Call Me Back - with Dan Senor - Ending the Lebanon War - with Nadav Eyal

Episode Date: November 21, 2024

On an almost daily basis, Hezbollah fires hundreds of missiles and rockets into Israel’s North. And yet there seems to be progress being made in negotiations towards a ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah.If we are approaching a deal, what does it look like? How will it be enforced? What are the political forces shaping the deal - in Jerusalem, in Tehran, and in Washington D.C., as the U.S. transitions to a new administration?And, crucially, how many of the some 60,000 Israelis who were evacuated from the north over a year ago will be able to return to their homes?To help us understand what’s going on here, we are once again joined by Call Me Back regular Nadav Eyal.Nadav Eyal is a columnist for Yediiot. He is one of Israel’s leading journalists. Eyal has been covering Middle-Eastern and international politics for the last two decades for Israeli radio, print and television news.

This is what they are negotiating. Israel is very insistent that because of its conclusions from recent history, it will never trust any international mechanism or agreement or UN Security Council decision as to what Hezbollah is doing. Hezbollah is rebuilding its force in southern Lebanon. Israel wants to make sure that all parties understand that the IDF is going to take those infrastructures down immediately. They're not going to wait for an operation or another war. So make sure that this is implemented or we are going to make sure that this is enforced. It's 8.30 a.m. on Wednesday, November 20th here in New York City. It's 3.30 p.m. on Wednesday, November 20th in Israel as Israelis are beginning to wind

down their day. Judging by the hundreds of missiles and rockets fired at Israel's north by Hezbollah, one could assume that significant progress has actually not been made in these negotiations or these indirect negotiations over a ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah. As a matter of fact, if you just look at history, the number of rockets fired has always escalated. The closer parties get to a deal, so maybe it's a sign that the parties are close to a deal.

In any event, as we try to understand what kind of deal is taking shape, if in fact the deal is taking shape, and how it would be enforced, which is probably the most important question given the legacy of UN Security Council Resolution 1701 and the aftermath of the 2006 Lebanon War, and also what the political forces are that are shaping a possible deal in Jerusalem and Tehran and in Washington, DC as the United States transitions to a new administration. And of course, the ultimate question of how many of the some 60,000 Israelis evacuated

more than a year ago will be able to return to the north perhaps sometime soon. For all these questions, we turn to Yediut Achronot, political analyst and call-me-back regular, Nadav Ayal. Nadav, good to see you. Welcome back. Thanks, Jan. Good to see you too. I see your voice has improved. It's improved. For our listeners, I actually lost my voice a few days ago, which is an occupational hazard for someone who talks as much as I do.

The risk of losing one's voice is hugely problematic. And Nadav and I decided best to, and Alain and everyone involved decided best for me to take a breather from yapping into a microphone. Nadav gave me some very good tips on how to recover from a lost voice. I'm not 100% there, maybe 80% there. It's an excellent tip. It's about not talking and not whispering too.

I know that no whispering is key, by the way. I was telling people that, that you told me it's not just enough to not talk. You can't whisper because whispering has a lot of strain on the vocal chords. Although my rabbi, Rabbi David Ingber was here for Shabbat, and he told me that singing actually doesn't put as much strain on your vocal cords as speaking does, which I didn't know. Don't worry, I didn't start singing.

Maybe we could sing through a podcast one day. We'll have a singing episode. All right, Nadav, onto much more serious matters. I wanna talk about what's going on up north, whether or not there is a possible deal in the works. Can you start just to set the table by describing what the current state of the warfighting in Lebanon and the attacks from Hezbollah on the north look like? What's a snapshot of what's happening now? Israel is still fighting in southern Lebanon, both with boots on the ground. It has already taken what

is labeled as the first front of those villages that were the stronghold of Hezbollah on the Israeli-Lebanese border. And it is now advancing to the second line of villages and settlements in some towns that were bases of Hezbollah for attacks against Israel. Population there has evacuated itself during the war. These are the people of southern Lebanon. Many of these people are actually families or Hezbollah fighters or officials, and others just live there and having this misfortune of Hezbollah controlling this entire part of southern Lebanon. There are casualties to the IDF in this fighting. It's very

