Call Me Back - with Dan Senor - Will Saudi Arabia's MBS save Israel from its political crack-up? With Micah Goodman

Episode Date: September 21, 2023

Are you pessimistic about Israel’s future? My new book – which I wrote with my "Start-Up Nation" co-author Saul Singer – should give you reason for optimism. I care deeply about Israel. I’m endlessly fascinated by Israel. I travel to Israel regularly. Some may say this is a fraught period for anyone who cares about Israel. But in our new book, "The Genius of Israel: The Surprising Resilience of a Divided Nation in a Turbulent World,” we write about the health and resilience of Israeli society, a topic that could not be more relevant to this period. You can order the book here: https://tinyurl.com/5f8s6sb7 We have a special pre-order campaign for my podcast listeners. If you order the book between now and this Friday at sundown, simply forward any order confirmation to [e-mail], and I’ll send you a special chapter sampler that deals with issues debated in Israel – and about Israel – these days. One of the most illuminating characters in our book is Micah Goodman, who has been on our podcast before. Micah is on the speed-dial of a number of Israeli political leaders. He is a polymath, having written books ranging from biblical lessons for the modern age to Israel’s geopolitics. His books include: "Catch-67: The Left, the Right, and the Legacy of the Six-Day War" and, more recently, "The Wondering Jew: Israel and the Search for Jewish Identity." Not only have all of his books been bestsellers in Israel, but he essentially created a new genre; books that bring core texts of Jewish thought to a general, secular audience. Micah also hosts the most downloaded podcast in Israel. In this episode, Micah and I focus on what effects a Saudi-Israel normalization deal could be on Israel's domestic political crisis. Might MBS help restore some normalcy to Israeli politics? And we have a special pre-order campaign for my podcast listeners. If you order the book between now and this Friday at sundown, simply forward any order confirmation to [e-mail], and I’ll send you a special chapter sampler that deals with issues being debated in Israel – and about Israel – these days. One of the most illuminating characters in our book is Micah Goodman, who has been on our podcast before. Micah is on the speed-dial of a number of Israeli political leaders. He is a polymath, having written books ranging from biblical lessons for the modern age to Israel’s geopolitics. His books include: "Catch-67: The Left, the Right, and the Legacy of the Six-Day War" and, more recently, "The Wondering Jew: Israel and the Search for Jewish Identity." Not only have all of his books been bestsellers in Israel, he essentially created a new genre; books that bring core texts of Jewish thought to a general, secular audience. Micah also hosts the most downloaded podcast in Israel. In this episode, Micah and I focus on what effects a Saudi-Israel normalization deal could have on Israel's domestic political crisis. Might MBS help restore some normalcy to Israeli politics?

So we have here two massive events, a massive fight that Israelis are having among themselves, and a rapid peace process in the Middle East. And how will these two events meet each other? Will our internal crisis destroy peace, or will regional peace calm the internal crisis? That, then, is the big question. What's the factor that's going to define the end of the day? Will regional peace mean peace between Israelis, or or the battle between Israelis destroy regional peace? That's the big question.

Are you pessimistic about Israel's future? My new book, which I wrote with my Startup Nation co-author, Saul Singer, should give you reason for optimism. I care deeply about Israel. I'm endlessly fascinated by Israel. And in just about every spare moment I have, I'm reading about Israel, talking to Israelis. I travel to Israel regularly. My mother lives in Israel. I have two sisters who live in Israel. I have nieces and nephews who've all served in the army living in Israel.

Heck, this podcast is actually produced by an Israeli. Now, some may say this is a fraught period for anyone who cares about Israel, me included. Perhaps the jury is still out on this matter. But in our new book, The Genius of Israel, The Surprising Resilience of a Divided Nation in a Turbulent World, which is our follow-up book to Startup Nation, in this new book we write about the health and resilience of Israeli society, a topic that could not be more relevant to this period. And we're doing a special pre-order campaign for my loyal podcast listeners. If you order the new book between now and this Friday at sundown, that's the key point,

sundown. I don't want you ordering this book once Shabbat kicks in. Simply forward any confirmation of your book purchase to book at dancenor.com. That's book at dancenor.com. And I'll send you a special chapter sampler that deals with issues being debated in Israel and about Israel right now. It will give you a taste of what's to come in the book and help you keep informed as these debates are raging right here, right now, even before the book is published. So please go online today, pre-order the book, and send confirmation of your purchase to book at dancenor.com. And we'll send you something to read. You can even read it over Yom Kippur. Actually, don't read it over Yom Kippur.

