Call Me Back - with Dan Senor - Biden's Bibi Problem - with Nadav Eyal

Episode Date: March 18, 2024

On October 6th of last year there was a long-standing ceasefire in place between Israel and Hamas. On October 7th, Hamas launched a massive war against Israel. Israel responded to this war that Hamas launched. Wars are violent. In all wars, civilians tragically get killed in the crossfire. What is unique about this war is how Hamas has used violence against civilians – Israeli civilians and Palestinian civilians -- as core to its war-fighting strategy. What is unique to this war is how Hamas has built a 300-plus mile tunnel system underground to protect Hamas leadership and fighters while it set up its own civilian population to suffer. What is also unique about this war is the lengths the IDF has gone to telegraph so many of its operations so Palestinian civilians can re-locate in advance of those operations. This is the reality of this war. And, yet, the Biden administration has supported Israel in this war from Day 1. Israel articulated its objectives in this war. The Biden administration made clear it supported Israel in pursuit of those objectives. But suddenly, the Biden administration and some of its allies on Capitol Hill are excoriating Israel's government. In fact, they are calling for the toppling of Israel’s leaders in the middle of this war. Well, as Minister Benny Gantz said on Friday, “ Israel is a strong democracy, and only its citizens will determine its leadership and future. Any external intervention is unacceptable.” How does this shifting US-Israel relationship impact actual events on the ground? The actual things that matter in this war -- the hostage negotiations, the debate about a day-after plan for Gaza, and the coming operation in Rafah, to name a few. To help us understand what’s going on here,guest today is NADAV EYAL, who returns to the podcast. He is a columnist for Yediot. Eyal has been covering Middle-Eastern and international politics for the last two decades for Israeli radio, print and television news.

Hamas feels that the wind is blowing to its direction, that they're optimistic about the war. And one of the reasons for that, to be frank, is the way that the international community and mainly the U.S. has been treating Israel. What they've been doing in the last three weeks is criticizing the government, attacking Israeli policy, giving the impression maybe that Israel cannot win this war against Hamas. And this has major optimism within Hamas and jihadi elements. And there's absolutely no doubt about that. It's 11 p.m. on Sunday, March 17th in New York City. It's 5 a.m. on Monday, March 18th in Israel as Israelis get ready to start their day. On October 6th of last year, there was a longstanding ceasefire in place between Israel and Hamas.

On October 7th, Hamas ended that ceasefire and launched a massive war against Israel. Israel responded to this war that Hamas launched. Wars are violent. Even defensive wars, like the one Israel is fighting, are violent. And in all wars, civilians tragically get killed in the crossfire. What is unique about this war is how Hamas has used violence against civilians, Israeli civilians and Palestinian civilians, as core to its warfighting strategy. What is unique to this war is how Hamas has built a 300-plus mile tunnel system underground

for Hamas leadership and Hamas fighters to hide while it sets up its own civilian population to suffer part of the human catastrophe of this war. What is also unique about this war is the lengths the IDF has gone to to telegraph so many of its operations to Palestinian civilians, so those Palestinian civilians can relocate in advance of those operations, often compromising the maximum effectiveness of the IDF operations. These are some of the realities of this war. And yet, here in the United States, the Biden administration has supported Israel in this war from day one. Israel articulated its objectives in this defensive war they were forced to fight. And the Biden administration made clear it supported Israel in pursuit of those objectives.

This war has been very hard to fight for Israel, but Israel is finally making progress. Suddenly, however, in the face of this progress, the Biden administration and some of its allies on Capitol Hill are excoriating Israel's government. In fact, they are calling for the toppling of Israel's leaders in the middle of this war and calling for Israel to go to elections. Well, as Minister Benny Gantz said on Friday, and I quote him here, Israel is a strong democracy and only its citizens will determine its leadership and future. Any external intervention is unacceptable. Close quote.

In calling for a change in Israel's government, do President Biden and Senator Schumer really understand what makes sense for Israel right now? Do they understand what makes sense for U.S. interests right now? Have Biden and Schumer ever weighed in previously this brazenly about the political processes and other fully functioning Democratic allies? What's going on here? Do they have other concerns? That is, is this really about Biden needing a foil in Israel as he heads into a tougher election campaign in order to mollify concerns from his

progressive base. Is Senator Schumer concerned about leadership math in the U.S. Senate? That is, if the Democrats lose the Senate in November, will there be added pressure from the Democratic caucus from his fellow Democratic senators to change up its leadership. Is Schumer looking for ways to manage the increasingly frustrated ranks among some in his own caucus? And how does this shifting U.S.-Israel relationship impact actual events on the ground? There's that, the actual things that matter in this war, the hostage negotiations, the debate about a day-after plan for Gaza, the coming operation in Rafah. To help us understand what's going on here, our guest today is Nadav Ayel, who returns to the podcast. He is a columnist for Yediot Akhranot. Nadav has been covering Middle Eastern and international politics for the last

two decades for Israeli radio and print and television news. Nadav Ayal on Biden's Bibi problem. This is Call Me Back. And I'm pleased to welcome back to this podcast Nadav Ayal, who is normally in Israel when we speak, or The Hague, or wherever he is, depending on the topic. But right now I'm catching him in the midst of travel to the U.S., where he will be in Washington, D.C. in the next couple of days for meetings. And we have lots to catch up on where we are with the U.S. as a relationship and some other developments.

