Angry Planet - Will the B-21 Bomber Break the Mold, or the Budget?

Episode Date: January 8, 2018

It’s been a while since the Air Force built a new bomber. In fact, it’s still flying an aircraft that’s 60 years old, the B-52. The more recent B-1 and B-2 bombers were beset by problems during their development and construction, and are now long in the tooth themselves.So, here comes the B-21, still in its development stage. In this episode, we talk with retired Air Force General David A. Deptula about what the new plane’s mission and capabilities will be.You can listen to War College on iTunes, Stitcher, Google Play or follow our RSS directly. You can reach us on our new Facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/warcollegepodcast/; and on Twitter: @War_College.Support this show http://supporter.acast.com/warcollege. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

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You're listening to War College, a weekly podcast that brings you the stories from behind the front lines. Here are your hosts, Matthew Galt and Jason Fields. Hello and welcome to War College. I'm Jason Fields. And I'm Matthew Galt. The U.S. track record in building large bombers since the B-52 in the 1950s has been a little spotty. In fact, it's been so spotty that the B-52 is still flying. The more modern, B1 and B2 have serious limitations and play relatively limited roles. Now, development of a new bomber is underway, the B-21. So what makes anyone think that this one will be a success?

And that it won't break the bank. The budget's already under strain from building the F-35 fighter jet. David Deptula is the dean of Mitchell Institute of Aerospace Power Studies. He served in the Air Force for 34 years and retired as a lute. Lieutenant General. We're lucky enough to have him today, and he's going to help us understand what's going on. Great, Jason and Matthew. I'm pleased to have the opportunity to chat with you on this extraordinarily important topic, so fire away. Can you tell us what the B-21 is supposed to be and the purpose it's supposed to serve? Well, I tell you what. I'd be happy to do that. Let me start with a little bit of

generic background, if you will, with respect to long-range strike aircraft, better known as bombers. Ever since World War II, American leaders have relied on long-range strike aircraft to hold any target around the globe at risk. And then during times of peace, this capability is instrumental in deterring potential adversaries, reassuring allies and shaping security dynamics. But when conflict does occur, long-range strike aircraft have the ability to hit the most vital targets in a decisive, overwhelming fashion. And quite frankly, the Department of Defense does not possess anything in its arsenal that can yield comparable effects at a value that long-range strike aircraft bring to bear.

Getting a little more specific, bombers, long-range strike aircraft can also do their jobs efficiently. Speaking toward the need to be more cost-effective in an era with declining resources allocated for defense, you know, for example, one of these long-range strike aircraft that we currently have in our inventory can strike over 80, 80, that's 80, independent targets on a single mission. Now, commanders are quick to appreciate this value. To kind of put that in context using a current day example, you hear sometimes folks talk about during our recent operations against the Islamic State,

there are occasional aircraft carrier gaps that have occurred. Well, to replace that missing capacity of an entire carrier battle group, that can be backfilled by flying an extra one or two B1 sorties per day. So the cost effectiveness of bringing force to bear when you consider the totality of what's required to do that really emphasizes the importance of being able to carry a large payload a long way. So what the B-21 will do, given that background, is allow us to operate this unique capability in an era where threats have increased to the point that our current bomber inventory simply can't penetrate

advanced air defenses that our potential adversaries are now fielding. with the exception of a handful of B-2s. So the B-21 will provide the kind of payload range and penetrability that our current force of B-1s, B-52s, and to a small degree, B-2s cannot accomplish. First, I just wanted to ask, when you're talking about gaps in the carrier groups, Does that mean that because they're sort of overstressed that sometimes they actually just, we don't have as many carriers out on the water as we would strategically want to have out there? Is that what you meant?

No. Just trying to make sure I understand this. Yeah, no. What I'm trying to get at is the issue, and perhaps it'll come up a little bit later on. But, you know, the bottom line is we need. as the United States, a spectrum of capabilities to conduct the entire panoply of security missions. Now, aircraft carriers perform a segment of that capability, and it's not just for strike. It is for projecting a presence to conduct signaling, to be able to access locations where you may not have a immediacy of land base,

and so on and so forth. But these are enormously resource-intensive assets. If you get to the issue of putting bombs on target and you do the comparison, that's where bombers really show their value. You want to get the issue of cost effectiveness. There is no more cost-effective system for putting weapons on a target

than with long-range strike-term. strike aircraft. Literally more bang for your buck. Absolutely. And the issue that too many people overlook, and this has been a symptom of the last 10, 15 years, as we've moved into an error with greater resource constraints on defense, people have focused on cost. Okay, but the error that they make is a focus on cost per system, whether that's a single

