Call Me Back - with Dan Senor - We need to talk about Turkey - with Hay Eytan Cohen Yanarojak & Nadav Eyal

Episode Date: January 13, 2025

Watch Call me Back on YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/@CallMeBackPodcast To contact us, sign up for updates, and access transcripts, visit: https://arkmedia.org/ Dan on X: https://x.com/dansenor Dan on Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/dansenor The collapse of Assad’s regime in Syria has created a new geopolitical reality, in which Turkey has emerged as a dominant regional power, both militarily and diplomatically. For Israel, this new reality entails certain risks, but also opportunities for cooperation? What is Turkey’s next move - and what are Erdogan’s ambitions? And how is Israel preparing for this new order?  To help us understand, our guests are Hay Eytan Cohen Yanarojak and Call me Back regular Nadav Eyal.  Hay Eytan Cohen Yanarojak, who moved to Israel from Turkey, is a researcher at the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies at Tel Aviv University, and an expert on contemporary Turkish politics and society. Yanarocak is the editor of Turkeyscope, and a member of the Middle East Network Analysis Desk. He is a frequent guest on Israeli media, where he regularly appears to discuss contemporary Turkish issues.  Nadav Eyal is a columnist for Yediiot. He is one of Israel’s leading journalists. Eyal has been covering Middle-Eastern and international politics for the last two decades for Israeli radio, print and television news.

Israel is very fearful that it has replaced the Shia-led axis of resistance with the GAD-Sunni axis of resistance. Jolani will try to consolidate power in Syria. He will be supported by Turkey that sees itself as a power that's returning to an area that it controlled for hundreds of years during the Ottoman Empire. And after he finishes consolidating power, then Jolani will do what every Arab leader, Sunni or Shia or anything like that, has done. He will say, we need to return our stolen Arab land, which is the Golan Heights.

And what Israel is fearful of is that the Golan Heights will become a magnet to every Sunni GAD in the region in ways that the Shia could never achieve through their own axis of resistance Because they are such a minority and because of this Turkish influence there Israel needs to prepare This is the argument within the defense apparatus. It's 8 o'clock a.m. on Sunday, January 12th here in New York City. It's 3 o'clock p.m. in Israel on Sunday January 12th as Israelis start a new week and Anticipate hope for pray for await any news of a possible

Hostage deal that is a topic will be following closely It is 5 o'clock a.m. On Sunday January 12th in Los Angeles, California Where many of our friends and members of the call me back community are suffering from the utter catastrophe of These LA wildfires, which is an issue. We will also be turning to in the days ahead But today we are going to be focused on the Middle East and an area of the Middle East we had not been as focused on up until recent weeks. Following the collapse of Bashar al-Assad's regime in Syria, there has potentially been a new geopolitical reality created in which Turkey has emerged as a or the dominant regional

power both militarily and diplomatically For Israel the new reality does pose some risks such as Conflicts in Syria where Turkey could be the major force in Syria against Israel But also opportunities potentially for cooperation in the areas of energy and possibly security in the areas of energy and possibly security. Meanwhile, Turkey's NATO membership and its alliance with Russia does present new complexities to geopolitics in the region. What is Turkey's next move?

What's Erdogan trying to accomplish here? What are his ambitions? There's been a lot of speculation, quite heated speculation, but what role do the politics inside Turkey play in Turkey's foreign policy and how is Israel adapting to this new reality? Has Israel's security infrastructure and intelligence infrastructure changed as a result of this new reality?

To answer these questions, I'm pleased to welcome to our podcast for the first time Dr. Hi, a ton cone. Yenna Rojek, a researcher at the Moshe Dayan center for Middle Eastern and African studies at Tel Aviv university. He is an expert on contemporary Turkish politics and Turkish society. He studied in university in Istanbul and we will also be joined shortly in this podcast. Joining the conversation will be call me back regular Nadav Ayal who has insights on what Israeli policy makers and security leaders are doing as a result of this new reality. But I want to start with Chai. Chai, welcome to the podcast. Thank you very much for having me. Before we begin, you have a

rather unique perspective into Turkish society. So can you just tell us a little bit about your background? Sure. Before we start, I would like to send my love and solidarity with the American people because of these wildfires. And regarding your question, I grew up in Istanbul, Turkey. I lived there for 22 years. I was born in a Jewish family. We are the descendants of the expulsion from Spain, 1492. We are very much raised with this notion that the Turkish people and the Jewish people always had brotherly relations and we always were safeguarded by the Turkish authorities also during the Ottoman times and also during the Turkish times. So when I moved to Israel in 2006, I was a very proud Turkish Jewish youngster who came to

Israel, of course, because of Zionism, but still emphasized and highlighted by nationality. However, unfortunately, during the last two decades, we are seeing steady deterioration in the relations. So long story short, I'm working at the Moshe Dayan Center, analyzing the Turkish foreign policy and, of of course the Turkish society, the Kurds, etc. So that's my background.