Leo Leibovich from Tablet Magazine is actually a voice in the book. And he just told me today that he is planning to read a few chapters over Yom Kippur, and I caution that he not read it on an empty stomach. That's not the kind of feedback I want to get. But anyways, I digress. One of the most illuminating characters in our book is Mika Goodman, who has been on our podcast before. I've actually interviewed him when I've been in New York. I've interviewed him in person in Israel. Mika Goodman, who has been on our podcast before. I've actually interviewed him when I've been in New York. I've interviewed him in person in Israel. Mika is a fascinating guy. He's on the speed dial of a number of Israeli political leaders. He's a polymath, having written books

ranging from biblical lessons for the modern age to Israel's geopolitics. His books include Catch 67, The Left, The Right, and The Legacy of the Six-Day War, and more recently, The Wandering Jew, not The Wandering Jew, The Wandering Jew, Israel, and The Search for Jewish Identity. Not only have all of Mika's books been bestsellers in Israel, but he's essentially created a new genre, books that bring core texts of Jewish thought to a general secular audience. Mika also hosts the most downloaded podcast in Israel. Now, why did I want to talk to Mika? A, he is the voice of one of the most powerful quotes in the book, in what is probably my favorite chapter, and one of my favorite chapters in the book. And he and I talk in this conversation about that quote. You'll have to listen to the conversation to hear

that quote. And Mika and I have recently been talking over the last few weeks about what the effect will be of a potential normalization deal between Israel and Saudi Arabia on Israel's domestic political crisis. In other words, could the fast-moving train, which is diplomatic and economic normalization between Riyadh and Jerusalem, actually upend for the better and stabilize Israeli politics and, in a sense, protect Israeli democracy if you are of the view that Israeli democracy is under threat? That's the role that Mohammed bin Salman may be playing in this crazy, topsy-turvy time in Israeli politics. So Mika and I have talked about that offline. I asked him if he would come online so we could have a conversation in front of all of you about it. He's got a lot of interesting insights. Mika Goodman on whether Saudi Arabia's MBS can bring some normalcy to Israeli politics.

This is Call Me Back. And I'm pleased to welcome back to this podcast my longtime friend, Mika Goodman, who when I last got together, we sat in his home in Israel and had a fantastic conversation. Now we are sitting in different countries. But Mika, I'll be in your neck of the woods soon enough and maybe we'll get together in person. Until then, thanks for joining the conversation. I'm glad to be here, Dad.

Mika, you have been talking to a lot of people. You are, as always, prolific in your writing and in your public commentary is everywhere, not just everywhere, but is important. So it not only is voluminous, but it has depth and impact. And I feel like you more than most really have a balanced take on what's happening in Israeli society during these tense times. So I just want to start high level. Where are we in the midst of this crisis period, what some would call a crisis period for Israeli society? Okay. So here's highest level. Let's think about what the role of government is. Governments are formed according to Thomas Hobbes,

this is how big picture we're going to start with, starting with Thomas Hobbes, is that anxiety is what creates governance, is the justification for the existence of governments that use political power in order to govern people. The legitimacy comes from anxiety. The anxiety that there will be no government, I'll have no protection. No one will protect my life. No one will protect my rights. I need a government to protect me from bad people, from thieves, from robbers, from murderers, from enemies, from Hezbollah, from Iran. That's why we need a strong government. You want to be protected through the power of the government. We want to be protected by the power of the government, whether it's protected by the government. But if you also have liberal sensitivities, and Dan, when I say liberal now, I mean classic

liberalism. I mean, John Locke, I mean, John Stuart Mill, classic liberalism is that I have another set of anxieties. I'm not only afraid of robbers and murderers and terrorists, and therefore I need a government that will protect me. I am also afraid of the government itself, because I gave the government the power to protect me, but how do I know? And what guarantee do I have that the power I give to the government so it can use that power to protect me, that the government won't use that power against me. And what the founding fathers of your country then, of the United States of America, specifically James Madison, realized is that the only way for us to have true protections, to be protected by the government and then to be protected from the government

is to have separation of powers. And that is now, I want to just analyze Israel using our need, our yearning for double protection. To be protected by the government and be protected from the government, from the power of government. And here's the way to think about it. In the 4th of January, 2023, Yariv Levin declared what he called a judicial reform. Israelis were listening to him and had a panic attack. Many Israelis had a panic attack. Because effectively, implementing his judicial reform means that we won't be protected from the government anymore.

