Call Me Back - with Dan Senor - Understanding Netanyahu’s new government - with Yaakov Katz

Episode Date: January 3, 2023

WIth Prime Minister Netanyahu's new government now sworn in, and also developments for Israel at the UN, Yaakov Katz – Editor-in-Chief of The Jerusalem Post – returns to our podcast. Earlier, Yaakov was an advisor to former Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett. He served as The Jerusalem Post’s military reporter and defense analyst. He is the author of "Shadow Strike: Inside Israel's Secret Mission to Eliminate Syrian Nuclear Power" and co-author of two books: "Weapon Wizards - How Israel Became a High-Tech Military Superpower" and "Israel vs. Iran - The Shadow War" "Shadow Strike: Inside Israel's Secret Mission to Eliminate Syrian Nuclear Power" – shorturl.at/adioS "Weapon Wizards - How Israel Became a High-Tech Military Superpower" - shorturl.at/fhIJ3

This puts Netanyahu in a real bind of what does he do? On the one hand, he's got to give something to his partners and his constituents and his voters. On the other hand, he's got to walk a very careful line not to upset the Americans or the Europeans too much. It's going to be complicated. I mean, that's just one of the big issues that he has. As you may have heard, Prime Minister Netanyahu is prime minister again, the only prime minister in Israel's history to return to power, not just once after having left office, but now a second

time. It is his sixth government. The new right-of-center government, 64-member coalition, is now in power. It is attracting a lot of heat. Today, we're going to try and shed a little bit of light on this topic and try to see if the controversy is merited around this government, whether or not there's some possibilities for hope. So we want to have a balanced conversation, and I can think of no one better than with Yaakov Katz, who's been on this podcast before. He's a regular. He's the editor-in-chief of the Jerusalem Post. He's a former advisor to former Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett. Earlier in his career, Yaakov served as the Jerusalem Post's military reporter and defense analyst. He's the author of Shadow Strike, Inside Israel's Secret Mission to Eliminate Syrian Nuclear Power. He's the author of Shadow Strike, Inside Israel's Secret Mission to Eliminate

Syrian Nuclear Power. He's the co-author of two other books, Weapon Wizards, How Israel Became a High-Tech Military Superpower, and Israel versus Iran, The Shadow War. But today's topic is Israel's new government. This is Call Me Back. And I'm pleased to welcome back to this podcast my friend Yaakov Katz, who is the editor-in-chief of the Jerusalem Post and is a frequent guiding voice for me and our listeners on all things Israel, Israeli politics, Israeli national security, Israel and the world. Yaakov, thanks for coming back on. Oh, it's always a pleasure, Dan. Before we get into what I initially reached out to you about, which is what to make of

this new government and some of the early moves and early personnel appointments in the new coalition, I just want to talk for a moment about something that is really in the news, as of last Friday, where the U.N. General Assembly, you know, wished Israel a good Shabbos and voted to approve a resolution requesting the ICJ, the International Court of Justice, to intervene in, Israeli practices and settlement activities affecting the rights of the Palestinian people and other Arabs of the occupied territories. So this is getting wall-to-wall news coverage in Israel. Why is, can you first describe what this is? You know, the United Nations is a is a longtime critic of Israel. Definitely the General Assembly, right, where you have a vast, where all the nations, and there's that automatic block that always exists there to vote against Israel and to support the Palestinians. There's nothing

new on that. And there's no veto. You don't have like the U S abilities of the ability to veto. Correct. Like you have at the security council. Right. So, uh, you know, that, that, that itself is not necessarily new that there would be this, uh, attempt to try to take Israel to task like they did at the, at the United Nations over the weekend. What, what, what's, what it's about is, and it follows on a vote that took place in November, which is to basically send off to the ICJ and refer the case that has to do with Israel's so-called occupation and the annexation and settlement activity and get them to give their assessment or their opinion. This could be a step toward potential charges brought against Israel, whether at the ICC or at the ICJ. It's just another kind of nail or a step along the way in attempts to

delegitimize the state of Israel and its activities and its presence in Judea and Samaria in the West Bank. I think what to me was most striking were two things, I would say. The first is the timing, right? This came on Shabbat, as you said, they were wishing Israel a Shabbat Shalom. This came on Shabbat, but it was just after Netanyahu, the new prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu took office and took up his new role or went back to his old role on Thursday with his new government. And there's been a lot of criticism of them. So it's a, it's a shot across the bow. And, you know, we've heard a lot about, I know we're going to dive into this of what the policies of this new government are, but this was their way of kind of saying, watch out, you know, we've heard a lot about, I know we're going to dive into this of what the policies of this new government are, but this was their way of kind of saying, watch out, you know,