And when you moved from Turkey to Israel, what was the state of Turkish-Israel relations? I know it's complicated now and it's been complicated for some time. What was going on when you moved? Well during 1990s, it was kind of a honeymoon that we witnessed bilateral visits, we witnessed joint military drills. I do remember during my childhood that even the Israeli army came to provide humanitarian aid for the Turkish earthquake victims in 1999, for instance. And of course, the Israeli government dispatched humanitarian

aid also for the earthquake victims last year. And unfortunately, within the years, we began to see a deterioration in the relations, but it was a gradual one. It was not an immediate one. And I believe that the fact that Turkey began to rely on Israel less on security issues, the situation got worse for Israel. Hi, I don't think we've done a single episode on Turkey in the history of this podcast. Our most diligent listeners can go back and research and let us know for sure.

I know we've mentioned Turkey quite a bit, but we've never actually dedicated an episode. So I wanna use this opportunity to help me and our audience get more familiar with Turkey, so this will feel perhaps a little remedial. But before we dive into the role Turkey has fashioned for itself in the region. I just want to understand,

Turkish history during the Ottoman period, so the Ottoman Empire dominated the region for hundreds of years, up until the end of the First World War. So it was an imperial player in the region. Can you just briefly describe, how did the Turkish people and Turkish leaders look at that period in terms of its

relevance today? Okay. First of all, I have to underline that Turkey is considered as the successor state of the Ottoman Empire. And when we are looking at the Ottoman Empire, we are seeing a world superpower that ruled in three different continents, in the Balkans and of course in the Eastern Europe we can say for instance Belgrade, Budapest, Bulgaria, Greece, all of Northern Africa and of course the Middle East.

And these places were under Turkish domination for hundreds of years and if we are speaking about Israel, Syria and the vicinity, we are talking about 402 years of domination. This entire region remained under Turkish control until the end of the First World War, which was 1918. And then they adopted a very interesting foreign policy that they wanted to disengage from the Muslim Arab Middle East. And instead, they wanted to become a part of Europe with the westernization reforms of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, who was considered as the founder of the republic. During the Cold War, Turkey became a really reliable ally of the NATO and later, thanks to the United States, Turkey became a part of NATO. However, because of the disagreements with the US administration of that time that was

ran by Lyndon Johnson, we began to see the first cracks in the disagreements between the United States and Turkey and in a very gradual manner, we began to see this mistrust deepened and deepened until the arrival of Recep Tayyip Erdogan. And today, because of Erdogan and today because of Erdogan's we can say neo-Ottomanist, pan-Islamist and foreign policy that he is engaging in a very negative manner to the current US foreign policy. So in terms of the national identity of the Turkish people, is there really this ambition to return to the influence that the Ottomans had in the region? If you look at national opinion surveys when you talk to average Turkish people, I know I'm oversimplifying

and overgeneralizing, but I'm just generally speaking, is this longing to return to the power and influence of the Ottomans something that is part of Turkish nationalism? This pro-Ottoman approach was not a part of Turkish nationalism until 1980s, but later with the rise of Islamism in Turkey, we began to see that the political Islam began to play a very important role here. And also, especially in the school textbooks, the Ottoman history began to be broadened. As a result, in a very gradual manner, the Ottoman history, Ottoman patterns, Ottoman way of thinking began to penetrate in the Turkish popular culture. Today, if you're gonna look at the Turkish soap operas that were produced during the last 10 years,

you're gonna find out lots of different examples of neo-Ottomanist themes that they are highlighting the so-called golden age of the Turkish nation. Today, especially under Erdogan, there is a new public phenomenon that is trying to merge the Turkish nationalism with the Ottoman past. And of course, the most important cement of this new identity is also the pan-Islamist

consciousness. And in this regard, from time to time, we are seeing some frictions and not only with the state of Israel, but also with the United States of America. That's what I wanted to mean before. Okay, so Erdogan rises to power 2002. Tell us a little bit about his background and his own rise to power, and then also how he has changed Turkey over the past decades and during the past two decades,

