Angry Planet - What Happens to the World When China and the U.S. ‘Face Off’?

Episode Date: April 12, 2024

Go here to listen to Face-OffJane Perlez is a veteran foreign correspondent, the former Bejing Bureau Chief for The New York Times, and host of the new podcast “Face-Off.” She’s on Angry Planet today to talk to us about the show and her experiences reporting on China. “Face-Off” is all about America’s complicated relationship with China. Perlez says she started the show because she was tired of the hysterical conversations she hears about Beijing in Washington.In this episode we learn …Why On the Beach is Perlez’s favorite nuclear war movie.What it’s like to visit China for the first time at the height of the Cultural Revolution.What “Communism” means in a country with a growing bourgeoisie.What it takes for someone to lead China.When Mao and Khrushchev Went SwimmingSupport this show http://supporter.acast.com/warcollege. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

Love this podcast? Support this show through the ACAST supporter feature. It's up to you how much you give, and there's no regular commitment. Just click the link in the show description to support now. You were saying that the reason you wanted to do this podcast. So much noise coming out of Washington, so much hysteria about China. And the only way, according to Washington, to deal with the China challenge is to get crazier and crazier. And, you know, China is a big challenge, but the United States is a

grown-up country and it can deal with it without having to go to war tomorrow's. So I was hoping to present some views of people who know a lot about China who don't subscribe to the hysteria and to show that there is a way of understanding it that doesn't need to scare the living daylights out of people. Before we get a little, before we get much farther, will you, or I guess Before we get much further, rather, will you introduce yourself and the show that you're here to talk about? I'm Jane Perlis, and I've just created an eight-part podcast called Face Off, US versus China, with a great production team from Pushkin and NPR and a great sound team in Philadelphia, Roe Home Productions, and I think we've produced a very lively set of discussions

and documentary feel episodes about the challenge from China. I was in Beijing for the New York Times from 2012 to 2019 as a correspondent as Beijing Bureau Chief, but I had visited China many times before from my base in Indonesia. And then I first went to China. I don't know whether I'm embarrassed or pleased to admit during the Cultural Revolution when I was a university, student in Australia. So I have a firsthand

reminiscences and knowledge of the cultural revolution at its height. Oh my, that's so fascinating to me. You have to tell us about that. Yeah, please. What years were you there? And what did you, what did you see? We saw a lot. Well, you know, I'm always hesitant to say that I was in China during the Cultural Revolution because people immediately think, oh, red diaper child, you know, parents were communists. Actually, you couldn't be further from the truth. We were a bunch of 50 university students who were just curious about China, a mix of students

who were conservative, small little liberal, apolitical. I sort of fell into the apolitical category. And it was the first year that the Australian universities had offered travel abroad. And you could go to Indonesia, which was too close. in India where the food was too dodgy, I thought, and China, which is by far the most interesting. And we had no idea we were going to arrive in the middle of the cultural revolution, but we did, and we were there for three weeks. And we saw red guards in full force. The streets of Shanghai just mobbed with red guards. We saw self-criticism ceremonies. We met with Chen Yi,

the foreign minister in the Great Hall of the People, who was waving the little red red book around saying how great Chairman Mao was, and nine months later he was in the doghouse too, a victim of the Cultural Revolution. It's interesting that we kind of start the conversation here, because it's also, I think that historical moment is really key to the development of kind of one of the main characters of the podcast, which is Xi, right? Definitely. He's the main character of China.

Basically, yeah, I mean, yeah. How could he not be? He's the main character for the United States. He's the main character for President Biden. And he came out of, basically came out of nowhere. Well, can we start with, I was very sad that the screener episodes that I got did not include the G-specific episode. So I need to know, can you kind of give us the background of him briefly? I know it's a large question.

And then kind of explain his rise to power and how he's become the central figure. Well, I think I'd like to begin, not with his childhood, which we can discuss, but I'd like to begin with a scene that's very vivid in my mind. And I think it explains a lot about she in many ways. And actually, it's the seventh floor, state department, elegant dining room. And 2012, and it's Valentine's Day. and I have a front seat table at this lunch for Xi Jinping, who is still vice president. And there are 200 guests at this lunch to greet the next, we knew that he was going to be the next president of China.

And vice president Biden is the host, and so is Hillary Clinton, the Secretary of State. What's the most crucial factor about this lunch is that in the sort of the pre-luncheon situation, where everybody's milling around, the grins on the American officials' faces couldn't have been wider, and not because it was Valentine's Day, but because it was Xi Jinping. And they all thought that he was going to be great for the United States, because he was going to continue the reform movement, and he was going to be great for business, and who knew maybe China would get even closer to the United States. And how wrong could they be? Because just a year later, he showed his colors and issued a document called Document 9, which was a list of taboos in the Chinese

political system, which was everything that had anything to do with democracy. You know, no elections, no freedom of speech, increased security, et cetera. So, and I've told this story to Chinese people as well. And they say, well, the Americans were not the only ones to get him wrong. We Chinese too got him wrong because we didn't know who he was. And I think there's a line of thinking that if the Politburo or the Standing Committee back in 2007, when they chose him to be the next president, had known what his political thoughts really were, they may not have chosen him.

