Conversations with Tyler - Larry Summers on Macroeconomics, Mentorship, and Avoiding Complacency (Live)
Episode Date: September 20, 2017The economist, President Emeritus at Harvard University, and former Treasury Secretary joins Tyler to discuss innovation in higher education, Herman Melville, the Fed, Mexico, Russia, China, the Larry... Summers production function, philanthropy and Larry's table tennis adventure in the summer Jewish Olympics. Read a full transcript enhanced with helpful links, or watch the full video. Recorded September 6th, 2017 Other ways to connect Follow us on Twitter and Instagram Follow Tyler on Twitter Follow Larry on Twitter Email us: cowenconvos@mercatus.gmu.edu Subscribe at our newsletter page to have the latest Conversations with Tyler news sent straight to your inbox.
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Today, Tyler is talking to Larry Summers.
And if, after the conversation is over, you feel like you haven't quite got your
Summers' fix, well, I got good news for you because he's also this week's guest on
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I'm here with Larry Summers.
Of course, Larry has many notable achievements.
But for me, personally, the most important one is that of all the classes I took
at Harvard University, he taught the very best one.
And that was PhD macro one.
So I'd like to start with a question about education and this idea of mentoring.
In your career, you've mentored a large number of very successful people.
Alan Kruger from my class, Ed Balls, Cheryl Sandberg, Natasha Siren, who's here with us today.
what is your philosophy of mentoring?
How do you think about this analytically?
And what can the rest of us learn from this?
So I should say first, Tyler,
since you were kind enough to compliment my class
that when my wife heard that I was doing this interview with you,
she thought it was really exciting
because you had written the only economics book
that she had ever enjoyed reading.
That book being about where and how to find good food.
So she really, you know, working in the White House, that was fine.
But being interviewed by Tyler Cowan, that meant I had really arrived.
Thank you.
You know, I don't really think of it as mentoring.
I think of it as finding people who are as talented as I can to work with
and then trying to make sure that it's something that works for both people.
And so each of the people you've mentioned, I've got an enormous amount out of the working relationship.
We collaborated on various kinds of projects, and I tried to give back as well by helping people advance in their careers.
And in each of the cases you formed, you described, I formed friendships that have lasted.
for a long time.
So I thought of it as something that was very much,
I didn't think of it as some huge act of generosity
on my part, very much the contrary,
getting to work with Cheryl Sandberg.
I was a much better Treasury Secretary
because I had Cheryl Sandberg as the chief of staff
and something similar is true of each of the people
I've worked with.
You know, I think my experience working with people
is that if you pick able people
and you make clear that you think very highly of their talents,
they will welcome it if you tell them the truth
about what they've done better and what they have done worse.
And so I've had a relatively direct approach
with the people
who I've worked with,
and I've encouraged them to have a very direct approach with me.
And that's tended to work out for both of us.
Who is innovating in higher education right now,
and what are they learning from this innovation?
Not enough people are innovating enough in higher education.
You know, the place to start is General Electric
looks nothing like it looked in 1975.
Harvard or Yale or Princeton or Stanford
look a lot like they looked in 1975.
They're about the same size to within a factor of two.
They're about the same number of buildings.
They operate on about the same calendar.
They have many of the same people
or some number of the same people.
in significant positions.
So I think the main thing to say is that for something that's all about ideas
and for something that's all about young people,
the pace of innovation in higher education is stunningly slow.
We're still on a system where the break is in the summer.
And the reason we're on that system is that when everybody,
went to pick the plants, that was the natural way to organize school, and it's still going
that way. You know, I think the potential action in higher education is probably heavily
through distance learning and artificial intelligence and learning technologies of various kinds,
because if you think about it, the unique capacity that online education has is that on the one hand,
they're huge economies of scale.
Once the lectures filmed, 100,000 people can watch it at the same cost as 100 people watching it.
And on the other hand, you can have much more personalization.
You can relisten to the bit you didn't understand.
You can insert diagnostic questions and have a different lecture for people.
depending on how they do on the diagnostic questions.
So it permits what's usually very rare,
which is more differentiation and more economies of scale.
But I would say to date it hasn't yet been pursued on a scale
and with a degree of energy that is commensurate with,
with the real challenge.
You know, a number of universities have made what Clay Christensen would say is the first elementary error.
They said that their MOOC efforts or their distance learning efforts are going to all be designed to be
complementary of better education on their campuses.
Well, that's a certain logic to that in terms of faculty politics and in terms of faculty comfort
and all of that.
But the essence of Clay Christensen's lessons about disruptive innovation is if you want to do something all new,
you have to separate it from the original mission, not judge it by the standards of the original product,
and let it be separate.
And what I've been struck by in the distance education efforts is that they tend to be very much within paradigm.
and not set up in separate ways.
So I think the main thing to say about innovation
in higher education is that there's much too little of it.
Regular economics.
One hears increasingly these days
that the higher concentration ratios
in the American economy are an economically relevant fact.
We all know those ratios are up somewhat,
but at the same time,
consumers don't in an obvious way seem to feel the burden of monopoly if you just look at product
choice and variety. Productivity may be slow. The growth of manufacturing output appears to be quite
steady. There's not obviously a break in that series where all the monopolies restrict output.
So we have all these different pieces of data, high share values, high measured profits, very steady output
behavior, a lot of product variety. How do you think about the issue of monopoly in the American
economy right now. Is it significant or not?
I'm not. Most things, I might be right or wrong, but I'm confident.
This is one where I'm not certain. On the one hand, Tyler, higher concentration ratios,
higher profit with lower investment, manifest in lower interest rates, more monopoly power
sort of fits the story. Right.
