Call Me Back - with Dan Senor - The last Israeli to negotiate with the Palestinians - with Tzipi Livni (Part 1)

Episode Date: June 5, 2024

Share on Twitter/X: https://tinyurl.com/3jzjamfh Tzipi Livni has served as a minister of eight different cabinet ministries under three prime ministers: Ariel Sharon, Ehud Olmert, and Benjamin Netanyahu. Her positions have included Justice Minister, Foreign Minister and Vice-Prime Minister. She has also been the official leader of the opposition. As foreign minister, Tzipi Livni led negotiations with the Palestinian Authority, she was a key government figure during Israel’s disengagement from Gaza and during Hamas’s subsequent takeover of Gaza. She was foreign minister during Israel’s Second Lebanon War and during Israel’s operation to take out Syria’s nuclear reactor. She began her service as a member of the Likud Party, and then the Kadima Party, and later the Hatnua Party and Zionist Union. Earlier in her career, Tzipi served in the Mossad (including in the elite unit famous for being responsible for the assassinations following the Munich massacre). No major Israeli political figure has had more recent experience trying to negotiate a two-state solution than Tzipi Livni. Tzipi Livni on X: https://x.com/Tzipi_Livni

It's worth to mention now that Hamas doesn't represent any national cause of the Palestinians. Hamas represents a religious conflict, and religious conflicts are unsolvable. Therefore, I believe that it is important to try and solve this conflict before it turnsclock a.m. midnight on Wednesday, June 5th, here in New York City. It's 7 o'clock a.m. on Wednesday in Israel, as Israelis start their day. Tzipi Livni has served as a minister in eight different cabinet ministries under three prime ministers, Ariel Sharon, Ehud Omer, and Benjamin Netanyahu. Her positions have included justice minister, vice prime minister, and foreign minister. Other than Golda Meir, she's the only woman to have served as foreign minister in Israel's history. Tzipi Livni has also been the official leader of the opposition in Israel's Knesset. As foreign minister, Tzipi led negotiations

with the Palestinian Authority. She was a key government figure during Israel's disengagement from Gaza, also during Hamas's subsequent takeover of Gaza. And she was foreign minister during Israel's second Lebanon war in 2006 and the diplomatic negotiations that followed that war. And she was also in office and in the government and in a key decision-making role during Israel's operation to take out Syria's nuclear reactor in 2007. She began her service as a member of the Likud party when she first served in parliament, and later moved to the Kadima party with Ariel Sharon, and later she led the Hat-Nua party, and she co-led the Zionist Union. Earlier in her career, Tzipi served in the Mossad, including, parenthetically, in the

elite unit, which is famous for also having been responsible for the assassinations following the Munich massacre. No major Israeli political figure has had more recent experience trying to negotiate a two-state solution than our guest today, which is why we wanted to sit down with Tzipi Livni. As Israel, as the United States, as the broader Arab world, as many others in the international community contemplate a day after in Gaza, which we're told must include some kind of two-state solution. Now, this conversation went long, longer than usual, but we covered a lot of ground and we did not want to cut it short. So we've decided to break it into two parts. The first part you'll hear now, and the second part we will post tomorrow.

Tzipi Livni, the last Israeli to negotiate with the Palestinians. This is Call Me Back. And I'm pleased to welcome to this podcast for the first time, Tzipi Livni, someone we've been wanting to have on for some time. So it's great that you're here, Tzipi. You join us from Tel Aviv, from the headquarters of Startup Nation Central, from the podcast studio there. Thanks for being here. Thank you for offering the opportunity to share my views and vision with your audiences. No, no, we're looking forward to this. So Tzipi, I want to, before we get into the policy debates and your experience that inform where you think these policy debates should go, I want our listeners to just get a better understanding

of you, who you are, where you come from from there are many interesting parts to your story and your career and your background not the least of which is that your parents were both deeply involved in the founding of the state of israel and you grew up in a very shall we say politically charged environment so how did your early life and upbringing shape your views maybe tell us a little bit first about that upbringing. Okay, yes. I was born to what is called in Israel the fighting family. Both my parents came with their families as children in 1925 to Israel. Both were in the Irgun. My father was the chief of operation of the Irgun, of the Ezel. My mother was a warrior. And just for our listeners, Tzipi, just the Yorgun, can you just explain for those who don't know what the Yorgun was, just like a

quick... Yes, the Yorgun was an organization that was established before the establishment of the state of Israel in order to fight the British army and to establish a Jewish state in the land of Israel. Jabotinsky was the mentor, and they believed in greater Israel, both sides of Jordan River. So they were like the predecessor to the organized political right in Israel. Yes. And they were often at odds with Ben-Gurion and Mapai or Labor Party. To say the least. To say the least, right.

