xi Jinping's increasingly repressive policies and censorship.

So when there was a very crazy and angry young Chinese, they are shouting and yelling in front of the U.S. embassy in Beijing. We assume that, oh, my God, they are so nationalistic. They support Xi Jinping. they will support Xi Jinping, whatever Xi Jinping does. But actually, it turned out it is not the case as we confirmed during the latest student protest in China against zero-COVID policy. So while Chinese students support Xi Jinping for his nationalistic policies, they have been critical of Xi Jinping's illiberal policies at the same time.

We just could not really observe their discussion inside China until we could observe when their anger break broke out. But that's how we can explain this dual attitude of liberal nationalism, which is actually very common in any country we can also observe. any American students are liberal. They may criticize, say, President Trump's illiberal policies, but they also can support Trump's policy a strong drive against another authoritarian Xi Jinping. So liberal nationalism is seemingly counterintuitive, but it is also not really difficult to understand.

And then that can explain a lot about Chinese people's complex attitude about their country, party, and policy. What is communism in China at this point? Does it have anything to do with Marx or, you know, because we talk about the Communist Party, and I just wonder what it stands for? So communism theory and Marxism and Maoism, Chinese students, they studied that,

they memorize, they take a lot of pace to take that exam. But in my time in China, from 2008 to 2010, I studied in China for a master's degree. I find that not many people really believe in the ideal of Marxism. So they are very uncertain about what the ideal of communism is. But what they also, what I find interesting is that they are also against the the uncontrolled, unregulated market capitalism that they observe in the U.S. most

representatively, which cause the widening inequality and then also politics are corrupted by the force of market capitalism that politicians only represent the narrow interest of the powerful people or corporates. So in that regard, Chinese people, Chinese young generation, they still have this leftist ideal of the state, and there should be an authority that regulate the market capitalism or the force of market and then distribute the wealth in an equal way. The problem is that even in the communist China, there is a rapidly widening inequality. So that contradicts the Communist Party's own theory, and then China's young generation also find that, and then point out that you guys argue that we are communist country, and then how can you explain this widening inequality? Can you tell us a little bit more about that widening inequality? Because the value, it's a, to China is a big country with a lot of different kinds of people.

And the values, the liberal values of a city dweller are not the same as the values of someone in one of the rural parts, right? Yes. Yeah. So it is the mechanism of stress. that clearly the younger generation living in urban area clearly have more liberal and democratic values than the other segment of population in different locations, which is also confirmed from the survey data. But also, the researchers also find that there is the transmission of values from urban to rural

area. And then one, the best example is that when there is a street protest that is ongoing in rural area, many of them are also organized, inspired, and led by the migrant workers who spend some time in urban area. So in urban area, migrant workers, they were exposed to the modern system and then have a chance to contact, if you will, or internalize some level of democrating and liberal values. And then when they come back to their hometown, they are the ones who provide the logic and argument

about their legal rights and civil rights to protect them. So there is a transmission of values from urban to rural area. and then the media that transmit this value is, interestingly, migrant workers. All right, angry planet listeners. We're going to pause there for a break. We'll be right back after this. All right, angry, planet listeners, welcome back. Can you tell me how things have changed since Xi came to power?

It feels like certainly tensions or tensions with America have increased. what is what are these these liberal urban dwellers what is their relationship to him so love and love and hatred or tough love that

so there is a reason that why Xi Jinping has also no choice but no choice but to strengthen authoritarianism that so I have to start from this observation that Xi Jinping's rise

as a strong leader is ironically confirm the theory of modernization theory. So modernization theory predicts that with economic development,

there is more spread of liberal and democratic values that will form a force against authoritarianism that people will demand more openness and government accountability, if not outright demand of

democratization of the political system like multi-party system or general election. The argument didn't go that far before Xi Jinping, but there was a clear increase of all kinds of protest across the country and also feminists and then the Chinese post-service veterans, and just give you some example. They form interest groups, and they start to demand their rights and protection of their rights from the state.

So there are so many protests and then also Hujin Tao and Wuzintao and Wonzab of Error, the WHO won government also allows so-called investigative journalism that as a way to control the corruption by local, local, party officials or government officials. So the center cannot really monitor all the what's going on on the province. So let journalists give them more freedom to investigate and find corruptions. And then all these liberal policies satisfy people's expectation following this economic development that, okay, China is still a non-democratic country at the top.

But within that limit, there was a great level of liberalization, and people are really excited about that. So that's how they also support the party, not only for economic performance, but also the administrative performance. There was a political reform. As long as you don't really argue that I like to overthrow the party, I like multi-party system, the party tolerates all kinds of protest and demand. And then the problem is that that demand starts to going up. People start to discuss, okay, this is a great trend. Maybe we have to criticize Huzintau and Wan Jabba's relatives, their daughters, corruption. And there was a New York Times and then Wall Street report about that.

