Ask Haviv Anything - 149: Patriotism is too important to leave to extremists, with Prof. Alex Yakobson

Episode Date: September 25, 2026

To support our work, please consider joining our Patreon community (https://www.patreon.com/c/AskHavivAnything), Substack (https://havivgur.substack.com/), or Buy Me a Coffee (https://buymeacoffee.com/havivrettiggur).And be sure to check us out on Instagram (https://www.instagram.com/haviv.rettig.gur/) and TikTok (https://www.tiktok.com/@haviv.rettig.gur).--Hebrew University historian Prof. Alexander Yakobson returns for a subscriber Q&A: Did the Arabs really “miss an opportunity” in 1947? Can Europe reclaim its national identities without falling into old, dangerous chauvinisms? What happens if Israel’s “modern” class walks away after years of war and a rightward political shift? Do liberal democracies fuel extremism when they abandon patriotism?From Germany’s struggle with its past to a pointed debate over Israelis leaving their country, we ask what holds a nation together and what happens when those bonds are tested.--This episode is sponsored by David Allouch and dedicated in honor of his dear friends Ezra and Michele Chammah for their enduring friendship and unconditional support throughout the years, and to the memory of his late father Abraham Ben Haim who passed away on 25 Elul, 2023, and his mother Sarah Simcha who passed away on 6 Adar, 2025.Thank you, David, for that dedication.--If you like what we do here, please consider joining our Patreon community at https://www.patreon.com/c/AskHavivAnything or our Substack at https://havivgur.substack.com/. You can also Buy Me a Coffee at https://buymeacoffee.com/havivrettiggur. It helps us keep the lights on. Patreon and Substack are also the platforms where you can ask the questions that guide the topics we cover on the podcast, join our great discussions where listeners share news and valuable resources, and take part in our monthly livestreams where Haviv answers your questions live.If you would like to sponsor an episode, please email us at [e-mail]⁠.Musical intro by Adam Ben Amitai.

Hi, everybody. Welcome to a new episode of Ask Haviv Anything. Today I have the privilege and honor of hosting one of my teachers, one of Israel's, most interesting public intellectuals, Professor Alexander Jacobson of Hebrew University. He's on the podcast for the third time. I think it was episodes 8 and 118. This time we're going to focus exclusively on your questions. This is something we're continuing. We did this with Van Jones, and we're going to keep doing it going forward. Subscribers send in questions. We put those questions to the expert, to the guest. You sent in many, many dozens of wonderful questions. Thank you for that. We're going to drill down on a few. Let's get started. Professor Jakobson is a

professor in the Department of History at Hebrew University. He's a scholar of democracy, popular politics, public opinion, elections in the ancient world. And today, Professor Jacobson researches, the themes of democracy, national identity, nation states, the rights of national minorities in Israel, in Western democracies. He co-authored a book on the subject with the late, great Amnon Rubinstein, Israel and the family of nations, the Jewish nation state and human rights. It was published in Hebrew in 2003, in English in 2008, and many, many people who have listened to this podcast, I've heard me recommend that book several dozens of times. so let's get into it. Before we do, I just want to tell you we have a sponsor for this episode,

a repeat sponsor for whom we are very grateful. This episode is sponsored by David Alush, in honor of his dear friends Ezra and Michelle Shama for their enduring friendship and unconditional support throughout the years, as well as the memory of his late father, Abraham Ben Chaim, who passed away on the 25th of Elul in 2023, and his mother, Sarah Simcha, who passed away on the sixth of Adair Thank you so much, David. Really appreciate that dedication. I'd love to invite all of you also to join our Patreon, subscribe to our Substack. You ask the questions that I'm going to be posing here today to Alex and to our many experts when we do these episodes. You also get to take part in our monthly live streams where I answer your questions live. That's at patreon.com slash ask Habiv Anything or Javivgur.com. Those links are in the show notes. Alex, how are you? Thank you. Glad to be here. Our first question comes from a subscriber Joe. And Joe writes, Professor Jakobson,

in episode 118 from May 26, you discussed the Arabs missed opportunities in rejecting the 1947 UN partition plan and even the minority UNSKOP plan, both of which provided for a Jewish state. We should just refresh people's memories. The minority opinion of the UNSKOP report was not two equal states, but in fact a kind of federated state with no Jewish immigration.

In other words, a permanent Arab majority state. Even that was rejected in principle by the Arab states negotiating or dealing with Unscop at the UN. In hindsight, the rejections appear to be immense blunders. But at the time, Joe says from the Arab perspective, there was no chance they would agree to any proposal that allowed for Jewish sovereignty of any kind. because, one, their religion and culture forbade it. They spoke about that very explicitly and constantly in Arabic and even at the UN. And two, there was a consensus shared by the Americans, the Arabs, many other international observers,

that the creation of a Jewish state would provoke a war which the Jews would lose. Under these circumstances, if there was a war, the Arabs would win it. If Arab leaders had acquiesced to a Jewish state, how could they have explained the decision to their constituents? The Arab's rejection of partition was inevitable. Was there even a political capacity to have chosen any other path for them at the time? Well, you know, when one says, as one often does, that the Palestinians, and especially this is Abba Evans' famous dictum, the Palestinians never miss an opportunity to miss an opportunity. And I think he meant, first of all, the rejection of the partition.

when one says that they missed an opportunity, it means they missed an opportunity to have peace and on reasonable terms from their viewpoint, not that they missed an opportunity to go to start a war in the hope that they would win it. Of course they hoped they would win it, they expected to it. Nobody starts a war expecting to lose it. Everyone who starts a war always assumes that they will win it. And one of the bad things about wars is that you never know what happens. It's not a result.

It's not tailor made for you when you started. But it is true that any Arab, I think with the Palestinian leadership, there was never any chance that they would accept it. The Egyptians hesitated. There was internal opposition within the Egyptian government on that. And of course, the King of Transjordan famously hesitated. Until the last moment, he was pressured into it by the Arab League. Can you tell us that story fleshed out?

Some of our listeners will know the extent of Arab rejection. It wasn't literally just rejection of giving the land to the Jews. It was rejection of a small minority Jewish polity within an Arab Federation. That's what they rejected as well. With the UN report, the UN Commission that investigated the case, recommended partitioned by a majority, two states for two peoples, a Jewish state and an Arab state, giving independence to both peoples,

whereas there was a minority report supported by Yugoslavia, India, and I don't know, I forgot whom, that recommended a federation, an Arab Jewish federation. I think it was Iran. Iran was the third. Iran, okay.

