Animal Spirits Podcast - Talk Your Book: The Case for Investing in Emerging Market Bonds
Episode Date: June 15, 2026On this episode of Animal Spirits: Talk Your Book, �...�Michael Batnick and Ben Carlson are joined by Eric Fine from VanEck to discuss: how emerging markets have changed, geopolitical risk, currencies, AI and more. Find complete show notes on our blogs... Ben Carlson’s A Wealth of Common Sense Michael Batnick’s The Irrelevant Investor Feel free to shoot us an email at animalspirits@thecompoundnews.com with any feedback, questions, recommendations, or ideas for future topics of conversation. Check out the latest in financial blogger fashion at The Compound shop: https://idontshop.com Investing involves the risk of loss. This podcast is for informational purposes only and should not be or regarded as personalized investment advice or relied upon for investment decisions. Michael Batnick and Ben Carlson are employees of Ritholtz Wealth Management and may maintain positions in the securities discussed in this video. All opinions expressed by them are solely their own opinion and do not reflect the opinion of Ritholtz Wealth Management. See our disclosures here: https://ritholtzwealth.com/podcast-youtube-disclosures/ The Compound Media, Incorporated, an affiliate of Ritholtz Wealth Management, receives payment from various entities for advertisements in affiliated podcasts, blogs and emails. Inclusion of such advertisements does not constitute or imply endorsement, sponsorship or recommendation thereof, or any affiliation therewith, by the Content Creator or by Ritholtz Wealth Management or any of its employees. For additional advertisement disclaimers see here https://ritholtzwealth.com/advertising-disclaimers. Important Disclosures from VanEck: https://www.vaneck.com/us/en/talk-your-book-vaneck-disclosures-june-2026/ EMBX Performance: https://www.vaneck.com/us/en/investments/emerging-markets-bond-etf-embx/performance/ Past performance is no guarantee of future results. Investment return and principal value will fluctuate; shares may be worth more or less than original cost when redeemed. Current performance may be lower or higher. Call 800.826.2333 or visit vaneck.com for month-end performance. Investing involves substantial risk and high volatility, including possible loss of principal. Visit vaneck.com to read and consider the prospectus, containing the investment objective, risks, and fees of the fund, carefully before investing. Van Eck Securities Corporation, Distributor Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices
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Today's Animal Spirits Talk Your Book is brought to you by Van Eck.
Go to Vanek-Eck.com to learn more about the Vanek Emerging Markets Bond ETF.
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Welcome to Animal Spirits with Michael and Ben.
Michael, you learn something new every day.
It's true.
Today I learned on our talk with Eric Fine, who's the portfolio manager for the Vanek Emerging Markets'
bond strategy that in the past 10 years or so, the volatility for emerging market bonds,
emerging market currencies have all come down to now the point where they're lower than for
developed markets.
That's kind of shocking to me.
I guess assumed that it was conventional wisdom that emerging markets were just always more
volatile.
Yeah, news to me.
Very interesting stuff.
I feel like the bond market is one area where people are just now this decade starting to explore other areas of it, right?
Because you had this thing where like the ag or the total bond market index fund or whatever got kind of blown up a little bit from the inflationary scare and the rising interest rates.
So people are going, whoa, whoa, whoa, I need to like learn other areas.
And emerging market bonds are one of those places where I don't think there's been a ton of exploration.
And this is our first time talking about on the show too.
We got all the stuff about volatility, currency.
why emerging markets actually, I don't know, from a fiscal perspective, seem better than
the developed markets today, which is kind of crazy to think about, that they were such a
basket case and just a series of crises for so many years. Anyway, fun conversation. Here's
our talk with Eric Fine from Vanek.
Eric, welcome to Amel Spurts.
Thanks, Michael.
All right, so we are here today talking about emerging market bonds. And to the extent that
people do think about their bond allocation, they are probably thinking through the lens of
United States bonds, be that government issued treasuries or municipal bonds or corporate bonds,
junk bonds, things like this.