Nadav, good to be with you. Great to be with you again, Dan. I apologize in advance for my scratchy voice. Full disclosure, I was at Port Said last night, a popular Israeli restaurant that originated in Tel Aviv and is now, as you and I were talking about offline, now in New York City as well. And let's just say the age difference between me and the people I was with and everyone else there was not insignificant.

And I noticed something with younger people, which is they like going out to dinner and having conversations against the backdrop of blaring music, which means they're either yelling the whole time as we were in our conversations, or they're just not talking to each other. We chose to talk to one another, which means I lost my voice. I identify with the way you feel, but I need to say that that was a very boomer kind of thing to say about your experience in the restaurant. If I get that from my teenage kids, that's one thing. But to get it from a contemporary like you really hurts. I mean, that's painful.

But I identify. Yeah, yeah, yeah. By the way, when we walked in, my wife said we cannot be the people to ask the waitstaff to turn the music down. We're not going to be those people. So we suffered. Nadav, there's a lot we want to talk about. I want to start with, before we get into where things are with the U.S. as a relationship, although it's all really tied, there is a lot of news coming out of Israel. Difficult to make sense of what is actually happening. What is the latest on the news reports on these hostage negotiations? So as we speak today on Sunday, the prime minister, the government are going to send the delegation of the Israeli negotiators to Qatar to discuss the terms that were sent by Hamas for a new framework for the deal. And I need to say something that I think went underneath the radar. And that is that Israel came to what was labeled the second Paris summit with those countries, Qatar and Egypt, that are trying to get a deal and with the US. And they managed to get a

framework for a deal. And it was very much discussed in the last two weeks. Of course, what we discovered is that although Qatar and Egypt said that this would be accepted by Hamas, it wasn't. Hamas didn't answer at the beginning. It basically stalled. And then it went on to reject this. And now it's offering something that you might see as a completely different framework or very different than what was agreed in Paris. Now, it's no surprise.

In the latest show with you, Dan, I did say that I think it's going to end with about a thousand prisoners and many of them with blood on their hands, convicted murderers. And the Paris framework talked about something like 400 or 500. And I found it hard to believe when it was published. And now we're talking again about around 1,000. That's just one example. But there are other issues that are even much more important than the identity and the number of those prisoners, although this is a significant issue in the negotiations. One of them is, for instance, what would be the kind of either control or positions of the IDF after the deal? Will the

IDF surrender some of its positions within the Gaza Strip to get a deal? And the answer is probably yes, it would change its aligning within the Gaza Strip. But to what extent? And to what extent will the IDF in Israel allow, as part of the deal, the return of some of the population back to the north, an area that Israel still treats as a combat area? I was there exactly a week ago inside the Gaza Strip. I was there with Sayeret Anachal, it's an Israeli commander unit, and we went all the way through the Gaza Strip to the sea. And that commander unit told me, you know, we're fighting every day. We're having either skirmishes or small battles in these areas on the outskirts of that safe area that Israel created at the center of the Gaza Strip.

And this is happening daily. And people need to understand that the war is going on in these areas. So these are huge issues, even strategically for Israel, because if it surrenders that corridor that it has built in the center of the Gaza Strip, what does it mean for it trying to win in the bigger picture against Hamas? What does it mean if it allows the return of the population to the northern side of Gaza, if you want to keep the civilian casualties down while still fighting the terrorists that you have there? According to the IDF, you still have between 5,000 to 6,000

Hamas fighters in these areas that Israel already occupied. And what they are having there is a sort of a guerrilla war. So all of these issues we'll probably discuss this week. Within the security apparatus of Israel, the defense apparatus, there is a careful optimism, a cautious optimism as to the chances of getting a deal. But Netanyahu's office has been much more pessimistic. We don't know if it's tactical. I was in Israel a few weeks ago. I'm going back shortly. And I met with a number of officials in the war cabinet or advisors to members of the war cabinet. While I sensed frustration

between different members of the war cabinet with each other, meaning they don't like each other. There's histories, there's political and kind of personal animosity between these men. I did come away with the impression that all of them are individually working on getting to a hostage deal. There wasn't a lot of daylight between them. They may disagree on details, but I didn't get the sense that one of them suspected that the other was like holding things up or wasn't that serious about the hostage process. Yeah, that was also my position until lately. But during this weekend, Benny Gantz and Gadi Eisenkot are asking to speak over the phone with the prime minister, which, of course, he does during Shabbat all the time.