Or for all we know, maybe he changed his political thoughts along the way. And there is some evidence that he may have, which is that he met with, with Vice President Biden in 2011. They met in Chengdu, which is a western city of China. And at one of those dinners, Xi Jinping talked a lot about the color revolutions in the Arab world. And he talked about them in such a way that the Americans who were accompanying Vice President Biden,

you know, came to the conclusion that he was quite afraid of such things in China. and that when he became president, he was likely to do everything he could to stop such color revolutions, such as they might be, from happening. So, you know, he was brought up as a child of a big fish in the Communist Party. His father was very senior in the Communist Party. His father was criticized and sent out to the countryside by Chairman Mao.

So Xi Jinping as a child, saw firsthand what the Communist Party could do to its members, but he remained very loyal and somewhere along the way, seems to have decided that the Communist Party was the way to go and the only way to govern 1.4 billion people in China. Was part of the American thought that he had been to the United States, he had studied in the United States, therefore he must have fallen in love with the United States? Well, he never studied here. He did visit.

The U.S. made a lot of drama, and the Chinese did too as a way of covering favor with the Americans, made a lot of drama out of the fact that he visited Iowa as a young man in 1985, and he stayed with an Iowan family, and he slept in their son's bedroom, and he did all these things. I mean, you know, I was an exchange student in the United States, even before I went to China, I was a very young exchange student. And I know what a great impression the United States can make on you as a young person, which is for the great.

But I don't think that visit had anything to do. I don't think it made that much impression on Xi Jinping. It's a nice part of the folklore for the Communist Party and for Xi Jinping to pull out of the trunk when they feel like they need to. Why do you think everyone got him so wrong? Do you think that he changed his mind after seeing kind of what would arguably be, could be seen as Western influence in Arab countries leading to these color revolutions? I think he hid himself.

I think he was a very clever politician. And he saw, if you expressed yourself too much, what could happen. He saw what happened to his father. Not that I think his father went off the rails at all, but his father expressed some feelings, favorable feelings about a certain novel, and that novel was out of favor, and that helped to his being dismissed. So I think he was very good at disguising what he really wanted and what he really thought, which is pretty necessary in that in that hard-boiled system because if you expose too much you can you can get factions building against you and he managed not to do that what does it take to become leader of

China I was thinking of running for the job myself and I you know just sort of a rough idea well the first thing is you can't be a woman yeah apparently not not so far anyway um well I think it means that you have to be a total ideologue and fervently believe in the well-being and correctness of the Communist Party, which is not to say that you have to be an ideologue particularly, but that you do believe that the Communist Party, which, by the way, has 90 million members, you do believe firmly that that is the only and the best instrument to govern 1.4 billion people, which you've got to admit is a pretty hard job, particularly since they're, you know, despite the fact that they like to paint a picture of uniformity, there are people of many religions and many

ethnic backgrounds in China, and so you have to be able to knit all these people into hopefully some kind of seamless whole. It would seem like some of the part of that project now is the destruction of some of those alternate identities, right? Well, definitely. In Xinjiang, we know the story, the very sad and appalling story of the basically the attempt to abolish the Uyghur population. It's a Muslim population that has been there for centuries, for a long, long, long, long. time. And the frightening thing about the forced attention of many Uyghurs and the forced work of many Uyghurs is that the majority harm population seem to support it. And I found this very

troubling. One of my last experiences in Beijing, I was doing a profile of a documentary filmmaker, a youngish guy, you know, in his 30s, well-known. And before we went out on to do his filming in the southern part of China, I asked him about the Uyghurs, and he wholly supported what the government was doing. And here was someone who was part of the so-called creative, thoughtful class, very troubling. And those who don't actively support it like he did, of course, remained silent because you can't afford, if you want to stay out of prison, you basically can't afford to speak up. And people, is there sort of a Han nationalism?

I think so. And I think that, I think the more that the United States taunts China, which I don't think is going on at the moment, but I do see that possibility if the Republican candidate for the presidency wins, then I think. think that could rise up. I've spoken to some Chinese who fear that the chaos of a, and the finger-pointing of a Trump presidency could engender this sort of Han nationalism, this Chinese nationalism, which could be very destructive in response to whatever the United States might do. I know that I was given the impression as a younger person that, you know, growing up in

thinking about China, that, especially with the cultural revolution, the legacy of that, that the poor Chinese were sitting around feeling oppressed and that they hate their government, but they have to hate it in secret. What do people really feel? Well, there are 1.4 billion people, so it's pretty hot. Oh, no, I want to hear about each and every one of them. We have an hour or two. We'll get around to each one. But just sort of, I mean, if there's a general sense. Well, I don't know that there's a general sense, but I'll give you an example. So I know a young, youngish journalist.