because my understanding is The phenomenon you're describing the role of political Islam the role and its impact in Turkish nationalism And then its role in this longing for a return to Ottoman like influence was not always Erdogan's approach to Domestic politics and Turkish foreign policy it has not existed in the two-plus decades in the entirety of the two plus decades of his leadership. So can you just talk a little bit about kind of where he came from, how he rose to power and then once in power how he has changed? So he was born and raised in Istanbul in 1954 in a very poor neighborhood of Istanbul called Kasımpaşa. His father wanted him to get some religious education, so during the summers he went to the summer school where he learned the basics of Islamic studies,

but at the same time also like math, chemistry, etc. So at first he wanted to become a soccer player, but then since every time he played soccer, his father slapped him many times. So he decided to make a career change and he became the president of the republic. It wasn't so abrupt, I assume. I assume there was a lot that happened between the end of his soccer career and the beginning of his presidential campaign.

Yeah, I mean, of course he began as a junior politician in the Islamist party. Later, he became mayor of Istanbul. And then in 2003, he paved his way to prime minister's office. So he is a very pragmatist politician. In his first terms, he did not adopt a very pan-Islamist, very anti-Western foreign policy. That's not because he loved the West or he believed in the West, but rather he used the West to weaken the Turkish army. What I mean by that, when you engaged with the European Union and for the admission process when you got from the Europeans some homeworks to demilitarize the Turkish state mechanisms, it allowed you the necessary excuse

to conduct these reforms even if the Turkish army opposed it. So he used the European Union to weaken the Turkish army in the state mechanisms. He made this demilitarization and as a result he strengthened the civilian leadership that was controlled by himself. So in the very beginning most of the people thought that he was really changed, that he was a true liberal that so to demilitarize the state, but no. The real reason for that was to hinder, to limit the jurisdictional powers of the Turkish

army, which was then considered as the most important actor as a body in the check and balance system. I know that it is weird because in a true democracy you do not tag an army as a check and balance organ, right? We are of course speaking about judiciary, for instance, but in the Turkish case, the army was considered as the watchdog of secularism, if not democracy. Okay. So that's the role of the Turkish military in Turkish politics and Turkish society, and certainly as it relates to Erdogan. What role has Israel played

in the national political discourse in Turkey? So during the 1990s, the Turkish administration, they felt very much threatened by the Kurdish insurgency, the BKK, and they felt the necessity to equip with more modern weaponry. And during this time Israel appeared as the most important ally of the Turkish Armed Forces and the IDF modernized the Turkish Armed Forces' inventory, especially the tanks. We provided them all necessary equipment so

that they could cope with this guerrilla warfare, especially during the nights they had a very hard time to cope with the threat. In 1999, with the capture of the head of the PKK, Abdullah Öcalan, we began to see a very drastic decrease in the PKK's attacks against the Turkish security forces. And therefore, we began to see that the Turkish administrations less and less they had to rely on Israel. When this terror threat began to fade away, Of course, Turkey's problematic record on human rights also began to seem better in the eyes of the Europeans. So therefore Turkey began to be welcomed once again

in the European circles, also in the United States, et cetera. So within time, Israel lost its ground that could justify its existence in Ankara. However, since this PKK threat did not fade away in a complete manner, the Israeli-Turkish relations continued in a constant trend until the arrival of Mr. Erdogan's Justice and Development Party. In his first two terms, he also launched a new peace process with the Kurds. So when you do not suffer from terrorism, you do not need Israel anymore. So we began to see the first deterioration during the second Lebanon war. For the first time, Erdogan began to criticize Israel for Israel's military actions inside Lebanon.

And in January 2009, we all witnessed rhetorical confrontation between then Turkey's Prime Minister Erdogan and Israel's deceased President Shimon Peres in the World Economic Forum in Davos. I believe that was the most iconic starting point of this very deterioration. From that particular moment, we also can say that Mr. Erdogan adopted the Turkish foreign policy as his public relations machine. He began to see that when he is engaging in a friction with a foreign leader, no matter if he is Israeli or maybe he is American or he is Dutch, German, we happen to see this throughout the time that we saw many different examples, right?