He's not an observant Jew. And he just refused. And the fact that he refused even this says a lot in what it signals to the Israeli public. And Yoav Galant, who's the defense minister, had to issue a formal announcement saying that the defense ministry and apparatus are fully committed to get the hostages back and not miss an opportunity. And the reason he did that was, of course, to say, I'm not on the same side as Bibi is. Now, Bibi supporters would say, look, Netanyahu is playing negotiations, and he needs to be the bad cop. And, you know, Gallant needs to play another role,

and you have the negotiators, and they need to understand that it's not going to be easy. And it's not easy to convince the Israeli prime minister. So I'm bringing that to this conversation. That is to say that he needs to be conveying to his interlocutors who are dealing with Hamas that he's not desperate to do a deal. Your point is there needs to be someone in the Israeli security leadership that is projecting we are prepared to keep fighting this war if that's what we have to do. We're not rushing to a bad hostage deal. We're not so desperate for a deal that we're going to take a bad deal as a means to affecting negotiations, which could be important. That's fair enough. The only point is that when he does this publicly, and it's not coordinated within the cabinet, it only causes the families of the hostages that campaign for their release, and of course, his political rivals to play against him, and Hamas sees that. So I don't think that this

tactics is a working or, you know, transferring itself to the other side into the Israeli society. And furthermore, I think that if the US president can pick up the phone and call the family of Itay Chen, who discovered last week that he was murdered by Hamas on October 7th. They're holding his body. And the Israeli prime minister doesn't do that. We have a problem there. And also, we cannot not look at the polls. And the polls are saying that there is a growing political divide as to the hostage deal and hostages in general within the Israeli public. And it's becoming tribal again. You know, center left is saying, get them back. It's the first priority. Right wing Bibi supporters, a shrinking camp, by the way, is saying, well,

yeah, but not so much. You know, don't go over your head with this. And I think the PM is reading these polls. I would say that these last two weeks, he has lost some of that element that you have just mentioned, that his peers think, yeah, he might be playing with this, but he's on the same page with us. They're not sure about that anymore at all, including the negotiators themselves or circles close to them, which I spoke with. They themselves are not completely sure that he is totally committed. And they will know that only after he brings this

to the government. Bottom line, I think that if the defense apparatus brings a deal, says this is the best we can do, and it will release 40 hostages alive. I think Netanyahu is not going to derail that. I want to believe that he's not going to derail that. And then he will be able to say, look, it was purely tactical. And I guess people will believe or not believe that according to their primary judgment of Bibi. Meaning what he was doing in the lead up to that was purely tactical to get as good a deal as possible. And as you have said before in this

podcast, even if Bibi had another agenda and the deal were to fall apart, we would all hear about it because he's not the singular player in all of this. He's got a security cabinet. He's got other major players who would, it would immediately come out in the press if somehow a deal got derailed because of his moves. Absolutely. If he's going to derail the deal, reject the deal, I don't want to say derail, you know, say no. I really cannot imagine what's going to happen in the Israeli society. I think the protests during the judicial overhaul will be like nothing compared to what's going to happen in Israeli streets. If he's going to say, no, we have a chance to release 40 hostages, the Shabak and the Mossad, the defense minister are saying, let's do that. And Netanyahu is going to use his leverage in order to say no.

I think it's impossible for him also internationally speaking, but we're not there. Okay, it's really important to say we're not there. Hamas has been derailing the deal. So what has been the holdup in the deal? What is from your reporting based on what you're observing, and then also your contacts with sources within the defense establishment? What is the strategy here by Sinwar? Like, what is he trying to accomplish? Because he could have had a temporary ceasefire if he wanted one on the eve of Ramadan. And he didn't. And everyone saying, U.S. officials are saying, Israeli officials, Egyptian officials, Qatar officials, and American officials are all saying the hold up here is Sinwar. The hold up here is Hamas.