I mean, she's not a first, you know, she's had a couple of jobs, and she works for a Western news agency now. And she would be in her mid to late 20s. And I know that, you know, she doesn't love the government at all. She wishes that there was a different kind of government. But she knows that it's not going to change. So it's a cliche to say you kind of make your peace. But if you're not going to be an activist, which is almost impossible now,

then you make your peace in a way and you make a life for yourself. And so she travels abroad whenever she can. She goes hiking. There are amazing places. She's very sporty. She goes running. She goes hiking. she's a comedian.

So you do what you can to make a life there because it's pretty tough to get out. And I think that's what also, by the way, very well off Chinese are doing now. It's too late to take your money out as some very rich Chinese have done. Well, it's too late to get it out legally, put it that way.

And it's very difficult probably to get it out illegally. So, you know, they lead a good thing. good life there because that's where their money is. And they sort of don't like the government, but if they don't make trouble, they can have a good life. It doesn't sound all that much different from some of the things that Americans tell themselves, honestly. Exactly. I mean, a friend of mine really one of the smartest journalists I know said to me very recently, you know, it's like in all, in many countries, 98% of the population don't really worry every day about the politics.

It's just people like you and I who worry about it. We're part of the 2% I suppose. But there's 98% out there who can work at their jobs and be with their families and have a really comfortable life. And I think we have to remember that in China, I mean, the difference between when I went during the Cultural Revolution and when I started to go back in the 90s, it's just like night and day. I mean, we all know it's the fastest growing economy of scale ever.

It's just an amazing jump, an amazing scale. And, you know, people who in the late 90s were able to, the government made a regulation where you could buy your government-owned flat. Well, lots of people bought their government flats and apartments. And then after a couple of years, they found that they'd saved enough money where they could buy another apartment. And they could rent that out and they could get rent. And they still have those apartments. They've lost value because of the housing crisis.

But, you know, they're sort of bourgeois people and have been for 20 years. So what does communism mean? Does communism mean anything? It doesn't mean Marxism-Leninism, as it was outlined in 1917, put it that way. Yeah, it means a lot. It means security. It means by that, you know, you can't say much. You can't do, you can't say much. I would say that's the, you can't do much. You can't demonstrate. You can't, you're followed, not everywhere, obviously. But I know a friend who are outside the forbidden city late at night a couple of months ago and the cops asked why you hear. And they had pretty good reason. And then the cops just pressed the button on their cell phone, and they could trace where these people had come from in the previous 20, you know, half hour.

So it's constant surveillance. That to me is what communism means. It's just interesting that, I mean, it almost sounds like the word no longer applies. It doesn't mean collective farming. It doesn't mean state-run five-year plans. It doesn't mean any of those things. Well, it does mean slogans, and it does make. You can't get by without them.

Siegene King's come up with this new thing, new productive values or something, which is supposed to indicate that China is going to be like a higher class Germany. You know, they're going to have higher class manufacturing. In other words, they're going to really double down on tech and try and, you know, surpass the United States in tech. They're going to become sort of a, and they're going to do electric cars like no one's seen before and flood the world market with them, by the way, and solar panels. And they're going, you know, so it's a lot of, a lot of slogans backed by directives,

that this is what this is what state industries are going to do, supported by government subsidies. So, if we back up just a little bit, tell me about Xi's relationship with, or maybe not his relationship with, but what we can puzzle out of, or his views on the United States. Oh, I thought you were going to ask me about his relationship with Putin. That's in a way of interesting. Oh, that's a good one too. Well, that's on the list, but I wanted to get this out first. Well, I think he has, look, this is just psycho babble.

It's honestly it's psycho babble. Here is one fact. He sent his daughter to Harvard. Now, that was a few years ago, and we've never heard about it since. but obviously he had some admiration for the American university system. You know, I think he sees the United States as a major competitor, obviously is the major competitor to China, and he thinks the United States should get out of Asia

because Asia is China's, home and it's not the United States home. And that's what the competition is about. Primacy in Asia. Militarily, you mean? Every way. Military, economically. Economically, they're way ahead of the United States in terms of binding the Southeast Asian countries around them. Does that mean that like shut down all the apple plants? No American business, no American company does business in there anymore? No, no, no, no, no, of course not. No, of course not. No, no, no, no, no, no.

It means, it means, maybe you're right militarily. It just means that Asia is China's sphere of influence. And that's where the battle is. And I think some smart people think that it's going to be very hard to stop a war about that because they're both, the United States is determined to stay there where the United States has been for the last 70 years and China is determined to dislodge them. And unless there's some really smart and creative diplomacy,

it could all end in disaster. And there's many, many countries stuck in the middle that have their own feelings about all of this, right? Japan, Korea, Taiwan have relied on the empire that America has built to be a market for them. they're economically intertwined with the United States, and they also rely on their military in part to perhaps keep China out of their countries. Yes, but I think we've got to remember that these countries also need China as a market

and as an economic partner. United States is not doing a great job in keeping its economic ties with the Asian countries growing and in and and and and and and and and and and flourishing. I think that's probably a major problem because these countries also look to China and China's a huge market for them and if the United States is going to continue on the protectionist trend and keep out Asian products and Asian services take it. Where else are they going to go? They're going to go to China.

