Call Me Back - with Dan Senor - The Hostage Negotiations - with Nadav Eyal

Episode Date: December 23, 2024

Over the past week, we have seen headline after headline, indicating that Israel and Hamas appear to be closer than ever to a ceasefire and hostage deal. According to reports, the agreement would take place in phases, and would include a halt in fighting, an exchange of Israeli hostages for Palestinian prisoners, and a surge in aid to Gaza. The final phase would include the release of any remaining hostages, an end to the war and talks on reconstruction. How legitimate are these reports - is this for real? What political conditions, both in Israel and among key players in these negotiations, could allow for such a deal to be finalized? To help us understand, and to briefly discuss the recent Houthi attacks, Nadav Eyal returns to the podcast. Nadav Eyal is a columnist for Yediiot. He is one of Israel’s leading journalists. Eyal has been covering Middle-Eastern and international politics for the last two decades for Israeli radio, print and television news.

Do i think that netanyahu has an interest in a deal right now is it going to profit from him politically i think it does we've been spending so much time talking about our victories and israel being in the syrian hermone that's important i'm not gonna downplay that. But getting the hostages back even within the deal that means that you won. It's 6 o'clock p.m. on Sunday, December 22nd in New York City. It's 1 30 a.m. on Monday, December 23rd in Israel as Israelis turn to a new day. Just one quick note on the time stamp. I recently received a message from my sister Wendy Singer who's been on this podcast and she forwarded me a note that a friend of hers had sent her along with a comment Hi Wendy I hope all is well considering the circumstances of these days. Just wanted to let you know how much Dan's opening of his podcast means to me.

As the year dragged on, more and more people outside of Israel kind of moved on themselves. No judgment, but that's the reality. So I wrote a review that expresses my appreciation. And then the review, which is on the ratings and reviews at Apple, reads, while I love the content, what moves me to tears every time is the opening of the show. It might sound like something trivial, but knowing that you are thinking of my moment in time

as you are recording the show means so much to me. So I just wanted to mention that our intention with the timestamp was never to accomplish what that reviewer wrote, but it is true that as we produce this podcast a couple times each week, we are always thinking of Israel and Israelis, and obviously we will continue doing that. I guess I should mention that the original reason for the timestamp was in the immediate days after October 7th. The news events were moving so fast that often we would record a podcast and by the time we would post it, by the time we would drop

the episode, the news developments had advanced beyond what we had discussed in the podcast and we didn't want people listening to the podcast thinking, well why didn't you address this or why don't you address that? So by including the timestamp we were letting our listeners know exactly when we record this conversation so if a news event occurred after that time and date, they would understand why it wasn't referenced in the podcast. But since the timestamp has become this thing that people refer to, and I'm hearing about it from many folks, we will keep it going.

And I guess increasingly these days, especially over the last few months, there have been periods where the news events were moving so fast that maybe it made the timestamp as relevant as ever, including today's conversation where we're going to focus on developments with regard to the hostage negotiations and a possible ceasefire deal, as well as developments between Israel and the Houthis. Over the past week, there has been this constant drip, drip, drip of headlines indicating that Israel and Hamas appear closer than they have been in months to a deal. The agreement, according to reports, would take place in phases and include a halt in fighting, an exchange of Israeli hostages for Palestinian prisoners, terrorists in Israeli prisons, and a surge in aid to Gaza. The last phase according to reports would include the release of any remaining hostages. So

this again we'll discuss this but it would go through phases for chunks of time and following the last phase as I said would include a release of any remaining hostages and an end to the war and talks, I suppose, on Reconstruction. So is this for real or is this just the same old of what we've seen repeatedly over the last year or at least since November, since a year ago November when the only deal was accomplished, was reached? And what political conditions are necessary in Israel and among key players in these negotiations that could allow for such a

deal to go through. So with us to talk about all of these negotiations, or at least what he knows about them, and also about developments with the Houthis over the last week, call me back regular Nadav Ayal returns to the podcast. Nadav, good to have you back. Thanks for having me again. So Nadav, let's talk about what we know in terms of the deal being shaped, whether or not it's finally agreed upon or not, just what we know about what's actually happening. So first of all, just to set the table, who are the key players in these negotiations at this point? So, of course, what we're seeing is Hamas negotiating with the mediators Egypt and Qatar.

