Behind the Bastards - Voices of Revolution

Episode Date: October 30, 2019

Special Bonus Minisode: The collected unedited audio of the interviews from 'The World is Burning.' Learn more about your ad-choices at https://www.iheartpodcastnetwork.comSee omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Alphabet Boys is a new podcast series that goes inside undercover investigations. In the first season, we're diving into an FBI investigation of the 2020 protests. It involves a cigar-smoking mystery man who drives a silver hearse. And inside his hearse look like a lot of guns. But are federal agents catching bad guys or creating them? He was just waiting for me to set the date, the time, and then for sure he was trying to get it to happen. Listen to Alphabet Boys on the iHeart Radio App, Apple Podcast, or wherever you get your podcasts. What if I told you that much of the forensic science you see on shows like CSI isn't based on actual science?

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And I'm going to play that right now. Yeah, so would you guys give an overview in your own words of why these protests started? Obviously the kind of foreign headline is a public transit, fair increase leads to protests. My understanding is that's just sort of kind of the spark that lit a bunch of tinder on fire. Yeah, but I'm interested in, yeah, what would you blame it on? Yeah, the last year we are participating in different protests for different things about problems that we have almost started with the Pinochet, with the Q. Start about the SP, with the pitch and plan system, and the education that is really high cost, and the healthcare problem, and really expensive transportation, and the minimum wage is very low.

Yeah, it's like you said, where what initially started this protest was a group, a bunch of students who were evading the metro. So to protest the rise in the fair, which is the second or third time they've raised the metro in the last three years. And so it's the most expensive metro in South America, and even though for someone from the United States it might seem it's still very cheap, or how are they only protesting over 10 more cents or whatever, but in Chile if you make the minimum wage you could be spending almost 20% of your wage on the metro. Wow. It is very expensive here, and so what happened is a lot of students were getting together as like a big group, and so there would be hundreds of them, and they would all rush into the metro together and jump over the turnstiles, and so that's how it all started, and then the police were very heavy handed in their reaction and got very violent, and then it got kind of worse from there, and so the protest exploded into more of a general protest,

because there's been a lot of problems in Chile, and there's a lot of inequality, and a lot of things that have never been fixed since the dictatorship. So they're still using the same constitution that was written by Pinochet, and there's lots of other things. The corruption of Pinera, the current president, and then a lot of people protest over the last couple of years about the pension plans, the AFP, and so the collusion of companies selling land for hydroelectric companies to only for business, and it's really interesting because in Chile, almost 10 families, they have control, they have control of the country. Yeah, so it's similar to the United States where there's a couple hundred billionaires that are kind of controlling everything, but in Chile, it's literally 10 families, and these 10 families are very, very rich and have a lot of control in the country, but yeah, so it's about a lot of things at the protest now.

And would you all walk me through... In this... No, please continue, please continue. Now in this period of the Pinera, that is the president, this is the second period. Second term for Pinera? Yeah, he has. So I think all the Chileans think that the cops in the terms of the Pinera, they are more aggressive this year in all the termings, so... There's also a big issue with the militarization of the police.

Yeah, so the police are really heavy, and like she was saying, especially with under Pinera, the police respond to often peaceful protests with tear gas and violence. And now, of course, there's been declared the state of emergency, so now you have the military and tanks in the streets too. And you said that the police have gotten more aggressive and more violent this year. Why would you... Is there a reason behind that, do you think? Is there some sort of cause to that that you can see? No, it's not any reason.

It's only a strategy of the government, but it's a bad idea. A couple of months ago, we saw some car of the cops driving in the paseo, really traditionally, in the center of the city, and, como tirando tear gas, ¿te acuerdo? Oh yeah. Yeah, a couple of months ago, there was some crazy protests, and the police were driving through Plaza de Armas, the downtown, the historic center of town, and throwing tear gas at people who weren't even protesting. But to answer your question, I think that it just has to do with the government,

because a couple of years ago, the president was Bachelet, who is more center left. And so I think the police now, under Pinyera, understand that they kind of have carte blanche to do whatever they want, and that they won't be reprimanded for violence against protesters. And when this current wave of heavy street actions broke out, were y'all there for sort of the beginning of that? Were you there on sort of the first day that this really kicked off into a city-wide sort of thing, rather than just kind of a fair protest? Yeah, definitely. So we live about six or seven blocks from Plaza Italia, which is the metro, Bacchivano,

which is like the center of downtown, and it's the historic place where protests always start. And so we're kind of in the thick of it. And also, we are right by this intersection where, when the protest really got serious two nights ago, there were five buses that were burned right at our intersection. So yeah, it's kind of right outside our door. And one of the obviously, I think, probably internationally the most famous image from these protests so far is the headquarters of that electric company being burned down. And it's usually, most of the sources I've seen have ascribed it to the protesters,

but I have seen a lot of people saying that it couldn't have been protesters because the fire started on the floor that only a limited number of people have access to. Obviously, I don't think anyone can prove to a point of certainty one way or the other what happened yet. Do y'all have sort of a take on that, an opinion on that? What do you think is most likely or what most people seem to believe? Yeah, it's weird. The bus is the same. It's crazy to believe because with the problem with the buses, we saw a couple of videos and one of these buses was escorted for the cops in really weird situation

and almost the bus they put in the place for the people can burn for angry and for the problem. So this is not the first time that the cops make stuff crazy like that. So you can think about and can use your imagination to think that it's real. It's fake. Yeah, we're not typically conspiracy theorist people, but as far as what a lot of people have been talking about is with both the NL Electric Company with the fire that happened on their staircase, their fire escape. There was a number of suspicious things about it.

