Angry Planet - War, Death, and Financial Collapse in the Middle East

Episode Date: September 24, 2020

Civil wars, proxy wars, cold wars, hot wars. Economic collapse, the collapse of civil societies and governments. Hunger, torture, disease.Many parts of the world seem to be falling apart in 2020, but even then, the Middle East is its own special case.To talk about the state of one of the world’s most turbulent regions, Steven Cook joins us. Cook is the Eni Enrico Mattei senior fellow for Middle East and Africa studies at the Council on Foreign Relations.He recently wrote an overview for Foreign Policy magazine that captures much of what’s going on—“The End of Hope in the Middle East”Recorded 9/10How bad are things really?How Western powers created a sectarian system in LebanonWho is fighting on the ground in Libya?Russian mercenaries and air assetsIraq as America’s original sin of the current troubles, and why that’s wrongHow Saddam held Iraq togetherFragmentation of the Middle EastIs Saudi Arabia as stable as it seems?The importance of having a vision for the futureSupport this show http://supporter.acast.com/warcollege. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

Love this podcast. Support this show through the ACAST supporter feature. It's up to you how much you give, and there's no regular commitment. Just click the link in the show description to support now. You have Turks with troops on the ground. You obviously have Syrian mercenaries on the ground. You have obviously Libyans on the ground. And then you have large numbers of Egyptian regular forces across the border. The Egyptians have a huge army. You have, along with them across the border, you have Emirati air assets, which have been used from time to time. You have Russian mercenaries on the ground in Libya operating with.

with Heftar's next to and with Heftar's forces. You have Russian aircraft on the ground in eastern Libya. You also have mercenaries, also from Syria, also from Sudan, also from all different places. If you, and Emirati special forces, which may be some Emirates, but they also may be Colombians. You have a, like a UN of forces in Libya facing off against each other for a variety of reasons. One day, all of the facts in about 30 years' time will be published. When genocide has been carried out in this country, almost with impunity, and when it is near to coimbring people talk about intervention. They will be met with fire, fury, and frankly, power,

the likes of which this world has never seen before. Hello and welcome to Angry Clint. I'm Jason Fields. Civil wars, proxy wars, cold wars, hot wars, economic collapse, the collapse of civil societies and governments, hunger, torture, disease. Many parts of the world seem to be falling apart in 2020, but even then, the Middle East is its own special case. To talk about the state of one of the world's most turbulent regions, Stephen Cook joins us. Cook is the Enrico Matai Senior Fellow for Middle East and Africa Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. He recently wrote an overview in Foreign Policy Magazine that captures much of what's going on. The article is called The End of Hope in the Middle East.

Stephen, thank you so much for joining us. It's a great pleasure to be with you, Jason. So just to start where we like to start, which is the beginning, how bad are things in the Middle East and where are things the worst? Oh, it's really actually quite hard to get your mind around how bad things are. And that's really part of the origins of this article. It's trying to just map out what's happening where and the multiple layers of conflict and problems that Middle Easterners are facing.

But it's obviously region-wide. And there are some cases that are obviously well-nosed. known, Syria, Yemen, Egypt, which is different from Syria and Yemen in terms of the fact that there isn't civil war, but there is terminal collapse going on in Egypt. But the article I focused on Lebanon and those are obviously major cases that have come on the scene this summer in ways that I think people hadn't really been thinking about. When was Lebanon last on anybody's real radar screen. Yet Lebanon has just been battered over the course of the last couple of years with one problem after another, culminating in this extraordinary explosion on August 4th. Libya is

a scene that might produce actual interstate conflict in the region. Those are, you know, two of the places that are among the worst. Of course, there's also Iraq. I can go into the details. of Syria. But like I said, some of those cases are better known than what's been happening in Yemen, what's been happening in Lebanon, what's been happening in Libya, and of course, Iraq, which Americans really want to wash their hands of. But I think they don't recognize how tenuous, how tenuous the situation is there. So across the board, there's very little, if any good news across the region. And the article was, as I mentioned,

an effort to really get my hands around it and understand what's driving these problems and these conflicts. And it's, I could go on and on. When you're talking about Lebanon, one thing that really struck me was you have just such a succinct explanation of how the government was formed, where you have the Maronites got a piece,

the Shiite got a piece, the Sunni's got a piece. And you just talk about how each of those groups or the leaders of each of those groups were looking out after their own interests. And could you talk a little bit about that and how that contributed to the situation now? Yeah. Look, this goes back to the French colonial period. And I think the generous interpretation of the confessional political system that grew out of the French colonial period was that it was an effort to keep the peace, that every major ethnic group or sectarian group would get their piece of the pie. In fact, the French, through their own policy, built up their allies in Lebanon, the Maronite Christians.

