Angry Planet - Why Germany Isn’t Picking Up More of NATO’s Tab

Episode Date: July 31, 2018

One of the great strains on NATO is the question of who’s paying how much for what. But that’s not a new problem. Almost as long as the alliance has been around - 69 years - there’s been arguing over the bills. Germany has been a particular target of late, with the United States calling on the economic powerhouse to pay up. Kathleen Hicks of the Center for Strategic and International Studies offers some needed perspective.You can listen to War College on iTunes, Stitcher, Google Play or follow our RSS directly. Our website is warcollegepodcast.com. You can reach us on our Facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/warcollegepodcast/; and on Twitter: @War_College.Support this show http://supporter.acast.com/warcollege. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

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from behind the front lines. Here are your hosts, Matthew Galt and Jason Fields. Hello and welcome to War College. I'm Jason Fields. And I'm Matthew Galt. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, otherwise known as NATO, is nearly 70 years old. It was created after World War II during the Cold War. It faced off against a Soviet-led block called the Warsaw Pact. Now, many of those Warsaw Pact nations are part of NATO. The United States is tugging at the threads of the alliance. President Trump is accusing allies of free-loading off the United States. So what's the real state of NATO? Kathleen Hicks is here to help us to get to the bottom of it. She's the director of International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International

Studies. Thanks for joining us. Happy to be here. If we can just start off with the most basic thing of all, what is NATO's central mission? Sure. Well, first of all, NATO, as you said, was formed at the end of World War II. So in its earliest origins, it did have a strong focus on bringing Europe in a united way into a more liberal or democratic period of time following the destruction of Europe during World War II. Because of the evolution of the Soviet Union as an enemy, it quickly found itself focused on ensuring that no foreign outside power and Russia was the most obvious one that might threaten it could come into Europe and disrupt that, you know, new era of growth and prosperity and democratic freedom.

So today, looking back 70 years, it maintains that focus on a Europe that is whole and free, if you will, that is not able to be, have its sovereignty impinged upon. from the outside, and it's done in a transatlantic unity with the United States and Canada focused on the freedom and security of Europe. NATO has evolved to have a couple purposes beyond the security of Europe itself, and that is to obviously have a self-defense element. You hear a lot of talk about that, which is both defense of Europe, but defense of any member nation. So it came into play on 9-11 when the United States was attacked. That is the one and only time that NATO has invoked the mutual self-defense approach, and it provided NATO countries,

and NATO itself provided capabilities to the U.S. And then as we saw in Afghanistan, where NATO was engaged as part of the U.S. with the NATO-led mission, but a part of a U.S. begun mission, it has the ability and the mission to build collective security outside the borders of Europe. That's actually interesting. If you're talking about Afghanistan, you're talking, that almost seems like carte blanche to work anywhere around the world now. Is that right? Well, it has to be agreed upon. So there's 29 members of NATO. So it has to be a carte blanche that 29 countries believe fits within that strategic concept of protection. And again, the Afghanistan mission was an outgrowth of 9-11. It was a response to an attack on the United States. So it invoked

Article 5, and then the mission that followed the U.S.-led mission that became a NATO mission in Afghanistan really was a follow-on to that sense that a member had been attacked, and the source of the attack in that Kaysas Osama bin Laden had received safe haven from the government of Afghanistan, and so that was sort of the origin of the Afghanistan mission. It's generally speaking pretty hard to get NATO members to find a compelling reason like that. Afghanistan is a pretty singular example. The other that people would point to that maybe is more questionable, if you will, is the Libya operation, where NATO undertook an operation to protect civilians after there was unrest following Qaddafi's ouster from power. And that led,

ultimately, not by NATO's hand, but to the internal toppling, if you will, of Qaddafi, and then NATO didn't follow that with a with a plan for stabilizing the country. And so many people would point to Libya as an example where NATO maybe did get a little further out of its mission space. But it did it under this view and its own view about protecting civilians and viewed that as part of its mission set. That raises one other question for me, which is in the case of Libya, not all NATO countries participated, right? The French and British were the primary actors, if I remember correctly. And so in the case of any NATO mission, other than, let's say, perhaps the invasion of Europe by Russia, something super dramatic like that, are NATO countries compelled to contribute to

