Blowback - S3 Episode 7 - "Mao's Poem"

Episode Date: November 7, 2022

The US threatens to cross the Yalu. The Chinese leadership debates its options in Korea.Advertising Inquiries: https://redcircle.com/brandsPrivacy & Opt-Out: https://redcircle.com/privacy

From East Coast to West Coast in Korea, Thanksgiving dinner is eaten by many troops in bitter cold and in incongruous settings. On Thanksgiving Day in 1950, U.S. soldiers in Korea enjoyed an all-American meal. Plenty of turkey and fixings for each. It's not the family dining room and the temperature may be a little low, but the scenery is okay and the chow is good. What these American troops did not know was at that very moment, As they tucked into pumpkin pie, shipped all the way from the United States, they were surrounded by thousands of Chinese soldiers in the hills. The Chinese soldiers, members of the People's Volunteer Army, had not at any point enjoyed the kind of feast the Americans had laid out.

The most that each Chinese soldier carried was a bag of cereal mix. Against the richest military power in the world, these soldiers held rifles and hand grenades. Against the Korean winter, hitting 30 degrees Fahrenheit below zero, they wore nothing but tennis shoes. Yet, they were about to drive every American soldier out of North Korea in just a few weeks. Speak about this luncheon. Speak about this lush sun. Welcome to Blowback.

I'm Brendan James. And I'm Noah Coleman. And this is Season 3, Episode 7, Mao's poem. In July 1988, a handful of retired generals of the People's Liberation Army, the Chinese Red Army, had a tea party. It was coming up on the 35th. anniversary of armistice in Korea. There was no fear of professional repercussions or political

score settling. These men had survived the heady years and now wanted to record their thoughts on a war that shaped their lives and the history of their country, and of Korea, and as a matter of fact, of the United States. In fact, this was the beginning of a wave of memoirs about the Korean War coming out of China. The title often given to the Korean War in the United States, the forgotten war, well, this could not be further from how the Chinese veterans saw it, or how China's national history and culture treats the war to this day. In this episode, we'll start to see why that is. Because now, we will see China enter the Korean War. America's police action had been inching closer and closer to all-out global war

against one, maybe even two, of the largest communist states in the world. China and the SSR. And as we hinted last time, this was an event long in the making. The Americans had not only pushed the North Korean troops out of the South, but then crossed the previously sacred 38th parallel, as General MacArthur set a crash course for the Chinese border. So first, we'll pay special attention to China's decision to enter the war, because it was hotly debated among Mao Zedong and the rest of the leadership. Once they do make their decision, we'll see a stunning military reversal in Korea in a series of campaigns in which the North Korean side gets a real shot in the arm from their Chinese comrades. Of course, this only inflames the Americans further, as General

MacArthur grows more determined to widen his campaign, and President Harry Truman grows more panicked at how to control his general and his war. As scholar and friend of the show Bruce Cummings puts it bluntly, quote, the defeat of American and allied troops by North Korea and and Korean peasant armies in the early winter of 1950 caused the worst crisis in U.S. foreign relations between 1945 and the Cuban Missile Crisis, led Truman to declare a national emergency and essentially demolished the Truman administration. As I.F. Stone puts it, caution in September might have brought peace. Truman preferred to push ahead across the parallel. Caution in November might have brought peace.

Truman preferred to push ahead to the Yalu River up toward China. Yet somehow, in December, President Truman was able to say to himself and others, quote, I've worked for peace for five years and six months, and it looks like World War III is here. It was a morning full of victory, writes British correspondent Reginald Thompson, who was accompanying the American troops after the fall of Pyongyang to UN forces. Quote, MacArthur was on the airfield

and all the galaxy of his private journalistic team from Tokyo. The Brit Thompson had by this point given up hope that this moment, seizing the North Korean capital, would satisfy the American generals and bring an end to the war. Quote, it was not the end, he wrote. More likely it was merely a beginning. General Milburn said laconically as he passed me, On to the Yalu.

As we saw last time, the Chinese did not exactly keep it secret that they were ready to enter the war to fend off a threat from the Americans. If MacArthur's forces should drive to the Yalu River, far above the 38th parallel and approaching the Manchur, border, this, they signaled, was unacceptable. Yet we know that by late September, despite press reports and rumblings from Beijing, Truman was directly authorizing military operations north of the parallel. By then, writes one Chinese general, quote, our general staff headquarters was working intensively on the operational plans.

On September 30th, Chinese premier, Joe Un-Lai, announced to the world, quote, the Chinese people can never tolerate any foreign aggression. The Chinese people can neither allow the imperialists willfully to invade our neighbors, nor can we ignore such provocations. Since, as the general notes, the People's Republic of China and the United States did not have diplomatic relations at the time, Joe and Lai asked the Indian government to pass China's warning on to the Americans. The messenger was K.M. Panikar, the Indian ambassador.

If the Americans crossed the 38th parallel, said Joe Enlai, China would send its forces there to support Korea. Now, either the Americans did not take Ponikar's message seriously, or they didn't care. Or, perhaps we'll find that some positively welcomed the idea. Quote, on the early morning of October 2nd, the Chinese general writes, we received the information that South Korea had ignored China's warning and its army had already crossed in large numbers. They were soon followed by American troops. Hours after this happened,

Marshal Pung del Huyi rushed to Beijing for a meeting of the Chinese Central Committee. Born in Hunan province in 1898, Pung had long served the Red Army through the Chinese Civil War. And once the People's Republic came to be, Peng ranked among the country's top military leaders. In the 80s, the PRC published his army. memoirs, from which we've drawn here.

