Angry Planet - The Origins of Haiti’s Gangs and What Comes Next

Episode Date: April 10, 2024

Violence thrives in countries where political solutions to conflict have failed. On this episode of Angry Planet, Jeffsky Poincy comes on the show to walk us through the origins of Haiti’s gang problems and lay out the complicated history that gave rise to them.Poincy, who is Haitian, is a program manager at PartnersGlobal, an NGO that helps foster democratic conflict resolution. Poincy’s perspective on the violence in Haiti is that it will require complicated and lengthy political solutions. The gangs thrive, he says, because of their place in a complicated transnational criminal network. It’s a local problem that requires local solutions. A thousand Kenyan soldiers on the ground in the devastated country won’t provide long term relief. Real political change will.Recorded 4/5/24Angry Planet has a Substack! Join to get weekly insights into our angry planet and hear more conversations about a world in conflict.Support this show http://supporter.acast.com/warcollege. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

Love this podcast. Support this show through the ACAST supporter feature. It's up to you how much you give, and there's no regular commitment. Just click the link in the show description to support now. I don't know if you listen to the show at all, but it's kind of, we're kind of a chatty, rambly kind of thing. A little bit less formal maybe than some other places that you've been and other things that you've talked on. and I will also preface the conversation by saying that I am pretty deeply ignorant of this topic in general. I think it's an important one, but it's just I don't have a lot of the background information here.

So I'm going to beg your indulgence as I ask some very stupid questions. But can you, at the top here, can you kind of introduce yourself? and kind of give us your background. Yes, absolutely. Well, first of all, thank you for an invitation. So I'm Haitian, first and foremost. I'm a specialist in governance and public policy. And I currently work for a peace-building organization that is based in D.C.

And I mainly work on governance initiative, peace-building, civil society, strengthening initiative, mostly in Europe and Africa. But prior to moving to D.C., I have over, you know, 10 years of experience working in Haiti in the government sectors, as well as in the private and the development sector. And I'm also involved in advocacy work with, you know, Haitian civil society organizations and diaspora organization here in the U.S. to kind of like promote a new approach, you know, the U.S. foreign policy towards Haiti. And can you give us your name? Yes, my name is Jeff Sli Prensi. What is the peace building organization you work for?

Partners Global. Okay. Can you tell me about your career in Haiti? Yes. So I had, first of all, I work in Haiti as a public investment manager for the Ministry of Youth. So I was pretty much in the public sector. I also work as an economic advisor for different organizations in the development sector. But my latest job in the government was as an economic development advisor in the cabinet of the Ministry of Tourism.

So that was the most significant experience in the government in Haiti that was prior to coming here in the U.S. All right. Can you lay out for the audience? what has been happening in Haiti the last few, like the last month or two. And you kind of give us an overall view of the current crisis.

Yeah. It's a, I think to talk about the current crisis, it would, we need a lot of context. Yeah, there's a lot of context here. But I think Haiti has been experiencing a lot of crisis

and Haiti has found itself in what I call an instance. trapped since Haiti became independent in 1804. And there are different factors that can explain that. And the two of the most important factors are, you know, the weakness of the government, the weakness of the stage that has been characterized by corruption and bad governance and also a dysfunctional economy that is being captured by the elite. So when you have the interplays of those two factors, it creates some kind of

cycle of instability that that never stops, right? But there's also a few other important factors that go back to Haiti's history. For example, one of them is after Haiti again, it's independence in 1804. Haiti had to pay an independent, what they call the reparation to the fringe colonizers in order for them to recognize Haiti's independence. And at the time, it was a lot of money. it was 500, over 500 million, you know, in today's dollars. This money was supposed to help Haiti develop itself as a new country.

So that's one of the factors that I think play a war in Haiti's fragility today. And another factor could be the American occupation, that people don't talk about that often, but the U.S. occupied Haiti since between 1915 until 1919, And during the time, there was a lot of, there was a lot of all the resources of Haiti, the banking sector and everything was under the control of the U.S. So those are like a few factors that kind of like play in the situation today. But in terms of the current crisis, it's a multidimensional crisis. And just to simplify it, it started after the assassination of the late President of Jopinel Mewis.

