Call Me Back - with Dan Senor - THE HOSTAGE DEAL - with Nadav Eyal

Episode Date: January 16, 2025

Watch Call me Back on YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/@CallMeBackPodcast To contact us, sign up for updates, and access transcripts, visit: https://arkmedia.org/ Dan on X: https://x.com/dansenor Dan on Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/dansenor After fifteen months of war, and months of on-again, off-again negotiations, Israel and Hamas have reached a hostage deal, which is set to take effect this upcoming Sunday.  What are the key points of the deal? What should we expect - or brace for - as hostages return home to Israel? And - will this deal mean the end of the war?  To take in this historic development, and to help us understand all the above questions, we welcome back Nadav Eyal to the podcast.  Nadav Eyal is a columnist for Yediiot. He is one of Israel’s leading journalists. Eyal has been covering Middle-Eastern and international politics for the last two decades for Israeli radio, print and television news.

All of us, you know, everyone listening, we're going to have 42 days that are just going to be exuciating in terms of what we're going to see. But at the end of the day, getting back the hostages is not about Israel being sentimental. In principle, the fact that Israel is willing to make these concessions in order to get our people back home, to get our hostages back home, the fact that this solidarity exists in Israeli society is not a point of weakness but of strength. And it is strategically important for the survival of Israel that in such a difficult neighborhood, people will know that the state has their backs and that the society stands as one

and that Kol Israel Harivim Zalazeh. And without that solidarity, how do we promise people that if they go to the army, Israel will do everything. It's five o'clock on Wednesday, January 15th here in New York City. It is midnight on Thursday, January 16th in Israel as Israelis turn to a new day, a very intense day where emotions are running high as news continues to come out about the forthcoming implementation of a new hostage deal and joining me to discuss that new hostage deal is call me back regular Nadav Ayal. Nadav, thanks for being here. I'm happy to be here now physically. I don't have to stare at you in the screen.

Yeah, exactly. You look the same but thank you Yeah, you know you could have said you look younger or something. No, I don't I didn't say that. Okay. Okay. All right, Nadav You have seen this deal the terms of the deal. Can you tell us what's in it? I mean, there's a lot of speculation about what's in it or a lot of speculation about what it means as to what's in it But let's just start with what's in it. What Israel and Hamas have agreed on with the mediation of Qatar, Egypt, and mainly the United States is a three-phase principle deal with the first phase being specified as to a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip and the release of 33 Israeli hostages, alive and dead.

Some alive, some dead. Most are alive and we're going to discuss exactly how this works. And this phase, the first phase of the deal is 42 days. And what we're going to do in the limited time that we have, Dan, is focus mainly on the first phase because the second phase of the deal and the third phase in which Gaza apparently returns to be some sort of a normalized place these were not detailed in the agreement reached in Qatar. The detailed agreement is only as to the first phase and this phase is as complex as it gets. So the first thing I need to say and that's what interests Israel, this is what Israelis are discussing right now.

This is what every house in Israel is very sentimental about in the last few hours are the 33 that are going to be released. The ceasefire is going to last for 42 days. that are going to be released. The ceasefire is going to last for 42 days and they are going to be released by Hamas in a moderated week by week agreement. The first week, this Sunday, we'll see the first civilian female hostages held by Hamas being released. And then when do we see the next so on the seventh day of the day seven days later will see four hostages released. These four hostages are most probably the female soldiers held by her mass. Then on the fourteenth day we will see additional three hostages released. released. 21 days after the beginning, we'll see another three hostages and then in the last week, the fifth week of the agreement, because these are 42 days, six weeks, we'll see 14 Israeli hostages released. And the agreement is that Hamas will release those who are alive first and it will happen according to a humanitarian

hierarchy. First women and children, after that elderly, then Israelis over 50 held by Hamas. Of the 33 that are dead, where do they get return? At the end. So they're all in the last tranche. So the principle is those who are alive will be released first. And here is the main problem. The problem is that Hamas said, we can't tell you who's alive.

It's not that we won't tell you. It's not that we know. We have huge trouble going to the places we need to go and finding the intelligence because this is all across the Gaza Strip. We've been attacking the Gaza Strip. You're attacking our people. We don't know how many of the 33 are alive. So what they were aiming for, Dan, is for Israel to basically agree to treat the entire 33, which is actually a number that we saw in previous negotiations towards this deal in May and in July. They wanted to treat the entire 33