I think it's personal. Personally, I think it's quite short-sighted. I mean, I know that a lot of Americans, many, many zillions of Americans suffered from, you know, lost jobs because of the low-cost products that came into the United States and are coming into the United States. But there's got to be a better solution to this than putting up protectionist walls. And there was the hope of a better solution with something called the Trans-Pacific Partnership under the Obama-Ridman. But they took so long to negotiate it that the moment passed. I think that's where a large part of, if I can say, a large part of the blame should go. Does China want to rule the world?

I think. No, they're happy with Asia? Well, who can tell, you know, the world is in a flexible place. It's a volatile and flexible place. I think that the Chinese know that they've got a lot of work to do on their own economy, particularly at the moment they're going through a rough period, and I've never thought they want to rule the world. The United States has ruled the world for 70 years.

Maybe it's time for others to come in and share the place. I don't know. But I don't think that's the point of the – competition between, and it's more than competition between China and the United States. I think it's primacy over Asia to begin with. Where do you think this hysteria on the part of the United States towards, let me rephrase, where do you think this hysteria on the part of some American policymakers towards China started? Is it pure economic, like economic anxiety?

quote unquote? I think there is a lot of economic anxiety. I mean, because look, I've been a foreign correspondent most of my career, so I have not been a domestic correspondent and I've not seen the way that cities have been gutted like Detroit and how manufacturing centers have been gutted and how the poor education system in the United States has not allowed people to flourish into the tech sector. So I'm not an expert. on that, but I can see where the anger comes from. I think it's a lot of anger, and it's easy to lash out at something else, particularly when there's something else is 1.4 billion people, when it's the scale, and when its military is increasing, and when they have an aim to be

more than the second biggest economy. But, you know, the United States is big enough and clever enough and got great talent to stand up to that. And I don't think people should be afraid. I think it comes from fear. And I think it also comes from easy political points. It doesn't, it's not rational. It's really not rational because life is better here in the United States. States for most of the people than it is for most of the people in China. So what's the, what's, what's, what's, what's, what's, what's, why be so

afraid? Uh, and needless to say, there are, there are political points to be made. It's easy to make political points. So it's a mixture of things and I think it can lead to quite dangerous, dangerous pathways, put it that way. All right, angry plaintiff listeners, want to pause there for a break. We'll be right back after. this. All right, angry planet listeners, welcome back. We are talking about China. Can you tell me about she's a relationship with Biden? As you said, the beginning of the conversation, they were both vice presidents at the same time, they've been in the room together in different capacities. Often, do we have any idea about what their relationships like and what they think of each other?

I think it's very, I've asked a lot of people about this because I do find it fascinating. You know, they first met on a bus. They met in Chengdu, this central Chinese city that I I mentioned earlier, they played basketball together. Biden made an extremely confident speech during that visit to a group of Chinese university students and said that no country on the planet had ever grown as quickly and as wealthy as the United States and basically saying, you know, we're going to beat you and we're going to keep you down. I mean, it was more elegant than that, but that, if you wanted to pass it, that was the message.

And then I think that I don't think, I've asked several Chinese about this who study the leadership. And they say it's impossible even for other Chinese politicians, other Chinese leaders to know the leader. That they don't, the people at the top on the standing committee, I call them the seven dwarves. Is Xi Jinping and six of his comrades on the. the Standing Committee, and they run the country. I'm told that it's really not possible for each of those seven men to know each other. They basically have to make an appointment to talk. I mean, they're just barriers.

That's the way the Communist Party is run there. So if they don't know each other, how well can he know Biden? But there is a very interesting story that Biden told to us reporters in Beijing in 2012. that I think says a lot about Xi Jinping's thinking. Biden told us that on that visit in Chengdu, they were walking just the two of them, obviously two translators in the back because he doesn't speak any Chinese and English

and Biden doesn't speak any Chinese. And Biden said, Xi Jinping turned to him and said, you have to stop sending those spy planes over our waters. and Biden said, well, what do you mean? He said, if you keep sending those spy planes, we're going to come and shoot them down. And Biden said, he said to see, no, you're not going to do that because you know what happened last time you did that, which he was referring to an incident in 2001 when a Chinese fighter jet collided with an American spy plane.

And the American spy plane was so damaged that it had to make an emergency landing on on the Chinese, on Hainan, part of mainland China, and the 24-member crew were kept hostage for 11 days, but it was smart diplomacy that got them out of there. But Xi Jinping bringing this up with Biden on the first time that he met him says a lot, I think, about how he sees, how he saw the United States making encroachments, unwarranted encroachments into China. And by the way, I think Biden was right. These Chinese have. planes actually stay outside the 12-mile limit. They're on international waters, what they're supposed to be.

And the American surveillance plane that was hit in 2001 was in international waters. But just the fact that he brought that up with Biden on their first meeting, I think tells a lot about his mindset. Security, our waters, our waters, keep out. I'm reminded of an interview I did with Jason. I can't remember how to say his name. John Sersione? Actually, that is correct.