Rarely do they think outside the U.S., and if they do, they are probably thinking about
Canadian bonds or UK bonds or something a little, something equally sort of plain vanilla.
rarely do they go out on the risk spectrum to think about emerging market bonds because historically
they have a, let's call it a negative connotation as far as it pertains to the fixed income side
of the ledger. How is that understanding or thoughts changed over time? Yeah, that's a great question,
Michael. So EM, as you rightly cited, has a perception, is perceived to be more risky.
said against this is the fact that EM bond vol is now lower vol than developed market bond
ball. So that's number one. That's pretty hard for investors to argue with when the volatility of a bond
market is lower than another's, it's, you know, by most finance frameworks is considered less risky.
So that's happened. Moreover, the carry is higher. All your coupons in your portfolio divided by the price,
if nothing happens over the next 12 months, that your carry, is higher in EM bonds than it is in
treasuries or the ag, for example, the most common flavors.
So already if your vol is lower and your carry is higher, that's pretty much finance 101.
But on top of it, this has been happening for a long time.
It's been happening for over a decade.
The ag and treasuries are, you know, barely, are basically up to zero over the last 10 years.
Our benchmarks up two and a half.
Our fund is up a lot more.
And now the perception is changing because partly because the 60-40 hasn't worked,
but that's because people had the wrong 40.
They're up to their necks and develop market bonds like the ag and treasuries,
which are generally characterized by governments that have too much debt.
We talk about what that means, but that's the story.
Whereas the good 40 is countries that have low levels of government debt.
They've already generated the lower volatility and higher carry.
I guess the conventionalism is that emerging.
market, everything, the stocks are more volatile, the currencies are more volatile, the bonds are more volatile.
Why is it the case that that volatility has been lowered?
The basic dynamic is the absence of fiscal dominance. So fiscal dominance is a movie that
emerging market economists or debt or bond fund managers have seen for decades. It's what happens
when a government has too much debt. What happens is the central bank ends up not maintaining
real rates as high enough as it would, as high as it would otherwise. It was solely focused on
inflation. And so you end up with higher inflation. We've seen this movie 80 times. And many of the
countries, I'd say most of the countries in our benchmark, have learned the lesson to the point
that it's not just about fiscal. It's now about politics. My countries have presidents or prime
ministers with 60, 70, 80% popularity who promised maintaining budget stability, who promised
maintaining an independent central bank, right? It is not popular among any parties in most of my
countries to promise you're going to harness the central bank to achieve economic objectives.
So it's not just the fiscal, right, the level of debt that allows EMs to be better and
DMs to be worse, which we're seeing the evidence of it in the UK and Japan.
But this is also resulted in really healthy politics, where you're just not going to get
a lot of these more risky economic ideas infecting EMs.
They can't even afford to contemplate them.
So they're actually a lot less risky.
It's really interesting to say that.
I mean, obviously a narrative violation with lower, higher yields performance.
Another thing that has changed, so you mentioned like the political stability.
That's not like when I think about emerging markets, that's not what comes to mind.
On the equity side of emerging markets at the index level, it looks a lot, the composition in
terms of the sectoral exposure looks a hell of a lot different today than it does 20 years ago.
I mean, a complete transformation could like completely.
I wonder what the bonds side looks like.
Is this story similar?
First, comparing EM equities and EM bonds, I would say the following.
EM equities is mostly Asia and mostly commodities importers.
Right?
I mean, you can frame these or aggregate the world however you want.
But they're mostly Asian and mostly commodities importers.
They are exporters of value-added goods like chips and cars or whatever.
but importers of commodities.
EM is not mostly Asia.
It's mostly not Asia and has a lot of,
as a majority of commodities, exporters.
So I'd say that's the biggest thing that's happened.
Now, continuing with your question,
the big issue in equities is how big China is
and what to do with it,
which is an endless conversation.
Should I have China X?
I don't know, you know, you can't go anywhere
with that discussion.