as though they are alive, get the Palestinian prisoners, many of whom, blood on their hands, convicted terrorist murderers, and not acknowledge any if Israel is paying, quote unquote, for bodies or for live hostages. Israel said absolutely not. And that generally we can say now that Israelis are estimating that over 20 of the 33, and there is an exact number, I don't want to use the exact number, but over 20 are alive. And because of that, during the negotiations, what they told Hamas is, we are going to release Palestinian prisoners according to our own assessment as to how many people are alive. So as far as Hamas is concerned, they are releasing 33 Israelis dead or alive, and they're going to get a specific number of Palestinian prisoners about 1200 Palestinian prisoners. Israel is saying no. The way that this

negotiations has happened is Hamas said for instance for the female civilians you will pay us with humanitarian women and teenagers held by you because we understand that there is a humanitarian principle and there are civilians. For the female soldiers that we are holding, they are soldiers. You need to pay more and you need to pay with prisoners with blood on their hands. For Israelis that are men, you need to pay more because these Israelis... Even more than that, right. Yeah, and so forth and so forth.

So generally what you can say is that Israel calculated the number of prisoners it's willing to release according to its actual intelligence as to how many of these Israelis are alive. But this deal is going to be incredibly, incredibly difficult for Israelis. I'll give you one example, the Bebas family. So Hamas on November 30 has announced that the Bebas family is dead. Shiri Bebas, their two redhead toddlers and babies are dead. Israel never acknowledged that. Israel never said that it has intelligence, that the Bebas family has died. Hamas, of course, blamed Israel, blamed the IDF bombing with their deaths. If we don't see the Bebas family released in the first week, that is an actual admission by

Hamas that they're dead, that they're gone, because they are supposed to release women and children first. And we see what happens at the end. And the way that it's going to work is that Israel is going to get its hostages, let's say, in the morning or in the late evening, and then it's going to release the Palestinian prisoners per day. So three hostages released first day according to a specific key, and that key is different to every Israeli hostage. Now as to the bodies, and if you're listening to what I said, that means that in the fifth week,

when they are supposed to release 14, any way you look at this, most of these 14 Israelis are going to come back to Israel in body bags, killed by Hamas, murdered by Hamas, killed during this war. Then Israel is going to release women and teens or children that are held by it from the Gaza Strip and that were held since the beginning of the war. So this is how Israel is paying quote-unquote for the bodies of the Israelis that Hamas has kidnapped and murdered or died during this terrible war. This agreement is not only about that, of course. For Hamas, what's much more important is for the Israelis to change their positions in the Gaza Strip. And this is much more important to them than the prisoners because if you look at the Palestinian prisoners that are being released and you

compare this deal and the Shalit deal in which- 2011, the deal in which 1,027 Palestinian prisoners were returned or exchanged from Israeli prisons for one Israeli hostage, for Gilad Shalit. And then the government again was led by Netanyahu. Then if you look at the price that Israel is paying in terms of prisoners with blood on their hand, this price is rather limited to the number of people that it's going to get back. Because what Hamas really cares about is Israeli presence in the number of people that it's going to get back. Because what Hamas really cares about is Israeli presence in the Gaza Strip, and that's where they negotiate it hard.

The reason that Hamas is going to go through this deal is because Hamas believes that there is no way that Israel is going to return to the war. And Mike Waltz has just been interviewed by you, and if you listen carefully to what the next us national security advisor is saying he's actually saying this administration and this was also said you know by trump now so i'm gonna recode this This administration's position is that Hamas cannot control the Gaza Strip and that Israel has a right to go after Hamas. And I just mellowed this down. I just diluted the intensity in which Mike Watts told you these things on this podcast. Hamas believes that there will be a dynamic in the Gaza Strip that will not allow, and internationally, and vis-à-vis the Trump administration, that will never allow Israel to return to the war. But one of the things that they're getting in this deal is that stuff are going to move

on the ground and they are going to be dramatic. And what I mean is that the IDF is going to surrender territory that is critical and strategic, and we have discussed many times on your show. The first of these elements, or the most important of these elements, not the first, is the Netzerim Corridor that cuts the Gaza Strip from east to west, and it's just south to Gaza City. Israel has been holding to the Netzerim Corridor. To be clear, just the value of Netzerim corridor has many dimensions to it, but one of which is it allows Israel to either prevent or monitor which Palestinians move from southern

Gaza to northern Gaza. And the reason that is so important is because as Palestinians go back to northern Gaza, they get closer and closer to parts of southern Israel which Israel has real security concerns about Palestinian life resuming in full form in northern Gaza, at least if Israel doesn't have someone to monitor who's there. And the Net Zerim Kordor allows them some capacity to either prevent or monitor. SL. What has happened is that much of Hamas operations against Israel on October 7 and in general are happening in the northern part of the Gaza Strip areas like to buy the moon and others. And of course Gaza City and what is has been doing it's been conducting raid operations again and again in these areas it's a subject of a lot of is really discussion many, many soldiers have died since summer.