difficult. It's going basically house to house. And what senior command in the IDF has been explaining to me when I was asking, for instance, can you do this using aerial support? Do you actually need to go and clear house to house? And their answer is absolutely we do. And the reason for that is the substantial arsenal of weapons and ammunition that was found across southern Lebanon in such amounts then that there is actually an idea within the IDF of building a new unit that will use the weapons and ammunition that was caught by the IDF during the war, somewhat like has happened after 1967, because it's just such large quantities that Hezbollah has been stockpiling towards a possible invasion

of the Galilee. The IDF can of course destroy this ammunition and weapons, but some people in the IDF think it's just wasteful and you should use them to form units that use it. In order to catch this arsenal and to bring it back to Israel and to understand where is Hezbollah from where Hezbollah was planning its attack, you actually need to go village to village, house to house and clear these areas. Because of this house to house fighting, as you said, it's very hard. There have been a lot, a staggering number of IDF casualties. And I just see these reports daily almost

of these casualties. And I'm speaking for myself here, but I think what I'm saying reflects a lot of the perception of people who are following this from abroad, is that we got accustomed to casualties in Gaza, Israeli casualties, and then those numbers came down. They're not zero, but they came down substantially and

I felt like we had entered a period where casualties at a steady clip were behind us And now Israel's fighting a front up north and I feel like we're right back to the early months after October 7th Where we're seeing these reports every day and I got to tell you Nadav It's gut-wrenching because you read these stories of these people who are being killed, these Israelis, whether they're young men in their, you know, 1920, 21, 22, or they're reservists, they're Miluim personnel who are not in their late teens

or early 20s, but people clearly with families. And like I said, the numbers aren't small. I'm not articulating myself here. Clearly, I just, it's very emotional, because it feels to me like we're back in it again. And when one is reminded that Israel is facing a seven-front war, it just feels like none of this... I know we may reach some calm with Hezbollah in the north when we're going to get to that, but just generally speaking, this period that Israel is in does not feel like it's going

to get long-term calm anytime soon. Yes, and I think that this sentiment is flowing through the Israeli society for a long time now. So first of all, according to the latest data, it's 73 IDF soldiers that have died in the northern front since the beginning of this war, since Hezbollah opened fire and declared war against Israel. And we are seeing a spike, a substantial spike, since Israel decided to have this incursion

within southern Lebanon, which was a consensus, I need to say, on both political level and military level that Israel would need to clear at least the first line of villages and towns that were the stronghold of Hezbollah. But since October 7, the IDF has lost 800 soldiers. This morning, it was the 800 casualty that has died during this war. And yes, it is almost on a daily basis. And it is taking an extensive toll of the Israeli society. Many of these people who are fighting and dying for their country are reserve soldiers, people with children, and this notion of a knock on the door.

Well, the knock on the door, just what you're referring to, meaning getting news that your loved one has been killed. It's what every Israeli lives in fear of. You know, even knowing that a military car stops, you know, just in front of your building. And here's the thing, Dan, that people usually don't compute. It's more than a year now that these things have been happening across the Israeli society. It's more than a year that people live in this fear that opened with Israel's most tragic

trauma of October 7 itself. Israel had wars before, but since 1948, it didn't have a war that lasted more than 24 days, 25 days. That was the Yom Kippur War. Even the mere fact that it is stretching to this extent. It has dreadful impact on the Israeli society, you know, sense of stability and security, of course. Just imagine, daddy goes to serve in a reserve service because he must, and they explain

this to their kids, then he returns. Then after a month and a half, he's being called again to reserve service. And if he is in any combat role or even stationed up in the north, these kids in quite young age will understand that he might die, and they will live with that fear, and they will continue to consume news,

because the country consumes news all the time. And the caretaker will know about this, their teacher will know about this, their classmates will talk about this. And then dad returns. And then after a couple of months, he goes again, and it doesn't end. Now I know that in this country, people went into tours in Iraq and Afghanistan and served there. So these experiences are experiences shared by people who serve their country in the US and in Israel.