It started on the 11th floor, so it's like how could a protestor do that? I don't know. And of course, it only burned that the fire escape and didn't touch anything about the main building. So there's a lot of suspicion here of that and then of the idea that possibly it was the police or the government who started that as a way to justify bringing in the military and all of that and starting the curfew. And what's very similar is these five buses that were burned outside of our apartment. It was very strange because yes, there's almost never five buses all right next to each other on the street in the corner.

And then there's also been videos that have been passed around WhatsApp and social media where you see that these buses were discontinued so they were already in bad shape. And then there's a video that's been passed around of the police escorting one of these buses very slowly, almost like they're escorting it here so they can burn it and again use it as justification to ratchet up the police response. So it's hard to say and you don't want to be a conspiracy theorist but certainly there's suspicious things happening in that regard. And on the street here, almost every Chilean that we've talked to has said that they pretty much believe that it was the police that were doing that. And in terms of what you've seen in person from the police response to all this, how would you describe how you've watched the police deal with the protest so far? Like what have you seen?

Just a lot of tear gas, a lot of the water cannons, mostly tear gas. Just in our experience, we've been kind of playing it safe, we weren't getting really too far into the extreme protest. We kept trying to go to the center to Plaza Italia but we kept getting pushed back by tear gas every time. So we've seen videos of extreme violence, the police beating people and even hitting them with their cars, extreme stuff and shooting them. There's been a lot of videos we've seen on social media of the police shooting innocent protesters not doing anything. But as far as what we saw with our own eyes, mostly just a lot of tear gas, but sometimes it would be just like peaceful protesters and the police would drive by and literally throw a tear gas out the window, a canister and then drive away. So it's also interesting, some people have been commenting that it seems different to police strategy this time in comparison to previous protests. Whether not so much like kettling the protesters or not so much getting into one-on-one physical fistfights.

Which is again, some people are saying that they want the protesters to get more extreme and burn more things and loot so that that justifies what they're doing. Yeah, and divide the people because now you have the more extreme people, boring stuff, destroying the city, destroying the pharmacy or the supermarket. And the people like us that we take the stove and you shake with the spoon all day and when the police, you can see the police and you need to run. So the government I think they want to divide the feeling of the people, the feeling of the protest and the union of the people. Yeah, so yeah, they're just trying to divide the people so that the people who might sympathize with the protesters will say, no, they've gone too far. They shouldn't be burning things or taking down street lights or looting supermarkets. And as for this curfew, how long can you see it last? It's so extreme it doesn't seem like civil life could continue if it goes on for too much longer. Yeah, well it just started last night. Last night it started at 10 o'clock and then tonight they started at 7 o'clock.

So it is very extreme. Like I was saying to you in text that if it were to go on for two more weeks, it would be insane. I can't imagine that that would happen. It would shut down the entire city. But at the same time, tonight's protests were crazier than last night. I don't know, I don't see how it stops. Because Pina doesn't seem like everything from the government has been just attacking the protesters, not taking any responsibility for the action of the police. Yeah, and I don't know if he changed the price of the ticket bus if we are going to record the peace in the city. The people have too much angry. So I don't know if we are going to be conforming? Like, satisfied. Pinyera has mentioned that he might freeze the price increase for the metro. But at this point, it's like that's not going to be enough to satisfy people because as we mentioned, the protest is about things much worse than the metro fare.

So yeah, I mean, I don't think people will stop protesting unless Pinyera resigns. People are out there shouting and calling for his resignation. Obviously, I don't think he wants to do that either. And if you could send out a message to people from around the world, Americans and Europeans and everyone else, not in Chile, listening to this, what is it that you want other people to know about what's happening in your country? I don't know. When we live in Colombia, the most common stuff that the people ask us, it was why we leave Chile when Chile is so good, so good country and all the system is so good. But the problem is that the problem is Chile has a lot of problems for a long time, almost started with the queue and we didn't have any solution for this. So yeah, we are not okay. We have a problem. We have a huge problem and the world didn't know anything like that. So yeah, I guess I would just say to people that I hope that people are aware of what the Chileans are protesting for and they understand that it's not about the metro fare. It's not only about paying 10 cents more, that it's about deeper, profound issues that are at the core of this country, like for example, still having the Constitution that was written by a dictator and things like that.

So yeah, like Stephanie was saying, people maybe need to understand that life is really not so easy in Chile or maybe it is easy for 20% of the country, but a lot of people here are really struggling and the minimum wage is really, really low. And there's a lot of fundamental problems and that's why I think this is happening. So I would just ask people to understand a little bit about the other issues with the Constitution and the corruption and the pension plans and the minimum wage and all of those. And even though I don't condone looting or violence or anything like that, I would ask that people have some empathy for the people who are out here protesting for a better life. And obviously I think the most well-known protests occurring in the world right now are the ones in Hong Kong and I think the tactics there, I've seen them used and cribbed by protest movements in a number of other countries that are going on right now. Have you seen that have any impact on the tactics people are using on the ground? I know that I've seen a lot of people sharing videos on social media about like the Hong Kong protesters, like diffusing the tear gas canisters where they'll put a traffic cone on top of it and then pour some sort of chemical solution in there and it neutralizes it. So I know that I haven't actually seen any Chileans do that, but I know a lot of people were talking about that. And while we have seen we were just being watched by a drone, but I don't think the facial recognition here in Chile is as strong as Hong Kong. But yeah, I think that part of it is what's happening in Hong Kong and what's happening in Ecuador right now is probably influencing the protesters here.