On the other hand, take a thing like Apple Pay. Apple Pay means that Apple, which is already the largest company in America, is even larger. So you could say that's kind of more monopoly and more market power. Or you could say there's a whole financial industry that's now getting competed with from outside the financial industry. And so it's making things more competitive. And both those views have merit. I kind of think the second may have more merit.
than the first.
So some of the rhetoric one hears recently,
which kind of leave you with the impression
that we're seeing an era of a lot of new standard oils.
Seems to me to be quite overdone
with respect to the facts, as I understand them.
On the other hand, are there combinations of health care systems
in cities where we go from having some real competition
to their being one dominant provides?
and that works to consumers' benefits.
I think there's almost certainly, almost certainly some problems there.
Are there difficult issues when information is central, as it would be with a Facebook or a Google,
yes, there are difficult issues, privacy, reliance on information, networks.
But are those best thought of through the prism of antitrust and monopoly?
I'm not at all sure that that is the best way to think about them.
After all, in some sense, the products and those two examples are given away to consumers for free.
I think one of the most important issues for economists to figure out over the next year or the next couple of years is how to think about these trends.
I think there are some selective grounds for concern.
I think it's much more likely that antitrust has been insufficiently tough
than it is that it's been too tough over the last decade.
But I also think one needs to be careful about the fact that being a successful business
will tend to cause you to have more profits.
And we usually think of that as a good thing, not a bad thing.
Here's a real softball question.
What's the optimal rate of tax on capital income?
Closer to the tax rate on other income than to zero.
Would be my answer to that.
A fair amount of capital income reflects rents of one kind or another.
Capital income is substantially held by those.
at the high end. There's a fair amount of what's really capital income in the form of
unrealized capital gains that never gets taxed. So I think the right aggregate capital income tax rate
is closer to what would go with a comprehensive income tax than it is to the alternative
idea that capital income taxation is just a way of taxing future.
consumption, and therefore you should tax future consumption and present consumption at the same
rate, and the tax rate should be zero. If we think about the 1980s, there are a lot of models
from that time, some coming from your research, where you have an infinite horizon model
with a zero tax rate on capital income, at some point enough capital accumulates so that even
wages are higher, and there's a kind of steady state long run argument that still the number
should be zero. What has changed that makes those models less applicable? Is it that we think
that elasticity is different, or is it some other variable? What's changed in our knowledge or your
understanding? At the technical level, there's been some mathematical work showing that some of the
results that you're referring to for the 1980s were just mathematically wrong. That's one part.
I think the second and more consequential part is that the premise of those models was essentially that the supply of capital was infinitely elastic.
And so you would, whatever the tax rate, you would drive capital to the point where the after-tax rate of return was some fixed number.
And that just now looks like a very poor description of reality.
We've seen real interest rates fluctuate substantially, and we just don't see that when real interest rates are higher, savings is lots higher, and when real interest rates are lower, savings is lots lower, in the way that many people, including me in the early 1980s, would have expected.
And so in the absence of that kind of evidence, I think the argument is very much attenuated.
What if someone said, well, for this special 20-year period, we lived through Bernanke's East Asian savings glass.
So there was always enough capital. Real rates were very low.
Arguably, for demographic reasons, that's starting to end.
And we'll end up back in an error where actually the supply of capital with respect to the rate of return will be high again.
Is that possible, unlikely, too far away to matter?
First, one word one should never use in economics is never.
And so I don't want to preclude any possibility completely.
Second, you uncharacteristically made an analytic conflation there.
You conflated the idea that the savings rate would fall for a variety of reasons,
with the idea that the savings rate would become more elastic,
which is a separate issue.
I don't see any reason to think the savings rate will become more elastic.
And with respect to the savings rate falling,
my reading of the evidence would be different.
I think that the structural factors driving low interest rates,
including longer life expectancy,
which makes people save more,
increased in security, more inequality,
are more likely to be semi-permanent
than they are to prove transient.
And I think a variety of the factors
holding down investment, the demographic factor,
the fact that you can buy an enormous amount of capital
for a very low cost, think about my iPhone,
all of that, I think, operates in the direction
of meaning that,
we're likely to have this phenomenon of low real interest rates and secular stagnation for quite a long time to come.
Let's say you're advising a philanthropist in St. Louis, and that person has $100 million to help the city.
For general background, there were poor public schools, a fair amount of crime, a lot of racial segregation,
but some good universities, hospitals, it's a biotech hub. What kind of advice would you give?
How should they start thinking about this problem?
Wait, let me see.
You're asking me about a philanthropist I've never met
in a city in a city in which I've spent a day and a half
that has relatively generic urban problems.
You can make it.
What should the philanthropists do?
Or the poorer parts of Boston, if you prefer.
That's the, I was kind of trying to temporize a bit while I thought.
But that's the question.
So look, I would tell the, I would tell the philanthropists.
a few general things. One is, I would say, your temptation is going to be to spread the butter
uniformly across the bread and to try to do everything. And that your $100 million is a lot of money,
but the budget of the city of St. Louis is measured in the low billions of dollars. And so you can't do
everything. And if you try to do a little bit of everything, you won't see anything you did.
so you should look for a targeted couple of interventions that will be most effective.
That's the first thing I'd say.
Second thing I'd say is you need to be very careful to make sure that whatever you think you're buying is what you're actually buying.
That if you give more money to the health budget of the city and the city responds by reallocating its own money from health care to other things,
then you'll have demonstrated fungibility, you won't have spurred health care.
So have a strategy for addressing fungibility.
I would probably say that if you can do something meaningful in education to create positive examples in education,
which can then be emulated.