But Israel has a mandatory reserve service. You're supposed to come. It's not a professional army. It's not your profession, right? So it spreads across the Israeli society. And of course, beyond what the IDF is doing in southern Lebanon with boots on the ground, it also continuously attacks the headquarters of Hezbollah in Beirut, in Lebanon, at the Dahya, continuing killing senior commanders or mid-level commanders that are leading Hezbollah

during this war. So Israel is attacking all across Lebanon including at the Baka region, it's called the Valley of Lebanon, in Beirut, in Tzor, in other areas, hoping to fracture even more Hezbollah. But one thing is completely clear at this point. Israel, of course, has substantially managed to hit Hezbollah and to inflict a tremendous damage for the axis of resistance by killing Nasrallah and killing its leadership. I think the devil you're saying is very important because I have been very focused the last couple of weeks on these Israeli casualties and every one of them is devastating. But it's also important to not lose sight that Israel and the IDF are making

extraordinary progress in weakening this adversary, this enemy, that it should have dealt with a long time ago, and for a variety of reasons didn't, but it is now, it's long overdue, and as Israel learned after October 7th, enemies like Hezbollah, which wanted to do its own version of October 7th from the north, the situation is unsustainable without Israel

confronting this enemy in the way that it must. And in doing so, it is ultimately making, God willing, Israel safer and more secure. And I actually think, as you and I have discussed, and it's beyond the scope of today's conversation, Israel confronting its enemies, particularly Hezbollah North, also I think sends a message to the region, which makes Israel a country that many in the region, particularly in the Sunni Gulf, ultimately want to partner with in some way rather than a country that looks weak and under siege.

I agree. And at the end of the day, Israel managed to have these substantial achievements against Hezbollah by the virtue of its intelligence services and the abilities of the Mossad and the Israeli air force. And many would say that was the time to stop. Here you have a clear victory, Mastralla is dead. But if you talk with defense apparatus officials and people who understand, like in the northern command, the Israeli northern command, they say absolutely not because our problem was first and foremost tactical on our northern border with Lebanon. And our problem there was that Hezbollah was planning an invasion and it was planning to do what Hamas did in October 7, 10 times better.

And because of that, you need to go physically into Lebanon and to take care of those stockpiles of arms, these bunkers from which they were supposed to come out in the tunnels that Israel has found in southern Lebanon making their way into Israel. And because of that, it was essential to continue beyond the killing of Hassan Nasrallah and that central command. And without that, Hezbollah would still exist. And at any rate, and this is the most important point, so people don't get their hopes up, Hezbollah is not going to go away. While in the South, Israel has a clear goal of Hamas not maintaining control in the Gaza Strip at the end of the war. And the army of Hamas disintegrated.

Israel or the Israeli cabinet never made this a goal of the war as to Hezbollah in the North. And I think we should underline that. And the reason that the cabinet didn't say take out Hezbollah is to do that. You would need basically to effectively occupy the entire state of Lebanon. Something that at this point is truly beyond Israel's means and power. And also, Hezbollah is a grassroot movement with the Lebanese society, unfortunately,

and it's not going to go away, and it's going to remain an armed group until the Lebanese themselves manage to somehow maybe make sure that it is disarming. By the way, according to international decisions, including UN Security Council decisions, Hezbollah should not be armed to begin with. What you're speaking to specifically is after 2006 Lebanon War, UN Security Council Resolution 1701 not only required Hezbollah to move, but Hezbollah had to disarm and it was never enforced. Hezbollah was never forced to disarm.

Even before 1701, after Israel left Lebanon in the year 2000, there were decisions that there should not be any military force, any armed force in Lebanon beyond the government's forces, like in any normal country, police and army. And this was not implemented. After the 2006 war, as you rightly noted just now, there was decision 1701 that Hezbollah cannot go south to the Litani River. And of course, they did. And they built outposts across the Israeli border,

planning their invasion, publishing videos, saying we're going to invade Israel. We're going to occupy villages and kibbutzim in Israel. They said this on the record. This is not prime Israeli intelligence. They were publishing this in El Manar, in their TV station. Nothing of that happened. You remember our conversations really at the beginning of this war and me getting slightly agitated about the way that the international community and,

to an extent, the US are seeing the Hezbollah attack on October 8 as an obvious thing, just a repercussion of the Gaza War and not understanding how this evacuation of Israeli citizens and this decision to open war against Israel is going to reshape the Middle East. And this is actually what has happened. It has reshaped the Middle East. And what the IDF and the Israelis want right now is to materialize those achievements into a new political order between Israel and Lebanon. Okay. You say that Hezbollah will never be wiped out, at least until the Lebanese people act

and confront Hezbollah. Hezbollah can be severely weakened. It's not going to be wiped out by Israel. What is a metric, is a concrete metric, does Israel use as success in its war with Hezbollah? Is it the return Israel has talked is added as one of its post October 7th war objectives, the return of the 60,000 plus Israeli residents that were living in these towns right up in the north who've been out of their homes now for over a year. These places are like ghost towns.

