Call Me Back - with Dan Senor - EMERGENCY EPISODE - with Amit Segal & Nadav Eyal

Episode Date: March 19, 2025

Watch Call me Back on YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/@CallMeBackPodcastTo contact us, sign up for updates, and access transcripts, visit: https://arkmedia.org/Dan on X: https://x.com/dansenorDan on Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/dansenorArk Media on Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/arkmediaorg We recorded an emergency episode as fighting resumes against Hamas in Gaza, ending a cease-fire that lasted 57 days; as military operations escalate between the U.S. and the Iran-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen; and as Prime Minister Netanyahu moves to fire Ronen Bar, the head of the Shin Bet security agency. To discuss this rapidly-evolving escalation of events we are joined by two of Israel’s leading journalists and mainstays of this podcast.  Amit Segal is a columnist for Yediot Ahronot, and chief political analyst for Israel’s Channel 12.  Nadav Eyal is also a columnist at Yediot, and the recipient of Israel’s equivalent of the Pulitzer Prize. He is also an adjunct professor at Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs.  Nadav’s article about Netanyahu’s decision to fire Shin Bet Chief Ronen Bar: https://www.ynetnews.com/article/skykzau31e CREDITS:ILAN BENATAR - Producer & EditorMARTIN HUERGO - Sound EditorYARDENA SCHWARTZ - Executive Editor of Ark MediaGABE SILVERSTEIN - ResearchYUVAL SEMO - Music Composer

Israeli far-right parties, Ben Gver and Smotrich, have told the prime minister basically that there is no political option for him, anything but resuming the war in full force with the attempt to a crushing victory. And because of that, and because every poll in Israel are saying that Netanyahu is losing the elections if they were held today, he is convincingly losing, Netanyahu had no other choice, politically speaking, but resuming the war. Yes, Netanyahu got weaker since October 7th, but the security establishment became the weakest because it has the burden of the devastating failure of October 7th, and that's why Netanyahu, who's weaker, is in relative terms stronger than the security

establishment. That's why he caused Galan to leave, the IDF chief of staff, Herzi Alevi, to leave, and now he tries to do the same for the chin bed. It's 4 o'clock p.m. on Tuesday, March 18th here in New York City. It is 10 o'clock p.m. on Tuesday, March 18th in Israel as fighting resumes in the Gaza Strip, ending a ceasefire that lasted 57 days and as military operations escalate between the U.S. and the Iran-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen. And, oh by the way, as Israelis and Americans learn of the news that Google is making its

largest acquisition in history. Not its largest acquisition of an Israeli company, but of its largest acquisition in history of Israeli cybersecurity startup,izz, for $32 billion. Once the deal closes, Wizz will join the Google Cloud. So all this is happening in the startup nation as all these military developments are occurring and these regional military developments are occurring. Also on Sunday night, Prime Minister Netanyahu announced his intention to fire Ronen Barr, the head of the Shin Bet Security Agency,

an announcement that has ignited heated political debate, to say the least, inside Israel. Netanyahu cited, quote, a growing lack of trust in Barr's leadership for his decision, a move that has been met with charges of political motivation. Attorney General Gali Baharav-Miarra has challenged the legality of the dismissal, asserting that Netanyahu cannot proceed without establishing a clear factual and legal basis for Barr's removal. In response, Netanyahu has accused the Attorney General of overstepping her authority. The unfolding situation has prompted opposition leaders to plan protests and consider legal actions to contest Barr's potential removal.

Again, all this while warfighting resumes against Hamas, all against the backdrop of the ceasefire ending for the first time during the Trump administration, and as I mentioned, a US strike against the Houthis, where the US has launched its largest wave of attacks since 2015. The US declared, quote, sustained combat operations vowing to hold Iran responsible for further attacks. Could this create an open-ended pretext for strikes on Iranian targets? To discuss all of these dramatic developments, it's a lot.

I'm joined by call me back regulars Amit Segel and Nadav Ayal, senior political analysts for Channel 12 and Yediot Achronot. Amit, Nadav, welcome back. Hi, it's a pleasure to be here again. Thank you so much. Okay. So Amit, I want to start, there's a lot to get to here, which is why we're doing an emergency episode, a lot happening very quickly. Give us the background that led to the decision by Israel to resume the warfighting in Gaza and what the objectives are now of this new wave of warfighting. Israel was trapped into a situation which is unacceptable.

There is no fighting going on. Hamas is recovering. There's more so-called humanitarian aid, aka more money for the pockets of Hamas, and the hostages stopped coming back from Gaza. That was the situation for the last three weeks, and it appeared more and more to Israel and to the new US administration that Hamas feels very convenient with this situation, that he doesn't believe that Israel would resume the war, maybe because of the disputes within Israel, maybe because he believed that Mr. Bowler's negotiations with Hamas signaled something about the willingness of the US

administration to actually come to terms with the presence of Hamas in Gaza Strip. Maybe the fact that they are just fundamentalists that doesn't interpret the world as it is, but the outcome was devastating. And therefore Israel decided to relaunch a military attack. And I suggest everyone not to think about it in the terms of, yes, yet again, another round of fighting in Gaza, bombing, killing of half-serial figures in Hamas. No, it's a whole new ballgame.

First because we have a new US president who actually wants Israel to unleash hell on Hamas. We have a new IDF chief of staff that wants to invade Gaza and to conquer it. He believes that the idea of entering Gaza and then going out of Gaza wasn't a very efficient idea in dismantling Hamas. And we have more ammunition. More ammunition that came from the US? Directly from the US. So when the Trump administration announced, you know, within days of taking over that

it was sending all these new shipments of munitions, that was a big deal in terms of giving Israel more options, more flexibility in terms of when to act. Exactly. And to wrap it up, that signals the fact that this is going to be the new normal. And I think that unless something dramatic happens, we'll see more and more force operated towards Gaza, first from air, then ground invasion, boots on the ground, occupying specific wide territories of Gaza Strip and not withdrawing from them. And therefore I think we're heading towards a new era in Gaza Strip.

