Call Me Back - with Dan Senor - The Houthis and The Hague - with Nadav Eyal

Episode Date: January 13, 2024

In recent days, two big stories have gotten a lot bigger. The U.S. and U.K. have launched air and missile strikes against Houthi targets in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen on Thursday and today, marking a significant response after the U.S. Government warned that this Iran-backed (and Iran armed, trained, and financed) militant/terrorist group would be held responsible for its attacks on commercial shipping in the Red Sea. But how did the Houthis -- rather than Hezbollah -- find themselves as the primary Iran-backed proxy responding to the Hamas-Israel war? And what does U.S. and U.K. action against them tell us about this war? Is it widening? At the same time, Israel finds itself at the International Court of Justice, having to defend itself againt the charge of committing genocide against the Palestinians, because of Israel's response to Hamas's attempted genocide. Our guest is NADAV EYAL, who joins us from Europe, having just been at the Hague, where he was covering the court proceedings. He is a columnist at Yediiot. Eyal is one of Israel’s leading journalists, and a winner of the Sokolov Prize, Israel’s most prestigious journalism award. Eyal has been covering Middle-Eastern and international politics for the last two decades for Israeli radio, print and television news. He received a master’s degree from the London School of Economics and a law degree from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

South Africa said yesterday more than a million people were ordered to leave their homes immediately and with no warning. And today, an attorney for the Israeli Justice Department said the Israelis have notified the Palestinians in northern Gaza where to evacuate and when to evacuate three weeks before the ground operation. So they will have enough time to evacuate down south. So these are not factual errors. This is basically misleading the court and trying to use the court as a weapon for what? To achieve a Hamas victory. It is Friday, January 12th at 11 p.m. shortly after news broke of new military strikes in Yemen by the U.S. and the U.K. It is 6 a.m. on Saturday, January 13th in Israel. In recent days, two big

stories have gotten a lot bigger. In the Middle East, the U.S. and the U.K., as I mentioned, launched air and missile strikes against Houthi targets in the Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen on Thursday and today, marking a significant response after the U.S. government warned that this Iranian-armed, trained, financed, supervised militant group, the Houthis, would be held responsible for its attacks on commercial shipping in the Red Sea, which has incredibly disruptive impact on the global economy. Non-operational partners working and supporting this U.S.-U.K. operation include Australia, Canada, and the Netherlands, and Bahrain. Interestingly, laying low for now seem to be the Saudis and the Emiratis. They are not officially part of this operation in any capacity. The Houthis

are a Shiite Islamist militia or terrorist organization whose namesake leadership is drawn largely from the Houthi tribe. Their religious leader has the same name. It emerged as an opposition movement to then Yemen President Ali Abdullah Saleh, who they accused of corruption and being backed by Saudi Arabia and the U.S. But how did the Houthis find themselves as the primary Iran-backed proxy responding to the Hamas-Israel war of October 7th? We expected Hezbollah to join this war, but the Houthis? And what does the U.S.-UK action tell us about this Hamas-Israel war? Is it widening? At the same time, Israel finds itself at the International Court of Justice

having to defend itself against the charge of committing genocide against the Palestinians by actually responding to the genocidal massacre of October 7th. The Genocide Convention of 1948 defines genocide as, and I quote here, acts committed with intent to destroy in whole or in part a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group. Now, just hear that again. Acts committed with intent to destroy a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group. Now, just hear that again. Acts committed with intent to destroy a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group. It would seem obvious that this would not apply to Israel's response to the October 7th Hamas organized and executed genocidal massacre against Jews. But here we are. To help us better understand both these issues

that were playing out in split screen, our guest today is Nadav Ayel. He joins us from Amsterdam. He has been covering the court proceedings at The Hague for the last couple of days. Nadav is a columnist with Yediot, one of Israel's largest news organizations. He's one of Israel's leading journalists and a winner of the Sokolov Prize, Israel's most prestigious journalism award. Yael has been covering Middle East and international politics for the last two decades for Israeli radio, print, and television news. He received a master's degree from the London School of Economics and a law degree from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Nadav Ayal on the Houthis and the Hague. This is Call Me Back. And I'm pleased to welcome Nadav Ayal to this podcast.

Back to this podcast, he joins us from Amsterdam, where he has been at the Hague at the International Court of Justice for the past few days. My pleasure. If there's one person who can offer insights on both of these quite unprecedented developments, I figured you were the person, so I'm grateful for you taking the time. This is sort of like a split-screen reality for you this week. While these two issues escalate that you are covering and are expert in, and normally one of them would consume your time, and here we're calling on you for both of them. So we'll start with the military action overnight by the U.S. and the U.K. against the Houthis.

What can you tell us about the attack itself? Here we are, it's late afternoon on Friday in New York City. What do we know about what happened? So we know that about 60 targets of the Houthis were hit by U.S. missiles, some of them cruise missiles and some guided bombs shot from Typhoon UK airplanes with their bases from Cyprus. And of course, the US was using its air carrier in the region, in the Red Sea. And the aim of this operation is basically to deter the Houthis from what they've been trying to do. They have been blocking maritime transportation on these routes along the Red Sea.