I don't know your problem, right, is the best answer.
So, E.M.
though, have not had that problem. The indexes have always been capped. Our benchmarks, you know,
both of our benchmarks have 10% caps per country. And there have always been more markets that are
more diversified, a lot less concentrated in these few EM equities that are doing well. The last point I'll
make is that within EM bonds, I'd say that there's, that especially with the local currency bonds,
there's really two worlds.
There are the, what you consider typical EM bond, let's say, you know, a Brazil with high beta,
14% yields, only 4.5% inflation, by the way, with 14% yields.
And there, that's higher beta.
You have to treat it as the higher risk instrument.
It is.
But there is a whole category of my market that is being bought by central banks.
And they're not going to tell you.
A big portion of our Asian bonds are becoming.
reserve currencies. And just as with gold, we wrote about gold 15 years ago,
so the central banks were going to buy it. No one cared then because it wasn't really a story.
They are not going to send a press release to the financial time saying, oh, yeah,
we're buying gold over the next five years, right? When you saw all those headlines of Brazil,
China, et cetera, agreeing to trade in each other's countries, what do you think a bank or central
bank is going to do with a bunch of cash, right? They're going to open a bond line. They are not going to
send a worldwide memo on it. And that's the same.
the big thing that's happening. So I think of China government bonds, Malaysian ringet bonds,
Sing dollar bonds, Korean-Wan bonds. Those are attractive reserve assets to central banks
that want to diversify. And so there's demand. So that's really unique. At the time that they're
selling the stuff that's in a lot of our portfolios like treasuries. So you mentioned your
portfolio. You are the portfolio manager for the Vanek Emergent Markets Bond Strategy. The ticker is
EMBX. Where does your work begin? Like, all right, you log on, you're looking at
I guess currencies, interest rates, fiscal solvency or lack thereof.
Is there investment great stuff in here?
It sounds like a giant and completely different universe than what the typical investor
is used to looking at.
So where does your work begin?
Yeah, I think that's a fair description, which is also a great counter to any efficient market
hypothesis, right?
I mean, you know, the odds of me being beating the S&P 500 are extremely low, right?
just mathematically and with a less efficient market.
So I'll start with that.
So we have a benchmark.
Very old benchmark.
That's where we start.
What is our benchmark?
Our benchmark are the two oldest government bond benchmarks in emerging markets.
The oldest one is dollar denominated.
These governments borrow in dollars.
And that is basically exactly like the U.S. high yielder IG market.
You get a spread.
And if the spread compresses, you know, that's good.
If the spread doesn't widen too much, that can be good, too, if you like your all-end carry.
But it's very much like the IG or high-yield market in the U.S., with the exception being that in EM, you get a little higher spread for the same rating.
And it's harder for the EM to get the same rating.
So it's arguably better quality.
But that's the dollar space, fairly straightforward.
And I don't like leading with the example because that by itself has,
done incredibly. I don't even want to say what it's done over the last 20 or 30 years. The spreads were
really high. It was the first winner from fiscal don't, the absence of fiscal domes. It was the first thing
that rallied as the EMs got their acts together starting around 30 years ago. The other part of our
benchmark is the same governments, or it's a different set of governments, but often the same
governments and their bonds and their own currencies. And there, they are generally higher beta,
but these are all mostly much higher yielding with great success on the inflation front.
So those are our two benchmarks, and we start with the benchmarks.
We overweight things we like.
We underweight things we don't like.
And in extreme situations, because we're bond investors and it's all about being paranoid
and avoiding losses, we're allowed to eliminate some things that are too risky, but we
can't do that too much.
How about currencies?
That's kind of one of the risks a lot of people say when you're investing international
bonds is, hey, the currency, that could kind of swamp all or your yield if currency goes against
you? How do you think about that? Do you guys hedge currencies at all? Or you let them free float? And it is what it is.