I just want to establish that. And vice versa, yes. Right, right, right. Menachem Begin was the commander, and later he formed the Herod party that turned into Likud. They met in the best blind date ever while robbing a British money train in the Irgun in order to buy weapons for the organization,

for the Irgun. Both of them were arrested by the British army. Both of them escaped from prison in heroic operations. My father bombed Akra prison from the inside. My mother asked somebody to inject her milk. And when she was ill and they took her to an operation, she faked in illness. She jumped from the second floor and escaped.

They got married the day after the State of Israel was established. So they are the first couple who got married in the independent State of Israel. And I know that they are the first because these are the days between Sfirat HaOmer, between Passover and Shavuot, so you cannot get married. But my grandmother, from my father's side, forced the rabbi of Tel Aviv to set the marriage. I don't know how. So only 10 people attended, Minyan, with Menachem Begin and other friends from the Irgun. Wait, Menachem Begin was at your parents' wedding? Yes.

Yeah, wow, okay. Yes, they were very close. As a child in Tel Aviv, I grew up with these stories. They were very frustrated because their story or their contribution for the establishment of the State of Israel, these stories were not told. There's a very famous story that was written also about my mother and nobody knew that. So we were a kind of a cult or a group that the establishment at the time that govern Ben Gurion and this group Labor Party, they didn't acknowledge their contribution

and the gap between the image and who they really are was very frustrating. Later, my father was a member of parliament and what worried him until his last day or what he wanted to do was that young people will acknowledge what they really did, how they fought, and what was their contribution. So I grew up in Tel Aviv in a neighborhood that basically most of my friends and their parents were members of the establishment, Labor Party. So I was the daughter of the Herutnik. Meaning you were in a pretty liberal, social, liberal, quasi-socialist community. You were the daughter of the Herutnik. Meaning you're like in a pretty liberal, social, liberal, quasi-socialist community, you are the daughter of the crazy right-wingers. Yes, something like this. So I went to Beit Ar, grew up learning about Jabotinsky and Menachem

Begin and so, and my friends went to the Boy Scouts. It's important for me to share this because I grew up in an understanding how it feels to be a minority and to understand also the other side. So I could understand both. And this led me later in my life, also in the negotiations with the Palestinians. And so to understand, it doesn't mean to agree with, but to understand the positions or the way of thinking of the others. Both, it sounds like understanding the differences, not just with the Palestinians, but the differences inside Israeli society. Inside understanding and frustrated from the gap between the images and realities. When my parents were blamed for being fascist, they believed in full equality to the Arab

minorities in Israel, respecting it according to Jabotinsky's views. And therefore, yes, it gave me the possibility to understand how it feels because we are speaking about more the other thing, but especially in politics, I believe that everything is about identity. It's about being part of the group, about feeling part of the group, and from this you draw your also vision and policy later in politics. I want to get to your time in politics in a moment. But before you were in politics, you obviously did your compulsory military service, and then you also served in the Mossad. Now, by coincidence, we recently had on a few days ago, Glenn Cohn, who was the chief of psychology

for the Mossad and was called back in for reserve duty after October 7th. And he led all the debriefing of the hostages when they were returning after the first hostage deal. And he served in the Mossad for a couple of decades. I know you were in the Mossad for a few years, and I know there's not much you can actually say about it. That said, I'm now going to contradict myself. What can you tell us about your time in the Mossad? No, frankly, I studied at Bar-Ilan Law School and I started as a student working in the Mossad, at first in research, and later they offered me to have an operational course and to go to Paris for a year.