They've been using their strategic geographic location in order to shoot at ships, take hold of ships. And basically it began as something that was aimed as a sort of part of the jihad against Israelis because what's happening in Gaza, that's the excuse. But it sort of broadened to be something against the US, against the West in general. And it has deterred international shipping in the area. So the Houthis campaign was extremely successful in that sense. We have seen big shipping companies trying to divert their ships from there.

And we have also seen ships not coming to Israel at all, including at least one internationally recognized carrier saying it's not going to dock in Israeli ports anymore. So they have been extremely successful for the type of regime that they have. And this has been the major regional repercussion of the Gaza war. Now, these aerial attacks by the coalition that is not only the US and the UK, it's also supported by the Netherlands and other countries which have not directly, militarily attacked the Houthis. This coalition is aiming at a very specific and minimal aim. Retrieving, returning to free maritime transportation, safe, according to Chapter 51 of the un charter it's a self-defense thing restoring peace and security in the region and that's what we've been saying is seeing the houthis are saying they have some casualties about five people who were killed in these assaults and

they're saying that they're not going to change their course. They're going to continue with these attacks. They're saying that the US and the UK will pay a heavy price for these aerial attacks. So this story is far from over. We're also seeing, internationally speaking, much more responsibility put at the Iranians. And of course, the Houthis are basically Iranian proxies. And I want to quote to you, Dan, something that was just said today by a NATO spokesperson. And this was a direct response to these attacks by the US and the UK. That NATO spokesperson said that these attacks, these assaults are defensive, are designed to preserve freedom of navigation in one of the world's most vital waterways.

And then she said Houthi forces are supported, supplied and equipped by Iran. So Tehran has a special responsibility to rein in its proxies. Now, I should note that NATO is not formally involved, but the fact that NATO will say this as she said that Iran has a responsibility to rein in its proxies, I find this quite meaningful. Meaning, rhetorically, at least it's an escalation. It's not just the West taking military action. It's the West taking military action against a proxy and laying blame and responsibility with the source of the funding and the arms of that proxy, which is Iran. Yes, and that's very meaningful because Iran has been playing this game

for a very long time with the Houthis, of course. That's the history of the Houthis. The Houthis were born as a militia within Yemen. In order to take control of the country, they have achieved some control of Yemen. And this is because of the Iranian influence. And they have fought a Yemeni government that was supported, of course, by Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia was part of that war. And at a certain point, the Saudis understood they're not going to win. They were attacked by the Houthis again and again. The Houthis became much more

resourceful at their attacks using drones, for instance, something that was not seen at this capacity before in the Middle East. And they definitely managed to get the Saudis rethinking their strategy in Yemen and in the region. And the fact that the Iranians got that made them even more defined as to American interest in the region and, of course, as to Israel, which is seeing itself, and Iran is seeing it, as another regional power, maybe the only regional power that isn't Iran and maybe Egypt. So I think for close followers of Israeli geopolitical history and for close followers of American foreign policy and its recent to medium-term history, organizations like Hamas and Hezbollah and Palestinian Islamic Jihad and others are quite familiar. And they're familiar for a lot of reasons, not the least of which is proxies of Iran. I think the Houthis

are new in a sense for a lot of people, and probably including a lot of people listening to this podcast. Because what many people know of the Houthis is, yeah, there was the civil war in Yemen, and there was this Shiite group that was fighting the government of Yemen, or at least trying to make Yemen ungovernable. It's sort of similar to the role Hezbollah actually plays in Lebanon. And this group we hear about, they're mucking around, causing problems for the Saudis and maybe the Emiratis, not really the Israelis actually, historically, that since 2015, I think they've been more of a, they've been a real problem for the Saudis, as you said, and the U.S. was sympathetic to the fight against the Houthis, although it became a divisive issue in the U.S. because of the way Saudi Arabia was waging its war against the Houthis inside Yemen. But that said, generally speaking, the reason

Washington, to the extent Washington cared about the Houthis, it was because the Houthis were causing a headache for this country with whom the United States had an important relationship, and that was Saudi Arabia. I don't think on anybody's radar screen was a world in which this organization called the Houthis would be in a position to be perhaps the trigger for a regional war, perhaps be this, an organization that's taking provocative steps that are drawing the U.S. and the U.K. in very direct ways into the Middle East, taking military action, that would be a headache, a very direct headache for Israel. So how did that happen? How did the Houthis go from this major headache inside Yemen, a nuisance to a headache for