Once he arrived in Beijing, Pung slipped into the Central Committee's meeting, the debate on what to do already in progress. The Central Committee was consulting with military leaders such as Chutein, commander of the PLA, and Nirong Zhen, acting chief of the PLA general staff. Lin Biao, perhaps the most celebrated of the Revolution's military brass, was notably skeptical of the intervention. As we publicly criticized the American imperialist's invasion, Some of our comrades were scared, writes General Nie of the debate.

Quote, they believed that it would be disastrous if we fought a war against the United States, the strongest imperialist nation in the world. They mainly argued that, having fought wars for so many years, we had an urgent need to recuperate and rebuild. Pung himself writes, quote, after all had expressed their opinions, Chairman Mao said, All you said sounds reasonable and logical. When we, however, are standing on the side, just watching other people undergoing a national crisis, we feel terrible inside no matter what. Pung writes, I did not say anything since I had just arrived there.

I, however, said to myself that we ought to send our forces to rescue Korea. Marshal Pung could not sleep that night in the Beijing Hotel. Complaining at first that the beds were too soft, He moved rooms until he admitted to himself he could not get his mind off of the question of the war. America occupied Korea across the Yalu River, threatening northeast China, he said. It also controlled Taiwan, threatening Shanghai and East China.

It could launch a war to invade China with any excuse any time it wanted. The tiger always eats people, and the time when it wants to eat depends on its appetite. it is impossible to make any concessions to a tiger. He was not the only one suffering some sleepless nights. Comrade Mautse-Tung had been pondering whether or not to fight, writes General Nyi in his memoirs.

He remained undecided, even when our forces reached the Yalu River, and troops were poised to cross it and enter Korea. After careful consideration, Mao finally made the decision. Quote, he had racked his brainstem, Nye said, and indeed thought about this many times before he made up his mind.

Mao did not like war, but the Americans had already brought the war to our borders. On the American side, both in Washington and Tokyo HQ, the Chinese prerogative either went ignored or, for some reason,

was accepted as a fait accomplice. For his part, British correspondent Reginald Thompson, who was on the ground in Korea, wrote this. I thought that it was absurd to expect the new China slowly becoming integrated under one government to tolerate the United States or the United Nations on her Manchurian frontier if she could prevent it. Not because China's government is communist, but because great nations in the recorded history of the world do not permit these things if they can help it. When then should China, strongly suspecting the goodwill, and the motives of the United States and of the United Nations, sit tamely by while these things

took place. I could not believe it possible. I thought that the only chance of China sitting tight would be the consideration that sooner or later, the USA and the UN would have to leave Korea. The Chinese leadership decided on an initial detachment of troops. Pung de Huai was made commander of what would be called the Chinese volunteer forces. Throughout the war, he would be in touch with every leader on the communist side, from his own Politburo and Mao Zetung to Kim Il-sung to Joseph Stalin. This label of volunteer forces was an artful way of avoiding direct declaration of war against America, actually suggested to Mao by a non-communist liberal official in the government. Yes, those existed. If the Americans were enforcing a police action

in Korea, well, these Chinese troops were simply volunteers. Thank you very much. Upon deciding to help the North Koreans, China sent a cable to the Soviets. But this was not the final word on the matter. Zhu Gantrov and Lewis write, quote, as the Kremlin and North Korea kept pushing Mao toward war, the Chinese Politburo kept tugging him back. And as October went on, debates flew this way and that among the Politburo. Mao, who would make the ultimate executive decision, heard everyone out. In fact, a solid majority of the Politburo, still opposed.

opposed entering the war, and that included heavyweights such as Premier Zhou and Lai and military star Lin Biao. On this side of the house, the war was seen as a bloody distraction, despite the threat of U.S. forces permanently residing on the Chinese border. The PRC needed to concentrate on getting its own house in order and to consolidate the revolution at home. On the other side remained Mao, Commander Pung, and, for example, General Nih Rangshend. On this side of the house, the plan to unify China with Taiwan was in tatters. Korea was yet another front from which they suspected the United States would try to squeeze the revolution.

This encirclement, this sabotage from without, has been described as Mao's, quote, recurring nightmare. In fact, the specter of it was already generating some effect. There were rumors, false but spreading fast, of U.S. troops supporting a return of Chiang Kai Shack. Encouraged by the successes of the UN forces, which were approaching the Sino-Korean border, opponents of the Chinese government were staging armed uprisings, wrecking communication lines and assassinating government sympathizers. But finally, the debate was over. To his comrades, Mao, first among equals, declared,

If we do not send troops to Korea, the reactionaries at home and abroad would be swollen with arrogance when the enemy troops pressed the Yalu River border. Not to mention, North Koreans had supported China in Manchuria and had now just gone through their own revolution. It would be unacceptable for China to leave its neighbor to such a fate. As another member of the Politburo put it, quote,

When the lips are destroyed, the teeth feel cold. The Chinese sent a telegram to Pyongyang, informing Premier Kim Il-sung that China would fight. Kim reportedly read it, clapped his hands and shouted, Well done, excellent. Help couldn't come sooner. The very day before, October 7th,

the United States' first cavalry division shot more patrols over the parallel. But suddenly, in mid-October, as the Chinese troops began to cross into North Korea, a huge reversal. Meeting Joe N. Lai at his dacha on the Black Sea, Joseph Stalin informed the visiting Chinese prince, that the Soviet air power, the Kremlin had previously promised, would be scratched.

Not only was this air support a sign of goodwill, a confirmation of the recent Sino-Soviet treaty, the Chinese had already factored it directly into their own military plans. Now Stalin had personally reneged. Jo An Lai, accompanied by Lin Biao on this trip, objected, pleaded, offered counterarguments, and the two continued to haggle until Joe and Lin salvaged a deal. for at least heavy military aid from the USSR. Joe cabled home that, while direct Soviet air power had been lost, the military aid was secure.