defense or missions like this? I think this is one of the hardest things to understand about how the treaty is set up and then how it's executed. The way the treaty establishing NATO is set up, to be a member, you have signed up by virtue of being a member to contributing. So there is an expectation when you are accepted as a member that you are going to contribute. So, you know, it's not a compelling in the way people think in terms of an enforcement mechanism. And I'll come back to how NATO operationalizes it. But it is it is the grounding principle upon which people, you know, different countries become members is that they will contribute. And every, and the reality is every NATO nation contributes in some way. And today's terms, we often talk

about that in three ways. Cost, capability and contribution, meaning contributions of military personnel. So for going back to the Afghanistan example, you'll see many countries that maybe can't spend as much as others or choose not to spend as much, but they are contributing forces on the ground. Or you'll see in the case of capabilities, maybe they're a Navy-heavy country. Or if the Libya example points out, maybe they're a country that has advanced aircraft or intelligence assets. And so they can contribute those capabilities. So that's, they're different. ways in which to contribute, but there is absolutely a grounding expectation in the treaty that all nations who are parties to the treaty are contributing. So this, this idea that a country needs to

contribute two percent of its GDP or spend two percent of its GDP on its military, is not kind of a hard and fast rule of NATO then? No, it's not. What happened to get to what what people hear these days is the 2%, which is about spending 2% of your GDP on defense. It's several years ago, and in particular in the context of coming out of Afghanistan, there was this question about what was the purpose of NATO, right? We had at that point, there was a general view that Russia wasn't much of a problem. We were coming out of this, you know, what seemed to be a successful use of the NATO alliance to support one of its members, the United States, in a mission, military mission in Afghanistan,

but we were at that point drawing down significantly in Afghanistan. And this is roughly 2014. You see NATO try to start having an internal conversation about what it means to contribute. Because during Afghanistan, what it meant to contribute was, are you sending capabilities and people to Afghanistan? And are you, when others are sending capabilities in people to Afghanistan, maybe you're country that's providing security inside Europe while others are away. So that had been the context. So coming out of that, the question came, well, you know, we didn't have Russia invading Ukraine at

that point. What is the purpose of NATO and how do we think about it? And the general view was, well, what we know we know is that the military capabilities will be important in the future. We know we believe in the alliance collectively as a force for common security. So how do we lay down a measure for what we all do. And they came up with, internally, this idea of 2% of GDP as a way to keep member states engaged on defense issues in their own domestic contexts and thinking ahead to how to transform, if you will, capabilities for future missions. And the way it was said in a pledge that came out of the Whales Summit in 2014 is NATO states shall have as a goal to reach 2%, and I believe the year was 2022, of their GDP.

And it was one of several different so-called investment pledges made by member states. And then enter the 2016 presidential election cycle in the United States, and it built upon frustrations from the Obama cycle, this Obama team, about burdenship. sharing and kind of took off as a singular focus of energy around this discussion of burden sharing. So what's going on right now with President Trump in the most recent NATO summit, which was very loud, is not actually new. It's not new. There had been, as I said, coming out of that Wales summit and in the ensuing years in the Obama, first of all, burden sharing has always been an issue.

It was very prominent in the 1980s, coming from the Democrats, actually, in the United States after the end of the Cold War and the view of the desire for a peace dividend. There was a heavy emphasis on making sure Europeans were bearing their share, and it's never left us. as an issue. The 2% itself became an issue during the Obama years because that's when NATO adopted it as a measure or as a goal. And so when Bob Gates left as Secretary of Defense, I believe that was 2012, he gave a pretty searing speech on the need for NATO countries other than the U.S. to pick up more of the share of burden. And then that theme was carried on even after he left inside the Obama administration. So it was, it was, when it came around to the 2016 election

cycle, it was hitting pretty fertile soil inside the United States as a talking point. What became unusual in the 2016 cycle was it became the talking point. And it was it was no longer a part of a overall conversation about the mutual benefit of security and then the need to have burden sharing. it just became about burden sharing. So what would happen if the U.S. decided to leave NATO? Does NATO exist without the United States? It doesn't. It's, you know, a U.S.-led effort.