The federal government would control immigration, which is, of course, obviously the result of it is that there would be no mess in Jewish immigration. They rejected that. The Arabs, the Arabs meaning the Palestinian Arab leadership, the Arab High Committee of Palestine, with the, added by the Mufti, but also all the Arab governments. Now, they rejected that and they insisted, they basically accepted that the, they accepted in principle that the Palestinian Arabs should decide.

It's their issue, their cause. And the Palestinian Arab cause was then that what we demand is a unitary Arab state in the whole of Palestine. That was nothing less, everything other than that was an act of aggression. They said explicitly they would fight it. Any kind of dismemberment or any kind of giving a minority privileges. That was, they called a federal state giving a minority, meaning Jews privileges, a privilege position.

And also a minority that consists of illegal immigrants. and so. In any case, I rejected, now it is true, of course, that it was objectively very difficult for any Aleb leadership in 47 to accept any kind of a national compromise over the question of Palestine. But, you know, they were, of course, they bore very heavy responsibility for the fact that it was difficult for them to accept it, because suddenly they had done nothing to prepare their public opinion for any possibility of any kind of a compromise with the Jews.

They did not recognize that, of course, the Jews as a legitimate side with which you are seeking a compromise and you want a compromise which is as good for as convenient for you as possible. And so the Palestinian Arab leadership totally rejected, of course, both those propositions and the Arab countries went along with it. they diplomatically, they were very loyal to the Palestinian cause. In fact, they were quite probably if they were able to destroy the Jewish state, to put an end to a Jewish state, they would, you know, you never know whether they would have then allowed a Palestinian state or maybe they would have partitioned it, the Jordanians.

The Transjordanians took over then the West Bank and the Egyptians never ever. annexed the Gaza Strip. They kept it for the future Palestine. So in any case, nobody, as we all recall, nobody thought of establishing a Palestinian state over those territories. By the way, you could have done it even without recognizing the state of Israel. Totally not diplomatically. You could say, we are now establishing a Palestinian state,

and it will deal with the question later, you know, by diplomatic or by other means. That was also a possible solution. But, of course, the Jordanians wanted it to themselves. I annex it formally. Now, we go back to the question of missed opportunities. The Palestinian leadership, there was never any chance that it would accept anything, short of what they were demanding, a unitary Arab state in the whole of Palestine. They rejected a binational option just as they rejected an option of two states for two people.

And in fact, after the War of Independence in Gaza, in Egyptian-occupied Gaza Strip, there was, they formed the government of all Palestine, of the whole of Palestine, the old Palestinian government, which is whose name tells you what they thought about the idea of partition, okay? And it was headed by Mr. Hadjahmila Hussein, by the same Mufti of Jerusalem. So that was... Two follow-ups. One, the reason the Palestinian leadership, specifically the Hussein is,

specifically, Khadjami al-Husaini, rejected in principle the idea of any kind of Jew, a fed. A federated state in which Jews can't come in when there's still only 600,000 of them, and their birth rate is far lower, and all the DPs stuck in Europe still have to find some other place. And that's agreed to by the UN, meaning it's agreed to by the Soviets and the Americans and the British and the French and everybody else, the people holding a quarter million Jewish refugees in Europe, right? and it's agreed to by the Arabs, so presumably the Iraqis won't then begin a mass complete total expulsion of their Jews. That's a Palestinian Arab Muslim state, and that was, they're not stupid. They know this.

And yet, Khadjami said, the only Jews who, we, I actually want to create a larger refugee problem. I want to expel 600,000 Jews. The only Jews who can remain are the ones who were here before 1914 or during Ottoman times. times. What is that? That's religious, right? There was no motive like that. There were some Christian Palestinians who, it was about nationalism for them.

But for Khadjahmin, it was Salafist, it was Islamist. It was, it was, Palestine is, waft, and Jews can't be allowed to push Islam back and all of that stuff, right? Well, they happily combined the Islamic rhetoric and the Arab nationalist rhetoric, which they certainly used and probably believed it. Why not? There is no content. It's just a theoretical contradiction. Why wouldn't Arab nationalism be also Muslim? Why not? It was both a suddenly used Islamic rhetoric,

and they would have established, of course, a Muslim and, you know, when you are asking about this federal state, but they had rejected, the Hajim al-Hasin, had rejected an even better British proposal in late 30s. The white paper, the famous, infamous from Jewish point of view, white paper, which would have given them an Arab majority country without an autonomous Jewish entity within it.

They just said, Jews and there will be a large Jewish minority, but they would, Jews and Arabs will somehow negotiate it, how would they would live together in peace, but it's just an Arab majority state, which is, of course, inevitably an Arab state, and they rejected that too. By the way, to be precise, they did not say they would drive away all the Jews who had come. They refused to guarantee that they would. They would not. They, look, they basically thought and said, Palestine is ours.

It is our country. This Jewish immigration is foreign invasion. Jewish national home is a hostile foreign entity in the Arab and Islamic. homeland and we will fight it. And they also believed that they were there. They believed that they had a good chance to win. By the way, the question assumes, the question asks me, how do, how am I saying it's a missed opportunity when they had good reason to expect to win?

My first answer is that an opportunity means sometimes that you give up the opportunity. You don't go to war. You go for a peace, a settlement. even if you don't like it, in order to avoid a war and what the war entails and the price, the humanitarian and the national price of a war, although you will, in that situation, often might expect to win.

For example, in the same year, in 47, there was a partition of India. And, you know, the Indian national movement that accepted the British proposed partition of the Indian Raj, the Indian subcontinent between Indian Pakistan. They thought that partition was an outrageous injustice. This is how they saw it. They thought that partitioning British India into two states along religious lines,

because the Muslim League was arguing that the Muslims of the subcontinent are a nation. And the Indian nation woman refused to accept the idea of, two nations along religious lines. And that's one of the reasons why the Congress governments found it very difficult to accept the idea of Zionism because they regarded it as nationalism along religious lines. But never mind, they, although they, this idea of two nations was directly against their beliefs and their interests and what they wanted to establish. By the way, they were quite wrong.

