Bankless - Eigenlayer Q&A with Founder Sreeram Kannan

Episode Date: February 3, 2024

What are the biggest questions that people have about Eigenlayer?  David sourced these questions from Crypto-Twitter, and will be asking Sreeram LIVE! ------ 🏹 USE PODCAST24 FOR 10% OFF https://bankless.cc/Citizen2024  ------ 🎧 Listen On Your Favorite Podcast Player:  https://bankless.cc/Podcast  ------ BANKLESS SPONSOR TOOLS: 🐙KRAKEN | MOST-TRUSTED CRYPTO EXCHANGE https://k.xyz/bankless-pod-q2  ⁠ 🔗CELO | CEL2 COMING SOON https://bankless.cc/Celo  🗣️TOKU | CRYPTO EMPLOYMENT SOLUTION https://bankless.cc/toku  🛞MANTLE | MODULAR LAYER 2 NETWORK https://bankless.cc/Mantle  💸 CRYPTO TAX CALCULATOR | USE CODE BANK30 https://bankless.cc/CTC  ------ TIMESTAMPS 00:00:00 Start 00:00:29 Intro 00:03:27 Sriram and Nima 00:04:41 Why Should We Care? 00:06:09 Unique Use Cases 00:14:25 AVS Rewards Payouts 00:19:07 AVS Incentives 00:24:32 AVS Awareness 00:29:24 Slashing a Delegated Validator 00:31:26 Calculating Risk 00:33:18 Ecosystem Take Rate 00:36:10 Unstaking 00:38:02 Solo Staking Premium 00:42:19 Addressing Risks 00:54:40 Healthy Slashing 01:03:36 Native Token 01:08:19 When Token? ------ RESOURCES Eigenlayer: https://www.eigenlayer.xyz/  Sreeram: https://twitter.com/sreeramkannan?lang=en  Nima: https://twitter.com/nima_vaziri  Risks: https://docs.eigenlayer.xyz/risk/risk-faq  ------ Not financial or tax advice. See our investment disclosures here: https://www.bankless.com/disclosures⁠ 

Bankless Nation, we got a live stream for you here today. We're going to get some questions answered about, I think, something that people have the most questions about, which is restaking, eigenlayer, AVS networks, timelines, where's the yield coming from, what are we going to do? There's a lot of different questions I have, a lot of different questions that other people have have, and I have sourced questions for the past two weeks from people around the Cryptosphere, around the Ethereum ecosystem, both on Twitter, in my DMs, on Farcaster as well. we are going to bang through all of these questions one by one by one. I've got 23 questions total.

Some of them are redundant, so I'll ask them all at once. Some of them will be longer than others. Some of them will be very short. We're going to get through all of them. We're going to get you guys some answers to the questions that you guys have about eigenlayer. So I'm going to bring on two people out of the eigenlayer ecosystem. One you might not be as familiar with. Nima Vizari, who I actually met at Heath Denver, 2019.

He is drawing the eigenlayer ecosystem, the Aigen Labs team, and also Sri Ram Khanan. Everyone knows Sri Ram. So we're going to bring them on in just a second. But first, a moment to talk about some of these fantastic sponsors that make the show possible. Cracken knows crypto. Cracken's been in the crypto game for over a decade. And as one is the largest and most trusted exchanges in the industry, Cracken is on the journey with all of us to see what crypto can be.

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I'm joined with Sri Ram Khanan, the founder of modern restaking. Sri Ram, welcome back to the show. Hey, hi, David. Really excited to be here. We're looking forward to do this together. And also next to him, we got Nima Viziri, ecosystem research and development

over at Agen Layer. Nima, welcome to show. Thanks so much for having me. Nita, you're a new face for us. Maybe give us a little bit of your introduction, who you are and what you do at EigenLayer. Yeah, sure. So I joined the EGel Labs team a few months ago to lead the ecosystem development and AVS, you know, teams that have been interfacing with the protocol.

Right before this, I was actually a research partner at Polychain, which is how I joined, which is how I got to know about the protocol in its early stages. And I just saw the ecosystem kind of flourishing. So I was super excited to hit up Shagram. I'm like, hey, what do you need to help with? So I jump on board. Beautiful. And I'm enjoying having you here because I think I want a lot of questions answered about the AVS ecosystem specifically. So I'll be directing some of those questions to you. Some of the higher level, more general stuff, I'm going to throw it to Sri Ram. And I think that's actually where we're going to start. This first question that I've got. It was actually, I think this is kind of a troll question. But I think it's a good place to start anyways. This is from Permo Weave. Why should I care about it? Sri Ram, why should we care about Agen Layer? Different people can about Agen Layer for different things. If you are a builder, you know, it opens up an opportunity for you to go build new things without having to secure a trust network on your own.

You can build arbitrary new protocols on Agenle. That's why you should care about it. If you're a staker, you're staking in Ethereum, you're already putting your ETH at risk in validating the Ethereum protocol, might as well contribute security to other protocols and earn some rewards because of that. If you're a node operator, you're already running services for Ethereum validation or some other chain validation,

one of the big problems as an operator is every new chain that you validate, you have to sell to a new community of token holders. With eigenlayer, what we are able to do is the same community, many, many operations. So that's the value proposition to the operators. If you are building a roll-up in the Ethereum ecosystem, you may be bottlenecked by cost and bandwidth

and the economics, and eigen-DA, which is on eigen-Layer, is a solution that we're offering for you. That's the value proposition to the different sites. Beautiful. A couple of these questions, or maybe some of them, will actually be in the same spirit, and so I'll ask them both at once,

and these next ones, NEMA, are going to you. Udi-S-S-U-Dai-Suzuki, re-block.eath, and also Niski. First question, what are some unique use cases using eigen-Layer? And then the second question, it's unclear how much need there will be for AVS is beyond the early handful of

examples, where will the demand come from? I think the spirit of this question is, what are the flavors of AVS is? What are the different types of services that can come from these things? How do we even know that there is a there there? Nima, maybe you can take this one. Yeah, sure. So, I mean, right off the bat, a few things that are uniquely enabled by the protocol, right? Let's just say bridging, right? The economic security that we're dealing with here can just, enable much more secure protocols to enable cross-chain activities. The other thing that I'm personally really excited about is the idea of co-processors, right, where you have some of a crypto-economic bond,

