Call Me Back - with Dan Senor - Bibi in Washington - with Amit Segal

Episode Date: July 19, 2024

*** Share on X: https://tinyurl.com/mr2sejpr *** Prime Minister Netanyahu prepares to arrive in Washington, DC next week for an address to a joint session of Congress (his 4th), a meeting with President Biden (covid-permitting), all against the backdrop of the negotiations over hostages and a temporary (or phased) ceasefire. To help us understand what is going on the eve of Prime Minister Netanyahu’s visit, to preview what the Prime Minister hopes to get out of the visit, and the stakes for the visit (and also the future of the political Right in Israel), we are joined by Amit Segal. He is the chief political correspondent and analyst for Channel 12 News, and for Yediot Achronot, the country’s largest circulation newspaper. In his military service, he worked as a media and parliamentary correspondent for IDF (military) Radio.

We see two contradicting processes. When it comes to ideology, the right-wing bloc's ideology is stronger than ever. But at the very same time, Netanyahu, which is the flag bearer for this ideology, is weaker than ever. Because people in Israel want two things these days. They want right and they want change. Now, Bibi gives them right. And he believes that as long as he drags the discourse to Palestinian state versus anti-Palestinian state,

he'll win back a lot of the ground that he lost since the war. And Gantz believes that he'll get all the change votes. But like the old ad, why not both? I mean, if there's a new right-wing party that offers both change and right, I guess they'll just hit the jackpot. It's midnight on Friday, July 18th in New York City. It's 7 o'clock a.m. on July 18th in Israel as Israelis start their day. Hours ago, a drone exploded over Tel Aviv, killing one Israeli citizen and injuring four others.

The U.S. military reportedly shot down four additional drones that were also heading to Israel. The Houthis have claimed responsibility for the drone that exploded over Tel Aviv. Earlier today, the IDF killed two commanders of the Radwan force, the most elite force in Hezbollah. These operations seem to be almost like a daily occurrence in which the IDF is removing senior military commanders of the Hezbollah terror organization. Needless to say, here in the United States, there is plenty of news as former President Trump officially accepts the Republican Party's nomination and delivers his acceptance speech and wraps up the GOP convention. Meanwhile, President Biden appears to be just days away from winding down his re-election campaign.

As for who replaces President Biden as the Democrats' standard bearer heading into the fall, is a topic we'll be returning to in the days ahead. But all this is happening while Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is preparing to arrive in Washington next week for an address to a joint session of Congress, his fourth, and a meeting with President Biden, COVID permitting, all against the backdrop of the negotiations over hostages and a temporary or phased ceasefire. To help us understand what is going on on the eve of Prime Minister Netanyahu's visit, the stakes, why now, why this visit is so important? And to preview what is likely to happen while he's in Washington and come out of it, we are joined by Amit Segel. Amit also talks with us about the

future of the right, the political right in Israel, which seems to be going through its own transformation. Amit is the chief political correspondent and analyst for Channel 12 News and for Yediyat Akhranot, the country's largest circulation newspaper. In his military service, Amit worked as a media and parliamentary correspondent for IDF Military Radio. In 2006, he joined Channel 2 as a parliamentary correspondent, and from 2009 through 2010, he worked as the London correspondent for Channel 2. He's also the author of a book that is coming out after the U.S. presidential election in English about Israeli politics. We'll talk a little bit about that at the beginning of our

conversation. Amit Segel on Bibi in Washington. This is Call Me Back. And I'm pleased to welcome to this podcast for the first time, Amit Segel, Chief Political Analyst for Channel 12 in Israel and author of the recently published book, The Story of Israeli Politics, which has been published in Hebrew and Russian and Arabic, the first Hebrew book formally translated and published in the Arab world since the Abraham Accords. Not yet in English, though. It will be published in English. Folks will have to wait until November for that. Amit joins us from his home in Jerusalem. Amit, thanks for being here. Dan, it's a pleasure joining you. So, Amit, I want to say a couple things. One, over the past nine months, we, as you know, have had a number of guests with a range

of views, political views, some from the left, some from the center, some from the right. But one thing almost all of them have in common, not all of them, but almost all of them, is deep opposition, if not outright hostility, to this government in power in Israel and its leader, Benjamin Netanyahu, someone I have known for 30 years and have admired a lot of things he has done. But even guests I have who I think are going to be sympathetic to him in some way based on the totality of his record, not just the events of 2023 and 2024, there's still intense hostility. And you, as a not only

political analyst, but one that I think is very effective at conveying and reflecting the sentiment from the right in Israel, continue to support or express support for this government and the prime minister. So I want to bring you on because it's mere days before Prime Minister Netanyahu is going to make a big presentation in Washington. Not only he'll be meeting with President Biden, but he will be addressing a joint session of Congress for his fourth time. And I want to get your take from a unapologetic segment of the right in Israel on a range of issues. I want to start with the hostage ceasefire deal that's currently on the table.

What are you looking at when you see the polls about public support for the deal? What are you seeing in those polls? What does it tell you about where the public is? And then, you know, how is the government interpreting those polls? Well, what you see regarding the hostage deal is exactly the picture that was seen in Israel for many, many years regarding the two-state solution. The vast majority of Israelis was in favor of the two-state solution, but when it came to details, it appeared that the vast majority of Israelis actually opposed it, because Israelis were against the division of Jerusalem, against evacuating many settlements,

etc. And this is the case, in my opinion, when it comes to the hostage deal. Israelis are for bringing the hostages back home as soon as possible. The question is, at which cost? And then when you actually dive into the details, you see the problems. The vast majority of Israelis want to continue the war. They don't want the war to end when Hamas is still barely on its feet. there is still room for improving the hostage deal. For instance, the refusal of Israelis to end the war. For instance, leaving military presence in the border between Gaza Strip and Egypt, a.k.a. Philadelphia, the area from which 99% of the ammunition was smuggled into Gaza.