Egypt and Qatar are also talking with the Unitedators Egypt and Qatar. Egypt and Qatar are also talking with the United States and with Israel. And this is the same dynamic that we have seen before. Qatar has ejected itself from the negotiations at the time. You probably remember then they were saying neither side is serious. They're very much part of the negotiations right now. And if you talk with Israeli security sources, they'll tell you that they are the most important mediator at this time, including the Egyptians. Physically, a lot of the negotiations are being held in Cairo. So for instance, just the day before yesterday, a delegation of Hamas led by Halil

al-Hayya. Halil al-Hayya has been the chief of the negotiating team of Hamas since actually the beginning of the war. A person who was very close to Yahya Sinwar, the former leader of Hamas, had a meeting in Cairo with the Islamic Jihad and the Popular Front of Palestine, another terror organization. And the reason they met in Cairo was to try and to have a united front going through the negotiations with Israel. They had a notice, by the way, a press notice put out saying that the possibility to get it to a deal is closer than it was ever before if only Israel stops making new demands.

And we are at critical moments according to all sources that are part of this, both Palestinian sources, American sources, and Israeli sources. It's not that they are optimistic about the possibility of getting a deal. Some of them aren't. But they're saying that now is the money time. So the person who's doing the negotiating is who? From the Israeli side leading the negotiations as he did actually since the beginning of the war is the head of the Mossad, Tadi Barnea. And from the Egyptian side, it's the head of the military intelligence who has been replaced in recent months.

And you have the Qataris there. And Bill Burns was leading the American effort here. Director of the CIA. And he is still leading, although, for instance, Jake Sullivan's visit to the region in the last two weeks was very much related to what happened with Hezbollah and Syria, but also to a deal. Now, who's the decision maker? That's what I'm trying to understand. Is he the decision maker or is he just the negotiator? Because previously, Halil al-Khaya was, to your point, negotiating, but everything had to be run through ultimately to Sinwar, who was in some

tunnel in Gaza. And it could sometimes, every time new terms were negotiated, sometimes take a week or two between all the intermediaries and all the messengers and couriers to get to Sinwar and then get the message back cause he doesn't communicate electronically or wasn't communicating electronically. So this delayed the whole process. The fact that Sinwar is not the decision maker, does that from a logistical standpoint make this simpler? Also that he was this demonic leader who believed that he was winning the war and was not inclined to negotiate. Leaving that aside, the logistics of it just seemed to really slow the process

down in the past. SL. So it's a great question and the answer is that to an extent the Palestinians have replaced one sinew with another Sinwar. And the Sinwar now running part of the show, not all the show, not like Yahya Sinwar, the leader that Israel killed, is his brother, Mohammad Sinwar. Mohammad Sinwar is to an extent on a personal level, at least in his reputation in Gaza, even more ruthless than his brother. His brother was a calculated and successful political leader, unfortunately for Israel and I think unfortunately for the Palestinians.

Mohamed Sinwar is more of a military commander than his brother ever was. His brother spent most of his days in Israeli jails and then he was released and elected to be the leader of Hamas in Gaza. Mohammed Sinwar was the regiment commander of Hanunis years and years ago. So he grew up really from the field. Israel tried to strike him several times. It didn't manage to do that. And he is a classic dangerous military front of Hamas is a Dinal Qassam official that has grew up really through the guerrilla war and the terror war that Hamas has been conducting against

Israel for many years. And what we are seeing within Hamas is some sort of a struggle on power with the vacuum of Yahya Sinwar dead because of the Israeli attack. And not only Yahya Sinwar, also Muhammad Def, who was really the paramilitary leader of Hamas for many, many years, much before these two brothers rose to prominence within the Hamas movement. And this power struggle within Hamas doesn't mean that they don't take decisions together. So I want to be very careful when I say there's this kind of power struggle. It's not that they have split to different factions, but there are different factors

within the movement that are trying to push, and it's not as organized as it was during Yahya Sinwar's time. And some would say that it plays to the benefit of a possible hostage deal and you see this kind of push and shove within Hamas and to some extent and this is a point made I think by Prime Minister Netanyahu himself. The death of Yahuwah allowed more leeway and more maneuvering and the ability to change things in reference to a possible hostage deal because Sinwar was so difficult. But let me give you an idea about Muhammad Sinwar. So we all remember President Trump's post giving this ultimatum and saying, you know, all hell would be brought over Hamas if they don't agree to release the hostages.

What my sources are saying is that Muhammad Sinwar, the brother of Yahya Sinwar, is thinking about these threats like this. If we stand against even Trump, that means that this is a real resistance. So for him, this threat by Trump is an Islamic challenge, a fundamentalist challenge. And this is how he thinks about this. And it is the idea of the sources that I'm speaking with that Mohamed Sinawar is basically saying, whatever Israel did, Trump can't do more to us here in Gaza than Israel didn't try to do.

