Call Me Back - with Dan Senor - A Hostage Deal — with Haviv Rettig Gur & Nadav Eyal

Episode Date: July 8, 2024

*** Share episode on X: https://tinyurl.com/vehsrjpx *** Before today’s conversation, one housekeeping note. We are announcing our second "Call Me Back Live" Event. I will be talking to creators of Fauda -- Avi Issacharoff and Lior Raz. They are scripting OCTOBER 7th, a feature film on the heroic true story of Noam Tibon, who rescued his son Amir Tibon, a Haaretz journalist, and his young family, from Hamas terrorists who had invaded their home at Kibbutz Nahal Oz. Issacharoff is also is a war correspondent who has been embedded with the IDF in Gaza. The event is July 22 at 6pm in NYC at the Comedy Cellar. Part of the proceeds will be donated to Leket, Israel’s leading food rescue organization, which has played a critical role working with farmers and kibbutizm in the Gaza envelope since 10/07. To RSVP, please go to comedycellar.com, click the "lineups" button on the top left and select "July 22". Now onto today’s conversation. How close is Israel to reaching a hostage deal with Hamas and – with that – a temporary ceasefire that could possibly become a permanent ceasefire? And why does this negotiations process have direct implications for Israel’s Northern border, between Hezbollah and Israel? Could a Gaza ceasefire result in a de-escalation on Israel’s Northern border? To help us understand what’s going on here, we have two guests today: -Nadav Eyal is a columnist for Yediot. Eyal has been covering Middle-Eastern and international politics for the last two decades for Israeli radio, print and television news. -Haviv Rettig-Gur has been a regular presence on this podcast since October 8. He is a senior political analyst for the Times of Israel, and has been an important interpreter for Western audiences of how to understand this conflict in broader historical terms. Speech by Nadav Eyal discussed on this episode: https://www.instagram.com/reel/C9IUmVwtRZV/?igsh=MW95bXpyZ2hhdm4xNA==

Three months ago, Israel had much less of an achievement in the battlefield of Gaza, and Hamas positions were much closer to the positions of Israel. And as the war became longer and longer, Israel had to come closer and closer to the positions of Hamas. And the Israeli IDF and the defense apparatus are doing a pretty good job, according to experts to urban warfare and military historians, and they're saying you're doing a pretty good job, according to experts to urban warfare and military historians, and they're saying you're doing a pretty good job. On the other hand, our political leadership is doing the kind of a job that at the end, strategically speaking, if you look at the positions made by Israel in the negotiations with Hamas, you see that we're in a process

in which we are going weaker, weaker politically, while winning to an extent, militarily speaking. And because of that, we need this pose. It's 5pm on Sunday, July 7th, here in London, where a new government takes office and where I am today. It's 7 o'clock p.m. on July 7th in Israel, where our two guests are today, although in two different parts of Israel. And it's 12 o'clock p.m. on July 7th in New York City. For today's conversation, one housekeeping note. I am thrilled to announce our second Call Me Back live event, this one in New York City. For today's conversation, one housekeeping note. I am thrilled to announce our second Call Me Back live event, this one in New York City as well. At that event, I will be

talking to the creators of Fauda, Avi Isikarov and Lior Raz. Avi and Lior are currently scripting a feature film called October 7th on the heroic and true story of Noam Tibon, who rescued his son, Amir Tibon, and Amir's wife and their young family from Hamas terrorists who had invaded their home at Kibbutz Nahal Oz on October 7th. Avi has also, with his journalist hat on, spent time in Gaza, embedded with the IDF, covering the war. So there'll be a lot to talk about with Avi and Lior at our live event, much like our last live event, which we did with Michael Rappaport. This next event will take place on July 22nd at 6 o'clock p.m. in New York City at the Comedy Cellar again.

I hope you're all able to come and join us. Part of the proceeds will be donated to Leket, Israel's national food bank, which has been doing pretty extraordinary work in Israel since October 7th. To RSVP for the July 22nd event, go to the Comedy Cellar website, ComedyCellar.com, ComedyCellarOneWord.com, click the lineups button on the top left, and select July 22nd. Now on to today's conversation. How close is Israel to reaching a hostage deal with Hamas?

And with that, a temporary ceasefire that could possibly become a permanent ceasefire. And this negotiations process through intermediaries with Hamas has direct implications for an escalating situation on Israel's northern border between Hezbollah and Israel. Could a Gaza ceasefire result in a de-escalation on Israel's northern front? To help us understand what's going on here, we have two guests today. Nadav Ayel is a columnist for Yediot Akhranot. Nadav has been covering Middle Eastern and international politics for the last two decades for Israeli radio, print, and television news.

Aviv Ratikour has been a regular presence on this podcast since October 8th. He's a senior political analyst for the Times of Israel and has been an important interpreter for Western audiences of how to understand this current conflict in broader historical terms.

I've always been grateful to have you on this podcast individually. I'm especially grateful to have you both, Haviv and Nadav, on together. And as I just realized, this is actually the first time you two are actually meeting. Is that right, guys? That's true. Yeah. Yeah. I've been reading Nadav for a long time. We've never met in person. Hey, Nadav, how are you? The feeling is mutual. I will say, I should say that Alana and I should be proud because that is another contribution Call Me Back is making.