We talked about this with Mati Friedman once where he described just his parents live actually up there. What these towns are like. They're just really, it's a kind of a movie, a sci-fi movie of a town that's just been completely ghosted. And that's what many of these towns and villages are like. So is that the measure? Is that when Israel will know we've been, Israel has been successful when those residents after over a year can return home? Meaning it's safe enough to return home. Yeah, professionally speaking, will the military say, we have taken out the threats across the northern border to your safety in a way in which Hezbollah cannot initiate a surprise genocidal attack the way that Hamas did on October 7. This is the reason that Israel decided, a decision never made in the history of the Zionist movement,

to evacuate dozens of thousands of people from their homes and evacuate whole kibbutzim and small towns and of course the town of Kiryath-Shmona and Metula. These are places that Zionism held to in very, very difficult conditions. And if you asked today both Gadi Eisencourt, who was a minister in the government, Joav Gallant, who is the fire defense minister, or Netanyahu, I think all of them would say that was a mistake. Evacuating those civilians was a mistake, but the government was very much pressured by the public to do so because the people there up in the North and also the general public were saying, you failed. You, the leadership, you, the army, you failed us in defending the South.

And we're not going to take any chances if Hizballah is just across the border. So take care of Hizballah and then get us back. It's been over a year now and these people lived in hotels, then they moved, many of them moved to just starting to rent a house. The state is funding these families. These are, by the way, very large sums of money in terms of the state expenditure. And in order to have that security to people living in the north, you need two elements, Dan, and that's the metrics. The first one is that you need to take out those infrastructures of Hezbollah across southern Lebanon. So we know that they can't have this attack with zero notice. And you need Hezbollah very much weakened.

And in order to make sure that this is the case, the other element is political. You need to have an agreement with Lebanon and a mechanism to at least monitor that agreement agreement if not actually enforce it, that makes sure that Hezbollah doesn't exist as a force to the south of the Litani River, according to the 1701 decision. And this is what Israel, the United States, and the moderate politicians in Lebanon, to the extent that they exist, are trying to accomplish in the negotiations that element, the political element that will make sure that Hezbollah isn't doing what it did prior to October

7. But at any rate, let me tell you what's the most important factor here according to Israel. And this is what they are actually, as we are talking right now. It's Wednesday morning Eastern time. This is what they are negotiating. Israel is very insistent that because of its conclusions from recent history, it will never trust any international mechanism or agreement or UN Security Council decision or assurance as to what Hezbollah is doing. And if it sees that Hezbollah is rebuilding its force in southern Lebanon, Israel wants to make sure that all parties understand that the IDF is going to take those infrastructures down immediately.

They're not going to wait for an operation or another war or go to the UN. They're going to do it immediately. They're not going to wait for an operation or another war or go to the UN. They're going to do it immediately. And this is really down to your question, the assurance given to the civilians in Israel living on our northern border, that this time Israel will not trust promises made by parties who couldn't care less, to be frank, really, seriously. They couldn't care less. All they want is for quiet to exist. And then you have October 7th, right? It doesn't matter.

They don't really care that it will be implemented. And they will always pressure Israel to restrain itself and to use international tools at its disposal and to use diplomacy. No, no, no. What the Israelis are saying is they break this agreement. They have really a minimal infringement of the agreement. If it's monitored by that mechanism, if we see it, if the Lebanese army doesn't take care of it in 24 hours

at most, we're going to take it down. We're going to do it on a daily basis. This is going to be like Israel having targeted operations in the A region in the West Bank controlled by the Palestinian Authority. So if Israel knows there's a unit of terrorists that are planning to go ahead with a terror attack, they're not going to wait for the PA's security to take care of that. They're going to get a commander unit inside Ramallah that's controlled by the PA and take that unit out.

And what Israel is saying is we're going to do that in southern Lebanon. So make sure that this is implemented or we're going to make sure that this is enforced. Now this issue, specific issue, this is what is debated with the Lebanese. Because for the Lebanese to agree to that is to say that their sovereignty doesn't exist in Southern Lebanon. And it doesn't. They need to acknowledge the facts there.

