Call Me Back - with Dan Senor - A Political Reckoning for Netanyahu? - with Nadav Eyal and Amit Segal

Episode Date: July 17, 2025

Watch Call me Back on YouTube: youtube.com/@CallMeBackPodcastCheck out Ark Media’s other podcasts: For Heaven's Sake: lnk.to/rfGlrA‘What’s Your Number?’: lnk.to/rbGlvMFor sponsorship inquiries, please contact: [e-mail] contact us, sign up for updates, and access transcripts, visit: arkmedia.org/Ark Media on Instagram: instagram.com/arkmediaorgDan on X: x.com/dansenorDan on Instagram: instagram.com/dansenorTo order Dan Senor & Saul Singer’s book, The Genius of Israel: tinyurl.com/bdeyjsdnToday’s Episode: On Monday, the three Haredi parties in Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s coalition were presented with a draft of a new Haredi conscription bill, which they say did not satisfy their demands for military exemption for Haredi youth.This led two of the parties, Degel HaTorah and Agudat Yisrael, to leave Netanyahu’s government on Monday, bringing the coalition down from 68 to 61 seats, which is the smallest possible majority in the 120 seat Knesset. On Wednesday, Shas, another Haredi party, announced its resignation from the government, but not from the coalition, leaving the coalition’s majority at an extremely thin margin. In other news, over the past couple days, the new Syrian government led by Ahmed el-Sharaa, has been working alongside local Bedouin tribes to violently target Syria’s southern Druze community. This has prompted around 1,000 Israeli Druze to breach the Israel-Syria border in an effort to join their brothers and sisters’ struggle. In response to the Syrian government’s actions, Israel launched a series of airstrikes targeting military infrastructure in Damascus.  To unpack the developments taking place in Netanyahu’s government, as well as the chaos unfolding in Syria, we were joined by Call me Back contributors Nadav Eyal and Amit Segal.(00:00) Introduction(03:51) Israel’s system and current composition(09:24) What are the parties negotiating?(16:45) Haredi conscription in the IDF (22:37) Why did the ultra-Orthodox parties resign?(28:29) What are Netanyahu’s options?(36:31) What does this mean for a hostage deal?(39:09) Crisis in Syria (48:33) OutroCREDITS:ILAN BENATAR - Producer & EditorMARTIN HUERGO - Sound EditorMARIANGELES BURGOS - Additional EditingMAYA RACKOFF - Operations DirectorGABE SILVERSTEIN - ResearchYUVAL SEMO - Music Composer

You are listening to an Art Media Podcast. What the ultra-orthodox leadership failed to understand is that the Israeli society has changed. And now here is the number one question. Does the center-left want more to defeat Netanyahu as a prime minister or to replace the ultra-orthodox parties as the kingmakers? Does he want to change the kingmakers or the king itself? Because demographically speaking, it doesn't work.

You cannot form a coalition without both the messianic so-called Smotrich and Megvir, the corrupt Netanyahu, and the unbearable ultra-orthodox parties. You have to choose. It's 2.30 p.m. on Wednesday, July 16th in New York City. It is 9.30 p.m. on Wednesday, July 16th in Israel, where much has unfolded politically within the past two days. On Monday evening, the Haredi party's Degel HaTorah and Agudat Yisrael left Prime Minister Netanyahu's government, bringing the coalition down from 68 seats to 61 seats, the smallest

possible majority in the 120 seat Knesset. Just hours ago, in a highly symbolic move, the Shas Party, another Haredi coalition party, announced its resignation from the government, but not from the coalition. We will explain the distinction. The reason we are seeing these parties withdraw from the coalition is, of course, the hotly contested issue of the Haredi, the ultra-orthodox, exemption from service in the IDF. On Monday, the parties leaders were presented with a draft of a new Haredi conscription bill which they say did not satisfy their demands for military draft exemption for Haredi ultra-orthodox youth.

Keep in mind though, the resignations take 48 hours to come into effect, meaning that Netanyahu has time, in theory at least, he has time, to prevent Degel HaTorah and Agudat Yisrael from leaving the coalition. And time is always Netanyahu's friend. In addition, even if Netanyahu loses his majority, legislation to dissolve the Knesset takes even more time and the Knesset's summer recess is set to begin in 11 days.

So when the Knesset is in summer recess, the government cannot dissolve and the Knesset does not resume until after the high holidays later in October. In other news, there are dramatic developments taking place in Syria and on Israel's border with Syria over the past four days there have been violent clashes between Syria's Druze community and local Bedouin tribes resulting in more than 100 deaths. On Tuesday Syrian government forces entered the majority Druze city of Soweta claiming they were there to oversee a ceasefire however witnesses report that the government forces have joined the Bedouins in their rather vicious attacks against the Druze. On Wednesday, 1,000

Israeli Druze breached the Israel-Syria border in an effort to join their brothers and sisters' struggle in Syria. In response to Syria's targeting of the Druze, Israel has launched a series of airstrikes targeting military infrastructure in Damascus. Lots going on in this past 24 hours. Joining us to unpack all of it and the developments taking place within Netanyahu's coalition are Call Me Back contributors taking place within Netanyahu's coalition, our Call Me Back contributors, Nadav Eyal and Amit Segal. Nadav Amit, thanks for joining us.