It is bringing you two together, two people who should have known each other. You live much closer to one another than either of you live to me, but it takes our podcast to build community. So here we are. Okay. So the reason I wanted both of you on is because we are at a dramatic juncture at this moment in the war. There seems to be a deal on the table to essentially end the war or at least a path to ending the

war in Gaza. Yes. And possibly at least temporarily in the north, as well as bringing back some, if not all, of the remaining hostages back. That is the Israeli offer, which Biden made public back in May, in which Hamas said last Wednesday that it was agreeing to. Now, on paper, it feels like this could be another deal moment that could go like the previous ones. I can't keep track of the number of times. We've heard there was a deal and then there wasn't a deal or Hamas reneged on terms of the deal or tried to make changes to the terms that were just too much for the Israelis to

handle. Or there was just internal tension within the Israeli government that precluded a deal from advancing. But this time does feel different for the following reason. Israel's security apparatus is pretty explicitly advocating for this deal. And the IDF has taken Rafah and the Philadelphia crossing, the Egyptian-Rafah border. The IDF is essentially saying it's running out of targets in Gaza. Hezbollah has indicated that if this ceasefire goes into effect, it will seize its own fire, and at least temporarily,

in most of Israeli society, according to some polls, seems to be in agreement that this deal should happen. So what's the problem, one would ask? Well, obviously, there are many far-reaching political implications to this deal, both inside Israel and in the region. So I want to get into it, and I'll start with you, Nadav. You were on our podcast last week. You indicated that the security apparatus had told the Israeli government that it recommends ending the war. There isn't much fighting left to do. So if the war is going to wind down, why not create a formal structure around the winding down of the war, which could include the return of hostages. That was what the IDF was articulating and advocating when we spoke last week. What do we know about where the deal stands just in broad brushstrokes?

Like what's different now from what you had updated us on last week? So first of all, at the end of our chapter last week, we did say, Dan, that there are signs that things are changing rapidly. And we talked about specific signs that came from Israel's political sphere, like a speech made by Batalya Smotrich at the time, warning from a deal, Batalya Smotrich is a far-right politician who serves as Israel's finance minister. And is a major player in the Israeli government and holding the government together. Yeah. And also I quoted Naim Qasim's speech. Naim Qasim is the second-in-command in Hezbollah. And he spoke about the possibility of holding fire in the north if indeed there's a ceasefire in Gaza.

And this, together with some sources of mine, gave the impression that we are on the verge of a possible breakthrough. And this breakthrough indeed did happen. And it happened with an answer that came back from Hamas. They were willing to compromise their previous positions and to come much closer to the Biden initiative that was actually an initiative made by the Israeli defense apparatus. So basically, we need to understand that this entire development is the result of the Israeli defense apparatus led by Yoav Galant, the defense minister, with the support of the head of the Shin Bet, with the support of the chief of staff and the head of the Mossad. And a couple of months ago, they came and

they wanted to have a much more proactive approach and they made an offer to Hamas and at the time Prime Minister Netanyahu was very hesitant and sceptic as to this offer and he even blamed the people in the government that were still inside the government. I'm talking about the centrist parties, I'm talking about Benny Gantz and Gadi Eisenkot, and new Afghan defense minister, that they ambushed him, they pushed him to make that offer that actually includes at least a scent of the end of the war, a vagueness that could be used by Hamas to argue that this is actually the end of the war. And then Hamas came back with a negative.

The Americans came in and became increasingly intensive about this. And they actually gave a bear hug to the prime minister. And President Biden was saying, this is the offer made by Israel before Israel said that publicly. And then the prime minister could not negate that. He tried to maneuver out in a TV interview in Channel 14. He said, this is not an offer to end the war. It's a partial deal. He used the term partial deal. And then he had to walk back on that. The US administration,

to its credit, for like the first time during this crisis of negotiations, held steadfast that it's now it's the blame of Hamas. The responsibility lies on Hamas. Hamas is saying, no, we had numerous statements made by both President and Secretary Blinken, basically saying it's the fault of Yair Sinwar. And then Sinwar said, actually, I'm going to go through with something that resembles more of the Biden offer. And in the first phase of the deal, we will see a release of at least 18 living Israeli hostages held by Hamas. All in the humanitarian category, right? So women, children, and elderly, and those who are sick or injured. That's true. And then we will see the release of Palestinian prisoners that are in Israeli jails for terror-affiliated activities.

And then at the second stage, we're supposed to start discussing really the end of the war. And of course, the release of the majority of Israeli hostages that are held by Hamas. And what happened is Hamas came back with a positive. The Mossad, the Shin Bet, the IDF, everyone that knows anything about this said, look, this is a major compromise by Hamas. We have here a window for an agreement. They came with that to the cabinet, to the prime minister. The prime minister decided to send the head of the Mossad together with his advisor to Qatar.

This is important, by the way. I know the gentleman you're talking about, he's a very close advisor to the prime minister. It sounds like Barnea, the head of Mossad, is basically not bringing anyone else but Ofer Falk. This is a decision by Netanyahu. Netanyahu didn't want to send the professional team. Right, he wanted to send Barnea plus Ofer.

Because the head of the Mossad answers only to the prime minister. And the advisor of the prime minister, who is not of importance within the negotiating room, and this is an understatement, is being sent there as a Netanyahu person to supervise and report to the prime minister. Okay. So he didn't send the the head of the shin bet yeah but it also could signal that the prime minister is taking this one this round much more seriously this is the crux of the matter okay is the prime minister doing that dan because this is so delicate and sensitive and he has decided to go for a deal or is he doing this

because he wants to make sure that the deal won't happen? Nobody knows the answer to that yet. But at any rate, right now, today, we have learned that a team would go into Cairo to negotiations with Hamas through the mediator who is Egypt. And these negotiations are already on the fine details of, for instance, what would be the number of Palestinian prisoners released for every Israeli civilian hostage held by Hamas. And if this is the case, and indeed, Israel is sending this delegation to Cairo, that's a positive sign as to the seriousness of this government and the prime minister towards the deal. And I should say, before handing it over back to you and to Habib, that this thing can crumble in like five seconds for a thousand reasons that can make everything, you know, just go down the drain. I'm talking about how many Palestinian prisoners would be released. Will there be a veto power over the names of those Palestinian prisoners. Israel demanded a card for a 100 veto power

over Palestinian prisoners. That means that it can veto out like 100 people out of the list made by Hamas. Basically, in previous rounds, some of the rounds of negotiations have broken down because Israel says, yes, we will release Palestinian prisons from Israeli prisons in return for Israeli hostages,

but we—and Hamas submits its list of who it wants released, and we can agree on numbers released, but we, Israel, have veto power over certain names, and we can dictate that certain names be removed from that list because we think they're too much of a threat, too much of a risk to be released from prison, and they would be replaced with other names. And Hamas has not wanted Israel to have that veto power. Hamas says zero. And it says that it's going to be a deal breaker. Hamas says zero. And that's, of course, very dangerous for the prime minister.