And is there a sense also that it's not just the new munitions and the new supplies coming from the administration, but I think an expectation from the Israeli government that they're going to get less lecturing, hectoring, and just general criticizing on how they conduct the war than they did from the previous administration. That they basically, once Israel goes in, they have a free rein. Exactly. In order to zoom in, I think the number one change is the fact that the humanitarian aid is not something that the US demands. They will no longer demand Israel to provide humanitarian aid. And second, that from within Israel, the IDF under the new chief of staff, Eyal Zamir,

agrees that Israeli soldiers would either provide the humanitarian aid or will secure the situation in which American company provides humanitarian aid, thus taking this huge asset from Hamas's hands, emptying his pockets, preventing him from paying salaries to activists and trying to kill it. You know, the situation with Hamas, just in one sentence, and then I'll give it to Nedav to describe it from his own perspective, was like this old story from the Lord for Minchowzen. It's an old German story about a knight that drove with his horse, but the horse was injured in the war and he was cut to two. So they come to a lake and he wants the horse to drink, but the horse is very thirsty.

Why? Because the water that he drinks just spilled from his half-cut body. That's the situation with Hamas. On one hand, Israel tries to eliminate Hamas, to kill each and every member of it. On the other hand, it provided Hamas money that actually helped him to recruit new members, to buy new weapons, etc. Okay, Nadav, I wanted to get a sense from your perspective what the operational goals are here, but just in terms of how we got here, just timeline. So there was supposed to be multiple phases to this ceasefire deal that was negotiated

by the Biden administration and the incoming Trump administration by Steve Wittkopf in January and phase one was completed and negotiations on phase two were supposed to begin when? Late February, February 20th, I think? Yeah, on the 16th day after the initiation of phase one and they didn't really begin on day 16 as they should have. So they never commence and then when did phase one formally end? Well, actually it ended with the release of the bodies and the last Israeli hostages that were released.

And since then, the pressure was on both sides, mainly because of the mediating factors here, Egypt, Qatar, and to extend the United States to try to negotiate a phase two. So when was phase two, roughly, if they had negotiated phase two, because phase one ended, phase two never began. And then there was in this sort of phase one plus or extended phase, because there was this holding pattern where Israel wasn't fighting, hostages weren't being released. There was talk about more hostages being released, but none were released. So we were like in this nowhere land. Yes. And this nowhere land is where we are at right now. And look, there's no way to get around this. Politically speaking, Prime Minister Netanyahu and his coalition never wanted to implement

phase two unless basic demands would be met. And these basic demands would be that Hamas would leave the Gaza Strip, the Gaza Strip would be disarmed in terms of its militias, and maybe the leaders of Hamas would be granted a safe harbor or safe passage to an exile, and all the hostages will return back home. These are the prime demands of Israel to phase two, and these are the minimal demands that Israel could make. For instance, the exile of the Hamas leaders actually gives them some sort of an immunity for a period of time, although they are the architects of October 7th. Israel never wanted to go anywhere else in phase two, but the total surrender of

Hamas. And that actually means that, and I think we spoke about this at your show, Dan, again and again, look, Hamas is a genocidal, anti-Semitic movement and it is my op-ed position written many times, it cannot control the Gaza ship. Having said that, it is the decision of Israel to let go of the ceasefire, to let go of these negotiations and to resume the war. And the reason for that, and I've detailed this on this show and written about this extensively, is that Israel has come to its conclusion, the Prime Minister has come to a conclusion, that the entire Gaza Strip needs to be at least with a credible threat of being occupied completely. And by occupied completely, I mean held by the IDF

in order for Israel to win the war. And another reason to put in context is, of course, that the Israeli far-right parties, Ben Gver and Smotrich, have told the Prime Minister basically that there is no political option for him, anything but resuming the war in full force with the attempt to a crushing victory to call the new chief of staff after Netanyahu basically got rid of the former chief of staff. And because of that, and because every poll in Israel, every reputable poll in Israel, and specifically the polls of the TV station where Amit Segal works in his senior position, are saying for more than a year and a half, much before October 7, that Netanyahu is losing the elections if they were held today. I'm not sure that this would have happened because we know what polls are in this time and age.

But according to the polls, he is convincingly losing. And according to the polls, the Israeli public has no trust, 60, 70% have no trust with the prime minister. It's true to the Jewish audience, it's true to the general public in Israel. Netanyahu had no other choice, politically speaking, but resuming the war. And the most important word I want to add to this discussion before turning to the operational plan is, of course, hostages. The reason that the prime minister is extremely stressed because of the resumption of this operation. And I agree with Amit that the intention is to have a ground maneuver and to take the

entire Gaza Strip is because when you look at polls, and Netanyahu knows how to read polls, he has been reading polls for many years, he reads them much better than I do, the Israeli public with an astounding majority is saying, we prioritize the return of the hostages over beating Hamas. They're saying this again and again, and you've seen this all across the public. Of course, center-left voters, you'll see a much more crushing majority there, much more convincing, but you also see big chunks of the Likud, big chunks of coalition voters who say the same. And even when Channel 12 asks them, you know, what's more important right now, then you get these type of answers. Now, of course, it's all in the question.

