Breaking History - Restless Nation: The Making of Modern Iran (Part 1)

Episode Date: July 16, 2025

Breaking History dives into the paradox at the heart of modern Iran: How a nation born in revolt, from the tobacco protests of the 1890s to the 1979 Revolution, has time and again empowered autocrats in the name of democracy. This week we trace the cycles of reform and repression that still shape Iran today. Producer: Poppy Damon A special thanks to our sponsors: Go to ⁠groundnews.com/BreakingHistory⁠ to get 40% off the unlimited access Vantage plan and stay fully informed on today’s biggest news stories. Listen to ⁠Boundless Insights⁠ wherever you get your podcasts for smart, honest conversations about the biggest stories shaping Jewish life, Israeli politics, and their global impact. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Welcome back to Breaking History. In this episode, we dive into Iran between its revolutions and what this recent history tells us about what comes next for a regime wobbling after the 12-day war. I want to tell you about a podcast I can't recommend enough. It's called Boundless Insights, hosted by Aviva Klumpis. Aviva is sharp, fearless, and deeply informed, the kind of host who challenges assumptions without turning up the volume. On Boundless Insights, she sits down with diplomats, military leaders, and legal scholars, people who actually know what they're talking about to make sense of the chaos in the Middle

East and beyond. No hot takes, no tribal echo chambers, just smart, honest conversations about the biggest stories shaping Jewish life, Israeli politics, and their global impact. If you're tired of the noise and ready for something deeper, check out Boundless Insights. You'll come away with new insights and a deeper understanding of the issues. Find Boundless Insights, available wherever you get your podcasts. Only a few weeks ago, in the afterglow of America's bombing of three critical Iranian nuclear sites known as Operation Midnight Hammer. President Donald Trump let this slip on truth social.

It's not politically correct to use the term regime change, but if the current Iranian regime is unable to make Iran great again, why wouldn't there be a regime change? MIGA! For America's isolationists, it seemed that the president, who campaigned as the anti-war candidate, had taken off the mask like the end of an episode of Scooby-Doo to reveal he was John McCain all along. But Trump has just acknowledged something that millions of Iranians have understood now for at least a quarter century. The Ayatollahs lack popular legitimacy. They rule by fear. The Israeli government understood this as well.

The time has come for you to unite around your flag and your historic legacy by standing up for your freedom from an evil and oppressive regime. It has never been weaker. This is your opportunity to stand up and let your voices be heard. Woman, life, freedom. Zan, Zandeghi, Azadi. There wasn't a Velvet Revolution in Iran last month, though.

But this doesn't mean the Iranian people are content with living under the fanatic clerics who purport to rule them. On June 15, seven of Iran's leading democratic opposition leaders, including Nobel Peace Prize winners Sharina Bhatti and Nargis Mohammadi, issued a joint statement in Le Monde calling for an end to uranium enrichment, an end to the war, and another plea for the unelected clerics of Iran to step down from power. Meanwhile, the son of the last Shah of Iran is urging his countrymen to rise up. So today, I have a direct message for Ali Khamenei. Step down, and if you do, you will receive a fair trial and due process of law, which

is more than you have ever given any Iranian. He is pushing on an open door. The Iranian people have led national uprisings five times since 2017. In 2009, hundreds of thousands of Iranians took to the streets to protest a stolen election. In 1999, students all over the country led demonstrations again. That protest was about a newspaper. This is Ahmed Batibi, who helped organize the 1999 demonstrations and was featured on the cover of The Economist in an iconic photo, waving a bloody shirt. That time, one of the reformist newspapers in the name of Salam published a confidential

letter about Iranian intelligence services. Before that, a group of employee of intelligence service started to kill some intelligent people in Iran, some journalists, some writers, some directors, without any reason. And the reformist government released some information, confidential information about that. That's why, that was a reason that the Iranian regime

arrest this group and send to the jail. The head of this group wrote a letter about their activity and he said that yes, we killed these people, opposition people actually of the government, by our decision and the Iranian regime officials didn't order us. And one of the Iranian reformist newspaper in the name of Salam, which means hello in English, released this confidential letter and the Iranian regime closed this newspaper. Street protest has been part of Iranian culture now since 1892, when a few mullahs stoked crowds in Tehran to boycott tobacco after the Shah at the time

Cut a sweetheart deal with the British Empire to corner the market on what was then one of Iran's leading exports Every leader of Iran understands that the street is always watching and if he's not careful his regime may topple The man in charge Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, has been in power since 1989, the year the Berlin Wall crumbled under similar circumstances. And so we shouldn't be surprised that despite the detentions, tortures, exile, and murders, Iranians of all classes and creeds

have time and again expressed their disgust for the killers who purport to rule them. So that was the reason student come to street for protest and said that we have to have democracy, we have to have freedom of speech while you close this newspaper. It is now a corrupt and lethal police state. Khamenei is approaching 90 and it's unclear who his successor will be. It may not be the street, but a mafia of killers, spies, and clerics smell blood. Anything can happen. Does this mean that what comes next will resemble a democratic republic? We can hope, but the ferment for self-rule stoked

since the end of the 19th century has crashed against a much longer tradition in Iranian history, two and a half millennia of kings. It dates back to the Achaemenid Persian Empire. And while the Iranian Revolution in 1979 ended this streak of monarchs, the supreme leader Khamenei resembles the past Shahs of Iran in that he alone is the decider of his nation's fate. Like the Pahlavis, the Khashjars, the Zans, and the Safavids before him, Khamenei is a supreme leader. And this illustrates a kind of paradox.

Khamenei is Iran's second supreme leader that came to power in what was portrayed in Western media as a democratic revolution. It followed a pattern. At hinge moments in modern Iranian history, the Democrats have empowered the autocrats. And at the same time, the Pahlavi dynasty overturned so violently in 1979 by an exiled Ayatollah, did more to liberalize and modernize Iran than the constitutionalists that both empowered and despised the Shah that ruled over them. I'm Eli Lake and you're listening to Breaking History.