More than 120 soldiers fell in battle, many of whom are in the northern part of the Gaza Strip still fighting Hamas terrorists that are there. And because there is a military operation there, Israel has ordered the evacuation of civilian population south of the Nasserine corridor towards the central refugee camps of the Gaza Strip and an area called the Muassi north to Rafah and south to the Nasserine corridor. And this area is where most of the Gaza Strip is right now concentrated in terms of population. And many would say that Israel has been pushing the Palestinian population down south in order to pressure Hamas in order to release our hostages. You know, informally Israel is denying that. And I would say, yeah, of course Israel would deny that.

This would not be something that in terms of international law, you can actually say, but you can say is that it is evacuating the Palestinian population from the North temporarily because it doesn't want to jeopardize them while they are having, the IDF is having their military operations in the North. As a byproduct of that, we know from intelligence that this is a huge point of pressure for Hamas, because this is seen as a Nakba. A Nakba, like the 1948 disaster of the war of independence of Israel.

These people had their houses, their towns, their cities in the north, and now they are being pushed to the south. And these areas are being destroyed and fighting. And if you travel to these areas and I have traveled into these areas in Gaza, you see that there is nothing there anymore. And this has been really a source of tension for Hamas leaders because of the population that has been pushed from the north that is pressuring Hamas to agree to a deal. Now, in this deal, they're going to come back home. They're not going to find their towns and cities there. Much

of it has been destroyed in the fighting. The Palestinians will argue not in the fighting, but this is a punitive act by Israel. It doesn't matter. It's not there anymore. And you're going to see down about a million people. And this is going to start happening after about 20 days through this deal, a million people returning back north. And according to the agreement, they're not supposed to return back with weapons, but no one is actually going to inspect them. Well, that's the question. Is there any way to monitor?

Because I've heard, again, I'm not saying I think this is all possible, but they'll be able to do aerial surveillance and no. And they're not going to be able to do any monitoring of who moves up to the north even though the net-stream corridor is evacuated? There's going to be a monitoring of the vehicles coming back to the north by- Through the net-stream corridor? Through the net-stream corridor by a private security company agreed by all parties and they will stand there and check vehicles. Beginning upon implementation?

Upon implementation. On Sunday? No, the implementation of the Nasserine corridor is not immediately. I see. It's after about 20 days. Okay. And that will actually mean that Hamas will be able to return to the northern part of the Gaza Strip en masse.

Not that I need to say, not that they're not there. Israel is losing soldiers fighting with Hamas. This is under-reported in the West. Israel has been taking severe casualties in the northern part of the Gaza Strip. So Hamas is at any rate there, but it will be able to rebuild itself in the northern part of the Gaza Strip, together with a million people that are going to go back home now. And you should also remember, and you know about these things, Dan, better than I do, that it's going to be also an image.

Right. So we're going to see three images. One image is Israeli hostages being released. And this is going to be a sentimental, a happy, a solemn, a devastating moment for the Israeli society. And it's going to happen altogether because there are so many that are not going to come back home. And Israelis are going to have to, even the ones that are coming home are going to have

to face the reality of what these people have been living through for over a year, year and a half. I think I said that on the show, you know, that there is no group of Jews in Jewish history since the Holocaust that have undergone what the Israeli hostages in the Gaza ship have gone through because they're Jews. There is simply no other example like that. So this is the first image. And for Israelis, this is the most important image.

According to polls in Israel, most Israelis support not a ceasefire but an end to the war for the release of all Israeli hostages. The second image is going to be of Palestinian prisoners many of whom more than a hundred. You know convicted murderers blood on their hands arch terrorists being released from Israeli prisons. Said where? That's an excellent question and right now when we are recording this, negotiations are still held as to where will they go. As far as Hamas is concerned, the answer is Gaza or the West Bank, relatively to where they came from.

Israel, even in terms of politically speaking, doesn't want them to be back in the West Bank. It fears another armed intifada. It doesn't want them there. Sending them to Gaza might also strengthen the Hamas and the Gaza Strip. Another idea is exile. The Hamas in the Gaza Strip another idea is an exile Many people within the Israeli defense apparatus that are saying send them to exile and you create more Ismail Haneeh's Salah al-aghuri and all of those leaders of Hamas that are traveling, you know Internationally raising money for the cause talking on Western television and being as harmful as they are But at least in the West Bank or in Gaza we can keep an eye on them. So there is a huge discussion about that. We don't know yet.