In Israel, we have a shortage of checks and balances. There is the only institution, independent institution that can protect my rights from the government is the Supreme Court. That's all we have. And I think we spoke about this. In Israel, we have a deficit in checks and balances. The only institution that can protect me from the government is the independent Supreme Court. And Yair Rezaian, his reform, the way it was described in the 4th of January, if that reform would be implemented, I think it's fair to say that de facto, on the ground, regular civilians

were not protected. The government could use its power to destroy our liberties and our rights. That's a panic. Okay, and hold on, hold on. Mika, I just want to, so just for our listeners, Yariv Levine is the justice minister in the Netanyahu-led government. He's considered one of the key architects of the judicial reform package. And I think, and Mika, correct me if I'm wrong, what Mika is referring to is the introduction of the original judicial reform proposal was quite expansive. In retrospect, I think even for some of the leaders of this government, including Prime Minister Netanyahu, some provisions in the package were never going

to pass, were just too extreme, particularly the override clause, allowing the Knesset with a simple majority to override the certain decisions of the Supreme Court. And that more than anything was a shock to the system. So not only was it was the totality of the package, it wasn't judicial reform. The message, the response was not no judicial reform at all. It was the totality of it was shocking and the speed of it was shocking. That is to say, there was no real, there was no, there seemed to be no real mandate for this because it's not like the Likud party and others had been talking about this issue during the campaign that resulted in this government being elected.

So there was not like it's not like the public was generally kind of socialized to to know this was coming. And then once they got into power, they didn't launch a real effort to educate the public over some period of time before passing the various provisions. They just tried to do shock and awe. Shock and awe, and it backfired because many Israelis thought, okay, the government has just exposed its intentions. Its intentions are to accumulate enough power that we know boundaries, know checks, know nothing, know institution that has the power to balance this government.

And as a result, we are not protected. We're not protected from the government. As a result, and that's the panic attack number one. As a result, a protest movement was created. A very impressive protest movement. A very passionate protest movement that combined a few impossible miracles, which we discussed then a few months ago.

If you remember, they're against the government, but not against the country. They're liberal and they're patriotic simultaneously. And it's a very passionate protest and not violent at all. That asymmetry, a lot of passion and no violence is an Israeli invention. This is our new startup. Around the world, if you have protests that's very passionate, it's also violent. But if it's not violent, it's probably not passionate. Israelis are creating a very passionate and very nonviolent protest movement. But when the protest movement felt that it was not having any impact, it took out or it somehow influenced some of the people serving in the Air Force

to declare that if the reform is not canceled, they are not showing up to duty, not showing up to training. This is something very important to understand. Critical mass of Israeli pilots on reserves. Their only way to stay qualified is to train every week. Critical, many of them, we don't know the numbers. I don't think it's even safe to say out loud the numbers. Many of them have not shown up for the past two months, which means many of them over time are becoming less and less qualified. And as a result, there's fear in Israel that our military, specifically our Air Force and some of the special units are less and less qualified. I want to try to put this in a larger picture.

I said before that people, that Western people, we have two fears. We have a fear from robbers and murderers and terrorists. And for that fear, we need a government. We have a second fear to protect us, to protect ourselves from the government. So here's what happened in Israel. Yariv Levin declares that effectively it wants to cancel the ability of the Supreme Court to protect us from the government. A protest movement was created and effectively is weakening the air force. And as a result, many Israelis feel like now we're not protected. We're not protected from,

we're less protected from Iran. We're less protected from Hezbollah. If I want double protection to be protected by the government and to be protected from the government and you're Israeli, being protected by the government means having a strong air force. So Iran won't mess with us and Hezbollah will think twice before it does anything to us. We need a strong air force. That's why we're protected by the government. If I'm protected from the government, I want a strong, independent Supreme Court. What happened in the past eight months, Dan, is that many Israelis felt that the protection of the Supreme Court, that the protection that the Supreme Court offers me, protecting my rights, my liberties, that protection might be weakened. And at the same time, the protection of the Israeli Air Force is also being weakened. Here's the anxiety in Israel.

We're not sure if we're protected from the government, and we're not sure that we're protected by the government. That's the crisis. That's the anxiety you have in Israel today of two very radical moves, weeding the Supreme Court from the right and threatening not to show up to military. On the left are mean for most Israelis that all they want is to live protected from the government and by the government. Those two layers of protection, it seems like, are being taken away from us. Now, are they really being taken away from us? I'm not sure. But the perception of reality is that today we're less protected by the Supreme Court from the government and we're less protected by the Air Force, yes, through the government. Okay, Mika, if the government said right now, we're pausing

everything on judicial reform, we're not going to make another move. There's this reasonableness clause change that has been made that was one fraction of a much larger proposal that was originally introduced. We can debate about how consequential it is but we'll pause there there will be no more efforts to reform the the supreme court maybe you know they may at some point work on some change to the selections committee on how how uh how justices are appointed okay i i'm let's just say even that we're tabled. Okay. Let's just say the government said, we hear you. We're done.