Saudi Arabia, and I guess other countries in the Sunni Gulf, to suddenly the headline-grabbing name as perhaps the spark or the next spark to turn what many people perceive, I think mistakenly, but what many people perceive as the Israel-Hamas war into something much bigger? This is a huge question, Dan. The slogan that is on the Houthi flag, Allahu Akbar, God is the greatest, death to America, death to Israel, a curse upon the Jews, victory to Islam. The Houthis adopted this slogan as a result of the 2003 occupation of Iraq. So that was the moment that it became an understanding within the Arab world beyond Iran that you might describe Israel as the little Satan and the U.S. as the greatest Satan. Now, the Houthis emerged in Yemen, if I'm not mistaken,

during the 1990s. And they were always a Shia group. They were always supported or aligned, at least ideologically, with Iran. But Iran has an idea within the Iranian revolution that's called exporting the revolution. And that's a very important idea within the teachings of Imam Khomeini, who was the leader and the man who established the Islamic Republic of Iran. And because of that, the Iranians have made an agenda of having these kind of proxies all across the region. Now, this agenda is both ideological and practical. It's practical in the sense that if the Saudis are employed with the Houthis, they really have no time, no energy to tackle the Iranians themselves. So,

it's leverage, basically. If Israel has to deal with Hezbollah, it knows that if it, for instance, strikes in a preemptive military strike against the Iranian nuclear program, then Hezbollah will probably respond as an Iranian proxy. And that's not the only proxy. You have the Islamic Jihad that is in the Gaza Strip. Now, at the time, the way to look at these proxies was always as Shia proxies. So that was the understanding of the Middle East. You have Shia, you have Sunna, and probably most of your listeners remember that. But for instance, in Gaza, Hamas is supported today by Iran. It's completely Sunni. It's a Muslim brotherhood. Even Islamic Jihad, that is a formal proxy of Iran, is comprised of Palestinians who are probably Sunni. So what you're seeing across the region

are these kind of Iranian offshorts or proxies that are doing their best in their relative states. Hezbollah has become the most important militarily force in Lebanon. And the Houthis have become stronger and stronger. And in the beginning of the 2000s, they've become a very stable sort of social construct within the Yemeni society. And there was a dictatorship. I remind our listeners, a president called Ali Abdullah Saleh, who was a brutal dictator, and they fought him, and the Iranians supported them. And they began their way as a sort of a guerrilla and a social group, and they made their way into a ruling class in Yemen, which is very ideologically homogeneous, and also socially and militarily. And they're much more capable than the West

has initially thought, for instance, during the Yemeni war. And now, of course, we're paying the price. So when I go back and think about the history of Hezbollah, when Hezbollah was founded in 1982, following Israel's war against the PLO in Lebanon, Hezbollah was just not really on the radar screen of most Americans. And then, of course, soon after, 1983, there was the suicide truck bombing of the U.S. embassy in Beirut, where the weapons, and I presume the training, was supplied by Iran. Forty-nine U.S. embassy staff were killed and 34 were injured. There are accounts that have casualties even worse to some degree, but let's leave it at that.

And the U.S. embassy actually had to relocate north of the capital of Lebanon. Then in October of 1983, there was the bombing of the U.S. and French marine barracks in Beirut, total of 300 or 299 dead. Then Hezbollah, as a force in the region and a terrorist organization that we had to really pay attention to. We in the United States, not just analysts and intelligence officers at the CIA, not just senior U.S. government officials, but Hezbollah was becoming a household name following those two terror attacks in 1983. Since that time, Nadav, there haven't been that many more organizations that have come online,

so to speak, have come into existence that are household names in the United States. Now, obviously, Hamas. Are the Houthis next? I mean, are we going to look back this period and say, yeah, it was this regional player and it was causing problems in the region, but it didn't really affect U.S. interests and we didn't really have to pay attention. Is this the, are we watching the like ascendance of the Houthis as a major force in regional geopolitics that we, like that Washington is going to have to, and London are going to have to start

really paying attention to? The ascendance of the Houthis sounds like, you know, a new Star Wars movie, right? Basically, by the way, the Houthis were never, they never called themselves the Houthis. They called themselves Ansar Allah, okay? They were called the Houthis because their first leader came from a prominent family, widespread family in Yemen that's called Houthi. Basically, I don't think so, Dan.

I don't think that the Houthis are going to become what Hamas is or what Hezbollah is. And that's mainly because of where they are placed in the Middle East, because Yemen is sort of down there to the east and to the south of the areas in which there's the Israeli-Arab conflict. And also, if you look at the Persian Gulf. So the Houthis can cause a lot of damage. And they can, of course, inflict major changes into navigation, maritime navigation, and maybe cause oil prices to go up substantially. But they won't go all the way.

That's the assessment of most analysts, because Tehran understands full well that if they will, Tehran will need to pay the price. And this is how I see that statement that I quoted to you from the NATO spokesperson, but also when I'm seeing what the Pentagon is publishing in recent days, it's very clear that these missiles shot by the US and the UK are a signal to Tehran. And what they're saying is, we don't want this to be a regional war. We don't want this to deteriorate. We want the Houthis to get our message. We'll do whatever we can to protect navigation. We're not going to take this precedent that this kind of a militia supported by Iran can stop ships from traveling through the Red Sea and other places across the region. And we're going to do our best there.

But we don't want this to become a full-blown escalation, regionally speaking. And I read a really interesting piece the other day that was comparing between this and between an event you probably know better than me about. And that's the Operation Praying Mantis. Do you remember that? Yeah. That was in the 1980s. The U.S. Navy sank a portion of the Iranians, the Iranians' ships, fleets, military fleet.