I can talk about this question at length. Can I stay on that for one sec? Because I also tend to nerd out a little bit on polling methodology and how questions are asked, because you can often expose paradoxes in polls. I agree with you that almost all the polling I've seen, if not all of it, has prioritized release of hostages over resumption of war. The problem is, I think, coming back to the paradoxes, if phase two had actually been implemented the way it was conceived, and obviously the details were not negotiated,

but as it was conceived, it would have meant realistically, Israel being out of Gaza entirely, and there being no way to ensure that Hamas didn't take over some kind of either Gaza entirely or in some kind of partnership with the PA, or Hamas would still be there. And that is in complete conflict

with one of the major war objectives. So in what world would Israel ever agree to a phase two? Now, but I'm not litigating right now my own opinion. No, I'm not saying I'm just saying the polling in these polls. Do you think the polls capture that reality that to move forward with phase two, the way it was conceived of would have meant Israel ending the war with Hamas still in Gaza? reality, that to move forward with phase two the way it was conceived of would have meant Israel ending the war with Hamas still in Gaza. I'm not sure, but I want to say something about that.

What the Israeli political class and mainly the government and the prime minister have failed at is convincing the public that it's the best interest of national security getting the hostages and winning against Hamas that is the top of their agenda. So this is the deep-seated kind of idea that you see at the polls, by the way we poll that too, that if you ask Israelis what's number one for the government and the Prime Minister, it's always about their own interests as far as the majority of the public. And because of that, I think that it's not about defeating Hamas. It's about the public to a large extent, losing trust that the government can do that.

And this is amazing because the government did manage, the army did manage, the defense apparatus managed to defeat Hezbollah and to an extent, axis of terror, of resistance, right? But they don't trust the government as to Gaza and they also hear the things that the hostages that came back are telling us. And what they are saying is that the military operations of the IDF in Gaza have again and again risked their lives. People entered the room. They were torturing them as a result.

And it's the hostages tonight, as we are speaking in Israel, that are standing in the demonstration. Yaden Bebas has stood tonight. He has lost his wife Shiri, who was murdered by Hamas, his sons, Ariel and Kfir, the toddlers that were murdered by Hamas. And he's standing and he issued a message saying basically the families are disappointed, they're extremely angry at the government because of this resumption. They think that the government has decided because of political

reason to sacrifice their loved ones. Let me just read what he said. I'm just pulling it up because I saw this earlier. This is what Yarden Bebus, Shiri Bebus's widower said at the rally, and I quote here, he said in Hebrew, this is an English translation, Israel's decision to return fighting brings me back to Gaza to the moments where I heard the sounds of explosions around me and where I feared for my life is I was afraid that the tunnel where I was being held would collapse. My wife and children were kidnapped alive and were brutally murdered in captivity. The military pressure endangers the hostages while an agreement brings them home.

So this is exactly, Deon, you nailed it in the question. And I think the most important word in Nadav's answer was prioritize. The Israeli public prioritized at the moment bringing back all the hostages at the expense of defeating Hamas utterly and decisively. But you see fluctuations during time, because I guess if you ask today, do you support that the IDF would keep killing Hamas senior leaders, keep bombing Gaza, keep invading Gaza? I think the vast majority would say yes. People want both of it.

They want to have the cake and eat it too, or to eat the cake and have it too in that respect. And I think that it reminds me of something in the past. Till 15 years ago, the vast majority of Israelis supported the two-state solution in the polls. It was something like two-thirds of the Israeli public. But then when asked, okay, so do you support dividing Jerusalem? The answer was decisively no. Do you support evacuating 100,000 Jewish settlers?

The answer was of course not. Do you support a Palestinian army on your borders? The answer was no. So they were for the idea, but not for the costs. And I suspect that the cost that Hamas demands would never meet the demands of the Israeli public. I would like to add something else. I don't think it's feasible because half of the Israeli public at least, and many opposition

leaders and many journalists offer that we would cheat Hamas. We would say, yes, you can stay here. Just bring back all the hostages. You'll stay in Gaza, you'll rule the Hamas in Gaza, everything is going to be fine. And then a moment after they released the last hostage, we would invade Gaza, kill each and every Hamas member and live happily ever after. It's not going to happen for two reasons. One is that Hamas would never release all the hostages. He ran out of tunnels, out of rockets. There hasn't been a single rocket fire that is real today following our attack. You mean Hamas.

You're talking about Hamas has lost all its rockets. Hamas lost of its members. Hamas lost its leader, Yiches Inuar and its leader, Muhammad F. So the last thing they got, the asset that gives them access to the White House, to President Trump's special envoy in terms of the hostages, is Israeli hostages. They would never find themselves without this nuclear weapon. This is one thing. And the second, which is more important, it's impossible in democracies to cheat the public

and the world. How do we imagine it? Prime Minister Netanyahu would say alongside Smotrich and Ben-Gavir, yes, we decided to surrender to Hamas. Yes, you can have the territory of Gaza. And then President Trump, who promised to unleash her on Hamas, would say, yes, no problem. You can stay there. And the Israeli army, it's not gonna happen.

We would not hear lies from leaders, generals, etc. for five, six months, which is the length of the process of releasing all the hostages. And that's why this is impossible. And also the international community would not let Israel go back in. The flip side though is, presumably Prime Minister Netanyahu or whoever is in charge at that time, in that scenario, the scenario where Israel agrees to end the war, agrees to let Hamas stay in power, gets all of Israel's hostages out and then obliterate Gaza. And I hear this plan being suggested to me all the time. I mean, presumably the Israeli government would be able to find a pretext to go back in. I mean, that's the question. I mean, certainly Hamas will do something stupid that would give Israel the grounds to go back in in that situation.