we're there, we're ready, we're watching and, uh, and we're gonna, we're gonna do stuff. We're going to take you guys to not only to the UN, but the ICJ and the ICC and other places. That's number one. Number two is, you know, you can't miss an amazing political opportunity. And of course, Netanyahu is one who will never miss that as an opportunity. And he, on Monday, decided to use what happened at the ICG over the weekend, even though it happened on his watch, but he put all the blame, of course, on the previous government. It's Yair Lapid's fault. It's Naftali Bennett's fault. So, you know, of course, automatically, like everything in this country, Dan, it becomes also about local domestic politics. And the actual vote, I do want to pull this up because I was struck by this, the actual

vote. So the final vote on Friday in the General Assembly was 87 countries voted in favor, 26 countries voted no, and nearly something like 53 abstained or didn't show up. And when there was a preliminary vote on November 11th at the General Assembly's fourth committee, the vote was 98 countries supporting it, 17 opposed and 52 abstaining. So the actual total number of countries supporting the resolution dropped by over 10 countries. So what was that about? Look, Israel worked hard, right? After the November vote, it was reported in the press, we reported on it. Then Prime Minister Lapid sent out letters to all these countries. The

foreign ministry worked very hard. Ambassadors were sent to meet with the officials in their home countries. And there were a number of countries that actually this time voted for Israel. You had European countries, which for years have always been against Israel on settlements and on the occupation, on the Palestinian, you had Austria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, and others that actually voted for Israel. The United Kingdom voted for Israel in this case, and there were a bunch of countries that actually abstained. So you did see a shift, and this is something that's actually positive, right? I think that, I don't know that we can say, oh, you know, these countries support Israel's presence in the West

Bank. Let's not go that far. But I do think, and I'm sure you hear this as well, Dan, that there are countries that have, are growingly aware, increasingly aware of how the UN is used as just a tool to bash Israel all the time. And that's why they would vote against a resolution like that. Not because they support settlements, right? Let's not jump too far. But they understand that this is just ridiculous and this obsession that the United Nations has and how the Palestinians are cynically using the UN as a tool to avoid peace, to avoid normalization, to avoid talks with Israel. I mean, you're right. I mean, if you look at this list, actually, most democracies around the world voted against the resolution. Most European states chose not to vote yes. And I think most interestingly, most of the countries in sub-Saharan Africa also did not

vote for the resolution. Israel, over the last decade and a half, I think it started intensely with Netanyahu. I think it continued with the most recent government has been making these major efforts in Africa. And this looks like it's bearing fruit. Right, and that just shows Israel is a diplomatic superpower. I think that whatever government is in power,

countries recognize that. They value the relationship and the alliance that they have with Israel. They understand that Israel has what to provide them with, and Israel has done a very smart job starting under Netanyahu, but even continuing in the last government. I'm sure it's something that Netanyahu will continue to support and to encourage. But that outreach that was done in Africa and also in South America to an extent, although that's less to bear fruit,

at least in this recent vote, but it's something that shows the world is not going to be played for a fool by the Palestinians. So while they can chalk this up as a victory to an extent, because yes, it has been passed on to the ICJ, if you're in Ramallah, you might want to ask yourself, did this really work to your advantage? And that'll be an interesting question, what they would say behind closed doors. Okay. We, I'm sure we'll return to this issue as it, as it develops. Now let's turn to Israel's new government, which was just sworn in. Just an easier topic. Easier topic, simpler. Exactly. You know, it's like, uh, it's like Bismarck said, you know, the, the two, the two things you never want to watch is sausage making

and legislation. So as, uh So this is like sausage making and coalition politics in Israel. So this was the fifth election in more than three years. The new government, in terms of international press coverage, Israeli press coverage, including in your own paper, is attracting a lot of heat. Before we get into some of that heat, I think it's important to say a few things. First of all, more Israelis turned out to vote in this election than they have in a number of years, despite the fact that it was the fifth election in something like three plus years. There are no debates about whether or not the election was rigged. There's no, to my knowledge, no election denialism. There are no debates about whether or not the election was rigged. There's no, to my knowledge, no election denialism.