And it seems just in the last week that protests have started in a number of other countries, is there any sort of feeling at least from you that this is part of kind of a global... You mentioned earlier in the interview that some of the problems that are happening in Chile right now are similar to some ones that we're dealing with in the United States and others, this like concentration of wealth. Do you have a sense that like the mass uprisings going on in a number of nations are all sort of part of something global that's bigger than just the movements in the individual countries? I don't know, I would like to think so. I would like to think that hopefully we are opening our eyes to the failures of neoliberalism, but I don't know if there is a grander movement here. Yes, like this one from CAS that appeared recently, for example, like the extreme right that never existed before. Of course, but is there a connection like the movements in South America? Of course, for example, that with Brazil and that there is also a big wave in favor of this kind of thing, like the media is connected, like the right movement is being stronger and more visible. So another thing is that we have the left maybe is growing stronger and using more forceful methods because of the growth of the extreme right in, you know, all over the world,

but especially feeling that in South America, in Brazil, and then also in Chile, where you have someone like Cast who was a presidential candidate who is extremely to the right, even more so than the current president. And so I think that maybe in some ways the left is responding to that and a fear of the extreme authoritarian return to dictatorship right like you have with Bolsonaro in Brazil or, you know, Cast who knows could be president of Chile one day. Well, thank you both very much for your time. I really appreciate you talking with me today. Cool, man. Yeah, I think that's all I wanted to get into right now. Obviously, I'll be in touch with you as I figure out kind of my schedule and please do keep me updated on y'all and what do you see happening outside your door. Okay, yeah, definitely. I'm happy to like send you some photos. If you make it down here, we'll show you around. And yeah, send me a link to your podcast. Yeah, absolutely. Thank you both so much for your time. Okay, cool, man. Have a good one.

You too. Bye. Okay, I'm back and that was the Chile interview. And next we have my interview with Jody Ayub over in Lebanon. So I'm going to play that now. Hey, Joey. Hey. Hey, sorry, is this a good time still? Yeah, yeah, it is. How are you? I'm doing good. How are you doing today? I'm good, thanks.

Yeah. Well, I guess we should just get into it. I'm doing as much reading as I can to try to understand what's happening in Beirut right now. And, you know, obviously, there's a lot to keep track of, you know, I've been covering Iraq and Syria for years and I would say I barely have a minimal level of competence in either of those nations politics. So I'm pretty new to focusing on what's happening in Beirut. From what I've listened to or been able to read, it seems like like the thing that the news is crediting for these uprising or for the uprising might not be the right word. But for these protests is a tax on WhatsApp. Yeah. When I've listened to or read things that other people in the area have written, it seems like the wildfires that swept the country and like the fact that this helicopter fleet that was purchased by, you know, volunteers and then like allowed to kind of decay into obsolescence.

Like the fact that just in general, the government has been very ineffective at dealing with major problems like those wildfires is a much bigger reason for the protests. But I'm interested in kind of your telling of like why this has all happened and sort of how it's how it where you see things as being at right now. Yeah, so it's it's a bit of both and obviously much more than that at the same time. The wildfires that was last Monday, so that's the 14th, the night of the 14th to the 15th and it lasted about 48 hours. And it was what 1300 hectares? Yeah. Yeah, and those 48 hours we lost basically a year's worth of trees lost usually. So I think there was something like three million trees.

That's horrible. That's usually an average. So that obviously pissed a lot of people off because the government was utterly incapable on willing whatever we used to deal with it. You had pretty much you haven't had seven servants paid in like 20 years. So these are all volunteer forces and you had even had like the civil defense forces from the Palestinian camps that stepped up that helped. And you had basically volunteers just doing it themselves. There wasn't really anything until two things happened that put them off. One is Greece, Cyprus and Jordan basically sent some, you know, helicopters and whatever.

And the other thing is we got lucky because it started raining the day after. Yeah. So that's pretty much why we the damage was more or less limited if you want. And so the fact that after all of this just like a day later or something, the first thing the government can think of doing is to impose attacks on WhatsApp, which is obviously a free service that people use because actual phone services are extremely expensive in Lebanon. That was kind of, you know, as everyone has been saying, you know, that whole store that will become this back thing. And then you had protests on that like that Thursday evening. So that's basically a week now.

And in that protest, you had lots of roadblocks. You had basically some of the usual protests that we have been seeing before. And during that protest, one of this, if you want symbols that became this, I don't know, point of unity, I guess, is there was a bodyguard of one politician, took out his gun, started scaring people. People were not scared. They were actually fighting back. And then you had this woman who kicked him. And that became this sort of meme and it became super popular and that kind of galvanized everything. And then after that, it became sort of like a daily story.

The more people come down, there's a bit of repression. Then the next day, even more people come down. Kind of a familiar story if you see what I'm going with this. Yeah. And now it's day number eight and people are still in the streets and it's way more than just in Beirut. And it was, you know, the biggest protests so far were something like a quarter of the entire population that got out into the streets. Am I am I right on that? It was like a million some odd people.