And this system actually tended to favor the Christians who were the smallest group over either the Shia or their Sunni. There hasn't been a census in Lebanon in an extremely long time for obvious reasons. But this was something that became part of the formal Lebanese political system. And the most famous example of this is, as you point out, the president is always a Maronite, the prime minister is always a Sunni, and the speaker of the parliament is always a Shia. And then you have the parliament that has then divided up along these groups and groups within these groups. What that has done over a period of time has created a system in which the leaders of these groups are less interested in Lebanon, per se,

as they are in fighting over and gaining control over state resources that they then funneled to their groups as a way of staying in power. And this has generated spectacular corruption as well as violence among the groups. after 2005 Cedar Revolution, which wasn't much of a revolution, that ultimately kicked the Syrians out of the country, there was this effort to get beyond the sectarian system. Most of the Lebanese political bosses who really inherited their positions as a result of being warlords during the Civil War that ranged between 1975 and 1989, paid lip service to it. But of course, they were benefiting from this system. And that's the problem, is that the people in charge are benefiting from this dysfunction that breeds corruption and at the expense of everybody else. And this kind

of exploded in, pardon the pun, this exploded in October 2019 with protests in the streets 11 actually over a proposed tax on WhatsApp communications. This was a desperate effort by the government to raise revenue, people came out into the streets to oppose the tax, which quickly turned into a protest demanding the overthrow of the system, not just the government, but the system, which is very hard because there are so many vested interests in the country in maintaining it. Is there anyone currently collecting the garbage, literally and figuratively in Lebanon? You put your finger on it. Even before this most recent outburst of public anger, at the people who were running Lebanon, there was a crisis in Lebanon because no one picked up

the garbage. That's how much dysfunction there was. And there was this, Lebanon stinks. There was a hashtag Lebanon stinks on Twitter and people talked about this. And so that situation has never actually been fully resolved. This is a beautiful country. It has been described as the Paris of the Middle East and it has been marred both physically, politically, politically and economically and economically by this dysfunctional system that has led us to this grim moment where more than 50% of the Lebanese people are either in poverty or destitute, where they're bartering for eggs. Could you imagine in 2020 people are bartering for their basic needs because the currency is basically worth nothing? It is beyond grim. and there doesn't seem to be a real effort on the part of authorities, as if anybody has an authority,

but people who are nominally in charge to undertake reforms. People talk about, oh, Lebanon needs an IMF bailout. Who would go to the IMF? Who would have the authority, the prestige, to actually implement an IMF program? This is assuming that even the IMF has enough resources to save even tiny Lebanon. And keep in mind that there is a state within a state in Lebanon called Hezbollah, which is extraordinarily well-armed and has leverage over the rest of the political arena because it is so well-armed. This leads me to conclude that we haven't even come close to the bottom in Lebanon yet. Speaking of the bottom, maybe we can talk a little bit about Libya, which I try to pay attention to the world.

I had no idea how bad the situation was until I read your article. I'm sorry. I depressed everybody. I got emails from former grad school advisors saying, I need a drink, friends as far afield as Istanbul, saying, God, that's so depressing. I want to apologize to people. but despite my basically sunny disposition, I have a dark view of human nature. If you have a dark view, I think it sounds like Libya is the place for you. Just the number of players from outside of Libya is amazing to me. And one thing I was curious about is, are you talking about people with actual troops on the ground when you talk about Russia and Egypt? and Turkey.