but in terms of what the actual functionality of the co-prositor ends up doing, whether it's generic or hyper-specialized, that suddenly gets enabled by any L2 or even on the L1 itself, right? Those are just a couple ones. But in terms of another one that's like really interesting, I think, is what witness chain is doing, right? With the proof of location and the fraud proof network, right? You can have, you can tap into the power of the Ethereum network to effectively deploy, it trusts minimize fraud-proof watcher as opposed to having each L2 itself claiming that their

providing fraud-proofing service for you as well. So I think that's going to make the community of fraud-proofing any kind of optimistic system very much more robust. So one thing I would add to that is, you know, a little bit of a high-level response. You know, when people think of the modular paradigm, the modular paradigm is chains were integrated solutions for all the different things that need to be done

on applications inside that chain. but the modular paradigm is, oh, maybe there are different modules, maybe there is a data availability module, maybe there's a consensus module and so on. And normally, when people think about the modular landscape, they think of maybe there are three modules, maybe there is an ordering, maybe there is a consensus,

maybe there is a settlement layer, data availability, some very few handful of modules. Our vision is a little bit different. You know, if you look at the cloud era, you see on cloud, there are thousands of thriving software as a service solutions, which are basically like very hyper-specialized, focused services that if you're building a consumer application, for example, you know, and examples of these SaaS services include,

like, you know, I want to offer a database as a service. There are tens or even hundreds of databases as a service. The reason is there are different types of databases, different types of, you know, there's a SQL database. There's a no-SQL database and all these different, some optimized for AI, some optimized for different purpose and so on. So you have these hyper-specialized software-as-a-service solutions, and what you do today when you're building an Indus application is just concatenate a few of these software-as-a-service solutions and then only build what components don't exist. That becomes a consumer application. That's our vision for what crypto applications look like.

these applications consume a bunch of services that are built on eigenlayers, say, and then tie all of them together and then offer it as a consumer application. So what might this be? And NEMA gave some of the categories we're seeing a lot of interest interaction. But the broader picture is you can think of, let's say, roll-up services. You know, you're a roll-up, you know, Ethereum's very deeply into the roll-up roadmap. What are the problems that roll-ups are facing can we kind of waste? find ways to solve it. Can we find ways to do sequencing? Instead of having a single central

sequencer, can we have decentralized sequencing? Altlair is doing its version of it. Espresso is doing a different version of it. You can have, you know, watchtowers, which is how do you know that the role-ups doing what it is saying it's doing? When you had a couple of big roll-ups, then of course you can just, you know, there is a lot of extrinsic incentives, everybody running Brock Explorers, watching the network, you know, optimism, arbitram, a few networks, people can watch. But if there are thousands of these networks are who's going to be watching? You need actually dedicated resources to be watching and incentives to make sure that they're doing the job that they're supposed to be doing.

So that's watching. Then you have bridging. Like there's fragmentation of liquidity across L2s. You know, you guys have discussed this a lot in the show. So how do we solve it? You know, can we have instantaneous bridging across these L2s? Can we have new kinds of, um, um, um, um, finality services. I come to finality. Usually the sequencer tells me like, hey, you know, it's final.

Or like, hey, there is a, I promise you, but instead can you have economic finality? Can you have MEPA protection solutions? Can you have an encrypted memos like what shutter is building? These are all examples of the roll-up adjacent services. Like some services that I can just integrate in as a roll-up and then I get better as a roll-up. This is one category, which, you know, meta-category, I would say we're seeing a of traction. But there's lots of other like verticals or meta categories we're also seeing. Nima mentioned co-processors. The idea of a co-proster is you're sitting in Ethereum, and I want to enhance the functionality beyond what like I can, functions I can call inside the EVM. Can I call an AI? And then I'm sitting inside Ethereum L1, right? Call an AI and say, hey, you know,

run like the previous, for example, I've run a Dex and I say that my price is now adjusted how much price I take on uniswops are just based on the competitive dynamic between how much sushi is charging, how much other dexes are charging, and then I adjust my prices up and wrong. The intelligent D5, for example, can happen if you have a processor,

like coprocessor like that. Maybe you want to run a command, which is actually like, you know, something that normally run only on a Linux machine, so that would be a general purpose co-proscer. Maybe you want to run a command, which is a SQL server. I just call a thing and say that, hey, load this database, a query to the database, and give me the response, and I want that back on Ethereum.

So these are the kinds of examples we're seeing inside co-processors. But there are other categories, like cryptography. Like, can I run more advanced cryptographic-like solutions? Why do we need this? Because, you know, blockchains are usually like transparent ledgers. That makes it veryifiable, but, you know, there's a trade-off against privacy. So I won't have private but verifiable systems. Can I split the secret or information across the many nodes?

So you need deep access into the distributed system, into the consensus to change it. It could be secure multi-party systems, trusted execution environments, fully homomorphic encryption, these types of categories that we're seeing on IELA. So these are some of the broad categories. The one thing which, you know, which is we haven't seen built already, but we've seen proposals is how to modulate some commitments on Ethereum L1 itself. All these other things are outside of Ethereum L1. But I'm a block proposer on Ethereum L1.

Can I promise that I can do a pre-confirmation for a transaction I include in an L2? I'm staked. So I tell you as a kind of like a block proposer who's going to propose the next block, I promise to you that, hey, when my slot comes, I am going to include your transaction. So the LTO can have an instant confirmation with economic security. So these are the kind of like range of things that we're seeing. It's we did not invent all these categories. Most of these categories came Dino out of permissionless innovation.

And that's what's really fascinating. Yeah, one of the things that I think really gets people's imaginations going about eigenlayer is there is pretty boundless. The design space is pretty boundless. But that also makes, that leads into my next question here from Ethan Lipman. If you have such a boundless design space and I'm assuming that also goes into the fee structure that these AVS is charged, how will AVS rewards payouts work? If they can charge their fees in their own kind of network and their own token and

ultimately goes down to the E-Staker on the layer one, what's like the supply chain of value flows from fees charged on the ABS network while that application is being its business, going down to the ETH staker who has restaked their ether. Is that a NEMA question or is that a SRI-ROM question? I'll let Shri-ROM take the first step at this, but I'll chime with anything he hasn't covered. Yeah. So the idea is that, you know, that is an AVS consumer.