So he saw that his public approval rose dramatically because of this Neo-Ottoman sentiments. Because if our leader is capable of challenging the leader of the Jewish state or the United States or Germany. So it means that we are not like the old Turkey anymore, but instead we trust ourselves. We are not deterred and we gonna say whatever we think. We are not going to auto-censor ourselves anymore. This is the mindset. Okay, whether if it's logical for you, not logical

for you, but that was the pattern, okay? And this is, in my opinion, very important. And later, in a steady manner, we began to see that as much as the role of the Turkish military weakened in Turkey, Turkey became more and more critical towards the state of Israel. We also saw the Mavi Marmara flotilla that sought to break the legal naval embargo against the Gaza Strip. And of course, this paved the way for a mistrust and the first ever physical friction between the state of Israel and Turkey as a result of this incident, 10 members of the IHH organization, they were all Turkey citizens, they were unfortunately killed in this incident because of their engagement against the IDF commandos. So it was again, a very, very complex and very saddening event,

especially for those who have this binational identity. It's like seeing your father and your mother like having a quarrel. Long story short, unfortunately, the quality of the Israeli-Turkish relations were bound to the quality of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. And that was the most important problem because unfortunately the Turkish side refrained from looking at the Israeli-Turkish relations as a separate thing, but they connected it with

the Palestinian issue, especially with the Gaza Strip. So every time when Israel had to launch military operations to stop the constant rocket fire against the Israeli citizens, and I believe that every state should behave in this way to protect its citizens first and foremost. We saw that the Turkish side adopted a very critical line against the state of Israel, and it reached to a new climax after the October 7th. At what point did Erdogan identify maybe the opportunity,

it's the best word, the opportunity that Israel, not only Israel, but that Israel largely had created for him in Syria. So since 2011, Erdogan is engaged in the Syrian civil war. In the very beginning, he called for a free elections and crowned himself as the knight of the democracy in the Middle East and asked Bashar al-Assad to conduct free elections in his country.

Of course, we all know the real reason. Syria's population is constituted of 75% of the Arab Muslim Sunnis. And Erdogan himself also, he is representing a Muslim state, a Sunni Muslim state. And if we are speaking about neo-Ottomanism, we cannot ignore Ottoman Empire's Sunni Islamic identity. So in Erdogan's point of view, the existence of Bashar al-Assad's alivite identity government Bashar al-Assad's alivite identity government was an artificial body that took control of historical Syria because in his opinion, the Syria, the land itself, had to be under the Sunni dominance, which means that we already spoke about the Ottoman history but I just want to remind you since 1516 until 1918 that particular land Syria for 402 years

remained under Sunni dominance. So when we are looking at the latest incidents the fall of Assad of course we cannot disconnect this whole so-called success from two different important wars. The war in Ukraine and the war in Lebanon. The Russians were weakened and they could not provide the necessary reinforcements and military support for Bashar al-Assad. And besides that, the Hezbollah terrorist organization, which was severely weakened by the Israeli defense forces and of course the Israeli Mossad's very creative warfare patterns, we began to see that Hezbollah also could not provide necessary reinforcements to combat with the Syrian rebels.

And of course, let us not forget, the Iranians could not manage to provide reinforcements also from land and also from air and also it's because of Israel. And as a result, all the stars aligned and we saw that Mr. Erdogan, now he's enjoying the fruits of his steady foreign policy. And now he is penetrating into Syria more and more while crowning another Sunni actor, Mr. Akjulani. He is super dependent on Turkey. So he is effectively the new leader, at least for now, he's effectively the new leader of Syria and you're saying he's extremely dependent on Erdogan and Turkey. Yes, and I can tell you why.

Because Israel destroyed Syria's conventional army within three days. So who is going to arm the next Syrian army? Of course, this will be Erdogan. Also the Turkish defense minister, Yashar G will be Erdogan. Also, the Turkish Defense Minister Yashar Guler made it very clear that if the Syrian administration will ask the Turkish president to do so, so his country will be ready to provide all necessary equipments for the armament of the new Syrian army. That's the first issue. Second issue is the rebuilding of Syria. Who do you think that will rebuild Syria? Of course, the Turkish subcontractors, the most important

allies of Mr. Erdogan, will go into build Syria. With whose money? With the European unions and Qatar's money. Okay, so I assume that there will be soon an economic boom in Turkey and the last but not the least, the political connection. I assume that you also saw the suit and the tie of Mr. El-Julani. Yeah, meaning they told me you got to put on a suit and tie, you got to clean up, you got to present yourself as a Western looking, if you will. Indeed. Serious minded, looking, if you will. Indeed. Serious minded, professional, civilized leader.