There's no, you know, people who lost elections did something incredibly interesting and novel. They conceded. So the election is actually over by all accounts, according to the winners and the losers. There were interesting developments. Not only was voter turnout high, but the one Arab Muslim party that was in the last government for the first time that joined the government, the Rom party, actually did better. They're not going to be in this new government, obviously, but they did better in this election. More people voted for them this time than last time. So there were these, as far as the health of Israeli democracy, based on the election, one could argue there are some very healthy signs, high turnout, high turnout among some supporting minority parties,

no election denialism, etc., etc. So that's encouraging. And yet all we're reading about is that Israeli democracy is under threat. Why? Wow. That's a big question. First of all, I totally agree with the way you just portrayed that, right? This was a beautiful show of how vibrant and strong Israel's democracy is. Over 70% turnout, an election that no one denies the results that we saw just in the last few days, Dan, people who were on completely opposite sides, bashing one another in the election,

holding ceremonies together and transitioning one minister out of the office to the other. Avigdor Lieberman, who was one of the greatest critics of Batsalo Smotrich, right, is shaking hands and embracing him at the finance ministry. Benny- And to be clear, Smutrich is one of the, Bitzal Smutrich is one of the most provocative figures- Correct. The head of the religious- In this election, in this most recent election, and there he is shaking hands with the outgoing

minister at the ministry of finance. And Benny Gantz embracing Yoav Gallant at the defense ministry, and even Yair Lapid at the foreign ministry with Ellie Cohen, who's the incoming foreign minister. So you really see, you know, people, they don't have to get along, but I think that everyone as understands that there is a bigger issue at stake here, and that's the success and the continued prosperity of the state of Israel. Right. So, so, so even when very controversial figures are involved, there's still a, a peaceful

and dare I say, dignified transition of power. And that should make us happy, right? Now, with that, though, there's no question that this new government has come to change things. And there's a number of issues that they in particular want to change. But before we just jump into that, I think it's important to look at some of the personalities here. So you have, for example, Netanyahu's back. He's a known commodity. And Netanyahu, for most of his career, has always been very careful. One of the compliments that we could actually give him, he's usually hesitant to use military force, contrary to the way people look at him. He's

not a right-wing radical, contrary to the way he's perceived around the world. He's quite moderate in his views, but he's always had these coalitions that he surrounds himself with someone on the right and someone on the left. In this government- Can I just, just one thing, just because I think people don't appreciate the length of time Netanyahu has been, so he's been prime minister on and off for 15 years. He had a three-year run from 1996 to 1999. Then he was out of the premiership for about 10 years. He came into government first as finance minister before he returned to the prime minister's office, I think around 2003 in Sharon's government. Then he became leader of the Likud party when Sharon left the Likud party to form a new party, Kadima. And then Netanyahu was head of the opposition for three years, became prime minister again in 2009, during which he had a 12-year run, 12 years from

2009 up to 2021. So three years in the 90s, then a tour as finance minister in the early 2000s, and then another 12-year run as prime minister from 2009 to 2021. The only reason I say this is when you say, you know, when you point to Netanyahu's history, there is a, it's a long history. In other words, you have real data. This is not just like a flash in modern Israeli political history. You have a long stretch of data to point to what you're describing right now about Netanyahu's, generally speaking, his governing style. But what we saw this time, though, which is different than previous governments, is how Netanyahu conceded to almost every single demand that was made of him by the coalition partners. So religious Zionist party, which is led by Batsal Smatrich, who very much is perceived

as a radical, extreme right-winger. It's a party that's made up of people who are in favor of annexation of the West Bank. They're in favor of all settlements. They're against a Palestinian state. They're in favor of more religious control over different state institutions. They're opposed to pluralistic prayer at the Western wall. I mean, we could go on and on and on, but whatever they asked for, they pretty much got. Itamar Ben-Gvir, who is a rabble rouser, someone who was convicted in the past of incitement to terror, is actually a nice guy. I've known him for 20 years, right? But put that aside for a moment. Definitely someone who is seen as perceived as a radical extremist. And some people would even say, I don't necessarily know that this is true, but people would say he's a supporter of terrorism,

Jewish terrorism in this case. He got what he wanted. He's now in charge of the police, right? And you see with the Haredi parties, the ultra-Orthodox parties, they have received everything that they wanted. You mentioned Netanyahu's term and tenure as finance minister back in the early 2000s. He was known then for the massive reforms that he did to the welfare system in Israel, cutting the aid to the ultra-Orthodox community.

He suffered a big blow because of that. Now he's going completely in the opposite direction. He's increasing welfare. He's increasing aid to the ultra-Orthodox. That's not good for Israel's economy. That's a separate conversation. But again, it speaks to how all of these partners got what they wanted, which raises some questions and speculation of where is Netanyahu in all of this? What's his thinking?

Where is his state of mind? And what really is his priority? And it raises some concern across Israel. Okay. But, but what he says, what he said in a podcast conversation I had with them and what he said elsewhere publicly, he's been doing a lot of interviews with U.S., with American personalities. What he says in response to that is ultimately I'm in charge. Correct. Ultimately, I'm the prime minister. It's it's my party that has something like 34 seats in the Knesset. We're the largest bloc.