In this first of a two-part episode, we examine the Iranian riddle. How has a country so restless against tyrants ended up voting for kings? After the break, the origin story of Iranian democracy and the unmet promise of its first revolution. The beast who has a feat, democracy's supposed to be People now's the family that makes the ring for King of Kings From there is nester a deep beat We love the sun, we love them all We love them till we threw them off.

We love the sun. We love them all. If you've been listening to Breaking History, you know how today's headlines often echo themes from the past. Whether it's deep state suspicions or disinformation campaigns, the pattern is clear. The truth gets buried when narratives are controlled. That's why I use Ground News, the most practical tool I've found for separating truth from propaganda in real time.

Their app and website pull in the world's perspective on today's most contentious issues, including ours at the free press, but this is better than swiping through headlines. Ground News analyzes each reporting source's political lean and whether they're corporate, controlled, government-owned, or independently funded. If you go to groundnews.com slash breaking history, you'll see how most of the media miss stories like declassified documents on Chinese election interference. Of the few dozen articles covering this, most are coming from more conservative, independent outlets, making it a blind spot for those relying on more liberal, mainstream sources. Which is the very reason ground news

made one of my favorite features, their blind spot feed. It shows you the important stories being filtered out of your typical news feed for a clearer picture of the world. I honestly think ground news is tackling one of the most urgent issues of our time, restoring trust and transparency in the media. That's why I partnered with them to get you 40% off the same Vantage plan that I use. That's $5 a month for unlimited access to everything I've mentioned. Just go to groundnews.com slash breaking history. It's an investment in your ability to think critically and stay informed while supporting platforms like ours.

Hey there, it's Eli. With a constant barrage of alarming headlines, wars, a warming planet, and high stakes politics, it might feel like we're teetering on the edge, but the world contains a lot more good news than you hear on mainstream media. If you're looking for another show that questions the status quo, then I recommend What Could Go Right, the twice-weekly news podcast hosted by Zachary Carrabell and Emma Varvaloukas. Recently nominated for Best Politics or Opinion Podcast at the Ambi Awards, What Could Go

Right provides a balanced view of what's going on across the globe, even during difficult times. Each Wednesday, they sit down with leading minds like best-selling author John Green and environmental reporter Emily Atkin to discuss today's biggest challenges with nuance and insight. And on Fridays, they highlight the latest progress reports from around the world, from life-changing medical advancements to groundbreaking efforts to combat climate change. If you need a place to start, check out their recent episode with economics expert Matt Stoller who breaks down the 100 year war between monopoly power and democracy.

It's an enlightening conversation that's perfect for breaking history fans. So fight the urge to doom scroll. Tune in to What Could Go Right wherever you get your podcasts. Before we get into the tale of the Constitutional Revolution, we have to give a little background. By the end of the 19th century, Iran was in desperate shape. The vast majority of Iranians were illiterate. Four decades into the 20th century, most farmers tilled their land with donkeys. There was no centralized education system or even a real army.

Now, for some countries, this wouldn't be such a big deal. The strong do what they please, the weak suffer what they must, as Thucydides instructs in the Melian Dialogue. But Iranians have a long civilizational memory. They go back to Cyrus and Xerxes, the Achaemenid Persians who were the villains of the travelogues of Herodotus, and the heroes of the Old Testament. Later, Persian empires ruled over the kingdoms of the Caucasus and Central Asia, at times reaching into what

today is Iraq. And yet by the end of the 19th century and into the dawn of the 20th, Iran was a prize over which Russia, Germany, the British Empire and the Ottomans fought. Iran was now the chessboard in a game played by great powers. This sad state of affairs is due to the Al-Qajr dynasty. It was decadent, corrupted by British gold, and bullied by Russian Cossacks. The state of affairs angered both the common people and the elites. When Al-Qajr Shah sold off the rights to export Iranian tobacco in 1892, there were riots.

A similar dynamic ensued at the end of 1905, when the governor of Tehran imposed excessive price controls on sugar, infuriating the powerful sugar merchants in the bazaar. On December 12, 1905, the situation came to a boiling point. A mullah named Jamal al-Din Isfahani addressed an angry crowd with blood in their eyes. He made the case that if the Shah was a real Muslim, then he must lift the price controls and adhere to popular will. This challenge to the Shah's authority was too much for the government-appointed cleric that oversaw Friday prayers in the capital city, so he ordered his guards to physically remove

Isfahani from the pulpit. This led thousands of Iranians who were stirred by Isfahani's sermon to march to a shrine on the outskirts of the capital and conduct a massive sit-in. No one knew it at the time, but a revolution had just begun. Now all of this sounds like an echo of 1776, no? Economic grievance leads to civil unrest, and then a new republic is born in freedom. But there are some important differences. To start, there are no founding fathers per se. One of the beauties of the Constitutional Revolution, if I may say that, I'm a little

bit biased and favor of it. That it is a, first of all, a leaderless revolution. This is Yale historian Abbas Aminat and the author of Iran, a Modern History. It does not have a charismatic figure with a beard and turban and sitting up there as it is sacred or something close, semi-sacred, like Khomeini. So if you want to point out who is the leader of the constitutional revolution, there is none. There is a bunch of fact, had certain superiority over others or were

blameless. So they were all the same. They were all basically more or less supporters of a constitutional cause. The second feature is that while the constitutional revolution results in the establishment of a parliament known as the Majlis, it taps into a very ancient Iranian sentiment about justice. This goes back to the Shia origins of Iran, which is a polyglot nation, a hodgepodge of Persians, Azeris, Kurds, Awazi Arabs, and many other smaller ethnicities.