Like, imagine an AVS like something concrete as an Oracle, right? this is an oracle. So an avius consumer is an DAP that is calling the Oracle, right? So that's where it is starting. But the DAP itself has a user, right? So I'm calling a swap, which are a lending protocol, which needs to call an Oracle. There are articles now like triggering, you know, an eigenlayer AVS Oracle. And that, so there's a fee that is being paid to the Oracle. So the Oracle accumulates all these fees in a pot. And the Oracle has a certain obligation. to pay some fees to the eigenlayer stakers, which is specified by the AVS model. For example, it says that, hey, for this much amount of stake, I'm willing to pay this much

amount of ETH or this much amount of my token emissions. And that is paid periodically to the stakers and operators. So essentially, it comes from either the user to the DAB, the DAB to the AVS, the AVS to the staker and our operator. And it looks like it's a lot of. of layers and like some people complain that this could be a big problem for the this kind of a modular economy. But I think that's simply not true from our experience in the cloud. Like each consumer application in the cloud integrates 15 SaaS services in the back end. These are all abstracted out that, you know, as an end user of a particular application, you wouldn't even know that they're using all these things in the back end, but they are.

and they have like, you know, different periods and settlement periods for when they pay these fees to these SaaS services. Some things are monthly subscription. Some things are pay as you go. All of these things are happening in the back end. And that's roughly why we think that it is going to be okay, that you have more complex value flows. Because our bet here, when we're talking about permissionless innovation, is really specialization. This is really what drove the SaaS economy is, and if you just look at the broad arc of, civilization, it is bends towards more specialization. We all become more and more specialized in

what we produce, but more and more generalized in what we consume. Right. And so these aviases are going to be exactly the same. They are going to be very specialized in what we produce, what they produce, but end users are going to consume many of these things and pass a little bit of value to all of these. And actually, this makes for a very much more efficient economy because, you know, if you ask the question, which is going to be the best chain, it's a very hard question to answer. If you ask the question, who's going to build the fastest no SQL database? It's a much, much more narrow question. You can kind of zoom into like, oh, this guy has this experience, that experience.

It's a B2B system. And then actually they can go and build it. So that's why I think it is okay. Not only okay, it is actually great that, you know, you have hyper-specialization and a sharing of value. across all these layers through the modulus stack. Nima, anything you want to add there? I'm just fascinated by the fact that this permissionless market

is going to enable all the various flavors of services. I just view it as, you know, we've seen district systems, these back-end infra providers be able to do what they do over the past 20, 30 years, right? except now you have this cryptoeconomic angle attached to it where you're building on a substrate that as long as there's a market for something, no one's going to be able to tell you you can't

provide this functionality. So it's very exciting. Yeah. I think maybe part of the spirit of the question is that one of the reasons why everyone is getting excited about restaking is because we love ether and we love staking ether and we love the yields and we get more of it this way. But then there's also a tension, I think, maybe at least I suspect in AVS networks that also have a token, where maybe a lot of the economy in that ABS network is the token, and then that AVS network is paying in that token, but then the ETH-Stakers want ETH, not the token. And so in order to pay restakers' ETH, that token has to be sold, which goes against the incentives of the AVS network. And also then, like, are ETH-Restakers just

collecting a bunch of tokens as the yield? Like, how, do you have any clarity that you can provide here on this one, so you're wrong? Yeah, I mean, this is the power of permissionless markets is, you know, we can't say whether this is going to be the market, you know, eat stakers demand that they get only paid in eat. We will see that that's what happens. If we see that, yeah, actually, eat stakers want all kinds of liquid tokens, then that's what will happen. If we see that actually, each stakers want or willing to take you and locked Avious tokens with a kind of like a vesting. That will happen.

The thing is we are very unopinionated about it. And this is a, this is an emer, we view this as an emergent property of what, you know, it's like, you know, you can dial back, you know, say four years before the defy summer and then to go ask, you know, Justin or Vitalik or somebody else at the Ethereum or Timbek or somebody at the Ethereum Foundation, what can it be used for? I don't know. It can be used for, you know, in a D5 protocol like this. It can be used in a, in a

to provide liquidity provision, but to earn like some farm, like, you know, all of these things are possible and we'll probably see a combination of all of these things. And also, stakers might segment by preferences that maybe stakers are very purest and they just want to take ETH or they're not able to take for legal or other reasons, anything else. That will be takers who'll take all these other things. But going back to the kind of high level thing about is there a conflict? I think there is no, like the idea is that the eat staking, if it is beneficial to an avias, they're going to use it. If each staking is not beneficial to an aviars and their own token staking is more beneficial, they absolutely should use their own token staking. We are not

taking a kind of any opinionated position on it. In fact, Eigenlayer itself, the contracts are return to enable dual staking and multicorum staking. So you can stake Eid, you're building an Oracle, you can have your own token, and you can have each staking, you can say that, hey, I'm borrowing some amount of security from a neutral substrate and some amount of security from an opinionated, like aligned substrate. That's actually like game theoretically very interesting and useful to actually do that, because you know, the neutral substrate is neutral and therefore more externally very fable. the neutral substrate, but can only be slashed on specific violations, whereas my own token holders

have exposure to just, you know, what is happening in my system. And that is a different kind of crypto economics. And actually promoting this is what we think is the best thing. Right. Maybe the question, that question specifically is like how to couple the income being generated from AVS is and then transfer it over to the restakers, the E3Sakers. Maybe that question is actually more appropriate to ask the LRT level of the stack because they are the people actually more or less in charge of these flows. So maybe that's actually, yeah, if eigenlayer is any opinionated, then eigenlayer's not the actual place to target that question.

Maybe this is a question for the LRTs. Yeah, we are also seeing interesting kind of payment management type services emerging. Somebody may say, hey, you know, subscribe to my, you stay, you know, you don't even have to go through an LRT and subscribe to my payment management service. I'll collect all these tokens. I'll do an R of Q auction and then later I'll give you like, you know, your tokens in EAT. So these we view as again emergent structures rather than like enshrined opinions. So absolutely the LRTs, therefore not only LRT is a liquid restaking token, it's a token that represents a position on eigenlayer,

but also represents an opinion on what set of operators should be used, what set of aviases you should, stake two, but also what rewards you want to collect and how you want to do trashy management of these rewards. So the dimensions of opinion of a liquid restaking token are far higher than a liquid staking token, which is your stake in Ethereum, you're complying by protocol, you have no price fixing abilities, you just take what the protocol does. So Ethereum is this rigid, solid underlying substrate. But as I can later is this very, you know, anything can happen.

of us on straight or not. It's funny that you say that because there's the variety of opinions that liquid resaking tokens could have, which is good because there's so goddamn many of them. There's like 15 of them out there. So maybe you'll see all those opinions expressed. Nima, these next set of questions I want to ask to you, and these are all about the logistics of AVS's. Three questions here, kind of all in the same vibe. Can an AVS be aware about the state of other AVS's? If an AVS creates a slashing event or slashing events, how can other ABSs be aware of that

and become aware about the change in collateral that's being shared among ABSs? And then are there scenarios in which one AVS, the slashing event for one ABS, could trigger a slashing event of another AVS. Maybe you could take in these in however you want to. Yeah, I'll start with the first one.