How? But if they do the stupid something when we still have hostages in Gaza, I think how many members of the Kibbutzim would agree to leave again a few hundred meters, a few hundred feet from Hamas when they have 25,000 terrorists, when they have the Philadelphia corridor that enables them to smuggle yet again RPG and Kalachnikov rifles, etc. When they rebuild their tunnels, when they get money to actually recover Gaza, and we know that they don't mean to buy parks and, I don't know, amusement parks, but to rebuild the tunnel. I speak with the members of the Kibbutzim on the southern border who have put their life in danger

for many, many years and of course feel completely forsaken by this specific government even after October 7. I'm extremely angry at the government, are saying that they are getting phone calls if they're as foreign citizens from Denmark and they're not getting any call from government ministers. Meaning if they're dual passports. If they're nationals of another country, they're hearing from the other governments, but they're not hearing from the Israeli government. Yes. They're getting flowers from the Queen of Denmark, but they're not getting a phone call

from an Israeli minister after they lost a brother who was murdered or who died at Hamas captivity. This is one example, but what they are saying is that the first thing to do is to get the hostages back. Now, this entire thing of the maneuver, the deceit, the trick that we just discussed, there's another way to look at this. And the way to look at this is really, if Israel doesn't want to have Hamas in Gaza, how do you achieve that goal strategically? Is it a kind of a blitz? Can you do that? Let's say that the IDF hands over and assists with food

and humanitarian assistance. Let's say that the IDF just took control of the entire Gaza Strip. What happens then? What's the plan? I'm not talking about a specific plan. I'm talking about any sort of vision. There's the vision of President Trump as to massive immigration of Palestinians. He has made sure that everybody knows that he's not talking about expulsion. It's quite sure that the Israeli far right is playing with the idea of actual expulsion because they get the signal from the White House. If the White House is talking about voluntary immigration, maybe we can do more than that. By the way, I published this this week, it's Israel's judicial advisors that are telling the army, if we go to an operation right now, unlike in a ceasefire, and then in the midst of the operation, we're trying to push the Palestinians to massive voluntary migration from the Gaza

ship, then it might be deemed illegal everywhere and actual expansion because you're doing that during war. If you actually want to go with the vision of President Trump, you need to have a ceasefire in Gaza. And you absolutely cannot be on the offense when you do that because they are acting under duress. So the answer to Amit's query and to yours, Dan, is saying Israel needs to have this aim strategically that Hamas does not control Gaza.

Now how does it achieve that really does not control, not a Hezbollah bluff, really does not control Gaza, that its leadership isn't in Gaza. And when you say the Hezbollah broth, you mean post 2006, as that war ended, that the UN mandated that Hezbollah couldn't be in control, but the reality is they were effectively running the Lebanese government. They had a monopoly over violence in Lebanon,

and the Lebanese army didn't mean a thing. So you're saying you can't have the like fig leaf of the PA or some other body being in charge, but Hamas is really in charge. That's what, I just want to explain what you're saying you can't have the like fig leaf of the PA or some other body being in charge but Hamas is really in charge. That's what I just want to explain what you're referring to. And by the way, this is the position of the Israeli defense apparatus almost in consensus. It's also my my own small modest position as a writer, but it doesn't matter for that. Say reasonable serious people in Israel, you need to prioritize first getting the hostages back and you need that again not getting the hostages back and you

need that again not because of sentimental issues but because of the strength of Israeli society, the need for solidarity, the need for all parts of the public to be united and then you need to devise a plan together with the international community, together with other elements that will include probably a military maneuver within Gaza to get rid of the Hamas regime. Still, it's going to be a grassroots movement, unfortunately, within the Palestinian people. But this is what you need to do. Now, if you go with this line of thinking, Dan, that this is a strategic aim of the state of Israel,

and Israel has failed with this aim for years on end of making sure that Hamas doesn't control Gaza. A promise made by Netanyahu when he just came to power more than 15 years ago. If you go with this line of thinking, it doesn't match with Netanyahu's political survival needs. Because this actually means that he's not going to get this before the elections which are to be held next year. And because of that, Netanyahu wants it now. And what the hostage families are saying, and they are extremely frustrated, sad, angry at this, they're saying the meaning of this kind of an aggressive operation in Gaza, and they hate Hamas most, right? They have been hurt by Hamas the most. It's not about wanting to cave into Hamas most right they have been hurt by Hamas the most it's not about you know

Wanting to cave into Hamas what they're saying is that if you do this right now The actual meaning of that is that the hostages will die, but it's not right now It's over the last 17 months and we have to admit that if Israel agrees to face be under the terms of Hamas that if Israel agrees to phase B under the terms of Hamas, it would become the first country in the history of the world, and I hope the last, to actually translate kidnapping of its citizens and soldiers into strategic loss at the diplomatic field. Because if Israel agrees that Hamas stays, even if we say to ourselves that we'll fight another day, it means that Hamas stays, even if we say to ourselves that we'll fight another day. It means that Hamas succeeded on October 7th at 6.29am. I don't support this. This is for me a straw man.

I don't support the stay of Hamas in controlling Gaza anyway. That's why they demand. No, because I just want to explain myself. When you describe... They can make many demands. No, no, but when you describe the families, what they say, and I think we can't argue with families of hostages and with released hostages. And it's a nightmare that we cannot even imagine.

But the interpretation or the outcome of what they say that as long as there are hostages in Gaza, Israel should not attack because of the fear that they will not be released and will be killed. It means necessarily that Israel has to end the war when Hamas is in office, when Hamas can smuggle weapons again, rebuild the tunnels, threaten the kibbutzim. I don't think that this is what the families are saying. I published myself, unlike many others, that it was military pressure that led Hamas to the first deal. I never agreed with this idea that there was a deal on the table at the beginning of the

war and that Israel could have had it without military action. So what is the suggestion? So I think that first of all, they do not think that the negotiations have been exhausted. We just heard, and Amit, you know this best because you reported on it, that the day that Israel resumes the war in Gaza, Ben-Gurion returns to the government. And this is the actual debate. It is not on its merits. And this is really important to understand. It's about trust. Okay, hold on, Nadav. I just want to, I don't want to cut you off. I just want to for our

listeners to understand what you're referring to. So Ben-Gvir in his six Knesset seats withdrew from the government when the government agreed to this deal back in January. He said he would return to government if war fighting resumed. So war fighting has resumed and now Ben-Gvir has rejoined the government. And I think, Nadavv what you are saying is at a shall we say politically convenient time because in a couple of weeks the Israeli government has to the Knesset has to vote on a budget and not being able to agree on a budget is often how governments fall. So one could argue and I think what you're speculating about is whether or not Netanyahu wanted to keep as big a coalition in this government as possible as he goes into this budget season.