And then without censorship, Chinese people learned that and they start to criticize. So this liberalization policy went too far. So the party leaders, they realized that. okay, we went too far. This is the time that we need to tighten the control. And then that's how the rise of Xi Jinping was accepted and supported by the party, other party leaders within the party.

So ironically, because the society is becoming more liberal and they demand more and then more, they expect more government openness and accountability, that puts party under pressure. So Xi Jinping's rise of power and return of strong and politics, paradoxically, somehow approves the, you know, the causal logic of modernization theory. Do you think that that has legs, though? Is that every year that he remains in power, it China looks less and less like it's had democratic reforms. Sure, there's this liberalization going on, but at a.

But like at the top at this political level, it's things are calcifying. So like long term, what do you see happening there? So he reversed all of the Hujin Tao and Wanjabal, so liberal policies and also political reform set by the previous leader, Zhang Jamin and Dong Shampin, breaking the age limit or also the, the, the, the, informal practice of pointing out their next leader in their previous party

Congress. So all in all, Xi Jinping really reversed all the liberal legacy and the political reforms of the previous leaders. And then he appeals a lot to the nationalism,

because in order to compensate for the legitimacy as he lost in liberal policies, he has to appeal to the nationalism. And then the election of President Trump was actually a challenge to China, but also at the same time an opportunity for Xi Jinping that really President Trump could really visualize the image of anti-China sentiment from America. And then Xi Jinping could point out President Trump's image as the U.S. is finally really does not hide its intent to contain the rise of China. China has been rapidly rising and then the U.S. cannot let it happen.

So finally, the time that we have been worried come and then we should unite. So Xi Jinping could appeal and then Chinese people generally agree. So they put up with Xi Jinping's illiberal policies that because this is the time that China is under external challenge and then we need to unite behind the party's leadership. So they put up with all the strengthening censorship and most critically zero COVID policy. So at the beginning of zero COVID policy, they could endure and support that drug-conium measures while they observing all the chaotic initial response to pandemic in the U.S. No masks and were a vaccine.

So at the beginning of COVID, Chinese people could confirm the Xi Jinping's narrative is correct. the unity of Chinese country under the leadership of the party is superior than dysfunctional politics in America, which causes the spike of the death toll of COVID at the beginning. But as time goes by, American society picks up and then develops vaccine, and then the U.S. and other countries get out of this COVID problems, whereas China is digging, in to this problem deeper and deeper by sticking to Xi Jinping's zero-cove policy. And then Chinese people lost patience and they started to doubt the judgment of Xi Jinping. And then it erupted in the student protests in this year.

So it sounds sort of like an old playbook to me that many countries, when they have domestic issues start to point beyond their borders to an enemy. Is there anything that you see that's particularly Chinese about what's happening, just to differentiate it from, you know, things that have happened in the past? It's also not, they're not wrong, right, Jason? Like, we look at them as an enemy or a rival? Yeah, of course. Like, like, we're, we're playing the heel for them, for sure, just as they're playing the heel for us. Like, like, Trump certainly talked about it a lot. I would say that a lot of American military policy in the last 10 years has had an eye towards a coming conflict with China.

Right. It's not like, it's not as if they're making it up. Right. You know? Yeah, we've been pivoting to Asia for about 12 years now. Yeah. What do you think Western? analysts get wrong?

So, I think a Western analyst focused too much on the power of Xi Jinping that they lost sight of Chinese people's thinking their perspective behind that and then also

lost interest in what impact they will bring in the elite politics. which is also a big question to myself. So after the end of the 20th party Congress, Xi Jinping clearly solidified his power base by filling all the political standing committee with his loyalists. And then many analysts predict that, okay,

Xi Jinping clearly consolidates his power, not conceding any sense. to other faction by removing Wang Yang or Li Ko Chang. And then that means that Xin Jinping will stick to his policy of Zirokub's policy, wolf warrior policy, and he will double down on his policy to emphasize political and ideological control over the economic performance. But it was not, it was not. It didn't take long for Chinese people to be upset about non-change,

and then young generation, especially, they come out to street to express their opposition against zero-cov's policy. So it is easy to write down what they observe on the surface, which is Xi Jinping's ever-strengthening power. but we should not stop making efforts to look into what Chinese people are thinking and then how they will impact the elite politics, despite all these obstacles and difficulties of researchers and analysts traveling into China. How can people do that now?

Like what are the, and there's such a huge language barrier. I mean, I guess experts, hopefully would speak or read some of the languages. But where do you think they should look? Where are the places that they should be going and talking to people? Well, despite this barrier for physical traveling, still the online survey is possible. That's how foreign researchers are still conducting a survey.

but the difficulty is that through online survey, there will be more censorship. So you cannot really ask some, you can only touch upon questions that are not very deep. And also you cannot really conduct in-depth interview. But then again, through online and emails, still researchers collaborate with Chinese scholars to gather data on people's opinion on something, on the subject, which is now the problem that under Xi Jinping and then this online communication is under very tight surveillance. So that constraints a lot of researchers' latitudes to form the question, engage the subject. But despite that, that's the only way that people outside excurs can try to get some perspective from inside.