And this is K-3-K-3.
Yeah, that's likely to be the most effective thing that you can do,
but that you need to be very careful not to succeed by cannibalization,
that many too many philanthropists interested in education decide they're going to set up a charter school,
only their charter school is only going to admit highly motivated kids with highly motivated parents,
and their charter school is going to pay 20% more than the regular schools
and cherry-picked the best teachers out of the regular schools,
and then they're going to be really thrilled about how they have better achievement
than the regular public schools,
when it's clear from the nature of their model,
selecting the kids and cherry-picking the teachers,
that it is supremely non-replicable.
So I would say impose a replicability constraint on yourself
and innovate in the area of a...
education. My general view has been that a lot of the way successful innovation happens is alongside
big systems. So I don't know whether it's preschool before kindergarten. I don't know whether it's
summer programs. I've been active in Boston with citizen schools, an organization that does
after school programs. But I probably, as a vehicle for getting it
education, look at something that wasn't either joining the public schools or going to war with
the public schools, but was acting constructively alongside the public schools in the after school
or preschool or transition from high school or summer school or some such would probably
be the advice I'd give. Now, there may be a few people in the audience who don't know. You've actually
delivered a lecture at University of Chicago Law School on the Herman Melville short story,
Paradise of Bachelors, Tartarus of Maids. What did you learn from engaging with that story
with respect to social change or segregation or gender issues? Anything from that story,
as you read it as an economist and social scientist? Well, the first thing I learned was that I should
probably stick to my day job of economics, because while I typically find myself reasonably
cogent relative to others in discussing economic issues, attending that literary conference.
I did not find myself relatively cogent relative to other, relative to other literary experts.
And I'm not sure I would have made it through that experience without the help of my wife,
who is a professor of English at Harvard.
I guess took what I learned from that was that literature had a way of evoking what an economist would call the non-pecunary aspects of work that is sort of lacking when you say non-pecunary aspects of work and you write a mathematical function, utility of consumption, leisure, and,
job attributes and that there was a kind of texture of alienation and depersonalization that was provided
by Melville that one missed if one thought about things in the economic paradigm is what I learned.
Speaking of work, your last op-ed was on labor unions and you suggested a hope for a future where
labor unions are stronger, let me tell you my worry and see if you can talk me out of it. If I look
at the labor economics literature, it seems to me the union wage premium is declining. It used to be
about 15%, now maybe it's 7 or 8%. Some studies find it's 0. And if you'd say it's 7 or 8%,
if you take the 7 or 8%, a lot of that's a tax on capital, but surely some of it turns up in the
form of higher prices. So labor gives back some of it. Surely some of it turns up in the form of
lower demand for labor, so some people don't get that jobs. So if I think of unions being much
stronger, even without worrying about allocative efficiency costs, I just see this one-time
bump upwards of like maybe 3, 4%, which would be a gain, but wouldn't change the fundamental
reality on the ground. Now, can you talk me into more optimism on this, or do you just think,
well, 3 or 4% is a lot, let's do it? Three or 4% is pretty large relative to real wage growth that's
taken place over the last generation. It's the first thing I'd say. Second thing I'd say is that,
as I learned reading Melville, there are important non-pecunary aspects of jobs. And if you look at
turnover, which is a kind of measure of job satisfaction, it's much lower in union employers.
If you look at the way in which employee grievances are dealt with, it is more, more responsible.
respectful of those potentially discriminated against in union workplaces.
If you look at job safety, it appears to be better in union workplaces.
So I think looking at wages is a good way to miss the local benefits of unions.
I think the third thing is that, you know, again, this would depend on one's broad policy views,
but that more successful unions push for policies like the preservation of social security,
the expansion of the health care safety net, that are for the benefit of everyone.
And so the political impact of a society in which labor is better organized on the broad
contours of policy is another way in which stronger unions can make a difference. But part of the
argument of that piece was, I don't know what exactly the right level of unionization is, and I don't
know exactly what would be optimal. But if we've got a system where if some
Somebody tries to organize the workers at a company, and the company fires the attempted organizer.
And the only remedy the organizer has is to spend five years fighting through the courts,
where if they win, they'll get back salary, less whatever they earned in whatever new job they got.
The cost benefit for the employer has to be that it's incredibly attractive to fire the would-beer.
organizer. So we don't have a remotely level playing field where workers are given an opportunity
to make whatever choice they prefer, and that seems wrong to me. So I look at an America
where corporate profits rose last year by 16 percent, and wages have been stagnant,
and it seems to me that more bargaining power for workers almost certainly has to be good.
But I agree with you that the technological dynamics, the globalization dynamics of a modern economy,
mean that it's not clear just how large the benefits of more bargaining power will be.
but it's like the question of how much weight I should lose.
I don't know how much weight I should lose,
but I kind of know which direction I should be moving.
And that's kind of how I feel about more labor power.
Now, in the middle of all of these conversations,
we have an interlude where I ask the interviewees about table tennis.
And I understand that this summer you played in the table tennis Jewish Olympics in Tel Aviv.
Is that correct?
That is correct.
What mental qualities make for a good table tennis player?
Judging by my performance, qualities that I do not possess.
I think a deft wrist, a certain capacity for concentration, and a great deal of practice.
And while I practiced intensely in the run-up to the activity,
There were other participants who had been practicing intensely for decades,
and that gave them a substantial advantage.
I also probably was not the quickest participant in that competition,
even in the 60-and-over division, which was the division in which I was participating,
but I found it enormously satisfying to be on,
an Olympic team, which
it's not something I ever
thought about.