And the discussion with the US is, say that the Lebanese refuse to allow the idea of freedom of action if this agreement is infringed or is not enforced. Say the Lebanese refuse. Will the U.S., the Biden administration in its last days, will it supply Israel with sort of a side letter or an understanding that will definitely be maintained by the Trump administration, according to their public statements, that it is understood that the IDF is going to do that. And from what I'm hearing from both the Trump administration and the waiting and the Biden administration now leaving,

this is something that Americans were very positive as to, because they're saying this is your right of self-defense. We're not saying anything that isn't according to international law. You, Israel, have a right for self-defense. We understand that you might need to attack Hezbollah if they threaten your security. This is what they said at least a month ago. Now we will see if Amos Hochstein, who as we speak is making his way to Israel after receiving the Hezbollah answer in Beirut, we'll see what he comes up with. When do you mean when he receives the Hezbollah answer? He has received the Hezbollah answer.

Amos Hochstein has received the Hezbollah answer to this. The person representing Hezbollah in this negotiations, Amos Hochstein is an American envoy. He will not sit with Hezbollah people, of course. Hezbollah is these negotiations, Amos Hochtlain is an American envoy. He will not sit with Hezbollah people, of course. Hezbollah is a designated terrorist organization by the US. He's sitting with a man called Nabi Berri. Nabi Berri is a speaker of the Lebanese parliament.

He's Shia. He's affiliated with another Lebanese terrorist movement, Amal. That movement has disarmed. And now he represents Hezbollah in these negotiations. Nabi Berry presents himself as a person who wants to stop the war. He's also with close connections with Hezbollah. And now the question is whether or not Amos Hochstein will be able to bring the sides to an agreement.

The Israeli side wants an agreement. The Israeli government to an agreement. The Israeli side wants an agreement then. The Israeli government wants an agreement. And one of the reasons they do want an agreement is because their assumption, their baseline, is that the IDF is gonna enforce not having Hezbollah in southern Lebanon. So why not also have an agreement?

So for Israel, the agreement is really important because then Hezbollah leaves the war and they actually withdraw from their position that they will be at war with Israel, at open war with Israel, as long as Israel is operating in Gaza. This is really the beginning of the war. And if Israel gets to a point in which Hezbollah is saying, we are seizing fire, although you are still in Gaza, this is technically winning this specific war, because Hezbollah joined the war in order to be in solidarity with Hamas. And it is now leaving the war. Why? Because Israel has struck it so hard in such a meaningful way

that it feels obliged to leave the war. And by the way, they got clearance from Tehran to do that because Tehran sees the extent of which Hezbollah has been beaten by now by the Israelis. Or at least this was the case until a few days ago. I hope it doesn't change in the last days before an agreement. So can you just dwell a little bit on that, just how a deal in the north would impact the IDF's ability to operate in Gaza? Because as you said, Hezbollah joining the war,

if you will, on October 8th, and then all its statements since then have been that Hezbollah would only agree to some kind of ceasefire or scaling back its military operations against Israel in the context of a broader deal with Hamas, meaning it's in solidarity with Hamas and until there's a ceasefire with Hamas, there's going to be no ceasefire with Hezbollah. So what you're stating is Hezbollah is now basically saying to Hamas, you're on your

own. We've got to take care of our own business. So what does that mean then for Israel's ability to keep doing what it's doing in Gaza? If indeed there is an agreement in the North, and you know, it's very difficult in the Middle East. There's always a last minute crisis, and I expect a last minute crisis. As we are speaking, Naim Qasem,

who's the new leader of Hezbollah, a very unimpressive person, according to both Lebanese and regional sources. He may be unimpressive, Nadav, because I gotta believe the HR department has not been getting flooded with resumes. That's true. After Nasrallah was taken out,

and then every other possible candidate to succeed, Nasrallah was taken out. So I'm not sure there's that much demand for the job. They're hiring headhunters. First of all, there's a rumor, more than a rumor. There are some info suggests that Naim Qasem is not in Lebanon, that he has fled Lebanon. He's actually in a bunker in Iran somewhere

from where he is airing his speeches. And Naim Qasem didn't want the job. And one of the things that Qasem said in his speech is that Lebanon will not agree for an infringement of its sovereignty, which exactly goes to the point that we discussed. So this is why this agreement is difficult for both sides. Gaza. Of course, if the war in Lebanon stops, if there is a ceasefire in Lebanon, the IDF can maintain its positions in Gaza for a very long time. And as far as some ministers at the Netanyahu government forever, it allows Israel's political class if they want to, to remain in Gaza almost indefinitely and to stop one front, even if you get, for instance, a new intifada or some sort of an insurrection or protests that are violent or more terror attacks in the West Bank.