I think it was, it is very lucky for India that it was not in the end established containing all the Muslim minority that later would become Pakistan and Bangladesh. But that just enough. They thought it was wrong. It was a historic injustice imposed by British imperialism. But they accepted it because they, you know, because obviously it was the only way to prevent a war, an all-out war. Now, very probably they might have thought that they would win this war if they went, okay.

but they didn't want to start such a horrible thing now. What happened was pretty horrible, but it was much less horrible than would have happened if there was an all-out war. These were just local clashes with horrible results. But, you know, that is an example of a national movement that is faced with a compromise proposal. By the way, by the British Empire rather than by the international community. That is also not unimportant.

and believes that the proposal is unjust, but also believes that it's the only way to, accepting is the only way to prevent an all-out war and chooses a peace settlement which, of course, at least reduce the number of casualties that would have resulted in, if they rejected it. Now, you have, no, a much less dramatic event. It sounds funny, but in the beginning of the 20th. century, Norway quit Sweden. Do you know there was a drama that the kingdom of Norway was ruled by the king of, by the Swedish king. There was a personal union between the two kingdoms.

And Norwegian parliament decided they wanted a separate independent state. And you know what? There was a serious debate in Sweden about the possibility of sending troops to Norway in order to prevent this secession. As, you know, as you may remember how America was. The Brits did send troops because these were the norms of the late 18th century. By the beginning of the 20th century, a country like Sweden discussed this possibility, by the way, the Swedish conservatives, I'm afraid, or many of them at least, were in favor of that, and the Swedish Social Democratic Party opposed it and threatened the general strike.

So sometimes social democrats have been right, on the right side of history, historically. And in the end, the country of Sweden decided that it was not something worth fighting. Now, of course they would have won the war. What do you think Sweden, you know, of course they would have defeated Norway at what price, you know. We cannot even think about a Swedo-Norwegian war, but Scandinavian peoples, you know, they fought each other and others very ferociously. So, again, speaking of culture, is it consistent with the Nordic culture to allow a secession unconstitutional, you know, violation of loyalty to the king without fighting?

Well, it used to be consistent with the Nordic culture to do all kinds of things in European history. There was a horror of the whole of Europe, the people, the Nordic peoples months. you know, if you remember that Denmark used to rule parts of England, all kinds of things, you know. By the beginning of the 20th century, it was not yet inconceivable for the Swedes to fight, but in the end they decided that they wouldn't do it and they didn't do it. And so, yeah, they accepted something which they thought was, by the way, they also said that Norway was important for Sweden because it was a defense against Russia.

They needed it to defend the security of the, by the way, as a Russian, as someone born in Moscow, I must tell you that this argument was not at all groundless, you know. There was nothing flimsy about this. Sounds funny, everything, but people could have thought, could have brought themselves to the feeling that we have to fight because it's a matter of national security, not just, you know, king's power. But they decided not to fight because, you know, some people think that, starting a war is a horrible thing, that you have to, you know, you have to take risk

and you have to make sacrifices in order to avoid it. And, you know, and again, the Palestinian leadership never, I think, the then-existing Palestinian leadership never, I think, gave a thought to the possibility of accepting any kind of a compromise. But the Egyptians were wondering and hesitating in the end, they decided. why they decided. As far as I know, the only Palestinian Arabs

who are in favor of accepting partition in order to avoid the war, and moreover accepting the principle of self-determination for both peoples were the Arab Communists, not all of them. Before the Soviet Union supported partition, the Arab Communists and Palestine

supported accepting the rights of Jews as a national minority. That was the most liberal, the most non-nationalistic stance. A very small group. Once the Soviet Union supported partition, they, of course, accepted Comrade Stalin's line, but that was objectively progressive on their part because it meant they were the only group of Palestinian Arabs who openly and courageously supported partition were prosecuted by

the Arab governments and Arab communists were. was a detention camp in Sinai of Arab communists from Palestine. And when the Israeli forces entered Sinai, they took it over and released. Those people brought them back to Islam, returned them to Islam, because the communist, the Arab communists, but that was a very small group that had an idea that there is something other than the national and religious motivation. Now, historically speaking, that means that the Palestinian people lost an opportunity. to have a solution that is on much better terms that are now proposed by those who speak of

of the Palestinian state in West Bank and Gaza because the Arab state in Palestine was supposed to be much larger than that. And also, I would say, at least as good as those who are now speaking about a binational state because they rejected a binational state. Of course, now, theoretically a binational state now would be would have would contain a much larger percentage of Jews than it would have been at that time although I don't believe that if there is a real binational state in Palestine

I don't believe this percentage would remain but that's another story okay we move on to Fritz as a 30-year-old German I got unconsciously ingrained with a deep mistrust of national identities. It was seen as a cultural answer to the Holocaust. And even though lately, I have become more aware of the weaknesses of a nation-state without an identity. I still can't completely shake the worry that rebuilding this identity will lead to the suppression of our minorities.

Or maybe he means the oppression of our minorities, as has happened so often in European history. So my question is, how would you alleviate this concern in me and my fellow West European and what cultural aspects must an identity entail so that it doesn't lead to the blaming of its own flaws on some imagined external enemy? He's, you know, worried about German history, but also I think he means also an imagined internal enemy. Can modern Europe, modern Germany specifically, where it becomes a much more painful question, reclaim national identity without falling into the traps of old? Well, first of all, it is true that there is a danger. Whenever you accept anything that is national, of anything national of any kind, then there is a danger of nationalism and in the negative sense of chauvinism, of racism, of exclusion of it.

It is very often, the argument is very often made by people who, in my view, are crazy and also dishonest because they all, their condemnation of nationalism is only confined to Western nationalism. They do not really oppose nationalism. They are very happy, excepting any kind of non-European nationalism that includes all kinds of characteristics that they would have, everyone would have found outrageous. So they are at best unrealistic and very often also dishonest and biased. but that doesn't mean that the argument is wholly wrong. It is not wholly wrong.

It is true. That whenever you accept any kind of national anything, you know, you are on the same continuum with very nasty things. You are on the same continuum with in the German case with Adolf Hitler. This is true. This is simply the truth. And so what is the answer to that you do not get to that continuum? I won't, by the way, first of all, I want to recall that it is equally true, that the moment you accept anything social, any kind of, not just socialism, but any kind of social state of what is in Germany is called the social market economy, the social state, the welfare state, any kind of a social arrangement, you are on the same continuum. You are on the same continuum with Robert Stalin and Combeck-Port and the North Korean comrades. It is true because it's about collective.

giving the state power to do something for the common good. So there is a danger. And by the same token, I would say that the moment you oppose colonialism, you are in favor of giving independence to colonial people, which is a, okay, not a very radical view nowadays. The moment you do that, you are in danger of ending up with something like Saddam Hussein. And it's a very real danger, by the way. And Mugabe and Zimbabwe and there's a whole lot of people who fill that vacuum of decolonization with terrible crimes. So the argument about the continuum is, I think you should bear in, of course, if you are a German, you must, you will always bear in, you must bear in mind the danger of nationalism above all else.