So I stopped my study at the university, went to Paris. And when I came back, I also worked at the Mossad and had another operational course. And later I got married and quit the Mossad because of this. Because at the time, well, I don't think that they are, no, I know that they are not asking women to sign this kind of letters or documents now about not getting pregnant and so. But at the time, different time, so I quit. I'm a lawyer by profession, and i practice law until joining politics in 1995. okay so you joined politics in 1995 it sounds like there was no question that when you joined politics you were going to join in the likud party oh no really there was a huge question whether I will join politics and then to which party.

And I will explain, if I may. Okay. At first, I didn't want to join politics. The decision to join politics was in 1995 in Yom Kippur, a one-day decision. Israel at the time, it was after the Oslo Agreement, and Israel at the time was split between two different camps. One called itself the camp of the land of Israel and it was completely against the agreement. And this is an agreement, the Rabin-Perez agreement with the PLO? Yes, with the Palestinians, yes.

The Oslo peace process to create a Palestinian state. So they believed in greater Israel, not to give the Palestinians even an inch. And on the other side was the group that called themselves the Peace Camp. And they believed they were waiting for the new Middle East to fall on our shoulders. And I felt that I'm caught in between because I believe in the rights of the Jewish people on the entire land. But yet I understood at the time that there's a need to divide the land in order to keep Israel as a Jewish democratic state, secured state. But I am a lawyer. I was a lawyer at the time. And I said, okay, Oslo agreements, well,

these are not real agreements. It postponed all the core issues. It was mostly memorandum of understanding, very open, without, not detailed, some principles. And I said, OK, that's the reason for me to join politics. I looked at my sons. I have two sons. They were five and eight at the time. And I say, OK, that's what I'm going to do. I was not involved in politics until that day, and it was clear to me that Oslo Agreement was signed by legitimate government that was legitimately elected in Israel, led by Rabin,

and I said, okay, we need to continue Oslo Agreement, but in a different way. We need to deal with all the core issues. And this voice was not heard at the time. And then I've met somebody who was very close to Netanyahu at the time. Netanyahu was the leader of Likud at the time. And I said, listen, this is what I believe in. I don't know whether it's what Netanyahu will say in the end, because he completely opposed Oslo Agreement. And these guys told me, listen, he will do it. So this is the right place to be. And I decided to join politics. And it was just a few weeks before the assassination of Rabin.

And in my first TV interview, I said that Israel is a democracy, that Oslo Agreement was signed by a legitimate government. And I believe that we need to deal with the core issues that are on the table in a different manner and keep Israel's interest during the negotiations. Okay. So you ultimately run for office. You serve in the Knesset and the Likud party. You serve as Minister of Justice under Ariel Sharon, as we talked about in our introduction. You served as Foreign Minister under Ehud Omer. You were ultimately, you led negotiations with the Palestinian Authority. So you had a number of very senior positions. We'll get to some of the lessons from the experiences you had in those positions.

But can you just describe how you approached this role you had now in government in these very big positions? What was your kind of worldview as you approached these challenges? It's important to say that for me, politics is not a profession. It's a platform to promote your views and vision. And as I said before, I think that what we've seen before the assassination of Rabin that is connected to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, this is also the division amongst the Israeli society in politics today. And I believe that it is all connected. And I think that we are having two different national GPS. So let's speak about our national ways. My destination in my national ways

is to keep Israel as a Jewish democratic secured state. We are all speaking about Israel as a Jewish democratic state, but the meaning is completely different because for me, Jewish democratic state means the nation state for the Jewish people with equal rights to all its citizens, as written in the Declaration of Independence. And security is a must, of course. When this is my national GPS, when I'm driving toward this destination, I need to have a Jewish majority because otherwise without

a Jewish majority there's going to be a clash between the nature of Israel as a Jewish state and a democracy. And in order to avoid this clash, I hope to stop at the station, let's call it the peace station, hopefully find somebody on the Palestinian side to sign an agreement with, but assuming that there is no, nobody is waiting for me in the station. I mean, I negotiated twice. I am the chief negotiator for peace in the last two rounds of negotiations. So nobody is waiting. It doesn't mean that I'm changing the destination, the nature of the state of Israel, the declaration