So at the time, President Jopinal Mouis was the only one in power. So the parliament was dysfunctional because the president didn't have time to organize the elections to renew the parliament. He also was in a lot of conflict with the judiciary. So when he was assassinated, brutally assassinated, the country finds itself in a situation where there was no government at all. There was no functioning institution. The parliament was dysfunctional. the judiciary was dysfunctional, and with the death of the president, the executive branch became dysfunctional as well. So that created like a political vacuum, and this political vacuum

kind of like facilitated the emergence of the gangs, which existed, you know, before, but that created an opportunity for them to become stronger and stronger and stronger. And that's kind of like led to the security issue that we have today, where the gangs control. I would say 80% of the metropolitan area, which is where 4.5 million people leave. Is gangs an accurate word? I've been thinking about this as I've been reading about Haiti and kind of watching the propaganda that's produced by the gangs themselves. Are they just criminal enterprises or do they have political aspirations? Are there ideologies here? Is there anything beyond just money? Yeah, that's a very interesting point.

And I think we can, we can, if we try to categorize the gangs in Haiti, they're not, you know, they don't have the same capacity. So the latest report suggests that there's about 200 gangs, you know, currently operating in Haiti. But I categorize them in three categories. So if I were to break them down. So the first category is what we call the first generation gangs. And those are, you know, local gangs that are involved in mostly in petty crimes, you know, opportunistic crimes and all that. And they were mostly driven by money and so on.

And they're the second generation gangs. And those gangs are, you know, mostly entrepreneurial driven, business driven. So they're mostly involved in marketing and, you know, crimes that bring some kind of economic return. And we also have what we call the third generation gangs. Those gangs are criminal enterprise, as you mentioned. Right. So as criminal enterprise, they explicitly set themselves an agenda, like a political and social

agenda. And that's what we've seen in Haiti lately. For example, if you've been following the news, you've seen that the gangs that were supposed to be rules, they, you know, came to. to push the prime minister out. So it's a clear statement that they do have a political, they do have a political agenda, either to system themselves or either to promote somebody

that would protect their enterprises and their endeavors, the criminal endeavors in Haiti. So just to, you know, break it down, you know, I completely understand that the terms gain could be, to some extent, could be inaccurate. But if you break them down, the third generation gangs,

they are like, you know, mostly criminal. They are criminal networks, I would say, organized crime. What, do we have any idea, kind of like,

what future these third generation gangs imagine for Haiti? Like, what does a barbecue want long term? What does, uh, an isu, five Sagan want long term. Do we have any idea?

Well, you know, first of all, I wouldn't want to put the focus on the gangs themselves because if the gangs became, what happened in the first five years is that if we, if we take into consideration the categorization that I just gave you, right? So we've seen like some kind of promotion within the framework where like gangs that were you know, first generation, they became second generation, and second generation gang became third generation gangs. So the problem is gangs mostly is a political phenomenon in Haiti, so it's inherently linked to politics.

So that's why I wouldn't say that barbecue or any of the gangs, they have an agenda for themselves. I think they are being instrumentalized by, you know, like by other actors to promote some kind of agenda. What exactly this agenda entails? I don't know, and I don't take, you know, anybody knows. But just to mention that it's linked to, it's not only about the gangs, but it's also about the entire ecosystem that nurtures the gang,

that fuel the gangs and that create the condition for the gangs to sustain themselves and so on. So what are these, I know you've kind of laid out the historical context for it, basically like brutal colonization and resource extraction over the course of more than 100 years. What are the systemic problems that give rise to these gangs? How is it that they have flourished? Okay, so the phenomenon, and as I just mentioned, of the gangs is wooded in politics, right? So the gangs are mostly being used and instrumentalized for political objectives. So if you look at the mapping of the different gangs in Haiti, you'll see they're mostly concentrated in areas that are very strategic when it comes to elections.