So the background image that Shrewon-Pain it is these services talking to each other, right? These ABS's. So in the same capacity, you can imagine how an ABS talking to another ABS has the capability to read some state, right? Now there's like on-chain contracts. There's off-chain like software being run, right? But depending on the exact nature of what is happening for an ABS, right?

Sure, you can say like ABSA, their off-chain contract, whatever the operators are running, can watch for some state change on ABSB's contract, right? So there's no limitation in terms of like who is aware of what's and what's happening, right? Which I guess leads to the second question a little bit in that the design for slashing, which is a feature we're going to come out with later this year, are still, you know, we're thinking very thoroughly about how that's exactly going to work mechanically to reduce the risk as much possible. but then again, if an AVS operator can read a slashing event on another ABS, right, it can choose to react to that under whatever kind of path or like behavior like they do

implement. So it's nearly like almost entirely up to the application of ABS developers discretion in terms of how they want to take slashing as a mechanism and as a reactionary thing into account. I guess the third thing, which is can one slashing event have an effect on others, that would probably be a function or it depends on how the slashing mechanism ends up working in its final version, right, and the version that we're going to release. So, yeah. I'll just add one thing to all of these things is every all of these events are reported back to

Ethereum. Aigen layer is an Ethereum centric system, right? So any AVI which is actually, there may be aviases which don't interact on a kind of like a routine basis with Ethereum, but all of the aviast state is reported back to Ethereum on a periodic basis. Whenever it's reported, it's there on Ethereum. It's on the Ethereum contracts. So now like I can write a contract which is dependent on all. these other things. Like, for example, whenever a slashing is triggered on any aviars, that's going to be

reported to the eigenled core contracts. Because it's reported to the eigenled core contracts, I can read from another aviars that, yes, that has actually happened. And so I can react to it on a much more instantaneous basis. So this is really why we think that, you know, having one coordination engine for all these services is the best architecture rather than saying, hey, I have an LR. let's say, you know, this is a misconception that people have, that, oh, you know, now that the eigen layer is there and it's allowing LSTs to stake, somebody else can build another layer which takes LRTs and then allows them to stake and so on. But the right architecture is actually a much more integrated architecture, which knows what's happening across all the different layers.

In fact, this is one of the reasons we keep saying that it'll be even better in a future when Ethereum can integrate eigenlayer more natively, because the cross-communication between Ethereum and eigenlayer can be even tighter. Like, how much of security is used by other things? How much of security is reserved for Ethereum? All of this communication can be much, much tighter if it's in the same system. But inside eigenlayer, all the state is on a common eigenlayer contract. It knows when, like, your slashing has been triggered on any areas.

It knows when state updates have been made on any areas. So all of this is routed through a common contract, which is a common source of information. And like Nima said, you can pull from it as often as you want. But I think in the worst case, you know, all the avi contracts will pull at least at, you know, something like a few days period because you don't want to be desynchronized more than that. And that's the kind of challenge or fraudproof period in Aigelair. Moving on to a question from cloudy.eath. Shout out Christy. That's our community manager at Bankless.

What happens if an eigenlayer Aves operator with delegated LSTs get slashed? What happens with the LSTs? Where do they go? I'm sure, Om, you want to take this? Yeah. Yeah, you know, so there are two types of slashing that can happen on eigenleared. So Nima was mentioning that we have, you know, upcoming designs on the full slashing mechanism. But there are two kinds of slashing.

One is burning, right? You just burn the stake. The other one is redistribution. And the simple version to burn would be to just burn the, you know, LST. This has some kind of, you know, different kinds of consequences for different people. But one could also think of the, actually what is happening in the eigenled contracts is the LST is not burnt. The LST is frozen into the contract state. So you can't touch it.

do anything with it. It's just stuck. It's like a stuck token. And, but that's what actually happens in our V1 design, but we are going through some thinking on the different slashing architectures. But the thing is, there's also redistribution. And redistribution is, I take the LST and give it to the harm party, slash from the bad guy and give it to the harm party. So the other guy has the LST. So that's what happens. So that's why when an AVAS is white listing which LSTs to use, they should have some measure of trust on the LST because, you know, that's what's getting handed over across the different parties. There is a more sophisticated architecture on burning, which should be to like exchange the LST

for ETH and then burn ETH. But, you know, we do expect that slashing is, you know, a rare event because operators have to be malicious and they know they're going to lose their ETH. So they're not over-optimizing for burning EAT in this scenario. Shamus on Farcaster, Orange Shamus.Eath, asks, how will delegators, operators, and AVS's adequately be able to calculate risk? The problems here will be incredibly dynamic and involve unclear dependencies. I'm not sure it's solvable, let alone by all parties routinely.

So I think it's a little bit of just the unknown unknowns about risks question. Nima, you want to take this one? Yeah, this is a super interesting question. A lot of us have spent quite some time thinking about. And I guess to approach this, we can take a look at it from the perspective of each of these different stakeholders, right? For example, as an ABS developer, what does risk means to you, right? Is it the operators that are serving your AVS? Is it, you know, what LSDs they have delegated to them?

In terms of restakers, which operators do I want to give my stake to, right? what is the distribution of the operators that look like for me to be able to assess who's riskier and who's not? And in terms of operators, they also have this duty of being able to, or wanting to, rather, look at the nature of an ABS and being, and saying how complex is a logic for serving this application, right? And how much does it, how much load does it bear on, for example, my physical infrastructure that I'm running, right? I'm going to run into, you know, bottlenecks that affect my ability to run another ABS. So all these risks or things that the various stakeholders have to take into account, essentially compound, right? And depending on how you slice and dice an exact combination of these stakeholders,

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might be no answer here this might be a market forces thing but we'll see how do they see days you guys eigen layer see the take rate in the ecosystem for example, $1 paid to buy an ABS, how many cents goes to restakers, how many cents goes to operators, how many cents goes to eigenlayer? Nima, do you have an answer here? This is still being thought out, and we're taking a lot of community feedback from, you know, what ABS developers like to see, what operators are comfortable with, like what ranges, you know, they think is reasonable across what type of assets. So that's because it's such an ascent space,

it's still something like we're actually figuring out. Yeah, that's what we're at. Yeah, I think, you know, there are dimensions of pricing and that we are thinking through the dimensions also carefully. For example, pricing need not be only for stake. Pricing should also be for the complexity of computation. So we're thinking through all the other systems that exist and see how we can absorb some of the best practices from there and also failure modes.