Yeah, great, great question. First, overall FX volatility in emerging markets is lower than
developed market FX volatility. So yen sterling, right, euro, a dollar, though that's been the
VAL. The VAL has not been Chinese Yuan with which most of my country's trade, which has been
like watching paint dry in a good way, right? That's just getting stronger and stronger and
stronger. So first, the VAL is already lower. And second, as a general principle, we never hedge
currency risk, because hedging the currency risk takes away basically the entirety of the value.
The value is the yield. And we try to invest in countries with high real yields. So countries that
pay you a very high interest rate in their currency, much higher than their inflation rate,
because their inflation rate should and will hurt their currency. But if they're paying a lot more
than that inflation rate, their currency shouldn't go down. And that's what's been happening
roughly for 10 years, especially in the Asians. And that's also why other central banks want
these sorts of assets. The definition of a reserve asset is not that when your interest rate goes up,
your currency weakens. It's a minimum is that if you hike interest rates, you can stabilize your
currency, and the UK and Japan can't even do that. Whereas EMs do do that all the time. They're arguably
being too hawkish because of the Iran war now, which is why things have been so stable.
And EM has been a winner, again, year to date. Again, I don't want to make it sound like it all
sounded this year. This has been going on for a long time.
So you mentioned that a few times now. So you're saying a lot of these emerging market countries
are buying each other's bonds. Correct. And they've got a lot of assets. These are the big
reserve piles, right? These countries, especially in Asia, own more of us than we of them,
right? Economists would call that your net international investment position. But look at
how many CGBs does the Fed own? Zero, I assume. Maybe some. How many treasuries do Japan or
China or Korea have? A lot, trillions. And so we depend on the kindness of offshore, right? We
need to borrow a lot from offshore. If you regress U.S. yields by this fact, we did this in one of our
research pieces and say, hey, look, let's just take into account the fact that we borrow a lot from
overseas. Now, why does that matter? Because a yen or Chinese-based investors going to hedge their
currency risk. And because of the volatility, the yield on our bonds, on treasuries there is so much
lower now that they're not buying it. And if you calculate that using a simple regression, it means
our yield should be a lot higher. But that would be the economics way of explaining it is. These
countries have low debts. They borrow onshore. They have to work to raise their money. And the U.S.
generally just pushes a button and assumes offshore investing. But obviously, since the 2008
financial crisis and the obviousness of fiscal dominance, the repeat in 2020, but especially
sanctions, right? Sanctioning, if you have a trillion dollars of treasuries as your savings,
your national savings, and there's any sanctions risk, that's somewhat unacceptable, right? Ken Rogoff
called a default, right, the sanctioning of reserves held by the central bank of Russia.
At a very high, basic level, you could generalize you can drill down. What is more risky,
all else equal? Emerging market government bonds?
or corporate bonds historically.
And I know that varies by everything,
but what's your take on that question?
Yeah, I would say the following.
I would change the comparison a little.
I would say if you have,
first of all, everyone is up to their necks in corporate bonds.
I don't care whether they're EM or DM.
I dare you to find anyone who's not up to IGUS up to my neck,
high yield US up to my neck.
So let's focus on that.
Number one, if you own high yield or use,
U.S.
Corp, a high-yield corporate or a U.S. corporate, you're going to get paid more for the same
rating just because it's called EM.
And it's going to be harder to get that rating.
Moreover, illiquidity in corporates is the big risk.
And I'd argue that the illiquidity in the illiquidity of U.S. high yield is a little lower
than the liquidity in EM because I can trade with Goldman Morgan Stanley Bank of America
and Standard Chartered, but I can also trade with local.
Mexican, local Brazilians, right? We've got additional counterpart. I grew up on a high-yield
desk. So that's the straight apples-to-apples comparison, EM, U.S. or DM, you know, U.S., for high-yield.