Okay, let's just step back for a second, Jason, and let's just set the table on Libya. In February 2011, just a few days after the uprising against Omar Khaddafi began, his son, Saif al-Qadhafi, appeared on television in Libya. Now, keep in mind that Saif al-Islam was someone who was hailed in the West as a success in a potential reformer. This is a guy who basically purchased a Ph.D. from the London School of Economics. It was a lot of funny business around site,

but he was built up as this potential reformer. He went on television, and he said two things. One, he said, and this is something that I think people remember, is that they would fight to every last man, woman, and child to save the regime, which was really cold-blooded. We're going to fight to the last bullet. But he also said, and this was, I think, more telling, He said that he warned Libyans.

He said, we are not Tunisians and we're not Egyptians. We are going to fight with each other for the next 40 years. And while there was a lot of commentary at the same time about if Gaddafi were to fall, Libya would be in a good place to establish a functioning democracy because there were no institutions. This was a fundamental misreading, the clean slate idea. that because Gaddafi had this weird bottom-up kind of notion of participatory democracy, which is of course a total ruse, that if he were to fall and he would leave nothing in his wake and there would be a clean slate, which was not true.

And Saif al-Islam had that insight that there were actual institutions that would drive Libyans apart. And almost immediately after Gaddafi fled and then actually, was murdered, the country fragmented. And that's been the story of Libya for since 2011, the fragmentation of the country, rival militias based on region and tribe, and in between the cracks, extremist groups. Now, in the spring of 2019, a former Qadhaas general named Khalifa Heftar, who was at one time rumored to be a CIA asset. He's also an American citizen. He has a residence in northern Virginia.

He, a number of years earlier, had raised an army. And in 2019, began a march on Tripoli, the capital from his base in the eastern part of the country in Benghazi. And in that march on Tripoli, he had helped from Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, France, and then later on, Russia. There's also, you know, rumors that the United States was somehow involved with Heftar. He and they, particularly the Egyptians and Emirates, opposed the internationally recognized government in Tripoli because it has Islamist elements associated with it. And the Egyptians and the Emirates are maniacally opposed to any whiff of Islamism and the accumulation of political power in the region. the supporters of the internationally recognized government besides the UN and the allegedly the international community have been the Turks, the Qataris, the Italians, other Europeans.

And recently, the Turks had introduced their own force, small number of their own forces, as well as Syrian mercenaries. They have been working with Syrian militias, some of which are come from extradited, extremist groups and they have transferred them from the Syrian battlefield to Libya to roll back Heftar's advances on Tripoli. Now, his advance had bogged down already and with the introduction of the Syrian mercenaries, a Turkish air defense umbrella around Tripoli armed drones operated by Turkish forces, they were able to turn Heftar back to the city of Seart. That And when that happened, Turkish president, Rejab Tayyip Erdogan said, we're going to kick Khalifa Hathar out of Libya.

This is not enough. And that raised the concern of the Egyptians who sit right next door to Libya. This is their backyard. They have been at odds, to say the least, with the Turks since the coup d'etat in Turkey in 2013 that brought Abduf Tassisi to power. The Turks welcomed in the Muslim Brotherhood. They have set up a media companies in Turkey to delegitize the Uylajadize the U. the Egyptian government. So at that point, Abduh Tatsisi, the president of Egypt, declared that Sirt was a red line

and that he basically ordered Egyptian forces to be ready to cross into the border, which would be welcomed by the government in the east and rubber stamped by the Egyptian parliament. In terms of who has actual troops on the ground, now, after all that, getting through, who has troops on the ground, you have Turks with troops on the ground. You obviously have Syrian mercenaries on the ground. You have obviously Libyans on the ground. And then you have large numbers of Egyptian regular forces across the border.

The Egyptians have a huge army. They can bring a lot of force to bear even if they're not necessarily as technically proficient as the Turkish military. You have, along with them across the border, you have Emirati air assets, which had been used from time to time. You have Russian mercenaries on the ground in Libya operating with Heftars next to and with Heftar's forces. You have Russian aircraft on the ground in eastern Libya. You also have mercenaries also from Syria, also from Sudan, also from all different places. If you, and Emirati special forces, which may be some Emirates, but they also may be Colombians. You have a, like a UN of forces in Libya.

facing off against each other for a variety of reasons. Now, for the Russians, there's an energy aspect to it. For the Egyptians, it's his backyard and the Islamists. For the Amarades, it's the Islamists in checking Turkish power. For the Turks, it's about upholding the internationally recognized government, extending its influence around the region. Ditto for the Qatari's. And you have the Europeans who have different views of what is going to produce a stable Libya so that they don't have waves of Libyans and others continuing to try to reach European shores. This has become a problem beyond Libya because it now is affecting stability in the eastern Mediterranean, actually on the water.