Thanks for having us again. Glad to be here. All right. So, Amit, I want to start with you. I kind of whipped through in that introduction what was going on in the Knesset, and I'm going to assume that a lot of our listeners don't understand all the terms I was dropping there. So for those who are not familiar with Israel's complicated parliamentary system, just in

simple terms, describe what happened in the Knesset on Monday. We'll get to the risk that opposes Netanyahu's government, but just describe what happened and in so doing also explain how the Knesset works and who these parties are that are the players here. So basically what he calls Netanyahu's natural alliance consists of Likud, the national religious parties. And Likud is his party, he leads the Likud party. Likud is his party.

And it's the largest right wing, largest right of center party in the country. Yeah, right. And nationally, it's the conservative party of Israel, the Republican party, you name it. We have the National Orthodox Parties, namely the settlers, Benkir and Samothrich, and we have the Ultra-Orthodox Parties. Now if you want something which makes it simpler, so the right wing in Israel consists of three parts, the Black Keepers, the Ultra-Orthodox, the Neated Keepers, the needed keepers, the national orthodox, and the keepers in the

pocket for funerals and Saturday, Friday night meals, which is the Likud Volus. Likud. Exactly. Now, it's a natural alliance usually when it comes to security issues, because they're very hawkish, all the ingredients, but when it comes to one issue, this natural alliance is not that natural. And this is the military service in the IDF, because even within the right wing there is a huge majority for recruiting even ultra-orthodox millennials or, alternatively, stop funding

their yeshivas. Now, here's the thing. The ultra-orthodox party waited over the last 15 months for a new bill to come, because the former bill was cancelled by the Supreme Court. So they wanted a new one. It's called the Crutment Bill, but it's exactly the other way around, because the current situation is that everyone has to go to the army. Of course, it doesn't happen, but this is the general rule.

They want something that will enable the vast majority of young Haredi's not to go to the army. And since those negotiations failed, on Monday they announced they are leaving the government and the coalition, but it doesn't necessarily mean the end for Netanyahu and why, because the next opportunity to legislate is when the Knesset comes back from the summer recess. The summer recess begins next week, there is no way to legislate it in a week, but you can actually do it on the first week of the winter session, which is October 17th. If Netanyahu legislates this bill with his coalition, the Orthodox parties would return to his government, thus leading for the election to occur in their original date, give or take

November 2026. If Netanyahu fails to do it, or decides not to do it for political, electoral considerations, it means that he is going to go to the ballots around January 2026. So it's either January 2026 or November 2026, and just in one sentence, Netanyahu has to choose between political considerations and electoral considerations. The political consideration means that he wants to preserve the current coalition with the AlthoThthogh's party, but the electoral consideration means that it's extremely unpopular to do so. So if Netanyahu wants to actually look for votes in the next election, it's better for him not to do it. If he believes that one year would actually give him an advantage,

he would prefer to legislate. Okay, so I just want to slow this down. I'll ask you a few questions that you may wind up repeating some of what you said, but just indulge me and indulge our listeners. Likud party represents how many seats in the government? 30%. Okay, if you add up all the Chareidi, all the ultra-orthodox parties, the Shas party, United Torah, Judaism, like all these parties?

18. 18, okay. 18, it's half, yes. Okay, and then the national religious, which is Ben-Gurins Smoltres, represent how parties? 18. 18, okay. 18, it's half, yes. Okay. And then the national religious, which is Ben-Gverens Smoltres, represent how many? 14. Okay. 14.

And so he can afford to lose some of the Charei-Di. Exactly. But not all of them. Exactly. And the risk now is he's losing all of them. And losing all of them brings him down to? Below 61, below 50. Right, right.

50. Right, right. So it's bringing him down to... Below 61, below 250. Right, right. So it's bringing them down to 50. So the current crisis is bringing them down to 50. Now I'm hearing some analysts say that even with 50 he can still govern in a minority government, even though he doesn't have a majority of the seats in the Knesset. Can you explain how that works? Does that mean that they would not support a no-confidence vote, but they're just not part of the governmentnesset. Can you explain how that works? Does that mean that they would not support a no confidence vote but they're just not part of the government? Exactly. There are two options to topple a government in Israel. One is to have a

no confidence vote, which means that 61 Knesset members vote against Bibi but at the very same time nominate someone else. There is no chance on earth that those 61 Knesset members can unite under one prime minister because the alt-orthodox won't support Lapid and vice versa. The other option is to actually call on early election. So the 61 can either say we're voting down the current government and agreeing on a new government or the 61 can say we're voting for elections. Exactly. Okay, so just before I move to Nadav, there's some advantage to Netanyahu going into elections saying that the reason why they're going into elections

is because he was not willing to be controlled by the alter-orthodox parties, which is why they're going, would be going to elections. Yes. Nadav, these negotiations have been going on for a while, as Amit said. What was the actual negotiation and why did it break down? It broke down.