You heard about that, I suspect,
because some magazine wrote a story about it,
and the reporter who wrote the story
said to me, you know, Mr. Summers,
you used to be Treasury Secretary,
what I used to do whatever you did at Harvard,
you know, how did it feel like
putting a track suit on and running out with 800 other people,
800 other Americans into a stadium.
And I said, well, you know, 10-year-olds dream a lot more
about international athletic competition
than they do about fiscal or monetary policy.
What is the rate of productivity improvement in table tennis
amongst the very best players?
So someone like Janove, Waldner, or Dingning,
are they a lot better than the best players of 20, 30 years ago or just a little better?
I don't know. You know, look, obviously, I don't know. I tend, I am struck in general by the fact that a good college track athlete can now run a four-minute mile.
And nobody in the world had ever run a four-minute mile before 1954.
that the world record in swimming events in 1964
wouldn't qualify you for the NCAA championships
in 2017.
So in the sports where we can measure things,
there's vast and rapid improvement,
and huge improvement.
So I'm not sure why people debate
whether Shaq is better or worse than Will Chamber.
or whether people debate whether today's best baseball players compare with Willie Mays,
or whether they debate whether Rafael Nadal could beat Bill Tilton.
My assumption is that, of course, Rafael Nidal could beat Bill Tilden,
even with the same equipment, and I would assume that the same thing is true in table tennis,
better learning about technique, better training approaches,
greater intensity and better equipment, I assume mean that the quality of play and all these things
is much higher than it used to be. And I think it's a mistake that people generally make
to acknowledge progress in the places where it can be readily and concretely measured
and then be in doubt about whether there is progress in the spheres where it can't be
measured. I think the right first approximation is to think that there's progress in all spheres.
And, you know, to take it to someplace that's outside of athletics where I've been very struck,
I think the evidence is overwhelming, at least very strong, not overwhelming, very strong,
in favor of the so-called Flynn effect, which suggests that all over the world, if you administer
or any kind of constant IQ test,
averages in populations have been getting smarter
for a long time.
And I think that's probably right as well.
Now, we're here in Washington, D.C.
I'm going to ask you some kind of short bullet questions
about supercurrent policy issues.
Feel free to pass.
You can give just a sound bite answer,
but if you want to go on, please do.
Right now, on the Fed, there are only three seats being held,
and it seems if things go according to,
plan by the beginning of 2019. Everyone on that board will have been appointed by President Trump.
Now, you've been a lifelong Democrat, so probably your dream candidates are not the ones who are
going to be appointed. But if you could give advice to the Republicans that they possibly might
listen to, what would that advice be for filling these seats?
Serious, thoughtful people with real expertise who will set monetary policy based on a pragmatic
reading of data rather than a strong ideology or a political orientation.
The DREAM Act is in the news right now.
What's the best way to think about where the limits to immigration should be?
So you've spoken out in favor of renewing the DREAM Act or possibly doing more.
But what's the margin at which we say no more?
Look, I think on the DREAM Act, because the people are here and they've invested their lives,
and we as a country made a commitment to them.
I think it's kind of a no-brainer
to find ways to enable them to stay.
I think the right deal on,
the right broad deal on immigration is,
yes, there should be immigration,
but at least my view is the idea of the melting pot,
which has become kind of unfashionable in many circles,
is actually a good idea.
And the understanding should be that if you immigrate
the United States, you're immigrating to the United States to become an American. And that reflects
a kind of acculturation, one crucial part of which is speaking English and understanding that
you're going to be learning English and that you're going to be carrying on your life in English.
And I think if we had more acceptance of the idea that immigration was about becoming American,
We would have more acceptance of higher levels of immigration than generate comfort right now.
But I think that one does need to understand that any country should make policy in the interests of its current citizens.
And I think it would be in the interests of America's current citizens to,
to have more immigrants come for all sorts of economic reasons
in many ways in which it would support the economy.
But I think that when the argument is framed
in terms of broad obligation to humanity and so forth,
it's understandable that there's some reluctance to accept that argument.
Today it was announced a three-month extension of the debt ceiling
virtually all economists think there should be no debt ceiling.
But that said, what's striking is Trump seems to be doing this with the Democrats.
Do you see a kind of shift in regime where Trump will try to govern as an independent
and possibly get nothing done, or do you think there will now be agreements with Democrats in Congress?
I'd be surprised if there was much where there could be agreements with Democrats.
I think the debt ceiling is in some ways, is more sui generis than it is a template for things to
come. I can't imagine, for example, on tax reform or on health care reform, there being some
coalitional arrangements of that kind. Now, you're active on Twitter now. I saw a tweet not long ago.
It read something like this. I'm going to sell all of my Ethereum and double down in VIX.
See you in hell. If you were tweeting back to that person, Ethereum and ICOs seem to be priced
very high. Vicks seems to be remarkably low for what at least two observers feels like a very
volatile period in our history, either nationally or globally. How do you think about those asset prices?
I don't know from where Ethereum, from where Ethereum is going. It makes me nervous
whenever I see an asset where I think most of the demanders are buying it in the anticipation of
selling it to somebody else at a higher price rather than buying it in the anticipation of some
use they'll put it to or some set of cash flows they'll receive. So I tend to be nervous
about cyber currencies. And I think in particular some of the more libertarian arguments that
are made in their favor, governments are going to debauch the regular currencies or this will
permit avoidance of excruciating regulation and the like, I'd be pretty skeptical of.
That said, I think blockchains are fundamental technology, and there will be winners to come
out of its use, and which cryptocurrency it will be. I don't know, but some of what's said
makes me uneasy. With respect to the VIX, first of all, it was up 30 percent yesterday,
whatever anomaly one saw is a lot less anomalous today.