Ammunitions and other equipment and resources and capabilities for building the tunnel system, I mean, all of that was smuggled through the Egyptian-Gaza border. And what is your take on the deal? I mean, how do you feel about the deal as it's discussed? I'll try to describe it from the perspective of Silwar, the leader of Hamas. Hamas has seen Israel's weakest point in the way it deals with kidnapped hostages or citizens. And he made this very painful tactical problem into a strategic one. For instance, Benjamin Netanyahu released more than a thousand terrorists in 2011 in return for one citizen. One of the most famous terrorists is Zichir Sinwar himself. So actually, the Shalit

deal that emanated from the virtue of not leaving anyone behind actually fostered this terrible war and this terrible October 7th massacre. So not at any cost, in my opinion. I think that military pressure on Hamas can, was, and will lead to a better deal. So as long as the war does not end, and as long as Israel has the right to attack Gaza or to attack Hamas and make sure it doesn't become a threat again on Israeli citizens, I'm for a hostage deal. That was the case in the first deal, when we got more than 100 hostages in return for eight days of humanitarian pause. So maybe a month, a month and a half is enough. The Channel 12 poll, your television station, the most recent poll, and these are top line numbers, so I'm not getting into the crosstabs. But the top line poll, 64% are for the deal, 15%, 1-5 against, and 21% don't know.

One other point I would say is 46% of those who voted for the current government in some form, meaning they either voted for Likud or they voted for one of the other parties in the government, but 46% of those who voted for this government support the deal. So you're saying those numbers don't tell us something? Because those numbers did not exist three months ago, five months ago. So it does feel to me, Amit, like something has changed. And you're saying those, I think what you're saying is those numbers don't reveal the whole story. It depends how you phrase the question, I think. We have to look at the war as an axis with two ends. One is releasing all the hostages, which is one of the main targets of the war. And the second is dismantling Hamas military and government in Gaza. So it depends where you put the deal. The more it gets to end the war, you'll see less support. But if it's something in between, let's say,

let's release 33 hostages. Let's take a pause of six weeks. I think you won't see 64 percent, you'll see 90 percent. But if it comes to ending the war at all, without any option for Israel to actually keep dismantling Hamas, keep killing its senior leaders, keep destroying terror tunnels, I think you'll see a vast majority against it. And you personally, Amit, do you support the deal that is currently being discussed as you understand it? It depends. I just came back from Gaza this morning where I saw the brigade that actually stops militants from coming back again to northern Gaza, to Hamas's capital city. So this is where? So you were in the Netzerim corridor? In the Netzerim corridor, exactly.

Okay. When you see what the IDF did and is doing as we speak, we are actually dismantling Hamas. And I think Israel can stand a few weeks without the Netzerim corridor. And just for our listeners to understand, the reason that's important is because if there is a ceasefire deal, the one that's being currently discussed, during the first phase of that deal, anywhere establishment and some in the government that it's dangerous for Israel to pull out entirely, even for a few weeks, including especially to pull out of the Netzerim corridor, because they lose control of that ability to deal with population flow in either direction. You're

saying you're okay with it. No, it's dangerous, but it's a calculated risk. I'll just give you an example. 14 years ago, in a military operation, it took three hours to actually cut this, to actually get to the sea. Three hours from the east to the west of Gaza. In this war, it took two or three weeks because Hamas became way stronger. The fights that went on were very, very heavy. But now we heard that it's going to take again a few hours because we are more experienced. They have less ammunition. They have less supply. They have less people. So yes, this is a calculated risk. But I don't want terrorists to be released into Gaza because we actually learned the painful lesson in 2011. We released many, many terrorists who became the leaders of Hamas.

So once we killed so many Hamas leaders, we don't want to give them a fresh supply of new leadership. And I think that evacuating Philadelphia, which is the border between Gaza and Egypt, is highly dangerous. And then we are at risk of giving them a new lifeline again.

We cut this lifeline and giving them back this lifeline will be very, very dangerous in my opinion. So I want to just break this down because my understanding based on individuals I've talked to in the government, there are three areas of contention that are unresolved, but maybe they are getting resolved. One is if Israel is to withdraw even for up to six weeks for phase one, what happens to IDF presence in the Philadelphia corridor, as you said before, between Rafah and Egypt? Two, what happens in the Netzerim corridor? And then three, how many hostages?

From what I understand, the Hamas is proposing something like 16 or 18 hostages, and Israel, for at least this first phase, wants something closer to 30. Is this your understanding? Yeah. Okay. So are any of these close to getting resolved from what you understand? Yes. There is a support for this deal. Support from Hamas.

It sounds like these are areas of, have they resolved these differences? It's still disputed, but you see that the more military pressure you put on Hamas, the more soft they become. And I think it's a tragedy that we haven't taken this route way earlier. And I think, yes, we can get a better deal. And then once Hamas agrees, there will be this political obstacle within Netanyahu's right wing cabinet. When you say it's a tragedy, what's the tragedy that wasn't dealt with earlier? Not put enough military pressure over the last three months.