Did I get it right? Wow. I'm really bad at names, so I'm very proud of myself. We were talking about hypersonic missiles. And I'm sure, as you know, that there's this great push from the United States right now to kind of catch up to other countries, hypersonic missile capabilities. And something he said has really stuck with me is like you have to see things from China's perspective where their country is completely surrounded on all sides by

these vast, powerful military machines run by the United States. It's completely encircled them. And from that perspective, of course, every time anyone gets, like, it makes sense that you would be upset about spy planes, that you would be developing. missiles that could, you know, strike past that military line that's been created, right? I think we do a bad job in this in America. And I hope that one of, I think, would think that one of the things we try to do on this podcast is to emphasize the perspective of other countries and to keep them in mind.

Great idea. Great thing. We try. We don't always succeed, but we definitely try. They're trying to tell people that America is not always the center of the world. Correct. And that all these other countries have a lot of control over their own destinies. And it's not always in reaction to war controlled by the United States. And that's something that cuts both ways, right? So just a point I wanted to make is that that makes sense to me, that he would be, that the spy planes would be something that's at top of mind. Because you're, I'm sure from China's perspective, you're constantly reminded that you're encircled, right? And that's, going to create anxiety. I wouldn't like it. I wouldn't, you know, I don't want to be boxed in. That's one of the reasons why people say that the, uh, that the, that the Xi Jinping regime would

prefer to see Trump win in November rather than Biden, because Biden is being very assidious in trying to reinforce the allies around China. So can we talk about exactly what we'd mentioned before, which is of Vladimir Putin's relationship with Xi, because, Because that a lot of people see as a reaction to the United States. I think it's more than that. You know, I think there's something in the C family about this. It's crazy. Because C's father went to the Soviet Union in the late 50s when he was, you know,

big muckety-muck in the Mao regime before he was taken down a peg or two. and he apparently came back very impressed with Moscow. He was very impressed with their industrial ambition and came back with all kinds of souvenirs from Moscow for what it's worth. And maybe that somewhat romantic idea of Moscow washed over the young sea. And now, fast forward, I think it's a very convenient alignment. I wouldn't call it an alliance, but a very convenient alignment for sea between Moscow and Beijing because it means it's two against one, two of them against

the United States. And I have a feeling that that has a lot to do with it. So they do seem to get along very well. I mean, there are these photographs of them, you know, seeing almost looking to each other's eyes, like George Bush looked into Putin's eyes. C and Putin seemed to really get off on each other's eyes and they're always draping each other with, you know, necklaces of medallions and having birthday parties together. And I think they had a birthday. I think it was maybe Putin's birthday or something in Bali.

I mean, and C organized a birthday party. They seem to celebrate a lot, put it that way. And they're now into like their 42nd meeting coming up. But I do think it's a very strategic alignment. And the United States is complaining a lot, I'm sure correctly, that the Chinese are helping the Russians keep their industrial complex afloat. You know, they've been careful not to provide military wherewithal for the fight in Ukraine, but they have sent other things that allow them to make the weapons.

There's a lovely photograph I'm looking at them of them right now, where Putin is gifting Xi ice cream. Yes. And they're partying in Tajikistan, partying. They're celebrating his birthday in Tajikistan. Oh, sorry, I got the, I got, and they may look up, maybe if you're while you're there, you can have, look up Bali.

Maybe he was celebrating something else in Bali, but I remember a Bali celebration as well. It seemed very odd. So this personal relationship, I mean, that they seem to actually like each other, that's crucial, right? I mean, in two countries that are so driven by one, man? Yes, although, you know, when it comes to national self-interest, I wouldn't, you know, if Putin did something that didn't suit China's national interest, I don't think C would go

along with it. But for the moment, as I said, I think they are very much aligned. Even, I don't know the details of it, but even in places like the Arctic, apparently maybe they're competitors, but they don't out-compete each other terribly much. So they're putting up this rather formidable show of interest. And because of the personal relationship, one of them can make a call to the other instead of acting unilaterally, or if there's some disagreement or misunderstanding, there's actually a chance to do something about it, right? I mean, and I mentioned this in opposition to the U.S. situation where we had no military connection with China. You know, the normal channels were shut down for such a long time, if I understand right.

It's like we don't have a personal touch at all, and that's kind of a problem. Well, we don't have a personal touch because the regime in Russia is so obnoxious, so it would be. and that's why Trump gets, I mean, gets valid criticism for being soft on Putin because it's the system and the regime. Mind you, I don't think there's a lot of love between, if you can generalize, between the Chinese people and the Russian people historically. They've not, you know, they've not gotten along so well. and this new friendship is relatively new. I mean, there is a fascinating story going back to, and I hope this is not too much off track,

but it's good to keep in mind. In 1969, before Nixon went to China, and this was one of the incidents, I think, that helped Kissinger and Nixon see that there was an opening for the United States. In 1969, the summer of 1969, the KGB guy at the Soviet embassy in Washington called up his counterpart at the State Department and said, let's go and have lunch.