So that's being negotiated between Israel and Hamas through intermediaries about where they go. Yeah. Of course the third image and for the international media I suspect that this is going to be you know much of the focus point is of a million Palestinians returning from the refugee camps down in the south of Gaza to the northern parts of Gaza and for them this is going to be an image of victory because of two reasons one of them is symbolic you see them returning back to their land. There were ideas in Israel by the far right and others that talked about annexation of these areas, that spoke about this as a punitive measure, a historic measure,

a punishment for October 7. It's not going to happen. And Netanyahu has agreed to that. He has agreed to not let it happen. Yeah. And the second reason is much more practical. Let's say that this deal after 42 days, after 33 live and dead Israelis are released, let's say that this collapses and Israel returns to the war. How do you fight this kind of war if you have, again, a million people up in the northern side of the Gaza Strip how will the war actually resume after you just changed everything

you need to evacuate them again basically in order to fight there and this is one of the reasons why there is a lot of resistance with mainly with right-wing and far-right politicians in Israel to the deal. But the points that are being raised here are valid points strategically. I do not agree with them. I think that the release of the Israeli hostages is one of two aims of the war. I think the toppling Hamas can always happen later. But the lives of these hostages, you

know, they're running out of time. And I think Israel is committed to people who have been taken in their pajamas. And it is committed also to its soldiers. And we can talk about that. But I want to give some sort of credence to those who are saying, yeah, but what's going to happen afterwards? And what's going to happen with Hamas? How how is it not gonna be a win for hummus. Will the trump administration understand that israel needs to resume the war and even if the war isn't resumed and you have some sort of solution to the gaza strip so one of the great questions you asked my quotes on this show

You asked Mike waltz on this show was could Hamas have some sort of role in the governance of Gaza And he said al-qaeda doesn't play a role Isis doesn't play a role and I don't think Hamas should have its own category, right? And I think that this was for Netanyahu really important to an extent I think that the Trump administration the incoming Trump administration is trying to make life Easier for Netanyahu. But when push comes to shove, this is the question. How do you make sure that Gaza doesn't become a Lebanese scenario in which you have a weak government of sorts and behind that weak government you have a terror organization like Hezbollah

in Lebanon, like Hamas can be in the Gaza Strip, that is the actual army. And they are not responsible. It's the government of Gaza that is like okay or fine, although weak, that is responsible. And people who object to the deal do not object to the deal usually because they don't care about the hostages. They object to it because they think that this could be very harmful for the future. – I want our listeners and viewers to understand the different elements of the deal. You mentioned Israel leaves the Netzerim corridor that Palestinian, Gazan Palestinians will move back to northern Gaza, but there will be some kind of buffer zone between northern Gaza and Israel inside Gaza that didn't exist before October 7th.

Yeah, so there's going to be a few hundred meters of perimeter between the Gaza border as it was before October 7th, where the IDF forces are going to remain. So that didn't exist before. That didn't exist. So there's now a buffer, so it's not so easy now for Hamas to plow through right up to the fence. No, absolutely not. And this is important. People back home can say, a few hundred meters, a few hundred yards, what does it matter?

It does matter because this is how close the Kibbutzim and these towns are. And this is always the problem, always was the problem with Gaza. Kibbutzim, like Kibbutz Nachaloz, is like less than a mile away from the Gaza border. Kisufim is on the border. Kibbutz Kisufim is virtually on the fence. Literally on the fence. So another thing is that the IDF will retain some presence at the Philadelphia corridor. Okay, so the Philadelphia corridor is this corridor.

It's actually a route. You know, say a corridor. The Philadelphia route is an area that divides between the Gaza Strip, urban areas, and between the Egyptian border. Yeah, it was long believed, maybe not to be the transit point, but a transit point through which Hamas over the years accumulated a lot of its weapons, its supplies, its materials that it used, its equipment that it used to build not only its arsenal, but also how it built this whole underground tunnel system was through supplies and materials and equipment that came through the Philadelphia corridor. So and we'll get to what Nathaniel's argument was over the past year, but just generally speaking

Philadelphia corridor was very important to Hamas after Israel left Gaza in 2005. Yeah well the Philadelphia corridor and mainly the Rafah crossing are important for Hamas and corridor and mainly the Rafah crossing are important for Hamas. And the Rafah crossing is the formal crossing from southern Gaza into Egypt. And the thing about this is that at a certain point during the summer when the negotiations on the same structure of a deal were there, Netanyahu made the argument, basically, I think almost literally, that the fate of Israel depends on controlling the Philadelphia route and that this is a good reason not to go through for a deal as to the release of the hostages.

He made a press conference about this and for security officials, including the chiefs of staff and the defense minister at the time gallant, this wasn't seen as a serious concern at all. And this is an understatement what I just said. For them, they said the route is so narrow that if you do have a tunnel underneath it, controlling the route right now means almost nothing. And their second point is most of the things that Hamas got, it got through the Rafah Crossing. And that's the most important area, the Rafah Crossing between Egypt and between Gaza. So at the time that the Muslim Brotherhood controlled Egypt, on those few years that they actually controlled Egypt, they managed to get a whole lot of military assistance to Hamas.