So I can sum up for you. The Turks, they integrated their embassy in Damascus. The Turkish head of the intelligence and the Turkish foreign minister already paid visits to Damascus. They provided him the necessary legitimacy. Now the Turks are also lobbying for Mr. Jullani to attract more investments to Syria for the can. They are seeking the cancellation of the international sanction regime against Syria so that they can

launch this rebuilding project. Okay? So the Syrians, if I'm looking at them, they are very much dependent to Turkey. And last but not the least, also the Turkish Transportation and Infrastructure Minister, Abdulkadir Uraloğlu, you know, recently he mentioned about his intention to invest in a very detailed manner in the Syrian economy, like paving new highways and reconstructing the airports, providing radars, providing GSM mobile infrastructure. The Turks and the Syrians are also nowadays planning to sign a maritime delimitation agreement at the expense of the Republic of Cyprus. Of course, we're going to see more and more presence of the Turkish Navy in the region. So it will be very interesting for us in the very near future.

I assume that we're also going to see the inauguration of the new Turkish army bases inside Syria, including Damascus. Okay. I want to bring Nadav in, who joins us. Let's call it fashionably late, not predictably late. He's normally waiting for me. I just wanted to say that I'm just learning from the best. But I am learning all the time from Hayat An. He's one of the best experts in Israel for Cherokee.

I'm not fishing for compliments, apologies for the misunderstanding. Yeah, he really, Hayat really went for it. He really like, you know, he saw some low-hanging fruit there. So, I'll say that those who are not watching this on YouTube and are listening, what you're not seeing is that for much of the, probably about a third of this conversation, Nadav has been on screen, on camera, dutifully listening, taking notes.

Believe it or not, he was not multitasking. He was just like a pupil, a student in Chai's class here on Call Me Back, as I have been too. So, in any event, but I do wanna bring you, Nadav, into the conversation, because you obviously are talking to Israeli security officials and policymakers and intelligence and the intelligence community about how they're perceiving all of what Hai is talking about. And so I want to ask you to bring that perspective into it based on what you've heard and obviously based on what what you know and the people you're talking to, will Turkey fill this vacuum that is opening up

because of the weakening of the axis of resistance, meaning the Iran-backed proxy system in the Middle East? If that really is breaking down as it appears to be, does the Israeli leadership and security establishment believe Turkey can step in in a way that's very problematic, of course, but do they actually think that's viable? First of all, they do. There are no vacuums in the Middle East, and we saw this immediately after the collapse of the Assad regime. Look, as far as

Israeli security apparatus is concerned, and according to the intelligence that Western intelligence services have, Erdogan did not know that this attack by those rebel groups, those militias that are associated with Ankara, will actually result in the fall of Bashar al-Assad. He didn't know that. When they started rolling down south and there was a feeling of momentum, the Turkish themselves were asking, where would this stop? Where would we see the resistance by Bashar Assad? Even Al-Julani himself didn't know he's going to be that successful. So the Turkish didn't know that too. But this project as Hayeitan detailed so beautifully during this show, this

project of expansion of Turkish power, ideas of new Ottomanism, these ideas have been long, long in the making for Turkey and of course the animosity that has been developing specifically I should say between Erdogan and between the state of Israel and it's much less about the circles around him. So the first thing I wanna say is that Israel and Turkey still have rather good security relations, even now. And these relations are relatively secret.

There are no photo ops there, but Israel and Turkey are working together on various issues that are strategic and very fundamental to both Ankara and Jerusalem, and they have been doing so continuously, continuously in recent years. There were points of breakdown or almost breakdown of the security relations as a result of what's happening in the political field. Now, saying this about Turkey after the coup attempt is very important. Chai, tell us about the coup attempt against Erdogan and the implications. The coup attempt of July 15th, 2016. Yeah. Who attempted the coup?

On paper, that was a coalition of people in the army, generals, journalists, and professors, etc. And this was regarded as a turning point, right? In Turkish politics. He took advantage of it. He took advantage of it, right? To clamp down, this is when he... He began to tag all of his opposition.

Journalists, judges, arresting, you know, all these judges and journalists. It was a great purge. Great purge, took on civil society. Okay, Nadav, sorry. So after the coup attempt, whether or not this was a sort of a false flag as high time is actually saying or he knew in Advance or something like that or whether it wasn't the the bottom line is that mr. Erdogan managed to consolidate a lot of power and afterwards

When you see the head of the Turkish security system, the secret security system talking with Israelis after 2016, that means that Erdogan knows about this. That means that there are no two turkeys. There is only one Turkey of power, and that is the Turkey of Erdogan. This is the Turkey that matters. This kind of cooperation is happening between Israel and Turkey even now, even as we speak. So I want to underline this. After I'm saying this, we just saw a report by the Nagel Commission. It's a commission in Israel.