So they can agree on a number, and then once they agree on the number, according to the terms of the way these deals have been discussed in the past is it's binding and then hamas just and then it's some hamas just fills in the names and israel's stuck they're bound by those names and they can't veto they're gonna they're gonna aim to release the most vicious murderers in the history of the israeli palestinian conflict and of course uh baraguti who's a main leader of the Palestinian society, and they're going to claim this as their own victory. And that's a big problem to the extent of a strategic problem for Israel. And there is another point that our listeners should understand, of course. If this deal goes through, the government's going to fall. Netanyahu's government is going to be over because of this deal and I'm sure about that and everybody

who talks with these politicians talking about the far right Ben-Gurion Smotrich knows that this is the case so if Netanyahu goes for the deal if it's possible if Yechel Sinoir doesn't blow up the deal which he of course can then the Israeli government's going to fall and there's going to be a new election and it might be you be Netanyahu leaving the public sphere. So this is extremely dramatic, what we're seeing right now in Israel. Okay, so we're going to get back to various terms of the deal, but I want each of you to give the best argument for why this deal is in Israel's best interest and why it could be interpreted as against Israel's interests.

And I want to start with you, Haviv. What's the case for it, and what's the case against it? I hate to say it. I think the case for it is part of the case against it. The case being made for it is very, very peculiar. It is not the argument that we shouldn't try to oust Hamas from Gaza. It is not the argument that the military is incapable of winning in the south or seriously dealing Hezbollah,

the kind of deterrence-restoring blow in the north that most Israelis still want. It is the argument that this government can't win. Not the army, not the country. This government can't win. And if this government can't win. Not the army, not the country, this government can't win. And if this government can't win, then the best you can do, the least harm you can do, is to get the hostages out at any price. If you track the polls of Israelis who distrust the government's either desire or ability to win the war, the numbers who say the government doesn't want or ability to win the war. The numbers who say the government

doesn't want or can't win the war are identical to the numbers who say sign the hostage deal, and they have risen together. In other words, we had a poll on Friday on Channel 12, the biggest news channel in Israel. 67% of Israelis prefer the hostage deal to 26% preferring continuing the war. It's extremely large majority. Also, totally separately, 68% believe we're very far from a total victory and 23% believe we're very close to it. 10 points off, but the same fundamental numbers. 54% say Netanyahu's political considerations are the only reason the war is still going. There is a deep sense, fairly deep even into the right, that this is a government that either can't or doesn't want to actually win. 34% say that it's been nine months because of

substantive and operational considerations. And all of that is to say that the argument for the deal is the argument that Israel is not politically capable of winning. And that leads me to the argument against it. I hate to be the bearer of bad news. I know I'm contractually obligated to be the bearer of good news. But the argument against it is that it is, in every important sense, in every sense that matters, a loss. It is a total loss of the war. We had Hamas yesterday, I think it was Osama Hamdan, said that Gaza won't accept, the Palestinian people won't accept any kind of guardianship in Gaza. Hamas is the only legitimate government in Gaza, or. Hamas is the only legitimate government in Gaza, or a Palestinian government is the only legitimate government in Gaza,

and Hamas will make sure that it uses its continued presence in Gaza to make sure that nothing else can take root. In other words, there's no Arab alliance coming in. We will make it impossible. Hamas and Hezbollah met on Friday in Dakhia in Beirut, the Hezbollah stronghold in Beirut, and put out pictures of that meeting and put out statements in which Hamas reports that it is in fact informing Hezbollah of its answers to the ceasefire. Hezbollah and Hamas are trying to look like they are coordinated.

And Iran is part of the story. There is a multi-front axis strategy, and that's what's going to bring the Israelis to heel. We get out some tiny fraction of these hostages. Now, if you're their families, they're the entire world. But what's the difference for Israel strategically if there's 100 or 120? There's no difference at all. We still have the same fundamental problem and weakness facing Hamas. It is smelling an extremely weak Netanyahu. And it's playing that extremely weak Netanyahu. I don't think Hamas will, I don't think there's a deal with the Israeli army still in Philadelphia destroying tunnels. I don't think there's any chance on God's green earth that there's a deal. So just on that point, if the IDF retains its optionality to go

into those tunnels in the Philadelphia corridor, as I said at the beginning, which is the area that borders Egypt, where so much of the war materials have been smuggled in over the years into Gaza for Hamas to fight Israel and the resources and the materials and the equipment to build the tunnel system. And now Israel is there now, and Israel's basically shut down that area, that corridor has control of it. And you're saying Hamas will not reach any agreement with Israel if Israel still has the optionality to go in and out of that Rafah, Egypt area. If it can still demolish those tunnels, if it can continue choking Hamas out of existence, out of operational capability in Gaza, in other

words, if from Israel's perspective the war is ongoing, even as the war is allegedly at a ceasefire, why would Hamas sign that deal? Hamas has 120 Israeli hostages. That is the only advantage and lever it has over Israel, that and the fact that Hezbollah will empty our north for them. Why would it lose that for anything less than ending the war, than survival? And so if you see them signaling that they're willing to lose those hostages for something less than their survival, it's a lie. It's not going to come through. It just doesn't make any sense. So long story short, this is an offer from Hamas that comes to serve Hezbollah's interests, comes to serve Hamas's interests. Hamas's goal is to retain control of Gaza the day after. It smells a very weak Israeli government because of those polling numbers. 67% want a deal because 66% or 68%