I'm running to the bottom line because they're trying to do the impossible. And here's what's impossible. The politicians, the ultra-orthodox politicians, are actually ruled by the rabbis and by the leaders of the communities. Unlike 30 years ago or 40 years ago, there aren't power centers of big rabbis. Some of our listeners will maybe remember people like Rabbi Shach and others that were seen as the gdoilim in Yiddish, the big ones. There isn't really this type of leadership that can put its foot down and make historic agreements

and compromises like the ones that the ultra-autodoc community had with David Ben-Gurion with the inception of the state. Basic original compromises to the conscription of Yeshiva boys then was that there was a capped limit of a specific number of Yeshiva students that would not be conscripted to the young IDF, although the country was in a very dire condition. And the reason that was given by these rabbis to Ben Gurion was that this is really she'erit hapletah, those small numbers remaining from the Holocaust. It was really keeping, safeguarding an essence of Judaism. Now, sorry for going into history, but this history is really important.

In 1977, Likud came into power for the first time in history, Menachem Begin. One of the things he did was to have a new historic alliance with the ultra-orthodox that all through the years were part of the Labour rule. And he wanted to enshrine that alliance with the ultra-orthodox. He wanted to enshrine Likud's alliance. Likud's alliance with them. And I think this is important for people to understand. It's not that the ultra-orthodox parties were always a feature of right-wing-led governments.

For all of Israel's history until 77, as you're saying, these were labor-led governments, and the Labor Party, now the numbers were much smaller in terms of the demands that the ultra-Orthodox leadership was in terms of the exemptions. The numbers represented a much smaller percentage of the population, but the whole arrangement with the special exemption with the ultra-Orthodox was a feature of labor governments and was actually orchestrated by Ben-Gurion. Yeah, but the exemption, and that's my point, was a limited number and the number was a few hundreds. And then Menachem Begin came into power and at the time it didn't seem like a big thing because still the ultra-orthodox community was

limited to be fair with Begin, but he gave them a general waiver of service in the army if that person is actually a student of a yeshiva and he can be a student. Yeshiva meaning a seminary, a religious, Jewish religious seminary. If you're studying Torah all day long and you have, if you have certification from a yeshiva, from a seminary. When you get drafted, when you turn 18, you could say, hey, I'm exempt. I'm studying Torah. Yossi Chayim and Ibrahim A. You can and you should, according to the principles of what is labeled the society of the learners, you could do that and should do that for your entire life.

That's actually a new notion of the ultra-orthodox society in Israel, and it was never a notion of Judaism that a large chunk of the Jewish people would be funded by other Jews. That's all they're going to do. And there's a whole discussion about that. I'm not going to go into the discussion, but here's the bottom line. The bottom line is that it was a limited waiver by Ben-Gurion and the others. Likud came into power, it became a general waiver if you go to the army, and over the years, it became a larger waiver. It's not only if you go

to a yeshiva and study the Torah in a yeshiva, it's basically then, and that's the truth, if you're an ultra-orthodox, even if you don't really study in a yeshiva and you're 18 years old, you won't go into the army. And this is something that was off the record and was, you know, it's corruption, actually. So these people will come, they will register twice a day in a yeshiva, okay, and they'll go to their daily business. Now, because they're not supposed to work, according to the Israeli law, they can't work because they are students and that's the reason they are not conscripted. This was always something that was a deviation, right? But what happened

in this crisis, in our crisis right now, is that the ultra-orthodox politicians and rabbis actually said on the record, to some extent, if you're ultra-orthodox, you're not going to go to the army. Now what they tried to do here to your original question is, on the one hand, the coalition in the Likud understand the pressure coming from the Israeli public. By the way, mainly from the community that has sacrificed more of its people than any other community in Israel, and that is the religious Zionist community during this war. The sacrifice of this specific community, usually we talk about the people who died, but it's not only

that. It's terms of reserve days in service. And these are generally people who, this is sort of a loose approximation, but these are people that come from communities that are largely represented in the Knesset by Ben-Gurion Smoltrich's parties and Likud to some degree. And some Benny Gantz and others. Yeah. But these communities you can go to, specifically by the way, to a settlement in the West Bank, and you don't see a lot of men, specifically during the beginning of the war, because everybody is conscripted. It's those communities of the religious Zionists that are, and I think Amit can talk better than I do about the sentiment there because he is a religious Zionist, that's his identity,

but the anger there towards the ultra-orthodox community and this waiver is just extremely enhanced. And why? And here's the subtlety here. Because for these people, the fact that the ultra-orthodox say, we can't go to the army because we are studying the Torah, this is such a show of complete arrogance towards people who are orthodox as they are. I'm saying religious Zionists, but there are orthodox as they are, and they are going to the army. Right.