What was the commission's mandate? Security budget. In this new world? In the post-October 7th. Yeah. Looking 10 years further. And basically what they said is that that Israeli security establishment will need about 13 billion shekels a year more in the next 10 years in order to deal with the security threats post October 7. That means you know about between three and four billion dollars a year that Israel will need more and one

of the focus areas of this commission is what are the threats? And they actually say in stuff that was publicized on the record that a possible confrontation with Turkey is possible and Israel should really look and prepare to that confrontation. And they were referring to Syria. Now here's the risk, Dan. We had a Shia-led axis of resistance, but Shia are a minority in the Middle East and a minority within the Muslim world, and they have a very specific class of reference

in the Arab world, and it's not positive in terms of the way that the Sunni majority treats them. We know that the most radical groups within the Muslim world are Sunni, of course, Islamic State, Al-Qaeda, Jabhat al-Nusra, from where Mohammed al-Jolani came from. The bottom line is that Israel is very fearful that it has replaced the Shia-led axis of resistance with the Jihadist Sunni axis of resistance with the GAD Sunni axis of resistance managing now to consolidate much like then you remember that after the US took out Iraq of Saddam Hussein and you were in the field back then if I remember correctly. Yep. The US took down the Taliban in Afghanistan.

It's the Islamic Republic of Iran that grew stronger and stronger because two of its major enemies Saddam Hussein and the Taliban were out and then they had even geographically geopolitically they had a lot of room to maneuver. The same the Israelis are thinking might be happening in the Middle East. It's not that they're sorry that Israel took out the axis of resistance. Nasrallah was a formidable leader in the Muslim world beyond being Shia or Sunni or pro-Iranian or anything like that. It was very important to take him down. But they understand that now Jolani will try to consolidate power in Syria. He will be supported by Turkey that sees itself as a power that's returning to an area that it controlled for hundreds of years during the Ottoman Empire.

And this could be a point of friction between the Sunni jihadists. And at the second phase, after he finishes consolidating power, then what will he do? He will do what every Arab leader, Sunni or Shia or anything like that has done. He will say we need to return our stolen Arab land which is the Golan Heights. And what Israel is fearful of is that the Golan Heights will become a magnet to every Sunni Jihad in the region in ways that the Shia could never achieve through their own axis of resistance because they are such a minority. And because of this Turkish influence there, Israel needs to prepare. This is the argument within the defense apparatus.

Okay, I want to let, Chai has to go. So Chai, I want to let you go. Thank you for joining us and I hope you return. Thank you very much for having me today and I wish you all the best. Thank you. Thank you for joining us and I hope you return. Thank you very much for having me today and I wish you all the best. Thank you. Thank you very much, Hai. Nadev, just staying with that, is there a view in the Israeli security establishment or even in this Nagel commission report

that the reach of Turkey could go all the way to the Golan Heights? It's one thing for Turkey to be in Syria. It's one thing for Turkey to be in Syria. It's one thing for Turkey to be helping Jolani and provide for the new government in all the ways that Kai was saying. It's quite another for Turkey to be sitting on Israel's border, which really would be a whole new reality. Well, first of all, if we're talking about Turkey, in the sense of the Turkish army,

no. But if we're talking about spheres, you know, in the sense of the Turkish army, no, but if we're talking about spheres of influence, of course. Look, the rebels in the South, Jolani didn't consolidate power yet. And the rebels in the South are extremely dangerous, and some of them don't accept his authority. They must be more extreme than he is in terms, and he's quite extreme in terms of their jihadism but if he can manage to do then what he wants to do and if he is influenced by Turkey this could be an issue. Now there is a huge question with intelligence organizations around the world. What is the degree of Turkish effectiveness in so far of the new regime in Damascus? Can they give an order?