don't think we can win, don't think this government can win. Hamas smells that and it wants this deal. And just to say one last thing, it comes at a very good time for Bibi. Bibi's about to go to Washington. Bibi needs to look like he's giving a go at a ceasefire so that fewer Democrats walk out when he gets up in Congress and gives a speech. This is a deal that this is a negotiation process that he's committed to at least until after he comes back from Washington. He just politically needs it. Biden needs it from him. And so it's a little bit of a game that everybody's playing. If we take it seriously, how is this not a loss of the war? Okay, so I want to return to the political

implications both in Israel and in the US in a moment. But Nadav, just on the merits of the deal, coming back to the initial question I just asked Haviv, Haviv just made the case against it. So rather than asking you to make the case for it and make the case against it, I'll just ask you to respond to Haviv and lay out your views. Well, first of all, I would say that there are no 120 hostages, living hostages in Gaza. At the most, unfortunately, there are 60, and probably less than that. So, getting a third of those is very substantial for Israel. Secondly, I would also point out that getting the hostages back is not a sentimental thing strategically for Israel. We live in a very tough neighborhood the israeli contract the israeli idea of all for one that's

not a slogan for a state of the union speech not that i'm trying to say that it's different in other countries but when you live in an area surrounded by enemies who want to destroy you and to sometimes murder every woman man and child and child in your country. The fact that your country will do everything to get you back after you've been kidnapped from your house, from your kitchen, from a party, that is substantial for the history of Israel, for the strategy of Israel. And Israel has never said no to a hostage deal. But one case, that case was of Ron Arad, an Israeli pilot, that his aircraft had a malfunction over Lebanon. And that is an Israeli tragedy. So to make a calculated decision, a rational decision to say no to a plausible deal

right now, that will mean something for the Israeli society, the Israeli deterrence, the Israeli solidarity, the willingness of Israelis to continue on fighting. Because the idea that you have the backing official, that Israel will do everything, anything, that is one of the strongest points of the Israeli society. And I just spoke last night at a rally of the Nero's, the Kibbutz Nero's. Kibbutz Nero's is the community that suffered the highest ratio of people who were murdered and kidnapped. I've been to Kibbutz Nero's twice since October 7th.

I'm just so endlessly moved by that community. One out of every four residents of Kibbutz Nero's was either killed or taken hostage. We'll post this speech you gave there because it was moving around social media. It's in Hebrew, but for those listeners who can understand Hebrew, it's very much worth listening to. Go ahead, Nadav. So my first point to this matter is that this is not measuring or deciding between the sentimental nature or humanist values of getting people back to their homes and their families or making the strategic calculus. No, it's strategic for the future of Israel to say no to a deal. Now, my second point is that this deal is an offer that we made. It's not at Hamas. It's true that Hamas, as Haviv said, that Hamas came back to us now.

And I'm sure they did that because of their interests. But I suspect that their interest is very much related to us holding the Rafah crossing and the Philadelphia corridor and that border with Egypt and us advancing intounis, and us eroding a lot of their military force in Gaza, and of Hezbollah wanting to end the war. So, if this is the case, is this such a loss for Israel to say after Hamas has actually withdrew from its position that it's the end of the war? This is the compromise. This is what has happened, that they came back and they said at the time that the Biden offer actually means that the war would continue. And Israel didn't budge and the Americans didn't budge. And now Hamas came back with a much better wording and an opening.

Sorry, Khabib. Yeah. The choice Hamas gives us, because that is our astonishing strength and our ethos, because the terrible trauma of October 7 was watching our own inability to save them, as much as the death toll itself. We have had events, wars with a much greater death toll than October 7 that did not sear us in the same way. Protecting each other is our fundamental truth. I am with you. But Hamas has played that like a fiddle. And the choice Hamas offers us today is

not release 20 or don't release 20. The choice is release 20 and then at what cost? What if the 40 never get out? What if there's not 40, but 75? And it's a lot of people who will never get out. I think the IDF has confirmed 44 dead out of the 120, something like that. But Khabib, explain to me the point. The basic Hamas demand is we leave Philadelphia, we leave Nizarim. Those are the two major corridors going through. No, not at the first phase.

We're supposed, according to the deal, as it is right now, the IDF is supposed to leave the urban areas. And that's not Philadelphia. That's not the corridor. That's not the crossing of Rafra. Hamas said, look, Israel was not willing to, Hamas at first demanded that Israel vow that this is the end of the war, that it's not going to be before the second phase of return to the war.

And that was where Hamas and Netanyahu couldn't meet and therefore nothing moved forward. And now Hamas is saying, you know, and now that the Israelis are moving forward with it, and Barnea is starting to run around the Middle East to talk about this, Hamas is now coming back and trying to front load some of the Israeli withdrawal questions. And then the question becomes at what cost? If we can get out 20, it means a six-week pause, we have to. There's no question. It's obvious. It's obvious to everybody.

It's obvious to Bitzalah Smotrich. I suspect he'll find a way to stay in the government. It's not. It's not because Smotrich didn't resist the last deal. He's going to resist this one. And Bedriy did resist the last deal that released 120 hostages. But at any rate, Israel is never going to let go of its ability after the first phase to resume the war. And Hamas knows this. And nothing in the world, no guarantee by a US president or by any international

mediator can actually change the fact that between phase one and phase two, Israel and the prime minister are going to make a demand, for instance, for Hamas to be disarmed. I published this. They're going to make that demand. And Hamas is not going to agree that before we move to phase two, they'll disarm. And because of that, that leaves a lot of room to maneuver for Israel between phase one and phase two. Now, this is an offer that Israel made with the backing of the U.S. president. True, that Hamas came back to us late, but they did. They tried to somehow improve it to their positions. They failed in that, and now they've returned.