Does that address the fear that you're describing of the segment of the population that is? I would say my assumption is that if Bibi Netanyahu does what I think he should do, is just say, listen, this whole thing backfired. We're freezing it out for a year and a half, for two years, for our next term. We're freezing it. I think the impact will be that the temperature will go down. The temperature, the anger, the anxiety will go down. Will there still be Israelis protesting in the streets? Yes.

Will there be many of them? Yes. Will there be many of them? Yes. We will be as large as it is today and will include radical actions like threatening not to show up to your service. I think all those dangerous parts of the protest, I think those will come down. Okay. So that's one scenario. The government just says, you know, enough, Dayenu, we're done, we're not going to do any more. And you say the temperature comes down and these reservists, whatever number it is, again, we don't really know the exact

number, but some subset of the reservists who've said they're not going to serve while this debate is hot will return. If in fact, we take everyone in good faith and say that it's really about the judicial reforms and it's not about the existence of this government, I do suspect there are some people who are oppositional to this government full stop, and it doesn't matter what this government does next. There's been a breakdown in trust with this actual government. There's a whole other track going on, which is the geopolitics, which are moving, it appears, at least from my vantage point, from people I'm talking to working on the Washington part of this three-legged stool, the three-legged stool being Washington, Riyadh, and Jerusalem, convey this is moving and potentially moving fast. And so there's a sense where Mohammed bin Salman is the one who saves

Israeli democracy. Yes. So this is how it works, I think. We have two stories here in two different universes that it's hard to imagine how these two stories meet each other. In one story, in one universe, Israel is deteriorating into what some people think might lead to civil war. Hot civil war, cold civil war, some kind of a form where we're having this vicious fight between Israelis. That's the direction of it. By the way, and this fight that Israelis are having has been giving birth to three new other problems. We have a diplomatic crisis. We have an economic crisis.

We have a diplomatic crisis. We have an economic crisis. We have a military crisis. And that triple crisis is all a result of the original crisis, this constitutional breakdown we have in Israel that led to this fight between Israelis. So one fight leads to a triple crisis. That's on the one hand. And it's getting worse and worse every day if it doesn't stop. On the other hand, in a parallel universe, you have, it seems like, there might be a massive historical transformational deal between Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the United States of America. And that deal, a deal between Israel and Saudi Arabia, is the end of the Israeli-Arab conflict

and will open doors to Muslim countries like Indonesia. So it's so interesting, it's fascinating and weird how we have two different stories, two trains which are going to different destinations. One train of history is going to war, the second to peace. When I say war, I mean civil war. And when I say peace, I mean regional peace. The question is, how do these two trains meet? What happens when the process that's happening in Washington and Riyadh, that process,

what's the relationship between that process that leads to regional peace? What's the relationship between that process and our internal problems that are leading to civil war? So here's one theory. One theory is what you just mentioned there, is that regional peace will end our civil battle. It will prevent civil war. And how does that play out? It plays out the following way. If I understand correctly, the kind of demands that Saudi Arabia has in the United States of America are the kind of demands that the only way to meet

them is for the Senate to vote for them with a majority of two-thirds. Am I correct? That would be if there's some kind of defense pact between Washington and Riyadh that has a treaty status, which means it's two-thirds vote. And I'll also add that I think any final deal between Washington, Jerusalem, and Riyadh will involve advanced weapon sales, potentially some kind of civilian nuclear capability that would also in some form have to be voted on by the Senate.

And the Senate needs to have a a majority of two-thirds so 67 if they have any kind of treaty so any kind of defense so if there is a treaty so it has to be 67 yeah so so you need to bring democrats and republicans to vote for this theory is that biden will be the democrats yeah baby will be the Democrats. Yeah. Bibi will be the Republicans. And the impossible combination of Bibi and Biden could make the impossible possible and have the Senate reach 67 and enable the deal with Saudi Arabia

and the normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia. But here's the catch. Democrats, Democratic senators, in order to reach 67, you have to bring critical mass of Democratic senators, which will not vote for this. This is the theory. This is a theory. If there is to serious

Palestinian components, a part of this deal, which would mean more than just Saudi Arabia giving money to Palestinians, it would also mean Israel giving the Palestinians more authorities to govern them with their lives, maybe even more land, Area C, which is governed now by the Israeli Defense Forces, handed over to the Palestinian Authority, and maybe even a declaration by the prime minister that has some kind of a vague intention of a two-state solution. Maybe that would be enough to bring in Democratic senators to vote for this. And then you get the 67. Here's the problem. And here's the problem.