And while there are religious minorities in Iran, one of the factors that holds the country together since the early 1500s has been that most Iranians adhere to the Shia strain of Islam. The Shia believed that the rightful heir to the caliphate was Muhammad's cousin and son-in-law Ali. His martyrdom is a central theme of the Shia Muslim faith. This leads to a profound sense of wanting to write injustice. Again, this is Abbas Aminat. Which brings me to a second part of your question. And that is, often it has been said it has been the establishment of

democratic regime in Iran or a democracy in Iran, which is true. But democracy in different contexts in different societies differ. I need not to tell you that. Okay. So in the Iranian case, one can say that this is a concept of justice, which then translated into social justice or socio-political justice, became crucial and central. And this was a fairly familiar concept for the Iranians. So while it's true that Iran's constitution, which is drafted in 1906, establishes a parliament and a foundational law, passed in 1907, enumerates basic rights, the driving force of the revolution, particularly in this early period,

was a sense that the Qajar dynasty had led Iran to ruin. Iran had been reduced to a plaything of the great powers. Iranians were being exploited. The escalating tensions eventually persuaded the Qajar Shah, Mosafar al-Din, to sign the constitution, which establishes this parliamentary system and limits his power as a monarch. This is a great moment in Iranian history, but it did not lead to democracy. Mosafar died five days after signing the constitution and his son, Muhammad Ali, succeeds him. He's not like his father. Muhammad Ali sets out to restore an absolute monarchy, but he has to contend with a wildly popular Majlis, which continues to establish basic laws that would in theory enshrine a

democratic system and individual rights. We should note that up to now, the Iranian transition to democracy is relatively peaceful. Primarily the liberals use the power of protest. There are massive sit-ins, for example, at the British embassy in Tehran and other Shia shrines. These are known in Farsi as Basts. But there are also radicals. And in February, 1908, two bombs nearly kill

the young Shah in Tehran, leading Muhammad Ali to fear that the dynasty was in danger. So he consults with the Russians. Now at this point in the story, we have to explain the Khazar dynasty aligned with the Romanov Empire in Moscow as a hedge against the British in the southern part of their country. Part of this cooperation was that Russian officers commanded Iran's most effective military force. A cavalry modeled on the Cossacks, the brutal force that terrorized Jews and other minorities in the pale of settlement. So after the attempted assassination, the commander of the Iranian Cossacks,

Colonel Vladimir Lyakov, persuades the Shah to attack the Majlis itself. The assault was brutal. Not only did the Cossack forces nearly level the actual Majlis building with artillery, but when they were done, they sacked the parliament and sent out their soldiers on horseback to pillage the surrounding neighborhoods. Ultimately though, this legislative coup, you could say, backfired. It led to the formation of now armed groups throughout Iran to coalesce and eventually march on Tehran to depose Muhammad Ali, the Shah himself, and restore the Majlis, and then select his 12-year-old son, Ahmed, to replace the deposed Shah. By 1909, the second Majlis convened, and a regent was in charge of the Qajar dynasty. But the constitution movement was still in trouble.

Iran's economy was in ruins, and by this time the Russians and the British were backing different factions to the Majlis. Eventually the parliamentarians decided to hire an American financial expert to audit the government's books. Where did all the money go? But the auditor is never given the chance to finish his work because the Russians invade northern Iran and demand that he's fired. By the end of the revolution, the Shah's powers are limited and the Majlis survives, but Iran is still a weak power coerced by the Russians and the British. Much blood has

been spilled, there are no fireworks and celebrations. Rather, many Iranians are left wondering whether this new, weakened government will be able to make good on the promises of justice and prosperity. The poet, journalist, and political theorist, Mohamed Taki Bahar, summed up the mood in the country in 1912 with his famous poem, It is from us what befalls us. The black smoke that arises from the roof of the motherland, it is from us what befalls us. The burning flames that flare from left and right, it is from us what befalls us.

Even if we are at our last gasp, we should not complain of the stranger. We shan't quarrel with the other, but complain of ourselves. This is the core of the matter. It is from us what befalls us. We are that old plain tree who does not complain of the storm, but grows on the soil. What can we do? Our fire is in our belly. It is from us what befalls us.

Ten years were wasted in desputation in the madrassa, while staying awake all night. Today we see that all was a riddle. It is from us what befalls us. We claim we are awake now. What an illusion! What is our wakefulness? After 1911, Iran limps along. World War I was a disaster for the once mighty nation. Russia still had troops in the north and the British, now aligned with Imperial Russia, controlled Iran's southern ports. Meanwhile, the Germans sent agents of influence to incite tribal rebellions against their

adversaries. Iran remained the chessboard of the great powers. After the war, a great famine came to Iran and the weakened government in Tehran was unable to meet the challenge. Up to 2 million Iranians perished in that famine, and then hundreds of thousands more succumbed to the Spanish flu epidemic. In the midst of all of this, a middle-aged officer in the Russian-led Iranian Cossacks named Reza Khan was watching and waiting.

He would go on to end the Khazar dynasty and begin his own. But in this period Reza Khan was a rising officer in a nation falling apart all around him. In 1920 he gets his chance to shine. Now at this point the Romanov dynasty is finished after the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia. The new Russians are interested in spreading communism all over the world and they focus on the northern Iranian province of Golan and begin aiding a local insurgency fighting from the forests known as the Zhangal. Reza Khan, who is now a brigadier general, is sent to suppress the rebellion.

His first attempt fails. So the second time he showed his basically abilities to lead and eventually prevail over the revolutionaries in the north, the Jangyal movement in the north. Again this is Abbas Aminat. I mean, this story of Jengal movement, it was first nationalist, it was first nationalist Islamic, then it turned to become more Bolshevik. The Bolsheviks supported it, so it was an earlier stage of pre-Cold War,

where you would see the Bolsheviks are striving to create a socialist republic of Iran in Gilan province in the north, and the central government and the British are opposing it. What happens as a result of that, he became well known, relatively well known. So still nobody thought that this guy is going to be the future of the country. They thought he's okay then. He's a valiant kind of a leader of the Cossack forces. One of the problems for Rezakhan is that he had no formal education. The other constitutionalists were intellectuals, reform-minded mullahs, and representatives of the old elites under the declining Qajar dynasty.