For example, one of the things that happened in Cosmos Interchain Security is operators are running these other services by taking a cut of the fee, other chains, by taking a cut of the fee. And if the fee volume is low, you're expending a lot of energy, but you're not getting it. like that much fee. So, you know, we should charge not only for stake, but also for computation. And so, and when you're talking about stake, there are also dimensions of stake where, you know, is my stake just going to be burnt for, for this, because that's a different risk, versus, is my stake going to be redistributed because there may be a different kind of incentive for that? Is my stake, is my entire stake burnt when I make a mistake in a navius versus is only a portion of my steak burnt when I make a mistake in this avias. So there's lots of different

dimensions here. And pricing will have to reflect all of this. So it is still under like active design on the specifics of how the payments get distributed across all of these things. Yeah. And to add on top of that, the reason why I said we're still so early in how this might look is because it's a problem that I think the broader industry is thinking about, right? when you look at Solana and like, you know, fee markets or like, you know, the concept of the discussion on multi-market, multi-dimensional fees, right? Like the notion of what a fee even is around what type of resources, who is providing those resources, all of that is, yeah, it's just being explored.

Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, right. I remember that's still, I think, an ongoing conversation, even when we talk about resource pricing inside of the EVM as well. Right. Thadie.eaths asks, how long does it? take to unstake. And then I'll add myself, why is there an unstaking waiting period at all? Street Rom, you want to take this one? Yeah. Yeah. It takes seven days to unstake today. And why is there a seven day period? Is because, you know, when you stick and you provide security

to services, what we don't want is you stake, you provide security to your service, attack the service, unstake, and then go swap and get out. So unstaking should have a lag. And you have a lag. greater than the lag within which any misbehavior will be detected. That's why we have the unstaking period. But it provides an unintended, and maybe not that and unintended from our end, an unintended benefit, which is actually fund safety. So you stake a lot of funds in eigenlayer. And one of the things you are to be worried about what if it gets hacked?

What if people just like take all the eat and go? That would be like an absolute disaster. One of the things that protects it is to withdraw any unit of money out of the eigenlayer contracts is going to take a week. I know already you've queued the withdrawal. You have to wait a week. This slows everything down to human timescale. No, monitoring.

There is pausing. There is a security council comprised of, you know, 13 members who are outside the eigenlayer code team. All of that can actually. kind of come in and step in to do something in case there is a problem. But that's, that's a kind of like an unintended side effect of the core reason, which is for fraud proofs. L.coco.e. writes great songs. Sometimes we put them into the roll up. He asks, how big do we think the premium will be that AVS is put on solo stakers? Is there a good enough way to determine who is a solo staker? He's asking, because,

because this is the one way that I can see that eigenlayer will actually increase Ethereum's decentralization. Sri Ram, do you have an answer here? Yeah, what premium AVSS will put, like I said, we are like a little bit of an open market type project. So we don't know what will happen. But there are clearly, absolutely clearly, there are places where, you know, ABS is just one more decentralization than just one. more stake, right? You know, I want to sequence transactions for a private roll-up. I want to do, like, you know, where the, so the high-level heuristic is where I cannot attribute false and slash for them. More stake doesn't mean much. But many independent parties consistently verifying and are coming to

agreement is actually the benefit. So services which have that structure, imagine I take a secret it and then spread it on like many, many nodes. If it turns out Coinbase is all these nodes, then like, you know, I didn't like spread my secret to anybody. Like the guy has all the copies of the secret. So it's useless to like when I'm doing secret chatting, when I'm doing sequencing. Essentially for any non-slashable false,

I want to have a decent list committee. And okay, so that's the types of things where like types of ABS is where they would have. absolutely want more decentralized operators. The question is how much, you know, so one question is how much premium, which I said, you know, it's emergent from the free market. But the other one is, how do you detect

whether somebody is a solo sticker? I think this is a harder question, but it's one of those questions where, you know, Nima mentioned earlier, like one of the services building, which is a proof of location. And, you know, you have to be in, you know, many different locations. So there's a geographic, you know,

diversity benefit, for example. That itself, so witness itself is an AVS. But there could be other AVASs which not only track like operator location, but do something more opinionated. It could be an Oracle that is basically a decentralization oracle, which looks at all the statistics of, you know, stake distribution, you know, historic correlation with exchange wallets, all of these things, and then puts in like a Merkel route of these are the most likely

to be decentralized. And this is not opinionated from the eigenlared point of view, but this is a service that somebody else can say, yeah, I know, I trust this opinion. And therefore, like, I'm going to recruit stakeholders from this set or operators from this set. Again, emergent downstream rather than entry. Yeah, something that I think is particularly interesting on this front is when you have

solar stakers, irrespective of the kind of hardware that they have, right? One thing that we're noticing is a lot of networks rely on this component of a keeper or a relayer, where the computational bandwidth of what you're actually relaying is not super high, but depending on where you're located, you might want to have many, many of them spread across all over the world, right? So the more of those you have within your system, maybe it's latency you care about, maybe it's like censorship resistance, whatever it is, if you can go through multiple routes from point A,

to point B through these, you know, lightweight, maybe not even lightweight solo stakers, that's a very emergent property as well. I think maybe part of your guys' answer is that it's actually not necessarily being the binary of, oh, you are a solo staker, you are one person, but it's more about how much net decentralization do you add to the system when we measure decentralization in a variety of different ways. because there is no good way of just like being a solo taker actually is only one bit of information. Like there's other bits of information there. Okay, so there's four questions here.

They're all about the same thing. We kind of have touched on this, but I want to dive headfirst into this subject. Genia asks, how do they respond about the risks of restaking being a daisy chain of potential risks? Clairvoyant asks, what doomsday scenarios have the team simulated or envisioned? Chain link God says, how does or should the eigenresaking? ecosystem approach risk management, particularly managing the second or third order effects of LRTs, LRTFI, cascading, slashing conditions, AVS selection priorities, leverage caps, etc. And lastly, what's matter? CFA says it looks like a lot of rehypification and tradfai.