Quote, with that mission accomplished, Wright Zhu and his co-authors, Stalin invited the Chinese to a grand banquet. One Chinese recalls that only Lin Biao left sober. Everyone but Stalin returned to Moscow, whereupon Joe and Lai, was stunned to learn from Foreign Minister Molotov that, despite the events of the past several days, the deal was suddenly off, again.

Not only would there still be no air support from the Soviet Union, there wouldn't even be any military equipment. Joe rushed to cable Mao again, and on the eve of fighting, the Chinese polyp bureau learned there would be no Soviet aid. Why not? Nikita Khrushchev recalls, quote, When the threat after Incheon emerged, Stalin became resigned to the idea that North Korea would be annihilated.

and that the Americans would reach our, the Soviet, border. I remember quite well that in connection with the exchange of opinions on the Korean question, Stalin said, So what? Let the United States of America be our neighbors in the Far East. They will come there, but we shall not fight them now. We are not ready to fight. This led the Chinese to reconsider their decision to fight in Korea

in light of the disappearance of Soviet air cover and military. material. Even Mao, who had not wavered in front of his comrades, was having second thoughts. Quote, after October 11th, he spent a sleepless 70 hours mulling over his options, write Zhu and company. Nothing in his past experience quite prepared him for a full-scale conflict with the most powerful nation in the world. By mid-October, Mao called an emergency meeting of the Politburo. Quote, the session was short and to the point. Mao had already made up his mind, or he had concluded that the Americans would not stop short of the Yalu, or even at the Yalu, as some of his associates believe. The Chinese would not back out. Troops were going

into Korea. Then yet another twist. Joe N. Lai was still in Moscow. He continued to speak to Stalin through the Foreign Minister Molotov, hoping for a reconsideration on some form of air support, and the military aid. Now, in another reversal, Stalin granted a bit of both. It seems as though he was moved by a cable from Mao, reinstating the Chinese commitment even after the help had been withdrawn. Quote, the Chinese comrades are so good, he said, reportedly close to tears. The Chinese comrades are so good. It appears China's determination to contribute in the Korean War eliminated what Cho and Lai called Stalin's suspicions of his Asian ally. The military hardware, including tanks and arms, would come at a discount. Still, the Soviet Union was not driven too far by sentiment.

The jet fighter Stalin sent would give only minimal help and certainly would not fly offensive missions against UN troops. But the Politburo could now rest easy that China's rear, facing back toward the mainland, would enjoy a much stronger defense as they waited across Korea. And so, in mid-October, the Chinese Volunteer Army crossed over the Yalu. Hung Zushi was a general and deputy commander of the Volunteer Army and a leading commander in the Korean War. In his memoirs, he explains how the Chinese leaders sized up their strengths and weaknesses

against the U.S. military. Quote, the American ground troops had certain advantage. such as modern weapons, high maneuverability, and strong ground fire power. Moreover, both their air and naval forces had absolute predominance. Our army's weapons and equipment were obviously inferior. Our artillery pieces were drawn by horses and difficult to move and conceal. Our troops still depended on rifles and hand grenades. Our army, however, had many advantages that the Americans could not match.

First, our troops would fight in an anti-aggressive war for internationalism. They were troops representing a just cause and fighting for a good reason. Second, our troops had rich combat experience. During the past several decades, our army had always defeated well-equipped enemies with our poor arms. Even though the American army had modern weapons and advanced equipment, its commanders and soldiers were not familiar with close quarters fighting, night combat, and bayonet charges. Our army was superior in those areas. And finally, he writes, our troops were mobile and flexible in combat.

They knew how to outflank the enemy. The American army operated by books and regulations. It was inflexible and mechanical in combat. So much for the pros, but the cons were not so easy to ignore. Scholar Bin U. writes, quote, Preparation for the volunteer forces intervention was at best inadequate. In fact, their entrance into the war was hastened by the unenectual. expectedly rapid advance of the UN forces toward the Yalu River. Although Mao and other top

leaders correctly anticipated events unfolding in Korea, including MacArthur's Incheon landing, the People's Liberation Army had barely three months to become combat ready. This was in early August to late October. The immediate problem was its limited knowledge regarding the structure, tactics, equipment, and strategies of the enemy. In addition to the material and strategic handicap, the rank and file itself needed convincing. Quote, according to General Duping, political commissar of the 30th Army Group, by mid-August only half of the 30th Army, that's over 200,000 men, were, quote, actively supporting the intervention,

and about 40% only passively accepted orders from above. The remaining 10% opposed intervention, due to concern about U.S. firepower and atomic weapons. Two months later, with training and preparation, however, left things in better shape. Take the following document. Shortly before the invasion, a Chinese soldier from the sixth company of the 357th regiment submitted the following to a company commander.

I cannot wait any longer. I am unable to endure the new hatred piled on old. My mother was hounded by the landlord. My father worked for the landlord as a farm laborer to his death. I pastored the landlord's pigs since I was 12. I had been whipped and abused until age 16 when I was drafted into military service. Isn't it the American Devils who supported Chiang Kai Shek so that we the working people lived in misery and suffered disasters?

After our liberation, can we watch the Korean people suffer the same fate without lending them a hand? The poor all over the world belonged to one family. I am requesting to go to the Korean Front to kill American Devil. At dusk on October 18, 1950, I crossed the Yalu River with the first group of advanced troops of the Chinese People's Volunteer Force. This is what Pung Duai writes in his memoirs. And on the morning of October 21st, his army clashed with what he calls Singman Rhee's puppet troops. But what became known as the first campaign, or the first phase, of Chinese intervention

in the Korean War, was a surprise encounter with the South Koreans. Across on the UN side, Reginald Thompson wrote, quote, Reports were hardening that Chinese forces of the 40th Corps had crossed the Yalu River on the night of October 18th to protect the electrical installations in North Korea, which were vital to Manchuria. General headquarters labeled these Chinese forces as, quote, Chinese Koreans and stuck to it that China would not intervene.