Rezekan is just a general from a military family of no particular distinction, but he is also a man of the moment. The Qajar dynasty is in decline, but at the same time the Majlis and the constitutionalists lack the unity and power to address the many crises befalling their country. So in February 1921 Reza Khan teams up with a prominent political journalist and they overthrow a weak and hated government. Reza Khan consults with the British, who were an occupying power in the south. But we should say the British Empire did not really help him.

They said, we're open to a new government if you can pull it off. Nonetheless, the Qajar Shah, now a ceremonial king, remains on the throne. As a result of the coup, Young Reza becomes commander of the Iranian army, which at this point is not much of a national army we should say, and Tabatabae becomes prime minister. The Majlis was suspended, but reconvened a few months later. In 1923 Rezekhan is selected as prime minister. He is now in de facto control of the country.

So at this point Rezekhan could go down as a Kemal Ataturk, the reform-minded president who left behind a quasi-democracy in Turkey. But instead, he chose to become the man from whom he had taken power. This is the fork in the road. Reza Khan becomes Reza Shah. And that is a kind of coup. Except he got that title through a vote of Iran's parliament. And the liberals and constitutionalists largely supported him. Again, this is Abbas Aminat.

Why intellectuals want it? Why all these constitutionals want it? You look in the group of people, yeah, look people who saved him are among the most capable of the constitutionals of the earlier period. This is a period of chaos in the post-war era, post-Fest World War era. Iran is suffering from great depression because of the war. Whatever they had was destroyed during the war. The Spanish influenza comes to Iran and along with the great famine that follows it, Iran

loses probably a few million people. Out of the population of nine, ten million, it loses two million, perhaps more. It's unbelievable. The big moment comes on October 31st, 1925. That's when the Majlis itself essentially fashions the rod for its own back. They vote to dissolve the Qajar dynasty formally, you know, it was barely limping along at this point, we should say, and to make Reza Khan the new Shah. They also amended the constitution to give the new monarch some of the powers the Majlis took away from the Khazar Shahs in the first place. Then the Majlis dissolves itself,

and there's an election for a constitu constituents assembly to determine the country's future. These moves were overwhelmingly popular, but a few, a few of the legislators offered mild criticism, choosing to praise Rezakhan's service to Iran while opposing, in theory, the idea of making him an absolute monarch. One of those deputies was a 43-year-old lawyer named Mohammed Mosaddegh. He had emerged as one of the leading lights of the constitutionalists. Born into privilege, his father was a powerful tax collector for the Qajari dynasty, and Mohammed had inherited the job himself before going to Europe for law school. He was one of the few elites in this period with a reputation for

unimpeachable integrity. He once sent deputies to collect back taxes on his own mother. He also had an unforgettable style. He would faint during his speeches at times for dramatic effect. He often conducted his affairs from his bedroom in pajamas, silk robe, and slippers. conducted his affairs from his bedroom in pajamas, silk robe, and slippers, and he was constantly attended to by doctors. Dean Acheson, who served as President Harry Truman's Secretary of State, described the Iranian lawyer as follows in his memoir. Small and frail, with not a shred of hair on his billiard ball head, a thin face protruding into aegh becomes a potent foe of the new Shah and his son. But in this period, he treads very lightly. On the floor of the Majlis, he argues at first that making Reza Khan a Shah would deprive Iran of a great prime minister. He then turned to

another member of the Majlis, Sayyid Yaqub, who was an ally in the constitutional revolution but was now supporting the motion to make Rezakhan the Shah. If they cut off my head and cut me into pieces, and if Sayyid Yaqub assails me with a thousand curses, I will not accept this. After 20 years of bloodshed, Sayyid Yaqoob, were you a constitutionalist, a freedom seeker? I myself saw you in this country, ascend the pulpit and urge the people onto freedom. And now it is your opinion that this country should have one person who is Shah and Prime Minister and

magistrate all at once? If so, this is reactionary. It is depotism. Why did you needlessly shed the blood of the martyrs on the road to freedom? Why did you send them off to die? From the beginning, you should have come out and said we lied and never wanted constitutionalism. You should have said that this is an ignorant people who must be beaten into submission.

Again this is Abbas Aminat. So people are desperate for some kind of an order, for some some fear that emerges and would hold on the reins of power and would tell them, this is how the government is going to be run. And Reza Khan had that kind of instinct, ability to say so or to do so. And the intellectuals came to their service, their service, realized that the path through constitutionalism is not going to take them anywhere. After Rezekan becomes Shah, he adopts a name based in part on the Palan tribe of his family, Pahlavi.

And with that, a new dynasty is born. After the break, the rise and fall of the first Pahlavi Shah. No Frills delivers! Get groceries delivered to your door from No Frills with PC Express. Shop online and get $15 in PC Optimum Points on your first five orders. Shop now at NoFrails.ca. There is no nice way to say this. Reza Pahlavi was a tyrant. And while his tyranny was effectively legislated into existence by Iran's parliament, that institution, the Majlis, became a rubber stamp during his reign, much like it is today in the Islamic Republic of Iran.

The Shah killed, exiled, and arrested his political opponents, including former allies. He banned opposition parties, newspapers, and many unions. Even though the Majlis approved without dissent his decrees, he rigged the parliamentary elections to pack the legislature with loyalists anyway. In the 1920s and 1930s, Reza Shah made war on tribal councils that had existed for centuries in harmony with Tehran. In one of his most controversial policies, the Shah imposed a ban on the hijab, instructing the police to physically remove the veil and head covering from women who wore it in public.