So pitting different NATO members against different NATO members. The French support Khalifa Haftar and thus the Egyptians and the Emirates. The Greeks and the Turks are involved in a conflict over. maritime borders that involves Turkey and Libya's maritime border agreement which was signed last November and then you have the French so now you have the French

and the Greek navies facing off with the Turkish navies in fact there was an incident in which a French naval a French worship was trying to enforce the embargo on Libya and stopped a Turkish freighter that was going to Libya and came into conflict, not shooting conflict, with Turkish warships.

This is a very dangerous situation. You can see how Libya can spin out problems across the region. That's a very long and complicated answer to your question of who's on the ground in Libya. It's actually a great answer, though. And I guess there are two things that come to mind immediately. One is whenever you say Russian mercenaries, I immediately think of Ukraine where there were, quote, mercenaries, unquote, who crossed the border to fight on behalf of the Russian-inspired Ukrainians. The biggest Russian presence is related to Russian air assets and air defense systems that they put in to help Heftar.

The Russian mercenaries were from this Wagner group, which, is it private? Is it not private? Is anything private in Russia? Now, there were some rumors that they were evacuated and the Russians were giving up on Haftar. but at the same time they moved aircraft into eastern Libya at this. And there's evidence that the Wagner personnel remain in Libya. They're not necessarily little green men, but no one's ever given me a satisfactory answer what the status of the Wagner group actually is. And one other thing I remember reading a big article in the New York Times about Haftar himself. This is an older guy, right?

And he seems like he's... I don't know, the almost whimsical in the way he runs his territory? Look, this is a guy. First of all, he is elderly. He is not necessarily competent. He was actually captured in Gaddafi's Chad campaign in the 80s. He was, and Gaddafi abandoned him to a Chadian prison. When he finally got out of the chatting prison, he made his way to the United States

and became allegedly part of efforts during the 1980s to overthrow Gaddafi with the help of the CIA. Remember, for those of us who are old enough to remember, the big boogeyman for the United States in the region was Omar Gaddafi. He was, in the words of President Ronald Reagan, the mad dog of the Middle East. Saddam was an afterthought, some guy in Iraq who was fighting the Iranians. So Heftar was seen to be as apparently an asset in the effort to overthrow Gaddafi, which he never managed to do. He returned to Libya and quietly to the east. And under the noses of all the people in Tripoli basically raised an army and has been the force in eastern Libya. He has not been necessarily the most effective.

Once the GNA, the government of National Accord, the internationally recognized government in Tripoli, received some effective help from the Turks, Heftar and his forces basically folded and had to retreat back to Sears where they're making a stand. So when we're talking about Libya, it also is a, one element is a theme that you mentioned about other countries too, which is that it could end up broken, that it's not necessarily going to end up one country. And you also talk about that being the. case in Syria, which I guess that's the default right now anyway, even if there are not

other recognized governments within Syria other than Assad, but it's not one country exactly. And you also mentioned Iraq when I was curious about Iraq. You said it's holding together, but that could change. How do you see it breaking up? A couple of things. First, let's just backtrack to Syria for a second. You're right. There isn't another government there. This situation isn't entirely analogous to what's happening in Libya. But you do have the Turkish military there. And they're there and determined to prevent a Kurdish state or autonomous zone from coming into being. And there's no indication, given the kind of things that the Turks have done with this sphere of influence in both the east and west and the northern tier of Syria, what they've done there,

that there's no indication that they have any intention of leaving, certainly any time soon. And we know these kinds of security belts. You can ask the Israelis can go on for a very good. very long time. In Iraq, it's a different, it's a different story. Because Iraq has become such, it's in the minds of many, although I don't think it's entirely accurate, it is the original sin. Americans don't pay much attention to it. And you have a country where a lot of people tend to focus on the Kurds and Kurdish autonomy and the Kurds want to be independent. And that is true, but there's less attention on the South where people in Basra, actually the wealthiest part of

the country, but is the poorest, have been an open revolt against Baghdad. And you, an open revolt against the Iranians. And you have a government that has been massively ineffective. The elite have basically robbed the country blind. And because the south and the north and even parts of the West haven't really been incorporated into the country in ways that make sense to people, that there is always this kind of fragmentary pressure on Iraq. You know, not in defense of Saddam Hussein, but there was a reason why he used so much force to keep the country together because people were an open revolt.