I'll just add, I mean, part of the problem, just for context, is a number of these Senate Democrats have no love for Saudi Arabia after the shenanigans they think that Saudi Arabia has been engaged in on oil production, after Saudi Arabia's allegations of Saudi Arabia's conduct in the war in Yemen, after the killing of Khashoggi in Turkey. So there's no affection for many Senate Democrats for Saudi Arabia's. So they say, if you want us to go along with some big deal that could basically be one big wet kiss to Saudi Arabia, you got to give us something. And to your point, that something would be some kind of progress for the Palestinians.

And anything, something would be threatening this government. Because in this government, people like Bezalel Smotrich and Itamar Benvir that last week threatened to bring down the government

just because our army enabled the Palestinians to use jeeps, which are protect, which like armed jeeps. That was enough for Ben-Gurion Smoltrich to threaten the stability of the government. And Ben-Gurion Smoltrich, as our listeners know, we talk about them all the time. They represent two of the more extreme elements in this new government. And to the extent that it sometimes feels like the tail is wagging the dog in this government, Smoltrich and Ben-Gvir are the ones that are doing it from the ultra-nationalist right to Bibi, to Netanyahu's right. Here's the catch. And this is the new catch

67. To get to 67 in the Senate, you have to have a Palestinian component. If it's a large enough component to bring in the Democrats, you lose Smolensk and Benkvile, and this government collapses. If it's slow... Hold on, hold on. I just want to stand this, Mika. You believe, you genuinely believe that if the Senate Democrats

insist on meaningful, we can debate what meaningful is, meaningful assistance or meaningful steps in favor of the Palestinians. You really believe Smoltrich and Ben-Vir will walk from what may be a once in a generation opportunity for them to be in the positions of power that they are. They're going to give up the cars and the security and the portfolios and the cabinet departments and the infrastructure and the king-making power. They're going to give that all up

and potentially write themselves off to being in the opposition for the foreseeable future. Yes, because I think the best way to predict the behavior of politicians is what the base expects from them. The base of Benvir and Smotrich expect them to not to compromise on one inch of the sacred land of Eretz Yisrael, of the Holy Land. And if it includes giving Palestinians authority and giving them some land and making some kind of a promise about the future state,

that would be way, way above what they could tolerate. So here's the catch. A Palestinian component that's large enough to bring in the Democrats means you lose Smotrich and Benvir and the government collapses. And a Palestinian component that's small enough, subtle enough to keep Smotrich and Benville on board will not be large enough to bring in the Democrats, which means we have a catch here. The only way to solve this catch. I don't think you could create a Palestinian component that could bring in both Democrats and keep Smotrich and Benville on board. Either you lose Smoltych and Ben-Viv because it's a large Palestinian component, or you lose the Democrats because it's a small Palestinian component. I don't think there is a way, maybe Bibi has an idea here, I don't think there is a way

to keep them on board, to keep both on board. So to reach 67 in the Senate, you have to do the, there's a catch. So the only way to do that is for this government the change would mean benny gans and his party joins the government smotrich and benville leave the government so so when you said before that the saudi process might heal israeli internal crisis, that's how it looks like. And if there's two big ifs here, that Bibi will be willing to say goodbye to his very loyal, but not stable,

partners on the far right. Yeah, he disagrees with them ideologically, but they are, you know, but they're his political partners and they're the base of his power. He has to separate from them, glue himself to guns.

And if that happens, all the judicial reform ends. All the other very radical plans of this government are canceled and we have a more moderate, balanced, centrist government that people protesting on the streets calm down. And that is the way, then, that peace with Saudi Arabia brings peace to Israelis.

And everything in here is upside down. Because we used to think Israelis have to unite between themselves in order to have peace in the Middle East. Now it seems like it's upside down. We need peace in the Middle East for the Israelis to unite between themselves. That's scenario number one. Okay. Scenario number two? Scenario number two is that everything goes wrong. And it's not that peace with Saudi Arabia will bring peace to Israelis, but the battle between Israelis will ruin the peace of Saudi Arabia. It will go upside down. That regional peace won't calm our internal crisis, but our internal crisis will destroy the chances for regional peace. And these are two very probable scenarios.

So we have here two massive events, a massive fight that Israelis are having among themselves, and a rapid peace process in the Middle East. And how will these two events meet each other? Will our internal crisis destroy peace, or will regional peace calm the internal crisis? That, then, is the big question. That is why I came to the interview your podcast, is to formalize that.

That's the question. That's the enigma. When these two, when one process meets the other process, internal fighting, internal battle, internal strife between Israelis and regional peace, when these two processes meet, what's the factor that's going to define the end of the day? Will regional peace be peace between Israelis or the battle between Israelis is for regional peace? That's the big question.