He banned public Shiite religious ceremonies and exiled mullahs that displeased him. And Reza Pahlavi's foundation confiscated property throughout the country. By the end of his reign, he was the largest landowner in all of Iran. So let's credit Mosaddegh here. The Constitutionalists empowered a Constitution killer. And yet at the same time, one could argue that it takes a tough man to raise a tender chicken. The first Pahlavi Shah used his power to bring Iran into the 20th century. He built a national railroad. He forged a national army out of an old system where tribal militias would lend their forces

to the Shah in times of war. And he created a modern education system, resting power out of the hands of the mullahs and their seminaries. In this respect, Reza Pahlavi was comparable to Ataturk, that strong man who transitioned the Ottoman caliphate into modern Turkey. He manages to basically create a certain national integration. This is Abbas Aminat again. That's a huge thing because if you compare Iran with Afghanistan or with Iraq or with Syria, Iran is a country that has been centralized. If you look at Iran, a map of tribal distribution in Iran, you would be amazed. There are hundreds of tribes and sub-tribes in the 19th century. He manages to create a unified, at a big expense. Don't think that it's always positive. Authoritarianism,

strong rule, suppression. As Reza Shah modernized Iran, he also began to pursue a policy of balancing the great powers that had always tried to influence his country. And this is where he got into some trouble. By 1939, the Shah had decided that Iran would be neutral in World War Two. This was a red flag for the Allies, particularly after Adolf Hitler double-crosses Joseph Stalin and violates their earlier alliance. In 1941 the Soviet Union and the British Empire

invaded Iran at the same time. It was 1914 all over again. This is the newsreel's record for history of the linking up of the British and Indian force in Iran with the army of the Soviet Union. The swift action that occupied a weak country in danger of falling into the grip of Hitler. Iranian civilians stood about in the streets watching the entry of the empire army. There is no sign of hostility or resentment. They have heard of the devilish cruelties practiced by Germany in the countries they profess to protect. The Shah's crown jewel, his army, ended up capitulating when it made contact with the enemy, and the Shah was furious.

In his last meeting with his generals, he physically beat up the Chief of Staff of the Army and showered the others with invectives. He then ordered the command staff to be court-martialed and tried for treason. But Rezipalavi was out of time. The British demanded his abdication. It was a humiliating end to his reign. He wanted to live in exile in Canada, but he was first sent to India and then South Africa.

This is Ray Takei, senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and the author of The Last Shah. And it was a fairly miserable, miserable exile for him. He was a very proud person, and so to have been exiled and cut off from his country was a very difficult time for him. He was a very proud person and so to have been exiled and cut off from his country was a very difficult time for him and he died a very sorrowful, mournful person. Once again, Iran is the chessboard. It was little more than a supply route for the allies in World War II to get the guns and materiel to the Red Army fighting the Nazis on the Eastern Front.

to the Red Army fighting the Nazis on the Eastern Front. The country's elites had zero leverage. And yet, miraculously, they take their lemons and make lemonade. Iran was not a democratic society, but it had institutions that mattered. Again, this is Ray Takei. It was an aristocratic elite that generated from the landowning class.

And as a result of their ties to the land, to the country, they had a feel for the temperature of the country. They were an elite that lived in urban areas, in some cases even were educated abroad, but they had a feel and a sense for the country because they had the relationship with their provinces and others through their land holding. It's not that they weren't exploitative, but they had a feel for the country and it was a very talented aristocratic group. If you think about what happened in Iran in 1941, it is a country that's occupied by the Soviet Union and Britain. That is a major accomplishment given the circumstances and is a reminder that Iran's diplomats are

excellent at negotiating from a weak position. Just consider the skill with which Iran's envoys forged the 2015 nuclear deal. After nearly 20 years of pursuing an illegal uranium enrichment program, they managed to keep their ill-begotten infrastructure in exchange for a promise to only use it for peaceful purposes. As a result of the bargain Iranian elites struck with their occupiers, the Pahlavi dynasty continued. The new Shah was Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, the first Shah's son.

In some ways, it's an echo of the deal made with the Qajar Shah Muhammad Ali in 1909, when he abdicated in favor of his 12-year-old son. Unlike his father, Muhammad Reza Pahlavi was born into privilege. He did not have a hard life, and he was only 21 years old when he ascended to the throne. He began his reign under British and Soviet occupation. began his reign under British and Soviet occupation. Now let's just reflect here on how the liberal elites in 1925 formally empowered the first Pahlavi Shah, and now 16 years later, many of these same elites negotiated for the continuation of that dynasty.

Unlike the 1925 votes in the Majlis, though, the elevation of the second Pahlavi Shah did not result at first in authoritarianism. Indeed, the first 12 years of his reign were a kind of golden era for Iranian democracy. So what happens is that the replacement, in answer to your point, replacement of Reza Khan by his son was condoned by the Iranian population because they were felt that well at least he's one of ours. This is Abbas Aminat again. He is not somebody the British has appointed.

Yeah, the British said okay they gave a green light. But eventually what emerged is allowed Iranians in the post-war period to experience a period of democracy, which I call the chaotic democracy, between the 42 and 53, 10 years, 11 years. And I think, very crucial period, because there's several important questions come about, oil nationalization and center of it, revival of the constitutional aspirations for the creating of a democratic regime. So this is what I call the half revolution. The Constitutional Revolution is a full revolution.

The events of 1942 to 53 is a half revolution. And then in 1979 is another revolution. So Iran experienced two and a half revolutions. And in the second one, which is very crucial, And in the second one, which is very crucial, again, the ultimate outcome was a kind of disappointment. Why? Because again, there was some meddling by great powers, by the British, by the Americans. Now not everyone was happy with the young Shah in this period. In 1944, with the war still raging, a 42-year-old mid-level cleric in Qom chastises Mohammed

Reza Pahlavi for continuing the secularization policies of his father. He rails against the ban on the hijab and accuses the new Shah of sending bogus representatives to the Majlis. In an open letter to the people of Iran, this cleric calls on pious Muslims to rise up. Today is the day that the breeze of divine spirituality is blowing on us. It is the best of times to start a reformative uprising.

If you miss this opportunity and don't rise up in the path of God and don't restore religious rights. Tomorrow yet another lustful, licentious bunch will prevail over you and make all your faith and honor subject to their false malevolence. Today what excuse do you have before God the Creator? The man who wrote those words in 1944 was relatively unknown. In less than 40 years though, he would change Iran and the world.

You know him as Ruhollah Khomeini, who would go on to eventually lead a revolution along the lines of that open letter. After the break, how Iran's opening became Mosaddegh's moment. It won't take long to tell you Neutral's ingredients. Vodka, soda, natural flavours. So, what should we talk about? No sugar added? Neutral. Refreshingly simple.