Right. So when you control, like a, like a, for example, if we were to have to have election today in Haiti, the gangs would control, would have control over. like 2.5 million of Haitian voters, which is a large majority of the Haitian voters, of the Haitian voting population, right? So those are like very strategic area for political reasons. And also, the gangs have been used to suppress, you know, mass practice, because most of the political movements, they always emerge from this disadvantage areas, from these communities. So they are being used to suppress.

protest and also to secure votes during the elections. So it's inherently linked to politics. So I think the other factor is, there are two very important factors that we tend to overlook when we're talking about the gangs, the conditions that make the gangs that powerful. First is the link between the gangs and the illicit networks in the region. So if you zoom out on Haiti's map, you see Haiti is wide in the middle between South America and North America.

And this isn't exact. This is like a very convenient location for transshipment hub for all kind of EDSA trafficking, including job. trafficking and all that. So it's a this is a very, this is a condition that this is one factor that create the condition for the gang to flourish because, you know, illicit networks, they, they, they take advantage of Haiti being being weak, Haiti not having the capacity to, to, to, secure the coastline in all that. And the other aspect is the gang, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the guns, illicit trafficking that are primarily linked to the U.S., right? So you have the gangs importing all kind of guns, and 95% of the guns,

an ammunition that the gang are using in Haiti, they come from the U.S. or they are being manufactured by the U.S. So those are like two factors that create, that I would say have a huge influence on the gang's capacity, on the gang's capability in terms of confrontation with the, police. What you're kind of saying is that Haiti acts as a hub in illicit trade of arms and illicit substances in the wider region, and that the gangs are a big part of this, and that there are outside players that have enormous influence on that. Yes, absolutely. And this

is what I usually call the transnational nature of the gang, because if you don't have that, the gang won't, you know, they won't be as powerful as they are today, right? Because if they don't have access to the, you know, illicit market of gun and ammunition, if they don't access to the banking system to launder money, if they don't have access, they don't have access to those illicit networks in the region, then they would just be first generation gangs that, of course, you know, create problems, but not with this capacity of disturbance, this capacity of, you know, to challenge all of law and to challenge the police and itself. So how do you solve the political situation there?

You're looking at me like I've, I just asked either a very stupid question or a very big question. Well, first of all, I mean, when it comes to the gang, I think it's important to, to, it's not something that can be resolved. like in a, you know, in a, in a short term, right? No, yeah, absolutely not. This is like a, it's a generational problem, it seems like, right? Yes, absolutely. And I think one of the, one of the, one of the way to address that is to find a way to break this linkage or to award the linkage between the gangs and the politician and the private people from the private sector as well. because they remain one of the main enablers for the gangs.

They create the condition for the gangs to exist. And to some extent, they create the gang and nurture the gangs. So that's a very important aspect if we want to address this issue. And the other thing is the transnational nature of the gang, right? So there has to be some efforts, you know, in the region to kind of break this, this linkage between the gangs and the illicit networks in the region. And for the guns coming from the U.S., there has to be some kind of coordinated efforts between the U.S. and Haiti and different countries in the region to make sure that,

you know, they can address this issue, intercept the gun before they reach Haiti, and also provide support and assistance to the Haitian police so they could, you know, actually be up to the task to not only tackling the gang issue, but also to be able to to control and patrol the coastline. And just to put that in context, Haiti has one, it's a 1,000 miles of coastline, right? And the cause got of Haiti is like less than 200 officers

with only one vessel. So it's a, it's a, it's literally like a it's literally like a open you know i would say open border in every sense for all kind of trafficking and all that so unless we address those issues unless we address those three components which is the the the link between the illicit networks and the gangs the link between the politician and the gangs and the the access of the gangs to the trafficking networks of guns and ammunition it's going to be very, very hard to kind of like control this phenomenon. And to kind of get on top of that, there has to be somebody in charge in Haiti, right? That's like an official government figure that is, you know, the president can't get in right now, right?