Does Israel have really any other option with 67% of the public demanding a deal right now, not to have in good faith negotiations with Hamas and try to see if there's a possibility, if there's a window, to have at least that first phase? I'm not saying that you're wrong about the end scenario, that everything's going to blow up, and that it might serve Netanyahu towards his Congress speech, and that it's not going to happen, that even the first phase is not going to happen. But aren't we obliged, at least, to do this? And also, another point that I want to make, because as far as the Israeli defense apparatus is concerned, they need this ceasefire,

even if there were no hostages at all. That's what they're saying. I published this from senior military command in Israel. Is this, Nadav, because of the wear and tear on the IDF and the reservists? Yes, yes. And this was said today. Gallant today spoke in government and said, we don't have enough soldiers. People don't understand the erosion of the army. After nine months, the IDF was never built strategically to hold up to a nine-month war that has developed into a guerrilla war. And we have the threats in the north. And therefore, the army is saying very clearly, and Garland in private conversations is explaining,

that even if there were no hostages, we would have wanted that ceasefire regardless of anything else in order for the army to move up north, to renew its stockpiles, to get some more international support, to block the spiral of regional deterioration, which is really on our doorsteps to tackle some threats in the east with Iran. So I'm not saying that this is a good scenario. And I agree with Khabib that the Israeli public doesn't feel that we can win this war. But this is not an argument against the deal, I think, Khabib. This is an argument for the deal, isn't it? Okay, Khabib, I want you to respond to this last point first, which is 360,000 reservists, something like that, were called up in the early days after October

7th. The length of time they have had to serve. You know lots of people. I know a lot of people. You have family members. I have family members who have served at the wear and tear on society, on the economy. The numbers have severely wounded. I mean, the longest war Israel has fought since the War of Independence.

This was never the vision for the length of time that the IDF would have to be built from a durability standpoint. Dan, what have we just admitted? What have we just acknowledged? I agree the deal moves forward. It can't not move forward. I'm saying it's definitely going to fail, and it's definitely going to fail. Nadav is saying it's the advantage, because we will still be there ready to fight. And so that's the response to my pessimism that anyway, it's probably going, yes, all true. And by the way, very few people are

going to be making these decisions. And so it's hard to predict what those decisions are going to be. But we have just admitted that our enemies have figured out how to fight us in ways we cannot win. Our enemies have figured out how to produce the long wars that we don't know how to fight. We don't have the wherewithal, the time. If we lose the American missile shipments, can we fight Hezbollah in the future? Do they force on us another year of emptying the north? The hostage question to me is the most painful question.

And it's the most painful question not just because of the family's suffering, okay? I know too many families whose child died and they're living their own hell. And so, you know, the human suffering and the pain and the investment of our emotions in it is, I understand. But the fundamental strategic question is the question of the next war and the next wave of suffering. Are we leaving a Hezbollah intact on that border and making the north unlivable for the future? Are we going to end up to get more hostages out? Because if Hamas really can, what if

the deal itself is a staged plan by Hamas? In other words, it goes through. They do it. They give us the six, we give them the six weeks, a release of some number of prisoners, of some number of Hamas mass murderers, and then they give us those 20 hostages. And then they say, here's the next 20. Well, a political, a polity, an electorate that doesn't trust this government to do anything. I mean, to do anything. I cannot, you know, if you follow the Hebrew language news streams, I mean, the press releases of ministries. I'm not talking about, you know, left-wing or right-wing news outlets. This is a government that is struggling on every front, on every front. They just announced a billion shekel, 1% cutback across ministries,

and only the ministries that don't matter were saved from the cuts, the coalition ministries. The Ministry of Heritage isn't going to be cut. But the welfare ministry that's dealing with 100,000 Israelis displaced, they're going to face a cut. This is a government that is deeply detached and has created the distrust that has led Israelis into a collapse of morale that we're seeing now. But all of these things that we're saying is our enemies have figured out how to impose on us massive costs at cost to them that they are utterly willing to bear. Hamas is not upset that Gaza is destroyed. Hamas is upset that Gaza isn't 10 times more destroyed, because a 10 times larger Gazan death toll would mean the world would come crashing down on Israel's head. Hezbollah has lost 450 fighters, but it doesn't care.

And so it has emptied the north for nine months, and what we are informing the Middle East is Iran's strategy of our slow death by a thousand cuts is going to work. We don't have an army built for it. We don't have a political system capable of making hard decisions, capable of being decisive in the battlefield, at least not under this government or under these particular politicians. And in fact, our enemies have figured out our basic DNA. They couldn't beat us with tank columns. They couldn't beat us with,

you know, guerrilla terrorism. They have figured out how to beat us. And an Israel that did not send the opposite message on October 7 is an Israel in vastly greater danger going forward. The deal that gets 20 out and in six weeks we go back to the war, we can't not. But a deal that is anything else is part of a slow, long, strategic setback. We are too small to afford. I'm not that pessimistic as you are, Haviv, as to our enemies and the hurt that they, and the pain that they have suffered. I speak with aid workers in Gaza, I talk with intelligence, and I see what is discussed there. Let me just quote the leader of one very known aid group that operates in Israel and around the world. And she told me, talking about Yechiel Sinoir, when he leaves the bunker, you won't need to kill him.