Second, the VIX, people tend to underappreciate this.
The volatility of the market moves very much with the level of the market.
And the reason is that if a company has $100 of debt and $100 of equity,
and then the stock market goes up, it's sort of 50-50 levered.
But if the stock market goes up by $100, then it has $100 of,
debt and $200 of equity, and it's only one-third levered. So when the stock market goes up,
its volatility naturally goes down, and the stock market has gone way up over the last 10 months,
and that's a factor operating to make its volatility go significantly down. It's also the case
if you look at surprises, the magnitude of errors in the consensus estimates of
company profits or the consensus estimates of industrial production or what have you.
Numbers have been coming in close to consensus to an unusual degree over the last few months.
And I think all those things contribute to the relatively low level of the VIX.
But those are more in the way of post-explanations.
I wouldn't, if you had told me everything that was going on in the world and asked me to guess
where the VIX would be, I would expect it to have been a little higher than it is right now.
Today, Dennis Rodman offered to mediate between President Donald Trump and the leader of North
Korea, Kim Jong-un. Now, you wouldn't sell yourself as an expert on North Korea, but as an economist,
people who've negotiated with the North Korean swear they're rational. Is your instinct to apply
a rational actor model to try to understand what's going on there, or do you think it's
more like a version of behavioral economics where other ends are being pursued?
I don't think I can answer that.
I think what I'd say is my instinct is the rational actor model is probably right,
but that means I'm 80% sure that that's right.
And the consequence of getting it wrong could really be huge.
And so I sure want to pursue the rational actor model
in a way that's doing a lot of hedging against a set of possibilities
that there are behavioral aspects.
Okay.
It seems the Fed keeps...
That answer seemed a little evasive.
No, no, no, that's perfect.
The Fed seems to consistently come in under 2% for inflation.
Do you think this is just a systematic mistake?
You think it's a plan motivated by political economy concerns,
that there's a high political cost to being above to,
but a much lower cost to being below two.
Do you think the implications of the semi-liquidity trap
have not been fully digested yet?
Do you think it's a lag from an earlier error,
still percolating through the system?
How do you think about the failure to meet 2% in an environment where, of course, it seems
if we had inflation being a bit higher, it would not be a major cost?
I think the Fed has not fully grasped the reality of secular stagnation.
The reality of secular stagnation is that we've got a very high savings propensity and a very
low investment propensity.
And that means that the neutral real interest rate, the real interest rate that's consistent
with full employment,
is very low.
And that means that interest rates, which
would historically have been highly expansionary interest
rates, are not highly expansionary.
And the Fed has underestimated the extent
to which that's true.
And therefore, they've been disappointed
by how little inflation they've generated.
I think that's the primary explanation,
a sort of analytical misjudgment on their part
of the change in the neutral interest.
I think secondarily, the factors we were referring to a few moments ago, having to do with the reductions in workers' leverage and bargaining power, means that a degree of tightness at labor markets that would, in an earlier point, have set off a wage spiral, no longer sets off a wage spiral because of how nervous workers are.
And so the Phillips curve relationship has either broken down or shifted, and that the Fed has also underestimated that.
And then I think those are two aspects.
Then separate from those two aspects, I think the Fed is confused in what it's prepared to target.
It says that it has a 2% inflation target.
But if you have a 2% inflation target, and it is, as the Fed claims, symmetric,
that means you should be above 2% as often as you've been below 2%.
Well, we've been below 2% for nine years now,
and we're in the ninth year of an economic recovery,
and the unemployment rate is at 4.3%.
So if there was ever a time when you were going to be above 2%,
it would seem like now, assuming recovery continues for several more years,
would be that time.
And yet, not a single dot in the history of the FOMC
has ever been above 2%,
at least since the great financial crisis.
So I think there's a disconnect
between what they're prepared to forecast
and what they say is the nature of the 2% target.
If my instincts would be to be more genuine,
symmetrically about the 2% and more recognizing the current policy is not quite as expansionary
as they suppose, both of which would operate in the direction of caution with respect to monetary
tightening. If there's an ongoing demand shortfall, as is suggested by many secular stagnation
approaches, does that mean monopoly cannot be a major economic problem? Because that's from the
supply side and that the supply side constraint isn't really binding. If you think of there as being
multiple Lagrangians, forgive me for getting technical for a moment, but do you see what I'm saying?
That wouldn't have been the way I'd have thought about it, Tyler, but that might be, but what you're
saying might be right. I think I'd be inclined to say that if there's more monopoly, there's more
money going to monopoly firms where there's a low propensity to spend it, both because the
firms don't invest, and because the owners of the firms tend to be rich or endowments that have a low
propensity to spend. And so the greater monopoly power to the extent that it exists is one factor
operating to raise savings and reduce investment, which contributes to demand shortfalls and
secular stagnation. I also think that there's likely to be less than
entry and competition in markets that aren't growing rapidly than there is in markets that are
growing rapidly. So there's a sense in which less demand over time creates its own lack of supply.
Let me ask you a deliberately too naive question, and that is, don't wealthy people invest
almost all of their money, and thus why is that an aggregate demand shortfall?
Wealthy people don't put it all under their mattress. They put it all.
in financial assets of one kind or other. But when they put it all in financial assets of one
kind or another, they drive up the prices of those financial assets, which is driving down the
return on those assets, which is driving down the natural or neutral level of interest rates.