But basically, most of the smuggling of equipment that you can use for army and for building rockets was smuggled in daylight through the raffa crossing. So they were saying, we don't understand this insistence of Netanyahu as to the Philadelphia route. And it's the first time that we've been hearing about that. And one of the things I said on your show, Dan, at the time is that it's also solvable. You know, there are like seven outposts. Israel will retain three that are close to the raffa crossing and another four would

be evacuated. But Israel is going to have some presence there. Yeah. So the bottom line as to this deal, Israel has agreed, as we expected, to decrease the presence of the IDF at the Philadelphia corridor. First of all, Israel is not staying 100% in the Philadelphia corridor. But will have some presence. It will have some presence. But it has agreed that when the second phase of the deal comes, if it ever does, and you people who are listening to us

probably understand that I'm not sure that we're going to see the second phase of the deal right now, in the second phase Israel will evacuate the Philadelphia route altogether. Now, as to the Rafah crossing, and this is important, Israel will retain some control in the Rafah crossing. So we will also have a veto on, for instance, Hamas officials trying to leave the Gaza Strip through the Rafah crossing through Egypt.

One thing that Hamas was demanding last spring and summer in any deal was a formal declaration that the war is over. And this was something that Netanyahu and many people around him, and even some of the security establishment, were concerned about. This idea that at the beginning of a first phase, not a temporary ceasefire,

not like a pause in fighting that Israel committed to last November, but actually the end to the war. And that is not in this deal. Absolutely not. Well, Hamas, as you said, Dan, after the first hostage deal, Yachiyah Sengwar, who was still alive back then, thought that if Israel goes for a hostage deal, there will be a dynamic in which it would be impossible to resume the war. Somewhat we're seeing right now, and this is the reason that Hamas agreed to the deal.

Also they got much more hostages, many more hostages than they bargained for in their attack on Israel, and many of whom were children and women. And for them, it was even a burden internationally speaking. But basically their interest was that they thought that there would be a dynamic. And by the way, many people in Israel far right, right wing, the same people who now object to the deal and also some security analysts said Israel will never be able to resume the war after that deal in which more than 100 people were released at the beginning of the war.

After the deal was finalized and actually collapsed, and it collapsed because Hamas stopped delivering at a certain point what they promised, it turned out that Senoar came to the conclusion it was a strategic mistake to have that first deal and what Sinwar basically said is there will be no more deals with Israel during war. You want a deal, you commit to surrendering every inch of the Gaza Strip back to us and you stop this war or there's not going to be a deal. And I said this on your show, So back in May 27, 2024, and then in July, when Hamas basically negotiated with Israel on the Biden proposal, which became

the Netanyahu proposal, or the Netanyahu proposal that became the Biden proposal, I said back then, and I'm saying this right now, it's the same thing. It's a big win for Israel that Hamas is agreeing to have a deal knowing that the war is not going to stop. So this element that you just discussed, Dan, is that Israel does not commit immediately to end the war. Immediately to end the war. This was already there months ago. And then you can ask, so why didn't we get a deal? What's the reason? And there the Israelis would say, look, we got a lot of things that we didn't get back in the negotiations in May and July.

First of all, the release is much wider than it was. Of live Israeli housing. Yeah, I don't know about that because this number 33 and 34 is a number that both of us in this room, we know about. We've heard that number before. The presence in Philadelphia, the presence within the Gaza Strip, the numbers of Palestinian prisoners released. But the main argument is not that.

The main argument is the argument made by the Biden administration. And to an extent by the Trump, the incoming Trump administration. That is, it doesn't really matter what Hamas has been doing. They are saying they didn't want to have a deal. You know, they blew it up. You know, they used to stop it. They used to stall it. They were actually using the negotiations in order to delegitimize Israel and to have these demonstrations within Israel to that the critics of Netanyahu

Including today in the Israeli right wing and the Israeli far-right Shows devastated by some parts of this deal the critics of Netanyahu will say it's basically it's the same thing You know, it's the same thing You didn't want to go through last time and you have Ben Gver saying on the record Ben Gver the far rightist minister who's saying on the record we managed to derail, we managed to sabotage and he's priding himself, we managed to sabotage the previous deal and then you have the prime minister's office saying that's not true then you have the secretary of government in Israel Mr. Fuchs saying you know this is basically the same deal that we had.