And we should stand our ground. Now by standing our ground, that doesn't mean that he is saying don't agree to any deal, but he is definitely, definitely a stumbling block towards a deal, according to my sources. And that's the reason I brought this name up. The main thing for Hamas in this deal is twofold. First of all, the first concession is theirs. They are willing to have a deal that will release some of the hostages without ending the war immediately and with the IDF staying in Gaza.

But this concession was already made back in May. So back in May they already agreed to a two-phase deal, right? But for them this is the big concession, that the IDF stays in Gaza and they're going to release hostages which are, you know, for them bargaining chips. So why is that a big concession if that was when they already conceded? days in Gaza and they're going to release hostages which are, you know, for them bargaining chips. So why is that a big concession if that was when they already conceded? Because it's all about the phrasing and the specifics. I'll give you an example. If Israel does evacuate the Netzerim corridor, cutting the Gaza ship from east to west and

preventing actually the Palestinian population returning to its land in the northern part of Gaza. This corridor is almost the size of Tel Aviv in its width. And what Israel told the Palestinians is that this is basically the trade-off. We're going to evacuate the corridor. Hundreds of thousands of people might be able to return back to the north. So all of these arguments and accusations that this is an attempted ethnic cleansing, that this is for eternity, that Israel is going to stay, that's not going to happen.

And you're going to release some of the hostages and then you're going to release all the hostages at the end of the war. This is the Biden proposal. This is the Netanyahu proposal. But now the question is following the killing of Yahya Sinwar and following what happened to the axis of resistance, i.e. the axis of terror that we discussed on your show many times now, now will Hamas compromise on the terms of that evacuation of the Nisarim corridor? For instance, will Israel be able to monitor the people going back to the north to make sure that Hamas is not rebuilding its infrastructure? Now, I should explain geographically that most of the Israeli towns in Kibbutzim are

close to the northern part of Gaza, which is also naturally closer to Tel Aviv, closer to the center of Israel. And because of that, it's very important for the Israelis to make sure that this is not going to be Hamas returning to all its places and coming close again to the border and to the border of France. So Israel is going to maintain a perimeter around the Gaza Strip anyway, and this is part of the negotiating deal, even if it evacuates the corridor. But what kind of monitoring possibilities does it have in order to make sure that Hamas is not rebuilding? And the answer then, to be frank, is that it doesn't. If you allow hundreds of thousands of people to return, you're not going to

manually inspect each one of them. It's impossible for the Israeli soldiers to do that. One question that was asked during the negotiations, as far as I know, is the questions of vehicles. Are you allowing vehicles? Because in vehicles, of course, you can put ammunition and other things. So there were ideas back in the summer. And now this is one of the issues that the Israelis think that they have managed to squeeze Hamas some more. This is one issue. A seminal issue, the most drastic issue for Israelis is of course the hostages and the number of hostages that Hamas is going to release. And you really need to go back each time to the previous negotiation, because it's to an extent, it's very close.

It's very, I don't want to say similar, but there are too many similarities between the previous deal discussed and the one discussed right now. At the time, Israel was talking about demanding that Hamas release the first phase, more than 30 hostages, and there was a minimum bar of at least 18 to 22. These hostages are considered humanitarian. That means women, female soldiers that are held by Hamas,

people that are in dire medical condition, people that Israel knows because of footage got hurt during the October 7 attack, people who are over 50 and others. And one type of negotiation is who are these people specifically and can Hamas vouch to the number of live hostages that it's going to release. And of course right now the negotiating team is very much focused on getting the live hostages back. And I should remind, unfortunately, our listeners

that dozens of the 100 hostages held by Hamas, dozens of them are dead. Israel has a pretty good idea on a number of how many are alive. I don't want to say the number because of obvious reasons. It's debated within the Israeli defense apparatus. If you ask people from the defense ministry, they'll say a lower number. If you ask people from the Mossad, they'll say a higher number. But I can say that dozens, I want to underline this, this is really important. Many, many dozens of hostages according to Israeli intelligence and Israeli intelligence,

as we have seen during this war, has its capabilities, are alive, are held alive, and Israel has significant intelligence as to their condition. And this is one of the reasons that Israel is so insistent with Hamas on getting the names and making sure that Hamas doesn't disappear people during these negotiations. Now, what Hamas wants, and this is the most important thing for the Israelis is other hostages, right? This is obvious. What Hamas wants is to drag Israel as much as it can to say that it's ending the war

and try to create a scenario on the ground which will mean that the war has actually ended and that there is no way that Israel can restart the military operation. And to that matter, Prime Minister Netanyahu did something in the last week that really enraged some of the families. First of all, he gave an interview to, I think, Eliud Kaufman with the Wall Street Journal and in that interview He stated that Israel is not going to agree to an end to the war in which Hamas will continue to control Gaza I have to say that this is you know, this sentence is somewhat part of it is completely consensus in Israel