Following one month of consecutive military pressure, Hamas released more than 100 hostages. And then Israel, somewhere around December to April, not that it stopped pressuring Hamas, but you saw that the pressure is actually decreasing. Once we actually entered Rafah and killed Muhammad F, the Hamas chief of staff of its military brigades, we actually saw Hamas crumbling. So why do you think that was? Why do you think the government decided between December and April to pull back? For many reasons. I think first and foremost, because of international pressure. I think it's a tragedy that Biden tried to stop Israel from entering Rafah. He did it, I think, because I haven't

spoken to him lately, but I think he did it because he believed that ending the war is his number one priority when it comes to the U.S. election. Because there is a split within his voters between, I don't know, the pro-Palestinian voters from Michigan and the pro-Israeli voters from New York. So he had to stop it. And he thought that once Israel doesn't enter Rafah, the war is going to end. But the other way around happened. So those three months were problematic. And, of course, the war is going to end. But the other way around happened. So those three months were problematic. And of course, the munition crisis. Yeah, I believe for some time that if Biden really

had the election in mind, and what was in the best interest of his election, although we're in a whole new world now, with his own position in the election, for reasons that have nothing to do with Israel, that it would have been in best interest for Israel to accelerate military operations, go to Rafah early, given that we saw how quickly the operation in Rafah was and the speed with which Israel, the IDF was able to move the civilian population or a lot of the civilian population from the south to the north. Why wouldn't it have been in everybody's interest for Israel to get that done at the beginning of this year rather than, you know, in the last couple of months? And you're basically saying you think Israel could be out of the Netzerim corridor for a period of time.

You think that's manageable. And what about Philadelphia? I think it's a risk. It's a risk because it's not only Philadelphia. It's the Rafah crossing. This is where I think 80% of the supply for Hamas came. The tax revenues for Hamas from this Rafah crossing actually funded this war. It funded each and every massacre in Beiri and Kfar Aza and Nachalot. So cutting the lifeline, it's like taking a Haifa port from the government of Israel.

It's like taking New York from the United States. It's a devastating both military and economic asset. And that was the game changer, in my opinion. Okay. Do you think the deal is going to get done? I think the chances are the highest in six months, at least. And I'll explain. The Israeli asset is entering next week.

It's very long, lazy summer recess. And according to Israeli legislation, the no confidence votes cannot happen in the during the recess. So there is no political danger for Netanyahu till October 27th. So just for listeners, this is almost a three plus month period during which the Netanyahu government is completely inoculated from being brought down. So even if there are parties within the government that want to withdraw and lead to the government's collapse, there's nothing they can do until the fall. There is no way that you can call an early election. Exactly. Now, Netanyahu's raison d'etre, politically speaking, is his right-wing bloc. It's like being pro-life or a republican. It's something that you have to stick to in order to get elected.

For him, it's crucial. So many people wondered, is there any chance for a deal if his partners in the far right demand him not to sign a deal in which terrorists are released and in which Israel withdraws from Philadelphia and the Nitzarim corridor. And I think for the first time that there is an option. One, Netanyahu has to soften the deal, for instance, to get a permission, according to the agreement, to stay in Philadelphia. Second, to expel the terrorists abroad, not to Gaza or Judea and Samaria, but to send them to Qatar or Turkey.

And then I think, I suspect, he'll come to Smotrich and Ben-Gavir and tell them, I know you are frustrated, you're furious, you want to kill me. But the summary says it's 95 days. The deal is for 42 days. So please test me in the 43rd day. If I'm back in the war, so everything's fine. We got the hostages. We're still in war. You're still in recess and everything's fine.

And if not, you can actually abandon the coalition comes October. That's my analysis for what Netanyahu is going to do. Is there any chance this gets done by the time Netanyahu appears before Congress? No. I have to explain for your audience. I guess they know that, but just to make sure, Ichia Sinwar doesn't have a cell phone. He doesn't have a laptop. He's in a bunker. The only electric tool that he got is a lamp, I think, the most. He's very suspicious, to say the least, of the Israeli intelligence abilities. So every message you send from Jerusalem goes to Egypt, then Qatar, then checked in Washington, back in Qatar, going to Gaza,

diving through the tunnels, and then all the way back. So only this process takes a week. It's like the Morse code, but slower than that. So I don't think it can be finalized within a week. And to be honest, I don't think there is any chance on earth that Netanyahu is going to do it as long as the Knesset is still working. And the Knesset recess starts July 21st. And just to clarify, and then we'll move off the hostage deal, from your perspective, which category of hostages, approximately how many, would be in this first phase?

So this is yet another effort. The ratio was 10 hostages for one day, the first step in November. Now it's one for one, one day for one hostage, give or take. We speak about women, then the female soldiers, then humanitarian cases, which means elderly people, those who are dismantled, sick, etc. Hamas says he has 15 to 18 alive in this category, and then he'll give yet another 15 to 18 bodies. Israel demands at least 30 live hostages. Okay. So basically what Netanyahu would be saying to the right-wing coalition partners of his is, we will get some of the hostages back, not all of them. We will get some of the hostages back, and then Israel can be back in the war after the first phase. And then comes the U.S. Remember, remember the 5th of November. I guess Netanyahu will tell his partners that there is land at sight. You see a very possible Trump victory in November 5th, which is exactly one week after the winter session begins at the Knesset.

And then he'll promise them we'll be free to do much more than we did, than we've done so far. So please stay with me, bear with me, even if you didn't like the hostage deal. It's exactly as he said, I support the two-state solution under the Obama administration and then wanted to annex all the settlements when Trump came. So he'll tell them, yes, I have to sign this deal because Biden is still in office. But there are, I don't know, 70 percent, according to Nate Silver, that President Trump is going to get reelected. And then it's us in Wonderland again. OK. Doesn't Sinoir see that scenario, too?