aircraft, a single tank or ship, versus cost per desired effect or outcome. And this has been an issue with respect to bombers in particular. Today, you have people that are looking at a B-2 as extraordinarily expensive because you have folks like former Secretary Gates talked about how the B-2, when you amortize all the costs that were required to produce it, amounted to around $2 billion per aircraft. But what has failed to be included in those equations is what are the alternate cost to accomplish the same outcomes or effects? It's a complex issue because, you know, that was not the design unit cost of the B2. But when you terminate a program at 20, when the design buy was 132, and you amortize the research and development costs of tens of, tens of billions of dollars, it adds up real quick. But, you know, I digress a bit because,

while they may be expensive when viewed through the cost-per-tail lens, the aircraft are enormously cost-effective, given their range and payload attributes. You know, you brought up the subject to the carrier. And again, I'm not bashing carriers. We need some carriers to do a variety of different missions. But to get a aircraft carrier from Norfolk, Virginia, to all off the coast of Syria takes how many months, at best case, weeks, three to four. Well, I can get a bomber there in a matter of hours, and I can deliver the same equivalent ordinance in a single sorty that, you know, it would take an entire day using the entire airwind to accomplish, which consists of 60-70 aircraft.

So these are some of the issues that our decision makers need to be informed of when we're dealing with the issue of costs. You spoke of the air defenses and adversaries that the B-21 was designed to get around. What are those- Or is being designed? Rather, what are those air defenses and who are those adversaries? Well, they're potential adversaries, and I'm specifically talking about the Chinese and the Russians. And while we certainly don't want to get into a conflict with the Russians or the Chinese, they're building weapons systems that they're willing to sell to other countries.

And a perfect example is the recent sale by the Russians of one of their most advanced surface-to-air weapons systems, missile systems. The S-400? The S-400? The S-400? The S-300, S-400, the S-400. the S-500 series, these are advanced surface-to-air missiles that, frankly, are extraordinarily capable. And so they'll sell them to their friends, so we need to be able to operate in those kinds of

environments. And what the B-21 brings to the equation is a degree of survivability that is the next step beyond or several steps beyond the penetrability of the B-2 and orders of magnitude, beyond the B1 or the B-52. I mean, frankly, you're not going to penetrate any significant air defense with the B-52 and to a lesser degree, the B-1. We've actually had a guest on to talk about the B-52, and he spoke about the B-52 as almost a political tool as much as it is a military one, right? Because it just, it announces the U.S. intention.

we are going to bomb you or we can bomb you, even if, you know, the aircraft itself is not exactly the most capable thing in the world at this point. Well, once again, it's capable in the context of payload range. Right. So we have to be careful also in these discussions when looking at and incorporating threats. If we're going to maintain our position as the world's sole superpower, we need to be able to succeed across the spectrum of, conflict, all the way from low-end counterinsurgency operations all the way up through global thermonuclear war. You don't necessarily need penetrability in all of these cases. So you're right on how bombers, whether they're B-52, a B-1, a B-2, or a B-21, they do have the

ability to send signals and messages in a way that no other weapon system can't. I mean, and that's just simply a proven fact. Our potential adversaries, Russians, Chinese, North Koreans, Iranians, they pay attention when there's a deployment of bombers into their region. You know, there was a case during operations against Iraq where, you know, we deployed some B2s to Guam, and we didn't see the North Korean leader emerge from a shelter for over a month. So potential adversaries pay attention to when bombers are deployed. And that's what's called, that's part of deterrence.

And so back to the B-21, and what's unique about it is it will expand our ability to operate in contested airspace, which is extraordinarily important because not just the congressional leadership, but the American people and many of those in the Department of Defense, have gotten accustomed to operating in permissive airspace over the last 26 years. And that's fine, back to my point I wanted to make with a B-52, is I can use a B-52 in Afghanistan over Iraq, in Syria, where we have permissive airspace. But I'm not going to take a B-52 and drive it into an area that is protected by modern, double-digit surface-to-air missile systems. So could you tell us a little bit about what would differentiate the B-21? And you can tell us it's not fully designed yet, right?