Hamas cannot control Gaza. Okay, the other part of the sentence It won't agree to the end of the war. Actually, if you look at polls right now, Dan conducted channel 12 polls and others, you see that the majority of Israelis are saying, if you get all the hostages back, you can end the war. But then, Dan, if you'll ask them, end the war and get Hamas in Gaza, I'm not sure that this would be the same kind of reaction. The question is, will Hamas be in charge of Gaza at the end of the war? When I talk to Israelis across the political spectrum,

they say, I mean, they all agree the hostages getting the hostages back is the priority. But they also say there's no way Hamas can continue to rule Gaza. Yeah, absolutely. This is a consensus in Israel. And the fact that the prime minister spoke about his red lines on the record during the negotiations, while we have had the impression that this is so serious because the Prime

Minister himself was saying, don't talk, and nobody was talking. Nobody was briefing. It was very hard for me as a journalist to get information because it was so tightly wrapped. It was obvious that Israelis are really serious about this being secret and suddenly he gave an on-the-record interview. And then what we call a senior official in Jerusalem also gave a statement, sort of off-the-record statement, and I let the listeners guess who it came from saying, Maran Baragouti, who's a Fatah terrorist.

I mean, a background statement. It was not attributable to anyone by name. You know, it's a small country, so everybody knows. So Mauran Baragouti, considered a possible leader of the Palestinian Fatah movement, not Hamas, will not be released in any deal. And they were going, you know, why should we say that? Israel is going to get veto power on some of the lists of the Palestinian terrorists that they want to release, the Palestinians, Hamas. So Israel can just say no to Maran Borghouti. It's going to be her first no, because Maran Borghouti is sentenced for consecutive life sentences. It'll be Israel's first no.

Yeah, because he's sitting for organizing suicide bombings during the Second Intifada, Because Moran Bar-Ghouti is sentenced for consecutive life sentences. It'll be Israel's first now. Yeah, because he's sitting for organizing suicide bombings during the Second Intifada and he's a very influential leader with the Palestinian street. So Israel is not going to grant this Hamas, not only because of obvious reasons of him being a terrorist, but also because it doesn't want to embarrass the Palestinian Authority and Fatah, which is the intention of Hamas saying, they got freed your leader, right? And you still sustain relations with Israel and you have the Palestinian authority. Anyway, it's not going to happen.

But someone in Jerusalem had the idea that he needed to brief the press. And because of these two elements this week, you see again, you know, a recreation of the same kind of some mistrust with the Israeli side, with Israeli society, with its leadership. And on the other hand, Hamas playing its cards and being extremely difficult and people in Hamas going, oh, like Sinwar, the living Sinwar, if Trump is threatening us, maybe we should stand on ground because this is who we are, freedom fighters and all the rest of this terrible fundamentalist nonsense that has led the Middle East and Gaza to

where it is right now. But Nadav, it seems to me that two very big changes since the previous negotiations is one, Hamas is completely isolated. So even if Mohammed Sinwar is getting dug in, Hamas as an entity does not have, can't rely on the alliances it had from other proxies and entities within the axis of resistance, namely Hezbollah, which was, after refusing to negotiate its standalone deal

with Israel for months and months and months, finally said, okay, we'll do our own deal. Hamas, you're on your own. So a they're isolated and B maybe Mohammed Zidane is, you know, defined in the face of the statements from president Trump, but it seems like others around the region, including those who have tremendous influence over Hamas are jostled to say the least by the change in tone from the incoming administration. And by the way, this point I'm hearing not only from officials close to Trump who are

getting this feedback from different players in the Middle East, but I'm hearing this also from folks around President Biden who say, look, it's very complicated trying to conduct our foreign policy while the incoming administration is issuing statements and having the officials that will be serving the next administration travel to the region. It complicates things on the one hand. On the other hand, they're inclined to get a deal done now while Biden is still president because they're worried about Trump. And so some of the Biden folks are saying that's helpful.