The situation was rather confusing. On October 22nd, U.S. military government advisors had said that only scattered pockets of resistance were being encountered in the North. The Korean People's Army, they said, was no longer capable of an organized defense. Within a few days, however, fresh, newly equipped North Korean troops plowed through South Korean forces. Bruce Cummings describes a scene from October 26th. Combined Sino-Korean units came roaring out of the mountains at Unsan. The site, of the old American gold mine concession, and badly bloodied the American forces there. The same day, the Korean People's Army attacks destroyed the South Korean Second Corps,

thus crippling the right flank of the U.S. 8th Army. One U.S. Army officer recorded these were, quote, fresh, well-organized, and well-trained units, some of which were Chinese communist forces. CIA Daily reports around this time noticed a pattern. The quote, large, coordinated, and well-trained. well-organized guerrilla forces in the rear area behind the Allied forces, but it would take a bit longer for their picture to become clear. Mao instructed the volunteer army to engage South Korean troops first in order to gain some experience

before dealing with the more powerful American units, writes Bin U. Quote, between October 25th and November 1st, the Volunteer Army dealt heavy blows to the South Korea's first, sixth, seventh, and eighth divisions by destroying many of their scattered regiments or sending them into hasty retreats. Some of the familiar and successful tactics of the People's Liberation Army included outnumbering the enemy whenever the situation permitted in order to wipe out entire enemy units, instead of simply repelling them, engaging the enemy in mobile operations and avoiding trench warfare and achieving surprise wherever possible.

The first phase, sometimes called the prelude, was underway. From late October to early November, the Chinese, Army had quietly seeped into the battle lines in North Korea. The Volunteer Army's first encounter with an American unit was a surprise for all involved. Chinese 39th Army attacked Unsan in the northwest of North Korea on the night of November 1st. They actually thought that, like their previous targets, it was the South Korean Army that held the town. The Americans, for their part, were totally caught off guard, even approaching the units and trying to shake hands.

Well, the 39th Army opened fire at close range. The battalions of the U.S. 8th Cavalry Regiment fell that day. Bin U.S. mechanized units had tremendous firepower and mobility. They also depended considerably on roads, air, and artillery cover, and uninterrupted supplies. The American troops also were afraid of night and close-range engagement. They tended not to move too far away from the road, which provided Chinese forces with opportunities to cut the American detachment into smaller pieces. We successfully resisted the American and puppet armies' pursuit and attacks,

Pung writes, and gained a firm footing in North Korea. By October 25th, we ended the first campaign with a victory. Traveling on the U.N. side of the front, Reginald Thompson wrote, It is an undisputed fact that the total enemy forces did not outnumber the United Nations, and if air, artillery, and the great naval power deployed around the coast is taken into account, there could be no comparison in fighting strength. But the enemy had grasped the initiative.

Now, despite major results in the first campaign, there were weaknesses showing up on the Chinese side as well. inadequate firepower, a lack of supplies, and trouble pursuing the retreating UN forces because of a lack of motorized infantry. Despite overseeing and encouraging opening here, Pung noted the clear danger ahead. Their mechanized troops moved fast and built up defense works quickly. It was unfavorable to assault the enemy's fortified positions with our technology and equipment. We might even lose.

Now, as we cross into the second phase of China's intervention, let's not forget, these Chinese troops were desperately needed in that they were crucial to reverse the rollback of MacArthur's forces. But make no mistake, Koreans were still fighting the United Nations and South Korean forces. There were, in fact, comparable numbers of renewed North Korean troops to match the Chinese forces fighting the United Nations armies. The Chinese counter-attacked was the, you know, shock effect, yes. But, quote, the Korean contribution to the outcome, both in strategy and in fighting power, has been completely missed in the literature, Bruce Cummings writes.

The evidence, he adds, makes the indictment of MacArthur's generalship even more devastating. The U.S. was, quote, outmaneuvered by the Korean People's Army generals, who operated with a fraction of MacArthur's material. Reginald Thompson describes the scene in November. The whole mountainous central sector of North Korea had become a no-man's land, down which the enemy could drive a wedge, almost at will,

to isolate the two independent groups of UN forces, fighting their uncoordinated campaigns, east and west. United Nations forces all along the line were probing cautiously forward into a strange emptiness, meeting nothing stronger than isolated enemy elements, which did not seem to fit into a pattern of either defense or attack. The enemy army, which had launched its attack with such speed and skill, striking at the soft center and forcing the withdrawal of the long arms, of the wings, had disappeared completely. Meanwhile, the feared winter freeze-up in Korea

was beginning, and there were still large numbers of men, including the British, ill-equipped with winter clothing to meet it. But whatever the enemy intention might be, it was becoming obvious that the over-optimism following the fall of Pyongyang had resulted in a dangerous gap in the supply pipeline from the United States, and a feverish effort was being made

to build up ammunition, food, and clothing above the danger point. November. Despite alarming his own country, country's brain trust in Washington and its diplomats of the UN at Lake Success, General Douglas MacArthur pushed aggressively north, even when North Korean and Chinese units broke contact with U.S. troops. The UN Security Council, meanwhile, was preparing to meet on November 8th, following one of these retreats from the communist side. This was a moment for negotiation.