The prime minister. See, this is like, again, showing the depths of my ignorance. the prime minister can't get into the country right now, right? So like what are, is there a path towards there being someone in charge that can kind of start to make these changes domestically? Yeah, absolutely. And you're white because the government, the governance, sorry, is the first step to address this issue.

So you cannot address it unless you have just enough governance, unless you have a functioning government that could at least give some legitimate intimacy to the solutions that you know that you're going to implement to address this issue. So as of now, the prime minister that you were talking about resign. So yes, he wasn't able to go to the country, but he also resigned. And I know that there's a process to set up what we call a presidential college, which is like a body of different, you know, people from the Haitian civil society and from the Haitian political sectors to come together to lead a transitional government. So this presidential

college will have the task to appoint a prime minister to form a government and to agree on a set objective within the agenda, which I think would also cover the security aspect. We had a conversation yesterday with a gentleman from a U.S. government department who I would say gave us the American Empire's view of Haiti. And it struck me that

America has kind of constantly been screwing this up, holding Haiti back, almost actively tripping Haiti every time it gets up and running. And I'm wondering if you can kind of give us your view of kind of the history of America's involvement. I know you talked to

a little bit about the occupation in 1915, but I'm also interested in the 90s. I think it was 1994 that what 20,000 troops came in and what America's involvement should be now, if at all, and what's being talked about. If that's all what, I would be curious to know what you've heard. We talked to Keith Minds, the U.S. Institute of Peace, which I thought was a very very, which is a fascinating government agency that I actually had not heard of before. Just that to be in Latin American, be near the United States is not great for the country often, kind of writ large.

Like, America has imperial ambitions, and it has exerted control over all of the countries in its sphere of influence in one way or another. And he kind of outlined the ways that America and the international coalitions, usually through the IMF, are lending money, but there's strings attached to the lending of that money. And often Haiti has trouble jumping through those hoops. And also, you know, it had, as you said at the very beginning of the conversation, it started off kind of on the back foot because it had to pay reparations to the country. that had colonized it. And when you win a revolution and then are out of the gate,

oh, France, $500 million, um, fuck that, I think personally. Uh, so it just, I just, I'm curious about the history of American involvement and,

like, how you view it and how Haitians view it. Yeah, absolutely. And to put it simple, I think, um, The US foreign policy towards Haiti in general,

while has been an interventionist, I mean, follows an interventionist approach. I would say patron-alistic approach as well. If you go, if you look through history, you realize that every crisis in Haiti has the US footpoints and the international community's footpoints in general, either as facilitator or as a neighbor or as sometimes as,

as instigator. So this is a fact that I think that, you know, it's a fact. And you can see that throughout the Haitian history. And I talked earlier about the U.S. occupation. I also talk about this. We can also talk about the support that the U.S. has been, you know, providing to, to, has provided, sorry, to the, to the devalued dictatorship.

you know, and also even during the current crisis, right? So the U.S. has been acting as a counterforce to the, even to the, you know, Haitian civil society that was trying to promote a Haitian-led solution to this very same crisis. And as a matter of fact, you know, when this, when the crisis started after the assassination of Jvna M. is the Haitian civil society, you know, saw that as a critical juncture to promote the groundbreaking transatlantic

that would, you know, that would, that would promote like a, like a, you know, social agenda that would promote like a, that would break with the impunity, with the corruption in Haiti. And ultimately, the international community came in and appointed the then prime minister that just resigned, the de facto prime minister, Eonore. And since then, they have been, you know, supporting our young, even, even, despite the fact that he didn't have any legitimacy, he didn't have any constitutional business for him to be a prime minister. And the Haitians have been promoting this Haitian-led solutions for like for about three years. And the U.S. has consistently impeding this process to make sure that it doesn't happen.