of independence. It means that maybe traffic jams. Okay. the destination, the nature of the State of Israel, the Declaration of Independence, it means that maybe traffic jams, okay? I'll stay for a while, I'll wait, I will try to find other roads toward the same destination, and clearly, I will not take steps that will be obstacles, barriers on my way toward this destination. On the other hand, and this is now being represented by the current Israeli government, there are those that for them it's about greater Israel, it's about the land of Israel. And for them it's more important than the existence of Israel as a democracy. For me, democracy is a matter of values, equality. For them, democracy is system of election, majority rules. So now we are having

those that this is their destination. So when I would like to find a way to separate ourselves from the Palestinians, don't be mistaken, I want to divorce them, not to get married with them. Their station is to get rid of the nature of Israel as a democracy. So you have the ultra-Orthodox. They are against equality in burden to serve in the army, against equality for women, for LGTB. You have some of the settlers that for them equal rights to Arabs or Palestinians, or they don't want the Supreme Court to be involved in what

they are doing in the West Bank. And unfortunately, on top of this, for his own reasons, we have a prime minister that doesn't believe in all this, but in order to stay in power, this is his chosen coalition. And for his personal reason, because he's under indictment, reducing the power of the Supreme Court and the police and the general attorney is good for him. But this is, or these are completely different visions for the state of Israel. This was the reason for the judicial, what is called the judicial reforms, but it was completely reduction or undermining the nature of Israel as democracy.

And now in the midst of the war, we are facing the same situation because for this group, it's not about security. It's also about the land. So for them, if at the end of the war, there was a need to reoccupy Gaza Strip, to build more settlements,

this is something that they support. And anything which is connected to the idea of two states for two peoples, they are completely against it. And we need to acknowledge this because Netanyahu succeeded in the last years of two states for two peoples, they are completely against it. And we need to acknowledge this because Netanyahu succeeded in the last years to portray the division as,

are you pro or against the Palestinian state? And he succeeded in portraying those that are for a Palestinian state as they are traitors, they support the Palestinian cause. And I'm saying, no, I support Israel as a Jewish democratic secured state. And the question whether a Palestinian state will be established is part of what is needed in order to keep Israel with the Jewish majority. And unfortunately, now nobody is speaking about this anymore because of the horrors of October 7th and the fact that Netanyahu succeeded in portraying the debate in a completely different manner.

Okay, I want to move to October 7th. You start to talk about it, but I also just wanttime guests, about the actual day, October 7th, 2023, as you were seeing it play out, as you were watching it play out, as you were processing what was going on. What did you think? Just as the grim reality of the attack was taking shape, what was your reaction? Well, I heard about it. It was the last day of a family vacation in wonderful lakes in northern Italy. So I woke up when my sister called me and I said, OK, that's a war going on. But it was not clear what really is going on. And the plan was that I would go to Copenhagen to have a meeting to a group that

Madeleine Albright established in the past, and Hillary Clinton now is leading, or former foreign ministers. And my family planned to go back home around midnight. So I went to the airport. My luggage was on the plane to Copenhagen. And then I heard that Ophir Lipshten was killed. Somebody texted me. Ophir Lipshten was a close friend and he was the mayor of the municipality of Kfar Aza and other kibbutzim. So I started listening and I went to the plane and sat and the stewardess closed the door and I said, OK, no, no, this is not just another round, not just another attack. So I woke up and said, I want to get out. And she said, but, you know, we are on the way.

I closed the door and said, no way, I'm getting out. So I went out of the plane, stayed at the airport, and then I heard my son, who was volunteered now, to go to reserves. So I tried to get another plane back to Israel. And we were all waiting for the plane, and then it appears that the pilots are not willing to come to take us to Israel. It was not El Al, it was another airplane. So at midnight, I met all the family, I arranged a ticket, and all together we went back to Israel. And the first thing that I did was to go to my son, who is now a baby, and so he asked us to get from his former room the stuff that he needs to go to reserves.

He's in the paratroopers. And just with Landon, he left. And I understood it took some time to absorb the horrors. I believe that we are still under a trauma because we are used as Israelis. Now, I'm old enough to remember Six Days War and Yom Kippur War and the Intifada. And, you know, we are taking into consideration that something like this can happen to us, suicide bomber, we can be killed. But October 7th has a holocaustic nature. People helpless, waiting for the army to come and save them and nobody is coming. These Hamas, Nuhba that are entering, raping, burning children, it's something that it's quite difficult to absorb. It's not about the number of people that were killed. I mean, that's horrible enough. But it's about the cruelty.