But suddenly, the U.S. Air Force announced it would lift the ban on its military flights on the Chinese border. In fact, the U.S. Air Force had already been operating there. Over 70 B-29 bombers and 300 fighter jets brought hellfire down on the city of Sinuzi, dropping 630 tons of bombs. The U.S. Air Force announced that, quote, 90% of the city had been destroyed. Not only did this rank among the most brutal assaults of the war, it was also a major surprise escalation, just as a fragile moment for potential diplomacy had broken out. Something else. Before the revelation of Chinese troops,

you may remember last time, Stone joked that MacArthur was positively covering it up for the communist side, perhaps in order to guarantee an entanglement. Well, now, with things truly entangled, MacArthur wrenched the dial the opposite direction and painted the Chinese counterattack as an onslaught by the armies of Mordor.

At this point, even our British ally was waved, on Korea. Back in London, over 20 labor MPs soon filed a motion to not only find a way out of the Korean War, but to talk to the Soviets more generally. They were soon joined by high-profile Tories. Even the rabidly anti-communist Winston Churchill croaked in the commons about, quote, not becoming too much pinned down in China or in the approaches to China. Both British parties, unlike the two U.S. parties favored recognition of and trade with communist China. Of course, all of this was

useless. Britain wasn't running the show. Hell, the U.N. wasn't even running the show, as we know by now. Yet on November 24th, some hope. A communist Chinese delegation had been allowed to join the U.N. in a special arrangement. Mainland China was still not, after all, recognized at the Security Council

to begin work on a diplomatic arrangement to at least deal with the situation unfolding in Korea. China had released a hundred American and South Korean prisoners of war as a good faith measure with rumors that they were ready to release another thousand. That was the same day that MacArthur's Tokyo headquarters unleashed a new offensive, known colloquially as Home by Christmas. On November 24, 1950, Douglas MacArthur initiated an advance that he was convinced would finish off the Korean People's Army. It was the day after Thanksgiving, where U.S. soldiers on the front line, as we mentioned

before, were treated to turkey and pumpkin pie while their Chinese counterparts munched on millet. That Friday morning, newspapers across America reprinted a long cable from the general, labeled MacArthur's outline for victory. The Nashville Tennessean, syndicating a story from the United Press, reported that Allied forces under MacArthur's plan had begun a massive, rapid offensive

from Northwestern Korea, where the Allies had already pushed the front deep into the People's Army's territory. This was yet another pincer maneuver from the brilliant MacArthur, meant to, quote, compress the enemy against the Yalu River and against the UN forces that struck far, that struck far northward on.

Is that the... He's a great writer. He's a good writer. In a communique that was reprinted across the country on the weekend of the 24th, MacArthur said that, quote, the United Nations massive compression envelopment against the new Red Army's operating there, is now approaching its decisive effort.

If successful, this should for all practical purposes end the war. Restore peace and unity to Korea, enable the prompt withdrawal of United Nations military forces, and permit the complete assumption by the Korean people and nation of full sovereignty and international equality. It is that for which we fight. According to MacArthur, they were going to be home by Christmas. MacArthur was feeling so bold that before heading back to military headquarters in Tokyo, He flew in an unarmed plane along the Yalu River to get a look at his prize. And he saw nothing.

McArthur, failing to see any evidence of troop movements there, said it would have taken some kind of massive snowstorm to cover up any troop movements in the area. According to his biographer, William Manchester, quote, This is exactly what happened. Chinese and North Korean soldiers, two days after Thanksgiving. began attacking UN forces by rushing down from the mountain ranges that MacArthur had said couldn't possibly have held Chinese and North Korean soldiers. The surprise offensive created complete chaos out of MacArthur's own offensive,

where some soldiers weren't even sleeping with their boots on. Here is Reginald Thompson who saw MacArthur in the flesh after the Home by Christmas announcement. We all went down to Sananju Airstrip to watch the Supreme Commander's Constellation Plan. come in. One General Walton Walker, the commander of the Eighth Army, looking like the Michelin tire advertisement in his bulky clothing, looking like a Michelin tire advertisement, stepped up for an embrace as MacArthur came down the gangway followed by his entourage of agency correspondence. MacArthur made a round of the divisions that day and was almost done for by the cold and just able to totter up the gangway for the journey home. The die was cast. Home for

Christmas, he had said, and then, to one of his generals, don't make me a liar, feller. In Washington, receiving reports from MacArthur to the Joint Chiefs that disaster had indeed struck, President Truman summed it up, quote, the Chinese have come in with both feet. While the bulk of the fighting up until this point had taken place in the either hot or temperate summer and fall, it was now getting late and cold into the season. And unlike the milder coastal plain of the south, sub-freezing temperatures were the norm in the mountainous north. And most of the American and U.N. soldiers now scattered throughout the mountains of North Korea didn't have their winter close with them. And the further into the north that MacArthur pushed, the more his troops were noticing the Chinese soldiers.

A British soldier reported seeing troops, quote, unlike any enemy I had seen before. This is kind of funny. He says they wore thick padded clothing which made them look like little Michelin men. There's Michelin men running all over the place. Yeah, really. I turned one body over with my foot and saw that he wore a peaked cap

with a red star badge. These soldiers were Chinese. There are two major battles of this second phase of the Chinese intervention. The first was the battle of Jung Chung River in a valley in the west of North Korea over 30 miles north of Pyongyang. Thompson writes, quote,

There was no rest or sleep by night. Within five seconds of wild bugle calls, the attacks came in. Seven men out of each ten literally draped with percussion grenades on sticks and the remaining three with automatic weapons. The lead battalion across the river was hit on the night of the 27th, and as it tried to withdraw across the Chongchan, the Chinese were already waiting on the banks with machine guns

sighted at the Americans' rear. A bazooka brewed up in American ten, and in the lurid glare of the blazing tank, the battalion struggled through, the remaining tanks carrying men across the frozen river. Their jeeps had frozen solid to the ground. And so, down went the right flank of the American's mighty 8th Army. At the same time, there was the so-called Battle of the Chosen Reservoir, which actually you listening might know by another name, because it was the subject of the recent Chinese blockbuster, the Battle of Lake Changjin. the biggest movie China has to this date ever produced,

and as a result, the highest grossing film worldwide in 2021. Well, it was about this battle in the Korean War. In that battle, down went the mighty 10th Corps, as the communists drove them back into South Korea. There was a brief terror about whether MacArthur's force would collapse entirely and thus require a fuller evacuation. The general was quick to report back once the situation. situation had stabilized.