And this is a break within a really big fracture within the Netanyahu historic bloc. Because suddenly you have orthodox who support Netanyahu who are Zionists, ultra-orthodox that now support Netanyahu, by the way, it's a sentimental thing. Today, it's not like in the Beringurian times that the rabbis decided. Today ultra-orthodox in Israel are very right-wing and they support Netanyahu really seriously. And now you see this friction between these two sides of the Netanyahu bloc, and this is a risk for his political survival. And it's probably one of the only issues that unites, say, Ben-Gver and Smoltrash's

voters and Yair Golan's voters all the way on the other end of the political spectrum, all the way on the left, the Democrats' party, what is like the former Labor and Merits parties, that you have left-wing voters who are serving in the reserves and you have right-wing religious Zionist voters that all of them are outraged by what Nadav is describing, what they would characterize as the unfairness of it. And I just think it's important to put the numbers in perspective. Every year we're talking about what 70 to 80,000 18 year olds that should be conscripted that aren't.

Right. What saved the idea of the Haredi society is that they were a single issue party. So it makes sense in a state in which everyone with five seats, with five percent of the popular vote wants to be a prime minister or at least defense minister, the commodity named 18 fingers, 18 votes of Haredi Knesset members was the cheapest because they never wanted to be prime ministers, nor defense, security, or treasury ministers. All they wanted is two things, to actually exempt the young generation from serving in the army and, as a result, to give the funding for them not studying and not working.

Now it's a major issue, but in Israel there has been always a more senior issue, which is the security one. So what saved the ultra-orthodox parties was that anyone wanted their votes. Now here's the thing, if the weird outcome of the war from a political perspective is that this Haredi question becomes the paramount question of the election, then we are going to see a huge change. Because if for the first time people would agree that, I don't know, security-wise we would keep attacking Gaza and they defend ourselves against Iran, etc. But now let's focus on the Haredi question. It necessarily means that they are going to the opposition.

And here's the historic decision that the ultra-orthodox parties are going to take, and in my opinion they are not aware of the importance of it. If they are to leave the current coalition, which is no doubt the most convenient coalition for the alt-orthodox parties, it necessarily means that they will never in the next generation are going to find a better coalition. So if this coalition cannot provide the alt-orthodox parties what they want, so the next BB coalition would not be able to do it. Meaning the best deal they're ever going to get is with this government. Yes, let's imagine that Netanyahu gets against all the odds and on almost all the polls 61 seats, a majority. So what comes next? They will still find themselves in the same mud

because it's still the same legislation and the same public and the same Supreme Court that would not actually allow this legislation. So if they are to leave this coalition, it might mean that at least one part of the Orthodox community in Israel is going to leave the political arena because they can no longer deal with this situation. Yeah, but okay, wait a minute. By the way, I want to say something about that. That's really interesting. I'm sorry for taking you again and again to Zionist history, but I think it's really,

it's really interesting. Trust me, bring it. You're knocking on an open door here with the Call Me Back community. You know that there was an incredible story with Zionism right after World War I when the Zionist community was starting to arrange itself in Eretz Israel and Zionists were already there right, the first aliyah, the second aliyah. And then they wanted to have an election for the national institutions of the Jewish community in Eretz Israel.

So remember, this is 30 years before the country is founded. But they understand after the Balfour Declaration that they need to have a vote, right? And they need to have representation. And now comes the problem then. Most of the world in these years, there is no voting rights for women. Most of the world doesn't give voting rights. But the Zionist movement is a progressive movement. I'm not using progressive as they use progressive today. Those years, it's a secular movement, it's a progressive movement, and it basically doesn't

like the rabbis and the rabbis don't like it. And then, of course, the Zanis say, okay, women are voting. And the ultra-orthodox, which are at that time very powerful in Eretz Israel because they are the old community, they're saying if women get the right to vote, no way we're going to participate in the national institutions. It's not going to happen. What really happened is that the Zionists never let go of that. And women got to vote.

It was one of the first places in the world in equality that women got to vote. And the ultra-orthodox Dean left the national institutions of the Jewish community in Eretz Israel. And this is the source of the split between Zionists and ultra-orthodox. They wouldn't be part of an institution if women are allowed to take the vote. So really what we're seeing is an echo of something much deeper that runs through the Zionists. Just to add to Nadev's point, the first candidate, the first secular candidate to which ultra-orthodox voters gave their vote was Benjamin Netanyahu in 1996.

In 1996, when Netanyahu defeated Jimon Peres in a razor-sharp majority, it was thanks to the ultra-orthodox community. So they voted for the Haredi parties and for Netanyahu? Yeah, exactly. So Netanyahu dragged them inside of the political system and they dragged Likud to their version of being religious in Israel. That's basically the deal. Okay, if what you guys are saying is accurate, that this is the best arrangement that the ultra-orthodox parties could find themselves in. Why do they resign?

Yeah, if this is their best shot, then why are they shooting themselves in the foot rather than trying to get a deal? So I'm sorry for the description, but here's the thing. They try to convince Netanyahu that they are suicide bombers, politically. They are going to kill themselves, but to kill him too. By the way, this is exactly the same thing Becal Smotrich is doing to Netanyahu these days. He tells him, I'm going to resign from your coalition if you are going to a hostage deal. Now, Smotrich is under the threshold, so there is no logic into it. But he tells Netanyahu, I'm nuts, don't touch me,

I'm going to push the button. So you have to bear with me. And the same goes for the Orthodox parties. Now if you remember the reservoir dogs, Quentin Tarantino's... By the way, you introducing reservoir dogs into a conversation about Israeli politics, my mouth is watering to see where this, like I want to pop popcorn, where this is going to go. So go ahead.