He does. Absolutely. Ichi Sinoir, who never left Gaza, save for an Israeli prison, perceives himself as an expert when it comes to international policy. And he saw for some years, beginning with President Biden, that there is a daylight between Israel and the U.S. And he actually calculated his war on the basis of Israel being stopped from fighting at some phase around February to May. And the worst signs, he was right. I mean, you saw this ammunition shipment stopped on its way to Israel. You saw the Hague decision. You saw the arrest warrants that were quite imminent against Netanyahu and Gallant. So his calculation was not out of, I mean, it wasn't crazy for him to think that, but I think it didn't take into account two facts.

One is that Biden is going to net in the debate, thus weakening him in the polls. And second, that the Israeli public, if I have to quote a book that I got, showed resilience in a divided society in a troubling area. Thank you for the plug. Thank you for the plug. Thank you for the plug. The Hebrew edition comes out in September, so we'll really need you to do the plug then. But thank you. Mutual PR interest.

So as you wrote in your book, I think he consumed too much social networks in Israel. And he was really under the impression that Israel is about to crumble, that pilots would refuse to attack Gaza, that the army is going to collapse, protests are going to dismantle the coalition, etc. And it just didn't happen so far. Right. So he read too much into the judicial reform protests and the division in Israeli

society. Exactly. Okay. All right. So I want to move on to the tension, the long simmering tension over the last nine months between the security apparatus in Israel and the political class, specifically the government. The questions I'm going to ask are important that they help address kind of the where we are right now and the tensions that exist between those two entities. And it's a little bit of generalization because I know there's some disagreements within those two groups. But for the purposes of this discussion, how would you summarize the claims and counter claims of each of those two, meaning the professional military leadership, the professional

intelligence community leadership, that's kind of one group, I'll kind of put them all together, and then this government, the elected leaders of this government? So I would say that the leadership of the security establishment believes that Netanyahu doesn't take and hasn't taken the decisions he believes in, but the decisions that his political base believes in. That he's first and foremost, the most paramount ingredient in his policy is politics. And therefore, he missed opportunities to release hostages, to end the war, that he prolonged the war, etc. And Benjamin Netanyahu believes, and not from today, that the security establishment is weak, leftist, hesitant, and that they actually dragged him

into this horrible situation. Dragged him into this situation? What does that mean? What do you mean by that? In which the war has been prolonged, that had only more military pressure was put on Gaza, without excuses, Israel would have ended the war already been prolonged. That had only more military pressure was put on Gaza, without excuses, Israel would have ended the war already. But couldn't have Netanyahu in the war cabinet force that? Netanyahu is not Trump. I mean, Netanyahu is way more educated than Trump. His English is way better, I think.

But there is one similarity between Netanyahu and Trump. They both are holding the most senior positions in their countries, yet they are perceived and perceive themselves as opposition. They believe that power lies or significantly heavily lies in other places rather than the White House or the prime minister's office. Now, Netanyahu believes that with an alternative IDF leadership, he would have achieved more. Here's the thing. If you've had a ballot in the IDF senior generals, I think Netanyahu wouldn't be elected to prime minister. And if Netanyahu had an opportunity, he would have fired the IDF chief of staff. He wouldn't have elected him in the first place. He opposed his nomination.

But nowadays, since they are both involved in Israel's most terrible disaster in its history, they depend on each other. The IDF chief of staff knows that once Bibi goes, he goes as well and vice versa. So in a peculiar way, they are stuck together. How would each side of those two groups articulate who is responsible for October 7th? And then if I were to make you adjudicating that debate, where would you come down? Okay, so first of all, I'll start with the conclusion. It takes a village to raise a monster like Hamas. It takes a village, the head of the village, the guards of the village, the citizens of the village and the media of the village.

We all failed. Of course, the vast majority lies heavily in the prime minister's office for two reasons. One, he was the acting prime minister on October 7th, and he was the prime minister for 15 out of the last 25 years. So the process happened under his watch. So there is enough blame for everyone. And we mix here two things. Yes, it's true that from a strategic viewpoint, the decision of this Israeli cabinet and all its predecessors was that Hamas is not an existential threat. It's annoying. It might kill two citizens, fire 300 rockets, but their danger is somewhere else. And there is always something more urgent to do.

For instance, Iran or the judicial reform. And on the other hand, or taking Bibi out of office, if we talk about the Bennett-Lapid government, because they didn't attack Gaza as well. But when it comes to the military, to the intelligence failure, of course, this is a devastating failure. I mean, we could have survived this October 7th attack if we had known three hours before. And Bibi is absolutely right. I guess that had he known about it, he would have done something else. they didn't wake him up, that there were enough signs through the night going from October 6th into the morning of October 7th. And he has said, or people around him have said, including people I speak to, nobody woke him up. And had they woken up and said, this is what we're seeing. So it's not that they weren't seeing signs. It's not that the

intelligence community, wherever it existed in the formal intelligence community or in the IDF, it's not that they weren't seeing signs of something happening, some kind of plot operation being implemented. It's that Israel didn't do anything with that information. And you're saying no one brought that, no one woke up Netanyahu and brought it to his attention to make a decision. And I guess my first question is why? Why didn't anyone wake him up? And my second question is, what difference do you think him up and my second question is what difference do you think not what nathan yahoo says but what decision what difference do you think it would have made given that you you know the man i mean you you know him so and you know his history so

so knowing what you know of him that's my question do you think it would have made a difference he's a paranoid i mean he would have done I guess, but it's a failure and they didn't see the sign of the war. By the way, the war was not seen because there were so many signs on the wall. Wait, there were so many signs of the war, meaning even before the night of, months before there were a number of warnings. Months before, week before, night before, two hours before. Right. 30 minutes before. So even if you buy his argument that the night of he wasn't woken up,