Yeah. Yeah. The numbers I've seen is something like a million, like 1.2 million to 1.7 million. And Lebanon is something like 5 million or 6 million if you want to include refugees as well. That's almost unbelievable. So that's a significant percentage of the population. Yeah. I can't imagine a protest of that scale ever occurring in the United States.

Like it would literally be one of the most significant happenings in the history of our nation. Does it feel like that to you? Like this is one of the most important things that's happened in the history of Lebanon? Yes. Like for two reasons, even three reasons. I was involved, so I'll kind of give some background here. I was involved in the 2015 protests, those that followed the Waste Crisis. As in like an organizer in its early weeks.

And one thing that happened then that is not happening now is that back then it was really centralized to Beirut. And you sort of had like a sort of middle class focus to it if you want. Now it is completely spontaneous. There's actually no organizers. And Beirut is actually not even the most impressive one. You have protests in Tripoli that have been going on every single day. You have protests in Nabatiyeh, in the Ba'a Valley, in Zoum Musbih, and in Sur, here in the south.

I'm sure I'm forgetting many other places. You pretty much like have over 100 or 200 or 300 roadblocks every single day right now. And it is utterly spontaneous. There's no organization behind it. So that's like really one of the main, I kind of mentioned both at the same time. The fact that it's not centralized in Beirut and the fact that it's spontaneous. And you have much more of an awareness if you want that like we tried in 2015. It kind of led to more or less good stuff in 2016, but not enough like the Beirut

Madinati campaign during the municipal elections of Beirut. Kind of hinted that it was things were going in the right direction. But then you had the elections last year and I think we had like one independent or two governments that actually got in parliament and that was about it because the whole system, usually Lebanon is divided between March 8th coalition and March 14th coalition. They kind of came together last year to defeat civil society if you want. And they've been doing this time and time again. The current government is a government that historically has actually been of parties

that were actually opposed to one another. It's a future movement and Jermaine Bersiegel's free patriotic movement, not to mention Hezbollah and Amal. These are coalitions that kind of get formed on and off in a sense depending on the circumstances. And what can you tell us about sort of the nature of how the security forces have responded to this? I can tell you that like a lot of what I've seen on Twitter has been, you know, there have been some pictures of like Lebanese soldiers, you know, with tears in their eyes. And I guess sort of the thing we're led to take out of that is that even the Lebanese like police and military very sympathetic to the protests.

I can't tell what's actually happening on the ground. So I'm wondering what is your what is your take on that? Oh, that's not ideal. No, and I mean, oh, sorry, you cut out for a second. Could you restart your answer to that? You heard the question, right? Yeah, sorry. I did.

Yeah. It depends on when and where you did have some instances where the Lebanese army was sort of restrained. Like it actually stood in between protesters and what we would call Shabihas or some elements of the sectarian parties that are basically let loose to intimidate people if not do worse. But in other cases, like when we were to gas last week, that was Lebanese army as well doing it. So it really depends on when and where there is definitely a sentiment, I think, among Lebanese protesters. I don't share it personally, but it's definitely the majority that you basically need to defend the army and try and get them on your side. In a sense, at least individual and individuals capacity that hasn't happened. I don't think it will happen, but that hasn't happened as of now, because I wanted to really understand that the main difference between the army in Lebanon and the army in other places in the Middle East and North Africa is that the army in Lebanon is not the strongest force in Lebanon.

That's Hezbollah. Everyone knows that. And so it's not seen as, oh, we might have a military coup or anything like that, because that's not really in the realm of reality if you want. So most of the violence, again, depending on where we're talking, but quite a lot of the most brutal anyway, violence has come from the sectarian parties. So yesterday there was lots of violence in Nabati by Hezbollah and Amal gangs, basically Shabbiha, and you had something like 25 or 30 people who were injured and had to go to the hospital. And in the evening yesterday, you had also, again, I'll just use the word Shabbiha of the free patriotic movement in another area, not too far from where I live. They attacked people as well. Actually, I'm not sure how many people were injured in that one. It wasn't as serious as the one in the south, but it was fairly serious as well. So you do have these tensions between a spontaneous, if you want, sense of the fact that we're getting at the point where we can no longer tolerate 30 years of this.

You know, two days ago was the 30th anniversary of commemoration, whatever, of the Ta'af agreement. The agreement that was signed in 1989 that ended the Lebanese Civil War and they signed it in the city of Ta'af in Saudi Arabia. And that system sort of codified sectarianism even more than it was before the war. It did a number of things that I won't get into now, it's not that relevant, but what it did really is make it almost basically impossible for anyone to identify in any other way other than with your sect. So the fact that I am from a certain sect, it doesn't matter if I am a believer or not or an atheist or not, none of these things matter. What matters is that this is your sect and so you vote according to that and you vote according to sect and according to where your family is supposedly originally from. So for example, I can vote in Ashrafiyyeh, but I don't live in Ashrafiyyeh, I live in a different part of Lebanon. And that's part of the reason why it's been so difficult to really organize because, for example, when there was a municipal elections in 2016,

something like a quarter of, sorry, like there's four times more people who actually live in Beirut than people who are registered to vote in Beirut. So you have many of my friends who live in, I don't live in Beirut, but they live in Beirut. And so they were helping organize people who are officially registered in Beirut including people who don't live there to vote there. So that's kind of just like a small example of why it's been so difficult on all levels to really organize for an alternative to the sectarian system that we have now. And it does seem like what we're seeing, and again, you know, this is my perception as a very much an outsider, that some of this sectarianism is starting to fade in the face of kind of an understanding that more solidarity between groups is necessary if you're going to actually deal with sort of the problems that are making it so expensive to just live a basic life in Lebanon. Is that what you feel you are seeing or would you say I'm kind of off base there?