Now, on local, on their bonds and their own currencies, let's say the government bonds,
that's the real yield. And I'll just say two general things other than that EM has outperformed
treasuries. And those two things are, number one, all my countries have high real interest rates.
the central bank is only focused on inflation. And in Asia, most of these countries have lower
inflation than the United States. And so this has been an effective stabilization and their currencies
have stabilized as a result. And we've seen this pop up for several years now with headlines
on UK and Japan. And we've seen two Eurozone crisis. What I tell a lot of investors is
this is, you know, institutions normally have 3%. Pensions normally have 3%. And
I tell folks to imagine two scenarios.
One is their Portuguese advisor during the two Eurozone crises.
So you're a Portuguese advisor.
You've got a billion dollars in assets.
You're talking to your clients during one of the crises.
What are you telling them?
You're telling them you have to be long Portuguese treasuries.
The capital charges are non-existent or low.
The regulator favors them.
It's an uncertain time they're going to rally.
And what happened?
It got downgraded to below Nigeria.
you were not helped, right?
So that's one framing.
The other framing is put yourself as just a neutral, educated observer in Singapore.
You're watching the U.S.
You're not saying, oh, my gosh, I just wish the political team red or team blue won, right?
You're not saying either one of those things.
You're hoping, I hope they figure out some sort of 60, 70% thing and figure out the overall
strategy that's continuous, especially if you're a central bank.
And so that's the framing I would give.
And it's not that any of this stuff is going to happen,
is that you're not getting paid for this stuff, right?
We've got lower of all, higher carry,
and the newspapers just scream about these fiscal and, you know,
eventually central bank issues,
which lead to currency issues and financial issues in these countries,
which would be fine if you're getting paid for it.
The last thing I'll say is if you measure fundamental risk on an X axis
and you say, okay, this is a country that everyone can agree
has bad fundamentals, this is one with good.
And then you draw a line to say, how much do the countries call developed markets pay you as they get worse in quality and how much the EMs?
As the D, as things called developed markets get crappier and crappier, they don't pay you anything more.
Right, Japan had 2% yield this year, right?
And EMs pay you what you're supposed to get, right?
There's a real market for it.
They go to the market.
They talk to people like me and they say, what do we need to do?
Why are we doing so badly that our yields are higher, or spreads are higher?
Why is that?
These are the kids that grew up tough that didn't have a trust fund and had to work hard,
and now they're in good shape, right?
It's as simple as that.
When I was at Morgan's, I ran research at Morgan-Sailor, EM, you know, Seltzide
economic spa strategy, one of the interesting conclusions we found was higher and debted
countries are richer.
Richer countries can afford more debt, okay?
Mm-hmm.
You just need to read literature to know that that goes wrong.
Unfortunately, we live in a world of statistics.
And since, you know, this stuff hasn't happened in particular.
in the U.S. in a long time. It takes an EM person to say, well, this happens all the time. I've seen it
80 times. And this is where, for the last few decades, you've been hearing the alarm bells on the fiscal
positions of the U.S., UK, Japan. It's been people at the IMF or people from EM, right, who have seen this
movie 80 times. It has not been U.S. or U.K. or Japanese that, you know, for decades have been
pounding on this. They've been saying, it's okay. We just need a rate hike. We just need this reform
program. So that's, you know, one version of the answer. The other version of the answer is,
in 2008, we guaranteed all derivatives, right? About a quadrillion notional. That is an incredible
amount of forbearance or leverage. You know, that's what's feeding through the system.
The U.S. has what, we're dependent on the, how many people live in the Cayman Islands, right? They've
managed to somehow save like a trillion dollars to lend to U.S., right? So the central bank, the amount of
leverage in the system, hidden or not hidden. We've written a paper on how to measure it,
is extremely high in these developed markets, right? The banks were guaranteed. My country's finance
one was the biggest bank in Thailand in 1997. And the authorities decided, and it was good policy,
say, yeah, we're not going to take over the bank and guarantee it. And you know what?
Thailand is a better credit for it, right? They don't have the banking system as this massive liability.