It is true. In Germany, I think it's a very topical question nowadays, when the IFT gets 44% in a small East German state, but it is on its way to become a very powerful party. And the IFTA is a very nasty piece of work. It is nothing like, for example, Meloli's right in Italy, which may have originated in... She was a fascist as a young kid, but there's nothing like a fascist nowadays.

I don't think that is a, that's a decent, that's actually decent conservative government. And there's nothing fascist about the, I think, about the Italian prime minister. But the AIFDA is a very problematic political force. Can you tell people why, you know, there's a big debate out there about Aifday. Is it just a European response to mass immigration? Is it just populist right a little bit like you see in Britain? Or is it really something much, much worse? And the Jewish community, by the way, is very, very worried about them.

And the Jewish community is mainly most of the violence and anti-Semitism it faces in Germany is from Muslim immigrants. And they're still more worried about IFDA. What's so, why are IFD so worrying to so many people? All European parties are moving in the direction of imposing greater limits on immigration, which in practice means mostly Muslim immigration. not just the German Christian Democrat, but the Danish social Democrats have accepted unprecedented limitations on immigration.

I'm not sure they are less hawkish than the AFD on immigration. Maybe IFDA is, of course. Look, when the established parties move to the right, the IFD has to move further to the right, so they are now even more radical. But it's not a question of imposing limits on immigration, which is now a very widespread tendency

among conservative and even not only conservative parties, but, and I think historically there was a mistake made by the liberal establishment of Europe in assuming that there was no limit to the number of, and the pace of immigration

and the cultural gap between the great numbers of immigrants that there was no substantial limit to immigrant. But that's another debate. The I-FDA, apart from that, is, of course, tainted with the, there is a very strong German nationalist and the negatives and sentiment within the I have there, including, of course, the, I mean, the attitude to the Nazis and to the Holocaust.

I don't openly, look, in Germany, you cannot openly say, you know, Hitler was not all bad. There were good things about Hitler. If you say that, you will go to prison. I mean, the German state is very straightforward about dealing with those things. So you don't say that, but there are ways of, there are ways of sending this message. And this is a message which they are sending. How do the Germans going forward reclaim enough of their identity to have a coherent policy, to have a defense posture vis-a-vis Putin, all of the things that they're talking about now

that they need a stronger identity for, that the dismantling of identity by the elites, the universities for generations maybe left them a little bit unable to handle a real world, they now want to reclaim some of that. How do they do it safely? There is a, I want to say that there is, there is a danger that I pointed to.

There is a danger that one has to be aware of, of excessive nationalism or excessive, but there is also another danger that I want to stress. And we have to do with two dangers. both of them, some antennae say. There is a danger that if the democratic force, the decent democratic forces are perceived by the people as anti-national,

as renouncing their national identity, their culture, their history, dismantling, you called it, dismantling of national identity by the elite. There is a danger, a very grave danger, that if this happens, this will open the way to nasty nationalism. This is what makes nasty nationalism privates, really.

When the left and the center and even the moderate right are perceived as anti-national, as accepting national humiliation, as accepting a national double standard when it comes to preserving one's culture. And when you go to German history, you know, this is the Nazi movement, which presented itself as a German liberation movement, the German freedom. freedom movement. This is how it defined itself. Of course, one of its main resources,

one of its main pillars, what was the ability to present the Social Democratic Party that was the main basis of the Weimar democracy as anti-national. The Social Democratic Party was not at all anti-national. It was patriotic.

It was nothing like those who are now dismantling national identity. It was very patriotic and national, and in fact, one may argue that it had been too patriotic in supporting Germany at the beginning of the First World War. That is the far-left criticism which was not groundless, I must say. But the problem with the German social democrats under the Weimar Republic was not their attitude, but the fact that they had been forced by the victorious powers to sign a humiliating Treaty of Versailles. They were the German government at the time, and the Treaty of Versailles was imposed on Germany, and the government that they had ceased power in a revolution.

And so they were, in order to put an end to the war, into the blockade, to the siege, to the blockade, they had to put their signature in the name of the German people to the treaty that was widely perceived as a national humiliation, as unjust and humiliating. By the way, you don't have to be a Nazi. or you didn't have to be a Nazi to think that the Treaty of Versailles was an unnecessary or humiliation of the German people. The same argument was accepted by all the left-wing parties, by the Communists and the Sojourn, and, by the way, it was accepted by Mr. Churchill, who was neither a fascist nor a communist, but he thought it was a good British patriot and imperialist, in fact,

but he thought it was a bad idea to humiliate Germany in such a way. And he said this would foster aggressive nationalism. Of course, you can say the German people should have considered how they would have treated the Western countries if they were to win the war. It didn't take much imagining because as someone born in Moscow, I can tell you that the Treaty of Breastly Toast, which they had imposed on the defeated refraptions because of the Bolshevian was certainly no better than the Treaty of Versailles. I think it was worse.

It was even more unfair. So what? People's, you know, people's... Or Vichy, France, or... Yeah. When people's believe they have, they are being mistreated. They don't like it. And they don't ask themselves complicated questions,

although it is up to then intellectuals and liberal people and good Democrats to ask them this question. So that's fine. even at the cost of antagonizing, you know, a lot of, you know, a lot of your people. But if the Democratic camp, that was the catastrophe of the German democracy, of the Weimar democracy, and of Europe and of the world, as we know now, that the German democracy and the main forces that were sustaining it had been tainted by having to extorting. as to accept something that was widely and rightly, certainly not without foundation,

considered as a national humiliation and injustice to German. And so that was a huge gap. There was nothing. You cannot understand the Nazi rise to power without understanding this dynamic. So if when... So the liberal democratic forces have to be patriotic. People don't need that much. patriotism, but they do need some.

That's an iron law. The nation is not willing to accept anything that it regards as anti-national. So if you are playing this game or you think that you want to be on the safe side of it, then you are playing

into the hands of extreme nationalists. Would you go as far as to say the project of erasing national identity, of erasing borders, of erasing is going to create the exact opposite in deeply unhealthy ways? The moment it is perceived

as a national political issue that takes it's not always immediately perceived but when you have a skillful politician on the other side and who will use this that is a winning card for every populist nationalist

on earth and will all, and as far as far as I think it's really part of basic human nature. Now I want to go back to the history of the German, of the new, of the federal republic of Germany, of the modern German democracy. You know, there is a nice thing on YouTube.