It's very much about transatlantic crossing the Atlantic, the U.S. and Canada with Europe, without the United States. You have what already exists, you know, and except Canada, which is the EU. and the EU has a security element, but it has always been built in a way that is complementary to NATO and focused, for instance, on things like border security, intelligence, but not on military capabilities. And what you have seen in the last few years in particular is a growth in interest within Europe, if you will, as a hedge to the United States potentially either pulling out of NATO or not being interested. interested in NATO in using the EU mechanisms as a way to develop collective approaches.

If you boil it down, does the U.S. actually foot the bill for the defense in Europe? Is that accurate to say or is that an overstatement? Definitely an overstatement. The United States does spend more on defense than any other country in the world. And in, you know, in large part, that is because we have a global, both economic and security footprint that we're looking to advance. So that part's true, and it is true that part of that security investment that's, you know, the largest in the world, you can think about as focused in part on mutual security interests with Europe, whether that be Europe itself or other parts of the world where we're looking to advance economic and security interests.

That said, the second largest spender in the world on security is Europe. If you take these small states and add them up, they're spending more collectively than Russia. And so, you know, cutting off our nose despite our face, if you will, to try to alienate them when they, in fact, are making a significant collective investment. And together we are quite strong. So there's no way to really break down the U.S. spending. I know the president has used some figures, but you really can't break down what is the U.S. spending in defense of Europe as opposed to what is the U.S. spending to advance its own interests globally. That's nearly impossible to do. But what you can say is that the Europeans are themselves investing quite a bit as well.

and if we work together on our interests, whether those are in Europe or elsewhere, we have a lot more sway than if we're divided. What do you see is Germany's role? In NATO or generally in Europe? Yes, in NATO specifically. What is Germany's role in NATO? Yep. So I think, you know, again, it's easy to lose sight of history. Coming out of World War II, the antagonist in the European context for World War II was not the Soviet Union.

it was Germany. And so part of the origin of NATO was about what people will say colloquially is keeping Germany down, keeping Russia out and keeping the U.S. in. And the keeping Germany down part was incredibly important to its neighbors and at the time to the United States because Germany had shown a propensity through two world wars to use military power in an expansionist, nationalistic expansionist way. The very design of NATO and the way the U.S. led approach to West Germany, developed it as an economy and as a nation, really put a very small investment footprint into its military for these reasons.

And the obvious parallel to that is the same thing we did with Japan. So both Germany and Japan grew through the cold. war in their economic side, in their embrace of democracy, moving away from nationalistic approaches, but we essentially kept down in both cases their military power. So here we are 70 years later, and there's this now reverse dynamic, I think, going on where everyone looks at that, or some are looking at that, and are now quite frustrated with Germany for not picking up its fair share on defense. And they do underspend. They are not in good shape. Their forces are not ready. So they're not meeting the 2% when I say they are underspending.

But I think it's unfair to point to that without pointing to the incentive structure we created ourselves for them and for very good reasons, historically grounded reasons. So the Germans know they have a problem in terms of their defense quality and capability. They are moving in the right direction. They're increasing spending. In some ways, they were hurt, if you will, by having their economy do better than projected. So that means that their percent of GDP on defense is growing more slowly than it would if their economy were doing worse. So that's a perverse incentive right there. So part, in other words, part of the Germany problem is that they're strong economically. And so they are kind of marching up a pathway to get to 2%, which was the Whales Summit,