I don't think that the government, I know what Amit is going to say, and I agree, the government would not have fallen if Ben-Vu would have been left outside. Netanyahu has an interest in having as large as the coalition as he can. And for Netanyahu, the rock of his support right now isn't the centrist Likud voters in Israel, but the far right and the ultra-orthodox. This is how the government is built. And because of this reason, what I'm saying, and this is what I'm referring to when I'm saying it's not about the substance, it's about trust. I agree, Nadev. It's about trust.

And the Israelis, and when you go to war, you need to do certain things if you are leading people into war and you are convincing them to have an aggressive military effort that might lead to the deaths of hostages that were taking their pajamas. People like Omri Meiran, who's a dad, and who's three year old kid asks his mother if dad still loves her because she doesn't understand that why her dad is still in Gaza in those tunnels and other dads came back home. So you need to convince them that it's not about politics and add that the prime minister, according to your poll, Amit, has not succeeded, has failed.

I fully agree that trust should be built. And I think that the situation was horrific when Israel went to a war after a year of tearing apart the country from both sides. And I think it was a tragedy. And that's why I yelled as loud as I could so that Benny Gantz and Eisencourt would join the coalition and would have a unity government. It was a terrible mistake for Israel, not necessarily for them, to leave the coalition.

But at the very same day, we can't confuse correlation with causation. The fact that the war resumes does not emanate from Netanyahu's will to join forces with Ben-Gvir, But the other way around, Ben-Gvir found himself in the opposition because Netanyahu signed a deal. Netanyahu almost… But Amit, you yourself brought the quotes of these far-right ministers, Smotrich himself saying, we sabotaged the deal. Ben-Gvir saying, we sabotaged the deal to return the hostages.

So you understand that the Israeli public doesn't trust this. So first of all, I'm very happy that for the first time in Israel's history, the media quotes Ben Gevir and takes what he sells for granted. It's not true. The truth is that this government, this far-right government, signed a deal that almost cost Netanyahu his political life. Now I don't argue, and I would never argue, that Netanyahu is a noble figure

that's interested only in policy and not politics. No. Like any other politician, and even more than everyone, because he's here from the last millennium, he involves politics with policy. That's how it works for Obama, Trump, President Clinton, and it works for Netanyahu as well. But Netanyahu paid high prices within his political base in order to return as many hostages as possible.

We watched Channel 14. What price did he pay? He is only up in the polls. He almost lost his coalition. He was one vote short of losing his majority in the Knesset prior to the budget vote next week. This is one thing. Second, Ben-Gavir left his coalition.

Smotrich was on the brink of leaving the coalition. Now what I think is that Netanyahu, he knows his political base, understood that he's going on a brink, on a very narrow bridge like the old Hebrew song. And the old bridge says that the vast majority of Israelis want the hostages back home without losing the war to Hamas. And in order to translate it to deeds on the ground, what he really meant is that Israel would pay a high price. Hundreds of convicted murderers, hundreds of terrorists, thousands of humanitarian aid trucks coming to Gaza every day, withdrawal from the Nisarim axis and almost from the

Philadelphia corridor in order for every single hostage that can come back, but not at the price of losing the war. I don't think that any Israeli is willing, and I agree with that, to have Hamas control the Gaza Strip. And I think that in the long run, this government and this prime minister have lived so many years with Hamas. What the hostage families are saying is to base this principle now on Israelis that were taking from their beds.

And now, now decide that you won't negotiate. After the Qatari money was transferred with the authorization of the prime minister and the government, after years on end of a failure of both concept and of course of the military that failed dreadfully that day, that's something that will tear the Israeli society apart. Now, having said that, I want to say something in general. This is another problem from hell. How do you get as many hostages as you can? And how do you make sure that Hamas doesn't rule the Gaza ship?

But for me, the most important remark that you made, Amid, that is important, was really at the beginning when you said that Gantz and Eisencourt left the government. This was a classic Netanyahu maneuver. He wanted them to leave the government. He's talking with them. He stopped taking their advice. He treated them like trash. It was a grave mistake.

He pushed them outside of the government. And the reason he did that is because right now, Amos Sarrell, who's a regular on Dan's show, wrote an article. And the headline of the article is that, and this is the military analyst, the most long-standing military analyst in Israel, Amos Sarrell, and by no way considered to be wide-eyed lefty or something like that. And the headline in Aharetz was, this war is the war for the survival, for the defense of Netanyahu. What the IDF is doing right

now at the Gaza Strip. What I am saying is that a prerequisite to go to another round of war, a prerequisite is not only having ammunition from the Trump administration, it's also to have some sort of a national understanding in unity. And the government isn't doing much in that sense, not in its connection with the hostage families that basically doesn't exist. Not with the connection with the opposition parties that doesn't exist.

Yes, but, Nadav, not visiting Niroz and saying bad words from the mouths of many, many ministers, but at the very same time, I have to say that I haven't since... Maybe we'll just explain what you mean by not visiting near Oz. Yeah, for instance, smelling kibbutzniks on the day that more bodies of kidnapped kibbutzniks are brought from Gaza to Israel to be buried. But at the very same time, I have to say that I get the feeling, and not only feeling, from more than one opposition leader, that it's

more important to them to defeat Netanyahu than to defeat Hamas. They believe that Hamas can be defeated another day, but Netanyahu must be defeated now. That's why Yair Golan, the rising star of the Israel left this morning, claimed that this war is just an excuse of Netanyahu not to talk about Katar Gate, it's a spin. He says to mothers of soldiers that their sons might die in vain, might be sacrificed on Netanyahu's political aspirations, and he's not the only one. And Yair Lapid said that Bezalel Smotrich wants the body count to rise.