And I need to stress that the fact that we're not hearing more about the West Bank is only because the Israeli security service, the Shabak, and the IDF are doing one hell of a job there. But Iran is very much focused on trying to somehow blow up the West Bank into a third intifada. So you have this cushion of security if you stop the front in the north, that you'll have more forces to tackle both the possible third Intifada in the West Bank and of course, if you need or want to stay in Gaza. Because the levels today of the efforts made by the defense apparatus just to cover all the fronts are really herculean. Just trying to maintain this is very difficult

for the Israeli society and for the IDF. You're seeing a drop in people reporting to reserve service. We were over 100% after October 7. We are now between 80 to 75% people who are reporting. It was way over 100%. I was, for some units, the reserve turnout was something like 120, 130%, meaning way more people than were being called up

were showing up. And now you're saying- 75 to 80%. It's not the opposite, but it's definitely, they're calling up reserves and plenty of people. By the way, I know this anecdotally. I know I have plenty of friends who have been called up and they've just basically called their commanders and said, I can way, I know this anecdotally, I know I have plenty of friends who have been called up and they've just basically called their commanders

and said, I can't, I did over 200 days, I was released back into my family and back into my life and my business obligations and now I'm being called up again, I can't do it. And then they kind of, so it's not that they just don't show up, it's that they negotiate with their commander and they work something out that,

okay, I'll come in a month, not now. But so I think that factors into the data, but it's still. People who actually show up and they come for this week and not for the other week because they have something, they have an important flight to New York because they are in a round one of their startup or something like that. So they would say, I'm gonna go up north for a week and a half, then I'm flying to New York,

I'm doing round one with investors, then I'm going to go back to my unit. This isn't calculated with the 75-80%. This is like calculated within those who actually report. I'm talking about people who are saying, we're done. And again, when I say 75-80%, it doesn't mean that the units are down to 75-80%. It means that if you are calling people and asking them to deploy to reserve service, what is the number of people who will actually say yes? So you can always make this a more of an extensive call and get these units usually, you know, the personnel you need. But it isn't good.

And it's very natural. As you said, Dan, with your friends, people have been immersed with this for a very, very long time. And they have their life and family. And this is one of the reasons that we're seeing a lot of pressure from within the Israeli society to try to get an agreement in the north. Okay, Nadav, assuming there's a deal, assuming Israel can say we've met this war objective, it is now safe for these 60,000 residents to move back, return to their homes,

and try to resume and rebuild their lives. What does that actually look like? Meaning, can you just try to paint a picture if you're a resident of Matula, I'm picking a town that I've been to up north, if you're a resident that I can visualize as we're talking. So I haven't been there in over a year. I don't really have a life there anymore.

I've abandoned my business, I abandoned my home, and it's been in over a year. I don't really have a life there anymore. I've abandoned my business. I abandoned my home. And it's been well over a year. And now I'm going back. Can you just try to paint a picture of what that looks like? So at occasions, at the beginning at least, for instance, a family from up in the north would be living in a hotel in Tiberias.

I spent a lot of time with people who were evacuated from their homes in the north. And they will live two kids and two parents in one hotel room with four beds. And they will get the service from the hotel. But because there are no tourists, it's not the kind of service that you would get in a hotel usually, right? It's a government funded humanitarian operation. And sometimes they will have a kindergarten at the basement of the hotel

and they will have volunteers coming in. And as time goes by, of course, there's less volunteers. There is less interest, but the father will keep his job that is up in the North and that these factories, Israel never shut down the factories operating in the northern part of Israel. So these factories are still operating. And if this man is, for instance, a farmer, he will still go to his land. And we just had a terrible story of a man who died there.