Which was quite successful in reigning in Iranian behavior. Yeah. I don't think that the Biden administration has gone that far with the Houthis. And of course, it is not engaging directly with the Iranians are just playing with the West and with Israel, sending their proxies. Sometimes it's Hezbollah, sometimes these are the Houthis. And you have all these experts who are saying, oh, no, no, you know, Hezbollah is a Lebanese force. That's true. But it's getting their funding and their arms and some of their drugs, you know, funding coming from Iran. And the Houthis, they have their own Yemeni interests. That's very true. And they're a Yemeni organization,

a Shia Yemeni organization. But without Iranian weapons and backing, they would be nothing. And Hamas, you know, Hamas is the most Palestinian, the most original kind of socially construct within the local society from the three I just mentioned. But at the end, you know, Hamas is also supported by Iran and nobody wants to engage the Iranians. Nobody wants to engage directly with the Iranians. And their power has gone up substantially since President Trump withdrew from the JCPOA. In Israel's security establishment, there is an understanding today that it was a mistake to push Trump to do so.

Not that Trump needed pushing. You know, the president made his decision on his first day in office, told me Israeli officials, they didn't need to lobby him for the US to leave the JCPOA. He promised to do that, so he did that. And the result was that Iran's power has substantially increased regionally.

Its proxies have escalated the way that they have been engaging with the region violently. And also, Iran's nuclear program has been advancing substantially if you compare it to the days of the JCPOA. But the JCPOA did not restrain Iran based on the agreement from supporting these militias. So presumably pulling out of the JCPOA, I take your point about that it's worthy of analysis about the impact on the nuclear program. But as it relates to these militias, there was nothing in the JCPOA to preclude Iran from supporting these militias. Absolutely. You're absolutely right. And there was nothing in the JCPOA that said,

what's going to happen when the JCPOA ends? What's the horizon after the JCPOA expires? And that's very true. But as the former vice leader of the Mossad told me in an interview once, when you prioritize strategy, and your strategy is first of all to prevent Iran from getting nuclear arms, you need to understand that you're not going to get everything. The Israelis would have wanted to get an Iranian promise not to support their proxies, but this was off the table and it's still off the table.

The only way that you're going to achieve that is probably by force, either against the proxies or against Iran. And Iran has been convinced for many years now that the Americans and the West, they're not ready to take any sort of action against them, either against their nuclear program or at all. And that has emboldened the regime in Tehran. And we're seeing this with the Houthi attacks. I want to go through how each

of the players are reacting to this and how their interests are affected. So I want to start obviously with Israel. So Israel's reaction to this strike against the Houthis is what? So Israel has been very careful and I think very wise, and I don't grant compliments to the Netanyahu government easily, as you probably know. It's been very wise in its approach to the whole Houthi issue and their attacks at the Red Sea. Israelis basically said, it's not our problem, or it's not only our problem. This is an international problem, and we're not going to take care of this problem for you guys. For you guys is for the rest of the world.

And that was the right approach to take because it is an international problem and Israel has its hands full with the Gaza Strip, with the war in the north against Hezbollah. And the Israelis decided that they're not going to respond, although the Israeli Air Force can hit Houthi targets. It has even reached even further away places than Yemen, and it can do that. But the Israelis decided to delegate this to the decision of the President of the United States and to the allies of the US.

And that was a clever decision. Of course, Israeli establishment, the Israeli security apparatus is very happy that someone else is involved in the region. And they're seeing this as a sort of an opening because for the first time, the US and the UK are willing to draw a line in the sand and say to Iran, to Tehran, you have gone too far with this. The proxy war that you have initiated against

Israel and actually against the West has gone too far with these Houthi attacks. Reign in your proxies, just as the NATO spokesperson has said. So for Israelis, this is a really important strategic moment. And do you think Iran views it that way? Do you think Iran, in other words, gets the message that this is directed at them and you better rein in your terror proxies or A, we may escalate against them, or B, we may, the next step on the ladder of escalation may be directed at you, or is it what you said earlier, which is Iran says, interprets events as they may hit our militias, but they don't want to hit us? First of all, hitting the militias of Iran is an interest of Iran. So Iran doesn't want the Houthis to lose power in Yemen after so many years

and so much effort and of course funds that they have tunneled to the Houthis. The question here, Dan, is how symbolic this is going to be. Are these going to be like some missiles somewhere in the desert that have hit some targets of sorts. Even the way that the US and the UK did that, they basically said, we're going to do it. We're going to do it. You know, just look at us. We're doing it. And the reason they did that was because they didn't want to inflict too many casualties, right? It wasn't a preemptive surprise attack. This was done to signal something. And to your question about Iranians, Iranians understand, I think, these messages, but they have a tendency, again, that you know about maybe better than me, for miscalculating what the West will do. And this kind of communication lost in translation issue

is very much the relations between Iran and the world. They have huge troubles sometimes understanding what's the real red line and what's really going to happen. And I think they're imagining that this is an election year.