So now the, I don't know the reason why, but that was a very, I say that was a ultimate factor that created, that made the situation worse. And the same solution that the Haitian led, that the same solution that the Haitian civil society has been promoting is the same solution that is being applied today, but two years later. You know, so I think a lot of lives could have been saved if there wasn't this, you know, I would say this blind support of the international community, the U.S. for that matter to the then prime minister. All right. We're going to pause there for a break. Angry Planet listeners. We'll be right back after this. All right, Angry Planet listeners. Welcome back.

You mentioned the Papa Doc in there. And that was something that we didn't talk about. I mean-checked him yesterday. But I would like to hear about who he was. and the U.S. government's involvement with him. Well, you know, Papadoc is used to be as a dictator in Haiti, and he was in power from 1957 to 1971. And after he died, his son took over and led Haiti from 1971 to 1980. and so on. And when he died, when the DeValya son died,

that's what ended, that's what actually ended the dictatorship regime in Haiti in general. And the U.S. support to the DeValue regime was mostly, if I tried to frame it, would be, was related to what we call a great power competition because at the time, the strategy of the U.S. fund policy was to contend the communism, you know, at every cost, at all costs. And since the Duvalier was against communism,

so that was an ultimate opportunity for the West to keep supporting him despite the fact that it was a brutal regime that was, you know, it was a dictatorship and it was a brutal regime to the Haitian people. I'm very happy that I didn't have to live under dictatorship. You know, I was born after the Valle. But, yeah, so it was a regime characterized by, you know, mass killing, you know, brutality of the Haitian people. Brutality of, you know, every force that could represent a threat to him. And there wasn't, you know, freedom of expression, freedom, you know, there wasn't freedom at all.

So I think that's the simple way I can, I can describe. this regime. But there's a lot of, there was a lot of, you know, there's a lot of archives about the trail of, of deaths, of mass killing that he perpetuated in Haiti. All right. Can you kind of tell me what you see as the political path out of the current crisis? Yeah. So, as I mentioned, I think the first, the first step now is to, is to have a transition or governor. So this is a very important step. And that ultimately would lead to elections and and so on. But the most important thing right now is to have some kind of government to make sure that, you know, we address the urgent issues such as the security issue and, you know, like humanitarian

crisis as well. But most importantly, I think this, this presidential government should lay the ground for free and fair elections. And that involve a lot, you know, in a country like Haiti, right? That involves making sure that the environment is safe for people to vote, making sure that they instill enough trust for people to participate in the process, for the political parties to be involved in all that. And I think this is the path, you know, this is the path,

moving forward. First, have just transitional government address the security issue, the humanitarian crisis, and lay the ground for organizing the elections to make sure that, you know, in the next two years, we have, you know, we have functioning government with all of the institutions operational. I assume that you are not a fan of this Kenya-led coalition of troops coming in. Well, I think, so the thing is that there have been a lot of, there have been a lot of intervention of, you know, military intervention, police intervention in Haiti to address,

quote and quote, the gang issue. But they all felt, right? And the Kenyan mission was the only solution on the table without, you know, any, without any assessment of the, of the, the security issue without analyzing the failure of the past mission. And as a matter of fact, even as a policy, from a policy perspective, I don't see how it's going to work. Because one of the main characteristic of the past missions, military missions in Haiti,

they were mostly focused on tackling the gangs, right? They were mostly focused on eliminating the gang. But what we've seen is that some of them, you know, succeeded in the, eliminating some gangs members. You know, for example, in 2007, there was a UN-led military mission in Haiti. So they managed to neutralize more than 800 gang members. But what happened after that? It took a few months or two years for the gang members to emerge again in the same areas

and with virtually the same capabilities, right? So that tells us something. It tells us the fact that it should. be focused only on the gangs, you know, there's the entire ecosystem that fuel the gangs that also should be, should be, should be targeted. Because what happened is, you kill a gang today, you kill a gang leader today, tomorrow. There's, you know, tomorrow when you want emerge. So that's the, that's the, the, the, the, the, the, the first aspect is that it's not, it's not a, it's not a, you know, multidimensional response. It's only focusing on, on the military aspect, and

which make it a little bit, you know, more complicated to work. And the other component is, well, the international community is mobilizing the Kenyan, you know, to go to Haiti. The Haitian police is collapsing, literally. And just to give you an example, the international community is trying to mobilize 2,000, you know, police officers to send to Haiti, 2000. And it's been two years.