And we had another terrible story about a 17 year old who went to the crops to open up the water valve and was killed by a Hezbollah mortar or Hezbollah missile. And the parents, although they are in Tveria near the Kinneret, near the Sea of Galilee, they'll need to travel to their job, which is sometimes like two hours away, and then get back to the hotel room. So this is impossible to live like that. So many people will instead of living in the hotel room will take the monthly compensation and go and live next to their work. And then the kids already go not to the school of the community that they try to keep together in the form of all the kids going to the same school. Because the school is, as you know,

that it's really the hub of the community. It's your friends and parents' friends and everything. This is where it happens. But then they will say, it's impossible to do that because of the travel to our jobs. And we'll just rent a flat. If we, for instance, work in Haifa, we'll rent a flat in Haifa and the kids are going to go to school there. And this is where the

community starts disintegrating. And this is where we are at, really. So many of these communities remain close-knitted and remain together, but you see more and more people. And sometimes you see these communities, for instance, split. One is being hosted by this kibbutz. Many of the kibbutzim across the country took in other kibbutzim from the north, very much the tradition of the labor kibbutzim movement. Kibbutz sartzi, kibbutz mu'ukhad, etakam, these organizations. So the kibbutz in the north would be split between two or three kibbutzim. So friends are being between two or three kibbutz in. So friends are being split and the community is being split.

And then people start renting a house. And then kids are in school and they have new friends. And you're closer to your home. And the government suddenly comes and says, after a year or more than a year, oh, everything is great now. You can return back home because the IDF is fought and Hezbollah is being beaten. And then you look at your village or your kibbutz up in the north and half of the structure, the buildings there are destroyed by Hezbollah shooting anti-tank missiles there

constantly. So that kibbutz member or that kirach-monah person who's being told, go back to the north. First of all, he doesn't know if he can trust that Hezbollah is not going to do what it did before, which is rebuild in the south. Then Israel wants quiet. Everybody in the world wants this war not to resume. And he's going to pay the price maybe, you know, on the a.m. in five years from now when his bala invades. So he asks himself this question, why should I be the one who's living on the border? Secondly, he's looking at the government. And I'm just seeing the pose, you know, this government is not a popular government. It doesn't trust the government that it will rebuild. It's looking what's happening in the South. Right now, it's Brothers in Arms, which is a central left organization, a protest organization

that has started to rebuild Kfar Aza. It's not the government. So they're saying, you know, how is it possible? So on the other hand, I want to sort of emphasize that people want to go back to their homes and they want their kibbutzim and their towns back. And most people want to be back there. And if you look at the movement of the kibbutzim, the labor movement of villages and kibbutzim in Israel,

they're saying no place will not return to what it was. We have the people. Even if these are not the same people who are gonna return, we have many others waiting, and we will not let go of any piece of land, and we're gonna be back there. But it's a matter of resources being applied, and Israel has less resources after more than a year of war. All right, Nedav, we will leave it there,

unfortunately, on somewhat of a down note, but I there, unfortunately, on somewhat of a down note, but you know, I normally try to end on somewhat of a higher note. But like I said, the military successes have been extraordinary. But the part of this story that you're talking about here, there's unfortunately not any very, at least right now, very good news. I have to say that it's not because me wanting to end with a happy note or with a positive note, but if Hezbollah leaves this war and there is a decision to disarm it in southern Lebanon, and Hezbollah, after it began the war in solidarity with Gaza, is deciding to just exit this war. And our northern front will be quiet again.

This is the type of win that you can get in this war. And I think it's a great achievement considering the way that this war has begun and it is a victory. And this kind of feeling down about this is a very Yom Kippur thing, 1973 thing. But we should really keep our eyes on the ball. And if we are realistic, our eyes on the ball. And if we are realistic, we can see the achievement there. And as to the rebuilding of the Israeli society, as always, I would place my bets with Israeli civilians and society more than on Israeli administration and politics.

And if you do that, and you have done that before then, you've written books about that, then you actually see that there's a lot to hope for. And I'm really not saying this in order to cheer people up. It's just how things are right now, I think. I'm with you. Never bet against the Israeli people, is the note we'll end on.

All right, Nadav, thank you. I'll talk to you soon. Thanks very much. Call Me Back is produced and edited by Ilan Benatar, our media manager is Rebecca Strom. Additional editing by Martin Huérgou. Research by Gabe Silverstein. Until next time, I'm your host, Dan Seenor.