So they went to the beef and bird or some such saloon in one of the hotels in Washington. And they get to the main course. And Davidoff, the KGB guy, says to Bill Steerman, the American guy. So what would the United States think if the Soviet Union dropped a nuclear bomb on China and wiped out all its nuclear assets? Stephen wrote in his afterwards memo that he was about to put a piece of fish in his mouth and the fish never got there. And he raced back to the State Department and wrote a memo that recalls all of this. This is why we all know about it because he wrote a very clear memo.

So, you know, they haven't always been so friendly. Right. And actually, even though they were both communists at the same time, the party split, right? I mean, at some point. Oh, yeah, Mao, Mao and Cruci. Chistov hated each other. You know, Ma would humiliate Christoph by inviting him to the swimming pool. And, you know, Ma could swim and Christoph couldn't.

We had to wear floaties, didn't he? Something like that. They took these humiliating photos with Khrushchev in the pool with Mao where he's got floaties on. I haven't seen that photo, but I wouldn't be surprised. It sounds about right. Oh, that Mao. Such a rascal. Yeah, Mao who said, oh, it wouldn't be too bad.

if a country dropped a nuclear bomb on China, you know, we wipe out of several, you know, millions of people. The women who survived could make up by having babies. This is what he told Khrushchev allegedly. This is the perfect transition to a wonderful episode of the show, which is all about nuclear weapons, because for a long time, China had kind of remained steady in this field. They'd had about around 300,

just enough to say, you know, don't mess with us. There will be consequences. A normal amount for a superpower to have, I would say, given the current climate. Things have changed in the last few years. What's going on? Well, I think this is something that Xi Jinping signified soon after he came into office. He, in secret speeches, which my colleague at the New York Times, Chris Buckley, has unearthed, He signaled very early on that the nuclear weapons had to be increased.

And he didn't waste much time. He renamed the unit that was in charge of nuclear weapons, the rocket force. And satellite images a few years ago picked up that the Chinese are building silos in Xinjiang. They now have 500 nuclear weapons. weapons compared to the United States 3,000 plus, but they're expected to have about a thousand more by 2030, I believe. And yes, I think our episode on nuclear weapons is very strong, in large part because I interviewed Tong Zhao, who has come from China fairly recently, and I think he understands

the psychology of Xi Jinping and why he's doing this. And he explains in large part it's a fear. of being fear of the United States and fearing that China is now a big power on the world stage and should have nuclear weapons, consummate, equal to that power. And it's a feeling that China shouldn't be left behind and China should have its own options. And whereas it was a fairly, I hate to use this word, but, you know, in the amateur terms, maybe it's fairly sleepy nuclear arsenal, which wasn't on very active duty. Now it can be activated on, you know, very short warning.

So a big, big, big difference. And they seem to be building with great speed. And the most worrying thing is that there are no arms control treaties. There's one left, I believe, and the remainder have expired. It expires in 2026, if not renewed, and every indication is that it is not going to get renewed. Correct. It's going to just die on the vine. This is a very dangerous situation.

You know, and I'm a fellow at the Belfa Center at the Kennedy School, and twice in recent weeks to distinguish people in this field. Well, one person, Matt Bunn said, he studies nuclear weapons. He's never felt that the world was as close to possible nuclear conflict as it is now, very incredibly worrying statement. And then Robert Blackwell was at the Belfa Center very recently. And he said a similar thing, that nuclear war between China and the United States is not out of the question. And I might say in our final episode on Taiwan, which I'm very,

please that we have Lyle Goldstein speaking because Lyle is a very balanced analyst of what's going on and he speaks Chinese, he speaks Russian and he knows the Chinese military. And he points out that, you know, so-called responsible people in Washington wrote a paper for the Atlantic Council last October, noting that the United States might have to use nuclear weapons if there's a war in Taiwan because America's conventional weaponry power in Taiwan has, its power has declined. And he's saying that the way to overcome that decline in conventional weapons and the way for the United States to overcome China's stronger conventional forces would be to use nuclear weapons.

Well, as Lyle says, he doesn't use the word preposterous, but it is preposterous. This is not, this seems unfathomable at this day and age that we should be thinking, that that should be put on the front burner. Well, it's interesting also that the U.S. military is no longer seen even by us as strong enough to deal with China, at least in this one conflict. I mean, that instead we'd have to resort to nuclear weapons. I don't know. It just seems different from not that long ago.

Well, I think people have to remember that, you know, Taiwan is 8,000 miles away. It's not Europe. It's not the Middle East. It's a long, long way away. And you were talking about, you know, new classes of warfare that the United States are hypersonic missiles, which the United States is not the leader on. So, yes, there are some gaps. But do we really want to build up?

so that we don't have any gaps before we have arms control negotiations or some efforts at diplomacy, do we have to keep building and building and building? That's my question. What do you think? It sounds like from China's perspective, the answer is yes, because they wouldn't want to be on equal footing before those arms control negotiations begin. Probably. I think that's, you know, bad.