No, no, that's definitely what's happening. That is the most extraordinary thing that's happening and that's why it really feels different than before. Again, as someone like I've been involved in protests since I think 2010 was my first one and I went to the very brief ones in 2011. There was some stuff in between and then 2015 was the big one and then you had as of 2016, 2018. But there's nothing really like what's happening now. Now you have a chance in Tripoli, a Sunni majority around the North, saying like openly and people like in the hundreds of thousands repeating these chants, like we are with you in Nabati which is a majority Shi'a area, until the death. And we are like, we are, I don't know how to translate this, but we stand in solidarity with Nabati and with Beirut and Sur and all of these other areas. And there is very much a sense that it's something has been broken, like in a good way.

Like there is a way of doing things that is extremely difficult that even if people stop protesting today, which I don't think is going to happen anyway, that it is impossible for the government to just continue and do things as they have been doing so far. And one symbolic way that that has been happening has been through extremely rude, if you want, insults that people have been throwing against politicians, like notably this song that you have been repeating about Jebron Basile, which is basically, fuck his mother. That's basically what it means. And that has been repeated on against pretty much all major politicians, including, although much more Shi'a with someone like Hasan Nasqallah, the leader of Hezbollah and some of the other leaders that have had this sort of most sectarian bent to their politics, even though they were all part of the sectarian system.

Now, that's just the fact that, like, fuck your mother, you know, essentially is a chant. Like that, you know, you're talking, Lebanon is, particularly Beirut is kind of a very, very much a city of the world, but Lebanon, and again, correct me if I'm wrong here, much more traditional in a lot of aspects. Like the fact that people are saying things like this, that are so explicit and so kind of obscene, is a marker of how extreme the situation has gotten, that that would even be seen as acceptable. Like that seems very shocking to me. Yeah, I mean, these insults are very common, but they are not common towards the politicians. They're not common towards people that you usually would, or Fahamad-e-Rais, like you would give them honorifics,

like sir and mister, your excellence, you know, that sort of thing. And the fact that you have people explicitly when they're being interviewed, like if no one, if people who aren't going down to the seats, what they've been doing basically for the past week is just open some of the channels, LBC for example, and you have like a split screen into six different, you know, areas of Lebanon and people just being interviewed and giving their opinion. And the sense that you get, whether you're on the seats or whether you're just at home, is that there is something that is no longer taken for granted,

which is that these people have like time and time and time and time again. And of course, those in civil society, as you might call them, or the activists, or even the working classes that are the most affected, these are unknown. Like none of this is serious. Sorry, none of this is new. But there is something about how all of these things happen at the same time, that I don't want to say that people just woke up today because obviously that's not how things happen. But it's just that, as we say, like the wall of fear, if you want, has been broken.

That's a bad translation, but that's basically what it means. And that we are getting to the point where even in Nabatiyeh, which as I said, it's in the south, very much an area where Hezbollah and Amal have a lot of influence, where you have yesterday it was Amal and Hezbollah Shabeeha attacking protesters. And then the next day, people in Nabatiyeh, they're still, as we're speaking now, on the streets, and something like an hour ago, two members of the municipal council of Nabatiyeh, because of being forced by the people to resign, essentially. So you've been having these pressures, and just before we spoke, something like,

two hours ago, the president, Michelin also spoke, and it was such a contrast to what's been happening. It's eight days after we started, he hasn't said a single thing before now. And the thing which it says live, but it is very obviously edited, we have lots of different scenes that keep on changing, it's obviously in edits, and he looks exhausted because he's fairly old, and what he said is utterly disconnected from reality. Like he could have said nothing, and it would have made absolutely no difference. In fact, I think he just pissed people more off at this point. And let me think of the right way to phrase this question.

Do you, like, what is it that you think would be most, you know, most of the audience listening to this, most of the people listening to this are going to be, you know, Americans, Europeans, what would you say, if you could try to get just a couple of basic facts to them, what is the most important thing for them to understand about what is happening in Lebanon right now, and is there any way for them to help and to express solidarity with the Lebanese people who are currently protesting against their government? The latter is, I guess, a bit easier, faster to answer, because there have been lots of diaspora protests. So I would guess, show your support to these people there, because, you know, the Lebanese are pretty much everywhere.

So that's the second question. The first question is, if I would summarize it, there was a civil war between 1975 and 1990. I am of the generation that was born right after. I was born in 1991. But to use that example in bit symbolically, just before I was born, there was the amnesty law that was passed, which gave immunity to most crimes committed during the civil war. So most people who ended up in power after that were active participants in the civil war. One of the most notorious examples of that is Nabi Habibi, who is the leader of the Amal movement

and has been leader of the Amal movement since the 70s. He has been speaker of parliament since 1992. So he's been speaker of parliament for my entire existence, basically. And this is someone, like, right now, there was a joke before that, you know, we're fighting against sectarianism, and that means that the president, which currently has to be a Christian, and the prime minister has to be a Sunni Muslim, and the speaker of parliament has to be a Shia Muslim. The joke was that even if we get into a secular government, the speaker of parliament will still be Nabi Habibi, because he's been, like, across all of the governments that have passed so far in the past few decades.