It's about what one human being, I'm not speaking now about even one human being can do deliberately to another. Therefore, we are still under this trauma. It's not over. It will take some time, and especially not when the hostages are still in the hands of Hamas. Sipi, the analogy we've used on this podcast, and it's not original, Mika Goodman framed it terrorist attacks, this was the first time that it felt to Israelis like the Jewish state did not exist. I agree. Right. That this is what it was like being in parts of Europe or Russia or Ukraine, you know, in another century or parts of, you know, for Jews living in communities in the, in North Africa, in the middle, in the Arab world, that the sense that there is no jewish state the jews are just being massacred and there's no state dan i more than agree with you you can find my quotes before october 7th saying there are

those in israel they try to compare iran to the nazi and so on. And I said, listen, Israel is an independent state with an army. Israel is a strong country. All this. I'm not connected to this comparison because the situation of the Jews in Israel is not like the situation of the Jews in Europe in 1939. This is something that I was saying, that Israel is not just a ghetto, you know, in the Middle East with helpless Jews. So I more than agree with you because this was a moment in which even now it's, I cannot even listen to those young people calling or saying, okay, we are waiting for the army. For sure the army is coming.

The army is on the way. And they waited for hours. And these terrorists entered, killed, right? So, yes, dreadful moments. So you just described what, in a sense, Israel's up against, meaning that the nature, to your point, it's not just the casualty counts, but the casualty counts are awful. And it's not just the number of hostages, although the hostage numbers are horrendous and completely unprecedented, not just for Israel, but no countries had to deal with this, at least in terms of that many captives as a percentage of your population. I'm saying that this is not just about the casualties because, you know, I represent Israel in different international forums. And what I hear is, okay, they killed 1,400, you've killed 30,000,

it's a matter of numbers. And I'm saying, no, it's completely different. There is no comparison, not only because Israel is a democracy and we are trying to avoid civil casualties, but the nature of these are crimes against, these are really crimes against humanity by a terrorist organization that genocide is part of his charter. And unfortunately, it's not being understood in some parts of the world. Yeah, I got to tell you, and this is a little bit of a digression, but you're triggering me. I have a hard time having these debates with people who are critical of Israeli policy. I have a hard time believing they're with people who are critical of Israeli policy. I have a hard time believing they're coming at these debates in good faith, but they claim

they are, many of them, where they try to do what you just said, which is compare Hamas has done this, Israel's done that. How do you wrap your head? I do not know a single Israeli, really, who in their darkest moments would want to subject innocent civilian Palestinians to what Hamas did to Israeli civilians on October 7th. Not only what they did, but they seemed to revel in, to enjoy. There was like this glee. And if there is somebody that did something close to this, he's in jail. I mean, this is about who we are.

And in an Israeli jail, your point is, meaning like if it was a Jew who did it, right? In Israeli jail, of course. And there is no comparison, not moral, no legal, between somebody who killed somebody, my mistake, I don't know, in a car accident, and somebody deliberately murdered, tortured, burned children.

I mean, all this is something that in any democracy in the world, or people that tend to believe that they are moral, they would not compare this. But when it comes to Israel, this is what they do. And I regret that Israel did not release the videos from October 7 at the beginning. By the way, I tried. I called at the time the spokesperson of IDF. Because when we are saying September 11, I think that we both are thinking about somebody who's jumping from the tower to his death. And we are thinking, OK, if I'd been there, now the fire is coming,

should I just... I mean, when we say ISIS, and we are saying that Hamas is ISIS, so we have this picture of somebody on his knees and somebody that is going to... Just lit his throat. Or someone being lit on fire. That was the other thing ISIS would do. Yeah. Or take his head. My picture is somebody and somebody else is going to take his head off and when we say October 7th for us we are dreaming we are thinking about these pictures of these young people and women and outside of Israel it's not turning into the horrors that it was in people's mind unfortunately so why didn't they release the video you You're talking about the 47-minute video? Yes, yes.