And it depends on small questions like is Benny Gantz willing to join the government with me? Well, let's stay on that. Let's stay on that for one moment. Do you, because Benny Gantz is looking at the same polls that you and I are looking at

and they're showing him in ascendance and he's sitting there thinking, wait a minute, why do I have to go save Netanyahu from himself? I can be prime minister. So why don't I just wait this out and then I get to be on the ballot and I can be prime minister and I'm the one who can negotiate the Saudi normalization deal? Why should Gantz jump in now? Okay, so let me be naive. Gantz has a lot to lose personally and individually for joining this government.

He does. According to the polls, he's worth 30 seats in the Knesset. In the last elections, he got 12. So he's more than doubling the size of his party. According to the polls, he's prime minister. And he might destroy all that by joining Bibi and saving Bibi. And just to remind you, last time he joined Bibi's government, there was a deal between them. Bibi was a prime minister for two years, and then Gantz was a prime minister. And Bibi never handed the power over

to Gantz. He played some games, and in the end, Gantz was cheated by Bibi. So these are all very good reasons why Gantz will not do this. There's only one reason why he might do this. It's because Gantz, and excuse me for sounding very naive, doesn't only think about his short-term political gains or losses. He also thinks about what's right and what's good

for our country. But for Gantz to believe this is the right thing for the country, it really needs to be a deal that really serves Israel's national security interests. And Gantz is very worried about the whole nuclear component of the deal. He's very worried about the strategic weapons moving from the US to Saudi Arabia. And the Palestinian component needs to be a serious component. Benny Gantz, in his campaign, the platform of his party was, we can't end the conflict, but we have to stop ignoring the conflict. We have to start actively shrinking the conflict. He adopted the idea of shrinking the conflict. And if the deal with Saudi Arabia, Benny Gantz will feel that it's safe regarding our security and really actually does start shrinking the conflict with the Palestinians, he might be in a dilemma. He might say, I'm risking my political life in service of something that's more important than my political life, Israel,

because there is a triple win here. If it stabilizes Israeli politics and calms down our civil battle we're having in Israel, and if it normalizes, that's a win. If it normalizes our relationship with Saudi Arabia, that's a win. If it shrinks the conflict with Palestinians, according to Benny and myself, that's a win. If it shrinks the conflict with Palestinians, according to Benny and myself, that's a win. That's a win, win, win. Memphis'

triple win is there, maybe guns. I think he does have it within him to make an historic decision to risk his political future in order to save Israel's political present and have a tremendous future for Zionism. So I think he might be willing to do that. He might not be, by the way. I'm not his representative here in this conversation, but I think it's possible that Gantz will do that. To remind you, like in a conversation I had with Gantz, being a warrior, being a soldier means you're willing to risk your life in service of your country. So Gantz understands that when he being a warrior, being a soldier means you're willing to risk your life in service of your country. So Gantz understands that when he was a soldier, he was willing to risk his life in service of our country. Now I think he's willing to sometimes risk his political life in service of our country.

Okay, Mika, I want to pivot here because it's relevant. You and I have often spoken since this crisis began about, obviously, there's a lot of complexity to this protest movement and this moment that feels very fraught in Israeli society. And yet, there's something very inspiring about the reaction of Israel in the sense that these protesters from across political and ideological and religious lines and communities seem to be so engaged. And the way they've conducted themselves, more or less, has been quite inspiring, even if you don't agree with every position they're holding or advocating for.

And in our book, which I mentioned in the introduction, we interview you extensively in the book. And in one part of the book, you said something, and I was just struck when Saul and I would have our manuscript read by different readers before we finally submitted it to the publisher. There was one quote from you that especially stuck out, and people repeatedly said, without any prompting, this is my favorite quote from the book. This is my favorite part of the book. And I just want to take a moment to read it. Uh, and this was from a hike we took with you with, which Saul and I, uh, took with you. And I'm, I'm reading from the, from the,

from the book right here, where you, where you say, when you live in Israel, you feel like something big is happening all the time. Here, every Israeli feels like history is happening, and we can touch it, like we can push it a bit. Meaning comes from two aspects. Meaning comes from two aspects. One, you feel there's something bigger than you, and two, you feel you have a role in that thing that's bigger than you. Big countries like America or China have really big stories, but they're too big to push. Small countries have really small stories. So, okay, I could touch history, but there's not much to touch. Israel is a small country with a big story. I just want to say that again. Israel is a small country with a big story. So its story is big enough to give you meaning and small enough for you to have influence on it.