Secretary of the cabinet. Secretary of the cabinet yeah and then you know again this is basically the same deal that we had. Secretary of the cabinet. Secretary of the cabinet, yeah. And then, you know, again, the prime minister's office is saying that's not exactly true. You and I were at a meeting, a conference in the summer, where Biden administration officials were explaining from their perspective why the deal had gotten stalled. And one of the points they mentioned, among many,

was that at the 11th hour in the negotiations Hamas, initially Israel was going to save the most brutal terrorists that were going to be released for the very end of the phases when Israel would presumably get back the male soldiers. And at the 11th hour Hamas reversed it and that they wanted some of those or many or all of those brutal terrorists during the first And at the 11th hour, Hamas reversed it and that they wanted some of those or many or all of those brutal terrorists during the first exchange at the beginning. And what the administration officials conveyed, Nadav, and you and I were both with them, was this was them blowing up the deal. There's no doubt about this, that the Biden administration, about 100 days before the

elections, started to say Hamas is to blame and it is 100% to blame, including in the recent interviews by Tony Blinken and including by the interview made then by Mike Waltz on your show that Hamas was encouraged by pressure on Israel, by the possibility that Hezbollah would join the fight. There's not a lot of daylight between what the Trump administration people are saying, the Biden administration people today are saying that it was Hamas that's responsible for blowing up the deal. And many would say that if Israel wouldn't have killed Yahya Sinwar, wouldn't have gone through what it did to Hezbollah, isolate the axis of resistance, crash the axis of

resistance, you wouldn't have this breakthrough. I have to say to you on that level, you know, there are achievements of the Israelis here in the deal. For instance, the presence of the IDF in the Gaza Strip through the deal, the fine details of the deal that we can go into, some control of the Philadelphia corridor in the first phase and not evacuating it to the first phase and others. But if you look at the structure, look, it's the same structure. You have three phases, the first phase, you have 33, it's the same structure.

And to say that Israel sort of completely changed the arena as to the Gaza Strip and these negotiations and has delivered a deal that is representative of its regional victory. I didn't hear anyone, the Netanyahu government, making that pitch. Maybe the prime minister is going to make that. By the way, the prime minister has not spoken yet. Prime minister has spoken today as we record this. According to a press notice that came from his office, He spoke with the president-elect, Donald Trump. He thanked President Trump for helping to release the hostages and assisting Israel

to bring an end to the suffering of dozens of hostages and their families. He said that he is committed to return the hostages at any way. He congratulated President Trump on what he said that the US will work with Israel to secure Gaza so that it will never be a safe haven for terrorists. And they also talked about meeting soon in DC. And then at the end, it says, in just a very short sentence, afterwards, this is how the sentence began, the Prime Minister spoke with President Biden and thanked him too for the help in promoting the hostage deal. So first of all, you see here that basically, you know,

Netanyahu understands what's happening in Washington, he understands that we're less than a week to the swearing of a new president, but you can see here from from this that the prime minister is acknowledging that there is a deal. But there was no, you know, the prime minister of Qatar has spoken, you know, the Egyptians have spoken, Hamas is definitely speaking, but Francis still didn't give his argument about the deal. And by the way, I'm personally waiting to see what he's going to say.

How is he going to present this to the Israeli public? At the end, I think that the best argument that you can make is the hostages don't have any time, and Israel is a powerful country. We're going to get rid of Hamas and the Gaza Ship. We're going to not going to allow Hamas to control the Gaza Ship, but we need to get our hostages back home off the record. What the Netanyahu people are saying and his vocal supporters in the media are saying, they're basically blaming President Trump. There is a moment of break here between the Israeli far right and right wing. That's the far right though, not the people right around Netanyahu.

It's the Ben, Viren, Smotrich types. Also, to some extent, if you watch Channel 14, which is not only far right, you see that it's a very serious moment for them. I know of analysts, some of them I think are more serious, others are much less serious, that are going, you know, this is not what we expected of President Trump. Why is President Trump pushing us? And you see that off the record, the Netanyahu loyalists are explaining that the Prime Minister simply couldn't have said no to

the President. You mentioned to me before we recorded that one person around Netanyahu who was very instrumental in getting the deal done was Ron Dermer, who's been on this podcast. Yeah, absolutely. In my columns, I'm very critical of Ron Dermer sometimes. Ron Dermer deserves a lot of credit for this deal going through for convincing the prime minister to go through the steel as Does by the way are you Derry the chairman of Shas and the ultra-orthodox here that what they're saying is Pequah nephesh do hit color to her which means that you know saving lives is more important than the entire Torah and which means that you know saving lives is more important than the entire Torah and

Getting our hostages back and by the way, this is a classic position of the ultra-orthodox in Israel This is not the first time they've been adamant about this and I remember a specific meeting of the hostage families with Arya Derry a few months ago there he basically stood up and he swore he swore That he will do everything in his power to get them back. The hostage families were really disappointed of him. Many hostage families. And are you, Derry, leader of the Shas party, which is an ultra-orthodox party in the coalition, he's extremely influential in the Netanyahu government? He has the most expertise in cabinet and seating in cabinet meetings, including Netanyahu. So he set more years in cabinet meetings than any other minister, including the prime minister.