Those things that cannot be said, they haven't been said in Israel ever. During times of war. No, no, they have been said. Absolutely. They've been said during the first... Not enough. During the first Lebanon war. But the first Lebanon war was a war 42 years ago, 43 years ago, that was disputable for the purpose of the war.

But here, no one doubts the fact that Hamas must be eliminated. And yet, by the way, I think that what the opposition did in the first Lebanon war in 1982 was horrific, actually was unjustified and helped the terrorists. But what happens now is that those opposition leaders pay lip service for the purpose of of course we want to defeat Hamas, but at the very end of the day, they plant the disputes. So it takes two to tango and they are very good dancers. Their criticism, if they think, if those of, I'm not going to defend their actual views here, I'm going to say that it's their position is opposition

It's their duty as opposition if they think it's their duty if they think that this is a mistake And if they think that the Prime Minister is acting according to his own personal interest Which is the opinion of the total majority of the Israeli public again and again in every poll that is published, that first and foremost he's not thinking about national security, it is their job to say that to the public. Because this is the meaning of democracy now. They said in cabinet, some of them were senior generals in the Israeli army, they know what it takes. Yair Golan, when he said today that Netanyahu does it himself, he knew,

he already knew, he said that Netanyahu did it in order to distract the public opinion from the firing of Ronenbaer. But he knew that Ronenbaer himself, the head of Shin Bet, had supported this attack, had planned this attack. Guys, so, so how can he say that? Can I, first of all, sorry. No, it's okay. Alon just messaged me saying this is the longest time since we've been doing this podcast, the longest stretch of time he's seen my mute button on. But I just took off the mute button

because you brought up Ronen Barr and I want listeners to understand what you're talking about here. So Ronen Barr, as I mentioned in the introduction, head of the Shin Bet, which is Israel's, I mean, I don't know what to compare it to. People try to compare it to the FBI. It's not really the FBI.

People try to compare it to MI5 in the FBI. It's not really the FBI. People try to compare it to MI5 in the UK. It's not really MI5. It's a domestic security and intelligence agency that is obviously focused on Israel's enemies, well, as it relates to this, as Israel's enemies in Gaza and the West Bank, among other things. And Netanyahu is making a move to have him removed. And that's what you were referring to just now, Amit, with regard to Ronenbar and what you referred to as Cuttergate.

Can one of you just briefly explain what is going on here? So Netanyahu decided to get rid of Ronenbar. Now here's the thing, prior to October... Okay, so just to be clear, he's announced that he is moving to fire. Yeah. Ronenbar is head of Shin Bet. And the reason he says, what's the that he is moving to fire. Ronenbar is head of Shin Bet. And the reason he says, what's the reason he... Because he lost trust in Ronenbar,

not because of October 7th, because if Netanyahu says that October 7th failure is the reason, the first one who should step down is Netanyahu himself, of course. Right, so because the Shin Bet has authority for intelligence, or one of the... In Gaza. In Gaza, he's getting a one of the... In Gaza.

In Gaza, he's getting a lot of the blame for October 7th and not seeing what was happening and not calling Netanyahu and Mila Net... Da da da da da. And so... Yeah, and since the Shin Bet investigates the Qatar Gate within... But hold on, hold on. So you're saying Netanyahu hasn't called for... the reason he hasn't cited is what I just said, which is the Shin Bet's failure leading up in on October 7th, because that would mean

that Netanyahu has to go too. It's like Al Capone convicted for a tax offence. Right, so he's focusing on what then? When he says he's lost trust, what? Mistrust. Okay, so explain. Netanyahu sees... But what's the event? What's the incident?

No, no, it's not a specific event. Netanyahu sees the defense or the security establishment in Israel as the strongest version of local deep state. Now here's the thing. It's amazing that following October 7th, Netanyahu can do things that he didn't dare to do before. For instance, he tried to fire the defense minister, Yoav Galant, in 2023 and he failed because hundreds of thousands of Israelis stormed the streets and then he did it in November on November 5 2024. And almost no one went out to protest.

What's the reason they were serving at the reserve and the reserves in Gaza, it's difficult to go and protest. Maybe, maybe, they were grieving the dead. Maybe, but there are many reserve soldiers in Gaza from the other side. I don't think this is the reason, but I'll give you an alternative explanation. Yes, Netanyahu got weaker since October 7th, but the security establishment became the weakest because it has the burden of the devastating failure of October 7th and that's why Netanyahu, who's weaker, is in relative terms stronger than the security

establishment. That's why he caused Galan to leave, the IDF Chief of Staff, Herziah Levy to leave, and now he tries to do the same for the Shin Bet. It's more complicated because of Qatar Gate. The Shin Bet investigates. Okay, explain what Qatar Gate is. Nadav. explain what Qatar Gate is. Nadef. So Qatar Gate is an investigation that appeared after there were some media reports that people in the close circle of the Prime Minister received money from Qatar for advising Qatar,

for instance, towards the World Cup that was held in Qatar. So the Qataris wanted the advice of the advisors of the prime ministers as to their public image towards the World Cup, which is, of course, laughable. Qatar doesn't need the advice of people who have never or almost never worked internationally on events like the World Cup, but it did pay at least one person, probably more. And at least one of the people that is seen as a suspect in this is really a spin master of the prime minister, extremely close to the prime minister. And to that extent, the Cuttergate investigation is not a police investigation, it's a Shin Bet investigation. And the fact that it's a Shin Bet investigation stems from the job of the Shin Bet, which is very much like the FBI in that sense, counterintelligence. So one of the positions installed by the Shin Bet law is that they need to defend Israel from spies. It's the job of the Shin Bet. And by assuming position as to Katargate, the very fact that it's the job of the Shin Bet. And by assuming position as to Qatar Gate, the very fact that

it's the Shin Bet that leads it means that they are checking the possibility that this kind of subversion or involvement of Qatar that is by law, by the way, is not defined legally as an enemy state, according to Israeli law, that this has entered the prime minister's close circle. Prime Minister Netanyahu is, I would say, and I think Amit would agree, hysterical about this investigation because he sees this as a witch hunt. He has said that, you know, that they're looking after him, he blames the attorney general, he blames the Shabak. This is one reason for run-in bar, because as Amit said, it's not about October 7th. The prime minister isn't saying that it's about October 7.