So Lebanon has a sectarian system, a confessional system, I guess is the official word, but we just call it Ta'ifei, which is sectarianism, Ta'ifei being sect. And the way that works is that it basically makes it impossible to organize politically, or even to vote, outside of your sect. There might be some, like, you might be in, like, the sect being Christian, and you might vote for someone who is a different kind of Christian, but it is almost impossible to vote, for example, for a Druze or a Sunni or a Shia, depending on when we're talking about the municipal or general elections and that sort of thing. So it has kind of consolidated differences that sort of were fought out during the war, if you want. I'm grossly oversimplifying the civil war here, obviously.

It consolidated these identities, and it made it impossible for those of us who want to identify simply on a civil level, like only as Lebanese citizens, it made it impossible for us to only do that. And this is what the past week has basically been challenging. And we've been seeing much more of a sentiment that we are doing this as one people, basically, and that it doesn't matter whether you're a Shia or Sunni or Druze or Christian, there are certain things that affect, obviously, everyone, corruption, poverty, all of that. And we need to solve these. And one of the things I'm interested in, so I'm covering, obviously, we're in the middle of a number of different political uprisings

around the world right now, a substantial number. And I know that in Catalonia, and to a lesser extent in Chile, the Hong Kong protests have served as a sizable sort of like inspirational factor in how people have approached resisting the government. Have you seen any impact in terms of the tactics of those protests on what's being done right now in Lebanon? I've seen some people talk about it, and it was mentioned on the streets. I've been going to the Beirut ones, and I've seen some people on Twitter sharing these tactics that people in Hong Kong have been doing.

But I wouldn't say that, like one of the issues that I think is common in Lebanon is how I... Oh, sorry, could you say again you cut off for a second there? Yes, like there is a sense that you sort of cut off from the world, and that your links are the diaspora links. So you might have people who know a bit about France, a bit about Brazil or America or Canada or whatever, but that's the extent of how internationalist things can get if you want. That's the limit of it. You don't have as much of an influence from the rest of the world outside of the Arab majority world.

So you have had some sentiments from what I've seen primarily in Tripoli and North and in Beirut towards, for example, sending solidarity to Sudanese protesters at the time or to Iraqis right now. You have this a bit, but primarily the overwhelming majority are simply focusing on what's in front of them, essentially. And so because this system that we're talking about has really hampered Lebanon in our Lebanese and people who live in Lebanon as well, because don't forget, there are also Palestinians and Syrians and migrant domestic workers and so on. It has hampered everything to the point where it's just become impossible to look at anything else. And so my hope is that we solve this issue now, and I don't even think we're going to fully solve it, obviously,

but we start putting cracks in the system. And this will allow people in Lebanon, I think, or maybe that's the optimist in me, to sort of regain a bit of confidence and that hopefully can lead to us learning more things in a more long term. It's just that right now the struggle has really been to maintain the momentum every single day. That's really been the main thing. And because Lebanon is so divided by region, you don't have a train or a metro or something that really links the region. Everything is just by car. It's been very easy for the sectarian parties to sort of lock off, if you want, an area from the other.

And that's sort of been what's happening, but thankfully through the internet, social media, but also through some of the coverage on the news, we've been able to see what's been happening in other areas, and that has sort of strengthened individual protests as well. And that's part of what seems like we're kind of watching the worst nightmare of the powers that be in Lebanon occur, which is these different groups that have been split by sort of sect, realizing that they all have much more in common with each other as fellow working class people, as people who can't count on stealing millions of dollars from the larger chunk of the country, like the normal folks in Lebanon,

realizing they have much more in common with one another than with the people who run the country. That seems like what's happening, and it seems like the worst case scenario for the people in charge. Yeah, yeah, that's definitely what's happening. We're going to go down some numbers to show what we're talking about when we're talking about the levels of inequality in Lebanon. This is as of 2014, and it's gotten worse and since. The top 1% receives approximately a quarter of the total national income, which means that the bottom 50% is left with 10% of the national income. The bottom 50% makes, and this is in euros, the study was done in euros,

the bottom 50% makes about 3,000 euros per year. The middle 40%, and this speaks to how there isn't really a middle class anymore. You sort of have a class that's in between. The middle 40% makes 11,000 euros a year, and then it goes up and up and up. The top 10% makes 81,000, the top 1% makes 334,000, and then the top 0.1% makes 1.5 million, and the top 0.001% makes 47 million. So you would have, in a city like Tripoli, which is one of the poorest, it's the poorest biggest city, basically.

It's the second biggest city in Lebanon, and as the poorest of that, you have, I think, 2 or 3 or 4, I kind of keep losing count of who's the billionaire, who's the multi-hundred millionaire. Billionaires in Najem Miati and Saad Hariri are both from there, and they are billionaires. This is just an example. This is sort of the situation, and these are the numbers that we have. We don't know, for example, on the side of Hezbollah, how much money is coming from Iran. We don't know all of these numbers, and we don't know how much of the money

that these Lebanese politicians, warlords, oligarchs, whatever have, how much of it is actually in Lebanon. You have people that were mentioned in the Panama Papers a few years ago because they have, you know, offshore accounts here and there. So Swiss banks are always mentioned as part of the protests because it's so common for us to just assume, and obviously it's accurate, that they have so much money in Swiss banks. This is just really like a taste of this situation that's here.