And lastly, I've heard this from hostage families, that they say that Trump getting elected and him saying the things he's willing to say is Shaking up a process that had been stuck The process has been stuck and it needed to be shaken up and I'm telling you I won't say their names But the other people you know and I know who? Under normal circumstances would not have been people who would be terribly sympathetic to Trump. There are people who work closely with the Biden administration on the hostage negotiations and they are saying, hostage families, particularly Americans, they're saying, you know what, we're glad Trump was elected and we're glad that he's saying

the things he's saying because it's putting pressure on a whole bunch of people in the region that was badly needed. First of all, I'm hearing the same things. I think this is what ignited the negotiations to a large extent. As you say, I think the Biden administration is giving credit to Trump for moving this. And they're also, I don't want to say working with the Trump team. I'm not sure that they're too happy about Trump already actually being president, as though he is in office, but they are definitely coordinating

That is for sure like Mike waltz the incoming national security advisors in close communication with Jake Sullivan I know that Steve Witkoff who's gonna be the key Middle East envoy has been in close contact before his travel to the region with Sullivan and others Brett McGurk like they are very synced up, the Biden and Trump teams. And I think that it's a win, even politically, this is a win for both sides. If we get at least some of the hostages back

before January 20, it's definitely a win to the Biden administration that has put so much effort. And I want specifically to say this about Bill Burns, who has been so committed to these negotiations and. On the other hand you know for trump it's he who has moved the needle so to speak to the extent that we can have a deal and by the way i will also say i wouldn't be surprised. If trump puts out another statement you know that the first one had a large impact, it definitely made waves around the region and around the world. Many in Washington are surprised by how many waves it created.

And I think at the appropriate time, you may see Trump or someone around Trump putting out another message that wouldn't be the exact same messages the one he already put out, but continuing to put pressure on everyone in the region. Get a deal done. I'm taking notes, Dan, now for my next column from what you're saying. I'm just telling you, it's just my sense of things. No, no, I'm taking notes and I sort of recommend the listeners to take notes too. I think that, well, I don't know how many sort of threats can Trump make that will move Hamas in the dark

dungeons of Gaza. And you can see why tactically it's always a problem. But one thing is for sure. He got the Qataris stressed out, right? He got the Hamas, the foreign Hamas, what we call the Hamas that's not in Gaza, like Khalil al-Hayya and others. They're very tense because they're being kicked out from countries and everybody understands what's the new tune of this administration.

And there's another something that I should say. I'm not sure, and I'm saying this based on information, that it's going to be the position of the Trump administration to pressure Israel to have more humanitarian aid supplying to Gaza as it is the policy of the Biden administration. Trump administration to pressure Israel to have more humanitarian aid supplying to Gaza, as it is the policy of the Biden administration. And Hamas is very unpopular. And this is a new thing. Meaning Hamas is very unpopular among the Palestinians.

Among the Palestinians and in Gaza. In Gaza. Look, it's very hard to poll, right? In Gaza right now. It's not that everybody has, you know, has mobile phone available and can pick up the phone in these conditions. But if you look also in the West Bank, the tide has changed. And Hamas is to a large extent, if it was very fashionable right after October 7, it's very obvious after what Israel did to the axis of resistance that this is an opportunity

for the Israelis. And this is one of the reasons that there is so much pressure within the defense apparatus and with the mainly with the hostage families and the entire Israeli public to get the deal now. And I want to explain something that I think people don't understand usually when they talk about this. It's always when they talk about this. It's always the hostage deal versus winning against Hamas and ending the war with having no Hamas in Gaza. But for me, it's exactly the other way around. There is no way that Israel can win this war and have a different government or something in Gaza without having a plan for the day after in which Hamas doesn't control Gaza and Hamas is not gonna agree to release the last hostages that it will have and at any rate unfortunately Dan they're gonna hold on to many hostages live hostages in a two-phase deal until the end of the

war they're not gonna agree to that unless the war ends. So this is a problem that you need to solve. You need to know how you want to end the war in order to get all the hostages back. And Israel simply cannot take out Hamas unless it's willing to actively sacrifice their lives because it is holding the hostages in Gaza in a way that would prevent Israel from, and I need to be careful with my words right now, to advance operationally into Gaza. So they are using the hostages so that the war won't end as far as Hamas is concerned and that they'll be able to survive. For Israel to get some of the hostages back after its immense victories against the Axis, while it is still in Gaza then, that's a win.