it does raise questions that there were all these warnings in the months before. They haven't brought it not only to the prime minister's office, but to the IDF chief of staff as well, to the head of the intelligence as well. There was a huge problem there. But let's assume in 3 a.m., three hours prior to the attack, they would have woken up Netanyahu. Had he been woken up and the attack was stopped, and let's say would have killed 300 terrorists and, I don't know, maybe 10 Israeli dead soldiers, it doesn't change the fact that it would have happened again. Because as long as Israel's strategy was that we are in defense against Gaza, and that occupying Gaza and dismantling Hamas is off the table is not an option. Bipi took pride for it in his biography a year ago, a year and a half ago,

for not occupying Gaza, for standing against his cabinet ministers, Bennett and Lieberman. And he said they don't want to invade Gaza as well. So then again, there is the imminent threat on October 7th, but it would have happened again in January 12th, 2026. In February 13th, 2027, it would have ended because you can't survive while you're on defense

against a monstrous terrorist army in Gaza. And this is a strategic failure that, and you know, strategic failures tend to, the backstops usually at the prime minister's desk. I just want to stay on this point because there's a lot out there and some of it's accurate and some of it's not. So, and you're as close to this information as anyone. I'm just looking at

numerous news reports as we're talking. And basically the gist of them is that Netanyahu had received four separate warning letters from the IDF military intelligence directorate between March of 2023 and July of 2023 these are news reports so I haven't seen these warnings firsthand but I just again what is your reaction to that how does that affect affect your thinking on what could have been different? Here's the problem. If the intelligence was right about the imminent risk of war, how come the army itself was on shutdown in the week prior to the October 7th attack, including October 7th? During the Israeli, the Jewish high holidays, the army was in a minimum operative stance with only two helicopters protecting the skies of Israel, two airplanes, and I don't know, maybe

one third of the number of soldiers. Commanders brought their families and children and babies to the headquarters just overlooking Gaza in Simchat Torah on October 7th. That was the level of risk. So I think what happened prior to October 7th... Meaning that's how much they had let their guard down. Yes. Netanyahu felt that during the judicial reform, he perceived it as a coup d'etat, that it's

an organized attempt to actually unseat him personally and the right wing. And he saw that the economy moguls threatened to take the money out of Israel in order to change a legislation in the Knesset. He saw protests. He saw soldiers refusing to volunteer to the reserve service in the Israeli army. And then, I guess, he suspected that the army itself tries to actually stop a legislation with empty threats. They thought, I guess, and they feared that the level of hate in Israel weakens its standing among its enemies, that the deterrence is in a very low level because our enemies saw what was happening in the streets of Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. Okay. These questions I'm getting at, because a lot of the questions I'm presenting you are

questions that are pushed by many in the security establishment on background through the press to pressure Netanyahu or what some would say to deflect blame from themselves. What do you think they're up to? Why is the security establishment doing this now? You mean now in terms of taking responsibility? Yeah, they're leaking all these leaks against the government. You know, for instance, I just cited a news report about these four briefings that Netanyahu has given about the risk from Gaza. In other words, the security establishment is saying we were telling the government, we were telling the government that something was cooking and the government didn't do anything. So what's that about? Everyone wants to get prepared for the investigation that will begin once the war is

ended. So their line of defense says, we weren't. We said something was cooking. And Netanyahu's line of defense says, yes, but you thought what's cooking is, I don't know, is a soup and it appeared to be an ice cream. It's something else. You warned me against something that didn't happen. And the thing that happened, you have never warned me against. You were two days prior to the attack that Hamas is deterred, that there is no chance on earth that they are going to attack. So unfortunately, they are both accurate. They are both right. There is enough blame for everyone. We were flooded with information from the intelligence, but we didn't connect the dots. No one connected the dots. Okay. So regardless of who's to blame,

there's public perception. And if you look at the polling, including on your channel, on Channel 12, they ask the question, who's most responsible for October 7th? Netanyahu is the highest at 39%. Haliva, the head of military intelligence, is at 18%. Halevi, the IDF chief of staff, is at 10%. The head of the Shin Bet is at 7%. So Netanyahu does pull the highest, which I guess is understandable. It happened under his watch. But then the question is, should Netanyahu resign? And I assume the implication is, should he resign now? 72% say yes, 22% say no, and 6% said don't know.

And even among voters for the government, voters for this government, in support of him resigning is somewhere around 50%. So, I mean, do you think it's possible for Prime Minister Netanyahu to lead this country during war, when almost two thirds of the electorate, at least if you believe this polling, think he should resign? It depends. Most Israelis still don't want to change the government during in wartime, but they do want election when once the war ends and then they want Netanyahu to leave. This is give or take the thing. Now, we see two contradicting processes when it comes to ideology. Netanyahu's ideology, the right wing bloc ideology, is stronger than ever. This week, the Knesset voted against a Palestinian state, no matter what, 68 to 9. So there was a vote in the Knesset on a

resolution about whether or not there should be a two-state solution. There should be a Palestinian state anytime in the future. And the reason that's important is because that 68 includes more than just the right- wing government in power. Exactly. It includes, give or take, something like 65 percent of the Jewish vote. There hasn't been a single Jewish Knesset member who voted in favor of the two state solution. Gantz voted against the Palestinian state. Lapid was absent. Even Labor Party ran away from the Knesset. So this is something dramatic. This is the most dramatic change when it comes to ideology. Just imagine that 20 years ago, the vast majority of Israelis supported the withdrawal from Gaza,