And at any rate, even if Biden wants to be extremely resolved against the Houthis, he's not going to go the distance. Because if he's going to go the distance and Trump be able to say, you know, this is a full scale war involving involving the U.S. in the Middle East, I think that's going to be a problem for Biden. And I guess that the Iranians are making this estimate. And this is one of the reasons that they are acting the way that they do, that in an election year, no American president wants to have a Middle Eastern war. I think the last thing the administration wants in 2024, or any time for that matter, this administration, is regional instability. They have it now with Israel and Hamas. I think they're willing to accept a very hot, very hot, very tense war between Israel and Hamas, and specifically Israel

and Gaza, so long as, from the administration's standpoint, the Biden administration's perspective, they can contain it. They can keep it contained. They're okay with it. Which is why early on, as you know, the Biden administration both sent military assets to the region to tell other regional actors, don't think about capitalizing on October 7th to try to escalate or expand this war. And it's why they messaged behind the scenes to the Israeli government, do what you got to do. We have your back, but keep it contained to Israel, Gaza. This is not the time to wage some kind of quote-unquote preemptive strike against Hezbollah. They do not want the whole region to light up, and that's why I've been

very critical of them. I think their policy on Hamas has been, the administration's has been very strong. I give them an A. I think their policy on Iran is extremely weak. I give them a very low grade on their policy towards Iran. I don't even know what their policy is for that matter. It's very confusing. It seems like they just want to cover their eyes and plug their ears and get through 2024 and they'll live to, you know, to deal with Iran another day. That's why I'm surprised by this action, quite frankly, against the Houthis. I think it's warranted. I don't think it's going to stop here, but I think they themselves are, the administration is moving in a direction and therefore tolerating more action in the region by the U.S., which they know could have

cascading effects, than they would have hoped for, anticipated for, planned for in an election year. Yeah, it seems to me that we should remind people that the U.S. is already operating militarily even before this aerial assault. The Houthis have been shooting at Israel continuously in the last month and a half or two months, and the U.S. ships placed in the Red Sea and other places have been using weapons in order to shoot down those drones. Sometimes these are cruise missiles that have reached Eilat and have been downed by Israeli Air Force. So the U.S. is already engaged.

It was only defensively engaged against the Houthis. And now it's sort of doing something else. And the problem with these kind of coalitions, that if you don't have an aim, and the aim is deterrence, right? Because they're not trying to overthrow the Houthi regime or anything like that, is that they can crumble because of political reasons. These leaders, and everybody knows

that story about President Obama talking about that red line with President Assad of Syria. Yeah, 2015 in Syria. Saying, you know, don't use chemical weapons and then deciding not to employ US force against Assad after he did employ chemical weapons. So this means trouble for the leaders involved. Rishi Sunak in the UK. I think it's much less popular there attacking the Houthis than it is in the U.S., if it is at all popular at the U.S. And I guess the president is polling right now to see what it says in terms of his numbers. Last question before we move on. From Hamas's standpoint, from what we understand in conversations we've had with you and others, Hamas assumed that they would draw

others into their war on their behalf, on their side. There's been much less of it than I think anyone would have expected probably, including Yehez Inouye. Is the Houthi action a version of what Hamas has wanted? And now that the U.S. has responded, it means, all right, we're expanding this war. Leave what Iran wants. I'm thinking about what Hamas had expected post-October 7th. I think it's basically a great development for Hamas. The fact that there is a direct engagement, military engagement in the region, not only in the Gaza Strip, that is a result of what they call the Al-Aqsa flood, because they wanted it to be a flood in the region against Israel. And the fact that the Houthis have become involved, A, and B, the Americans are now attacking together with the UK and a coalition. They're attacking the Houthis.

So that means that the Gaza war is trouble for international shipping and navigation. It's trouble for the US president, not only because of humanitarian issues in the Gaza Strip and the way that he has internal domestic politics, but it's also a strategic issue because of these shipping routes that are being harmed or jeopardized by the Houthis, and he needs to take care of that. That could also, in a way, risk the stability of the global economy and, of course, risk the possibility of direct engagement on conflict with the Iranians. For Iha Sinwar, the leader of Hamas, basically, these are good news. And you can hear that from Hamas. Hamas is very appreciative of what the Houthis have been doing. Okay, let's talk about what you're doing

in the Hague and what you're seeing in the Hague. So you've been in the Hague since late last week. How would you describe what's going on the ground? What's the sentiment that you're seeing and hearing about this? So basically outside of the ICJ, the International Court of Justice, it sits in really a nice palace called the Justice Palace at The Hague. You can see demonstrations of Israelis and pro-Palestinian demonstrations. The families of Israelis that were kidnapped came and had their press conference the other day. And of course, you had two days of hearing the arguments within the court. So you have there the judges, two of which were nominated by the sides of this dispute. Israel had the former Supreme Court President Aharon Barak, who's considered to be probably Israel's most important and known judge,

and also an academic, nominated as a judge. He's 87 years old. I had the pleasure of speaking with him on the way to The Hague. And he said, I'm going to stay here as much as it takes. And of course, the South Africans had their judge nominated as part of the South African judicial system. And now they have to make a decision as to the request of South Africa, not only of the court, to say that Israel has broken its commitments according to the Genocide Convention, the Genocide Treaty, that Israel was actually one of the countries, one of the states initiating that treaty after World War II and because of the Holocaust,

but also to have a warrant of sorts or something that you can call an emergency warrant issued by the ICJ, by the International Court of Justice to Israel, to seize and desist its operation in the Gaza Strip that are causing this so-called genocide to the Palestinian people. And they had specific elements that they requested, not only just seize your operations, but do this and do that. And they made their case yesterday for a few hours. That's the oral arguments. And today it was the Israeli delegation that made their own oral arguments. First of all, it's the feeling of history here.