These smaller parties are joining my government. I'm not joining theirs so they can say all these provocative things and they they also have um you know powers they didn't have before obviously when they weren't in the government by virtue of of the offices they're inheriting and these concessions that he the you know nothing you know who's made but ultimately the policy of the government is the policy of the prime minister. And he's not going to let these guys run wild. That's basically what he says. And by the way, I think to a large extent, he'll be able to put, you know, put his foot on the brakes every once in a while. But we also got to keep in mind is these, these guys who came in

were not fools, right? And they, and they understood that some of what they were requesting was going to be super and hyper controversial. And they put in safeguards of their own to try to ensure that they would be able to retain some of the control and, and definitely challenge Netanyahu as much as possible. So we mentioned Smutrich before Smutrich, for example, wants to make some big moves, for example, in, in the West West Bank when it comes to settlement activity. He, in addition to being finance minister, he is a minister within the defense ministry.

So in the defense ministry. Okay, this is really confusing. I mean, you got to explain this. You're going to have to get granular on this one because he's the finance minister. So he has that ministry. But separate from the finance ministry, he gets a piece of real estate in the defense. I'll tell you even what the piece of real estate is.

I heard about this just today. So in, in, in the defense ministry in Tel Aviv, you've been to this building, Dan, you got the two towers, right? And there's a bridge that connects them. So the 14th floor is where on the one hand, I think it's the left side. If you're looking to the, to the east, you have the IDF building. The 14th floor is where the chief of staff is. On the right side is where the defense minister is, and they can just walk across the hall to meet with one another. On the 15th floor of the defense

ministry is traditionally the office of the deputy defense minister. That office is now Bitzal Smatrich's piece of real estate, right? It's registered in his name now in the defense ministry building. He has put in a very close associate of his who's basically going to be in charge of this. I think the best way to call it is the settlement administration. And what they want to do, they have three clear objectives from the get-go that I've heard from them about. The first is they want to curb Palestinian building in area C. So under the Oslo Accords, there's area A, B, and C. Area A, completely Palestinian,

civil and military control. Area B, civil control Palestinian, military control Israel. Area C is where all the Jews, about half a million who live in the West Bank, that's where they live. And that's under Israeli civil and military control. In recent years, Palestinians have been building more and more in Area C. Israeli right-wingers are against that for the obvious reasons, and they want to put a stop to that. So that's objective one. Objective two is they want to legalize, there's about 100 or so what we would call legal outposts they call them something else they call them the the the loose translation would be the young communities these are and illegal outputs the settlements that are not approved that were just

built people came to a hilltop put a caravan then put a watchtower then put a water pipe and slowly but surely it grew into five caravans, 10 caravans, and then homes. And now you could have even some of these with 30, 40, 50 families in permanent homes, but they've never been legalized in, in, in the Israeli government system. So they want to know some of them are problematic by the way, some of them are on private land. Some of them are on even Palestinian land. So there's some issues that need to be worked through here, but that's a big objective for them. And the third is, of course, they want to build more in existing settlements. I don't know if they want to build a new settlement, but they definitely want to build in existing settlements. This is going to be a big issue, right? And it's going to be a big issue because on the one hand, they're not going to stand down from these demands. Netanyahu is going to have to give them something. On the other hand, the Americans, as you know very well, they're just

waiting for something like this to happen. So this puts Netanyahu in a real bind of what does he do? On the one hand, he's got to give something to his partners who want to do this and his constituents and his voters. On the other hand, he's got to walk a to his partners who want to do this and his constituents and his voters. On the other hand, he's got to walk a very careful line not to upset the Americans or the Europeans too much. It's going to be complicated. I mean, that's just one of the big issues that he has. And what about Ben Gvir and the significance of the public security or now they're calling it the national security ministry that he's taking over? Why are the changes being made to that ministry and Ben Gvir sitting atop that ministry? So why is that so consequential?

Look, Ben Gvir is just a catchphrase for, he is a magnet for criticism and I myself was very, was very critical. So I'm not going to pretend that there isn't what to be critical about, but what Ben-Gavir did was he came into office and he said, I want to take this ministry. I'm willing to join the coalition, but I demand, uh, three things that happen. Number one is I want responsibility for the border police. So the border police are a unit that belongs to the Israel police, but there's a border police contingent, a few thousand policemen, who serve in the West Bank. And traditionally, they've always been under the command of the IDF.