supported the two-state solution, two-to-one, give or take. But at the very same time, Netanyahu, which is the flag bearer for this ideology, is weaker than ever. So Netanyahu's ideology is the flag bearer for this ideology, is weaker than ever. So Netanyahu's ideology is stronger than ever, and Netanyahu himself, personality, is weaker than ever. Now, what I see is that there is enough room in the middle, in the middle of Israel's political map, for a new center-right wing party. Because people in Israel want two things these days. They want right and they want change. Now, Bibi gives them right. And he believes that as long as he drags the discourse to Palestinian state versus anti-Palestinian state, he'll win back a lot of the ground that he lost

since the war. And Gantz believes that he'll get all the change votes. But like the old ad, why not both? I mean, if there's a new right-wing party that offers both change and right, I guess they'll just hit the jackpot. So Lieberman, Bennett, Saar, Yosikov, you name it, all together, they can gain huge numbers of seats. So we now have, I mean, this is a sea change to your point, because the idea of a two-state solution is, I mean, this is a sea change to your point, because the idea

of a two-state solution is the ultimate goal, the ultimate North Star, however difficult to achieve, was undergirded all of Israeli foreign policy debates going back to the mid-90s. Obviously, it stalled out after the Second Intifada, but it was rare for there to be a declaration that it's officially dead. To the contrary, as you point out, Netanyahu gives that speech at Bar-Ilan University in, was it 2009, 2008? Yep. Where he says he's for a Palestinian state. The Biden administration repeatedly talks about, including in President Biden's press conference, most recent press conference, where he said the goal is a two state solution. And here the Israeli cabinet, the Israeli Knesset, again, not just this right wing, quote unquote, right wing government, it's the Israeli Knesset, is saying in large numbers,

we are against a Palestinian state. So it's a big political statement. It's a big policy statement. What's the implementing vision, though, for that? In other words, okay, so what does that mean for Israel? What does a world in which a two-state solution is off the table mean for Israeli policy towards the Palestinians anywhere in Gaza or the West Bank? So I think it's quite clear that the right wing won Israel's debate. I mean, it happened in Israel since 1973-ish till 2023. But not the settler's right wing. It's not for annexation, not for the biblical belief in the greater Israel, but for the security's right wing, which says the only guarantee for Israelis being alive and prosperous is the presence of Israeli soldiers in every place, there is a possible risk.

And it includes Judea and Samaria. Therefore, I think what Israelis really believe these days when it comes to Judea and Samaria is something like these two entity solution, a Jewish armed state and a weak Palestinian authority that manages the daily life arrangements. What is the downside of what you're describing? I mean, every policy prescription has trade-offs. What would you articulate as the greatest trade-offs to the implementation of that vision? Two risks. One is the demographic one. I mean, the incentive to leave Gaza almost 20 years ago was the demographic thing. Let's divorce from two million Palestinians. We see that the divorced

entity named Gaza didn't want to divorce, but to come and hug us in a murderous hug. When it comes to the West Bank, to Judea and Samaria, we have a few million Palestinians. I don't know how many exactly, from 1.5 to 3 million. And the second threat is that you have a hostile entity, many Arab militants, and you have to actually pave your way every day to places where terrorists are equipped with weapons, explosives, etc. It's a never ending process. One question before I move off this. I think this is often misunderstood or misinterpreted, but I want to give you an opportunity to respond to it. There's this line out there that Netanyahu, through his years in his various premierships, didn't support Hamas, but definitely didn't oppose their presence and governing of Gaza. And he made his peace with their existence in Gaza for a variety of reasons, not the least of

which is it guaranteed the political division among the Palestinians. That if there's a Palestinian authority in the West Bank and there's a competing entity, Hamas, in Gaza, there is not a unified Palestinian voice. And if there's not a unified Palestinian voice, it makes it impossible for the international community to persuasively argue that Israel needs to create a Palestinian state because he could say, who am I negotiating with? They can't even agree with each other. And that he had said as much. There are reports that he had said as much, at least at one point. What is your response to that? My response to that is that I'm in love with the ability of Israelis to think that they can shape the Middle East. Let's go to the past. What caused Hamas to take over Gaza was it Israel no it was the fact that they threw all the rivals from the roofs of Gaza they killed in the streets each and every Fatah

member and then they took over Gaza violently and they almost took the West Bank as well in the first and last free election in the Palestinian Authority. So the only barrier from Hamas to take the West Bank is the Israeli military presence in Judea and Samaria, which means that unlike what people think that Israel and Netanyahu decided to foster Hamas in order to avoid the danger of the peaceful two-state solution, it's actually the other way around. Had Israel left the West Bank, we would have seen a unified Palestinian state in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza, but it would never be a Fatah state. It would be a Hamas state, let alone the fact that Fatah state, it would be a Hamas state, let alone the fact that Fatah itself and the Palestinian Authority are pro-terrorist, anti-Israeli, anti-Semitic entity. They pay 7% of their

annual budget, 7% of their annual budget to terrorists. $3 million are allocated every month these days to the Nuhba murderers from October 7th, which means that the Palestinian Authority, who many European states decided to recognize as an independent state, is a terrorist state, a terrorist supportive state. So I would love to have the option to have a peaceful Middle East, but it's not the case. And it has never been. And by the way, we created the monster named Hamas in Gaza. Once we evacuated Gaza, in my opinion, evacuating 10,000 Israeli settlers, unrooting graves and leaving Gaza to the Palestinians, we convinced

them that terror works against Israel. And I think we should stop that. In the vision you articulated for the future rule or independence or lack of independence of the Palestinians, Jewish Israelis vote for the government of Israel. And what happens with Arabs either living in Israel or living in the West Bank and Gaza? Who are they voting for? What rights do they have? Israeli Arabs vote for the Israeli Knesset, of course. No one wants to expel them. There are two different parties, Arab parties in the Knesset. There are 10 Arab Knesset members. They were part of the last coalition. It's Jews who are expelled from the alleged Palestine state. They want a Judenrein state. They want to evacuate each and every Jew, which should be a red light

for the international community. I mean, if you want peace, why won't Germans who live in France can live there? Why won't Israeli Jews live in so-called Palestine, like Palestinians live in Israel? According to my opinion,