But in a Q-theory framework, won't that increase investment if the price of the stock market
goes up? It operates in the direction of raising investment, but if there are limits on how far
our interest rates can fall because safe interest rates can't fall much below zero, and other
interest rates have to hold spreads relative to safe interest rates. You may not be able to get
the system to equilibrate. Even if at a particular moment, the safe interest rates are above zero,
the awareness that at some future moment, when demand falls,
you will not be able to reduce interest rates sufficiently,
operates as a deterrent that holds asset prices and demand down.
What's the best framework for thinking about how the Federal Reserve's monetary policy decisions
affect emerging economies?
There's been work coming out of Princeton, Helen Ray.
How well do we understand this and what framework do you look to first on these questions?
I think we don't fully understand why there are so many places,
where the long-term interest rate is more responsive to what the central bank in Washington does
than what the central bank in their capital city does.
And I think that's an important puzzle that I don't think the economics profession fully understands at this point.
I don't know that we've got a framework that is in a profound sense better than
the Dornbush overshooting model for thinking about a range of exchange rate fluctuations.
If I think about the economy of Mexico, they have NAFTA, which I've always thought was a good idea,
they've done significant reforms, they have a much, much higher level of professionalism in their
government than they did several decades ago. But typically they grow in the range of two to two
and a half percent, and this to me is somewhat of a puzzle. What's your take on why Mexico hasn't
done better? I agree with you that.
it's a puzzle. And if you had described to me in 1995 after the 1996, after our bailout,
if you had said to me, this is going to be the quality of Mexican economic management,
this is going to be the kind of leadership that Mexico is going to have, how fast do you think
they'll grow? I would have expected more convergence with the United States.
than we've had. And I think in terms of understanding it, so I agree with you that it's a puzzle
and it's not what I would have expected. I think in terms of understanding it, I would highlight two things.
One is Mexico has still some very serious rule of law issues, some very serious security issues
associated with risks of becoming more like Columbia than it wants to be.
And I suspect those are larger issues than many outside Mexico appreciate.
I think that's one part of it.
I think the other part of it is a much broader phenomenon,
which is those who, in some ways I think Mexico's problem is the same problem
as Michigan's problem. We have this tremendous phenomenon of globalization, and there's some who are
able to seize the opportunity to produce and to build supply chains across many countries,
to sell their products into a global economy rather than into a domestic economy.
And there's some who, by being part of the global economy, like hundreds of millions of people in
China or India, are lifted to an entirely new level than they were before. But there's a group
in between those who are levering the global economy and those who are being pulled along by the
global economy, who can't really turn the global economy into an opportunity and don't really
want to compete with Chinese labor, who are a bit left behind and frustrated. And I think there would be
many in Latin America who would be in that group, including Mexico, and I think it's a very profound
social and economic problem. Speaking of puzzles, you mentioned China, we're still witnessing this
ongoing race between Chinese debt and Chinese nominal GDP, and I would say since maybe 2006,
at least I have been expecting some kind of discrete event to occur in China, where we all say,
uh-oh, now it's happened. It actually hasn't been the case. That to me is a puzzle, and after 11 years,
I wonder, what's going on? Can you imagine that we're finally at a frontier where you think
Chinese nominal GDP can outrace Chinese debt? Or do you think we still ought to expect some
discreet event? I think it's important to remember that a large part of Chinese debt is
explicitly or implicitly government guaranteed and that the fiscal capacity of the Chinese government
is very large, especially given rapid economic growth. And so I think,
the application of Western thinking that understates the extent to which the debts are really
internal government debts probably leads to more alarm about a sudden breakdown of Chinese
finances than is warranted.
So you could imagine a smooth glide into a lower growth path?
I could, I mean, yes, I could definitely imagine.
I could definitely imagine that.
and, you know, my best guess would be that Chinese growth will slow,
but I would not be confident that China will have an event like the Asian countries had in 1997.
It wouldn't amaze me if they did,
but I would not want to predict that within the next five years,
they will have an event of that kind,
simply because the government is standing behind so large a part of the economy.
Do you worry about the fact that so much is guaranteed that they're simply stacking on top?
And at some point you end up getting a lot of bad investment decisions.
You only need so many roads or so many high-speed rail lines.
And until they, at some margin, pull away those guarantees, they're just doubling down,
and the debts will get bigger, and provincial governments will fall,
and there'll be defaults on corporate bonds, and then they'll be in a very difficult situation?
Or do you think that moral hazard problem, they'll somehow keep on managing to maintain
with an acceptable levels? I think both are possible. Look, I think there's a very difficult question.
You know, you're a rapidly growing Asian country, and you decide to build an airport
somewhere where there aren't very many people. And you do that because it's going to be
cheap to build it now when there aren't a lot of people around, and it's important to establish
the land. And then 15 years later, if you've grown fast, you're a brilliant hero.
of masterful long-term planning.
And if you've grown slow,
you're an idiot who was building an airport
where nobody wanted to go.
And it's hard to know which is the case.
And so I think the Japanese probably
looked stupider than they really were
because they built-in anticipation of more growth
than they, in fact, were able to generate.
And I don't know quite what's going to happen
with respect to China.
You know, it's not unlike Dulles Airport.
Today, we think of Dulles Airport as a...
important strategic stroke that cemented and made possible a hugely vibrant technological economy
in northern Virginia. I'm old enough to remember in the late 70s or early 80s when it was a
generation after Dulles Airport was built and like it was a ridiculous idea built like a million
miles from anywhere and like why did we build that. And so I think it's very difficult to judge
some of these infrastructure investments
except in the very, very long run.
And even when you judge them in the very, very long run,
you can make a judgment exposed as to whether they were a good idea.
But even then, it's going to be even more difficult
to make a judgment about whether they were ex ante sensible
or ex ante not sensible.