So they officially get paid by the police. They're policemen, but they receive orders from the military. Ben-Gvir wants to change that. So they report more. So they, they actually, their operational line is through the, for the IDF chief.

Exactly. Ben-Gur wants to change that. He wants responsibility for them. That would give him a foothold in law enforcement in the West bank. That would give him the ability to see guys back off the settlers back off the, you know, we know,

unfortunately there there's a small percentage, but there are Israeli Jewish residents of the West bank and settlers who are unfortunately violent and, and, and, and use violence against Palestinians. So he could potentially play with that a bit. He could say, focus more on Palestinians, not on, on Israeli Jews. So that, that could be an issue, but what Ben-Gur also wanted, which I think is maybe the bigger deal is there were legislative changes that were made to the police law that existed in Israel and hadn't really been updated for about 60 years or so. Uh, and, and for years or decades

since the 1950s, the, the police minister has always been kind of a more of a ceremonial position, not real authority over the police. Yes. You know, if the police want to open up a new command somewhere, a new regional district or something, so they would have to get approval and the minister would approve budgets and approve senior appointments, but nothing to do with operations. That unlike the defense minister is an example, right? This is a change that has now taken place and that attracts a lot of criticism considering the fact that Itamar Ben-Gur is a convicted criminal, right? He is a man who didn't spend time in jail, but he was convicted of incitement to terrorism back in 2005. He's been investigated countless times. There was a great

cartoon, I think it was in Yediotah K was in Idiota, another newspaper here that showed him at the honor guard the other day, which he reviewed as he took his office. And he looks at one of the policemen and says, Oh, I know you from somewhere. And the policeman says, yeah, I investigated, I interrogated you back in whatever year it was. So, you know, he was the guy on the other side of the table. Now he's the guy who might be approving. It's going to be interesting. I mean, and that's also going to be a big challenge for Netanyahu because Ben-Gvir wants to change the balance of power in some of these places. And what he said, by the way, and this resonates with a lot of Israelis and also speaks to his success, was what Ben-Gvir spoke about in his campaign. And I think this is where he's going to put his focus. So I'm not as concerned about Ben-Gur.

His slogan during the elections was, who's in charge? Mi bal habayit in Hebrew. Who's in charge here? And that's because there was a feeling in Israel that Israel had lost control. It went back to the 2021 Gaza operation, guarding of the walls when there were riots in mixed cities. And a general feeling of loss of sovereignty and rule of law in the Negev and in the Galil and other parts of the walls when there were riots in mixed cities and a general feeling of loss of sovereignty and rule of law in the Negev and in the Galil and other parts of the country. Ben-Vir is promised, this is what I'm going to do. Now, that's important. That is a big

challenge, a big problem. And even Yair Lapid, by the way, admitted that they made a mistake, that they didn't deal with that enough. But there was a real visceral feeling among Israeli voters that led to them to kind of run and flock behind him. I think that's where he'll put his focus. Will he challenge Netanyahu? Of course. I mean, he wants to go up to the Temple Mount. He wants to do a lot of other things.

That's going to be a tough one to manage. So if, I mean, so there will be these tensions between Ben-Gvir and Netanyahu. The question for me, I guess, will Ben-Gvir and Smoltrich ever want to bring things to the brink of bringing the government down, collapsing the coalition? In other words, will they assume these ministries, assume things they've never had before, bureaucracies, budget, real operational lines of authorities, which, as many politicians do, they will get very comfortable with all this infrastructure around them. And suddenly, if Netanyahu calls their bluff and says, I'm not signing on, I'm not letting you do X, Y, and Z, are these guys so ideological? Are they so impervious to the allure of political fiefdoms, that they would bring the government down knowing there's a very good chance they may never be in a ministerial position again anytime soon?

It's a great question, and I don't know that I have the ultimate answer, but what I can say is that, number one, we don't know for sure, right? I think that in Ben-Gvir's case, we've already seen him start to moderate a bit some of his positions, some of his opinions. He's done some outreach to the left and to the secular Israeli camp in the country, trying to say, you have nothing to be scared of me. That's not what I'm out to do. I think he definitely comes with an ideology and he will have to deliver and show the people who voted for him, that there was a reason they voted for him and they voted for him

because they wanted a real right wing inside the coalition to the right of Netanyahu. They support Netanyahu because if you voted for Ben Barrett meant you wanted Netanyahu as prime minister, but you wanted someone who would keep Netanyahu in the right. Yeah, a purist. Yeah, and that's very much what it's about. I think Smutrich is a little different, and I'll tell you why. I think that Smutrich comes with very strong ideology, very strong, very hard line, a bit even at times messianic in some of – not that he thinks the Messiah is coming, but I think that he, he believes so strongly in his ideology that he won't move. If you remember in, in, in 2021, after the, that election, Netanyahu tried to form a coalition with Ram, who you, the party, Mansoor Bas, that you mentioned earlier, it was Batsal Smatrich who said, no, there could have