Palestinians can vote for their parliament. They have a parliament. The only reason they haven't voted for since 2006 is that the last time they went to the polls, they elected Hamas. And then Abu Mazen, Abbas, the president of the Palestinian Authority, decided that free elections are quite a bad idea.

So he actually is now a dictator. He's not running an elected chamber. He himself is not elected. But your complaint is that the Palestinians haven't had the right to vote in a non-sovereign entity, which I agree with, by the way. It's been ridiculous and it's a fraud that Abu Mazen has not allowed elections since 2006. That said, it's still a non-sovereign entity. So Palestinians will have a vote in an entity that does not have independence, does not have sovereignty, does not have control over guaranteeing basic rights for Palestinians, doesn't have control of providing essential services for Palestinians. It's not an independent

sovereign state. So I mean, again, it's not my view, but I could make the argument that what am I voting for anyways? The difference between what Israeli citizens in Israel get to vote for, which is real government decisions of an independent sovereign state, under what you're articulating, Palestinians will never have that right. Not exactly, because first of all, we Israelis began a process in which at the end of the day, the destination was an independent Palestinian state. We gave them an airport.

We gave them a port. We gave them a police. There were talks about economy. There were agreements about economy. But they chose to stop it because they preferred killing Jews and eliminating the Jewish state rather than building their own Palestinian state. This is one thing. Second, under no circumstances, never ever whatsoever, there isn't a single policymaker in the West that want a 100% Palestinian state. For instance, no one allows

them to have an army, right? So it's not a 100% Palestinian state. And it's not 0% as well. So it's something in between. So it doesn't really matter how you define it, as long as you know that this creature is friendly and is not exploiting the resources from the international community and the assets given by the Israeli government in order to kill this very own Jewish state. And I mean, this is the number one differentiation between Israelis and President Biden, because President Biden emphasized from October 7th onward that there is differentiation between Hamas and the citizens of Gaza and the Palestinians in the West Bank, ignoring the fact that the only thing in the Middle East which is close to democracy, save Israel,

is the Palestinian Authority. They elected Hamas. I mean, Syrians has never elected President Bashar al-Assad in free elections. Neither was King Abdullah from Jordan. But they elected Hamas. So they have to be responsible for their choices. When 71% of the Palestinian population

in Judea and Samaria and in Gaza support the October 7th massacre, it means something. It means something. And therefore, I think it would be responsible to give them a state and to deal with those issues prior to fully abandoning this murderous ideology. Okay. I want to talk about Prime Minister Netanyahu's upcoming address before Congress. What do you understand in terms of what he's trying to accomplish in this speech? I think Netanyahu sees it as an opportunity both for using this speech in the U.S. to buy support in Israel and vice versa, to use his position as the Israeli Prime Minister to buy support in Israel and vice versa, to use his position as the Israeli prime minister to buy support in the States.

And I'll explain. In Israel, he wants to achieve or to convince Israelis that he's still the number one leader. This is his qualitative edge compared to Gantz, Bennett, Lieberman, et cetera. The ability to speak in front of Congress, to play on the world stage. And he is in a desperate need for public support these days, as you mentioned, the grim numbers in the polls.

But in terms of the US, I think he tries to use his position as the leader of Israel in order to make the Israeli case bipartisan again. I noticed something very interesting in the debate. It was the first time in which the term Palestinian was used as a curse. Trump blamed Biden for being a Palestinian and Biden tried to defend himself and say, no, I'm very pro-Israel. So I think Netanyahu wants to come to Congress and say, hey, I know this is the standard in the state. In order to get elected, you have to be a staunch pro-Israeli supporter. So here's my wish list. I want to is the standard in the state. In order to get elected, you have to be a staunch pro-Israeli supporter. So here is my wish list.

I want to finish the job in Gaza. I want support for a possible military operation or invasion in Lebanon. And I want a possible attack on Iran's nuclear facilities of the U.S. and of Israel as well. This is, in my opinion, this is the purpose of the trip. Do you think it's a good idea for him to do this address right now? Yes, I think so. I think President Biden is way weaker than he was when Netanyahu accepted the invitation. So for Netanyahu, it's no longer a fight against yet another democratic president in Congress, but something broader than that, setting the targets for the next

year or so, no matter who the next president is. Do you worry that there could be blowback to the speech, that you could have a whole segment of the Congress protesting the president's speech? You could have chaos outside the Capitol, equivalent, something similar to what we saw on U.S. campuses in the spring, or Israeli hostage families that are in the chamber in some way disrupting the speech. You just described a regular day in the Israeli Knesset. So to be honest, I'm not sure. But it's one thing if it's in the Israeli Knesset. It's another thing if the dirty laundry is being aired in the chamber of the most important democracy in the world. So isn't that a risk? Are you concerned