Mohammed Reza Shah was lucky. One of his first tests as a national leader was in 1946 when Soviet-backed forces in Iranian Kurdistan and the Azerbaijan provinces began an uprising. The national army that wilted in the face of the British and Soviet invasion proved their mettle and for the final campaign against the Azeri separatists, the young Shah traveled to the front and personally commanded the troops in the final stage of their victory. It was an important moment for this untested leader. His powers were diminished at this point. The prime minister, for example, was now setting national policy. inside the Mashlis, led by Mohammed Mosaddegh, were calling for the Shah's power to be reduced even further, to be a ceremonial head of state like the modern King of England.

In this half-revolution, as Amunet calls it, Mosaddegh emerges as a star. Some of this is because of his erudition. He is a dramatic and eloquent speaker, who knew the law as well as he knew Persian history He could appeal to the both the hearts and minds of Iranians with his oratory The man also had sharp political instincts He knew how to press an issue and after World War two he found political gold Iran's oil Specifically who owns Iran's oil the old regime sold away the rights to the British. Mosaddegh's position was simple. Give it back.

A little context. Remember that one of the main issues animating the original constitutional revolution was a sense of justice, or precisely, injustice. It was this perception that Iran's rulers at the time, the Qajar dynasty, had colluded with foreign interests against the interests of the Iranian people that really gave the constitutional revolution its fire. This is what led to the tobacco uprising in 1892, that royal decree that gave a British firm exclusive rights to sell and control the market for one of Iran's biggest cash crops. Well, in the late 1940s, there was no bigger Iranian export than oil, but the British took the lion's share of the profits. This again goes back

to another sweetheart deal from the Qajar dynasty. A British investor named William Knox Darcy secured the rights for a pittance, £20,000, to explore Iranian oil in 1901 in a deal with Mosafar Aldeen, the same Shah who signed the 1906 constitution. After discovering oil in 1908, Darcy formed the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, and the British government became its chief investor. Eventually, that company would become British Petroleum. To make a long story short, through a series of opportune renegotiations with subsequent Shaws, the British secured the rights to take the majority of the revenue generated from Iranian oil and gas sales through 1993. This was a matter of national pride. And it wasn't just the exploitative arrangement in terms of profit sharing.

The conditions for the Iranian workers were abysmal, and the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, as it was now known, ran the wells like a plantation. The English speakers were in management. They were the engineers and the technicians. The grunt work was left to the Bakhtiari herdsmen that had their villages uprooted to make way for the oil rigs. In Aminat's history of modern Iran,

he quotes one contemporaneous observer of a refinery as follows. Wages were 50 cents a day. There was no vacation pay, no sick leave, no disability compensation. binary as follows. deep and when the rain subsided clouds of nipping small winged flies rose from the stagnant water to fill the nostrils. Summer was worse. The heat was torrid, sticky and unrelenting while the wind and sandstorm shipped off the desert hot as blower. The dwellings of Kazaghazabad cobbled from rusted oil drums hammered flat turned into sweltering ovens.

In every crevice hung the foul, sulfurous stench of burning oil. In Kyrgyzabad there was nothing. Not a tea shop, not a bath, not a single tree. The tiled reflecting pool and shaded central square that were part of every Iranian town were missing here. The unpaved alleyways were emporiums for rats." Mosaddegh becomes the champion of these oil workers and rallies the country to their cause. His argument sounded like something one might hear from Thomas Jefferson or James Madison.

The contracts that established the Anglo-Iranian oil company were null and void because it was signed with an illegitimate regime without the consent of the Iranian people. And his argument wins over a wide coalition of political factions in the Majlis ranging from the far-left communists to even fascist parties to many of the austere clerics. This National Front considered Mosaddegh its leader. Everybody understood that there was something wrong with the British government getting more tax revenues from the Anglo-Iranian oil company than Iran getting revenue from its

oil. This is Ray Takeh again. Everybody understood that the supplemental agreement that the British had forced down the throne of the monarchy in the past was exploitative. Namely, that contract, if it allowed to have existed, would have expired in 1993. That was in a dispute. By the way, I think the British government understood that. The American government certainly understood that.

The leadership of the AROC did not. So the idea that the negotiations had to happen between Britain and Iran regarding re-examining of the contract that was imposed on Iran in the early 20th century in an exploitative manner, everybody got that. The problem, as Takei explains, is that Mossadat did not understand that Iran did not have the technical expertise to actually extract the oil from the ground. It still needed British know-how in 1950 and 1951, when the oil nationalization bill was being debated. The other issue was that Mossadat was not flexible enough in offering compensation to

the British, which they would have accepted. It was a matter of principle for him. Mossadegh didn't seem to understand that then there had to be some kind of a compromise about the oil apparatus of Iran. He didn't want to understand that actually foreign technicians at that time were critical to the operation of the Iranian oil refinery. He didn't seem to understand that the Abadan refinery was the largest British overseas assets and a declining colonial power would actually be prickly about simply walking away from such things.

And he didn't seem to understand that the Iranian people wanted the oil reclaimed, but they also wanted their economic lives to improve and therefore economic austerity and financial pressure were going to be ill advised for him. He didn't seem to understand that he was a single actor in a constellation of power that involved the monarchy, the military, the clergy, the merchant class and foreigners, Americans. He didn't seem to understand that in his very dogmatic

approach to oil nationalization and his maximalist demand that the British cannot have any role in the future operation of those refineries and facilities. He was incapable of compromising at a time when the art of compromise was necessary and indeed urgent. On March 17th 1951, the Majlis passed a bill to nationalize its oil, and four days later revoked the Anglo-Iranian oil company's concession. Nearly seven months later, the Brits said goodbye to Iran. Here is the account of that company's official historian, Henry Longhurst, on the British legation leaving their headquarters at Abaddon.