So you're saying that they don't do a lot of the same bailouts,
and such. Correct, which is good. China had a real estate crisis, right? Did they bail it out? No,
they let it happen. So you keep, Eric, you've said a few times my countries. Do you have a list of
countries that like, you're like, these are the countries that I will invest in? Or do you have more
a list of criteria that you say, once a country reaches these criteria, then I will invest in them?
A list of countries. We have a benchmark. It's ironclad. We can, and if, if our core of our process.
Are there any countries you won't invest? And you say, nope, uninvestable, not touching them.
Absolutely. Do it all the time. We can't do it too much. We're allowed to exclude 15, 15, 15%, 15% from our benchmark. But absolutely. And right now, we like India as an equity market, but as a fixed income market, as an FX, it's not ready for prime time. And so that's something we're very comfortable excluding the current, you know, all these things that I described of good markets, namely central banks that maintain high real rates that have a free floating exchange rate. That's not India. Right. So we don't, we're, I definitely. I definitely.
didn't want to give the impression that everything in EM is awesome. There are definitely some
problematic countries. India is a big one. Indonesia, arguably. Philippines and Thailand right now with
high energy prices, that's normally why EM bond funds are actively managed. However, given the
sort of interesting nature of the kinds of things we talk about, I'll reemphasize that our benchmark
has outperformed Treasuries in the Ag for 10 years. In other words, it's great that, you know, we've been
able to navigate, do better. But that should not be the threshold. If just passive is, because I get
that a lot of people somehow feel that passive is an easier decision, that's a fine conclusion.
That's a far better conclusion than most people have right now. But yeah, what you asked about
is a good reason for active, especially with bonds. As you know, bonds are really about not making
mistakes because you get paid so little, right? And also, I'm always sitting in a room next to somebody
talking about Nvidia.
and so they don't want to hear from me.
So, Eric, on that, I'm curious,
AI has been a global trade.
Samsung and SK Hynix are, of course,
a huge part of their benchmark.
And a lot of these companies are issuing a lot of debt.
I'm wondering how you're thinking about that.
What sort of framework are you using?
Really none.
The two questions that get asked on AI,
I, one of them, I have a table pounding no opinion.
Like, is this thing going to work?
I think there's way too many opinions on that.
You don't need another, you know, on, is this a good thing or not?
I have no idea that's additive.
The other one is what, you know, the CAPX cycle,
the CAPX cycle is taking on strategic dimensions, right?
So it's going to continue whether the thing works or not.
And that should crowd out the consumer.
I think that's the only economic conclusion you could come to.
and it should eventually be adverse for the U.S. economy, probably positive for yields.
Sorry, that's not a sexy answer. That's a very economics answer, but I think that's the way of looking.
And the debt is being, you know, look, I don't want to mention specific names, but only one of the big names is not, you know, an unassailable balance sheet.
So it doesn't strike me as one of those kinds of problems.
But I say that only based on experience in debt markets over 30 years, not those specific types of situations.
But the CAPEX is real and it's going to continue whether it should or not.
When the war in Iran started, a lot of people said a lot of these emerging markets are screwed, right?
They are heavily reliant on that for oil.
And the U.S. is energy independent.
The U.S. is going to be fine by these emerging markets, especially Asian countries, are out of luck.
Emerging market, stock markets have been fine.
How have things in the bond market done since the geopolitical situation hit?
That's a great point, Ben.
And this was the same last year.
I'll just expand, you know, I'll riff off and magnify.
Last year, what were all the cool kids saying in response to Liberation Day?
Oh my gosh, Asia's going to get destroyed.
And moreover, China has to devalue its currency.
Because like when I was a sell-side economist on these countries, they're solving for the manufacturing export surplus.
But they've been running these for 30 years.
they're up to their necks in dollars.
And so what happened last year?
Everyone thought CNY should go weaker.
Misunderstanding in the situation.
The tariffs were essentially a message,
your currency needs to strengthen.
And what's the position of these currencies?
Up to their necks and dollars.
So they're told those dollars are going to go down
against their currency.
What do they do?