But by early December, the American press, from Time magazine to the New York Times, had turned on MacArthur, and the general had begun punching back at his critics, insisting that there had been no error on his part. I.F. Stone notes that, as they were preparing and conducting their offensive, McArthur and his generals had functionally advertised what they were going to do in their press briefings. Their bold pincer movement, now under Chinese attack, had turned in the United States. into the stranding of two difficult to extract units of soldiers stuck on different sides of the country without any real ability to easily communicate, command, or resupply. As Stone describes it,

quote, to read the November 26th New York Times account of a military briefing from MacArthur headquarters is to see Achilles pointing frantically at his heel. The dispatch said that while all was going well on both flanks, the enemy had counter-attack in the middle, and, quote, there were indications that a large-scale battle, if there is to be one before the end of the war, might shape up in that snowy mountainous sector. The resistance in the center, the Times reported, while not in mass force was the strongest encountered, and it was added, almost seductively, stone notes, that, quote, the absence of major opposition raised the question of what the foe was doing in the wedge-shaped area 50 miles deep

between the two UN armies. A Victorian maiden could not have fluttered her eyes more unmistakably behind her fan as she moved shyly into the garden. Though President Truman had publicly affirmed his support for MacArthur, he also had it clearly communicated to the general that he was no longer to make any public statements whatsoever. The situation was deteriorating rapidly, and it appeared that MacArthur was intent on describing.

describing the situation on the ground in the worst possible terms, perhaps in order to widen the war. When shit had begun hitting the fan, quote, MacArthur headquarters was ready to assume the worst and to go on assuming it. Though MacArthur's orders were to hold the positions he could and to keep the Chinese from pushing further south, the Chinese were not really aggressing all that hard. Something was odd about this American retreat, writes Bruce Cummings. Quote, observers at the time wondered why the Americans were moving so fast, often breaking contact with an enemy not necessarily pursuing them. Even British attachés, the partners on the American side,

began to see, quote, a great hoax, or, quote, a phony war. In early December, they remarked that the Americans were puffing up the numbers of Chinese troops, numbers that the prisoner of war count could not possibly bear out. MacArthur's armies seemed to be melting away at record pace. Still, the so-called military disaster unfolding in Korea was being turned into substantial and deadly political capital at home. And so this second phase, the second campaign of the Chinese volunteer forces, amounted to a major victory.

In only nine days, the Chinese volunteer forces had dealt heavy blows the UN forces, and pushed the battle line to the 38th parallel and recaptured Pyongyang. Yet, like in the first phase, this second phase revealed more weaknesses on the Chinese side. The Korean winter was getting brutal. But not only that, like the Americans, these Chinese soldiers were not adequately prepared, with frostbite racking the bodies of 30,000 men as a quarter of the 9th Army, and actually killing a thousand of them. Bin Yun writes, the second campaign represented the peak of the volunteer forces in the Korean war. As it began to strike further south, however, the tactics it had successfully used to that

point began to lose effectiveness as UN and U.S. forces rapidly adjusted to them. And as the volunteer forces supply became extended, UN air power began to cause heavier damage to its primitive logistical efforts. Then, there was this. On the very first day of the second phase, 48 hours after Thanksgiving, there was another casualty on the Chinese side. It was the son of Chairman Mao,

Mao-on-Ying, who was only 28 years old. Mao-on-Ying had eagerly volunteered to fight in Korea. In fact, this made Pong-de-Huai and other military brass deeply nervous if Mao's son ever met harm in Korea they were worried it would be their heads. But Mao was reportedly insulted at the idea that he'd treat his own son different from anybody else. Pung took Aang Ying as a secretary and a translator.

Mao Aung Nying was killed on November 25th by a U.S. Napalm bomb. General Hong Zhuchi narrated the scene. Several enemy airplanes came and raided the area. Without even circling, they bombed Pung Shed directly and heavily. Some of the napalm bombs hit the shed, and at once it was on fire. The napalm bombs had intense burning power, able to even melt metals. One of the staff was able to get out with a little burn on his face.

Maoan Ying and Gao Ruzhin, however, could not make it, and both died in the fire. After the airplanes left, Pung came back to the site. He looked at the two burned bodies with a heavy heart. purportedly Mao Nying's body was burnt beyond recognition and was only identifiable through a Soviet revolver given to him by Joseph Stalin. The flagrant aggression of Chinese communist troops in Korea arouses the country's ire.

With the North Korean bandits well under control and with the promise that UN troops would be withdrawn, the unexpected entry of 300,000 red Chinese across the Manchurian border may well precipitate World War III. President Truman voices his accusation of red imperialism. The collapse of MacArthur's expeditionary force in North Korea prompted questions about whether the U.S. was really doing all that it could in the peninsula. Were there tools, policies, or weapons that could be deployed without sending a bunch of G.I. Joe's on the ground immediately? We are fighting in Korea for our own national security and survival.