It's not going to be more extreme than describing the ultra-orthodox and small-trich as suicide bombers, but I'm listening here. Okay? Go on, I mean, it's only getting better. I'm wondering where Jeffrey Epstein is going to go into this conversation. No, no, Nadav, Nadav. Describing them as suicide bombers is something I can do, but you can't, okay? That is true, that is true.

Just like, by the way, Amit was the one who made the joke about the Likud headquarters in Doha. Nadav, you couldn't do that. Only Amit could do it. Exactly. So here's the thing. There is in Reservoir Dogs, a Mexican standoff scene in which three guys pointing guns at each other, right? Now here is the situation. In politics, even if you don't have bullets in the gun, it can fire. Why? Because you're afraid that they are going to shoot, and they're afraid that you're are going to shoot and at the end of the day, everyone is dead.

This is exactly the situation here. Yes, it happened in the past in Israel and it can happen again that a political camp, a political wing is committing suicide. The Orthodox, then National Orthodox and Likud can find themselves in the opposition in less than a year if they keep on like this. But I'm not sure they have an alternative. Yeah, I have a nuance to that and I think it's important. The ultra-Authodox politicians that I speak with and I'm sure Amitzi is speaking with,

they understand this. The problem is go and explain this to a 91-year-old rabbi that doesn't want to be the fall guy, historically speaking, that is going to agree to this transition, that actually Yeshiva or young ultra-orthodox 18 years old will go into the army. But beyond the political deal, then, there's something here that is real. We are hearing what soldiers are telling us about what's happening in Gaza. This week, while the ultra-orthodox and the coalition were negotiating, and the same night in which the ultra-orthodox were threatening to leave the coalition, three Israeli soldiers from the tank

brigades were killed in Gaza. Their families got a knock on the door. There is a Jewish population in Israel with dozens of thousands of people who can recruit tomorrow morning. Israel is fighting something that's described by the government as an existential war, and these mothers, they'll never get a knock on the door because their son died in Gaza. And not only that, but the general perception is that they are entitled to this waiver. It doesn't come with a sort of a modesty. It comes with threats and exploding everything else. And this is, as Amit said at the beginning, the most toxic thing for this coalition.

This coalition was losing polls before October 7. It's been losing every poll in Channel 12 where Amit works since March or April of 2023, according to my count. Why? The coalition was only formed in January. And the answer is because it's a far-right, ultra-orthodox coalition, mainly because of the ultra-orthodox. The ultra-orthodox are very unpopular because of these reasons, and it's about equality.

Equality in the obligations and the duty that you have to your country when your country is fighting a war. And for many people, it's simply now for the IDF, it's about operational needs. The army doesn't have enough soldiers. We're saying that there are five divisions operating in Gaza. It's a half lie because it's not really five divisions. These divisions are deflated. It just sounds like divisions.

I'm not going to say I know how many actual brigades are in these divisions, and it's not that number. And the reason is that reserve soldiers cannot come on for 300, 400 days in two years. And I think that the insensitivity that involves into this and the moral crisis here is huge. And this is one of the reasons, let's just give an example. So one of the threats, for instance, made by ultra-orthodox leaders is that they will leave Israel. And where are they going to go?

I mean, I don't mean to sound- First, Dan, I heard they're very interested in your neighborhood in New York. So first of all, I don't know where they're going to go, but anywhere they're going to go, by the way, on the one hand, they're not going to get conscripted to the army. That's true. Yeah. But the government is not going to subsidize the yeshivot. That's what I mean.

As it does. Right. Or the entire lifestyle in which you get so much of child benefits and the rest. So this is a huge crisis in the Israeli society today. It's a real crisis. It's not just politics. So Amit, if the government falls and they go to elections, you say there are two scenarios. One that basically that some version of this current government is reconfigured after an

election if Netanyahu manages to cobble together another government. Or and I guess this is a question, could he form a government without them? Netanyahu. Yeah. Okay. So here's the thing, I fully agree with Nadav that the main fear in the Israeli society was not of the judicial reform for the central left and parts of the right, but from demographics, the fact that an average Haredi woman has six children, whereas the secular one has 3.1.

I mean, it doesn't add up at the end of the day, both economically and militarily, and I have to say that the army didn't want the?alto-orthodox soldiers to steal the world. There was a perception that wars can be won with high-tech air force intelligence and without tanks and soldiers. But here's the thing, the bastards changed the rules. What the orthodox leadership failed to understand, especially the very old rabbis that Nadav talked about, is that the Israeli society has changed. And now here is the number one question.