And I do think that Netanyahu has an interest in a two-phase deal. Many families would say it's not enough. He should have a one-phase deal and just end the war. Now, get the hostages back, agree to whatever, then defeat Hamas. This is what many families would say. But if you're asking me politically, just cynically, do I think that Netanyahu has an interest in a deal right now? Is it going to profit for him politically? I think it does because the Israeli public is so bent on getting a deal and getting these hostages out. And the feeling is that if you don't get at least some of them out right now, it's never going to happen. And this

is a crucial moment. And again, while saying this, I need to remind our listeners that it takes two to get a deal, it takes two to tango. And Hamas, if the pressure goes up at the Israeli street, it is true that then Hamas feels that they have more leverage to maneuver in negotiations with Israel. And because of that, this is a problem from hell. But there is a horizon here, and the horizon is as such. The IDF and the defense apparatus has proved to the political class in Israel that they can deliver against substantial enemies much bigger than Hamas now. And this gives the Prime Minister and the coalition should give them if they want some leeway to have concessions, get the deal, get as many hostages as they can out and then tackle

Hamas and have a day after plan in Gaza. And by the way, this day after plan in Gaza is still negotiated and it is in the process of being presented or talked about, conversed with the Trump officials. Okay. So I want to talk about that. So two things. One, this is another way in which I think Trump's arrival on the scene helps as it relates to negotiations.

One, I don't think Ben-Gver and Smoltrich were so intimidated by Biden and the Biden team. I've heard from some folks around Netanyahu, let's see how they fare dealing with Trump. Trump happens to be extremely popular among Israelis, as you know, and Trump is especially popular among the base of Ben-Gver and Smoltrich.

More popular, as Trump himself says in close conversations, popular among the base of Ben-Gveren Smoltrich. More popular as Trump himself says in closed conversations, more popular than even the Prime Minister. So if he's very popular with the Ben-Gveren Smoltrich base, that's a new dynamic that I think that Prime Minister Netanyahu and the people around him are more than happy to welcome. That's a new input that has not existed. And two, obviously, as we've talked about on this podcast, the expansion of the Netanyahu government

with Guido Ansar joining the government, adding four Knesset seats, creating more cushion in Netanyahu's majority. So suddenly Ben-Gvir and Smoltrish, specifically Ben-Gvir, has less negotiating power. His threats are not entirely empty, but they're a lot more empty than they were before Gideon Sartre joined the government because his constantly huffing and puffing that he's gonna bring the government down,

suddenly start to do the math and you're like, not so easy. I totally agree and I think that to that extent, really this plays very well. So the stars are aligned. You have a win for Israel in the north and against the Axis of Resistance. You have Hamas so isolated in the region. You have its popularity drowning.

So they really want and need a ceasefire. They know that with the Trump administration, they might not get even the humanitarian assistance that they've been getting during the Biden administration. You have here the Israeli public that is becoming more and more supportive with the concept of ending the war. If you would have said months ago, end the war, you wouldn't get the type of numbers that you're getting right now in the polls. All of this together should really bring us to a deal. And saying that this is the Middle East, and I have to tell you, this is taking too much time. I was much more optimistic when we spoke last time. I'm hearing some pessimism coming from both American sources and to an extent Israeli sources.

And I'm hearing again accusations that you know some people are not sure that the prime minister wants to go ahead and I didn't open up with this I open up with Mohammed Sanwar not wanting this and trying to derail this in the name of another fundamentalism. And all of this sounds very familiar. And it also brings about the question is, could we have had a deal in July? And if we would have had that deal, those hostages that were murdered, the six hostages that were murdered, could they have been released? Because if this is going to be very similar to the deal we didn't have back then, what does it mean? Except the difference is last July, as you and I heard directly from one Biden official who was very involved, Hamas was feeling emboldened.

Hamas was feeling the pressure was mounting on Israel, not mounting on Hamas. They were in a much different situation and they were much more obstructionist in the negotiations than they appear to be now. It was a different world. I agree and I think that what Israel has done in the Middle East is truly remarkable. And you have had a few excellent programs about that, conversations, and we talked about this. is I want to underline truly, if you're an Israeli, what really matters and the best victory image that Israelis can have is having the female soldiers and the rest of the hostages released back home.

I cannot explain how crucial this is for the Israeli society to get this done because this is the name of the war. This is not about a deal or not a deal. You know, everybody would be happy if Seyret Matkal could land somewhere in Gaza and release them. But unfortunately, what we have seen is that military activity in Gaza by the IDF as part of the war has led to the deaths of hostages.

There's no doubt about that. The IDF is saying this and they're saying, you know, in this place we weren't careful enough. But it's impossible. And some people, for instance, are saying, I'm talking about right-wing Zvi Cheskely, a colleague of mine who is very much aligned, he's an expert on the Arab world, we work together in Channel 10, he's very much aligned with what people would call right-wing, ideological right-wing in Israel, but he also knows the neighborhood, he speaks Arabic, and he says what Israel should have done is have a hostage deal immediately after October 7, not begin the war at all, wait for the hostage

deal, release every Palestinian prisoner in Israeli jails. Everyone. Everyone. Every single one. Including the arch-murderers. And then begin the war against Hamas. Because then you would have our hostages back home. Now, I don't know if that could actually happen. That would have taken months. And of course, then Israel would have lost its credence internationally to act against Hamas. I can go on. I'm just giving this as an example of a public sentiment in Israel that, yeah, we're successful against Iran and we're successful against Hezbollah and we disintegrated Hamas, but what about the aim of the war besides taking down Hamas, which is getting the hostages back?