They did exactly what they did last year,
which is sell the heck out of dollars.
That was the story of last year
and the de-dollarization thing became a hot story.
Again, this year, Iran happened.
Oh, no, hey, Ben, let's not start with Iran. Let's start with Venezuela. Ships sail in,
Venezuelan, we accumulate Venezuelan bonds. Americans are conditioned to think, oh, there's an adverse
geopolitical headline. I'm supposed to sell my risk. I don't get that. It's good for Venezuela.
You know who else won? Latin America. Columbia is one of the best performing local currency markets.
We may not view it this way, and I'm not saying this is an endorsement of policy from anything
other than is it good or bad for my bonds. I'm not getting into whether it's good or bad,
in principle and all that stuff.
It is good to have the U.S. as a stabilizing influence in a lot of these countries,
both security and financing-wise.
In fact, this has been going on for a couple years in our portfolio already.
Ecuador, right, had a very positive election, IMF agreement.
U.S. tried to reopen a base with the friendly government there, didn't succeed,
and yet it's still working.
Bolivia just had an election, met both president, the two market-friendly candidates,
one-on-one, so they did it with a lot of people.
people in the market, clear support from U.S. Treasury to smooth the transition because they're
doing some hard things during the transition. And then Iran, oil prices go higher. Sub-Saharan Africa
is replacing Russia and now big parts of the Gulf as a supplier of commodities to the rest of the
world. Latam is a supplier of commodities that's really far from the region. And unless you think
whatever happens with the Iran war, you know, whatever you want to call what's going on,
negotiations, it's not a stretch to say that there's a reasonable odds of a scenario where risks
remain elevated, right? And these prices remain high. And so we, for our portfolios, or typical
portfolios for your audience, are going to think, oh, my gosh, this is high inflation. It's bad for
growth because now we're paying $5 a gallon for gas and we're going to consume less and we might
have a recession. There's a lot of my countries, this is boom time. Eric, last question for me.
what do you make of the global rise and yields?
I think it was primarily driven by the U.S.
That's how I felt it.
I'm sitting here staring at screens.
I used to trade with, you know, I don't trade directly myself now.
And the way it felt, which I think is really important, we do our own trading, is this was
led entirely by U.S. rates.
And if that's not true by UK and Japan, that's what the story has been, right?
even the Wall Street Journal reports about fiscal dominance, debt, deficits, Liz Trust.
Who knows who Liz Trust is other than that moment? That's number one. Number two, as interest
rates rose, of course, my bond's interest rates rose along with them, but the currencies didn't
weaken. My currencies did not weaken. And so my market was essentially saying, okay, you're the
king of rates. You set somewhat of a benchmark. And if they go up, we'll let our rates go up. But
number of central banks got more hawkish afterwards. So their currencies were stable, which the market was saying, okay, rates have to go up. But then the central banks reacted as they have for over 10 years performance or proofwise, but 20 plus years of actually doing it. That sends them signal to the market that, okay, you know what? These higher rates are a gift from the U.S. because their inflation rates in a lot of these countries are not significantly higher, particularly if they have
good policy to address them.
If their currencies are appreciating, which is the case in a lot of them, what do you think's
happening to their inflation?
It's going down.
So that's the thing.
Their inflation may be going up at the central bank hikes rates and their currencies rallying
because they're exporting their export prices more than their import prices are going up.
Their export prices are going up.
And so their currencies rallying.
What inflation and expectations are going down.
And so it was a short-term knee-jerk.
The currencies didn't adjust.
and it created probably a really, really great entry point for yields globally.
Eric, if people want to learn more, where do we send them?
Vanek.com.
My name's Eric Fine.
Our fund is EMBX and really appreciated this meeting, Michael and Ben.
Us too.
Thank you.
Thanks to Eric, remember check out Vanac.com.
To learn more about the Vanek, emerging market spondi, T.F, what we talked about today,
and then email us, Animal Spirits at the Compound News.com.
Thank you.