I don't have an answer to this, but maybe we'll know in a few months. Does the center-left want more to defeat Netanyahu as a prime minister, or to replace the ultra-orthodox parties as the kingmakers? Does he want to change the kingmakers or the king itself? Because demographically speaking, it doesn't work. You cannot form a coalition without both the messianic so-called Smotrich and Mengvir, the corrupt Netanyahu, and the unbearable ultra-orthodox parties. You have to choose. No, no, but according to the poll you published today, Amit, I saw you on TV, there is a 61

majority for a coalition with no Arab parties, with no ultra-orthodox, and with no far right. This is right now the condition. I don't think that this would be the condition. Led by Netanyahu? No, no, no, Dan, you'll need to let go of Netanyahu for this poll, Dan. So led by who? You need to let go.

This poll, like every other poll published by Channel 12, is saying that he's losing. No, he doesn't say he's losing. He says that he cannot win, but in Israel it's different. In Israel in order to win you need 61. I guess Netanyahu will not have the 61 seats, but in order to lose, Netanyahu needs to get 49 seats. Why?

Because if he gets 50 and the Arab parties get 10 Knesset members, it necessarily means that the coalition of change gets only 60, so they have no majority. So if Netanyahu gets 50, according to most scenarios that we showed even in this bad poll for Netanyahu tonight, it means that he has a block, unless Bennett, Lapid, and Golan decide either to go with the alt-orthodox parties in order to topple Netanyahu, or go with Netanyahu in order to solve the alt-orthodox problem

once and for all. Or do what they did last time, go with the Arab parties. They can't because of them, but because of the Arab parties. I don't believe that in a situation in war in which Israel bombs Damascus in the morning, Gaza in the noon, and Tehran in the evening, I'm sure the Arab parties would not be part of such a coalition. They can't stand it. I agree. I think that this is a fair assessment. I just want to say that in that regard, there are many, many forms of coalition cooperation, for instance, staying out of government and supporting it from the outside.

Right now, the polls in Israel are saying consistently, just that our listeners will understand, 70-50 against the current coalition. It's true that within these 70, that's what Amit just said, it's about 10 seats, Arab parties seats, and it's also true that right now, Bennett, to a large extent, is ruling out any cooperation with the Arab parties. But here's the bottom line, even if the ultra-Orthodox will see this and will see a 70-50 situation, Netanyahu is not going to be the next prime minister. Even if it's going to be a cooperation, it's going to be a coalition, but he's not going

to lead it, right, if he's going to lose 70-50 in's going to be a coalition, but he's not going to lead it, right? If he's going to lose 70-50 in the blocks. Who knows? Who knows? Well, the other scenario is what if nobody can get to 61? And then you have the situation that you had, what was it? 2018-2019 where they just go to election after... 2020, yeah.

Yeah, exactly. Netanyahu just sits there and says, okay, I'm prime minister, we'll go to new elections and then we'll go to new elections. And he gets to be the incumbent. I don't think so. No? I don't think so because first of minister, we'll go to new elections, and then we'll go to new elections, and he gets to be the incumbent. I don't think so. No? I don't think so, because first of all, we are no longer in this, I think people want to see more unity, and they have no patience for this privilege of us having elections

while our enemies prepare for war. Do people in the center-left hate Netanyahu for being Netanyahu, or for their original purpose, for actually bringing excessive power to the Alt-Orthodox party and the National Orthodox party. That's the thing. So they will have to choose. I'll put it very simply. There is no way you can form a government in Israel that survives without a religious party in it. Either Svata Jemangvir, the ultra-orthodox, or they have a religious party of Likud. It doesn't work. It never worked and it won't work this time.

So they have to choose. In my opinion, I'll give you my guess. A year before, maybe, or six months before, we will see a coalition without the ultra-orthodox parties. This is my guess, it's not even an estimation. One way or the other. One way or the other, yes. I think if the Netanyahu blow Queensland, he gets 61, it's the natural coalition with the ultra-orthodox and there will be a general waiver exactly as the ultra-orthodox demanded, because this is the only way. But if he doesn't get the 61, and right now according to the polls, he doesn't get the 61,

then they will come to the Likud, either Bennett or Benet and Lapid, the leaders of the camp, the bloc that did win. Okay, I'm not talking about who's forming a government. The anti-Netanyahu bloc, they will come to the Likud, to Netanyahu, and will say, yes, let's have a national unity government without the ultra-orthodox. I agree with that. But there's no doubt that Netanyahu, I think Amit agrees, if Netanyahu goes to an election now and his natural coalition wins, far right in the ultra-orthodox, this is the coalition he wants. He doesn't want the national unity. And here's why. This is something that people don't understand. Why doesn't Netanyahu really want to have a coalition with Benny Gantz and Bennett and

the reasonable people? Why does he want a coalition with the far right? Because he doesn't want to trust his political future with people that are, how should I put it, more fair and balanced, more middle of the road are not Ben Gviorn Smotrich. Let me put it diplomatically speaking. My explanation is different. Netanyahu always during his history, political history, preferred the coalition with center, center left, even politicians till they decided in 2015 ish to ban him,

to see him not as a rival, but as an enemy. It was one of the reasons. Netanyahu bears responsibility as well, of course, but this was a major reason for the devastating result of five consecutive elections and the tragedy that we are all in. But Benny Gantz had his career almost eliminated because he did join the government and did not ban Netanyahu. And he did that not only once, he did that twice, you know, since 2015. And after 2015, you had centrist parties in the coalition.