And this is where all the pain of October 7 is still there. It is where October 7 didn't end. And I'm not saying this is in a critical tone. You don't get to get everything you aim for in a war, and there's no doubt that Israel tried to either operationally release hostages or negotiate. I cannot imagine what would happen to the Israeli society if the end of this is that Israel knew that there were this number of dozens of live hostages and then it decreased, it decreased, it decreased, it decreased, and then everybody, you know, they

died in the Hamas dungeons, tortured, assaulted, attacked, hopeless in those tunnels. What will it mean to Israeli solidarity, to call Israel a revim ze la ze? What it will mean to the Israeli society that has a crisis of mistrust with its institutions? By the way, not only the government, but also if you talk with many Likud voters, they have a crisis of trust with the army, right? With the army leadership, with the defense apparatus. What will it mean? And this is one of the reasons why the image, the most important image, but the most important essence intrinsically is to get the hostages back. We've been spending so much time talking about our victories and Israel being in the Syrian hormone. That's important. I'm not going to downplay that. But getting the hostages back, even within a deal, that means that you won. Ben Shepard Nadeim, before we go, I do want to ask you just to bottom out where we stand

with regard to Israel taking real action against the Houthis. Last Thursday there was the Houthi attack that resulted, I guess the ballistic missile was partially intercepted, but there was some kind of debris or some part of the munition that landed in a school in Ramat Gan. And then Saturday night there was a ballistic missile that was not intercepted. I guess the interceptors failed. I'm not entirely sure what happened there and it hit a playground in South Tel Aviv where 16 people were injured Israel has struck the Houthis since then hit fuel depots hit three of the ports that are Houthi controlled Obviously, that's where the Houthis receive a lot of their munitions supplies and also the US took action Days after this strike on the

Saturday strike on Israel. Israel responded pretty robustly 14 fighter jets, dozens of aircraft, apparently considerable volume of munitions dropped on these Yemenite sites followed by obviously more recently the US. So there's a lot happening. Yes most of the access of resistance seems to if not been entirely defeated largely neutralized and yet the hooties are this persistent problem. Yeah and this is a huge problem first of all for the world because the hooties have changed maritime trade routes substantially and there is a coalition of the UK and the US that's operating against the Houthis and at least in terms of success. It's not showing any meaningful change in that regard and now the question is what do you do with the rogue country that's ruled by a fundamentalist sect. a fundamentalist sect that is held down on just being jihadists to the full extent. And this is what they're saying, that they're going to continue on fighting against Israel. And if Israel is bombing them and the UK is bombing them, the US is bombing them, and

it doesn't change anything, what is the world supposed to do? And this is the reason we had some sort of an international order after 1945. We should have had a UN Security Council decision. We should have had an international coalition that would have gone there and take them out. And nobody's even talking about this because it would be completely, I think, illegitimate politically in the US to even consider boots on the ground in Yemen. But let me just quote something that a Saudi friend told me at the time. And he talked with me about how the US a Saudi friend told me at the time.

And he talked with me about how the US administration, he was talking about the Biden administration, didn't understand what was happening in Yemen and in the region. So it was a conversation between people kind of from the Middle East, both an Israeli and a Saudi and someone from Bahrain. They're all talking about US administrations not understanding the Middle East, right? And this person who's a known figure, he told me, look, we have told them in Yemen,

we're fighting this war. And if we're not gonna fight the war against the Houthis, the Saudis fought against the Houthis, one day someone else will need to fight the war. And you guys in the West and the Americans, you criticized us. You wanted this to stop. We had human rights organizations

attacking the Saudi kingdom. It was so crazy. When you think back about the heat that the Saudis took for confronting the Houthis, which were posing a real threat to Saudi, a real threat to the Emiratis. They attacked Saudi oil installations. Exactly.

And some of these organizations, NGOs, and members of Congress that were running around irate about the Saudi responding to the threat from the Houthis. If you just go back in time and think, knowing what we know now, the havoc that the Houthis have unleashed, we probably should have been encouraging the Saudis to kind of finish the job, not reining them in. And now Israel is going to have to do it. Someone has to do it. But the truth is that even geographically speaking, Israel has huge challenges in doing so vis-a-vis the Houthis. But Israeli Air Force is using this experience to prepare itself, what might happen in 2025 in relation to the Islamic Republic and its nuclear program?