I think we should not be doing that. but I also think that another path towards that would be America getting rid of a bunch of weapons and it certainly doesn't seem like it's going to do that. I have mixed feelings about getting rid of the American Empire, honestly. I just wonder what's left afterwards, I think, is more my concern than anything else. And I live in the United States. You know, when it comes down to it, it is home. So it wouldn't be so bad.

Let go. It's fine. I'm sure. I don't think, you know, I don't know. I've, uh, I didn't think empires are probably do more harm than good. Um, so one of my favorite conversation topics is to find out what, uh, what people's favorite nuclear weapon movie is. You're asking me? It's so obvious.

Oh, no, no. I, I know. I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, to the episode. So... Oh, that's so kind of you. So, well, because I mentioned this because I normally hear, hear the day after a lot in America. In Europe, I, if they're European, I usually hear threads.

Those are, like, the two big ones. I don't often hear on the beach. I love that movie. Which is this incredible, it's kind of like a mask of the red death in Australia. basically. And I was wondering if you could share your thoughts about that film and why it struck you. Well, it struck the whole Australian population when it came out. So it came out when I was, you know, not even a teenager. But my mother took me. So I tell this story to some Americans. They say, oh, your mother took you to that movie, which is about Australia being the only country in the world that's not overcome by

nuclear vapors and everybody. Everybody else in the world is dead. Strader is the last living place. And there's this big romance between Ava Gardner and Clark Gable. And they go to the beach and sit in Mel. It all takes place in Melbourne, the southern city. Those of us who come from Sydney think this is a very poor choice because the beaches in Melbourne are very lousy.

But they go to the beach and they have a nice time and they go to parties and they drink it up and it's all very sweet. And then they realized that, wow, the vapors are coming towards us. What are we going to do? And my one memory of that movie is all over, all my life, I've remembered this white pill on a tray, which is handed around to people to take so that they can commit suicide before the vapors come down to Melbourne. And sure enough, it's pretty like that in the movie.

But the most touching thing, I think, is that a crew of submarines decide that they will leave American submariners decide that they will leave Melbourne and go back to San Francisco because they feel they should be at home. And they approach San Francisco and everything is dead as a dormouse, really dead, dead, dead. So it's a very alarming movie, but it's also a great movie. Because somehow the directors make you feel as though you're right there. I mean, I don't know if you remember Matt, but you really feel as though you're right in the room with the characters.

It's a very intimate movie about such a universal story. It's such a great book, too. Neville Schuett's book? I thought so. Yeah, a very dramatic story. But it was, you know, that situation was front of mind of everybody in the 50s. I think that that kind of close-up intimacy, there's a couple different ways that you can do impactful, like, nuke stories. And I think a lot of the really good ones have that kind of close-up intimacy that on the beach does, where you're really focused on these characters and their lives caught up in this thing that is bigger than them.

So it is such a large and horrifying topic that the mind balks, right? And so to kind of ground it in like Clark Gable, if a gardener and the relationship. And she's such a bitch. I don't know. She's a horrible bitch, but somehow you keep watching her. I'm not quite sure what that's all about.

I have to go and have another look at it. Yeah, I need to rewatch it. It's been a long time. So to kind of see us out here at the end, can we talk about the other episode that I really loved that I listened to was the one. about Apple in its relationship with China? I found it fascinating, too.

I learned so much, I've got to tell you. Shifting power dynamic, right? Definitely. It's extremely fascinating. Definitely. Can you tell us kind of where Apple is now with China and the lovers of power that China has that it can pull? Well, let me just preface by saying,

it is extraordinary, don't you think? I mean, Apple and China are the marriage of, the two most secretive organizations in the world. China's Communist Party and Apple. I mean, I have not covered Apple as a daily reporter. I mean, I learned a lot about it during the episode, but I've been told that it's just so secretive. They're unpleasant to deal with. They don't respond. I mean, it's just like an iron wall. Well, with all these tech companies, it's really fascinating because I can watch, Like, I'll know they read the email because something will change in the public presentation of how things are going.

But they will never respond to me unless they're really mad and then they reach out. So I think, you know, and just a little bit of history on this. In 2016, Apple was running into problems in Beijing and they knew it. And I, you know, I wasn't covering Apple as a beat then, but I could see. that Tim Cook came to Beijing several times, and he looked quite worried. I mean, you've got the sense that things weren't going right, partly because Beijing was telling them to take down their apps. Beijing was insisting that they store more of their data inside China,

and things were a little bit rocky. Even the sales of the iPhone were going through the roof. And it turned out that in the... That year, Tim Cook signed a 275 billion, beefer boy billion deal with Beijing, which basically allowed Apple to continue to manufacture its iPhones and its other, whatever else it was making in China for the next five years. I mean, that's an extraordinary amount of money. And included in that were pledges to keep up the education of tech.

you know, Chinese tech people. And there was a lot of other stuff in there, aside from just the money and the manufacturing. And I have to say that Wayne Ma, who was a reporter in China for the Wall Street Journal concentrating on Apple and is now the information, he dug around and he found this document that shows that they paid this money.