So it's not just that people suddenly are realizing that they're old Lebanese and they have these things in common. It's not that in itself isn't really new. It's more that the only ways people have been able to mobilize so far because of the combination of sectarianism, as we mentioned, which is consolidated and basically made into law, but also the issues of the lack of public space, the issues of it, it's very difficult to actually physically get from one area to the other

because of that, because of the lack of public transport, sorry. It's been just extremely difficult to kind of shake the system hard enough to allow independence, at least as a start, to get in and show just by example. It's been basically impossible to show by example that an alternative is possible. So the hope here is, at least that's the sentiment that I'm getting, that most people are hoping that this government follows. What comes after it depends on who you talk to. Some people want a sort of technocratic government that temporarily replaces it

and then you have early elections, other people are just going for early elections directly. And the hope basically is that this time, just as in last year, we almost got a few independents, this time we will be able to do way more because the people, the sectarian warlords and oligarchs that united against us are extremely unpopular and this time hopefully, or next in this imaginary future election, they will be less able to mobilize in the same way that they did before. Well, Joey, thank you so much for talking with me today. Is there anything else you wanted to talk about or wanted to mention before we draw this to a close?

I would just ask people to basically keep an eye out on what's happening. I don't know if it will get worse. I'm hoping not, but it's very difficult to predict what some of these sectarian parties, how they will react if they feel that the only thing they have to stay in power is to basically show some close because they all have armed militias. And that's obviously the worst-case scenario. The best-case scenario is that the pressure is so overwhelming and so decentralized. So I'll mention this as a last thing.

The fact that it's so decentralized means that if, for example, Hezbollah wants to crack down on people in Nagotia, you will have people in Tripoli telling those people in Nagotia that we stand with you. And there is this popular, I think it went viral video of, in Tripoli, the third night or something, people chanting, before chanting, a Shabirite-Scotanism, that people want to downfall of the regime, which obviously has been a popular chant, obviously from 2011, now re-adopted much more strongly in Lebanon. Besides that, they said something along the lines of, if they shut down all the squares, our square will remain open, the Tripoli square, so I didn't know.

And that's sort of the end note that I can, like the note that I can end on, because it really shows that it will be very difficult, not impossible, but very difficult for the ruling establishment, the sectarian warlords or the gox, to shut all of this down. That, I think, is very difficult for them to do. Well, thank you, Joey. Thank you for talking with me, and thank you for sharing your impressions of what's going on in your country. I really do appreciate it.

Thank you. Thanks for your time. Yeah. And last, we have my interview with Chabad. So I actually conducted this through WhatsApp. I asked her some questions, and she responded to me. So the first question was, what is your understanding of the agreement reached by the SDF, which are the military forces of Rojava, in the Syrian regime? The memorandum between the SDF and the Syrian regime is a military and not relevant to the political status of self-administration.

Actually, the withdrawal of the American did not give a choice to the court, then dealing with the Assad and the regime. The regime forces are located in Kobani, Manbij, Ain Asa city, as well, it's a prison in their headquarters in Hazakand, Qamishli cities. The officials of the self-administration sees that it's a duty of the Syrian government to protect Syria international border from the Turkish occupation, to avoid having the same scenario of Afrin. I talked to many people from Qamishli about that. They said they are not happy to receive the regime after all these years of self-autonomous,

but at the end regime might be better than Turkey. And others said they will leave if the regime take over this area, including me, as many of them participate in the 2011 demonstration against Assad. The second question I asked Habat was, how do you believe closer integration of Rojava to the Syrian state will affect the progress of the women's revolution? The regime is representing the patriarchy system. On the contrary, Rojava is representing the women revolution. Women of Rojava built last eight years specific system for the women in all levels, military, economically, politically, and they made impact in the education via teaching the genealogy,

which is a women's science, on the mentality of the new generations. In addition, the implementation of the co-presidency system in all the institutions starting from coming to the highest official ranks allowed very effective participation of a woman to lead this region beside the men. I interviewed Dubai Dali, the co-presidency of a society protection forces in Al-Jazeera canton about this subject, and she said, we know how to protect ourselves. Now, after a years of experience, and we are not afraid of a regime coming back, it's obvious that the women of Rojava will not lead their gains easily, but there is a great risk on the women evolution in case the regime take over Rojava.

I do believe that the regime will first target the women specifically, because this is what makes Rojava unique on a global level. Now, the third question I asked Habat was, the ceasefire, as written, appears to give Turkey all at once and leave nothing for the SDF or Rojava. Do you believe it will actually be followed? Even the agreement been implementing under the American monitoring, but we saw the first day morning of the truce had been bridged by Turkey and their backed forces. Turkey removed the parts of the wall and the Seregania city and entered their backed forces.

Heavy clashes took place in the city beside the shelling. As a result of the Turkish bridge of the truce last three days, there were 25 fighters being killed and 17 injured on the other side. 17 civilians, as a result, lost their lives as a result of the bombardment of the Turkish. Yesterday, there was a stop of bombardment for some time, which allowed the medical teams to evacuate a lot of injured and martyrs, both fighters and civilians. This afternoon, the SDF announced that they withdraw all the forces from Seregania

without details about the agreement yet. In the military analysis, this is fire, it doesn't mean surrounding by the SDF, as there is no clear details about the agreement. But that doesn't mean that Turkey will stop the operation as soon as it gets the safe zone area between Seregania and Tulaviat in 35 km depth. As we see on the ground that Turkey wants to destroy the safe administration system and Rojava, there is a report right now saying that there is a discussion between Turkey and Russia about Kobani even.