Because from what I'm hearing in Gaza, they're going to take care of him. Now, I don't know if that's true. Yechiel Sino War is a dictator, but I do know that the levels of suffering do influence some in that leadership. They do understand the dire condition of Gaza, and they do believe that this can lead to the end of the war. And to an extent, if you look at the IDF plan to begin with in this war, phase three, the famous phase three that we discussed in this show, we're not very far from the aims as they were presented to the cabinet. We're actually

dead on in terms of timing as to the aims that were presented to the Israeli cabinet as the goals for this war. And it was obvious that you're not going to annihilate every military command of Hamas in the Gaza Strip, but you do need to have a different regime there. Even Hamas today is discussing with other political Palestinian factions the proposition that there will be a different government of technocrats in the Gaza Strip, and Hamas itself will not control formally Gaza. This is a known record. This is not my own story. So they're talking with Mohammad Akhlan. They're talking with the Palestinian Authority,

about the Palestinian Authority taking control because they want to implement the Lebanese model in which Hezbollah is fighting Israel, but you have a Lebanese government. I'm not sure that this is good for Israel, but I am sure that it shows some distress. So I think that portraying both what's happening with Hezbollah and with Hamas,

we need to be very careful in assessing, you know, there is a distress within the Israeli society and there is a mistrust of this government. And this mistrust is so justified considering the actions of this government and its leader. But their distress being hit every day by the IDF with the most sophisticated weapons, it's not something that we should shove aside.

And I think that if the war would end tomorrow morning and all the hostages would get banned and we have thousands of Palestinian prisoners and the IDF would still have the capability to go in and out of Gaza and attack aerially Hamas in Gaza, and no one is going to take that ability away of Israel to defend itself, I think that as long as you don't have a Hamas regime there, as long as you don't, I agree with you, I'm not sure if it's not the right thing to do for Israel. Because this war is not a war that we began. We are not prepared to these challenges that you have just mentioned. trust of the public behind you, if you do not consolidate the Israelis for this struggle, if you do not prepare the north and our infrastructures towards a long war with Hezbollah,

that will be coming if this war would not end to an extent, or at least go into a long ceasefire, then you might see a defeat of a greater magnitude than the day of October 7. And because of that, the defense apparatus comes into this in a very realistic mood, saying, you know, this is what we have achieved. These are the regiments of Hamas that were there on October 7. These are the regiments today. This is the number of people that we think that we have killed. This is what we have done in Lebanon. Now, we think that if you continue the war now, we don't have anything else to do. You want a military ruling Gaza, the cabinet can convene and say, yeah, go, the IDF commanders, you have a military occupation of Gaza tomorrow morning. As long as you didn't make

that decision, our option right now is to go for a deal and for a long ceasefire after the U.S. elections. And after the U.S. elections, Israel will have, it doesn't matter, by the way, if it's going to be Biden or Trump or another candidate, Israel will have much more leverage to operate within the Gaza Strip. It will be much less political pressure than there is today. And this is the mindset of those who are recommending to go for a deal. So it's really very much dependent on the negotiations that are supposed to happen in the region in the next couple of weeks. I don't know, Nadav, if you just laid out all of my complaints.

And very well. In other words, we literally cannot win a war with Hezbollah. Hamas survives in Gaza, not just in some kind of ideological, spiritual sense, as an operational component that can prevent any kind of Arab world peacekeeping force, anything that isn't Israeli, from continuing the war. Gaza must, because Hamas cannot be degraded enough, become a kind of West Bank in operational terms. That is the only future we have available to us, and our enemies have imposed it upon us.

And in that scenario, Hamas gets to be the guerrilla it always wanted to be, without any responsibility for the fact that it destroyed Gaza. That for 17 years it built Gaza into a battlefield for its destruction. That responsibility disappears because it's a Hezbollah now, it isn't a government. And in the north, they've figured it out, and we are now, we can go to that war, we will lose. That is the situation. Now if that's the situation, here's the problem with imposing costs on our enemies. They're immune to costs. They are immune to costs. Iran in Yemen demonstrates just how immune to costs Iranian proxies are. And that is true in Syria, and that is true in even Iraq,

which is not catastrophically destroyed in a war that Iran is invested in, but nevertheless. But where does this lead you to, this way of thinking? In other words, what should we do? Haviv, I think what Nadav is getting at is, under your scenario, if they're never immune, then there's no point in going to any lengths, because if the goal is to restore deterrence by instilling fear in Israel's enemies, that look at what happened to Gaza, look what happened to Hamas when Hamas did what it did on October 7th.

Does anyone else want to test us? If you're saying no result of any test scares them, then what's the point of any of this? Meaning that you're basically saying it's the end of deterrence. I'm not saying that. Nadav just said that. April 13 was a beautiful day. It was a beautiful day. The largest missile attack, what, in the history of missiles, I think was the headline in one newspaper. I loved that day. It

was such a beautiful, spiritually uplifting day. Why? Obviously, because we shot it all down, we and our allies, which is much, much more significant than we. It was Iran. And the message that could have gone back to Iran, it was a missed opportunity because the Americans and also a little bit the Israelis are terrified at escalation because they see stability as an outcome in and of itself as the only outcome worth having. And therefore, any escalation is a bad escalation, the enemy has perfect control over escalation in this region. They drop it down when they need to be safe. They ramp it up when they need to pressure.

And there's no response and no cost. And I submit to you that that is a dangerous proposition and long-term potentially destructive of Israel. Now, that is Iran's fundamental strategy. Its fundamental strategy. Its fundamental strategy is mass shock conventional war doesn't work. Simple terrorism and guerrilla war doesn't work on the Israelis. All of these strategies that we have tried doesn't work. They're kind of clever with their hands, so they keep inventing counter missile missiles. So, that also is not in

and of itself. What is going to work? The death of a thousand cuts on six fronts in which we are willing to absorb all the costs they can impose on us, shrug it off, and continue to make their lives miserable. That's the enemy's strategy. What's our response to it? I don't think that this is any different than the enemy's strategy since the 1973 Yom Kippur War. I'm not saying that it's not true. I'm saying that in 1973, Egypt and Syria and the Arab world understood that there is absolutely no way that they're going to defeat Israel. And then you had terror groups such as the PLO and later on Hamas and later on Hezbollah that attacked Israel in different ways and you had still countries