And the answer is most probably they cannot. So this persona or this organization is definitely not an ultimate proxy completely controlled like a puppet show by Ankara. This is not the case, but they are extremely dependent of Ankara. And how did we see this? Almost immediately after they took control of Damascus, Turkey announced that now they're

going to march on the Kurds in the north. And they asked Jolani to help, asked nicely. And he did exactly what they asked him to do and he just took control of Damascus. Why should he go up north and start fighting the SDF? And there, I remind you, there are American forces there, there is an Israeli support there underneath the ground and there are many things happening there. The West supports the Kurds to an extent. And of course you have people here in the US that are doing their best, I think like Lindsey Graham and others to defend the Kurds. Why would the new ruler of Damascus need this trouble? He

just took control of Damascus. And the answer is because Erdogan asked him. And when Erdogan asks you and he's your, you know, your best supporter, and he's the guy who made sure that you dress with a suit as Khayyaitan just told us, then you make sure that this is actually happening. And now the jury is still out. Whether or not Turkey can control Syria in full or what is the degree a hundred percent? It's definitely not this is not a province of Turkey and I don't think everyone is aiming for that But can they influence Syria to a specific direction? That's that's a question now as to everyone, you know Everyone has his phases with Israel. There's always a phase of a honeymoon and then there is a phase of just blatant accusations, kind

of incitement, very, very difficult rhetoric for Israelis. And then when I speak with my Turkish sources, they say, you know, don't take it too seriously. He has his own politics. He has domestic politics. He doesn't really mean it. Look at, did he ever fund terrorist activities against Israel? And I go, yeah, well, the Navi Mama, that event in which they send a flotilla to the Gaza Strip, yeah, and they said, but this is public.

Look at what he's been doing in Turkey and look at the relations, look at the economic relations between Israel and Turkey, which have been developing until the last year in which they took a dive after October 7th. But in general, relations in terms of security are quite good. So it's really a question that there are people within the defense apparatus in Israel that are saying, it's not such a bad idea. If you look at David Ben-Gurion, do you remember the defense doctrine of David Ben-Gurion about the Middle East?

So, basically, he said, look, first circle, they are enemies. We're willing to have peace with them. The Arab countries that are our neighbors would be very happy to have peace with them, but there's no chance right now. They won't recognize our right to exist. Well, you have the second circle. Second circle are the civilizations. That is Iran and Turkey. And what Ben-Gurion did, I think very cleverly, is started developing relations with Iran and Turkey, countries

that are not Arab. One is Persian, the other is Turk. Both are civilizations of the Middle East. And Ben-Gurion started having good relations with Iran that lasted until the Islamic Revolution And then good relations with the secular Turkey and of course that secular Turkey doesn't exist but somehow even under Erdogan Security relations are being maintained. So some people in the defense apparatus are saying Yeah if Turkey wants to have spheres of influence in the Middle East and they want to talk with us about these spheres of influence and they want to say, you know, this area will influence and this area you'll

influence, maybe we should go for it. And other people are saying that's too naive. This is not really what they want. What is for sure is that Turkey is sending signals to Israel. It's ready to talk about the Middle East and how it looks. Now the reason that Israel is not so forthcoming is because Israel wants to defend the Kurds. The Kurd issue for the Israelis is an essential issue because they were a

counterweight to Syria, a counterweight to Islamic state. That's really important for the West in general. And to an extent the counterweight to Islamic State, that's really important for the West in general, and to an extent, a counterweight to Turkey. And a counterweight inside Iraq to the spread of Shiite Islam's reach. Exactly. Right. And the relations with the Kurds, again, go from the inception of the State of Israel,

Israel and the Kurds, from the very first years of the State of Israel's history, it had good relations with the Kurds from the very first years of the state of Israel's history, it had good relations with the Kurds, including traveling there, you know, equipment and all the rest, and deserting them in the Middle East will also signal something. So it's a really difficult choice. But on the other hand, Dan, what will happen if Erdogan would just crush the Kurds without having an agreement with the Israelis?

What would that mean for the future of Israel in the region? So these are really difficult strategic choices. And also the question is who succeeds Erdogan? Erdogan's not a young man. He's been in power for over two decades. Is there Erdogan part two? Is there an extension of Erdoganism? Or is there different power centers

that could emerge inside Turkey, although even though Erdogan has weakened most of them, just at a very practical level, Nadav? So I understand the Naglal Commission. I understand these conversations that you're reflecting here and reporting on that are happening inside the Israeli security establishment. At a very practical level,

are there any immediate steps being taken? Oh, of course, there are practical steps. With regard to Turkey? With regard to Syria. Right. With regard to Turkey, I'm gonna voice a speculation, which I don't think is such a speculation. So if before Jolani took Syria,

there were like, I don't know, 15 desks in the Israeli defense apparatus that were dealing with Turkey. And I think I'm exaggerating. I'm substantially exaggerating. So I think they're going to be double, just double that number of desks of people sitting down and talking about Turkey and what are the intentions of Erdogan and how this is going to work. And again, having said that, I am underlining again,

I simply cannot specify, but the relations between the countries in terms of security and day-to-day basis are good. And I don't think that if you'll come to Netanyahu and you'll say, what can make these relations actually better? Of course he would have wanted Erdogan to go into an honeymoon phase. And I remind you then that just before October 7, Israel and Turkey were in a honeymoon phase.