about that? I'm not sure. I guess they'll count the numbers of applauses and standing ovations, and it will leave more impression on Israelis and Americans alike than yet another protesters or two. Okay. Israeli elections. Walk through the timeline. So you basically said there'll be no elections, this government won't fall before the end of October of 2024. But the government's term ends when? On November 2026. Right. So sometime between the fall of 24 and the fall of 26, the government could fall and they could go to elections. Do you imagine that happening? I mean, we never know in Israel, but it will be no earlier than February 2025. And in my opinion, no later than February 2026. Usually in Israel,

governments tend to fall prior to the fixed date of election because people actually see the end and they calculate the time, the political crisis in order to gain ground. And it can be no earlier than February 2025, because according to the Israeli legislation, once you dissolve the parliament, the Knesset, it still takes three months. So February 2025 is the earliest. I would say, if I have just, you know, to gamble, May 2025, because somewhere around the next 2025 budget, all the cracks in the

coalition between alpha orthodox and secular far right and moderate right, etc., will break the coalition. So I would say somewhere in 2025. Based on the current polling and based on what you think of these individual figures, I'm just going to throw names at you and you just kind of lay out what you think their political promises and their political liabilities are. I'll start with Benny Gantz. What's your take on him? Where does he where does he live right now in the political landscape? Was it a mistake for him to leave the Israeli war cabinet? It would be way harder for him to be to be a prime minister

than it looks in the polls. He's actually the prime minister of the polls. But it's quite hard because he is more left to the where the Israeli media vote is. So unless he sharply breaks to the right, and it's quite hard for people who have an image in the Israeli public arena, it's quite hard for him. But he'll be a prominent figure. And do you think it was hard for him. But he'll be a prominent figure. And do you think it was wise for him politically to leave the war cabinet? It wasn't wise for him to leave the war cabinet

and it wasn't wise for him to stay in the war cabinet. This is the famous split of his voters. He has his base from the center-left who don't like Netanyahu and they want this government to fall. But he has his, I mean, his supplemental support, major supplemental support came from the right wing. So he has, I mean, he has a problem.

And he decided to actually cut the chains in June. Do you think, leaving aside politics, do you think the war cabinet was working? Yes. Why? I'm under the impression since Josephus Plavius, 2,000 years ago, I have the impression that once Jews are united, they beat their enemies. And when they are split, it's easier for the enemy to defeat them. And therefore, I'm a staunch supporter of each and every unity government, no matter who leads it. And in fact, as you've pointed out elsewhere, there were numerous

votes in the war cabinet on a whole range of decisions, and there was never disagreement. I mean, they voted in unity, right? There was a consensus. Exactly. In fact, when President Biden in his recent press conference said this is the most right-wing war cabinet in Israeli history, first of all, I think he was referring to the coalition government. I don't think he was referring to the war cabinet because the war cabinet wasn't so right-wing. But more importantly, it was the war cabinet that was making all the decisions. And there was basically, obviously, they disagreed on a lot of details. But on the core issues of what Israel needed to do in Gaza, there was basic agreement between Gantz, Netanyahu, and Galant.

Right. This is the case in Israeli cabinets. It's not like in the States, where the cabinet is professional and nominated by the president. In Israel, you always have political considerations. Therefore, the world cabinets are usually arranged around a political considerations rather than, you know, professional ones. So it's not something that we haven't seen in Israel. Okay. I asked you about Gantz. Where do you think Naftali Bennett fits into the landscape right now? I think he is actually leading in the polls, at least right now. Gantz had been leading in the polls. How do you evaluate Bennett's political future? Bennett is usually high in the polls and quite strong in the polls and quite weak when it comes to election results. And he has a split problems.

Half of his voters come from the center left because they remember how he led the anti-Bibi government only two years ago. And half of his voters are stone's right wing supporters. So usually in the past, what happened is that he entered the political killing zone in which he lost support from both sides. In my opinion, my humble opinion, his only way to survive, his only way to be a prime minister again is to join forces with another center-right-wing party, a.k.a. Lieberman's party, Israel Beiten. Why?

Because the only way to avoid entering this killing zone of, will you support Bibi or support the other guy from the center-left, is to say, none of the above. I'm running for prime minister. And then you can get support from both sides, those who want to unseat Bibi from the left and those who want a right-wing government from the right. That's what I would have done. He has to be strong enough to be able to follow. And the problem is, Bennett and Lippmann do not agree on who is going to be the candidate

for prime minister. So as long as they don't agree, they are doomed. I mean, they're really doomed. They have to decide and they have to So as long as they don't agree, they are doomed. I mean, they're really doomed. They have to decide and they have to decide as early as possible. And last one, what about Yoav Galant, the defense minister, his future? He seems to be the most trusted politician today, at least if you believe the polling. Yes, but I think it's misleading. His support is quite platonic. It comes from people in the center left because he is the flag bearer for the anti-Bibi sentiment. But once there is election, Likud will actually send him home

because he was against Bibi. Gantz and Eisenkron don't need yet another former general, and he's not that leftist to be in center-left parties. So to be honest, I think he, politically speaking, this is the peak of his career. Wow. Okay. Amit Sehga, we will leave it there. Thank you for this. I hope you'll agree to come back on, but this is a great primer, I think, for our listeners heading into what will be an eventful week for Israel in Washington. So thanks for being here. Thank you so much, Dan. My pleasure. That's our show for today. To keep up with Amit Segel, you can find him on X at Amit underscore Segel. Call Me Back is produced and edited by Ilan Benatar. Our media manager is Rebecca Strom.

Additional editing by Martin Huervo. Our media manager is Rebecca Strom. Additional editing by Martin Huervo. Until next time, I'm your host, Dan Senor.