And there he swore to them he'd do everything in his power. And for many hostage families, he didn't keep up with that promise. Many people are very angry at him because of that. But in recent weeks, you see this pressure and you saw something change with Netanyahu. And you can talk about this in terms of political cynical terms, which I will immediately, or in other terms. But here are the facts. If you saw Netanyahu brief just endlessly in previous negotiations and have press conferences and all the record meetings and go and see the Likud members of Knesset and tell them what are the Israeli red lines, then about a month and a half ago you saw

suddenly silence coming from the Netanyahu arena. He wasn't briefing about the deal and people were starting to say, including the defense apparatus that were really critical of Bibi during the previous negotiations, now it's serious. And let me give you an example of how serious this was. There were a few statements made by Netanyahu during these months, even on the record, for instance, in the Wall Street Journal. It's my understanding that these statements as to the future of Gaza and other were actually

coordinated with the negotiating team. The same negotiating team that has been accused in the past by parts of the Israeli government, parts of the Israeli right of not being loyal enough to the prime minister and to the government. And this time what the negotiating team sources were saying, like a month and a half ago, two months ago, they were starting to say, look, this is serious. And one of the things that was obvious after Trump was elected, and I showed you a tweet that I wrote on November 14, it's a short article on Twitter in which I said basically

only Trump can get them back because of the respect in the region, because of the respect in Israel, and because Trump can influence Qatar and influence Egypt, but he can also say to Israel, look, I want a deal now. And we know today that Steve Witkoff has been incredibly important in saying to the Israelis and to all counterparts there, it's not about getting a deal, it's about getting it now. And I've been crediting President Trump, but I should do this, and even if I do this now, it's not enough. This ultimatum of President Trump that the gates of hell will open as to Hamas if there's not going to be a deal until January 20. It was so important to reigniting the dynamics of these negotiations.

And why? Not because, and we said that, not because Mohammed Sinwar in a tunnel somewhere thinks that President Trump is going to send the Navy SEALs to after him in those tunnels or that the Navy SEALs, the US Navy SEALs can do something that the Israeli Navy SEALs are not trying to do anyway, which is killing him. It's because of the dates. It's because he put a date stamp on it. He said January 20 and that pushed everyone and I think mainly the Qataris in that sense, because Qatar has been playing here a game. And it's a very dangerous game in the region. They've been supportive of Hamas. Everybody's blaming Netanyahu for allowing Qatar to tunnel

money to Hamas. Yeah, well, I criticize him too, but it's Qatar that tunnels the money. Let's just not forget that. It's been Qatar has been igniting the reading, inciting the region. It's all about Qatar. And the Trump people were very direct as to things that can happen to Qatar and to other parties in the region. And I think this is really to the credit of the president-elect, the fact that he managed to insert that dynamic and he took this Reagan

example of what happened with the hostages in Iran. And I know that many people name will remain unknown to the general public and to the Israelis. Many people, I know at least of three, that made that pitch to the president himself and told him the most important sentence, only you, Mr. President Trump can bring them back home. Only you can do what Biden has failed to do. And knowing Trump, this gives a breadth of motivation and that was so important. Before we wrap, I think there's another group that deserves enormous credit, which is the fighting men and women of the IDF and the intelligence community of Israel. Because since that deal that fell apart in the spring and summer of 2024, and now, if

you think about what's actually changed, I think one of the most important things that has changed is Israel in the region has suddenly appeared to be winning. Not bogged down, not stuck, not reeling, not losing. I think many people thought Israel was losing. They looked like they're winning. In the spring and summer of 2024, when that deal was being negotiated, Sinwar was alive and in charge. Nasrallah was alive and in charge. Iran and the regime in Iran was emboldened. Assad was still in power. I mean, just think of all that has changed between those two deals. Sinwar dead and Hamas severely, severely degraded. Nasrallah dead. Hezbollah devastated in this incredibly dazzling pageager and walkie talkie attack. Israel exposing and seriously weakening Iran's air defenses.

Assad gone. Now the Houthis on defense. I mean, you just start to think about how the region has transformed really. SL. By the way, the Houthis just announced that they're seizing Faroq. RG. Okay. So there you go. So the sense that Israel is on the move, and my view is this deal is incredibly imperfect. So there is risk for Israel. There's no doubt there's risk for Israel in this deal, and you and I may disagree about the scale of the risk, but there is a risk in this deal for Israel. But if Israel is ever going to take risk, taking risk when they are winning and they are projecting to the region that, as one friend of mine said, Israel's new policy is F around and you'll find out.