been a right-wing government at the time with Ram in that government. It was Batsal Smutrich who said, no, there could have been a right-wing government at the time with Rahm in that government. It was Batsal Smutrich that put his foot down and said, I will not sit with an Arab party. And it meant Netanyahu losing the premiership, Naftali Ben-Yar Lapid establishing a government, and he wouldn't cave to any pressure that was put on him. He really stands and stands his ground. The third part of it with Smutrich is that what I've identified, and I could be wrong, but it's my read of the language and the feeling that I get from talking to him and some of his people, is they don't have... I sometimes compare it to Naftali Bennett. Naftali Bennett was an adversary, an opponent, a rival of Netanyahu, also sometimes on ideology, but, adversary and opponent arrival of Netanyahu, uh, also sometimes

on ideology, but had a lot of respect for Netanyahu. I don't sense that same respect amongst Smutrich and his members and his members of the, of the Knesset. I sense that they are, uh, more, uh, critical of him. They think that Netanyahu, if he won't deliver, they'll still push it through. They don't give him the same admiration that he got from other rivals in the past. And that could lead us in some interesting places. Okay. I want to move to the issue of judicial reform. This was a hot issue during the election. It feels to me like it was an issue that's been

simmering actually for a long time, meaning it's just my sense of like over the last couple decades, larger and larger numbers in the Israeli electorate or the Israeli population, I guess, have been increasingly skeptical of the power of Israel's Supreme Court. And this became a big issue in the election. And now it seems like this is going to become one of the most controversial issues now that Netanyahu's government's in power in terms of what kind of changes they can make to the power of the Supreme Court. So can you explain, and it's a complicated issue, we're not going to get into all of it, but just if you had to summarize, what is the issue? Why is the role of the Supreme Court so controversial in Israeli politics? Well, first of all, I mean, just on a 30,000 foot altitude level, Israel doesn't

have a constitution, right? Unlike the United States is an example. We don't have a clear separation of powers, but we do have, we have the legislative branch. That's the Knesset. We have the executive branch, which is the government. And we have the judiciary, which is pretty much the Supreme court. Now, what happens though, in Israel, unlike in the United States is that the, the executive branch basically is also the parliament because you become the executive branch by having a majority of in the Knesset.

So the moment, so it's basically there, there's no, there's no real daylight between the two of them that, that. Yeah. Like most parliamentary systems, the executive branch and the legislative branch are, are merged. Right. So the only real balance that you have is the judiciary. Now over the years, the Supreme court has shot down some bills, right? Some bills have been seen or some legislation has been seen as undemocratic or creating inequality. One good example is an IDF draft bill. We still don't have one. And this has to do with the fact that there have been petitions to the Supreme Court about

the fact that the ultra-Orthodox do not serve as every other 18-year-old does. And this is one of the objectives of this new government and the ultra-Orthodox parties is to pass a bill, right, that they would continue to get an exemption. What they want to do is kind of three big moves, I would say, in the reforms to the judicial system. The first one is they want to pass what's known as the override clause. So what the override clause would do is let's say I pass a bill tomorrow that all blonde haired people in this country need to serve a month in prison. Right. Of course, that's not going to happen. Let's go crazy with an idea like that. That's obviously not democratic. It's against human rights, et cetera.

The Supreme Court will immediately be petitioned and it's in its in its role as the high court of justice because it wears the two hats and and it would shoot down the bill. So the Knesset wants to have the right to then re-legislate that law with a special majority. So if they pass the original law with just 30 seats, they want to say, okay, we want to pass it with 61 seats, right? 61 out of the 120 members of Knesset. Now there's a debate, by the way, what is the majority, the special majority that you want to have? I, for example, I'm in favor of an override clause, but I think it needs to have a higher number, closer to 70, let's say, that would require you to also get some members of the opposition as opposed to just 61 when the coalition already has 64. That means they'll always be able to win and override the Supreme Court. And that basically eliminates any separation of powers or balance that you might have inside Israel. The second

thing that they want to do is they want to split the role of the attorney general, right? So the attorney general today wears two hats. The first hat is a legal advisor to the government, right? That's an important role. And it gives the government advice on, can you launch this operation? Can you do this? Can you sign this treaty, et cetera, et cetera. And also wears the role of making a hat of making the decision to bring charges against the prime minister. As an example, Benjamin is dining out. Who was on trial as we speak for bribery, fraud, and breach of trust.