Do you think, we're kind of coming to the end now. So I'm going to ask you to do some speculation with us, if you will. What happens if there's no let up on zero COVID policy, which? I know that there's, which I know is actually happening. And the world economic outlook is looking weird and shaky right now. And it seems to me as we're talking like the one of the big differences between what's going on in China right now and like say the end of the Soviet Union when communism collapses in the Soviet Union is that the economic picture is very different. right? There's there's thriving parts of the economy

in China. What happens if there's a global downshift in the economy and China starts to struggle? So economic performance has been along with nationalism. It has been a very important

pillar for Chinese Communist Party's legitimacy. But if Chinese economy stumbles the GDP growth already starts to slow down. And then as you point out in your scenario, with the global economic downturn, if China gets a negative impact, then Chinese people will get, they will have a hard time, they get angry, they start to criticize the party.

But that would not directly lead to the demise of the party or Xi Jinping. what I'm expecting to see is how they will translate into the factional politics within the party. And then I look at the episode of Mao Zodong and Liu Xiaofi, Deng Xiaoping in the early 1960s. So many people say that, oh my gosh, Xi Jinping is so powerful. He wants to be another Mao Zodong. And then if we look at what actually happened with Mao Zodong's cases, is that so Mao Jotong launched this national project, a great leap award, mobilized the whole society and country

for the grand goal of becoming great economy. But it turned out, it turned out, it was, it ends up as a great famine. So many people die from that. But because of Mauchong's authority, no one really advised against this project until the project fails so much that to the point that Malchton himself acknowledged it, no one really, really dared to advise. And then there was a fabrication of

the data that was reported to him. So it is like Xi Jinping's zero-COVID policy. Xi Jinping is so powerful. Zero COVID policy is Xi Jinping's signature policy. So no one dares to say that, well, this may be wrong. We need to develop more vaccine. The economy cost is so huge. Then let's look back what happened to Mauchotov. So he has to acknowledge Great Lift World was wrong and then he delegates decision-making power to Liu Xiaou Qi and Deng Xiaoping, then the second and third powerful politicians. And then he ordered Liu Shao Qi and Deng Xiaoping to fix this problem. While I acknowledge the problem, I will sit back in the second front line and then I'll take care of propaganda and politics only for economic issues.

Liu Xiaocheng, Deng Xiaping, you fixed the problem. And their pragmatic policies in the early 60s became so effective and powerful, and then people started to support their policies against Mao Zedong's political and ideological emphasis. Liu Xiaoxi and Dong Shafing, they didn't really intend to challenge Mao Zer Deng's authority to take over the central leadership. But their policies became more popular, and then Mal Chotong's authority was marginalized. And then the only way Malchotong can come back to power

against this party hegemony that is against his authority is to mobilize support outside the party, which was the start of the Cultural Revolution. So the analogy goes that, so correcting Jiro-Covic policy, policy is, so we have to see how people evaluate that. They will say, they may say that, okay, Xi Jinping, he cannot acknowledge his mistakes and change the policy, so we have to support him.

That can be one scenario, and there will be the party's propaganda. But also, some may people question that, okay, zero-quote policy was wrong, despite it was Xi Jinping's signature policy. So many people sacrificed for this ineffective wrong policy for such a long time. And then that may be the beginning of people's criticizing Xi Jinping within the party. And then we have to see how they will turn into a factional strife

that Dong Xiaoping and Liu Xiaou Qi also wore the loyalist of Mao Zedong. But that does not really prevent the, the division within the party and then the formation of faction among Mao Zedong's loyalists. So we cannot just conclude that, okay, the Politburo's standing committee is filled with all Xi Jinping's loyalists, so there will be no factional strike at all. We cannot really conclude that. The factional stripe can still spontaneously arise within the groups of Xi Jinping's loyalists, but that's really hard to predict. just a one possibility.

Sir, thank you so much for coming on to Angry Planet and walking us through all of this. Thank you. Thank you. Thanks for listening to another episode of Angry Planet. The show is produced with love by Matthew Galt and Jason Field with the assistance of Kevin Nogel. This is the place where we ask you for money. If you subscribe to us on substack.angriplanet.com, it means the world to us. The show, which we've been doing for more than seven years now, means the world to us, and we hope it means a lot to you.

We're incredibly grateful to our subscribers. Please feel free to ask us questions, suggest show ideas, or just say hi. $9 a month may sound like a big ask, but it helps us to do the show on top of everything else that we do. We'd love to make Angry Planet a full-time gig and bring you a lot more. content. If we get enough subscriptions, that's exactly what we'll do. But even if you don't subscribe, we're grateful that you listen. Many of you've been listening since the beginning, and seriously, that makes it worth doing the show. Thank you for listening and look for another episode next week. Stay safe.