Yeah. F around with Israel and you'll find out and everyone from Hezbollah to Hamas to Iran, to they're all fighting like you mess around with Israel and they've suddenly been learning over the last few months that Israel is engaged in these negotiations from a position of strength. And I just think that the transformation of the region here giving Israel leverage to do deals like this is extraordinary. It doesn't look like Israel is on the run and doing deals out of desperation. Yeah. And I think this is also incredibly important politically,

because I look at these things always in terms of domestic politics, and I think that in the world that we live in, leaders unfortunately rarely make these moves unless they look at domestic politics in general. And we just need to face that. And the truth is that Israel has had its victories that allow, even domestically speaking, to make the pitch that you can actually stop the war in Gaza, which would mean the Hamas people are going to see these pictures. We're going to see Hamas people celebrating in the streets in these 42 days.

We were going to see Palestinian prisoners being released, blood on their hands, and we're going to see a million people return back to the north. Israel can do that because it has this image of winning in the region, of disintegrating the axis of resistance, but also because of another reason, and that is that Netanyahu has expanded his coalition. He's not dependent on the far right of Ben-Gvir anymore. He has Gidon-Sarr there. He has another member of Knesset from Yesh At-Tid. From the opposition. He's coming over.

And suddenly, and cynically, suddenly, he can allow himself to have a deal now because his political life is not completely dependent on the Ben-Gver of the world. And Ben-Gver knows this, and because of that, the far right might stay in government because they know that Netanyahu can live without them. And this didn't exist before that. But after and before wrapping up, I want to say something about the people I'm thinking about right now.

Of course, I'm thinking about those families that are so excited waiting for their loved ones and the immense pressure and tension that they are in right now, not knowing their fate until they see them. And until we see these people released, I can say over 20 alive, but we don't know anything until this happens. So this is an incredibly dramatic moment for the Israeli society. But my thoughts are with the families who have lost everything. And I'm not only talking you mentioned the brave men and women of the IDF and the soldiers that have been sacrificing their lives in the Gaza Strip fighting Hamas, but I'm thinking about the families of the hostages that are not going to come back home or those that are going to come back home but are dead.

I'm thinking about those hostages that Israel was negotiating off back in May and July and were murdered by Hamas or died during this war. And I'm thinking about this probably immense sense of frustration, grief of those families that are going to see a deal now that to a large extent is quite similar to what we have seen. So yes, there is the political dynamics, there is the regional dynamics, but at the end of the day, this is just so devastating. And after I say that, I'm saying something I said, and I'm going to say this again, getting back the hostages is not about Israel being sentimental, paying these huge prices for Gilad Shalit at the time.

That might have been a mistake, and many people do think it was a mistake. But in principle, the fact that Israel is willing to make these concessions in order to get our people back home, to get our hostages back home, the fact that this solidarity exists in Israeli society is not a point of weakness but of strength. And it is strategically important for the survival of Israel that in such a difficult neighborhood people will know that the state has their backs and that the society stands as one and that kol Israel la revime ze la ze. And without that solidarity, how do we promise people that if they go to the army, that if they sacrifice their lives, that if they just live in the south on the border or live in

the north, that Israel will do everything? So this is so important. Israeli society is bleeding and is under immense political pressure and tension and distrust. So getting back home, everyone we can, is really important for our survival, factually, rationally. It's not about narratives, it's not about culture, it's about what we need to do to survive in this region. It's a point of strength, and because of that reason, I've been, at least, my op-eds, been very supportive, I'm content that the prime minister has made the right decision. And at the end of the day, if people accuse him or criticize him for making the wrong

decisions, they need to give him credit when he makes the right decisions, even if it wasn't done in the right timing or the right place when we wanted it, he's going to stand behind us. It's very important right now for this to go through. And all of us, everyone listening, we're going to have 42 days that are just going to be excruciating in terms of our sentiment and what we're going to see. Yeah, and what we're going to learn about what these people have been going through. Yeah. Nadev, as always, thank you and I'm sure we'll be speaking the days ahead. Thank you, Dan.

That's our show for today. You can head to our website, ARKmedia.org, that's ARK, ARKmedia.org, to sign up for updates, get in touch with us and access transcripts, all of which have been hyperlinked to resources that we hope will enrich your understanding of the topics covered in the episodes on this podcast. Call Me Back is produced and edited by Alain Benatar. Additional editing by Martin Huérgaux. Rebecca Strom is our operations director, research by Stav Slama and Gabe Silverstein.

Until next time, I'm your host, Dan Sinor.