I think that the level of tension within the Israeli society was reduced and we will see it in the next election. And the victim of this, I say victim, you know, is of course the other Orthodox parties. Okay, what does all of this mean for the hostage ceasefire negotiations, this whole timeline we're talking about now? Nothing, basically. Well, but if in terms of playing for time for the Knesset to go out for its summer recess, and then there's this period of time where the government cannot fall, is there an argument to be made that that's what Netanyahu is waiting for, that more flexibility negotiate in the summer when the Knesset is in its session?

Politically, it helps Netanyahu because the Knesset recess is longer than the ceasefire. It's 90 days versus 60. So we can tell Small-Tribe andhvi, listen, don't resign now. If you suspect that the war is going to end, you can always do it at the end of the recess. But you'll feel quite stupid if you had resigned in August and in October we resume the war, so don't do it now. So politically, it can help, baby. Yes.

I just want to say that as we are recording this, President Trump is saying in the White House there are good news as to Gaza. He's thanking Steve Whitkoff. He's saying we see good news as to Gaza. And my sources and also other reports in Israeli media are saying that Prime Minister Netanyahu has basically ordered the negotiating team in Doha to reach a conclusion as much as possible of the negotiations. That doesn't mean that Hamas will accept the Israeli offers on the table, the new maps

on the table as to the new IDF deployment as part of a new hostage deal. But it seems right now, and I want to be cautious as we're recording this and things are extremely fluid, it seems that there are positive developments with a chance of reaching at least the framework of a deal in the next week or so. I agree with Amit that since we are approaching the summer recess, it will have little influence, but there is a dynamic here. And the dynamic is that the ultra-autodocs parties are saying they left the government. And Smortrich is going to hear soon if there's going to be an agreement that Israel is not really staying in specific areas in Gaza that were supposed to be used to build the so-called humanitarian township that Smortrich was so devoted to, actually a camp to which

Palestinians would be expelled to. And Smortrich, we wanted this, allocating hundreds of millions of shekels just this week to have some works on that done. And if indeed Israel is redeploying in the manner that is right now discussed in Doha, it will be much more difficult to go through preparing that plan, something that we discussed on this show, I think, last time that we were here. One thing we have talked about on this podcast before is that the sense of inevitability about a possible, some kind of normalization, some kind of security arrangement, some kind

of soft or hard agreement between Israel and post-Assad's Syria. And a week ago, there were expectations that something may happen at some point. And then today, we learned that the IDF struck targets in Damascus. And there's a lot to process here. The images are awful. The images of what's happening to these Druze in Syria, the images of these Israeli Druze rushing to Syria. So Nadev and I start with you.

Just briefly explain who the Druze are, because I think they're obscure to a lot of people over here in the West. And then what actually is happening here? How is this all of a sudden a crisis between Israel and Syria? The Druze community is spread across the Middle East, specifically in Israel, Lebanon, Syria, a few other countries. it's a religious minority. An offshoot of Islam. An offshoot of Islam, but a long offshoot of Islam.

For instance, there are no mosques in the Jews' community. And they serve in the Israeli army. And one of the principles of the religion is a sense of loyal service in the country that they live in. The Jews serve in such a high proportion in Israel's combat units and not only combat units, it's an alliance of blood and fate as it is described in military cemeteries by Israeli politicians of all sides. The Jews community is also very spread politically within the political sphere.

There are Likud Jews, there Labor Druze, and really a powerful alliance within the Israeli society between the Jewish community in Eretz Israel and the Druze community. In Syria, the Druze community again was aligned with the state. With the fall of the Assad regime, they are now seeing what other minorities in Syria are seeing, that while Ashara or Jolani, whatever you want to call this former Jabhat al-Nusra commander, and he really probably wants normalization with Israel and with the region. Everyone has been meeting Syrians. I am not allowed to say, because of limitations, about the seniority of people in Israel meeting Syrian

officials within the Ashara regime. It seemed that what the Trump administration in Jerusalem was thinking about was maybe not a full peace agreement between Israel and Syria, but a cessation of hostilities agreement, some sort of first step towards normalization between Syria and Israel, while Israel still maintains the Golan Heights. And the Israelis were talking about this at length, briefing every Israeli official, you know, the Foreign Ministry, Prime Minister's Office, the army, everybody was meeting Syrian officials, and everything was done in secret. But on the other hand, we know that Ashara's people are jihadists and that he's a Al-Qaeda and Jabhat al-Nusra disciple originally. This is who this guy is, right?

And on occasions, they kill Christians, they kill Druze. And now in a place called Sweda, which is about 120 kilometers into Syria- From Israel, across the border. East to the Israeli-Syrian border, eastern. They entered the place. They are accusing the place that it is, you know, a base for an underground, for a Druze underground resistance group that has association with the Assad regime and with the drug trade that fed the Assad regime of Kopatgan.