And not the type of history that I, as an Israeli, would be too pleased about, were over three months after the most dreadful and lethal and murderous attack on Jews since the Holocaust. There's no question that crimes against humanity and war crimes were committed during the Hamas attack on October 7. And three and a half months later, the Israelis find themselves, you know, at the Hague, at the International Court of Justice, standing on trial.

That's how it feels. Now, you know, I wrote that in Yediot Aharonot, and the first thing that happened when I came to the Netherlands was that I, you know that I was with my Israeli passport passing through passport control. And the nice officer there asked me, why are you here? And I said, I'm traveling to The Hague to the ICJ.

And she said, why? And I couldn't utter the words because of Israel being accused of genocide. The word genocide, I simply could not utter it in front of her. And then she said, your family in Israel, are they safe? And that was, you know, the way that she asked that, because the answer, frankly, is that today we're at war and nobody feels too safe after October 7. So this is a highly emotional moment for Israelis. My daughter is 13 years old.

She watched the discussions yesterday and she called me to The Hague asking, you asking, that South African attorney saying what she said, does she have proof to what she said? Why did she say that the way that she said that? And she remarked on every other attorney making their case and then making our case. So the nation is very much involved. Yeah, I would say every Israeli I have spoken to in the last couple of days say it's wall-to-wall coverage inside Israel. Tal Becker, who you know from the, he's one of the senior people in the legal,

senior officials in the legal department of the Israeli foreign ministry presented today. And his presentation was wall-to-wall live television coverage in the middle of the day in Israel. I mean, it was breaking news, and it was so, I mean, I've never actually seen anything quite like this, where Israel or a country is in the middle of fighting a war, a war for survival, really, a war in response to an existential threat that was unleashed on Israel. So it's fighting this war. It's got hundreds of thousands of soldiers and, you know, and reservists,

all the reservists that were called up fighting this war. The country is still completely traumatized. Understandably, I have it on October 7th. There are well over 100 Israeli hostages sitting in the tunnels of Gaza now for 100 days. You know, we're coming up on the 100-day mark since October 7th. So Israel's consumed with this, understandably. And at the same time, the country is consumed with legal action at the International Court of Justice against Israel. And just talk about split screen. It's also, it's about advocacy. Look, you know Israel, you wrote books about Israel. Israelis want to be part of the world. They want to be a nation among nations, as Ben Goyen said that. And the fact that they have been brought to the ICJ

is a failure, really. The fact that the South Africans had those quotes made by Israeli officials, some of them deplorable, some of them basically talking about collective punishments, talking about revenge, and often misquoted. And quoting officials that aren't in real decision-making power. I mean, I understand they quoted Ben-Gvir and Smoltrich and some of the others

who aren't in, they're not in the war cabinet. They're not in a position of authority. And they also quoted, what, Netanyahu's use of Amalek and Gallant, what he said about... So that's actually a great point about Amalek. So Amalek was a biblical tribe that attacked the Israelites, and then God has said, destroy

Amalek, destroy them completely. Eliminate it, like completely eliminate it. Yeah, and then Netanyahu said that, and they quoted that. He said that in reference to the war, but they didn't quote it at the same segment. At the same segment, he said that he was referring to the Hamas military ring and to Hamas specifically. And at the end, he even said that the IDF is protecting people who are not involved at the actual military operations. So when you read the entire clause, it's obvious that Amalek is the Hamas terrorist or fighters. But it was brought completely out of context, and it was misleading the court by the South Africans. And after I said

that, Dan, I want to be completely frank about this. The fact that you see, you know, soldiers saying there are no people who are uninvolved at the Gaza Strip and then are singing about Amalek, and they are only soldiers, of course, but then you have ministers. They're only soldiers, Eyal, and they're not the majority of soldiers. No, they're not. So what I'm writing about as an opera writer these days is, yeah, this is a blood libel. What the South Africans are doing is a blood libel. It's morally corrupt. They're supported by Hamas. Hamas has sent a delegation to South Africa weeks after they sent their terrorists to murder hundreds and more than a thousand of Israelis, and they were accepted in South Africa. South Africa actually condemned Israel after the October 7th attack before Israel responded to the attack.

After saying all that, I'm saying as an Israeli, there are people that are completely innocent of the Gaza Strip. They need to be protected. There are people who are not involved. It's the duty of the IDF to protect those who are not involved at the fighting. It's very important not only to do that, and the IDF is trying to do that, but also to acknowledge that. And the fact that Prime Minister Netanyahu has stated what I'm saying right now, has stated that in English this week, towards this discussion, is, I feel, too little too late in that sense. It was quoted again and again by the Israeli delegation. But I'm sure that some of the judges were thinking, yeah, he said that

in English, you know, the same week that he has a discussion with the ICJ. But why did he need to say this today? Probably because he didn't say this, you know, a month ago. It was sort of hidden within the statement. The truth is that Israelis are very angry. And, you know, in one of my columns the other day, I quoted a number from an American poll that was done at the time, 1944, December 1944. They asked Americans what should be done with Japan. And according to that poll, you know, a third of the Americans polled in December 1944 thought that Japan should be destroyed as a polity. And 13% thought that you should kill all the Japanese. So, you know, when countries are at war with each other, people's sentiment is increasingly vengeful.