Right, Bucy Herzog, the president of Israel traveled to Istanbul, right? Yeah, there was a talk about a meeting between Erdogan and Netanyahu. And then October 7 happened and it deteriorated very quickly. And it's always these deteriorations are always related to public statements made by the president of Turkey and the way that he talks about Israel. Then Israel responds.

Israel responded this time by actual steps related to trade. And Erdogan, by the way, was criticized by radical leftists in the West that he's still giving harbor through his ports to Israel. So he was pressured by radical leftists and by jihadists that he's actually playing, you know, that it's a double game in his relations with Israel. And I think this burdened the relations substantially. Look, Turkey is a civilization and my encounters with the Turkish administration and civil society as an Israeli and as traveling many, many times to Istanbul, both as a journalist for the last elections, I traveled to Istanbul for the last elections,

and in other instances, all of my meetings and encounters were always extremely positive, including in the street. I need to say this in terms of tourism, not only trade, also in terms of tourism, relations are good. On the other hand, you saw, you remember this at the beginning of this war, these attempts by Iran to abduct people through Turkey, attacks that happened across the years. It's not only in this year and a half attacks against Israel, but this were not like common popular hatred against Israelis by Turks. No, that was not the case. The case were like units of terrorists infiltrating from other places. So one level, the jury is still out as to what is the effective control of Turkey with

the new ruler of Damascus. Another level is to what extent the relations can survive even if they are publicly they're seen so in such a pessimistic tone but just beyond the shadows the truth is that relations are in working relations are efficient at this point so to what extent this could survive and could actually be better and the answer of course is very much related to the war in Gaza the war in Gaza stops this gives the rulers in Ankara the possibility to maneuver more if they want to and the extent to which Israel is willing to have

concessions as to its position with the Kurds Can the Kurds be saved and can can the SDF area be maintained? Is the biggest question in the Middle East today, I think, or the most critical, apparent question beyond the deal in the Gaza Strip and a possible halt to the war. And the reason for that is also because the Kurds are holding to about a dozen thousand of Islamic State prisoners. And this issue is the most talked about issue between the intelligence branches in the Middle East and in the West right now.

The fear is if the Turks are going to mount an attack there and try to destroy the SDF completely, then what will happen to those prisoners? And the reason I think the Turks are not doing that is because there is an American presence in these areas and the US is basically telling them, don't do it, but will the new administration allow it? And then what will happen to those Islamic State prisoners there? Because the Kurds are saying, if this happens, we're not responsible and we're holding them

as contractors for the West. What I'm just disclosed to you, Dan, is really very much behind the scene, the conversation. It's very practical. And from what I understand, the Turks are also saying, Turkey is already saying, look, we have solutions to that, to those prisoners. They have a breakdown. You know, 3,000 are Syrians or 4,000, they will remain in Syria's jails by Jolani. 4,000, they came from here.

And we'll make, you know, we'll have new jails for Islamic State. It's like the genie in the bottle to an extent. And that's the biggest genie right now in the Middle East. And it's not only about the Middle East. You saw Christmas market attacks, right? In Germany, in other places, these people are going to go back home and they have the passports to do that. And what are you going to do with them? And that's a big chunk of the Kurd argument in the Middle East. And that's one of the reasons that Turkey needs to supply some answers. Okay, Nadav, we'll leave it there.

I'm sure this topic will not be far from our further conversations. And also we'll be doing a separate episode in the days ahead on the US thinking on what to do about Turkey and the US-Turkish relationship and this new reality. And also this will be very relevant with the incoming administration, which we'll be discussing. And also, this will be very relevant with the incoming

administration, which we'll be discussing. Nadav, thanks as always. Thank you so much, Dan. That's ARKARCMEDIA.ORG to sign up for updates, get in touch with us, and access transcripts, all of which have been hyperlinked to resources that we hope will enrich your understanding of the topics covered in the episodes on this podcast. Call Me Back is produced and edited by Alain Benatar. Additional editing by Martin Huérgaux. Rebecca Strom is our Operations Director.

Research by Stav Slama and Gabe Silverstein. Until next time, I'm your host, Dan Sinor.