But what would differentiate it from, let's say, the B-2 bomber, which is, I know it's got to be 20 years old now, maybe older, but can you tell us what sort of capabilities they're looking to add? Well, first, you're correct. it is over 20 years old. The actual final design on the B2 was solidified in the 1993 timeframe. So by my calculus, that's 24 years. And technology advances over that period of time. So, you know, you all and your audience are very well attuned to the fact that the details surrounding B21 capabilities are still very much held in a classified.

domain, which is a smart thing to do because one certainly doesn't want to yield any specific advantages to potential adversaries out there that might be paying attention to everything that we say and do. However, generically, what the B-21 is going to bring to the equation is a greater degree of low observability, which is part of the survivability equation, than our much more than our current bomber force, including the B2. You know, there are a lot of myths surrounding the value of stealth, but the fact of the matter is, stealth, which is really shorthand for low observability, is a significant factor in allowing us to build a penetrating aircraft

that can be highly effective against even modern air defenses. Why? I don't want to change tracks just a little bit and talk about development of this thing, and the development of like the B-2. Often these kinds of big projects are plagued by problems. They run into political issues. They have cost overruns. Famously in 2008, a B-2 crashed as it was taking off. Is there something about bombers?

Are they more complicated than other aircraft? What makes them run into these problems, do you think? Any new weapon system that is capitalizing on a advanced technology is going to have challenges because you're building something that's new. So there are associated issues with unanticipated realities in design development of something as complicated and advanced as a low-observable, long-range, high-payload penetrating aircraft. That's not a surprise. If you go back and you look at the development of any of our modern aircraft, you'll find out that, you know, there were issues that developed in primarily the research and development phase.

That's not a surprise. One could lower the technical risk, but by doing so, you also reduce the potential advantages of capitalizing on advanced technology. This program in particular, from what I understood, is actually supposed to be a little different from previous programs. It's being developed along a slightly different track. There's somewhat different oversight. Am I wrong about that? No, no. I mean, there's increased awareness to the importance of delivering this aircraft on time, on cost. You know, people in our acquisition system as well as the contract.

themselves don't go out of their way to delay design development or production of an aircraft. They're doing their level best to produce an aircraft on time on cost. So, you know, these are unanticipated issues. And part of a great big part of what oftentimes causes delays is sort of the development processes and acquisition processes that have amassed a degree of Byzantine bureaucracy and committee decision-making that in the past have tended to slow them down. You mentioned the political factor that that was the issue in raising the individual unit cost of the B-2.

I go back to my example of it, it was not a designed to be a $2 billion per aircraft system. You know, if we had procured the 132 as designed, it would have been. come in under $500 million in an airplane, and that's a lot of money. But if you look at a 747, which isn't designed to do anything other than flies straight and level and carry a bunch of people, you know, you're talking on the order of $400 million a copy there. So one has to put in context the capabilities that are being designed into these aircraft, the fact that they're capitalizing on leading edge and advanced technologies. And, Part of what's different about the B-21 is a very streamlined acquisition group that, you know,

reports directly to the chief of staff of the Air Force and the Secretary of the Air Force to streamline and get rid of some of the layers and layers of bureaucracy that had hindered the development of other systems. So if you had your druthers and you could design your own bomber, what would a truly great bomber look like? And what would it do that ours aren't currently doing? The number one characteristic of our B-21 force needs to be survivability to increase the probability that it can operate in contested airspace and deliver a large amount of effects at long ranges with rapid response. You know, I go back to what I said at the very beginning. That's the value.

of a new long-range strike aircraft, but it's got to be survivable. One of the elements that people tend to forget, and those who seek efficiencies without thinking about effectiveness, highlight the capability that standoff presents. I go, well, what do we need a penetrating bomber for? We've got B-52s that can act as arsenal aircraft and carry large numbers of cruise missiles. Again, this is a symptom of people not being aware of what's involved in a major regional contingency. The last one I would suggest you and your audience was Desert Storm. A nominal major regional contingency consists of 40 to 50,000 aim points, all right?

Not the 10 or 15 a day that we were hitting in and become used to in Syria and fights against the Islamic State. you know, we were hitting on average. On average, over 1,200 targets a day during Desert Storm. So you can't do that with standoff cruise missiles because you really, you very rapidly run out of capability at an enormous cost. Your typical cruise missile is going to cost you more than a million dollars a pop. You know, with 50,000 aim points that wraps up pretty quick.

So penetrability is extraordinarily important. responsiveness is important, and flexibility. That's the other key element that long-range strike aircraft present. And let me introduce another key element that the B-21 is going to introduce into the fight to a degree that our older bombers have. And quite frankly, this statement goes along with any modern aircraft today. we have to stop using anachronistic nomenclature to describe aircraft because I'll give you a great example. F-22 and F-35, people tend to think of these things as fighters.