But then still, how do you solve this problem? Israel is not going to send a force to occupy Sana'a. There's only one superpower that can do that. And I suspect that the US is not going to do this either. Definitely not under President Trump. So how do you solve this problem? And this is not about the Middle East even anymore. This is about the international order disintegrating. And I think that these are huge questions that when you know, when sometimes when I hear isolationists in the US making their pitch and some of them feel now more emboldened, although after the Trump nomination, the actual

nomination in the Trump administration, I don't think that they are that emboldened. But how are you going to sustain the world that the US so wisely has built in which the US has prospered and democracies have prospered when you have these rogue elements like the Houthis and others. Look, the US needs to face to an extent China. China is a nuclear power. It needs to face Russia. Russia is a nuclear power. There's always the risk of a nuclear war. And you have, of course, North Korea that's a nuclear power too. But there's one place in the world in which nobody has nuclear weapons, according to foreign sources, I should add, besides a US ally, and that is the Middle East.

There is one place in which it can actually be prevented, this scenario in which you can't get rogue players from stopping being rogue because they have nuclear weapons. And this is the Middle East with Iran. Iran still doesn't have nuclear weapons. And I would say that this resistance, North Korea, Russia, China, Iran, as you're saying, one of the four of them does not have nuclear weapons. And to your point, it can be stopped. And if you think about the summer of 2021, when the US withdrew from Afghanistan in a very haphazard way, and the degree to which that debacle is cited by enemies of the United

States as a reason why they felt emboldened, why Putin felt emboldened, why China feels emboldened, why Iran may feel emboldened is because look at the way the US haphazardly just pulled out of Afghanistan. The US is pulling back. The US does not want to be engaged in the world. This is effectively, if not a green light, then at least a yellow light for enemies of a green light than at least a yellow light for enemies of the US and enemies of the West to make whatever moves they want because the US is just not going to get involved. And if you want the inverse of that scenario, it would be a Western alliance stopping Iran from getting a nuclear bomb. That would be the opposite of Afghanistan, the Afghan withdrawal in 2021.

Of course. And we just saw in Syria a picture that we didn't see for a long time of Russian troops leaving their posts and going back home. And the country that supplied that picture to the West was Israel. And Iran can still be stopped. And you can only imagine what would happen if it won't be stopped. There are certain elements that Israel will have huge technical and political problems handling by itself. I think it showed its worth during the war in recent months, but it does need some sort of a coalition behind it

in order to stop at least the Iranian, if not the Houthis. Yeah, I agree. Nadav, we're gonna leave it there. I do wanna wrap in referencing something you said earlier, which is that it's hard to understand if you're not living in Israel, how much Israeli society has been shattered, obviously by October 7th, but also by the idea

that there was these hostages there. You and I talked about it, and I talked about this podcast, when I was in Israel in December, I really felt it there, that Israelis, this uncertainty about how to, you know, because Israel's clearly winning in the region, its geopolitical position in the region has been transformed. So there's a sense that you wanna just get back to life

and come back to some kind of normalcy and it feels very hard to do, obviously, when you know that a hundred of your brothers and sisters and children and parents and grandparents, whatever the relationship anyone has to do, obviously, when you know that a hundred of your brothers and sisters and children are, and parents and grandparents, whatever the relationship anyone has to any of the hostages, are still there. But I will just say, as an American, it is maddening to me that seven of those hostages

are US citizens, and we in the US do not have the familiarity with those hostages that we have had with other American hostages held in other places. Specifically, Russia are the ones I'm thinking about where American citizens have been held and they became household names. They became national causes to get them home. And I just think it's tragic that this failure

to put the notion of Americans being held by Hamas front and center hopefully it's not too late to do so but you know it does feel like the ultimate double standard. It does. All right, Nadev, wishing you and your family a happy Hanukkah. Thank you. Happy Hanukkah to you too. And to all our listeners who are celebrating Hanukkah and those who are celebrating Christmas,

the first night of both, holidays overlap. So as you're sitting around the menorah reciting the prayers, I hope you're not listening to call me back. I hope you're enjoying your family and your friends, but we'll try not to interrupt your holiday unless we have good news to report. I hope I'll have some good news. Thank you, Dan. Call Me Back is produced and edited by Alain Benatar,

our media manager is Rebecca Strom. Additional editing by Martin Wergo, research by Gabe Silverstein. Until next time, I'm your host Dan Sinor