If I think about Russia and its recent history,
I'm never sure if I should feel it's gone better
than we could have expected,
or if it's gone worse.
But if one redos that whole history,
and I'm not sure who is the relevant we here,
but what could have been done differently and better
with regard to Russia, again, with the we variable,
the choice variable, being a bit undefined here,
what do you think of as the lost opportunity in that regard,
or was there none?
Factually, if you had told any of us
who worked with President Clinton,
as he prepared for his first summit with Boris Yeltson,
in 1993, where the Russian economy, Russia's government, and Russian relations with the United States
were going to be in 2017, we would have been appalled.
Sure, but in 1988, you might have thought it was an okay deal.
Right.
So by the standards of what one was hoping for in the aftermath of the Berlin Wall falling
and the end of the Cold War, where the models would have been West Germany 24 years
after 1945.
It's 26 years after
1945, you'd have to say it's been a big
disappointment.
And I've thought a lot about that.
I think one big part
of it is 60
years of communism, not a
clear defeat.
It was just harder
to have it join the world
than it was to
repair Europe after the Second World War
and the structural reasons why it was more difficult were things we overestimated.
Second, I guess this may be the important point.
I think in retrospect, there was not enough respect shown to what once had been a proud nation
that didn't think of itself as having been defeated.
And that manifested itself in some of the efforts to push NATO over.
very far towards its borders that manifest itself in the way in which conditionality was applied
by the international financial, applied by the international financial institutions,
to some extent, by the G7 countries, including the United States.
I think there were probably errors in not providing enough funding quickly enough at the very beginning
at the moment of maximum malleability.
Those were errors probably primarily of the late Bush administration, but perhaps errors of our
administration as well at the beginning of 1993.
But I think in retrospect, my judgment would be that repairing Russia's economy was a much more difficult
challenge than we appreciated.
Two final questions.
My first one is about what I call the Larry Summers production function.
So you were successful at quite a young age.
But what I find striking after reviewing a lot of what you've done and a lot of talks you've
given is I find at your current age.
62, that when you answer questions on YouTube, in general, your answers are in some way better
or richer than they would have been five, ten years ago, and they were already obviously
quite good to have gotten you to where you are. So for people who are already famous and to some
extent well off, at the age margin of whatever to 62, for their answers still to be getting
better, this is what I find striking. You don't have to be modest here. But what is there in the
Larry Summers' production function that explains this.
Well, part of the answer, I think, is the goes back to the first question that you asked.
I've always tried to surround myself and be around extraordinarily able young people.
And they probably do learn some things from me, but I learn a lot from them,
both from things they say and know that I don't, and from the questions they ask, which keep me
on my toes. I think that's one answer. I think another answer, and by the way, I flattered that you
think it's true. I don't know if it's true. I don't know if it's true or not. One thing I've
always tried to define myself by, and sometimes it's been more successful than other times,
is opposition to complacency and not being satisfied with any institution, with myself or with anybody
and always thinking things can be better.
And that's sort of the attitude I have to myself as well.
So, you know, I'll be on a plane back tonight,
and I'll be thinking about the various questions you asked
and which questions I could have given better answers to.
And then I'll think about those answers.
And the next time I'm somewhere,
I'll give better answers or be better at discussing things
because I wasn't complacent or satisfied.
So those would probably be the answers I'd give.
Before Q&A, my final question,
this relates to a piece by your wife.
She's a professor at Harvard in the English department,
Elisa New.
And in a magazine called Tablet,
she has a piece on what she calls final acts,
namely wonderful things people do at the very end of their careers.
She focuses on Philip Roth and Harold Bloom.
and I would ask, can you think of a senior economist you have known or interacted with
where they truly ended their career on something wonderful as a sort of final act,
where you look at that and admire that and what would that be?
Let me first say.
You can cite relatives, by the way, if you want.
Let me just, let me say, I began by saying how much my wife admired you because of your book on food,
that will be as nothing compared to,
the fact that you had looked up her writings in preparation for this interview.
That's also not, that's my noncomplacency.
My, um, Ken Arrow was my uncle.
And, uh, he was a brilliant man who could talk with extraordinary intelligence on any subject,
who died this past March at the age of 94.
But six months before he died, he was the stalwart with the best attendance record at the
Mathematical Economics Institute that he had led for the previous 25 years in Jerusalem
and was, I'm told, as active as any participant and more sharply contributing than the vast majority.
And I think to be able to do that at the age of 93 with enthusiasm and zest is extraordinary and is a great example for me and for many others.
Larry Summers, thank you very much.
First question.
First of all, thank you so much for the great exchange.
The question is very simple.
U.S. economy, current growth, 2%.
Is this really the new normal,
which is to say that the post-war average of 3%
was an aberration?
Or are we going to find new ways
and what would be the new ways? That's the question.
To go back to 3%.
Mostly new normal because,
the labor force was growing much more rapidly because of the population dynamics,
because of immigration, and because of the tailwind from more women working through most of the post-war period,
then it's likely to be going forward. So productivity may accelerate a bit, but historical average growth
we're unlikely to see. Next question. The question is basically, are there two or three
really important issues that economists should be looking at in the world of the digital economy,
like the value of copyright that would, you think, need more attention.
So this is a homework assignment for economists looking for hot new topics.
I think there's a lot of work to be done on intellectual property.
It's marketing and the ways in which intellectual property is enforced.
I think there's a lot of work to be done on market structure in digital industries
and what constitutes increased competition and what constitutes measures that foreclose competition.
And I think there's a lot of work to be done on intangible infrastructures that promote exchange,
the blockchain being one example,
but I don't understand why there should still be
three-day financial settlements on anything
in the world of today's technology.