Those charges were brought against him by his own attorney general, who he himself appointed. Right. So there's a bit of an absurdity there and they want to separate those two roles. And what they also want to do is change the way we select our Supreme Court justices. Now, the way we currently select our Supreme Court justices is,

so you guys have, and I love watching some of these hearings, right? You know, you have the- The president nominates and then you need a Senate confirmation. Correct. So you have the Senate confirmation, you nominates, and then you need a Senate confirmation. Correct. So you have the Senate confirmation, and you watch the hearing, and there are questions, and people say it's bad.

It creates some transparency. That's a value, I believe. The way we do it here is we have a committee. We have two ministers. But I think what's important in what you just said is the selection of our Supreme Court justices is a, and all our federal judges, is a, inherently, it is a political process. Meaning the politicians ultimately, in the case of the president, nominates the justice and then the elected politicians, the Senate, has to confirm the justice, and then the elected politicians, the Senate has to confirm the justice. This is a process. The ultimate check is that the justices are controlled by a political process, not the other way around.

And I think where you're going with this is that's not the case in Israel. It hasn't been the case until now. There's a committee of judges and Knesset members. The judges themselves are part of the committee, so they're appointing themselves members of the bar. So think about that. So the committee, the committee, I think is nine people that chooses the judges. Three of them are sitting Supreme court justices. So justices are appointing justices. You have two Knesset members, two ministers, one from the opposite of the Knesset members, one opposition, one coalition, and then two members of the Israel bar association. No one, my criticism of it has always been, no one knows what goes on in those

meetings. No one, there's no transparency. And how many do you need to actually, isn't there a minimum threshold? Yeah, you need the law change. You need seven out of the nine, I think. So that's, that was changed. Gideon Saar actually changed that many years ago. He was, before he became justice minister, he was just, he just left his, his position there. This incoming government wants to change that. They want it to be more like it is in the united states as an example where the the government hold on just so i'm clear so so the committee of nine chooses the neck the justice right yes okay and then and you need seven of them to to vote for that. Yes. Okay. Which means the three sitting justices have a veto.

Correct. Oh yeah. Yeah. The three sitting. Right. So it's, it, that creates a compromise, right? It does mean that everyone has to kind of get along somehow. Uh, and, and that creates some balance, right?

So no one can go too crazy in one direction, but what this government wants to do is they want to get rid of the committee and they want to have that the government itself, the ministers of the Israeli government are the ones who appoint the Supreme Court justices. That would make the court more political, at least in its identification. It would be more like the system that you have, right? Donald Trump appointed how many? Three Supreme Court justices.

Yeah. Supreme Justice. So it would make it more along those lines. And then obviously the court would be more affiliated with a certain, or at least some makeup of it would be more affiliated with a certain political stream within Israel. But I mean, I am sympathetic to the argument that the combination of no constitution, so there's no constitution in Israel, with judges that right now at least are not staffed on the court by some kind of political process is a dangerous combination. It's unhealthy. Yes. Look, I want to say, I mean, I think a lot of the reforms make sense, by the way.

For example, the selection of Supreme Court justices makes sense. The splitting of the role of the attorney general makes sense. The override clause makes sense, too. I mean, Supreme Court justices, they weren't elected by the people. If the representatives of the people, i.e. the members of Knesset, decide that a bill should pass even if the Supreme Court is against it, there should be some mechanism that allows that to happen. The problem, I think, occurs when all of these reforms are being done by a government that is led by an individual who is currently on trial. And that's where things get a little murky because we could say, okay, these are important reforms. Every country needs to reform. Every country needs to advance. It all makes sense. But here you have that suspicion that I think has a lot of the people who are part of the bloc that did not vote for Netanyahu, who are very worried about what this all means and what direction Israel is heading in. There are people who talk already about, we're no longer going to be a liberal democracy. We're

going to be an authoritarian democracy. I don't know that we need to go that far. Uh, if our people were talking about undemocratic, as you opened up and said, I, again, I don't know that we need to go that far, but, but there are changes that are happening. This government has been elected on these changes and they've put the right people in the jobs. The guy who's going to be justice minister is, is the person who is uh is going to become the the the he's very close to netanyahu and he will be able to uh pass all these all these laws and all these reforms and and that's why he's there right so it's it's all about getting this done but the problem of netanyahu's trial is kind of in the background there yeah i was just on the override clause by the way i i i mean i was looking at any other countries that have override clause i was

surprised actually to learn that canada where i lived for a number of years has an override clause but i i agree with you very different it's a very different case though canada and you should speak with people who are greater legal experts than i am but i've looked into it a bit uh you don't have in your resume you know i have a law degree no i have a law degree from barry lawn university not from anywhere in canada it's different because canada does have a constitution and canada was done because of you know the way that they have their provinces and the way they are set up and it was meant to create a balance between like quebec and things along those lines and the self-identity of the but but you're right it was the only way to get the provinces, the various provinces to agree to the constitution that they passed at the time. Right. Yes. Right.