And it, I don't, even if you have someone who's not Saddam Hussein, and we have now, what, 16 examples of people who are not Saddam Hussein. Not all of them were, you know, as wonderful as we wanted them to be and how we, when we fell in love with them. But they also had to exert significant amount of force to keep the country together. The Kurds voted for autonomy and the Iraqi army had to go up to the north with the help of the Iranians and the Turks to keep, to keep the country together. Who's to say, who's to say that, given everything that's going on in the Middle East, I think it lacks imagination to suggest that the current Prime Minister, Mustafa al-Khazini, who, by all measures, is a stand-up guy, excuse me, wants to do the right things,

but he's up against huge obstacles. What if some sort of something spectacular happens, return of the Islamic State. Additional pressure, who's to say that the country will continue to hold together? I think we should at least entertain the possibility that it could fragment. I think, again, we tend to think in terms of, okay, it's bad and it's going to get better. I would hope that's the case, but the evidence so far is not. And given the myriad of problems that Iraq faces, we should at least, consider in our realm of possibilities that and plausible scenarios that Iraq could could fragment.

Same thing with Yemen. Yemen is obviously easier to think of. I mean, it's just two countries for most of the 20th century. People in the South don't actually want to be part of United Yemen. The southern separatists have agreed now to work with the internationally recognized government, but it's Yemen. And this isn't saying anything about the people of Yemen, but in the multidis. multiplicity of conflicts going on in Yemen, their southern separatist interests may change, especially if some agreement by hooker by crook comes about where that gives the Houthis significant amount of

power and so not. Fragmentation is happening in the Middle East. It's not like we're going to wake up one morning and be like, oh, there's two Yemenans. Oh, there's three rocks. There's two Libyans. These things are happening as we speak. When you talk about fragmentation, I'm actually curious about your definition. Does it mean in Yemen you end up with two prime ministers, or do you just end up with anarchy? Not just Yemen, but across the region. This would, I guess, be an endpoint of that fragmentation.

I think we're seeing fragmentation in a place like Yemen, and it isn't necessarily too. I think that there are, yes, you know, one can imagine, because there was a southern Yemen, South Yemen, and a North Yemen, up until 1990, one can imagine two, but there are actually regional differences and different spheres of influences for different groups in Yemen. But yeah, when I'm thinking about fragmentation, I'm not thinking about there is government in eastern Libya that's recognized and one in the

West that's recognized. I'm just talking about the chaos and the fragmentary pressure that breaks the country. People in Libya in particularly talk about will it break up into basically its old Ottoman provinces. My answer is maybe and then some on top of it. So I don't know if that's the outcome. You know, what's incredibly odd in all of these, and it shouldn't be odd. But you have Libyans of goodwill who are working on a constitution, working on a national dialogue. But what we've seen since the uprising that overthrew Gaddafi is that you have progress at this political level. And it's like, that's good stuff, good draft. And then you have at another level, this fragmentation and violence and the two never meet. And successive UN envoys had never been able to bridge those

in a way that brings the violence down to a manageable level at the very least. In Yemen, there's a political process. In Syria, they're in Geneva and Syria talking about something. I don't know what, but it doesn't seem to match the reality on the ground. So clearly I've lost hope, but other people have it. All right, Angry Planet listeners. This is Matthew Galt. We're going to pause there just for a break. And we'll be back in just a minute with more of Jason's depressing conversation about the Middle East.

Hello and welcome back to Angry Planet. I am Matthew Golt. Jason Fields is hosting today. Here he is with more of that conversation. I think the last country I wanted to ask you about, you do mention it in the article, but it's tantalizing. to me. Saudi Arabia, I have to say, in my mind, at least, is stability within the region, at least an example of it. But you are talking about Mohammed bin Salman and how he has changed things. And you mentioned the possibility of instability there too. Can you talk about how that would work?