How do you quantify the risk? I think this is what people's like first gut reaction goes to when somebody explains what restaking is. Like, oh, you take your ETH and then you stake it again. And then you can also keep on doing that over and over and over again. And people are like, oh, okay, great. So like, you know, cascading liquidations. I'm sure you guys have answered this many, many, many times. What's like the simple way to explain the scenario here? Not that this isn't a risk, but just like how do we provide more knowledge about what's going on?

Yeah, I think there is, you know, we put out a detailed risk document. And so I think that's maybe a good place to point it. We can put it up on the YouTube link afterwards. I think that'll be awesome. But the high-level thing is, number one, thinking of, I think the term restaking is what throws people off. If, you know, the exact same concept, for example, already existed for many years in cosmos called interchained security.

It's called interchained security, so nobody thought of exactly the same questions. But here's the thing that when you stake, so the right way to think of this is Shad security. So imagine there are 1,000 protocols, each of which can have $1 million state. Okay, so this is one world. Another world, and you take the same fees and then now aggregate them into a $1 billion pool, which is restaked. across thousand protocols, which world is better? Let's say in the first world, to attack a protocol, you need $1 million capital. And then if you do attack it, you're probably going to lose half of that $1 million

or something like that. In the second world, to attack any one protocol, you need $1 billion capital. When people are comparing the two scenarios, usually what they're doing is they're thinking there are 1,000 protocols with $1 billion each. And then on the right side, there is 1,000 protocols with $1 billion restink. But that's just not the right comparison. At the same fee parity, if there are 1,000 protocols each paying a certain fee to maintain $1 million state, you pay the same fee, you can actually sustain a $1 billion in a shared security model.

So security is growing as you get more protocols. It's a very obvious thing once you're stating like this, but that's what's happening. Okay, so you have much bigger security that is supporting all these things. Okay, now you do lose something in the second world. So the second world is better in the obvious sense that to attack anyone protocol, you need like $1 billion. But there is a little bit of a deficiency in the second world, which is there is no unique attribution of this $1 billion to any one protocol

or how much is going to each protocol, which is what is leading to all these questions about, oh, you know, I don't know how much I'm getting, there's a lot of risk and all of that. And the way we solve it is by principle we call attributable security. Attributable security is the following concept. It says that an aviase gets this benefit of pooling, but in addition, AVS can buy a particular ability to slash and redistribute a portion of the funds.

Let's say AVS 1, you know, out of this $1 billion slashable, AVS1 buys $25 million worth of attributable security. Which means if something goes wrong on that AVS, the eigen-Layer protocol maintains this complex calculation, which is what people are thinking, how is this going to happen? this is going to be in protocol, in the eigenlare protocol, maintains what we call a solvency calculation. Calculation ensures that whatever happens, how many other protocols trigger slashing simultaneously, you will be able to redistribute your 25 million,

your attributable portion. Now, suddenly all this question about like over-leverage and everything else is just simply gone, because each ABS has a unique, specified, attributable portion of slashing independent of what happens in all the other ABSs. So this creates compartmentalization. I know exactly how much I can redistribute if I slash. And so this is actually one of the tightest system of crypto economic security. It is not a leverage system with you don't know what leverage is happening.

You know, what? It's not like that. It is pooled security. So what is the benefit you're getting? you're getting is in the second world, now, even though I have only an attributable security of 205 million, to attack my protocol, I still need a $1 billion capital. I'm just much, much more secure in the second world than having my own $25 million dollar pool in the first world. So that's the first picture about shad security and attributable security. This changes the dynamics of how people think about ABSS compartmentalization. So another point is between, I can So we can do this inside eigenlayer, but to do this between eigenlayer and Ethereum,

because we don't build Ethereum, so we have limited interfaces to Ethereum. But the nice thing with Ethereum is Ethereum is actually extremely high security. So there's a lot of stake in Ethereum, $70 billion or whatever today's price is there. But there's a lot of stake in Ethereum. And the Ethereum's security requirement is not all of this $70 billion. And this is a whole other discussion to understand exactly how much security is needed. Because staking is not fundamentally protecting all the value, all the t-vial that is sitting on Ethereum. Staking is only protecting the value in flight in Ethereum.

So that's a whole detailed discussion. But what happens is eigenlayer, as the amount of assets restake between Ethereum and eigenlayer increases, let's say it's 100% of Ethereum stake is restaked on eigenlayer, eigenlir will not sell attributable security for this entire 100% it'll take a back off say something like 50% we don't touch we're only selling insurance for the remaining 50% so what this does is basically the there is a buffer that's maintained to make sure that Ethereum

it's an accounting for making sure that Ethereum security budget is at least that much and the remaining is attributed to all these Aveses so that's the way we deal with that and then finally LRTs right initially when, you know, one year back we were thinking about LRTs, you were actually worried that, you know, LRTs can have all this financialization and risk. And there is some truth to it, but there's also the other side of it, which is imagine there are no LRTs. So that's how eigenlayer is natively. There is no liquid restaking position or like a fungible position. But what could happen is I'm a staker.

I stake in Ethereum and eigenlayer and then now I have a position. and, you know, people want to borrow against this position. So somebody could potentially build a borrowing protocol against an eigenlayer position. This position is non-fungible and unique. And so the only way, if my position is now liquidated, the only thing that you can do is now you have to go and trigger a withdrawal from eigenlayer, and eigenlayer triggers a withdrawal from Ethereum. So what is happening is, if you did not build a layer of LRT, then anything that's happening in the financialized world

has ripples that propagate down into eigenlayer into Ethereum. You have to withdraw that money from eigenlayer. IgenLair has to withdraw that money from Ethereum to honor that position. And suddenly the AVS security fluctuates, Ethereum security fluctuates, all of these things happen. With the liquidries taking position, what happens is somebody has an LRT that's being lent and borrowed against, they get liquidated, the other guy just snatches the LRT,

there is no impact on eigenlayer or Ethereum. So financialization in a smart contract system is going to happen. And if it is going to happen, how do we mitigate and buffer it against, you know, ripples through the system? I think this is the first thing that is already true is LRTs actually create buffering for eigenlayer and Ethereum. Okay. Now, where is the actual risk? I think the actual risk is in what people call looping, right? You go and, you know, deposit an LRT, get ETH, and then go and, you know, or leverage restaking or leverage staking. That's where actual risks are. So this is now going into, I stake, I borrow against an LRT. And so the first thing is you cannot restake an LRT into eigenlayer. Like, that's not a thing.

this is again like some confusion in people's model or understanding of eigenlead. I can't just go to go stake in puffer or something, get an LRT, and then stake the LRT back into eigenlet. I can't allow for that. So that's not a thing. Okay. So when people are like, oh, I'm going to restake the restake and all this stuff. Like, okay, that's the first, you know, baseline thing.