And that's the truth about humanity. But then you have to judge things according to the actions on the ground. And the actions on the ground of the IDF are relatively impressing. You have leaflets. You have phone calls. You have stuff that has never been done in modern warfare before. You have humanitarian corridors. Warning, warning Palestinian civilians to get out of harm's way.

So that's another example, by the way. South Africa said yesterday, and I remember this vividly, how one of their attorneys said, you know, more than a million people were ordered to leave their homes immediately and with no warning. And today, an attorney for the Israeli Justice Department, her name is Orit Rajwan, said the Israelis have notified the Palestinians in northern Gaza where to evacuate and when to evacuate three weeks before the ground operation. So they will have enough time to evacuate down south. So these are not factual errors. This is basically misleading the court and trying to use the court as a weapon for what? To achieve a Hamas victory. Because that's the meaning.

If they attacked Israel and they have not returned our hostages, our kidnapped Israelis, our grandparents and grandmothers that are, some of them are still there. And of course, people that, you know, young women who have been sexually assaulted, and this is, you know, this is already a fact. We know this. They are being held in cages underneath the Gaza Strip. And now, you know, the South Africans are coming and they are asking for a warrant for Israel to stop their actions. And then again, having to say this again, Israel needs to keep its internal codes.

And I'm afraid that in the public discussion in Israel, it isn't keeping to its moral code. I want to bring up a story. I know that I'm— But I just want to say, I'm not excusing the— First of all, you're exactly right about public opinion during wartime for countries that are engaged in war or under siege. And you can find plenty of examples of countries where large parts of the population are saying what could be interpreted as inflammatory things, and that you don't even have to go back to World War II, Nadav. You can look at what American public opinion was saying in the 2000s after 9-11 and its war against ISIS. You can find similar situations where

Britain has had to take, the UK has had to take military action, or France has had to take military action, and what the sentiment was. So once you start going down that road and playing that game, it's, you know, this, this, it's not, it doesn't tell you anything. So even in the heat of the war, while certain, you know, fringe politicians will say fringe things, it's just, it's so, once you start applying that standard, it's, it's, it's not,'s not, I don't believe anyone is coming at this in good faith. Nadav, you touched on the significance of Aharon Barak being the justice that the Israelis appointed. It's sort of interesting that he was like the bête noire of this government for most of 2023, and yet here the same government is asking him to go represent Israel. And yet,

I find the whole thing very admirable. I find it admirable of this government to choose him, even though they have had strong disagreements of him. I find it admirable and very patriotic of Barak to take this on. It does speak to the unity in the country, even though there's a lot of division, obviously, but the unity of this country in this moment and the common sense of unfairness that Israelis believe they're being subjected to. It was obvious that a person like him, a Zionist like him, who's asked to defend Israel, and by the way, the person asking him was Ron Dermer. I think it's Ron Dermer's idea. And it goes to the feeling within Israel that we are all threatened now, that it's about basically our physical survival. And you are

also seeing this with reserve soldiers. You're seeing the way that all these kind of tribal political disagreements have vanished when you need to fight together. And I've been in these places with those fighters, and I've seen it in my own eyes. People don't talk too much politics, and if they do talk politics, they understand it's much less important than winning against Hamas. But I think that the government has been tremendously cynical in the way that it's been treating our own Barak and others. It's been treating the entire judicial system

in Israel as a part of a deep state. This is basically the position within the Likud. This is the position that has been supported by Netanyahu all the way that there is some sort of a huge conspiracy against him, something that very much resembles the stuff that Donald Trump is saying. And, you know, it's almost on the record that demonstrations in front of the House of Barack,

who's more than 80 years old and his wife is in bad health, during the night have been orchestrated by Likud supporters of sorts. So they have basically said, you know, Israel's judicial system is corrupt, it needs to be replaced, we have come to change everything. But now they need the independence of the judicial system and the independence of the Supreme Court as credence when we go to the ICJ. And I think that one thing that is for sure and is a consensus with Israelis, so if left and right, is how lucky we are that those plans to weaken the Supreme Court didn't pass. Because if they would have passed, Israel would have had a much difficult, much tougher case to argue before the ICJ. Because part of their argument is, we have a strong judiciary, we don't need the international judicial system breathing down our throats,

we're just fine, we've got a vibrant judiciary that's on top of monitoring our warfighting. Exactly. And by the way, this is not a speculation. This argument was made today by the Israeli delegation. You know, look at our Supreme Court. And the reason that Israel's Supreme Court is so respected around the world is because it can go against the government decisions. And it does so quite frequently. That's the truth. You know, some people want to say, no, it's not exactly the case. No, it does. Because Israel doesn't have a constitution.