So what is your take on what Hamas is trying to do here? Well, first of all, Hamas has some internal problems and there are communication problems with Sinwar himself. And these are not small issues. Marwan Issa, the number three in Hamas, was probably assassinated by Israel, is probably dead. This is in the last week. In the last week and a half, yeah. Any communications with the leaders of Hamas within the Gaza Strip is extremely difficult. But basically, Hamas feels that the wind is blowing to its direction, that they're optimistic about the war. And one of the reasons for that, to be frank, is the way that the international community and mainly the US

has been treating Israel in the last two or three weeks. As critical as you want to be about the Israeli government and its actions in the Gaza Strip and the war, the priority for the U.S. administration was getting some sort of a ceasefire and getting these hostages back so they can continue to a framework that ends the war and maybe Saudi Arabia track. Well, what they've been doing in the last three weeks is criticizing the government, attacking Israeli policy, giving the impression that they have run out of patience in regards to what's happening in the Gaza Strip, giving the impression maybe that Israel cannot win this war against Hamas. And this has major optimism within Hamas and jihadi elements. And there's absolutely

no doubt about that. There's also no doubt about Netanyahu playing for politics. It's serving him. The way that they are treating Netanyahu is serving him politically. The way the international community and the U.S. is treating Netanyahu is serving him politically, domestically. Yeah, for Netanyahu, the fact that he can say to the Israeli public, look, I'm the guy they're attacking because I don't want to have a Palestinian state right now after October 7, because I'm very much resolved to win the war and to destroy Hamas. And this is the reason I'm not having the backing of the White House. And actually, he's been saying this in the last hour or so. I'll give you that quote.

He said that right at the beginning of the government meeting. We're talking on Sunday. He said, and I'm translating, against Jews since the Holocaust. So quickly are you ready to deny Israel the right to defend itself against the monsters of Hamas? Did you lose your moral conscience so quickly? Instead of putting pressure on Israel, which is fighting a just war against an enemy that cannot be more cruel, you should direct your pressure against Hamas and its patron, Iran, they are the ones who pose a danger to the region. Now, this is an incredibly powerful pitch for the Israeli public. I also think that, to a large extent, it's very cynical. The US administration, led by Biden, gave Israel the backing to overthrow Hamas in the Gaza Strip for many months. They were asking, for instance, for a day-after

plan. And Netanyahu is not providing a day-after plan. And the reason he's not doing so is not because the professionals in the defense apparatus are saying you shouldn't have a day after. They're saying, we're begging you to have some sort of a vision for the Gaza Strip after we have taken control of these areas. And Netanyahu would not supply this because he is a captive of the far right within his government. When I was meeting with four cabinet officials and I asked about a day after plan, their take, again, you can agree with it, you can disagree with it. Their take was, A, any plan that we conceive of will get leaked quickly and anything that is Israeli backed will be doomed from moment one, from minute one. Meaning if it looks like any plan is happening on the back of an Israeli tank, it is doomed. Any plan that's going to have credibility has to be

largely conceived of in the Arab world by the Saudis or one of the Gulf states. It has to be American backed, and it has to be perceived to be something that Israel can, quote unquote, as one of them put it to me, is something Israel can live with. But the idea that Israel is to be the author of the day after plan will give it a death sentence right away in the eyes of the Palestinian public. That was one person's take. A. B, I do think the Biden administration's frustration with Israel is not a lack of a day after plan. Their frustration with Israel is the images in Gaza of Palestinian human catastrophe, the suffering of Palestinians. That is the reality. Those are the images all over television news here. They're all

over the screens of TikTok users of Biden's progressive base, young voters. That is what the problem is. And I don't think Israel saying it has a day after plan, don't worry, changes that fact because Israel is still going to be fighting the war before it gets to that day after. And so you still have this problem for the next few months while Biden is trying to shore up his base as he's running to what appears to be a very tough reelection campaign of images every single day that he will say or the people advising him will say antagonize his political base. And a day after plan doesn't change that. So I don't think it solves the U.S. problem. I think you're right, Dan. I think that the major problem are

these testimonials and the reality of life in the Gaza Strip. But to an extent, this is just one issue for the U.S. administration. And they understand they're going to get that anyway, the type of human suffering that they're seeing in the Gaza Strip. And that's going to jeopardize some of their base. The Uncommitted in Michigan is a code name. They understand that. But they're not getting anything else from Bibi. And the communications are anyway, they are what they are. And if you look at Netanyahu's history with American administrations, I'm not talking only about Democrats, also Trump towards the end. And President Trump talks about this continuously about his relations with Bibi and with Israel

in very harsh words. It's always a problem of communication. This Netanyahu thinking he can play the political arena within the U.S. against the sitting president or thinking that he understands exactly the calculations, or thinking that he must, you know, defend the interests of Israel vis-a-vis the White House, describing himself as an Israeli patriot. But for many Israelis, they remember what President Biden did right after October 7. And they remember the importance of Biden right now. It's not only about being thankful for the president for sending aircraft carriers to the Middle now. It's not only about being thankful for the president for