On the morning of October 4th, 1951, the party assembled before the Gymkhana club, the center of so many of the lighter moments of their life in Persia, to embark for Basra in the British cruiser Mauritius. Some had their dogs, though most had had to be destroyed. Others carried tennis rackets and golf clubs. The hospital nurses and the indomitable Miss Flavell, who ran the guest house and three days

previously had intimidated a Persian tank commander with her parasol for driving over her lawn, were among the party. And the Reverend Tyree had come sadly from locking up in the little church the records of those who had been born, baptized, or had died in Abadad. The ships' band, correct to the end, struck up the Persian national anthem and the launchers began their shuttle service. The crews of Mauritius steamed slowly away up the river with the band playing, the assembled company lining the rails and roaring in unison the less printable version of Colonel Bogey, the greatest single overseas enterprise in British commerce had ground to a standstill.

This was Mosaddegh's crowning achievement. He was named Time magazine's man of the year. This is an excerpt from the accompanying essay. There were millions inside and outside of Iran whom Mosaddegh symbolized and spoke for and whose fanatical state of mind he had helped to create. They would rather see their own nations fall apart than continue their present relations with the West. Communism encouraged this state of mind and stood to profit hugely from it, but communism

did not create it. The West's military strength to resist communism grew in 1951, but Mosadeq's challenge could not be met by force. For all its power, the West in 1951 failed to cope with a weeping, fainting leader of a helpless country. The West had not yet developed the moral muscle to define its own goals and responsibilities in the Middle East. Until the West did develop that moral muscle, it had no chance with the millions represented

by Mosaddegh. That quote from Time gives a good sense of where the American elites were in 1951. This was the second Red Scare, and President Harry Truman, like his successor, Dwight D. Eisenhower, is obsessed with communism. But they also understood that Mosaddegh was not a communist. He just represented a coalition that included communists.

The U.S. position throughout the Iranian oil crisis was largely as a neutral third party. Indeed, both Truman and Eisenhower, in his first months in office, viewed Mosaddegh's position favorably, and Mosaddegh sought the U.S.'s good offices to help negotiate a solution. Mossadda sought the US's good offices to help negotiate a solution. But after the Iranian Prime Minister rejects a generous American proposal to resolve the dispute in 1953 with the British, Eisenhower begins to be persuaded of another approach, regime change. Part of this was because by this point, Mossaddegh had alienated so much of his own coalition, this national front, that many Iranian politicians already of all political stripes were

quietly petitioning the U.S. embassy in Iran to support a coup. Again, this is Ray Takei. And then you began to see the movement against Mossadegh primarily because there was such internal opposition. Remember, throughout this time, a sort of a cascade of Iranians are coming to the American embassy saying, help us do a coup. And the position of the United States government at that time was we don't deal with internal politics of Iran. That was a rotating door of Iranians coming through saying, I'm going to do a coup, I'm going to do a coup, can you help us do a coup, can you help us?

And the position of the United States government was no, we're not going to do that. So, but that gained traction around March, April 1953 and you begin to see the planning. The Americans take over the planning from the British because Mossadegh has broken official relationship with Britain and the embassy had closed. Now in the telling of the story of the coup, the CIA and the left have exaggerated the American role in the whole affair. Some of this is because of a man named Kermit or Kim Roosevelt, the grandson of Theodor Roosevelt. Roosevelt was tasked by the agency with overseeing from Tehran this operation known as Ajax to Aus Bozadeh. And he thinks very highly of his own work.

In the opening pages of his memoir of the 1953 coup, he writes, At the end of this true account, in the late summer of 1953, the Shah said to me truthfully, I owe my throne to God, my people, my army, and to you. By you he meant me and the two countries, Great Britain and the United States. I was representing. We were all heroes. This is all a bit grandiose, no? Now, one has to remember at this point that the British have imposed a kind of embargo on Iran. The wells in southern Iran and that the British once controlled are no longer pumping oil. Iran's economy is in the toilet and as a result, most of its coalition is fracturing.

A number of senior army officers that the prime minister had fired are now openly calling for his ouster. He also lost the support of the clerics. More on that in a bit. But they are the most effective force for most of the 20th century in Iran for ginning up popular street protests. So the black propaganda element of Operation Ajax as it was known was like pushing on an open door. What's more, Roosevelt, who spoke no

farce, had placed his black propaganda articles in newspapers that were mainly read by Pallavi supporters in the first place. The one thing that Roosevelt and his team did manage to do was to pressure the Shah himself to use his constitutional authority to dismiss Mosaddegh from office. to use his constitutional authority to dismiss Mosaddegh from office. By this point, Mosaddegh was pressing his advantage, and the Shah was seriously considering abdication. In the summer of 1953, as Roosevelt was planning his operation, the Shah had taken off for his summer palace in a kind of internal exile. He didn't want to take responsibility for it.

I don't know if I want to be the Shah. I don't want to take responsibility for it I don't know if I want to be the Shaw I don't want to take responsibility for this what happens if this fails this is Ray Takei again so at some point I think he makes a suggestion to Kermit Roosevelt that why don't I verbally tell you I'm against Mossad there and you know not not not issue any famance. That's not quite the way it works. He gets visited by his sister, as you mentioned. He gets visited by Elder Schwarzkopf, the father of Norma Schwarzkopf of the Gulf War claim, who had been involved in organizing the Iranian police force. Eventually, of course, Kermit Roosevelt's account of this is exaggerated, but he does meet with the Shah and essentially presses him to dismiss

his prime minister, which he had constitutional authority to do so, by the way. In this period, the young Shah seeks assurances that Eisenhower will support him if he fires Mosaddegh. So Roosevelt arranges for a line in one of the president's speeches that expresses vague support for whatever form of government Iran takes. That was enough for the Shah. He dispatches the head of his royal guards to deliver this message to Mosada himself at his residence. He also signs another decree making General Fazlola Zahedi, the chief of staff of the army, the new prime minister.

What happens next sounds like something from a comic novel. Mosadat is furious and has the poor colonel delivering the decree arrested. He then goes on national radio to explain that he will remain the prime minister. This is on August 15th. The Shah is now spooked and takes off for Baghdad and eventually Rome where he runs into CIA director Alan Dulles causing a minor panic inside the agency. The CIA director and the Shah cannot be seen together in the same room during a coup. Come on!