So this fire doesn't mean surrounding by the SDF, and it doesn't mean that Turkey will stop even if they get that area. The fourth question I asked Hobat was, how has the autonomous region handled the flow of so many refugees from villages under attack by Turkey? October 9th, when the Turkish bombardment started against all Rojava cities, which is located on the Syrian-Turkish border, that led to a massive waves of the IDPs who moved from their cities to the villages in the south to be saved from the Turkish shilling like Derik and Qamishli cities,

while others' population moved to Hasaka city that is far from the border, which is Seregania until October until Aviat, which is more close to the Hasaka city. And those three last cities are most affected by the Turkish attack. The numbers of the IDPs, it's increasing, and until now it's get around 200,000 persons who have been displaced from their houses. Self-administration, municipality of the Hasaka are receiving basically the IDPs, and they get some support from the UN agencies, NGOs, and local associations as they are transferring the schools to shelters.

There is a lack of services. I went to, in the past days, to these shelters, and there is every time new numbers increasing very fast, and the humanitarian situation get worse, and the response is so slow comparing to the needs. In addition, it's worse as the results of the Turkish attack on the vital centres as the Turkish air strike, they hit the Alok Dam in Seregania, which is feeding the water to a city of Seregania and Hasaka until October, and that results a cut of water three days from those cities, and the situation of the population and the IDPs, it's get worse as a result of that.

Also, I met many families, and most of them basically from Tula, and even some of them have been many times displacement as they were from Afrin. I think if the international response is limited, that's going to lead to a humanitarian crisis. Even I met the head of the West municipality of the Hasaka, Muhammad Shammi, and he was explaining to us how there is a pressure on the city and there is no support. For example, he gave an example about the needs of the bread. He said, we use it to bake 35 tons of the floor daily for Hasaka only.

In the last days, we are baking 50 tons and we cannot cover the needs of the population. So the situation every day, every hour get worse and worse, and there is a gap and all the organizations have to respond to these needs. The fifth question I asked Habat was, how constant a presence is Turkish air power? I've read a lot of stories of convoys being bombed. Has this changed the way you travel during the day? Actually, while now I am trying to answer this question of yours, there is a plane.

We're not sure if it's in the sky, we're not sure it belongs to home because it's just confusing. It's so low and it's clear that it's not drones. Maybe it's a helicopter. Actually, I cannot identify which kind of plane it is, but it's there. Because despite the Pentagon statement that they were going to have no flies on even before, even before the Turkish attack started, but on October 9th, when the first Turkish start was jets in Sereganya, I was there and I witnessed it and it was the first hit by the air striking.

And since then, all other kinds of the warplanes have been used. But the most affected city of the air striking, it was Sereganya, Antal Abiyat. Last night, the injuries who have been evacuated by the cities, I met some doctors who were treating them and they told me like a must of the once is the results of the air striking and chilling. So it doesn't stop because in a different occasion, the SDF called the Americans for no flies on and they were going to fight, handling the fighting on the ground, but there was no response until this moment. In addition to the Turkish drones and the air strike,

they really restrict the movement inside the cities and on the way also one of the main reasons now it's affecting on the movement. It's the eyes of sleeper cells. Even in the first day, because they became very active recently, and there is a sources confirmed that they opened the way to the Turkish backed forces, which led that they controlled on the M4 highway and as a result, they excluded the civilians, including the co-presidents of the Syrian Future Party, Havrin Khalaf. The Turk, they didn't stop and there is no flies on until this moment from any side for the Rojava. The sixth question I asked Habat was, how does press access to the SDF now differ from how it was during the fighting against ISIS?

Is it still possible for journalists to reach the front line? Actually, if we're going to talk about the operation against ISIS and how it's been globally covered by all the media, because at that time there were the SDF forces, they provided protection and the coordination for them on the ground, and they managed to cover all the operation without any, you know, like cases for the journalists to lose their life or anything like that. While in this operation, via the Turkish attack, there is last 10 days for journalists to lost their lives, and other sevens have been injured, because now even the limited, the access, it's limited for the media because of the security reasons as there is a shelling, airstrike, ISIS, sleeper cells, and also there is a fear from the Syrian regime present also.

So there is no comparison in a way because of that we can say like this operation can't be covered as it have been covered like the operation against ISIS, unfortunately. And the seventh question I asked Habat was, of course, what can people outside Rojava do to help? I think the people of the outside can help Rojava and specifically all the feminist movements have to rise up for Rojava. Otherwise, we as a woman all over the world might face the risk to lose the woman revolution. Any activity to support Rojava like demonstrations, donations, buy-code Turkish goods, and raise the awareness of the Western community about what is Rojava facing currently. It's a genocide, it's a ethnic glancing, and it's a demographic changing.

And everyone have to take the responsibilities in order to make some steps, and that's what's going to help Rojava for sure. Okay, and that's all the interview audio. Again, I'm Robert Evans. You can find sources for this episode on BehindTheBastards.com. You can find me on Twitter at IWriteOK. You can find us on Twitter at at BastardsPod. And that's it. That's the episode.

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