It's about losing trust. Well, if the head of the Shin Bet starts investigating your closest people, people very close to you, as to their relations with Qatar, you might lose trust with the head of the Shin Bet. The first reason is, of course, that the head of the Shin Bet, unlike other officials that were part of the defense apparatus, the Shin Bet failed, you know, spectacularly, really terribly, and René Bar is responsible. He shouldn't remain in his position.

It's obvious he himself admits to it. But the internal investigation of the Shin Bet, since the Shin Bet is under the Prime Minister, in the Prime Minister's office. So the internal investigation also included some conclusions as to the responsibility of Israel's political leadership and specifically Benjamin Netanyahu as to decision made. For instance, it was the Shin Bet who said to Netanyahu, and this thing isn't denied by the Prime Minister's office, don't deliver money from the Qataris to the Hamas because it goes not to poor families in Gaza, it goes to Izzat al-Qassam, the military wing of Hamas.

And this is in writing. And Shin Bet has said that again and again. Shin Bet has also said that Israel needs to resume assassinations of Hamas heads, including in the months before October 7. Shin Bet, I published this, the head of the Shin Bet made a phone call to the Prime Minister because the Prime Minister won't meet him just before the vote on the judicial overhaul, judicial coup, and in that phone call he said to the prime minister, we don't know when and where the war will break out, but I am supplying you a warning

as to war. And he said the words warning as to war. This was in July, De'an, the war broke out in October. The prime minister's office response to my story was that the head of the Shin Bet didn't say that the war will break out in October, the Prime Minister's office responds to my story was that the head of the Shin Bet didn't say that the war will break out in Gaza. Yes, but they failed. They did fail to say that it's going to happen in Gaza. Not only they failed, three days prior to the war, Ronenbach himself said that what

we should do in Gaza is to bring more economic development, to lower the limitations on commodities in Gaza, etc. So there is enough blame for everyone. I think here's the thing, and that's why Katarge drives Netanyahu nuts. I don't think because he's necessarily worried. I think it's weighed in the stock, every indictment against Netanyahu. He's testifying two times a week in the district court and yet no one in his political base really cares about it. So it's not about investigation. He's not magnified two times a week in the district court and yet no one in his political base really cares about it.

So it's not about investigation. He's not even a suspect. It's the fact that the Shin Bet, according to Netanyahu, had more human sources in the prime minister's office than in Gaza prior to October 7th. That is to say that the Shin Bet, in Netanyahu's opinion, forgot its first and foremost paramount mission, which is to save Israel. Over the last two years, Shin Bet... But you're making an argument that Netanyahu himself isn't making as to the firing of Ronin Bar. You're right, of course, but what's the reason he's firing him?

Maybe it's rephrasing or my analysis, but I think this is the main idea behind it. Can I just say one thing, guys? The other thing that blew me away, I gotta tell you, watching this from afar, was the other night, the former head of the Shin Bet gave this interview on Channel 12, where he said, I saw things of Netanyahu when I was the head of the Shin Bet, I know things about Netanyahu,

I'm not getting the translation exactly right, and he was threatening Netanyahu, and I'm prepared to release this information if I don't know what the if was. I got to tell you, I'm not a deep state conspiracy theorist, but that was pretty eerie. So first of all, what Nadar Aghman said, I think I agree it was stupid. But I also have to say that what he said is that if Netanyahu goes beyond the realm of the law, he will expose everything he knows. And the only problem…

In his opinion, he is not… Everything we do is according to our opinion. And he said that he'll expose whatever Netanyahu has done wrong. And the only problem that I have with that as a journalist and as a citizen of Israel is that if the former head of the Shin Bet knows anything that Netanyahu has done wrong, he should just say it. You know, that's the main problem.

The problem is not that he said that on TV because you can't extort a person to act legally. It's called male male. Can I say one thing? I agree with you, Nadav. Absolutely. If he knows something, he should say it. I totally agree.

Also though, and I see this over here in the US for what it's worth, when politicians assume office, if they have to start worrying that some advisor or some aide is someday based on, is gonna use their own discretion, their own discretion to determine when information is revealed that could be that he may have learned in a confidential relationship. It's just, it's

so, it's toxic. Daniel basically describing the work of journalism and every book written about Washington in the last 200 years. I understand that but he goes on TV and basically puts a gun, these journalists who do this don't put a gun to the head of a sitting politician and say, I'm going to go tell Bob Woodward X, Y and Z unless if I think you're acting badly. Here he's saying I'm going to determine if you're acting badly and then I'm going to go. It's an amazing You know what, Dan, I agree that it's utterly stupid and there's a scent of something that really shouldn't be there professionally. I need to say that the head of the Shin Bet

now that I was trying to fire has condemned the former head, Nadeem Aghramad. For that, yeah. And I want to say another thing. The Shin Bet is a group of secret agents, this is Fowda, that work in the West Bank, that should have worked more in Gaza, that risk their lives daily. And since, before October 7,

since Iran has been funneling money and arms to the West Bank, have been the ones who are preventing a third intifada. And on a daily basis, they manage to stop terror attacks. Now it's true, now to say about them, that they have more sources with the prime minister's office in Gaza, they failed. You know, my wife is an ex-worker of the Shin Bet. I have a very close relative who is a worker of the Shin Bet. I know who the Shin Bet are.