What do I mean by big things happening? And then you go on to describe then, and this was a couple years ago that we had this conversation with you, what you meant by big things happening. So first of all, how do you think about this current moment in the context of what you said to us that day? And two, what big things are happening right now? I think you're talking about some of them right now. Right. So I think the sense that so many Israelis feel like Israel is not something up there that we're observed. It's something that you own. It's yours. It's yours to play. It's yours to shape.

There is a very strong shared sense of ownership. By the way, that is why we have such vicious, we're having such a vicious fight now because we all feel like we own this country. It's ours. But there is a sense like, imagine how many initiatives we have now all around Israel. Just people building an initiative in Kiryat Gat, a small protest movement in Moskera Batya. And I know like of reserve units that have their own

initiatives to heal relationships between right-wingers, left-wingers, secular and religious. Israel now is blooming. It's exploding positively with initiatives of Israelis that feel like, I want to make a difference. I have an idea. This is what I'm going to do. Now, some of these ideas are how to have a very effective way to protest against this government. Other ideas are how to heal the divide. And I know about this because many of these people want to send me WhatsApps

just to share with me that they think I might have something to offer and I can't answer all the WhatsApps. But I get many of them. I can't tell you at any moment I have five WhatsApps in my smartphone of another person with another initiative that he or she have the idea that will make the difference.

Now, do any of them really make a difference? Some do, some don't. But do they all feel like they have a real chance of moving the needle? Yes, definitely. Israel is a strong country with a tremendous story. And so many Israelis feel like it's up to them to make a difference. And they have the power to move the needle. That is a strong collective sentiment we have in Israel as we're talking. So I often ask people, friends, those I interview,

people in this podcast, but especially people actually on the left who are at the pointy end of the spear in the protests against this government and express at moments the greatest degree of despair. I asked them, are you pessimistic or optimistic about Israel's future or somewhere in between? And I have been pleasantly surprised that every one of them has said they're optimistic about Israel's future. And when I ask why, they say because they're in the game. Israelis are in the game. They're not shrugging their shoulders and saying, there's nothing I can do here. There's no ambivalence. You want a country where people, whether you agree with them or not, obviously

not in extremity, you don't want this, but generally speaking, when there's vibrant debate and people feel strongly about it and they're taking the time to be engaged in mostly constructive ways, there's something healthy going on in the society. These are people who care about the future of their country and they're not giving up. So you're asking me if I'm optimistic? Yeah. Okay. So that was a setup, I guess, in short. It was a windup. It was a windup to a question. I guess I never really asked the question, but you asked it. On the short term, I'm pessimistic. On the long term, I'm very optimistic about Israel. Okay. On the short term, it's obvious we're having very, very serious problems now. And this crisis has given birth to three more problems,

a military problem, diplomatic problem, economic problem, and it's spiraling downhill. And people think that this might lead to a civil war unless regional peace will save us from ourselves. That's okay. That's our conversation. But now let's say not a year ahead, but like five years ahead from us. And what are these events doing to Israel? So classically, when we think about the relationship between present and future, we think events in the present shape the future. But here's my question.

Sometimes it's not the events that shape the future, it's the way we remember the events that shapes the future. It's the memory of the event more than the event itself that shapes the structure of the future. As we're talking, two things are happening. We have a very extreme government, proposed very extreme policies that was met with a very extreme protest movement, and Israel is having a very serious fight, and it's deteriorating. But also we have a memory that's being created. And I think this is the content of the memory. Extreme right-wing governments don't work.

That's, I think, what we are all going to learn from this. And this is not a small thing. Because until this government was created, extreme right-wing government was a fantasy among many right-wingers. It's called in Israel, pure extreme right-wing governments.

This was a fantasy for many years and extreme right-wing government was a was a fantasy for many years. An extreme right-wing government was a fantasy among the right. And this fantasy served a point. It was the following point. If you ask a right-winger, you're in control ever since 1977. Yes, we had some moments with left-wing governments, but for the most of the time, for the past 40 years, you're in government. Why isn't Israel the utopia that he promised us? Here's the answer. We were never really in government,

never really in control. It was always a liberal or a centrist, like Tzipi Livni, like Eud Barak, like Busielso, like Yair Lapid. It was always a centrist there that was blocking our ability to implement our pure right-wing policies. One day, we'll have a pure right-wing government, and then Israel will turn into what

we all want it to be. Well, Dan, you know what the best way to ruin a fantasy is? To implement it. Right, make it a reality. And as we're talking, what used to be a fantasy is now transforming into a very bad memory. When this episode in Israeli history is over, how will this be remembered? I think it will be remembered, it will be a bad memory, a traumatic memory. And my only analogy for Israel after this government is Israel in the Second Intifada. In the 90s, we had left-wing governments. They had this fantasy of implementing pure left-wing ideology,

two states, Elusho, Adyasa, Arafat, and this very pure ideological way of thinking. And when you fall in love with an ideology, you become blind to reality. You try to implement the ideology on reality, and then what always happens, reality rebels against the ideology. And the second intifada destroyed left-wing ideology for many Israelis.