But this could obviously happen in a lending market that I take an LRT and then I borrow eat against it and then I go and stake it and so on. And this is basically a misassignment of risk in these lending markets. And that's what we should focus on. Why is this lending market allowing you to borrow an ETH for an LRT with like, you know, only X percent collateralization rather than like Y percent collateralization? Why am I able to loop 50 times rather than only loop two times? So these are the kinds of questions that, you know, we should ask lending markets.

this is mispricing of risk in the lending market has nothing really to do with Aguilera. And so, but we are going to be like putting out some of these modeling things so that people understand what is actually. Emma, do you want to add anything to the daisy chain of risk conversation? That was the two points were pretty much what, yeah, what I was going to say. Beautiful. Just one more thing on that is smart contract risks, which we don't talk about, right? Like I talked about earlier when talking about the withdrawal lag that the eigenlayer core, you know, each state is one way it is protected is because of the withdrawal lag because, you know, there is a time to pass and, you know, do security council interventions and all of that.

But on the aviase slashing, you know, aviose could have a bug in the slashing contracts. That is really only buffered by the veto committee. and initially we are going to have a single veto committee but over time you may have a marketplace of veto committees like each stake or an operator decides what kind of like veto committee they want and AVSSs can work with them only if they agree on it's like a kind of like a mutually trusted party or like an arbitration agreement right so that's that's what else actually one thing I would say in this discussion is there is probably a misconception

around how operators view their position in the ecosystem, right? There will be a sweet spot in terms of how many ABSs they want to opt into, in contrast to how much risk they're willing to take on, right? Because obviously, if you go beyond this threshold, beyond this sweet spot, you're increasing your risk at the risk at the risk of losing yields, right? Using, like, if you go down, you can't really have that anymore. So the whole concept of, oh, yeah, each operator is going to, opt into every single ABS out there.

Probably not the most practical scenario. So, yeah. On that note, that actually perfectly leads into a question that I have. So this one comes from me. I want to talk about possible design architectures for AVSs that have slashing as, like, more permissible slashing. Whereas, like, I think we talk about many AVS networks. And the general context that we talk about them is,

is like we want zero slashing events, for which there will be many, many services where like that is the optimum, zero slashing events. But maybe there's a landscape to talk about AVS networks in which people being slashed is actually a part of the way that the system works and it functions healthily. Like I could, for example,

I could imagine if we all remember the old auger design, the old prediction market, where people would stake their auger tokens on the particular outcome of an event. and if you staked in the minority, you were slashed for being wrong. And it was an Oracle service. And so somebody needed to be slashed in order for the system to work at all. And as a result of this system, we would have this Oracle, a prediction market, and this thing would function. So I could imagine an eigenlayer AVS network like that, where the AVS role is an Oracle. And I could imagine

there are other AVS constructions in which a normal functioning healthily, the operating ABS actually has frequent AVS slashing events. And why are we okay with that? Well, because the yield compensates for that and more. Have we thought about sort of these constructions? Sri Ram, you want to go first? Yeah, this is a really, really interesting question. And I should say this is out of scope for our current eigenlayer design.

And the reason is, you know, systems like Auger, have a tyranny of majority. You know, you slashed the minority based on a majority opinion. What if the majority was actually adversarial and then like tried to impose their like wrong opinion on the minority and get the minority slashed? What really protects auger and auger as a system itself doesn't have it. And the reason it doesn't have this problem is they had a way to fork the auger token if something bad happened.

And, you know, this is where, this is the boundary that Vitalik has drawn for us, that, hey, don't do stuff assuming, you know, Ethereum will fork for you. And I think it's a really good design principle of, like, you know, drawing a boundary. So it's one thing to consider aviases where you could get slashed, you know, a small amount in the normal mode. It's another thing to consider an aviase, which has a tyranny of majority. And I think we just simply don't go there. the aviases should not have a way to slash a minority of people based on the majority opinion, because if the majority colludes and tries to take down the minority, then it's kind of like a big systemic instability. Okay. And the other really important property, I think they, so whether aviases or operators get slashed in a normal mode is still okay. But I think the main thing that we want to kind of like have as a property of vign layer,

is that if you're an operator and if you're honest and let's say you can even add honest and effective, then you will not get slashed. If you're honest, you should not get slashed as the bar, but you could even lower that a bit and say, oh, if you're honest and effective, which means diligent and doing your stuff, then you should never get slashed. I think that is the, because that's what retains all the properties that we want about, let's say, an LRT. When somebody is holding an LRT, what are they actually holding? They are saying this would be equal to 1-Eath if I trust that the operators are honest. That's a really, really nice kind of a mental model that if I trust these operators are right,

then this will be equal to 1-1-Eath because all these other things won't happen. But if we start loading un-calculatable risks into this layer, So this is again like a very sharp boundary. We only want to do validation services. And we only want to do validation services where risks are what we call endogenous. If you are an operator, it should be under your control not to get slashed. That's a very, very, very important property. Because once it's like that, then all these like cascades and problems that people have about like, I can layer, they don't show up.

But if you don't do it like that, then you have all kinds of problems and the system kind of like blows up in ways that. you can't predict. Okay, so that sounds like a very firm line that you are drawing that you are saying eigenlayer will not cross that line. It will not cross the line of allowing for effective, honest operators to get slashed. Absolutely. I think that is what, that is what makes it all the rest of the property of the system to actually work. Okay. Okay. And I think you also kind of implied that that same line is the line that Vitalik was labeling in his blog post, don't overload Ethereum consensus. That's correct.

In fact, the example he gave was a USD to Brazil Oracle, and something crazy happens in Brazil, and then you have Brazil North and Brazil South. And now, you know, a majority is voting with Brazil North and a minority is voting with Brazil South, but actually they were all honest. And then suddenly, you know, you're slashing all the guys who voted on Brazil South based on the Brazell North guys.

And then, like, you know, it's tens of billions of dollars of each slashed for just being honest and doing your job, but just not knowing that this thing can happen. So that's the overload. That overloads Ethereum social consensus because then what happens is, now you know, do we save them?