But given the censor suite that they carry on board, they're not just fighters. They're not just F's. They're F-B-E-A-R-C-E-W-A-W-C-S-20. and 35s. And the B-21 will B-1-2. These are more properly termed long-range sensor, shooter, sharing aircraft. Modern aircraft today need to be considered as nodes that can operate inside a much larger intelligence surveillance reconnaissance strike, maneuver, sustainment complex. where the value that we're going to accrue from these aircraft is going to be their ability to penetrate contested airspace, collect information that otherwise could not be collected,

and then share it with the rest of the complex. This is something that I've written about and in shorthand try to describe as building a combat cloud. Where we're going to be in the information age is, you know, success is going to be deterrenting. by our ability to rapidly share information in a ubiquitous and seamless fashion. So along with that strike capability comes the ability to sense information and to share it. If you want a real-world example, the first combat use of the F-22 wasn't to shoot down another airplane, which it was ostensibly designed to do. It was to collect information and share it with the rest of the first of the flight.

force to increase a situational awareness of that force. And oh, by the way, apply weapons to the advantage of the Joint Force commander who was running the operation when that was necessary. So, you know, my precepts that I would like to see in the B-21 and aircraft that we move into the future in terms of designing, arrange payload, survivability, collectability, and information sharing ability. And so a lot of people, you know, when I talk about that, they say, oh, you're increasing the cost of the airplane. Well, no, if you look at it in a holistic perspective, by putting a growth capacity into aircraft like the B-21, we don't know what kind of weapons or what kind of technologies are going to allow us to achieve greater modifications to those aircraft in the

future. So we need to value that element. So you shouldn't build it just to a specific cost, you should build to achieve a degree of flexibility that we know, we don't know exactly, but we know we're going to be keeping these aircraft for many, many years. So we need to be able to adapt new weapon systems and capabilities as they come on board. The first one that comes to mind is the whole issue and subject and capability of directed energy employment. We're not there yet because we still have to resolve the technical difficulties of atmospheric continuation of potential weapons like lasers, but we're going to get there.

And so, again, it's another advantage for operating aircraft. You can operate above the majority of the atmosphere and actually enhance the use of some of these weapons. Again, technologically, not there today, but in five to ten years, certainly you're going to see directed energy weapons carried on board B-21s for defensive purposes. And at some point in time, they'll be used for offensive purposes. And now when you introduce speed of light weapons, you dramatically change the game and the conduct of warfare. So those are the kinds of attributes that the B-21 needs to be designed to embrace as we move into an uncertain future.

That sounds like quite a task for sure. Thank you very much. I mean, I think that sounds like an amazing aircraft. I hope they can do it. Yeah, well, I do too. The other part that I'd like to add, Jason and Matthew, is one that you haven't highlighted yet, but it's the importance of numbers. So when you look at force sizing for the B-21, based on historical use, experience, threat

capabilities, and our national military strategy, we're really looking at a minimum of one squadron of combat-coded B-21s per AEF. squadron size for the bomber force is around 12, 12 times tens, 120 combat coded B-21s. Now, as a rule of thumb, approximately 25% of a total force of combat aircrafts needed to support test and training operations and another 20% for attrition reserve and backup aircraft inventory. So those numbers result in a requirement of 174 B-21s. Now, at the same time, I mentioned earlier that, you know, we're not going to need penetrating aircraft for every mission. So if you take a look at the huge cost effectiveness of the combined payload range capability of bombers, the nation also needs a minimum of half of the squadron or six non-penetrating bombers per AEF for operations in permissive airspace, like the kind of combat ops that are being conducted in the mid-east today.

So, you know, six, that essentially you end up with approximately when you had the test and training aircraft, you end up with 108 non-penetrating aircraft. You combine the two. That's a total bomber requirement at 282 aircraft. And that's well above what we have today. Today we currently possess a force of 158 bombers. So you go, okay, my gosh, how do we afford that? Well, that's the requirement based on the strategy. Now, if decisions are made that, hey, we're not going to be able to afford that, given the kinds of budgets that we have, at least now, the public, the Department of Defense, and the Congress has a mark on the wall in the context of what's actually required vis-a-vis the strategy.

Anything less than that that you buy can be translated into risk. And so, you know, that becomes a subjective call, but at least the numbers are out there. I think that's a perfect note to end the conversation on. Well, thanks, gentlemen. I very much appreciate the opportunity to talk about these critically important subjects with you. Thank you so much for joining us. Thanks for listening to this week's show. If you enjoyed it, please run around your neighborhood and tell everyone you can find.

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