sending aircraft carriers to the Middle East. It's about having the possibility of another war with Hezbollah in the north. And to a large extent, it's about time. Dan, let's be frank about this. As far as the American administration is concerned, they said, you know, go ahead, occupy Gaza and overthrow Hamas. We're more than five months later, and Israel didn't do that, right? And it's very difficult to maintain this politically. This is one of the reasons that David Ben-Gurion, when he talked about the Israeli defense and war strategic concept, always said that it needs to be short. A war fought by Israel needs to be as short as possible. It needs to be fought within the enemy's territories and not within Israel. And one of the reasons for that was,

and you remember this, that every time that Israel fought a war, the Americans and the world, sometimes it was also the USSR, said, you know, you have this amount of time, this is your limit, this is your window, and you have to get it over with. Whether you have been attacked in the Yom Kippur War or you have been, you know, preemptively attacking in the Six Days War, there's a point that you need to end. Now, this is the longest war that we have had since the War of Independence in 1948. It's much longer than the four weeks, three weeks of the Yom Kippur War. We're talking about months

on end, and Israel is losing its ground, internationally speaking. But yeah, if you're asking, you know, what's the main reason for the US administration losing stamina, I think you're absolutely right. It's about those horrifying pictures coming from the Gaza Strip, which, by the way, they also accused the Netanyahu government. They're not saying this directly sometimes, but they are. They don't give the impression that it's all about Hamas. You don't hear the same kind of announcements that you heard from John Kirby. Yeah, you saw the shift. I think the big shift was the State of the Union address where Biden said things like, one, first of all, he cited the quote-unquote 30,000 number of Palestinians

killed in Gaza, citing the Gaza health ministry without qualifying it. The administration early on had qualified that the Gaza health ministry was basically a propaganda arm of Hamas. Suddenly, he dropped that. For the first time, I'd seen him do it since October 7th, which was quite jarring. And then he said in that same speech, he said more Palestinians have been killed in this war than all the Israel-Gaza, Israel-Hamas wars combined in the past, which is an accurate statement, but it's very misleading because in the previous wars between Israel and Hamas, Israel's objective was to return to the status quo, was not to eliminate Hamas. It was just, as you said, short war, military skirmish, and then just

get back to some sort of status quo, restore some kind of deterrent. This is the first war Israel's fought, where the objective is a complete elimination of Hamas, which the administration had supported. The Biden administration was very clear that it was supporting Israel's objectives and Israel should wipe out Hamas's leadership, wipe out all the fighters, and destroy the military infrastructure. Israel is still doing that. I will say, not to digress here, but if I just take a step back and think what Israel outlined what it needed to do after October 7th, which is what I just said, kill or capture Hamas's leadership, kill or capture the fighters, the Hamas fighters, completely break down and eliminate the whole military structure. Hamas is basically the equivalent of like a light infantry brigade of a state.

Eliminate it and get rid of the infrastructure. The infrastructure is proving harder to do than we first thought because there's over 300, you know, subterranean tunnels, 300 miles of, you know, like a subway system. So this is a lot of work. Israel said it was going to do at the beginning. The administration backed them. Nothing's changed. It's hard. It's a long system. So this is a lot of work. Israel said it was going to do at the beginning. The administration backed them. Nothing's changed. It's hard. It's a long time. It took the United States nine months in its fight against ISIS. Israel's five plus months in. It takes time. It's making a lot of progress in advancing towards those objectives, but nothing has changed. The only thing that has changed is President Biden's political calendar. That's what's changed, is that he wants these images gone as he gets closer and

closer to his reelection campaign. But Israel's military objectives based on its military calendar, and I get that this is an unconventional military calendar for Israel relative to the previous calendars, to your point, 1973. I mean, the reality has not changed. So I think the U.S. frustration with the reality of what it committed to in terms of when it backed Israel early on, that's what its frustration is. But it's not like Israel has changed the terms of what they were seeking to achieve. And I think by the U.S. mid-course, rhetorically, it remains to be seen whether or not it's actual has policy implications. But the administration rhetorically changing course, I think, has two

other risks. One, when the U.S. backed Israel to the hilt at the beginning and said, we are with you, and deployed assets in the eastern Mediterranean and got Israel all the munitions it needed, and was vetoing resolutions at the U.N. Security Council, doing all those things. Hamas only has a certain number of allies and supporters in all of this, right? It has Iran, it has China and Russia, you know, in different ways, playing different roles. It expands its access to resources and allies in its fight because they look at Israel and say, Israel's got the U.S. and wow, the U.S. is backing Israel full stop. And then the U.S. appears to be pulling back. And to your earlier point, that is a huge win for Hamas. If it looks like the U.S. is backing Israel full stop. And then the U.S. appears to be pulling back. And to your earlier point, that is a huge win for Hamas if it looks like the U.S. is pulling back,

because Hamas has its supporters and its supporters don't appear to be pulling back. But the U.S. appears to be pulling back and it has an emboldening effect on Hamas. And the second concern, friend of mine, Jonathan Schanzer at the Foundation for Defensive Democracy, has made this point a few days ago, that he was meeting with a Saudi journalist who is close to the monarchy in Saudi Arabia. And I've heard versions of this from other officials. I'm quoting Shanzer here, but I've heard versions of this from other officials in the Gulf, particularly Saudi Arabia. They get rattled when the U.S. does this public pylon on Netanyahu. And I'm not saying they are surprised that there's frustrations with Netanyahu. That's a separate issue.