not to be at it today, but to be there in the 2020s. And so now their focus, I think, has turned to how to build up real capability on the ground in the air and on the sea and under the sea by giving themselves capability benchmarks to meet in the near term. That will be very hard for them to achieve, but I think they have the right goals for themselves. I guess this really does show how old the alliance is that the role of Germany and how people view Germany has changed so dramatically, you know, from keeping them down to wishing they would spend more on defense, I guess is a very dramatic thing. But over the course of 70 years, I guess it's not that surprising. I think that's right. And I think what's maybe jolting for all involved is how that

shift in perspective has come relatively recently. And it takes any country, put aside that it's Germany, you know, as somebody who looks a lot of defense institution building and democracies, you know, you have to train an entire generation to that, to acculturate to that new mindset. So, for instance, if you had asked the Germans five, six years ago, well, why do you have military forces? What are they designed to? In the German domestic context, there's not an answer to that. They don't say, oh, Russia is a threat. This is what we designed to. This is why we have military forces.

That is counterproductive in their domestic context because they have been raised on a view that they have a historic background that is regrettable to say the least. And that military force may be a necessity for self-protection, but that's about all that they focus on. Now you're trying to get them to think much more strategically about, well, what are those capabilities we need in order to fulfill our. portion of, you know, keeping the Russians, for instance, away from Eastern European nations, from protecting our borders to the south, from even contemplating being in overseas missions as part of a NATO or EU construct. That's just a very different way to look at things that has to hit a domestic, you know, a constitutionally based domestic context that is completely unprepared for it. So I think they've actually been making admirable progress on that important

foundational shift culturally, and then the funding piece will flow from that. It's happening later than it should have, but again, I don't necessarily think that's Germany's fault. I think the expectations on Germany have shifted relatively suddenly, given where we were, you know, throughout the history of the Cold War. And again, just to stress, it's not just seven, years ago, go back to 1989, the fall of Berlin Wall, and the concern maybe listeners won't remember,

the extreme concern about reuniting Germany at that time and the fear that neighbors had that a reunited Germany would be a powerful Germany that could threaten its neighbors. So that was, you know, even less time ago at which we were trying to

make all concerned, including the Russians, understand that Germany would not be a threat. to the security of Europe, nor to then the end of the embers of the Soviet Union. That was 1991, I'm sorry. You know, Germany is just in an odd historical point right now, and I think the question is, can the relationship endure through this period, which I think it will, so that we kind of come out on the other side,

Germany on the right track nested well inside a Europe that's whole and free. Let's cast our eye to some other countries if we can. Do you think NATO cares whether a country has a functioning democracy? I'm looking specifically at Poland and Turkey when I think about that question. I think NATO cares for sure. There is a history of less than democratic countries being inside NATO. Turkey, obviously, Portugal. So I'll just stop with those examples.

It is a big concern. And I think the question is what are the levers you have to do something about? And here's where I think understanding the role of the European Union, the EU, is important because a lot of those tools for norms establishment for holding seat to the fire in democratic processes and the economic implications are particularly strongly executed through the EU as opposed to through NATO. But NATO does have a role to play in terms of the institution building of the appropriate role of the military and society and making sure that the military arm that being NATO of the Europe project stays in line with the other pieces of that project, mainly the democracy focus and the economic focus. So it's a concern. It's not unprecedented to have countries that are struggling with democracy.

But it could become, obviously, could become problematic if there is a true, you know, right turn that or far left turn that creates much more totalitarian societies than is tolerable within NATO. If we could stick with Turkey for just a second, because it's not just a matter of democracy, there's also what appears at least, and you can tell us whether it is, a conflict of interest in Syria, where, Turkey has very specific security concerns with the Kurds, whereas the United States and other parties have actually been arming the Kurds and trying to get them to fight Islamic State and Assad. Do you think something like that is actually serious or it's just a blip between allies? The way I would approach that is that if you look at Syria more broadly, every sort of major trend we're seeing in the world. the world geopolitical environment has played out inside Syria. You've named one that's important, and I won't sidestep that, but I do want to put it inside this context that, you know, there are many, many fathers to disaster in Syria. The central player is, of course, Assad himself,