And, you know, hats off to Wayne. He had to come back to the United States from China to actually get the document. I think that was just really telling. Now Apple is having problems. There's pressure from Washington to, if not entirely, stop manufacturing, which they can't stop manufacturing in China, but they're being pressured to diversify.

But it's not so easy. Vietnam is close by and has the tech talent, but it doesn't have the scale. You know, the biggest Apple factory in China, which they're run by a company called Foxcon, which comes from Taiwan originally, Foxcon plant in China for Apple iPhone typically runs to 300,000 workers.

That's the size of Tampa, Florida. I mean, that's huge. And you don't get that scale in Vietnam. And India is also a contender for all of this, but they don't have the discipline of the workforce that China has. So I think that, you know, people estimate, oh, they're going to be able to transfer easily out of China.

I'm told it's not going to be so easy. Let's see. Tim Cook made a very obsequious trip to China in March this year. Very obsequious. I mean, just incredible. He went to the Shanghai iPhone store, and he had videos taken with one of China's big pop star. and it was, you know, it was quite, quite remarkable at a time when iPhone sales are falling

because the Chinese Communist Party has instructed its people, and there are 90 million people, 90 million members, not to bring iPhones to work, not to buy iPhones essentially. So that's causing a dip in sales. And I think the iPhone in China accounts for about 20% of it. of iPhone sales. So problems are hidden. Right, the other big phone is one that we're not allowed to buy. Right?

Huawei, you mean? Mm-hmm. Yeah. Who made a very good model recently to the surprise of many people. I mean, the chip in the latest Huawei was far more advanced than people expected, which I think shows that when the metal hits the road, that there's going to be a lot of advance out of China, even as the Biden administration tries to put up this mile high fence to stop high high grade tech going to China. Yeah, and the car has also gotten a pretty good

reputation for the electric cars, I mean. Yes, BYD is popular in Europe. I mean, they've had a bad season the last few months, but so is Tesla. You know, now people are talking about the slow slower than it hoped for, slower than expected change from the combustion engine to EVs. But Tesla's also had a tough time. So BYD is not the only one. I love the acronym BYD. It's supposed to, we all thought it stood for Bring Your Dreams, but actually in real life it stands for bring your dollars. Really? I'm not sure, really, but that's how it's. Oh, okay. Well, I like it better.

That's fantastic. How I was referred to in China. Bring him a dogless thing. All right. I know we need to let you go, but I have one more question. Please. What do you think of AI in all of this? And I know that AI means a lot of different things.

How are people talking about AI in China? How is it different from the way people are talking about it in the West? Well, I wish I could tell you, but I'm not in China, in part because in New York Times. other Western media blocked from having the number of visas that they should have for their reporters. So we've got a skeleton crew there. And I'm certainly not an AI expert by any means. But I do know that China, and it's clear from what came out of the recent party Congress,

they're going to put a lot of emphasis on matching the United States in AI. And I think that that's where one of the big, races is going to be, and that's where one of the big challenges is going to be. And I wouldn't underestimate the Chinese discipline and determination and brains to do well in AI. So I think the question is wide open. I mean, for my own money, I think that it's really important that there be important talks about AI staying out of the realm of being the trigger for nuclear weapons, that AI governing

nuclear weapons is really almost unimaginable, but people say that it is imaginable. It can be done, and this should be one of the early rounds of talks among nuclear weapon-weapons countries. I think that that is the kind of dire note that we like to strike at the end of the show. Can you tell people where to find face off? You can find face off on Apple, Spotify, wherever you find your podcasts. And please, if you like it, please leave a review. That would be fantastic. If you don't like it, don't leave a review. But if you like it, please leave a review. At the moment, we've got full 5.0.0.5.0. out of 5.0, even though we've only got a trailer up there.

I hope it stays up there when the first two episodes come out and when the other episodes roll out. But thank you very much for having this discussion. I enjoyed it. We seem to have gone all the way from the Cultural Revolution, from Pristchof and Mao to AI and nuclear weapons. Only Jason and Matt could do that. Thank you so very much for coming on to Angry Planet

and walking us through all of this. Thank you. Bye for now. That's all for this episode. Angry Planet listeners. As always, Angry Planet is me. Matthew Galt, Jason Fields, and Kevin Odell, created by myself and Jason Fields.

If you like the show, please go to Angry PlanetPod.com. Give us $9 a month. You will get bonus episodes. There's quite a few up right now. There's one that's really popular about when war literature becomes culture war fodder. People seem to be really responding to that.

We've got some other interesting things in the pipe. Diner at the end of history is coming. You'll understand what that means soon. We've got a bonus fallout episode. Yes, about the video game franchise Fallout. Coming out maybe not next week, but the week after. In addition to all of these bonus episodes, you also get commercial-free versions of the mainline show.

You will get an email from Substack after you sign up that we'll explain how to set that up. So please go to angryplanetpod.com. It's $9 a month that helps us keep doing the show. We will be back very soon with another conversation about conflict on an angry planet. Stay safe until then.