Yeah. And I think your impulse about Saudi Arabia instability. stability is right. People have often criticized the Trump administration about its relationship with the Saudis and obviously setting aside rumors about business interests. If you entered the Oval Office in January 2017 and you surveyed the region, it was really only one major country that was left standing. Iraq is a mess, Syria is disintegrating. Egypt has in terminal collapse and has turned inward and never really was able to play that role that we wanted it to play in the region. And then there was Saudi Arabia. So you had to accommodate yourself to Saudi Arabia. And then you have simultaneous to this, the rise of Muhammad bin Salman, the crown prince. And what, there's a couple

things that he's been doing that are decent. And it's not to suggest that his insights are bad. again, I'm an analyst. I'm not going to take a political position on it. In general, I take a political position against hacking to pieces, opposition journalists. But in terms of what Mohammed bin Salman was trying to do, he had some good insights. And one of the things is that Saturday Arabia's economy is irrational and not really set up to work in a kind of changing global economy. But its political economy works perfectly and is geared towards maintaining stability. He is trying to change the way you do business, thus politics in Saudi Arabia. And that's why he locked up all these people in the Ritz Carlton in 2017. He was trying to show people who's

boss. Now, the whole thing was they were corrupt. They were corrupt. This would probably paved the way for a new class of corrupt people, but who would do things in a different way. And that changing the way business and the economy and those politics works in Saudi Arabia is destabilizing. As I said, the political economy works where everybody has their little fiefdom and gets their peace and it all flows out from the center and it establishes a kind of loyalty to the system and vested interests. And he's trying to say, change. change that. In a way, in an abstract level, it's a way, in a way it's similar to what Gamal Mubarak tried to do in Egypt, but Mubarak had far fewer resources to grease the skids, and he ran into

trouble. What also Mohammed bin Salman has done in order to help grease those skids is he has undertaken change that is popular among the most important demographic in Saudi Arabia. Those changes, that demographic is young people, like his age, in their mid-30s and younger. He's reigned in defang the religious police. You can go to the movies. You can go see WWE if that's what you're into. You can go to concerts. Women can drive, which has been an obsession in Washington for a long time. And people say, oh, this is just window dressing. But women driving in Saudi Arabia, it's actually empowering for women. They can be greater participants. in the workforce, what he's done is when he runs into trouble or potentially runs into

trouble with the prevailing elites who he's trying to undermine and change. He has this reservoir of support among young people that can be a shock absorber for the system. But of course, all of this is risky. All of this is risky. Can we talk about stability or instability in Saturdays, it's hard to, so it's totally, I don't think it's predictable. I think what you have to think in terms of relative instability. And so if you think about, does he have the resources to buy off opposition? Can he coerce people? Does he have a heroic vision of the future?

Things that leaders use. And he actually has a mix of those things. He has a vision for the future that is deeply appealing to a key demographic. he has a lot of resources that he can use to buy people up, although with the downturn in the global economy with the pandemic and collapse in oil prices in the spring, it was questionable whether he would. And he has a lot of coercion.

Those things would suggest that maybe he's more stable than we think, but it's very hard to predict. Look, everybody thought the region was stable in early December 2010. by late January 2011, people were running around with their hair on fire saying, oh my God, the region is so unstable. But I think Saudi Arabia is obviously because it's been that constant, it's been that one that, again, surveying the wreckage of the region, it remains intact. Saudi Arabia becomes unglued. Really, that is, as I alluded to in the piece, there are still depths to which the region can. can fall.

I think for our show, that's a perfect ending. We try to leave people without hope. I'm really sorry. The one good thing is there are some good things. If you look at what's happening in Lebanon, the people demonstrated extraordinary resilience. People in these places are working towards better futures. The obstacles that they face are, I think, rather extraordinary.

But yet they continue to work. work at it. But overall, the situation in the region is quite dire. Maybe this podcast should come with like a warning. Please remove all sharp objects before listening. Make sure your bar is stocked. I don't know. It's up to you. You're the guy behind it. I think that's actually just taken for red whenever we do a show. Stephen Cook, thank you so much for joining us today. Thanks, Jason. As I said before, it's a great pleasure. That's all for this week, Angry Planet listeners. Angry Planet is myself, Matthew Galt, Jason Fields, and Kevin Nodell.

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