that either acknowledged Israel's existence like Egypt or Jordan and other countries that said no you know the battle continues and the banner that was let you know bypassed by Egypt was then waived by Iran and now Iran is holding this banner of the three Nays of Hathom, you know, no to recognition, no to peace with Israel, and no to any cessation of the military struggle. And I think that this is the case. This is the scenario in which we live in Israel, and we have to do with that. And we need to, within this very terrible framework, we need to make the best kind of decisions. And right now, right now,

we have here an offer that is backed by the U.S. president. And that's something, because then Israel can say to this administration, as weak as it is today, you know, with everything that's happening in the U. the US and not knowing who's going to be the next president or even the candidate of the Democrats, can say, look, we're going to go for it, but we need this and this and that vis-a-vis the North. And if Israel says anything else, or if the prime minister sabotages the deal, we're going to have huge problems. And I'm not sure that these problems are going to be only with Democrats, by the way, and we're going to have huge problems. And I'm not sure that these problems are going to be only with Democrats, by the way. And we're going to have huge problems internationally speaking. So, all I'm saying is, yeah, you know, your angle is, I'm not going to dispute that,

that this is a very difficult situation for Israel, but it is up to us to live within this framework that's so, you know, vicious sometimes. So, just two points. One, in the 73 war, one of the, just if listeners want a fun little exercise in understanding why the Israelis don't really care as much as maybe they should about international opinion, go to the UN resolutions, the Security Council resolutions over the course of the three weeks of that war. Because in the first 24 hours when Israel was losing and the Syrians had overwhelmed the Israeli forces and they were down in the valley, they were what, an hour's drive from the sea? There were no UN resolutions, or the next day or the day after. A week later, UN resolutions start coming fast. And why? Because the Israeli Air Force bombed the Syrian industrial base 30 years back, and the Syrians would never again

challenge us on the Golan. The 73 wars is exactly the example of what deterrence can accomplish. And Israel and Syria would then fight essentially wars, sort of odd sort of side wars in Lebanon, but they would not directly confront each other again, at least in their mutual border. The problem is that I don't think Nadav and I are disagreeing with any of the facts. I think that we are afraid of different things. And everything, Nadav, that you're saying, I think represents minimum half of Israel. But I have to say, everything you have said, and everything I have said, and I think we're agreeing on this point, is that the enemy is now shaping the strategic environment. And all

that is left to us is to respond. And to me, with this enemy, that actually wants to destroy us, it's not cute. It's not a little ideological peccadillo to distract the people from their tyranny back in Tehran. It is a real and profound sense of self and of the meaning of their Islam and their revolution and the need to restore Islam to a great agent and power in history. And it begins with our destruction. And so they actually mean it. In Yemen, in Lebanon, I learned that they are willing to demolish nations to accomplish it. And this enemy is shaping the strategic environment. And one of our great problems is that democracies have a little bit of an attention deficit disorder. They have struggled to see around corners. They struggle to take the long arc in a way that a

system like Iran's can more easily. That is what is required of us. We need great strategy. And we don't have great strategy. We have petty politics driving fundamental strategic decisions. And so we are failing to face this great enemy. A deal that gets 20 hostages out in exchange for a six-week ceasefire in which we don't abandon Philadelphia is a wonderful deal. It's an ideal deal. A deal that is the first step in a government's collapse into future deals in which it surrenders the capacity to remove the threat of Hamas. What does it mean if we leave the northern buffer zone and we leave Nizarim and we leave

Philadelphia and then we're essentially left with the IDF on the border but Hamas streaming anything it wants underground into Gaza? What does that actually mean? That means we're back in October 6th. I agree with you, but it's like the analysis was spot on, and then you focused on the deal. But the focus should be on, indeed, leadership and having a new strategy. And you can do that when you're immersed in a war that your enemy has begun in a timing that is ideal for them with their own axis of resistance in the region operating in tandem and you need now to repurpose some of your military you need to start rebuilding those communities you need to think again about deterrence. And I would also make another point.

You mentioned the immunity of Hezbollah in Iran and Hamas. Of course, we had the second Lebanon war. And during the second Lebanon war in 2006, I was one of those journalists that was very critical of the Olmert government. Olmert was the prime minister that managed that war, and Amir Peretz was the defense minister. This was, for our listeners, this was 2006.

2006. And then the war was over, and it turned out that after the war, Hezbollah was deterred, at least for 15 years. And they were deterred to the point that Nasrallah didn't leave his bunker for about 15 years. He's still in the bunker today because he knows that when he leaves the bunker, and that's the leader of Hezbollah, Israel will surely assassinate him. And then we saw Hezbollah attack us on October 8th. Hezbollah launched a war against us. Lebanon launched a war against us on October 8th. So I don't want to sugarcoat this. This is not forever because this struggle of the Jewish existence in the Middle East, in its newly founded national home, that's not going anywhere. And it's going to be long.

As they say in the labor movement, the old labor movement that built this country, it's Dunam after Dunam and Ez after Ez, goat after goat. So this is how the Zionist project was built. They tried to assassinate and destroy us again and again. To figure out that at the end of that strategic turmoil and trap that you have just described, Habib, the problem is with the deal. Even if it's a deal to end the war and get all the hostages back, I think that the problem is that you need to, yeah, make sure that Hamas is not the regime in the Gaza Strip. I think we can do that, even if we go for a deal right now. And then you need to make sure that you start building an Israel that can resist these kind

of pressures, that has more connection with the international community, that can better explain its actions, that's much more prepared to the type of operations that we have seen coming from Hamas and Hezbollah, all the things that we agree upon. But right now, what's happening is that this war is becoming a spiral of events that are a net negative to Israel. And this is how I know that what I'm saying is true. Three months ago, four months ago, Israel had much less of an achievement in the battlefield of Gaza. And Hamas positions were much closer to the positions of Israel. And as the war became longer and longer, Israel had to come closer and closer to the positions of Hamas.