They've been, you know, trying to do that. The Kenyan, the Kenyan is committed to send 1,000, and there are like a few other countries that also want to send, you know, police officers there. But in contrast, for the past two years, more than 3,000 Haitian police officers left the Haitian police. So, you know, instead of spending, you know, all this money to get people from other countries, you know, police officers from other countries to go to Haiti, why not create the incentives for the Haitian police officers to stay and create the condition for them to be able to do the job? So there's a lot of, you know, there's a lot of things about the Kenyan mission that I think would be, you know, factors for failure, to be honest. But I have to say that the only potential of the Kenyan mission is eventually what we call a military deterrent, you know.

So, you know, if there's like 2,000 troops in the streets of, you know, in a few neighborhood, then that would kind of like deter the gangs from seizing some of the important infrastructure, strategic infrastructure. That's the only benefit that I can see coming from that. But what is the cost benefit? Right. So are we going to spend $200 to $500 million a year, which is actually, two-fold of the Haitian National Police budget.

Are those the numbers that are being floated for this Kenyan force? Yes, it's $200 million to $500 million, which is twice the Haitian national police budget, with 12 months to fund the budget. Who's going to pay for that? Are they charging it to Haiti? No, absolutely not. There are a few countries that are committed to participate. you know, in the funding basket, the U.S. and the U.S., you know, is committed to, to contribute in Canada and also a few other countries.

What happens to a Haitian police officer when they quit the force? So, just to give you an example, you know, as I just mentioned, for the past two years, 2,000 police officers left the force. And I think 25 to 30 percent, I don't have the exact number, what, 25 to 30% left the country. You know, some of them left the country. And some of them, you know, probably get other, you know, get to do other activities or they go to private security, something. But the fact of the matter is they left the police force, right? So, and right now, there is around 13,000 police officers in Haiti, which is a worthier of 1.1.1.

per thousand people, which is way below the standard, the international standard norm, which is 2.2 police officers, you know, for every, you know, 1,000 inhabitants. So just to give you, like, you know, an example of the construct, like the construct, because if we keep focusing on outsourcing the security of the country, then it creates a situation where it creates dependency, and that literally undermine the capacity, you know, potential of Haiti to be self-sufficient when it comes to addressing security issues. And that goes even further because for the Haitian police officers would stay nine months

without the salary, you know, without getting, you know, a dime from the salary. And at the same time, we're trying to bring, you know, troops from a board that will have all the advantages, right? Social protection, risk. premium and all that. And they're going to fight along the Haitian police, you know, which are operating in a very, in a very poor, in very poor condition with no social protection, with no, with premium, with nothing. So I think those are those are the, you know, important aspect to highlight because we cannot address the security issue if we keep outsourcing security.

So there has to be, the focus has to be on building the Haitian police capacity to make sure that they are both to address this issue, not only today, but should, you know, the issue arise in the future as well. Do we have any idea what the size of the gangs are? You just gave us the size of the police force and I'm wondering what, you know, the size of the force they're fighting is? No, I don't have an exact number, and I don't think, you know, I don't take any. It's hard to count.

Yeah, it's hard to count. It's very hard to count. But, you know, the gangs, as I just mentioned earlier, they were mostly. they're mostly located in the most disadvantaged areas, in the very populated area. And there's a lot of, you know, there's a lot of prospect for recruitment, right? There's a lot of young people, 60%.

If I get that right, 60% of the Haitian population is under, you know, 25. So it's like, there's a lot of young people that have no, you know, no other economic activities. So that makes it like going for violence and it creates a ground for recruitment. So I would assume that there's a lot, a lot, a lot of young people involved in the gangs right now. But again, you know, not all the gangs have the same capabilities. You know, some of them are more powerful than others. And eventually, you know, more larger in size than others.