You can look for it. The moment the Bundestag, the German parliament, receives the news that the Berlin Wall is falling when the government of East Germany decides to open the borders. That's the end of the barrel in the wall, and that's the end. In the end, that, of course, it will cause the unification of Germany. The moment they receive this piece of news, they stand up and start singing spateniously the national anthem. All of them, not just the Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats and the Free Democrats

and everyone. All the German parliament sings. the German National Enthel. Now, it's worth asking about the history of this son because if you ask where exactly the boundary passes, it's not

always easy to say because I would say the boundary passes between the different stanzas of the German National of the Federal Republic. The German National Anthem, the Deutschland lead, the son of the Germans, is a 19th

century son. calling for unification of Germany. This song was accepted as a national anthem by the Vime Republic. Then it was the national anthem of Nazi Germany. And the first tanzer of this song is Deutsche, Deutschland, Deutsche, Oberalis Intervetz. Germany, Germany, above all, above everything in the world. Now, it is said that the original meaning of this is nothing very sinister. It doesn't. It was not supposed to mean that Germany is above any other country, but that everyone in

Germany is German first and then Bavarian next. You know, the interpretation that suddenly became prevalent is not impossible. It is very possible when you say, Uber Alis and the Welt. Of course. So you can say, throw this. What do you do after you? when the federal republic is, when the German democracy is re-established after the war, and you have a post-war German government, you might say throw away the song.

What Adenauer, this was Adenauer's decision and with the president of the republic approving. The decision was not to throw away the song, but to change the stanzas, to sing, to make the third stanza of the song, the thing that is being sunk. This is what they were singing in the Bundestag when the Berlin world fell. The right and the left they were singing the third stanza

of the same anthem that had served the Weimar Republic and the Nazis, and those who were fighting for German reunification in the 19th century. And the third stanza says, my German, I hope my German accent in German

will not provoke much anti-Semitism, but it says, EINICKICT and Recht and Freight for the Deutsche Fraterland. Unity and justice and freedom for the German fatherland. Okay,

that is the, so they, okay, there's nothing wrong with that. And this is the Einichkees and Recht and Freight, this is kind of a motto, national motto. This is the Liberté, a litreternity of the German, of the German, of the Federal Republic.

Now, you know, it's a very complicated thing. Of course they could have, the Democratic government in West Germany, as it was then, could have decided that this son is so much tainted. Of course, it had been the anthem of the first German democracy at Wyoming Republic. They could say, we are restoring it, okay? The Nazis distorted it, but let them burn in hell, and we are going back to, the anthem of this honorable national song, to the anthem of the Vimerick.

Or they could have said, we are throwing the song away, we are writing a new anthem, because it was tainted by the Nazis so much that we cannot touch it. So they would have then, there was a real danger that this would be, uses a card by darker forces of German nationalist. So I think that except, so this was a, I think this was the right decision in, at least, or it, I don't know, it was a, it was a good idea to think how we preserve a national tradition. Despite it's to say that this song had a checkered history is an understatement, okay, this song had a horrible history. But if you are perceived as renouncing your national tradition, you are, you make sure. sure that forces, very sinister forces will make, will put this tradition to good use,

very effective political use. And it's not a good idea. Question three. We're only on three. Let's move faster. Leros, Leros, I hope I'm pronouncing that name correctly. Here's my question for Professor Jacobson. I often half joke to my friends that the U.S. today is like Rome, circa 400 CE. We're currently a once-great-great imperfect empire, but we now see evidence of our decline in our crumbling physical infrastructure, the greed and venality of our leadership, the incoherence of the electorate, and the rise of our largest peer competitor, China, as an economic juggernaut. Love to hear your thoughts on this. The analogy doesn't really hold. The Roman Empire did something that the United States

is not doing since the 19th century. It conquered territories and made them part of the of the Roman state. And by the way, in the end, not originally, but in the end, it also gave Roman citizenship to all the peoples that it conquered. So it was kind of an empire of all its citizens of you wish. It was a very radical thing to, on the other hand, while it was very inclusive ethnically, really, they had emperors coming from non-Latin and non-Italian peoples. They had an emperor called Philip Arabus, and he was exactly as he sounds, you know, so we're from Syria, a guy from Syria. So they were very politically correct in the sense of ethnic inclusivity.

On the other hand, they were extremely authoritarian, authoritarian, and there was an extreme social hierarchy that they created. So there was an ethnic, ethnocultural inclusivity, but not social inclusivity and no political freedom, There was no, how did they say, incoherent electorate? There was no incoherent, there was no kind of electorate elections. There was no element of political freedom. So it cannot be paired with free political, with the problems and the horrible problems of free political systems. It's a completely different situation.

David. Does Professor Jakobson think that it would be a good idea? to introduce a right to referendum in the Israeli system. In Switzerland, for example, if 50,000 citizens request a referendum within 100 days after Parliament passes a new law, the law is suspended and all citizens are called to vote on it. Would it not help solve issues linked, for instance, to the judicial overhaul?

Politicians would need to face the public instead of pretending to know what the majority of the public wants. Do you think a referendum process would be useful to the Israeli system of government? The Israeli law provides for an option of a referendum, but the Knesset has to put the question, has to decide to hold the referendum. Now, whether I am in favor of what are called initiative, the right of citizens to impose a referendum, no, I'm not in favor of that.

I'm not saying it's in principle and not a democratic feature, but it's a, I would say there are, there are, it creates chances, but also it creates dangers. Mentioning Switzerland, I would recall that there was an initiative imposed from, below and adopted and made part of the Swiss Constitution. That minarets are not allowed. There's an article in the Constitution of Switzerland that says minarets are not allowed. Now, you know, if the Knesset, the Israeli parliament would pass a law, outlaw in minarets, targeting a specific religion, the Supreme Court, as long as it has the power to annul

legislation would annul it. Now if, you know, if... And the world would be talking about nothing else. Of course, of course, but of course. The word would say we are Nazis, of course. But, you know, whether I would like, you know, you know, thinking of what would be, what would pass an Israeli referendum

in the wake of the 7th of October, you know, when you have a national conflict, when you have religious and national feelings and parties, appeal to them, imposing something by popular vote can be dangerous. The parliament has to be responsive to people. People view that, I think that's a basic logic of a parliamentary system. I would say we, I would be in favor of a written constitution and I would probably be

now in favor in principle. I don't know, it doesn't have much. I would be in favor of the second house. We have, we're a country with 10 million people. So maybe one chamber with a 20, 120 deputies is not enough, something more complicated. I would be in favor of giving the president of the state a suspensive veto, at least a right to initiate a reconsideration of a bill, maybe not a real veto like that can only be overcome by two-thirds.