Israelis are traumatized. They're traumatized from pure left-wing ideology. That's what happened to us in the second intifada. Dan, I think what's happening now in Israel is what's happening, what the second intifada. Dan, I think what's happening now in Israel is what's happening, what the second intifada did to the ideological left, this internal intifada, and I don't mean intifada literally, this internal chaos we're having in Israel is for the extreme right what the intifada was for the left. It's creating a trauma from extreme right-wing politics. This means, I think, Dan, that Israelis,

graduates of this government, will never want to repeat this coalition, will never want to repeat this government. And I include here many voters of the Likud itself. Many, like 40, 50% of voters of the Likud will never want to do this again.

And I think what we have here, it's not that the trauma from the extreme rights will push Israel to the Israeli to the left. No, no, no. We still have the trauma from the left. I think now Israeli history is going to be marching to a new direction because now we will be carrying on our backs two traumas, two bad memories. We have bad memories from the left-wing governments of the 90s, and now we'll have a bad memory of an extreme right-wing government in 2023, which I think

this double trauma, these two different sets of bad memories are pushing Israeli history towards the center. I think the future of Israel is balanced, centrist, moderate, pragmatic Zionist governments. And if this happens, we'll know this happens because of this government, because of what we're going through, because of the damage that extreme ideology is doing to Israel today. I think Israelis are now developing immunity towards extremism. And maybe the best metaphor to understand what's happening now in Israel is that this government, you know, demographically speaking, Israel is becoming more ultra-right wing, that's just a birthright, right? And that's why that's part of what's the reason why many Israelis are panicking.

They're afraid. And when they see this extreme governments, well, we're getting in the present the taste of the future 25 years from now. That's what Israel is going to look like. But maybe this government is not the flavor of the future before the future. Maybe this government has a different role in Israeli history to create to maybe it will prevent the future. Because now that we've tasted the flavor of extreme right, ultra-Orthodox right-wing government, we will never want this to become a reality again. And if that's true, the better metaphor here is it's a vaccine.

This government is a vaccine. That's creating immunity in the political soul of Israelis, now be more immune to radicalism and right-wing extremism, just like we're already immune to pure left-wing ideology. And just to remind you, when we take a vaccine, we took the COVID vaccine, you were sick for two days. Because the logic of a vaccine is that you taste the flavor of the disease in a small dose, and then you develop immunity towards disease. So now this government is giving us a vaccine, a vaccine from the kind of Israel that might be developing demographically. And now we have 25 years to think about how do we prevent it. But here's the big problem, Dan.

Sometimes we take an overdose of the vaccine, so you don't die from the disease you die from your attempt to take a vaccine from that disease so are we taking an overdose of the vaccine or is this vaccine enough i don't know history will tell but i am optimistic that in the long term israeli history is taking us to the center the the ballots, moderate center, center right governments. And that is being created by this very extreme government. Mika, we will leave it there. I love the vaccine metaphor.

That's the first time I've heard that. Second, in our book, we go in depth on Israeliraeli demographics and forecasting israeli demographics and for those who look at demographic forecasts with a real sense of like this is an ominous period ahead uh i think you will find some of our analysis of the of the uh forecasts reassuring it's it's uh i'm looking forward to read your book yeah i know you've you've only i've only shared with you the parts that you're in, but there's another part of the book where we get into these demographic forecasts, and I think they're not as foreordained,

not as predictable as many doom and gloomers would have us believe. But that is a topic for another day. Mika, this was great. Thank you for your snap analysis. And I will be in Israel in a few weeks, and I hope to catch up with you. Maybe we can have another conversation. Looking forward to seeing you.

All right. Thank you, Miko. Bye-bye. That's our show for today. Please remember to pre-order your copy of The Genius of Israel and forward confirmation of your purchase to book at dancenor.com. That's easy to remember, book at dancenor.com. And we will send you the chapter sampler in time for the weekend so you can read up and get up to speed and be informed and get a taster of what's to come when the book lands at your door when it is published. One other housekeeping note, we will not be dropping an episode on Monday. It is Yom Kippur, so we will be in synagogue,

hungry and atoning for our sins, but we will drop the first episode for next week on Tuesday morning. Call Me Back is produced by Ilan Benatar. Until next time, I'm your host, Dan Senor.