Mosaddegh holds on for a few more days, but on August 20, 1953, pro-Shah demonstrators flood the streets of Tehran and Mosaddegh realizes his position is untenable and steps down. These events have become a kind of dogma for American progressives and Iranian diplomats. The story goes like this, in 1953, Iran is once again the victim of great power meddling. And it's the coup in 1953 that leads directly to the Islamic Revolution in 1979. Now we should say, eventually the US government officially apologized for the 1953 coup after the election of a reformist Iranian president, Mohammed Khatami, in 1997.

Here is Madeleine Albright in an address to the American Iranian Council. In 1953, the United States played a significant role in orchestrating the overthrow of Iran's popular Prime Minister, Mohammed Mossadegh. The Eisenhower administration believed its actions were justified for strategic reasons. But the coup was clearly a setback for Iran's political development. And it is easy to see now why many Iranians continue to resent this intervention by America in their internal affairs. Obama himself internalized this narrative about the fall of Mossadegh.

And then I think the last thing that this is maybe not something I've learned but has been confirmed. Even with your enemies, even with your adversaries, I do think that you have to have the capacity to put yourself occasionally in their shoes. And if you look at Iranian history, the fact is is that we had some involvement with overthrowing a democratically elected regime in Iran. One of the reasons why so many people have seized on the coup is because of the timing of our friend Kermit Roosevelt's memoir.

That book was released in 1979, the year of the Islamic Revolution. I kid you not. So this view that the Ayikku was the spark that lit the long fuse that led to the toppling of the Shah in 1979 is far too simplistic. It also airbrushes away many inconvenient facts. Let's start with Mosaddegh himself. By 1952, when he began his second term as prime minister, Mosaddegh started to resemble the kind of autocrat that he had spent his entire career opposing. He bullied the Majlis in November of that year to grant him the powers to fine, exile,

and imprison anyone suspected of undermining national security. This law ended up banning most expressions of civil disobedience and created a de facto martial law. Mosaddegh also shut down opposition newspapers through a new law targeting the press. Prominent newspaper editors and journalists staged a sit-in at the Majlis to protest these draconian measures. In 1951, in a showdown with the Shah, Mosaddegh was allowed to serve as both Prime Minister and Defense Minister.

This gave him the authority to purge the military of more than 150 senior officers that he suspected of being disloyal to him. He also purged the judiciary, summarily firing without due process nearly 200 judges and state attorneys, including all of the justices on Iran's Supreme Court. He then dissolved the recently created upper chamber of the legislature, its Senate, and then he dissolved the Majlis itself, calling for another consultative assembly similar to the dissolution of the parliament in 1925. In this light, the overthrow of Mosaddegh looks much more like a duel than it does a coup. Remember, in 1953 the Shah himself is relegated to a kind of internal exile.

He almost left the country in a move that many of his supporters feared would be his abdication, but decided to stay after demonstrations erupted in the streets demanding that the Shah remain in Iran. This again is Ray Takei. A politician who entered political office as a champion of rule of law became essentially an outlaw. A politician who entered seeking the essentially institutional arrangements that will limit the power of the any one institution tries to become

Grandeyes power. He essentially, what I would say, Mossadegh as prime minister betrayed Mossadegh as a parliamentarian, Mossadegh as a lawyer, Mossadegh as a writer, because he also was essentially trying to clamp down on the press. So he subverted his own principles, which was very tragic because he was one of the more upright and ethical politicians in Persia at that time. Another problem with the CIA coup narrative is that as Mosaddegh consolidated his power, he alienates the broad coalition that gave his government political legitimacy.

Let's start with the Molas. In this period, the speaker of the Majlis is Ayatollah Said Abul Gassim Qashani. He initially supported Mosaddegh and was part of the National Front that nationalized the oil industry. But he too had a falling out with the Prime Minister, even though he was persecuted by the Shah. In one of the great ironies of Iranian history, Qashani, who was one of the most powerful and respected clerics inside of the Combe seminaries, ended up ginning up the street protests that ousted Mosaddegh in the 1953 coup. Khashani, who adhered to a strain of Shia Islam that believes a hidden Imam will one day return, was a major theological and political influence on none other than Ayatollah Khomeini. So yes, the radical clerics of 1953 supported the coup that many Western apologists today blame for fueling the 1979 Islamic Revolution.

After the coup, Mosaddegh is tried and sentenced to prison. He ends up spending three years behind bars. He is spared a death sentence when the Shah intervenes. After his release, Mosaddegh is sent into internal exile on his family's estate east of Tehran and spends the rest of his life writing memoirs under house arrest. He died in 1967 and his funeral was a private affair. It's a sad tale, but we should also recognize that even Mohammed Mosaddegh, the champion of the constitution,

the hero of Iranian democracy, was becoming a tyrant after his first taste of executive power. Once again, Iran's liberals, in a sense, had chosen autocracy. In the next episode, the Shah consolidates his power and faces a formidable rival, a radical cleric who seethes and plots as another Pahlavi modernizes this ancient land. Stay tuned for part two as we dive into the Shah's demise and the revolution that created The power of these two as they feed Democracy's supposed to be We form now as a family

That makes the ring from King of Kings From Dares to Nestor of D.V. We love the sun, we love them all We love them till we through them all, we love them till, we threw them all We love the sun, we love them all, we love them till, we threw them all Then ain't there we love the moon, we love them tears We love them till we through them all We love the sun, we love them all We love them till we through them all We've gone for constitution, parliament and land reform We've got manly oil rights from the land where we were born

Protecting the injustice, you rule us by decree If we don't get our freedom, we take it to the streets We love the sun, we love them all We love them till we through them all We love the sun, we love them all We love them till we through them all Then they still ween the king of kings We can't give up our purge on thee

Then they still ween the king of kings The Khazari The Safavids Then they still weep The King of Kings