Their argument is that out of respect for the families. Yes, this was the answer. I thought that for sure there are families that would be willing to do so. And maybe it's like, you know, when I was also in office as a foreign minister, usually we want to show that we are strong enough to deal with the situation. And maybe they thought that this is something that would weaken the Israeli society, the humiliation, the helplessness, that this will weaken the Israeli society. But I think that, I mean, we are under this, we cannot stop thinking about these pictures,

well, outside of Israel. The average or those that are taking the streets, supporting the Palestinian cause, they don't. I mean, OK, there is also anti-Semitism. OK, so I'm not speaking about those. But other normative person, I think that they would have thought twice before supporting the Palestinian cause after these orals if they knew. The video that was just released of the four young women who were at the army base who were clearly beat up and God knows what else. And there was an image of that, of those four women from that video that was released a month ago and then it disappeared. Clearly it leaked out and then the IDF or whomever pulled it back. And my wife had been saying to me, these images need to get out there.

Exactly what you're saying. You can't pull them back. Yeah. I think that it's too late now. Yeah. And then when that video was released just a week and a half ago, I was monitoring the press coverage of it. It was like a minute on BBC. It's not news. And frankly, and since then, the pictures are the situation in Gaza. Right, exactly. These are the news, not what happened on October 7th. And more than that, when I'm speaking about this,

people tend to think that I'm using this in order to excuse what we are doing to civilians in Gaza. And completely this is not true because we are trying, really trying to civilians in Gaza. And completely, this is not true, because we are trying, really trying to avoid civil casualties. It's hard to separate what happened on October 7th to how we think about the future of Palestinian statehood, possible statehood. I'm not speaking about the future of the Palestinians. I'm thinking about the future of Israel and how to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Okay, fine. So let's start there. Because you, in pursuit of that goal, have worked, seems to me, almost every version of a possible path. One was disengagement from Gaza. That was one path that you were very involved with. Another path was the negotiations you did

in the Omert government with the possible path to creation of a Palestinian state. And also, don't forget the last round of negotiations in 2014 during Netanyahu's role as the prime minister with Kerry. Okay, so let's get to each of those. I want to start with, you get into politics during the division in Israel over Oslo and the path to creation of a Palestinian state. You're then in government and you're in politics and you're a major player in a completely different model, which is let's just get out of Gaza. The Palestinians can have it. But talk about your evolution and how you wound up at being supportive of disengagement from Gaza? Firstly, as I said before, these are all different methods to achieve the same goal or the same vision. And in between, you are forgetting Ehud Barak negotiations in Camp David in 2000.

And I believe that Ehud Barak thought like me, that instead of having some parameters and postpone the core issues to the future, there's a need for a comprehensive agreement that deals with all the core issues. And this is what he tried to do in 2000 with President Clinton. By the way, the Clinton parameters are still the guidelines for any negotiations in the future, but yet he didn't succeed. And I thought at the time that the idea of pushing, if you recall the picture of Ehud Barak pushing Yasser Arafat to the cabin, it was like, OK, I will just offer the Palestinian everything that I can.

And for sure, they will be so happy to accept it. But we didn't get the right answer from Yasser Arafat and we got the Intifada. So at the time, I was, for many years, even when I was not foreign minister or justice minister, I was involved and very close to Ariel Sharon in anything that was connected to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. He knew that I am focused on this, that this is, for me, the reason to be in politics. So he was quite open and I was involved in all the steps toward this. And at first we had the roadmap between Israel and the

Palestinians. And for me, there was one thing very important to not only to mention, but to get the understanding. And this is the idea of two states for two peoples, and now does it connected to the core issues. People are saying two states, okay, a Jewish state or another Palestinian state, but this is not enough. The idea is two states for two peoples. The idea is ending a national conflict between Israel and the Palestinians based on two states for two peoples, that each state gives an answer to national aspiration of different peoples. Israel for the Jewish people and the Palestinian state for the Palestinians. It's worth to mention now that Hamas doesn't represent any national cause of the Palestinians.