But they get rattled when they see the U.S. fully embrace the Israeli government and say, we have your back. We are with you. We are in this fight. And then the moment things get a little choppy, they excoriate, the U.S. administration excoriates Israel's prime minister publicly in ways that have real impact in the way the war plays out, because to your point, it strengthens Hamas. And the Saudis are saying, whoa, like, yes, we want a defense pact with the United States. Yes, we want to deepen ties with the U.S. But one month they're with you,

and the next month they throw you under the bus. It rattles them. I think you're absolutely right. But I think that when you look right now at where we are at at the war, and you look at what Israel has been doing, and you look at what the U.S. has been doing, these signs, irradiating power and deterrence and resolve to the region have failed. Israel has failed by not maintaining the type of relations that it needs to maintain, not only with the U.S., but with the international community, in a way that does give an impression that it wants Palestinians to have a hope and some sort of a framework for future in the Gaza Strip. And the U.S. administration is failing by radiating and signaling to the region that it's out of patience for Israel.

And the meaning of this failure is detrimental, not only for this region, but for the power of the United States in other places, as you have just mentioned. For instance, in Saudi Arabia just mentioned, for instance, in Saudi Arabia or Ukraine. It's the same type of thing. This time, it's Democrats with Ukraine, it's Republicans. But again and again, that feeling that the U.S. cannot be trusted, maybe because of its tribal politics, because of its lack of resolve to be what it can be on the world stage. One example is the way that the Americans are responding to the Iranian threat and the Houthis in the region. And I'm telling you, and this comes from senior officials within the defense apparatus, it's not Bibi. These are not political people.

They are absolutely amazed by how the U.S. is deterred in its approach towards Iran in the region. This kind of stories about a ship, an intelligence Iranian ship, directing an attack by the Houthis against that shipping line going through the Red Sea, and the Americans not willing to hit it. You know, Israeli senior officials in the defense apparatus told me Israel has been attacking Iranians, sometimes killing Iranian army officials

almost every week in recent months. The U.S. won't attack, you know, it will defend the last hair of a senior IRGC official directing attacks against Americans and directing attacks against the region. And they are just struck by how the U.S. won't have it. Their impression is also that the American armed forces and Pentagon are not on the same page, and they would want to do that. And you probably saw the same testimony that I did of that general talking in Congress. But it's just amazing for Israelis to see this. And what kind of a day after, or what kind of a framework will you see in the future if Hamas is not defeated? What kind of Middle East will you see if Hamas is not defeated? What are the chances of having

a Saudi-tracked deal? What are the chances of somehow blocking Iran or limiting its influence in the region? And nobody's giving these answers in D.C. right now. Now, I don't think that the campaign has taken hold of the White House. And my friends in D.C. are saying it's not true. They're saying that the Biden campaign officials don't think they're going to win or lose this election on the Gaza issue at all. So these are, you know, my best sources in town. And they're saying, no, it's not their decision. It's much deeper than that. It's almost

ideological. They're seeing what's happening in the Gaza Strip, and they don't want to own this. They don't want this to be part of their legacy, this administration I'm talking of. And I can understand, you know, when you see the human tragedy there. And it's Israel's story, and they had the time to do whatever they needed to do. But that is the nature of presidential leadership in the history of American presidencies, is you come into office thinking you're going to focus on one thing or one set of agenda items, and then life happens. You know, history happens. The world happens. You don't have control. So I'm sorry, President Biden, the people around him, you know, you thought you were going to be working on one agenda, and then Russia invades Ukraine, and Hamas invades Israel. And now you're

now you're a wartime president managing directly or indirectly, I suppose, heavily involved indirectly in two major wars on two different parts of the world. And that's what being a president is. I try to make this point to officials here all the time, U.S. officials on the right and the left, that if at the end of Israel's response to October 7th, if at the end of it, out of the ashes, out of the rubble of Gaza, Yehia Sinwar or his lieutenants are able to emerge and be able to say, we're still standing. Yes, Israel pounded hard. Yes, Israel turned, you know, the IDF turned Gaza into Stalingrad. Yes, they wiped out, you know, 20 plus of our 24 battalions. Yes, all those things are true, but we're still here. And we are regrouping. I try to explain,