I just think that they were too invested in other missions that they forgot their core value. It doesn't mean that they neglected all the sources and the resources and invested time in toppling the government. No, but you know, when your mind is in somewhere else, where was the mind? I have not seriously, I mean, I know about the investigations before October. I'll give you two examples. First,

Ronenbaer thought prior to October 7th on October 1 give you two examples. Please, please do. First, Ronenbaer thought prior to October 7th, on October 1st, he wrote a letter, sorry, he said it in a meeting with the prime minister, that the main risk for the stability of the region is if Itamar Ben-Gevir visits the Temple Mount. So to be honest, I think it's a grave mistake. And I understand that Ronenbaer sees Ben-Gurvill as a threat to the stability. By the way, I don't think Ben-Gurvill actually fosters stability in the Middle East, but it's far from being the number one issue in the Middle East. I think it's a, bring it as a quote, I'm sure that-

It's a quote, it's a quote. Yeah, I know, but what I'm saying is I can see the situation. He said this is the number one, he meant that if Itamar Ben-Vir was a far right politician, goes on the temple mount, this might lead to an ignition of an anti-fac... He still claims this. Yes, but he doesn't mean that Hamas isn't a bigger threat to the state of Israel. So you know, it's just to put it out of context as an indictment. No, no, no, no, no, no. On October 4, three days, 72 hours prior to the attack, the Shin Bet writes in a secret

note to the prime minister, in a secret briefing, that so far the Jewish holidays are very peaceful in spite of the attempts made by provocative groups from both sides, Jews and Palestinians, to actually set the region in fire. So in my opinion, this is a grave mistake in interpreting the Middle East. But it has nothing to do with the fact that many, many brave men and women spend their best years trying to stop terrorist organizations. Can I just, we only have a few more minutes and I want to go ahead, Nadev, go ahead, you get the last word on this and then I want to ask you something else. The Shin Bet wanted to resume the assassination of Hamas heads.

They asked to assassinate Yahya Sinwar several times. We remember that. We know that the Shin Bet has objected to the transfer of money from Qatar to Hamas. At the end of the day, the investigation of the head of the Shin Bet has objected to the transfer of money from Qatar to Hamas. At the end of the day, the investigation of the head of the Shin Bet mainly blames the Shin Bet, so they agree with you, Amit. But the prime minister is firing Ronen Bar, not because of October 7 and all this discussion that we wasted time on. He's firing him because he has no trust in him, and he has no trust in him because he's doing his job, which is investigating Katargate. Okay, we have a few more minutes.

I have to ask you about, Nadav, quickly. I want to lift the lens here and ask you about the US military operation against the Houthis, why it was important and how, you know, Israel's fighting a seven front war. We focused this whole conversation basically on one front. The Houthis is another one of the fronts. So where does that operation fit into everything going on? So first of all, this is very important if the US administration is going to keep it through.

And they're saying they're going to keep it all the way, right? So there were some rumors yesterday that the Americans have hit the Iranian intelligence ship that is directing or used to direct some of the attacks by the Houthis. As far as I know from my security sources, this isn't true as of yet, but the fact that the Trump administration is A, invested in it, B, says they are going to follow through, and C, and this is really important, are saying that whatever the Houthis are doing, this is actually going to be attributed to the people who handed them the weapons and the arms and the support that is

the Islamic Republic mullahs. The fact that they would say that is very important in the region. In that sense, it's a testimony to the way that the previous coalition, international coalition, led by the Biden administration, failed as to the Houthis. We have seen the numbers, you know the numbers, of how international trade has been jeopardized, on how now ships need to go through the Cape of Good Hope, traveling thousands of nautical miles more just because this armed group has taken control of the seas. This is piracy. They're taking bribes, by the way, from countries who are willing to do so.

So for the Trump administration, this sends a message not only for the Houthis, but for the entire region, specifically, by the way, to Hamas and to Iran towards a possible strike. And I think to an extent, this is a correction of something, the Trump administration had two sort of mistakes in its approach towards Hamas and Iran in the region, the first one was to give the impression that any sort of strike against Iran is off the table. I think they have corrected that mistake that was made at the beginning of the first days of this administration. They have corrected that mistake that was made at the beginning of the first days of this administration

They have corrected it and the second one was of course the Adam Bowler issue Sitting in the room with Hamas and Hamas saw this as a testimony that they are actually in a breakthrough You know They had this why this massacre against Jews in history since World War two and suddenly they're sitting in the room with an Jews in history since World War II and suddenly they're sitting in a room with an American administration, something that the Biden administration didn't do. In both cases, the positive element here and the compliment to the Trump administration, they corrected very quickly and forcefully. And we see this with the support of the US administration to Israel right now and with

the Houthis. And the language the Trump administration is using is quite strong. And he's not the man of strong words usually. And by the way, this conversation, this whole conversation that I would say the three of us had but I wasn't really involved, that the two of you had, was characteristically very sleepy. You know, we got to figure out a way to like make it more interesting, spice it up. So next time maybe you guys could have a little caffeine, you know, I come with my my big venti Starbucks, you guys could, you know, Red Bull, whatever

you need. Whiskey. Whiskey works for me in this L.L. Yeah, all right, good. Nadeva Yel and Mitseg El, thank you as always and look forward to having you both back soon. Thank you. Thank you found this episode valuable, please share it with others who you think may appreciate it. Time and again, we've seen that our listeners are the ones driving the growth of the Call Me Back community, so thank you. To offer comments, suggestions,

sign up for updates or explore past episodes, visit our website arcmedia.org. That's A-R-K media dot org. Where you can also find transcripts with hyperlinked resources, which will hopefully help you deepen your own understanding of the topics we cover. Call Me Back is produced and edited by Alain Benatar.

Additional editing by Martin Huérgaux. ARK Media's executive editor is Yardena Schwartz. Research by Gabe Silverstein. Our music was composed by Yuval Semo. Until next time, I'm your host, Dan Sinor.