And its checks and balances system is rather limited. And the ones who are holding it are really the people who are judicial advisors within ministries and the Supreme Court. And the fact that we still have that system in place, that the so-called reform did not pass as it was suggested, I'm not saying, you know, as to all the moderation efforts, but as it was suggested by Levine and Rothman Levine as the Israeli justice minister, I think that it's a miracle Rothman Levine as the Israeli justice minister, I think that it's a miracle for the Israelis because today the Israelis can say, hey, you know, you're talking with a country that has courts that have put a president in jail.

They have put a prime minister, former prime minister in jail. They have put a treasury minister in jail. You have courts here that will issue warrants against the prime minister in jail. They have put a treasury minister in jail. You have courts here that will issue warrants against the prime minister saying, you can nominate this minister. You need to fire that minister. This is something that usually doesn't happen in most countries. Definitely doesn't happen in the Middle East. And the reason that we have this court system is because basically we didn't have a constitution made and we needed someone to fill in the vacuum. Now, is this perfect? It isn't. But if someone wants to talk, as you talk and wrote extensively and so impressively about Israel's success, Israel succeeded with these systems in place. Israel thrived with these systems,

with Aaron Barak as the Supreme Court president. And I'm happy to see that we have, in a sense, regained our senses as to how checks and balances are really important for a society, even when you're fighting Hamas, or not even, but especially when you're fighting Hamas, or not even, but especially when you're fighting Hamas. Nadav, where does this go now? How does this process that you're there reporting on end? And then what is the next step? So first of all, in a few weeks, the ICJ,

the International Court of Justice, will decide whether or not it's going to grant an emergency warrant of sorts to the South Africans. And this is what they're asking. But the case is going to go on. And one interesting development of today is that Germany has announced that it rejects the South African approach and it rejects the allegations made by South Africa as to genocide made by the IDF in Israel. And it has decided to join the proceedings at the ICJ as a third party and to make the argument that Israel is not committing genocide, which is, of course, like, you know, historically speaking, is, I don't know even how to describe it.

It's mind-blowing. Meaning the symbolism of it. Yeah. And again, Israelis are very much appreciative of the way that Germany has conducted itself during this war and the way that Germany as a government and Germany as a country has been so empathetic to what's happening to Israelis. And now they have put their money where their mouth is. Now, if the court is going to go completely political with this, it's going to accept everything South Africa has just said,

and it's going to issue a very wide cease and desist kind of order, I expect that the Americans will issue a veto. And a veto is never taken lightly by the White House or the State Department, but they'll do that. But it's going to cause damage. And let me be completely frank about that. The fact that the Palestinians have managed to take us to that point in which we are actually discussing whether or not internationally

Israel is responsible for that blood libel of genocide is a victory for Hamas. And it is the only victory of Hamas since October 7. The fact that it's an issue, the fact that people around the world are going to use these oral arguments again and again and again made by the South Africans. The fact that South Africa, a country that has freed itself from apartheid, is making these arguments and is saying about Israel that it is an apartheid state and it's trying to protect the Palestinians. This for Israel is a blow whether or not the court issues that order. But if it does, again, it's going to be a headache for President Biden, who's probably going to order a veto about that. I will say the statement you mentioned from Germany, I feel like we brushed right past it. It's extremely important. I just want to read from the statement they made when they announced, which the news is breaking, that they are intervening in the case. The statement

is here, on October 7th, Hamas terrorists brutally attacked, tortured, killed, and kidnapped innocent people in Israel. Hamas's goal is to wipe out Israel. Since then, Israel has been defending itself against the inhumane attack by Hamas. In view of Germany's history and crime of humanity, the Shoah, the federal government, meaning the German federal government, sees itself as particularly committed to the Convention Against Genocide. This convention is a central instrument of international law to implement, quote, never again. We firmly oppose a political instrumentalization of the convention. We know that different countries assess Israel's operation in Gaza differently. However, the federal government, the German federal government, firmly and expressly rejects the accusation of genocide that has now been leveled against Israel at the International Court of Justice. This accusation has no basis whatsoever. And then

it goes on to say how the German government intends to intervene as a third party in the main hearing. It is quite powerful of a statement. I mean, they basically say, reasonable people can disagree about details around the way Israel's fighting this war. But to conflate this with genocide, take it from us, we know genocide. This is not genocide. Yeah, and by the way, it's a tragedy that you need the Germans to say, we know what genocide is, they were the inflictors of genocide because the world is not going to take the Jews' words for what genocide is, who are the victims. I should underline that they're saying that they're going to join as to the main discussion at the ICJ. And that's not what we have just seen, which is a preliminary discussion as to a warrant

to cease and desist. And if you look at the United Nations, you can probably expect some kind of verdict against Israel. And the Israelis know that the probability for them getting this kind of an emergency order against them is quite high. Nadav, we are going to leave it there. I know it is late where you are. I appreciate you taking the time, as always. We covered a lot of territory. I hope this doesn't scare you off.

I hope you come back. But you're just close to a lot that is happening that's of great interest to me and our listeners. So I appreciate it. It was my pleasure to be with you, Dan. That's our show for today. To keep up with Nadav Eyal, you can follow him on X, at Nadav, N-A-D-A-V, underscore Eyal, E-Y-A-L. And you can find his reporting and analysis at Ynet.com, Y-N-E-T.com. Call Me Back is produced by Alain Benatar. Until next time, I'm your host, Dan Senor.