you can't overstate how dramatic that will change the geopolitics of the region, not just Israel's position in the region, although that too, and that is obviously what I'm primarily focused on. But as you said, the Saudis, all the Gulf states, it changes everything, if it appears that Hamas could do what it did on October 7, and then it's still standing. I totally agree. And I don't think that there is a general approach by the US administration, or by the way, by Republicans, for that matter, to how to tackle Iran's growing influence in the region and what it means for American power and what it means for Israel and for the world. I think that the general perception,

at least for Democrats, is that the key, the source is if we sort of solve the conflict with some sort of political framework, then we can advance and then we're not going to have any more wars like this or October 7th. But the truth is that Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Hezbollah and others are very much committed to a total war, a total annihilation of Israel and a destruction of American influence in these areas of the world. Now, I'm not saying that this should necessarily lead to an American attack against Iran or a war between the U.S. and Iran. I'm saying that it does demand a strategy of sorts, and I don't think that the Americans have one as of yet. Yeah, I completely agree. Before we let you go, you had done some reporting on something that had not gotten enough attention here in the U.S., which is this Farage plan. I just want to make sure we have a few minutes for that, Nadav.

Can you describe what it is and why it's important? So the Israeli defense, IDF and defense ministry are very much conversing about the day after in Gaza, although the prime minister doesn't want to discuss it. And the reason for that is because people don't understand, but the day after is here. I spent some time in Gaza a week ago, and you need to make decisions as to the areas that Israel effectively took control of. One of these decisions is about the entry of aid and food, and another decision is how you make sure that Hamas that still exists within the local population isn't there to regain its control and governance in the Gaza Strip. And the plan that they came up with that was supported by the defense minister,

by Golan, by the defense ministry, by basically the entire apparatus was that Majid Faraj, who's a security official, he's the head of intelligence in the Palestinian Authority, is considered a rather reliable man. So he's based in Ramallah in the West Bank. Yeah. And he's head of intelligence for the Palestinian Authority, which means he works closely with Israeli intelligence and the Israeli security establishment. Yeah. And Majid Faraj is also recognized in D.C. as a possible successor to Abu Mazen. He is considered reliable. He's not as corrupt, I would say, as senior Palestinian Authority officials. And the point about Faraj is, of course, that he yields real power because he's the head

of the Palestinian intelligence. And he made sure that they're not directly involved with terrorism, which is, of course, a thing for some parts of the Palestinian Authority. So the plan was that Majid Faraj will trace thousands of Fatah members. I remind our listeners that the entire Palestinian society is divided between Hamas and Fatah. And the Fatah is what controls the Palestinian Authority and Hamas controls Gaza Strip. And when you say Palestinian Authority, you mean controls the West Bank? Yeah. And he will trace those young Fatah members in the Gaza Strip. And of course, Fatah exists, you know, with power in the Gaza Strip. It's not only Hamas.

Hamas is ruling there, but Fatah is very much enshrined within the Palestinian society. Then these people during the war will leave Gaza, authorized by Israel, sanctioned by Israel, and they will be trained with the responsibility of U.S. officials. Lieutenant General Fenzel, that is the security coordinator, as far as the Americans are concerned, between the PA and Israel. The first idea was to train those 7,000 to 8,000 Fatah members at the West Bank. Netanyahu wouldn't hear about it, so they talked about the possibility of the Kingdom of Jordan. And then those men, armed, would be returned back to the Gaza Strip,

to the northern part of the Gaza Strip, where Israel is already in some sort of effective control. And they would be there to defend aid, to allow the entry of food. And so this would not fall to the hands of Hamas again. That was the plan. The entire defense establishment in Israel basically supported the plan. The U.S. supported and backed the plan. Then it came all the way to Netanyahu, to the war cabinet, and Netanyahu killed it. And his argument was that it's actually the Palestinian Authority, and he wouldn't deal with the Palestinian Authority. The Palestinian Authority is tainted with terror, and he's not going to do that. Of course, I would say, politically speaking, I also wrote that down, that for him, allowing the return of thousands of Fatah

armed members back to the Gaza Strip would be political poison. His government would simply not survive this, I think. Ben-Gur and Smotrich, who really hold the keys for this coalition and for Netanyahu's fate, would simply either redraw government or will not allow this anyway. So you can say, yeah, he killed it because of reasonable reasons, because the PA is involved to an extent with terror. By the way, the Shabak doesn't think that Abu Mazen is by any way involved directly with terror. They think he's very much committed and has been committed for the PA not to be used for terror.