But something, I would make some arrangements, but I'm not, I don't think it's a good idea to have an initiative in Israel. Nadav asks, I hope this isn't too tough of a question to answer, no such thing, but I read your book, Israel and the Family of Nations, and absolutely loved it and learned so much from it. My question is whether international law and European norms, which the book discusses and is really almost about, that's the topic, Israel in the context of international law and European norms, have gone through changes. in regards to the subject of nation states, laws of return, etc., it is a rousing and powerful and deeply convincing and very historically grounded defense of Israel. It forces you out of the categories. It forces you out of the rhetoric. That's 20 years ago. How are we doing right now?

Have the actual morals and standards changed? And also obviously has Israel changed? I would say the norms in the Western world have not changed. The rhetoric has changed, I think. The rhetoric of denying the legitimacy of anything that is national or culture-oriented is much louder and aggressive as we have discussed. But the actual practice of democratic states in this respect has not changed. For example, let me give you an example. called Norway, we discussed it previously.

It is certainly, and if it is nothing, if this is not a liberal democracy, European liberal democracy, there is no liberal democracy in Europe. It is also politically, very politically correct in anti-Israeli nowadays. But the flag of Norway still features the sign of the cross, the cross, which means that the idea that a country is a, is a, A democratic country, an inclusive democracy, has to be culturally neutral. And its symbols should be such that all its citizens, regardless of the ethnicity or religion, of the people with the religion, must be equally close to them.

Doesn't hold, doesn't exist. You know, in this, of course, the Jewish state, the idea of the Jewish state, and all these states and bills that are Jewish. They are attacked in the name of the idea, which, you know, in print, you can think of it that there is a, you know, theoretically you could say that, yes, that there is a price to the national symbols not being neutral from the viewpoint of the ability of the different groups of communities of citizens to identify with them and with the state. But the Norwegian state still has a cross, not just Norway, all the Nordic countries, but also. So Britain and Greece and Switzerland, have the cross on their flag, which is not a new,

I once told the German gentleman who was criticizing the very politely, Germans are very polite, or at least used to be, and he was criticizing the non-neutral character of the Jewish states, but I told him how the cross, if you insist on the notion of neutrality,

the cross is much more non-neutral than Lee and, than the Star of David, because the Star of David is a tradition jury symbol, but it's nothing from the religious point of words, nothing has no meaning at all. It is really an invention of tradition in the best of it. Cross is something very serious, and I told him, you have no idea what it means for an observant Jew, not someone like me, but for the serious observant Jew, and perhaps for a Muslim, to salute to a flag with a cross. And I told them the reason why you don't know that in Europe is because a Jews never

dared to tell you. But you'll be hearing from the Muslims, don't. Okay, it will come soon enough. Any changes such? Now, I'm going back to Norway since the publication of our book. It is not just the cross is still on the flag, but they amended the constitution of Norway in 2012, okay, which is within the relevant period. And they changed the definition of the relations between the Lutheran Church and the state.

And as we wrote in our book, amazingly for many people, of course, for Americans, for whom strict separation of religion and state is an article of faith of the American civil, civic religion. But there are other democracies, you know, and in some European democracies, in Norway, in Norway, the Constitution used to say that the Lutheran Church is a Church of State. They no longer say that. But when we were writing our book, we quoted the Norwegian Constitution that said that the Lutheran Church is a Church of State, which is a very flagrant violation of the supposed principle of neutrality, although the principle of equality and religious freedom was already

then enthrined, of course, in the Norwegian Constitution. and in practice. Since then, they amended the Constitution. They removed the definition of religion, of church, of the state church, but they say no. In the Norwegian Constitution, the fresh, relatively freshly adopted as constitutions go, a Norwegian constitution, that the Lutheran Church remains the people's church of Norway, something more fuzzy than state church. But it's a purely symbolic statement. It doesn't give it a, any, you know, it doesn't make a Lutheran more of a Norwegian citizen than a non-Lutheran, but it says it makes a cultural and historic statement about Norwegian identity.

It also says that the king shall always remain a member, the king shall always remain a member of the Lutheran church. Now, you could say it's discrimination, but the office of king, of course, doesn't observe the rules of democracy. It is only legitimate because the king has no real powers. It is only legitimate because it's purely symbolic, but what it symbolizes, the provision that the king should be Lutheran is again something which is not at all state neutrality when it comes to culture and tradition. And they added an article that says, our values remain our Christian and humanistic tradition.

Our values, they didn't, they didn't used to have it, our values, our values. Think of it, what it means. For non-Christians, there are some non-Christian, there are plenty in every European country of non-Christians. Compare that with the Israeli nation state law, I cannot avoid saying that. Then they passed a law enthrining the Jewish character of the state, which is fine. but they refused to say anything apart from the fact that the state is Jewish, Jewish

they repeat it a hundred times. They refused to include the principle of civic equality in the basic law. It doesn't mean that civic equality is not part of the Israeli constitutional law, although they refused to write it in the nation state law. They were afraid to strengthen the Supreme Court.

That's what they explained, and I think that's really what they were thinking. that we have a very active Supreme Court, and it was in that debate. The pretext was that they are afraid how the Supreme Court might interpret the principle of equality. But the truth is that whatever the Supreme Court wants to interpret as a violation of security, it is still entitled under the present system of basic laws to strike down because the Supreme Court has ruled that a violation of equality among ethnic lines is a violation of human dignity. because human dignity is still a constitutional right, anything that the court, rightly or wrongly, never mind, it's a, the arguments about judicial activism is a different argument, but they did not

limit the right of the Supreme Court. They did not influence the interpretation, its ability to interpret, rightly or wrong. What they made, they made a symbolic step saying, we don't want the non-jury citizens of Israel to be able to feel that the state is also theirs. And one of the... Yeah. This is different. In other words, a nation state with an explicit religious character, even if it has

minorities that don't fit that religious character in its constitution is still a democratic European norm. Norwegians. Yeah, but then say something about Israel. So has Israel moved back from those standards explicitly, legally constitutionally? So the Norwegians did it the right? way. The Israeli right under this government, I wouldn't say the Israeli right on the whole since 20 years ago, but this government, the Israeli, oh, the Israeli, originally much of the Israeli

rights supported the basic laws, including the basic laws of human dignity, and they explicitly supported judicial review of parliamentary legislation. The Likud as a party, there is a document adopted by a Likud conference shortly after the basic laws were adopted. taking pride in the fact that human rights are now thanks to the Likud, under the Likud government. Likud, by the way, shepherded the basic law, human dignity and liberty through the Knesset. I was very proud of it for many years. Miki-e Tann tried to write a constitution as chairman of the Knesset Constitution Committee. Yeah.