Do we not save them? The shelling point's not clear and it just like confuses everybody. So that's why we draw the line there is because objective attributable slashing for malicious operators. That is what Eiger is intended for. Intended for, yes.

and also eigenlayers also intended for permissionless innovation. And at some point, won't these two things collide? Like, if I can I go build my subjective auger layer? AVS? Yeah. Great question. So the way we mediate this is by the veto committee. So, you know, if I'm a staker, right, look at what I'm trusting. I'm trusting that either the AVS is correct or the,

the AAS contracts are correct or the veto committee is good. This is what I'm trusting when I'm opting into the system. That's the flow of trust. And so it is up to the slashing veto committee to make sure that it is able to understand and veto the slashing decisions correctly. So which means it also has an onboarding function because it needs to know what is it going to slash or not slash when such a decision comes up. So there is an onboarding decision which sits with the VATO.

veto committee. So there is a bit of permissioning there. But over time, like I said, we are going to have not one enshrined veto committee, but intersubjective veto committees, each of them, you know, there can be different groups that different stakeholders trust and, you know, they mediate different operas, you know, different ABSs. And what this does is in, in that world, each of those veto committees still needs to onboard those AVSs because that's how, because they are in a, in a position of mediating this dispute, they need to know what they're mediating. That needs to be like objective and concrete. And to the users of the AAS, you need a kind of like a clear understanding when you will,

you know, get slashed and when you won't get slashed. And the problem with the majority kind of a, so in a permission as well, it's possible that some veto committee, you know, on board's services, which have this kind of properties. But those committees, you know, will be less. trusted and less stake will be staked through them. That's what will happen. So the thing is by allowing for most of the genuine use cases of, you know, eigenlayer, which don't create these risks through the normal mode, you prevent the risk, because most of the yield is from genuine useful services which think through these risks very carefully. And somebody is going to build these things

which don't think through this carefully. And we want that to be exposed to the staker. And the way it's exposed to the staker is none of the big slashing veto committees are going to onboard that areas. Now I have to go and trust some other random veto committee and like, hey, why are you doing that? So that is how we stratify risk

and make sure that people understand what they're opting into. Beautiful. That actually has going to be a ton of clarity about this whole system. Getting back on to the questions here as we wrap up, getting closer towards the end. I'm going to put these two questions together. Arun asks, will they eventually switch to their native token staking to secure the network? Or is it always going

to be staked Eath always? And also, Green Curry asks, what's the point of the token? So now we are getting into the theoretical eigenlayer token. Theoretical eigenlayer token doesn't exist. So we'll review this position if and when it exists. All right. So we're punting on this question. That brings me to my next, my next. But just one, one important thing. The reason we have eat staking as the kind of central thing in eigen layer is, you know, this is a, this is important to understand for, you know, I see a lot of people, for example, asking, hey, when you have a lot of different DA layers and fees go to all these DLA layers, what is the role of eat? And I just want to like take a minute to answer this here. And the role of eat in our. And the role of eat in our. view is ETH is the money that is programmable. You know, you have the famous phrase programmable money, right? So ETH is programmable money. And what that means is as ETH becomes programmable money, it goes into all these different roll-ups and layer tools and other places where it is being used. And because these are different necessarily distinct zones, when a lot of the risk is now

priced in ETH, right? For example, I move value between. one roll up another roller that is priced in EIT. And then you ask, what is the right collateral to secure a bridge which moves ETH from one chain to another chain? That collateral should be like ETH or ETH pegged as closely as possible. And so the fundamental role of EIT is ETH becomes this money that goes into all these different chains and actually doing something interesting there. But then what I can layer augments that is with EIT. If I want to move this risk around, you want to buy insurance or security in the same unit, right? Like, if all my liabilities are denominated in USD, I might as well get credit in also UST.

Like, that is how I match the lowest volatility peg. If my, if I'm moving ETH around on all these Rolovs, but I have insurance in some other token, then there is a relative volatility of the token to ETH that I need to price. and that just makes it more expensive to have other tokens of security for moving around it. But that could be other things that are happening. For example, USDC becomes the dominant unit in all these different chains. It's a different world. And in that world, somebody may say, I want to stake USDC to secure a USDC to USDA transfer

because that is the closest volatility peg between that. So again, we view this as emergent, you know, market-down. dynamics. That's why even in EgelAid, you know, we are initially focusing a lot on E's staking, but you know, who knows, OPE token can be staked and, you know, for an OPE token like sequencer, an ARP token can be staked for an art token finality and so on. So these will all be happening also. But I think the fundamental role of ETH as money is what makes ETH as collateral ping pong each other to create this very powerful network effect. So that's, that's our vision. Would you say ETH is like the bootloader for the eigenlayer system as an asset?

And then other tokens like Arb for Arbitrum, OPE for optimism, can then kind of enter the game when the system is ready for it. I think that's possible because, you know, many of these different systems may want, for example, the way they might start off is they say like dual staking with Arb and E. But unless the belief is that, you know, any of these other tokens acquire the moniness that ETH has been able to acquire, risks will be primarily denominated in ETH, and therefore, ETH as collateral, still dominates in terms of utility. But there will be other tokens take for purely like alignment and other purposes, and they are the team that built it. They have to choose what token needs to be state.

So that is absolutely going to be a free market. So long as ETH is the money of the Metaverse. this is probably where it's going to go moving forward. If the metaverse demands something else, eigenlayer will serve that demand. Cool. A couple last questions. Two more questions.

Gabriel Haynes, we all love Gabe. He asks, of course, when theoretical token? That's the answer. Okay. All right. David, me, asks when main net? Oh, yeah. Early Q2.

Early Q2. Early Q2. All right. Is there any other questions? That's the end of my questions. Are there any questions that you guys wish that I had asked? What questions should I have asked? The questions around risks were really good. So, you know, another time, maybe there's an opportunity to dig into just like, you know, in a detailed discussion on some of that. Because I see a lot of people don't understand the models clearly enough to know what is actually happening. But I think they were really good. Some of that discussion around, for example,

can you have an all good article? I think your questions are on that. Awesome. All right, guys. Well, if that's all the questions, which it is, I really appreciate Nima. It's good to reconnect. And am I going to see you at East Denver?

Absolutely. And a lot of a team from Egan Labs, actually. Oh, yeah, yeah, yeah. Free Ram, I'll definitely see you at East Denver as well. Absolutely. Yep. Bankless Nation, you guys, thank you so much for coming on

and answering all these questions from myself and the community. I feel much smarter about Egan, Lair. Bankless agent, you guys know the deal. Crypto is risky. Staking is risky. Restaking is re-staking is re-risky. You can lose what you put in. That was a terrible pun. But we are headed west. This is for rentier. It's not for everyone.

But we are glad you are with us on the bankless journey. Thanks a lot.