And what do you do with the gang members? when this is over. Let's say that something works. Haitian police are built up. A political solution is found. What becomes of all of these young men that are in these gangs right now? Well, I think there's a lot of, you know, mechanism that could be implemented to address.

that I think there have been a few disarmament program in Haiti, but for some reason, they didn't work. So I don't think that's a viable solution. And from a moral standpoint, I think the gang leaders should be either jailed or killed. And that's a fact because they have been, you know, they have been involved in a lot of massacre and crimes. So somehow there has to be some accountability and justice for the Asian people. But I do think that there is going to be a need, you know, after addressing this issue,

there's going to be a need to massively invest in those community, you know, not in gangs, but in those community to make sure that we create what we call a peace dividend to the people living in the neighborhood, including for the young people that, you know, got brought into the gangs, because of lack of opportunities and all that. So I think that's a pathway to sustain the peace after we get, I mean, when we get to that. Can I ask you one more thing here at the end? Hidi's relation to the Dominican Republic and the Dominican Republic's responsibility, if it bears any in the situation. if it bears any in the situation?

Yeah, I think we always had, Haiti always had a very complex relationship with the D.R. And that goes back, you know, to history, you know, if you're aware of it. But I think in the current crisis, I wouldn't say they bear responsibility. But I think the gang problem is not only a Haitian issue, as I just mentioned. So we share 360 kilometers of border with the D.R. And there are a lot of, you know, clandestine crossing points along the borders. And the D.R. could be very effective in helping Haiti addressing this issue. And as a matter of fact, some of the gangs, I mean, some of the guns and ammunition,

I'm going to Haiti, come from, you know, cross the border and enter Haiti through the DIA. And I would also presume that there was a, you know, there was a connection when it comes to money laundering as well, you know, because people use the gangs, they use the borders to transfer money here and there. So I think the deal could be part of the solution. So I wouldn't say that they are part of the problem. I mean, they could be because of different, you know, because of different reasons, but I think I would emphasize on the fact that they have to be part of the solution in, you know, in helping Haiti addressing this issue, especially when it comes to illicit trafficking of guns and ammunition through the border.

Who do you see as the Haitian political leaders that can step forward now? You know, me personally, I don't think I reject the idea of having a messia, like a political leader. like a political leader, you know, that going to save Haiti. I think that's not the case. We've known that and the Haitian people has been misled in so many occasions when it comes to that. So I think what Haiti needs right now is, you know, like a large majority of people that are aware of the, you know, of the problems and that are, you know, willing to change. That are willing to be part of a solution. that are willing to, you know, to create a rupture with the, you know, with the current system.

And that's exactly what we need. I don't think the Haitian people needs a political leader, you know, per se. Well, I think that that is a good note to end the conversational. Sir, thank you so much for coming on to Angry Planet and walking me through this. All right. Thank you, Matthew. It's been a great conversation. Thank you very much. That's all for this episode, Angry Planet listeners. As always, Angry Planet listeners, as always, Planet is me, Matthew Galt, Jason Fields, and Kevin Nodell. It's created by myself and Jason Fields.

If you like us, if you really like us, please go to Angry Planetpod.com. Sign up for $9 a month. Get commercial-free versions of the mainline episodes. You should get instructions in an email about how to set that up. And you also get bonus episodes. There's a great one that's kind of a pairing with this that is up now. It's kind of the U.S. Empire's view of Haiti. It's pretty interesting.

You should definitely check it out. and that is up there right now. If you sign up at AnglicanetPod.com. We've got another episode coming out later this week. It is in a conversation with the former New York Times Bureau Chief for China about China and America's fraught relationship and what the future might look like. There's some nuclear war stuff in there.

You know, it's the kind of thing that you've come to expect here at Angry Planet that should be up a little bit later this week. We've got some other exciting things coming down the pipe. stay tuned diner at the end of history it's coming