But the Likud took pride in it. Now we have a very different recut and a very different kind of a right-wing coalition. But they have not succeeded in changing the constitutional law of the country. certainly not this thing. It is still true that anything that the Supreme Court of Israel regards as discriminating on the basis of religion and ethnicity is unconstitutional in the sense that it contradicts an existing, a valid basic law because of this interpretation, that ethnic discrimination is violation of human dignity.

By the way, as a Jew and someone who was born in the Soviet Union, I find it difficult to, I don't find it difficult to understand how ethnic discrimination can be construed as a violation of human dignity. I can tell you that. Anti-Semitism is a violation of human dignity. And so I don't find this interpretation surprise. In any case, they are not, they are trying, there are all kinds of things, you know, it's a complicated. They are not, they have not changing. They have not changed the constitutional law. Okay.

Moving on, Robert. Professor, do you think that Israel should adopt or develop a constitution? Yeah, it should, but it's not. It has a serious of basic laws. They have to be, I think. There is a decision of the first Knesset. First Knesset, when the state was established, they were discussing in constitution,

the constituent assembly, The First Knesset was elected as a constituent assembly. They decided not to have a constitution, but the constitution would be legislated step by step by a series of basic laws. I think that we should complete this process, assemble all the basic laws in a single consensual document, and also decide on the way to procedures to legislate basic laws and to amend that. That's a complicated issue, but I think, yeah, we should have a... It is not a, you know, it is, when people say Israel lacks a constitutional, sometimes that implies much more than what reality actually consists of, because we have since early 90s, we have judicial review of legislation that violates human rights. That we have.

That is, I would say, the most basic element of constitutionality in a liberal democracy. but it's not enshrined, it is controversial, it's not enshrined in a single document, there isn't an agreed upon. It is debated in various ways, I think there should be kind of, we should attempt to have some kind of a national compromise, a national agreement on basic laws, on constitution. And of course, I'm not saying at all that the judicial system is above criticism, or the Supreme Court. Some, I have a, I have. often thought that the Supreme Court in its, by the way, not so much in, yeah, maybe lately also in review and legislation, but basically in interfering what the government does, and they

have to interfere. The judiciary has to interfere with what the executive is doing. Absolutely. There is no, we are not a free country if there is no right of judicial review against executive actions and legislative actions, but it doesn't mean that I support. every specific decision to interfere. There is a very fine line that is very difficult to define theoretically between interfering in government in order to protect civil rights and the rule of law, which is vital, and interfering in government in such a way that you are running the state or making political decisions instead of the elected government.

Let's do two more questions with quick answers and then wrap up. Jesse, I am consistently amazed by the scientific innovations in medicine, technology, etc. coming out of Israel. My fear is that the way the muqawaima, the resistance ideology of Hamas, Chazbelah, Iran, etc., ultimately succeeds is by mass emigration of the secular Jewish intellectual, professional, and academic class that exhausted by war and isolation that Israel's best and brightest will decide it's easier to pursue their careers abroad, while Israel more and more resembles other Middle Eastern countries led by strong men and religious extremists with the growing Haredi population that doesn't want to participate in society. As a professor, I'm wondering what the mood is in Israeli universities,

as I know that researchers are becoming less able to collaborate with institutions abroad, how the election results could affect this, and also how greater Arab integration could possibly balance and or create even more dissonance in Israeli society and its character as an advanced democratic yet Jewish state. Do you feel it in the universities, and what do you think more broadly about the question? Well, first of all, up to three years ago, this strategy had failed, as a matter of fact, as a mentor of numbers, because the truth is that immigration of what we call the Eurydime, going down, and Gershon from Israel had decreased very substantially

since the 70s and the 80s until three years ago. Okay, less is left. The number of Israelis leaving the country was going down, went down, very substantially. Basically because Israel had been, the meantime, become a much more prosperous Western economy. Okay. And that is the overwhelming thing.

And so although there was a much more talk about immigration, that is the talk, the loose talk about immigration, became very popular. And again, because Israel became more liberal, less mobilized, more, whatever, but more hedonistic. But, you know, you can be hedonistic and relaxed and not feel that you have to swear religions

to Zionism, but as a matter of fact, Israelis up till three years ago tended to, including all those professionals that the question asks about, they, as a matter of fact,

left Israel in lesson numbers than in the good old days when it was a taboo to speak about living the country. So that's a good deal. A country is more liberal, but Jews want to live in Israel more than in the past.

That for me was a good day. Three years ago, things changed. There is now a real phenomenon of immigration that is, that is motivated by tiredness of this, you know, of the horrible things that, of the chronical warfare of the last three years and opposition to this government and to the, I would say, not just to this government, but I would say, not just to this government, but to the forces that are behind it and to the direction in which it is taking the country. There is a combination of war fatigue and political and philosophical and cultural resentment

of what is going on. And I hope very much that this is a temporary phenomenon, it is a very dangerous phenomenon. I hope very much that it is a temporary phenomenon. In our world, when you leave a country, you can also, it is also more, it is more easy to emigrate, but it is also easier to come back, and that has also happened. It is not what has been happening in the last three years. I'm not dismissing the gravity of the problem, but I just hope that there will be a change, frankly speaking, I hope that there will be a change of government, and at least one component

will be radically changed. If the present coalition remains in power, I think the result of that would be very bad in terms of the problem that we're discussing. But I hope it will not happen.

I have to push back here. There are two questions. One question is the culture and character of Israel. It could very much become much more religious. And by the way, politically less liberal.