We have committed ourselves to the cause of a just and peaceful world order through the United Nations. We stand by that commitment. The president had publicly said that the United States was prepared to use the A-bomb in Korea. The president has stated that the use of the atomic bomb is being considered to halt the communist on Russia, inspired by Russia. His hope is that the employment. of this devastating weapon will be unnecessary. Later that same day, on November 30th, the White House issued the following press release,

clarifying Truman's remarks on the use of the A-bomb. The president wants to make it certain that there is no misinterpretation of his answers to questions at his press conference today about the use of the atom bomb. Naturally, there has been consideration of this subject since the outbreak of the hostilities in Korea, just as there is consideration,

of the use of all military weapons whenever our forces are in combat. Consideration of the use of any weapon is always implicit in the very possession of that weapon. However, it should be emphasized that, by law, only the president can authorize the use of the atom bomb and no such authorization has been given. If and when such authorization should be given,

the military commander in the field would have charge of the tactical delivery of the weapon. In brief, the replies to the questions at today's press conference do not represent any change in the situation. Thank you. If aggression is successful in Korea, we can expect it to spread throughout Asia and Europe and to this hemisphere. A bit under 2,000 miles southeast of Korea is Guam, where at the time of Truman's press conference, sat multiple atomic-capable B-29 bombers, under the command of Air Force Joint. General Curtis LeMay. Actually, Curtis bombs away LeMay, as he was known.

Perhaps Truman wanted the Chinese to reconsider beating up on the UN forces, knowing that an American atomic payload could be deployed. Truman's press conference triggered worldwide concern. British Prime Minister Clement Attlee immediately visited Truman to discuss the atomic revelations, though Atley extracted from Truman a promise that allies would be notified if the U.S. were to go ahead with any strike, Dean Acheson convinced Truman to drop the language from the memorandum formalizing their meeting. Atomic weapons would remain not only on the table, but only the province of America. This was also, for what it's worth, how air power had been used in Korea from the time that

America jumped into the war in the summer of 1950. America had total air and naval supremacy, more ordinance and firepower than any other army on the planet, and it was generals like Curtis LeMay, who, having executed the most brutal bombing campaigns of World War II on Japan, who was now the head of the Strategic Air Command, a title bestowed upon him in 1948, giving him operational control over America's nuclear bonds. In his press conference, with Atlee and elsewhere, Truman was insistent that he wasn't about to use atomic weapons himself again. Although he had been the only head of state in history to approve their use on the battlefield.

He was now reserving that right for future American presidents and future American generals. Checking back in with Reginald Thompson, who remembers the aftermath of the president's nuclear threat. Truman had made some kind of statements and the news was bringing horror to mankind.

A young broadcaster had been out on the road with his microphone, meeting the first of the semi-hysterical lads of the second division as they came in from Kunuri, and were asked their opinion. Hell yes, use it. They're overrunning our CPs. We three, he's talking about him and some journalists.

We three slumped down as though we had been shot, each with our terrible thoughts as the monstrous possibility drowned our senses for a while. I know my thoughts were how to get home, to die with Mel and the babies. It seemed vital that we should all be together when we died. Things didn't stop at the nuclear talk. The catastrophe in Korea prompted Truman to pull the lever and to declare a state of emergency on December 16, 1950.

We talked last episode about the November 1950 elections, where the Democrats lost 28 seats in the House to the Republicans and gave up five seats in the Senate. Truman's approval rating, hovering in the 40s, was beginning a downward slide now from which it was. would never recover, in large part due to his handling of the war. Though Truman had tried to out-redbate the redbaiters, having been the president who instituted a government loyalty pledge in 1947, expelled the radical New Dealers from the Democratic Party, and helped smother the Wallisite Progressive Party, more radical anti-communists in the Republican Party were winning the day. In the December 2nd, 1950 edition of the Inside Washington political column, author Robert S.

noted that fresh off the midterm thrashing of the Democrats the month before, Senator Joseph McCarthy, quote, now boasts of the term McCarthyism, widely used by the Democrats in the past campaign as an insult, was a piece about the major policy debate in Washington of the moment about Truman's proposed defense profits tax. Quote, that is the term being considered by the Treasury to make President Truman's proposed excess profits tax more palatable. The chief executive still clings to the hope that the tax may be passed

at the coming session of the 81st Congress, despite the heavy tide of business sentiment against it. It was this moment of crisis, some historians argue, that gave McCarthyism the opening that it needed. The cost of the war had already moved Truman to pass the Defense Production Act and to institute a sweeping new price stabilization bureaucracy and price controls. And, as historian Richard M. Freeland writes, the enormous gap between what the American people had been led to expect in Asia and what actually occurred there probably did more to make

McCarthy's charges credible to Americans than anything else, save the discovery and conviction of Alger Hiss. And the political impact of the Hiss case, no less than that of the fall of China, derived in large part from the policies and politics of Truman and his advisors. An administration that had assiduously encouraged public concern over internal security in 1947 and 48 could not credibly argue that domestic communism was not really a problem after hard evidence of communist activities in the government had been produced. To borrow Freeland's phrasing, the American people had been led to believe that the police action in Korea

would not require an American troop commitment, and the Truman government had adroitly handled the subversive infiltration problem. But by November 1950, when the Democrats had gotten rinsed in the elections, the time to victory in the war for the Allies seemed to be getting longer, only six weeks after the landing at Incheon. What's more, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, food prices rose nearly 10% over the last eight months of 1950, and the House Furnishings Index rose at a similar rate.

Harry Truman, as we've seen, did not want to declare a global war, Maybe his general did, but he did not. And so, Harry Truman, master of the middle path, declared something else, a state of emergency. On December 12th, Truman had told his cabinet, we are faced with an all-out situation, with, quote, total mobilization, and was already pondering a state of emergency. At a national security council meeting, Truman swore the United States, quote, would not surrender to these murderous Chinese communists. Dean Atchison, for his part, called China's entry into the war a fresh and unprovoked, aggressive act,

even more immoral than the first, that is, the North Koreans crossing the parallel. And so, on the night of December 15th, the American public learned there would be, quote, no appeasement, as the title card where a Truman Oval Office address put it. That address outlined the state of emergency that Truman would make. official the following day. Now, we haven't mentioned much of the press censorship that was going on up until now. That's because, in large part, there wasn't an effective organized military media control apparatus.