It's a specific drug that is very widespread in the Arab world. There was a raid there, and that raid led to skirmishes and the Assad regime opening fire and vice versa. That led to the massacres done by the Assad regime against the Druze community. Now comes the Druze community in Israel that's extremely powerful and well-connected, and by the way, extremely brave, and has military experience. And they're saying, you go and save our brothers. And the Netanyahu government has committed itself to defend the Druze in Syria, which is not something that Israel used to do, unless it's an alliance during war, like in Lebanon

in 1982 with the Christians. But now the Israelis are saying to the Syrian regime, you hurt the Druze, not our Druze, not the Israeli citizens. You hurt the Druze in Syria, who are your citizens, we're going to attack in Damascus. And today we saw that amazing short video of a Syrian TV presenter talking from Damascus, and while she's talking, the Israeli Air Force just destroyed the building of the chiefs of staff of the Syrian army in the center of Damascus.

It destroyed the entire building and it was live on TV and the entire region saw it. And this was a response by Israel to what? To the massacres done against the Druze community. In the meantime, more than a thousand of Druze were just driving their cars to the Golan Heights and crossing the border, breaking the fence, you know, fighting with the IDF soldiers in order to enter Syria and save their folk in Syria from the massacres. And the Israeli Defense Establishment is extremely agitated and worried because these are Israeli

citizens and they might be taken hostage by those jihadists. One of the people who broke into Syria is a member of Knesset who's Druze. Now this sounds like a mess, but here's the bottom line. The Israelis decided playing big in Syria as a power broker. That's a big decision, Dan. Israel didn't use to make these decisions. On the one hand, the Israelis are saying, yeah, we were talking with the Syrians, we want to have agreements with the Syrians. On the other hand, they're seeing the true face of the regime. They're saying,

you know, they are a bunch of jihadists. Where does it all go? The Syrian regime immediately said we're stopping, we're reaching an agreement in Sweda, we don't want to have these confrontations. And the Syrian regime has been playing a very, very cautious game with Israel, to the point of basically agreeing to everything the Israelis are demanding. So, Amit, with that, do you think we're still on track for some kind of arrangement, soft normalization between Israel and Syria, despite this crisis? This is just the new normal. Israel bombs the masks.

I'm not sure. There are many ways to tell this story. There is the story of showing solidarity with the Jewish community. There is the story of defending Israel's borders because the combination of the cocktail of Syrian sovereignty and Turkish assistance, military assistance, is something that worries Israel much. So when we defend the Druze, we defend ourselves as well. This is like the perimeter between Israel and this new, very problematic state. Problematic state where Erdogan and Turkey could have huge reach into, so that means Turkey could be right up against Israel's border.

It's basically an extension of the Turkish Empire, but here is the right perception in my opinion. Israel has decided to act as the original superpower, and that's why for the first time in Israel's history, it deliberately acts only in order to help someone else. The main motive to help the Druze is not for Israel's security, but to show that Israel has partners, has even, you can say proxies, and it helps them. It never happened. Even when Israel assisted the Christians in Lebanon, it was to help Israel itself. Now it goes with Israel's perception following the successful military operation in Iran. And I would like to reconsider this perception because we are a very strong country.

I'm not sure we are a power or a regional superpower. And things like this can end up very, very fast in a Lebanese mud or in a Syrian mud or in a Middle Eastern mud. So I really hope that someone up there in the Prime Minister's office or in the IDF takes into account all the complications and all the circumstances and outcomes because it's a dramatic decision and what we saw today has never happened before. This is the fifth capital city that Israel attacks since October 7th. It was Gaza City, Beirut, Tehran, Sana'a, and now Damascus.

But it's the first time that Israel attacks a foreign capital city, not because it had been attacked before. So this is a dramatic development, destroying the defense ministry of a foreign country, even if a very hostile and a pro-ISIS one is something with consequences. And to be honest, I really hope that Israel would actually drag itself out of this very problematic situation before it's too late. It's definitely a weak state, this post-Assad Syria, and there's all these factions and gangs and militias operating, and God knows how messy it could get.

All right, gentlemen, I usually try to end on a hopeful note, but Amit, you were just a buzzkill there. Oh, I'm so sorry. Yeah, since June 22nd, we've had mostly, mostly, not all, mostly upbeat conversations. But maybe what Nadav is saying is right, we will, God willing, get some kind of deal here imminently on the ceasefire and the hostages. Amit, Nadav, thank you as always. Look forward to being in touch soon. Amit Chakravartty Thank you so much. Bye-bye.

Nadav Chakravartty Thank you. Thank you. That's our show for today. If you found this episode valuable, please share it with others who might appreciate it. Time and again, we found that our listeners are the ones driving the growth of the Call Me Back community. So thank you. And to offer comments, suggestions, sign up for updates or explore past episodes,

please visit our website, arcmedia.org. That's ARKmedia.org, where you can deepen your understanding of the topics we cover. Call Me Back is produced and edited by Alon Benatar, sound and video editing by Martin Huérgo and Mary Angeles Burgos. Our director of operations is Maya Rakoff. Research by Gabe Silverstein. Our music of operations is Maya Rakoff.

Research by Gabe Silverstein. Our music was composed by Yuval Semmo. Until next time, I'm your host, Dan Sinor.