Hamas represents a religious conflict, and religious conflicts are unsolvable. Therefore, I believe that it is important to try and solve this conflict before it turns into a religious conflict on the Palestinian side and also on the Israeli side. So this is the concept. And when this is the concept, it's clear that as Israel gave refuge and when the State of Israel was established as a way to solve an ongoing conflict, it took off the international table, the Jewish problem. And we absorbed Jews who came from Arab countries who need to live at the time, former Soviet unions and Ethiopian. So I said, by definition, the

establishment of the Palestinian state is the answer to the Palestinians, including the refugees. And I was worried since Oslo Agreement because the refugees was a core issue that need to be solved. And I said, no, how come? Because they are connected to 1948, not to 1967. And it goes underneath the legitimacy of the existence of the state of Israel, because it looks like, okay, this is what we cause to the Palestinians. So this is the answer. And therefore, I convinced Arik Sharon before the disengagement that I didn't like the idea of unilateral steps at the time. So I said, listen, the only way for me to support it is if we can get from the United States, because we cannot get anything from the Palestinians,

but from the United States, if we are doing it unilaterally, and understanding an agreement saying that the establishment of a Palestinian state in the future is the answer to the Palestinians, including the refugees. There is no right of return. And Arik Sharoni used to, I was the one that, you know, was speaking about it all the time, and he used to have jokes about Zippy and the refugees, and he said, you don't trust me?

You believe that I will open the door to refugees? I said, it's not about you. It's like an American movie, not the best one, that you have, you know, somebody nice, a woman, and somebody is knocking at the door. And you know that she opens with the chain, but the guy outside will kick the door. So I said, listen, I'm not taking my chances. It's a matter of concept. So I've asked and he let me go to Condi Rice at the time. I was minister of immigrant absorption. And I said, listen, to Condi, listen, Bush believes in two states for two peoples. She said, yes, of course. I say, OK, that's fine. So two states for two peoples means.

And I got, by the way, I told her the story of my parents and believing in greater Israel and that I am willing to divide the land to keep Israel as a Jewish democratic state as long as this is also the end of conflict. And this was the reason that President Bush gave Ariel Sharon what is called the Bush letter. So Ariel Sharon was in Washington.

I was on Israeli television. And when I heard that Bush gave this letter, I said, okay, I supported this engagement. Okay. But Sifi, just for our listeners, explain the Bush letter, because that was a letter that outlived Sharon in terms of the basis for U.S.-Israel policy. This was a letter saying that in any negotiations, the United States would acknowledge the existence of what we call blocks of settlements and that the establishment of a Palestinian state will be the answer to the right of return. And yes, this gave us, while we are doing something unilaterally and pulling out our forces and dismantling the settlements for Gaza, it's clear that the United States will support Israel. The message that I wanted to send at the time to the Palestinians is, okay, we are doing something, we are pulling out, but you're losing something as well. And by the way, not less important now, later, I was also nominated as justice minister for an interim period of time.

And I tried to convince the Americans not to permit the participation of Hamas in the elections. This is in the Palestinian Authority elections for the West Bank and Gaza. The elections for the Palestinian Authority. Hamas participated in the elections. And I checked all the constitutions in the world. And I said, listen, even in Israel, a racist party couldn't participate in election because it's against the nature of democracy. And these elections were in 2005? 2005, January 2006. Yeah. And these were elections for the parliament,

for the Palestinian Authority. They were legislative elections for the Palestinian Authority So I tried to convince the Americans Condi rice and I said don't let this terrorist organization to participate in elections because the base for democracy is that the use of forces by a a legitimate government, not by armed militia. And they are completely against rule of law. And even in Israel, the Supreme Court denied the right of a restive party to participate in the election. And the answers that I've got at the time, unfortunately, were two.

One was that Abu Mazen said that Hamas would not win. They will get up to 20%. Okay, they won. So this is Mahmoud Abbas, the president of the Palestinian Authority, yeah? Mahmoud Abbas, yes. And the other answer was look at Hezbollah in Lebanon when they have also the political, as a political party, they are more moderate.

Well, the results were that Hamas took over. And since then, it connected to the situation in Gaza, but also to the situation in Lebanon. I try to convince many years later that the U.S. can lead an international decision saying that if you want to get legitimacy for being legitimate elections, because the elections in the Palestinian Authority are being supervised by NDI, and Lebanon government is getting legitimacy why this terrorist organization is part of the government. So I would not accept the idea that you have one arm which is a political arm and the other is a terrorist arm because it is all connected to the same body and the same vicious mind.