Until that offer was made, described by the U.S. administration as very generous. And that's not a compliment to our strategy. And because of that, the Israeli IDF and the defense apparatus are doing a pretty good job, according not to me, but to experts that have been on this show, to urban warfare and military historians. They're looking at the tunnel system and they're saying you're doing a pretty good job. Okay. I don't know if it's a genius job. I'm not an expert on that. On the other hand, our political leadership is doing the kind of a job that at the end,

strategically speaking, if you look at the position of Israel in the world, if you look at the positions made by Israel in the negotiations with Hamas, you see that we're in a process in which we are going weaker, weaker politically, while winning to an extent, militarily speaking. And because of that, we need this pose. We need this pose right now. At least this is the argument that I'm hearing and I'm bringing here. Let me just say, my big takeaway from this is I don't need to be on these podcasts i'm just going to get you guys so sorry no no no this is beautiful this is a beautiful thing um which means we're going to want you guys back on together because uh this is a robust and rich conversation can i

say one one response one um one final word yeah i don't want the final word for me to be pessimistic. But... Dr. Doom, you're here. That's why we have you. But you just said again, something so pessimistic. We can't do it. Now, the arc, okay, that the Israeli public has gone through, people don't understand it overseas. And we've tried to describe it a few times in polling data and things, the arc from

that astonishing increase in optimism after October 7, that people don't grasp, because the young people came home, because the high-tech towers of Tel Aviv emptied out into that reserve army, because left-winger and right-winger and Arab and Jew went to war together. People didn't grasp the sense of strength that October 7 brought because Israelis felt their unity. And then how this dilapidated political class, this one of the, you know, things that holds me together and that makes me optimistic right now is every time I meet soldiers, the young people coming out of Gaza, the next generation, they're going to sweep away this generation of politicians,

these petty narcissists who took all of that strength and turned it into exactly this kind of strategic setback. What I'm saying, and again, you and I, we're not disagreeing on any of these facts. If people actually go through the facts, none of us have disagreed on anything. But what I'm saying is, if this country can't at this moment turn around some sense, something it can claim as a strategic victory, getting Hamas's regime removed from Gaza the way ISIS was removed from Iraq, it's different conditions. You can't expect it to be identical.

But the resolve is dissipating. And it isn't dissipating because Hamas is so great on the battlefield. It's dissipating because nobody trusts the government. A government we don't trust can't win it. I agree with you. I think that's the fundamental weakness. That's our Achilles heel. We could reshape our strategic environment, but for this leadership. But I have to tell you, if we continue down this path in which we don't, the 15 years in which Hezbollah was deterred, Olmert has made that point for 15 years, and I respect it. We came out of second Lebanon in 2006 feeling terrible. And then for 15 years, Hezbollah was deterred. Except that in 2006, Hezbollah couldn't set Tel Aviv on fire, and today it can. So was it deterred? Or was this the strategy? We need the long-term serious reshaping of the strategic environment. Every time an Israeli says we need America, in my heart, an angel loses its

wings. Every time an Israeli says we can't do anything, Hezbollah can withstand it, in my heart, I weep for this country. We have all the strength we need to face all the enemies we have to face. We need strategy, and we need leadership, and we don't have those. And that's the tragedy of this moment. And we will overcome it, but it's a generational thing. That's it. We're going to leave it there. I will say by the time most people listen to this conversation, Congress will have returned from recess in Washington and Democrats, elected Democrats in Washington will be talking face to face for the first time in most cases about what to do about their presidential nominee. There will be enormous pressure on this presidential nominee, the sitting president,

to get some big foreign policy win, which is going to add even more jet fuel to this process. And as both of you said, in the lead up to a prime minister about to appear before Congress, that adds its own jet fuel. So the next few weeks are going to be extraordinary, not only because of this process, but because of the different drivers and various political and geopolitical motivations, which means we're going to need both of you back together. I'll just say that the prime minister, during this conversation, the prime minister made an important announcement as to the deal. And this announcement sort of decreases the chances that this is going to be a deal, as they tend to do if you make public declarations. So, I'm just going to read out what the Prime Minister said, and I'm translating as I go. The Prime Minister continues to firmly uphold the principles agreed upon by Israel. One, any deal will allow Israel to resume fighting until all

the war objectives are achieved. There will be no smuggling of weapons to Hamas from Egypt. Number three, the return of thousands of armed terrorists to the northern part of the Strip will not be allowed. That means that we're keeping the Nizarine corridor as far as he's concerned. At least this is what he's saying is going to happen. And the fourth point, Israel will maximize the number of living hostages returned from Hamas captivity. Now, I don't see any good reason for anyone who wants this negotiation to go through to make this a public declaration as such, even if these are the principles of Israel. So, this is read as an omen that the prime minister has decided that he is either not going to go through or he's going to play a very, very tough position

in these negotiations. I don't know. Or he's trying to keep the government together while he pursues the deal. This is like a newsroom conversation because what Hamas was going to release about its new conditions, he's heading off. And this is the minimum that makes this a success for Israel.

So I don't know if he's heading off Hamas, if he's trying makes this a success for Israel. So I don't know if he's heading off Hamas, if he's trying to stymie the deal, maybe, but nobody knows. Nobody knows. Yeah. Gentlemen, until next time. Thank you both. Next time, Dan, we'll let you talk. No, I don't need to talk. This is a much better deal for me. I get to like hit track seven and let you guys go. All right. We will leave it there. Nadav and Haviv, thank you. And we'll be in touch soon. I suspect very soon. Okay.

Thank you very much, guys. To keep up with Nadav Eyal, you can follow him on X, at Nadav underscore Eyal. And to keep up with Haviv Retettigur on X, you can find them at Haviv Rettigur. And you can also find them at each of their publications, Nadav at Ynet and Haviv at Times of Israel.

Call Me Back is produced and edited by Ilan Benatar. Our media manager is Rebecca Strom. Additional editing by Martin Wergo. Until next time, I'm your host, Dan Senor.