but the U.S.-Russia relationship obviously is playing out there. The differences, as you're pointing out, of allied interests, then there's the differences between those who are on the outside, there are NATO countries or Arab states and the views on the ground of the Syrian opposition elements, you know, there are just many, many things going on there. One aspect of that is that there is a difference of viewpoint on how to view the Kurdish group and their roles inside Syria, but also in a rush to add inside Iraq because there are Kurdish national groups in Iraq and inside Syria. And then there is a separate group inside Turkey that is of concern to the Turks. And there is some difference of viewpoint in how the Turks,

one in the West might say conflate these groups. The Turks might say how the United States and others might be ignoring the ties between these groups who are separatists from the Turk's point of view. So yeah, that is definitely playing out. It's a stress on the relationship, but there are a lot of stresses in the relationship, almost to numerous to count, between Turkey and it's particularly Western European and U.S. allies. The Russia-Turkey connection, I think it's another, the way in which Turkey has absorbed, Turkey has absorbed over a million refugees coming out of Syria. So it has taken, born the brunt of the refugee crisis of the NATO countries. So that's created its own blowback. But, you know, there's no doubt that divide a

viewpoint over the future of the Kurds or how to deal with the Kurds as an actor inside Syria is one of those elements that it creates strain in the relationship. Well, then if we can bring this all home. And as we are, as we're looking at NATO as a whole, do you think it still has room to grow? Or do you think it's kind of at max capacity right now? So no, there's other countries on that border with Russia that would like to join. What is the point of contention? There's no reason today to grow NATO.

There may be a point in the future. I don't think that NATO could never grow again. but because of the strain being put on it right now to make sure that it has the capability to defend the Eastern Front, that's where the focus needs to be. You know, that doesn't mean that other countries shouldn't be on a path to eventual NATO membership. I think there is a value to that in the long term in terms of thinking about how to secure Europe more fully. but there's no doubt that the Russians have forced upon the U.S. and Europe a conversation about its future and how the countries on its periphery play into the navigation of the European, U.S. European and Russian futures.

And so the focus for now, I think, is appropriately on those partner nations, such as Ukraine, making sure that they have support from NATO, as, for instance, the United States has been providing, begun providing some lethal assistance to help them defend themselves against Russian aggression. But for NATO, the focus is really first and foremost on making sure it can succeed in defending its own territory. You know, that actually brings up just one final question for me, if you have the time. Yep. Okay.

Final question I have is, is NATO in good enough shape at this moment to carry out its mission in case something horrible happened and war broke out with Russia? I think so. Yeah, absolutely. The biggest question is the geographic advantage that Russia has if it wanted to do sort of a, you know, listeners might think of the Blitzkrieg analogy sort of a, State accompli is what most people refer to it today, a kind of a quick grab of some NATO territory because they are quite proximate across the border and have very strong internal lines. They can move forces across Russia much more quickly than multiple different countries on the

western side of that border can move across multiple borders. So I think the question is the time and energy and effort it takes to dislodge that, as opposed to being able to prevent that. That's really where the debate is. I think NATO is quite capable. I don't wish to sound outlandish, but it is also a nuclear-capable alliance, and there is a deterrent value to nuclear weapons. So I think it's shown itself quite capable to deter Russia from wanting to think that's a good idea. But even if Russia were to do some kind of land snatch, I'm quite confident that the United States and its NATO allies would be able to dislodge that over time and in a way that would be for Russia quite expensive in blood, treasure, and time.

Kathleen Hicks, thank you so much for joining us and taking us through all this. You're most welcome. It was a challenging tour to force across Europe. I appreciate you. I appreciate you giving me the time. Absolutely. Thank you again. Thanks. Thanks for listening to this week's show. If you enjoyed it, please leave a review, even if it's just a post-it note on your mom's fridge. Transcripts of recent shows are now available at warcollegepodcast.com, and we're always happy to hear from you on Twitter, at war underscore college, or Facebook.com slash war college podcast.

War College is me, Jason Fields, and Matthew Galt. We will be back next week.