That's extremely possible. The gay parade in Tel Aviv is the biggest party in the streets of Tel Aviv every year. I can imagine in Israel in which that becomes problematic for political forces and enough people. And that's a different Israel. Right now we have an Israel where you could be very, very conservative in many different areas, Muslim and Jewish, and very liberal in other areas. And that's how it's always been. And that's how everybody always likes it. The ultra-Orthodox talk about that is the status quo that we have to respect. But that might change. And you know, if that doesn't work for you,

God bless you. The vast, vast majority of Olim came because they had, this was their best option. And people make their decisions for their families, not for grand ideologies. That's why Israel is so sticky, so hard to remove. Because it's real people navigating a complicated world with very few other options for a century. And if the Arabs understood that, they might not have made those bad choices in 47 or in 36 or in 29 or every day since. but so I have a deep love and respect for people making the best decision for their family and cultural decision. But, you know, if they succeed, there are Israeli Jews who can't leave, won't leave ever, not ever. Look, if the Iranians succeed in removing or in causing indirectly, in contributing to the removal from Israel of the more modern part of the Israeli society,

We just have to be secular, but it has to be modern, and we know that, for example, the overwhelming majority of the ultra-authors are not part of that. I hope that that will change, but at the moment, not part of that. But if there are processes that remove from Israel, the more modern part of the Israeli society, it will create a more conservative, more right with government, but it will create a weaker of Israel. And the Iranians don't care about whether an Israeli government is right or left or the left.

It's not, you know, all those differences are only matter for those who would like to have some kind of a political arrangement or some kind of Israel. The Iranians really want, well, you know, not only if they want all the Jews dead, they want the Jewish state dead, okay, in any shape of form. But, Alex, though, that weaker Israel will still defeat. that weak Israel will still defeat them. Look at what Chisbalah has done to Lebanon. Look at what Hamas has done to Gaza.

Look at what they are told us have done to Iran. They are unbelievably weak. We can never finally defeat the Arab and Muslim world simply because of its size and its democracy. We can defeat them many times. Okay, they need to defeat us only once, but

we can defeat them a hundred times. We will not have defeated them strategically in the sense that there will not be be an Israeli empire the way there was a Roman empire that just conquered all the people that defeated. As you know, as I told you, as I taught you, in just wars, because the Roman people always insisted that all their wars were just and defensive, okay, but never mind. But Rome had the capability of ruling of eventually tens of millions of people. We don't have that. We will always be a small

state in the heart of the Mary, Mosul Middle East. And if this state is less modern, it means that that it would have less economic and technological capacity. The Israeli pilots who flew over Tehran. I'm not saying all of them were liberal. Many of them were, but they were all modern, and they were all moderate. And you need the kind of technological ability, and you need also the Israeli economy,

all these Tel Aviv startups. They bring the technology that makes those things work, and the Israeli intelligence that enable us to know where Mr. Khomeini was hiding, and to get him there. For this, you need all the Tel Aviv and others, but in particular in Tel Aviv people, many of whom are intensely disliked by the Israeli right. You need the ingenuity, you need their talent, you need the money, and you need the technology, including military technology that they produce. You need that.

If you get less of that, you get a country that is less strong, okay? And less strong economically, militarily, of course, internationally and diplomatically. And that's a very, very bad direction. Now, many people fear that the present government and the coalition and the logic, the cultural and philosophical logic behind what is now the Israeli right, as it looks now, I always oppose the crude generalization against the Israeli right. The problem is the Israeli right has worked very hard to justify those generalizations. We know that it often happens with crude generalizations.

But in any case, this coalition is taking us in the direction of becoming not just a less liberal, a less humane country, but a much less powerful country. I hope the Iranian regime will collapse before they have a chance of getting there. And I hope that there will be a change. By the way, as everyone understands, if this government has changed, what will come in its place will not at all be a left-wing government. It would be a white coalition of center, right and left, and the left would not be the main component.

It would be very far from being the main component. I have to say, I'm glad this person asked this question. I agree with you about what happened to Likud. Incidentally, huge numbers of Likud voters say they might not tell pollsters that they're not, they don't want to vote for this Likud. And Tengiao purged the party list in the primaries by literally threatening to cancel the primaries, if he didn't get his way, of the more populous people to make it a much more respectable looking list so that those huge numbers of Likud voters,

multiple seats worth, come back to the party on Election Day because he knows that what you and I are saying, Likud has, you know, the gross generalization of the right, that the right then spent 15 years trying to match. A lot of right-wing voters, traditional long-standing right-wing voters are saying that right now. And the ultra-Orthodox question, because everyone's been drafted for so long, is no longer avoidable in all of these questions. So everything we're talking about isn't a representation of opposition parties. representation of surprisingly large numbers of right-wing voters. And I completely share that. I want to stay very modern. I want to stay very liberal. I want to stay very successful. If we're not a liberal democracy, it's going to be a lot harder for the government to ask people to send their

kids to war. My point is just, if the enemy is clever, and this is the good strategy, the best strategy available to them, and they succeed, and we lose elite after elite, and our high-tech sector is gutted and the economy shrinks. By the way, Chahridim will go to work. Nobody will be able to afford the welfare state they live on. I'm not saying, there's silver linings is what I'm saying. If we undergo that disaster, and it is absolutely a disaster,

then we will still be the most powerful tribe in the Middle East with 200 noops, and a lot less likely to care what the world thinks if Iran sends 300 missiles at Tel Aviv again. And so I genuinely think this is a disaster for, it's a manageable disaster for this nation, which doesn't know how to go anywhere.

The day after the disaster, people keep saying to me, what happens if this collapses? What happens if that collapses? I'm like, well, the sun will still rise the next day and we still have to build. History is not over at any moment. And the day after, we'll still have to rebuild it, whatever is broken. Our enemies will suffer more than we will if we go in that direction. It will suffer, but, you know, they don't mind the Iranian mindset that you refer to. They don't mind suffering.

They don't mind the Iranian people suffer, as you mind. This is true. This is their great strategy. Their problem is not the stuff. You know, you know, this we love, you love life, we love death. Well, they love other people's death, but they don't mind it, of course. Now, of course, I'm not saying that Israel will quickly, even under a very bad scenario, it will not soon become militarily and economically weaker than Iran.

But if you want to, if your ideas, I have a series of wars every several years in the hope that in the end people will start just turning away. then it will, a weaker Israel is a good thing and not a bad thing, although your people will inevitably suffer. But when did it stop these guys? I mean, of course. And you say Israel will care less about what others say. Others will also care less, you know, providing defense against missiles,

which we enjoy it in this order. Yes, and we will become more fierce. Alex Jacobson, thank you so much for joining me for answering all of these questions and I don't know if we came out of it optimistic, but I learned a lot. Thanks so much. Thank you.