MacArthur had actually successfully fought to give reporters access to the front lines, only now, in December 1950, seeking to impose. press controls for the first time. Why? Quote, what triggered the censorship decision was the news of civilian massacres, writes Su Kyung Huang in Korea's grievous war. The month before, an associated press reporter wrote of witnessing, quote, an execution of 20 South Korean civilians accused of collaborating with communist troops. They included an 18-year-old girl and a mother of three children who was condemned for mobilizing women to make underwear for the communists. The ending of that AP article, quote, this story may be the last of its kind. An army order bans correspondence

from attending future executions. Although the International Committee of the Red Cross was witnessing what the AP reporter had, and in fact was made aware of the horrible conditions that around 35,000 to 40,000 prisoners in South Korea were enduring, Huang writes that the international aid organization in the end looked the other way. As South Korean and America, forces retreated, supported by airpower, the South Korean state's apparatus of political repression kicked once again into high gear, characterized most of all by mass executions. Before the United Nations and South Korean forces abandoned Pyongyang, historian Paul Thomas Chamberlain notes, one American saw the summary execution of, quote, hundreds of DPRK prisoners. To one side,

several North Koreans hung like rag dolls from stout posts driven into the ground, he writes. These men had been executed and left to hang in the sun. The message to the prisoners sitting on the ground was obvious. 50 miles to the southeast in Sinchon, South Korean troops forced some 400 women and children into a warehouse where they were interrogated in regard to the hiding places of their sons and husbands. They were refused food and water, and, after begging for the latter, were thrown human excrement. Days later, the building was soaked with gasoline and set ablaze. On December 15, 1950, in what Huang describes as, quote, one of the most infamous executions, known as the Hongjeri incident, South Korean soldiers perpetrated a gruesome crime. From an account

by a British soldier named William Hilder, reproduced by Huang in Korea's grievous war. It was about 7.30 in the morning when the South Koreans in uniform herded the prisoners out of a vehicle parked less than a stone's throw from our camp. They made them kneel down facing the truck with their backs to some trenches dug some distance away. They were roped together in pairs. I saw two women and two young kitties, age about 10 and 13 among them. The guards led them in batches of ten into the trenches and then shot them in the back and in the head. The women were screaming and the men wailing. About 80 people stood watching, including some American soldiers who seemed to disgust it.

One of the guards fired bursts into those who didn't die immediately. I walked away when the kitties were shot. I didn't like to see it. Afterward, they piled earth on top of the bodies and went away. I went over in the afternoon, and there was a foot sticking out. According to Huang, the Americans documented several executions, which reportedly occurred on a daily basis for several months. Going into December, the most celebrated commander, not only of World War II, but indeed of Korea,

while his image was beginning to disintegrate. Reginald Thompson describes it. The tension in Tokyo was intense. Nerves were frayed and tempers were ragged. Evermore flamboyant statements emanated from the dictator in his ivory tower. Bravado increased as humility vanished. There had been no mistakes. There were no lessons to be learned.

The enemy had been surreptitious and had cheated. And now the enemy was suffering for his behavior and was sustaining appalling losses under constant air attack. We had won a lot of real estate and killed very few enemy, said a spokesman. Now we've lost a lot of real estate and are soldering the enemy. The briefing conferences had become, frankly, ridiculous. Headquarters, having known nothing, now knew everything. The quote-unquote Chinese hordes were swollen to nearly a million in a few days,

though everywhere out of contact. The briefings closed down in dudgeon. Piles of handouts were stacked throughout the days and nights, and few of them were worth the paper they were written on. They were not military documents, but filled with the phrases of advertising copywriters. The one cheerful aspect of all this civil and military disaster was that no one felt that MacArthur could survive it. But as the weeks wore on, we knew that he could, that he had, and that only a miracle could move him. Meanwhile, another general, William F. Dean, the American commander held prisoner in North Korea, was asked by his interrogators a new question.

Why did I think Chinese volunteers had come in and were fighting us? I said, because their master told them to, because Stalin told them to. because Stalin told them to. This made them all chatter. The interpreter finally said, if the Soviets had wanted to attack, they would have attacked when your troops went to the very border of the Soviet Union,

but not a single Soviet soldier entered the fray. The reason the Chinese came in is the same reason that you would take action if there was a burglar in your neighborhood. Our Chinese brothers saw robbers in their neighbor's house. That is why they came to our assistance. This moment, a rag-tag communist victory, threats of nuclear war, a national emergency officially declared in the United States,

in many ways evokes our story from last season. Quote, it is commonly remarked that the Cuban Missile Crisis was the worst and most dangerous of post-war crises, writes Bruce Cummings. But the defeat of the rollback in North America, Northern Korea occasioned the greatest danger, because it bore down upon two axes. First, the grand global conflict between communism and capitalism, and second, the internal struggle for the American state between Truman, Atchison, and their substantial opposition, which looked upon MacArthur as a hero. Whether they knew it or not, China and North Korea

had perfect aim, decisively reversing the first and greatest attempt to displace a communist state. and simultaneously exploding a temporary and unstable coalition in America that advocated rollback. As 1950 drew to a close, panic gripped the highest levels of government in Washington, and the leaders sought to reverse their crushing defeat by contemplating the use of nearly every weapon in the United States arsenal. From a poem by a Chinese soldier in the 40th Army The American imperialism is a ball of fire. It will burn China after burning through Korea. China, the neighbor, rushes to put out the fire.

China can be saved by helping Korea. From the poem Two Birds by Mao Zetong, Gunfire licks the heavens, shells pit the earth. A sparrow in his bush is scared stiff. This is one hell of a mess.