I've got a question about your paper with Natasha Serran.
So you talk about the decline in bank franchise value
and you're slightly critical of the regulatory stress test
for being over-reliant on regulatory measures of capital.
So my question is,
what would you redesign about the C-Car stress tests
if you had the chance?
I would put more emphasis on market values.
It's madness that in the fall, in the spring of 2008,
when the stock prices of all the banks was collapsing,
everybody was saying they were totally splendidly capitalized,
and all was well.
So I would put more reliance on market instruments.
I wouldn't allow the market to satisfy me that everything was okay,
because sometimes markets are wrong and they don't see problems.
But if markets were alarmed, I would tend to think I should be alarmed as well
and to build more of that apparatus.
I think the fact that the stress tests are saying that even if we have an event substantially
worse than the 2008 crisis, no bank will need to raise capital.
That says more to me about the stress tests than it does about the banks.
Following upon your remark that government should pursue policies that are in the interest of their current citizens,
Chinese merger law considers both the effect of a merger and acquisition on competition,
also considers the effect on the Chinese economy.
U.S. merger law was adopted prior to globalization.
Should we be considering things like effects on the economy?
employment and effects on the long-term competitive position of the U.S. economy when we approve
mergers. Probably we should pay some attention to measures of long-term economic health.
Employment gets me nervous because if you successfully do something that's much more, that is much
more efficient, the effect will be that you'll compete with somebody, and that may lead to reduced
employment, but I don't think we want to become France where job preservation is a central
goal relative to economic dynamism.
In the past few years, have your views on alternative targets for central banks evolved?
For example, two years ago you gave an interview to Politico, or you discussed in GDP
targeting.
I think secular stagnations is a sufficiently serious problem.
that the zero lower bound is sufficiently likely a constraint
when a next recession comes,
that I wouldn't be satisfied with the status quo.
Whether a higher inflation target,
some form of price-level targeting,
or some form of nominal GDP targeting is best,
is not something where I have a certain answer to.
Right now, I have an instinct towards nominal GDP targeting,
since I think it has the attractive attribute
that the slower the underlying rate of growth,
which would tend to point towards a more serious secular stagnation problem,
the higher the level of inflation that you're prepared to tolerate is.
So that would be my instinct at this point.
But if I had responsibility in this area,
I would feel a need to make much more study
before coming to a definitive conclusion.
If the Trump administration pulls us from NAFTA
or the Korean Free Trade,
agreement or both, how great do you see the risk of another depression?
Neither the extra trade caused by Korea or NAFTA is large enough relative to our $17 trillion
economy to mean that those direct impacts would cause a depression.
What the psychological effect of that would be on either of those actions on the global
trading system?
I think that's harder to say.
I cannot imagine a crazier strategy at this instant with what is going on on the Korean Peninsula
than for us to say to Korea, we don't have your back. We're fussing around about our trade deficit right now.
I cannot imagine a strategy better calculated to foster doubt, uncertainty among people who have here to forbore been our allies.
and so I think it would be a grave error.
But I think economists make a mistake,
most recently in the Brexit debate,
when they're quick to say that anything they think
constitutes a mistake will cause a depression.
And I wouldn't go that far with respect to this.
Thank you.
I'm a Washington correspondent of the Japanese opinion magazine, The Liberty.
And I remember clearly,
you had been clearly against the consumption tax hike by Prime Minister Abe,
and your warning has been proved right,
and you gave a grade incomplete to Abinomics, I think two years ago,
as far as I remember.
And Prime Minister Abe declared a couple of weeks ago
he would raise the consumption tax again from 8% to 8%.
So what do you think will happen after the consumption tax hike?
I think there's a huge tendency in Japan and in other countries
when you see the first shoots of spring
to declare that spring is here
and to take down the storm windows and put on the screens.
And I think it's usually a mistake.
And so I would, if I were in Japan,
I would defer increases in the consumption tax at this point.
My question will relate to federal and state,
funding on maintaining bridges and roads. Specifically, companies like Amazon use every road in the
nation. Warehouser uses roads to deliver logs, Kimberly Clark, to deliver diapers. So, assuming that
none of these pay 35% tax rate, how would you pursue getting corporate America to fund the maintenance of
our infrastructure bridge and roads?
I think we all need to,
we all use our roads and we all need to fund
our infrastructure.
And after all, corporations
aren't separate entities, they're creatures
of their shareholders.
I think there's a lot that can be done
to close corporate tax shelters
of many different kinds.
And I would look particularly at issues
relating to earnings, stripping,
and relating to transfer prices.
where profits that genuinely should be taxed in the United States are transferred to tax havens
as an alternative would be the first place I'd look.
If you were in charge of Her Majesty's Treasury in England, what would you do over the next few years
to help protect the pound?
I'm not sure that if I were head of Her Majesty's Tre-oh, I have to get a new accent, but
if I was, other than that, if I was head of Her Majesty's Treasury, I don't think I'd
define my objective in terms of the level of the pound.
I think I would define my objectives in terms of the level of the British economy.
And the first thing I would do is try to talk everybody out of Brexit,
which I think is a costly unforced error that will ultimately make the British people poorer and less influential in the world.
Second thing, that's the most important thing.
Second thing is if I had to stick with Brexit, I would try to preserve it.
as much common access to the European market as I could as a way of attracting investment.
And I guess the last thing I'd say is I would try to make, create an environment that was
relatively hospitable to business so I could encourage capital inflows, which would both spur
growth and create demand for pounds, which in terms of your question would help preserve the value
of the pound.
That's the end of our questions.
Thank you very much.
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