That's what the Shabak is saying. But you can't argue with the PA paying salaries to convicted murderers in Israeli prisons, on the other hand. So this plan died. And that's a good example to the frustration within the Israeli defense establishment. They really think that the day after is already here. And for the central and northern parts of Gaza, that's the case. You need to make decisions. The first decision that you can make is that Israel has full occupation in these areas.

It's responsible for everything. It has some sort of a local commander that controls every aspect of the civilian Palestinian life in the central and northern Gaza. That's your first possibility. Your second possibility is basically to have someone else there. Let me quote the chief of staff, Herzia Levy, in a cabinet meeting. I brought that quote in my latest column. It was not denied by the IDF spokesperson. He said to the ministers, look, there are basically two things in the Gaza Strip. You have Hamas, and you have Fatah, and you have some Salafi factions, and you have a small minority of Christians. That's what you have in the Gaza Strip. And what he was trying to say is you cannot invent a new power in the Strip. You cannot import a new power to the Strip. This is what you're going to have. You need to choose. And if you don't want Hamas, at the end, it's going to be

Fatah at the best case scenario. This is if you can somehow architecture this. And if you're not going to make that choice, and this is something else that was said by Gallant, we will lose everything, everything that we have fought for, everything that those brave IDF soldiers have fought for, to try and change the ruling power in the Gaza Strip to make sure that Hamas would not be there. So it's either going to be Israel directly occupying the Gaza Strip, something that nobody wants in Israel, including Netanyahu, or it's going to be a different Palestinian local force. And I would have wanted to have, you know, the Palestinian Thomas Jeffersons and Hamiltons

and Madisons controlling the Gaza Strip, but you don't have them. You have to pick. And that's the defense establishment message. I'm not saying, by the way, that the fact that it's the defense establishment message means necessarily that it's right. Okay. But they are the professionals handling it. And Netanyahu killed that plan. And right now, we don't have any other kind of practical vision. I'm not talking about a far reaching vision to the Gaza Strip to make it Singapore. This we would all want, including Netanyahu. But there is no practical vision to what's going to happen in a couple of months, in three months in the Gaza Strip. There's been news over the last few days about statements coming out of Fatah in the West

Bank, critical of Hamas, lashing out at Hamas, blaming Hamas for a massive misstep on October 7th. I have, one, been skeptical that Fatah or Palestinian leaders within the West Bank are reliable in terms of being able to be a real alternative to Hamas. But I do want to acknowledge this and get a sense for you of how real or how important these statements are. I think these statements are terribly important. Basically, Fatah is saying the leaders of Hamas staying in seven-star hotels have led the Palestinians to say. It's a completely different thing when the political faction that is fighting Hamas and is ruling the West Bank is saying formally they are corrupt and they have led to a catastrophe that is worse. And that is a quote worse than 1948. Just imagine, Dan, that it's Fatah that is saying that what Hamas did to the Palestinian

people is worse than the Nakba. You know, take that to the demonstrations in the US. So the Nakba is just for our listeners, the Arabic word for what they regard as the catastrophe of Israel prevailing and building a state in 1948 that October 7th was worse than that. So you said take that to who? Take that to the demonstrators that are explaining to Israel that it is responsible for the Nakba. Well, the Fatah, you know, Fatah is the movement that began the fight for Palestinian independence. Fatah is the movement that was established by Aser Arafat, is saying, no, the people responsible for a horrible catastrophe, I'm quoting, worse than 1948 is Hamas. And they're also saying, do you want a Palestinian prime minister

nominated by Iran? It's so meaningful that they are saying this right now. The reason it's meaningful is because at the end of the day, the Palestinian society, and that's not because of Israel, it's because of the Palestinian society itself, is being torn between two big powers that are competing for control for the last 25 years. One of them is Hamas, and the other one is Fatah. And this kind of competition is crucial to understand the politics of the region, to understand why Hamas has been resisting recognizing Israel, to understand why Fatah is committed to recognizing Israel. By the way, it's committed to recognizing Israel much before the Oslo Accords. It said that it would be willing to

recognize Israel. This is the kind of fine detail and nuances that are lacking from some of the discourse that I'm seeing right now abroad, but also in Israel, I have to say. All right, Nadav, we will leave it there. Grateful for your time, as always, and I'll look forward to seeing you soon. Thank you so much, Dan. That's our show for today. To keep up with Nadav Ayel, you can find him at Ynet on exits at Y-N-E-T. You can also follow him directly at Nadav, N-A-D-A-V underscore E-Y-A-L. Call Me Back is produced and edited by Ilan Benatar. Our media manager is Rebecca Strom. Additional editing by Martin Huergo.

Until next time, I'm your host, Dan Senor.