Right. Two other items. I mean, I, I mean, listening to all this, I'm, you know, I'm reminded 1977, uh, if you look back at the history, uh, 1977, uh, Israelis elect, uh, Menachem Begin, who was commonly referred to as, quote, a terrorist. Time magazine wrote in an article about Begin, they described him as kind, honest and dangerous. Right. And he, you know, Sadat came, Anwar Sadat under Begin's, during Begin's premiership, the leader of Egypt, the most important country in the Middle East at the time, travels to Israel. Two years later, Israel has a peace deal, peace treaty with Egypt, and Begin, Menachem Begin, who Time Magazine and others called terrorists,

wins the Nobel Peace Prize. So things can change, and things can change quickly. And I just, when I, if I, if I'm going to give Netanyahu the benefit of the doubt, he is very focused on, as he's talked about, talked about in your press, he's talked about it. He also brought this up when I, when I had him on, on, on our podcast, he talked about, he was singularly focused on a, on a peace deal with Saudi Arabia, normalization with Saudi Arabia, nor, you know, some kind of expansion of the Abraham Accords with Saudi Arabia. I don't know if Saudi Arabia would actually join the Abraham Accords. I think it would have to be a separate peace deal. But that is like his ultimate legacy. If he can normalize with Saudi Arabia, it is the biggest change in the middle east since since sadat coming to israel and and and the egypt israel peace

treaty and so in order to do that you need nothing yeah who's geopolitical savvy and you need a stable government so he's not busy every week distracted wrestling and fighting for his life with no confidence votes so if you get a stable government with this 64 seat government, and he could focus on normalization with Saudi Arabia, and he can actually put to work his geopolitical chops, that we'll fast forward like people fast forwarded two years after Begin was elected and said, wow, like we may have all been hysterical, but everything we were hysterical about, A, may not have happened, or B, what did happen seems like small relative when you subordinate it to the massive geopolitical reaction, both in the Israeli press and in the diaspora, to some of these coalition moves I'm making, some of these personnel moves.

But no one's going to care because, A, I'm not going to let it get out of control. And, B, the stakes are so much higher and I'm going to deliver with Saudi. I think that might be what he's thinking. And I hope you're right. I think that we do have to give him the credit that Netanyahu has throughout his terms. And you mentioned the 15 years he served as prime minister has always been careful, has always been cautious, is not one known to take sharp turns, right? In previous governments, if he had wanted, he could have annexed all the West Bank. He decided not to do it. If he wanted, he could have signed on to peace deals with the Palestinians that would have given away and put Israel potentially in danger. And he refused to

do that. If he wanted, he could have pushed through an attack against Iran at the time. And he also didn't do that. So we see that Netanyahu is very calculated, very strategic in what he does. And I think that we do have to give him the benefit of the doubt and wait to see and judge him by the policies and the actions that they take. What raises the concern though is, getting back to the trial for a moment, is he is very dependent on these partners to give him what he needs to potentially stay out of court or even get the trial to end to be able to keep going as prime minister. And they will want things in return.

Those are where the issues become a little more complicated potentially. So if they say, listen, we'll let you pass that bill to split the role of the attorney general, which might be beneficial for his trial. But in exchange, you got to let us legalize illegal outposts. America's not going to like that. That would put them on a collision course with the Biden administration. But if he wants to get what he wants, he'll have to give them what they want. So that's where it becomes a little complicated. But again, I think we have to wait to really judge him and evaluate what he does based on his policies. And based on the past, he has been a careful prime minister.

Yakov, we'll leave it there. That was very enlightening and illuminating, which I just think everyone needs to take a deep breath right now and watch events play out. So I'm grateful for your taking the time with us. uh i will rope you back in for uh further discussions in the future as we hit other points of peak hysteria you're you're like you're that you're here to calm us all down i will try i gotta calm myself first down and then i can calm other people down but thank you very much dan it's always a pleasure that's our show for today. To keep up with Yaakov Katz's work, you can do it at jpost.com. That's the Jerusalem Post's homepage. And you can also follow Yaakov on Twitter at Yaakov Katz, Y-A-A-K-O-V-K-A-T-Z.

Call Me Back is produced by Alam Benatar. Until next time, I'm your host, Dan Senor.