And I believe that this is crucial also now, the understanding that this is the meaning of democracy. And by the way, I've checked also different constitutions in the world. And by having that, maybe we could have avoided not only the situation on the Palestinian side and in Lebanon, but also we have Taliban and others that are abusing and exploiting democracy in order to act completely against the nature of democracy. Okay. By the way, were you surprised by how well Hamas did in those elections? Yes, of course. Yes, I was.

I heard that the assumption, not only me, I remember the phone call, the first phone call with Condi Rice. I think it was 3 or 4 a.m. Washington time, but she wakes up usually very early. And she was also shocked. But what we did the next day or the same day is important also for now. And people tend to forget it because that day, Olmert was already the prime minister. And I was, I think, first days as the foreign minister.

And we decided with the Quartet. It means, the Quartet means the U.S., Russia at the time, maybe the last decision that you have the U.S. and Russia together. The EU and the U.N. That any Palestinian government who wants to get legitimacy needs to accept the right of Israel to exist, renounce violence and terrorism, and abide to Oslo agreements, the peace treaties. And Hamas, since 2006, is not willing to do so. For those calling Hamas, you know, freedom fighters,

they are not, because if they want to give freedom to their own people in Gaza, the way to do so was by renounce violence and terrorism and get legitimacy and open Gaza. Instead of, as it's part of their ideology, they cannot even say that Israel has the right to exist. And therefore, there is no hope of peace with them. And therefore, the eradication of Hamas as a terrorist organization and as a regime in Gaza is a sanction. So after that, Hamas comes into power. Hamas drives the Palestinian Authority effectively, drives Fatah out of Gaza. In Gaza, only in Gaza.

In Gaza, yeah, violently, forcibly. And Gaza becomes, as is referred to in the Israeli security establishment, Hamas-tan. It's basically Hamas's territory, Hamas-tan, and the West Bank is really Fatah. And then you proceed, both in the Olmert government and in the Netanyahu-led government over the next decade to lead negotiations for a resolution of the conflict quote-unquote that involves a palestinian state not with hamas not with hamas i understand i understand they agreed to a demilitarized state as part of the negotiations people don't know this but they agree already agreed to it and when we negotiated we knew that the situation in Gaza is complicated. So we said the following. The agreement will refer to Gaza because they are

also the legitimate representatives of the Palestinians, the PLO. But it would be clear that Gaza will be part of the Palestinian state only if it will be controlled by a legitimate government that is acting in accordance to the Quartet requirements, that is willing to demilitarize Gaza, and only then it will be part of a future Palestinian state. And we put it, the idea was to put it on the shelf until, and when the Palestinians understand that there is no hope for them with Hamas, but there is something tangible on the other side. Maybe next election, since then there were no elections on the Palestinian side, they will make their own decision.

But the idea is to act militarily against the extremists and the terrorists and to work politically with the world against them as well. Unfortunately, Netanyahu did completely the opposite. He worked with Hamas. I was not willing to negotiate Hamas. I didn't support what he paid for the release of Gilad Shalit at the time. I tried to undermine their position in the entire world as a foreign minister. And later I said to all the countries, you cannot, since you are bound by the Quartet requirements, you cannot legitimize Hamas. But yet the idea was to work during this time to work with the Palestinian Authority. Wait, you just, I want to stay on this, Sipi.

You were opposed to the 2011 deal, the exchange for Gilad Shalit for 1,027 Palestinians. You were against it then? Of course, yes. I was a member. I mean, we saw the list, the unbelievable list

of the demands that Hamas shared with. At the time, Olmert was against it as a prime minister and I was against it as a foreign minister. So when we left office, we didn't release Gilad Shalit. You didn't get back Gilad Shalit, yeah.

But I want to make it clear, the situation now with the hostages is completely different. It's not the same, no comparison at all. They were neglected the same day. We were just talking about it. And Israel is a society. People used to say that, yes, the war is something national and the problem of those, the justice, is the problem of the families. It's a matter of left and right. Right-wing, we need to act militarily and those weak guys want to release them. It's completely different. As a society, it's an open wound. We need to release them. That was part one of our conversation with Tzipi Livni. Please keep on the lookout for part two of our conversation with Tzipi Livni,

which will be dropping tomorrow.